2014 Elections in Indonesia Final Report by Rumah Pemilu · 2014 Elections in Indonesia Final Report by Rumah Pemilu ... • Strengthen polling stationprocedures and training for

2014 Elections in IndonesiaFinal Report by Rumah Pemilu

www.rumahpemilu.orgDecember 2014

Comprehensive report of the 2014 Indonesian electoral cycle

December 2014

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i Executivesummaryii KeyRecommendationsiii Preface

1 PART I - Election preparation1 The2009election1 The2014electorallegalframework3 TherenewedKPU3 Partyregistration5 Thevoterlist

11 PART II - The legislative election11 Votereducation12 Understandingvotingprocedures12 Revisionstothevotinglist14 Electionmanagement15 Campaigningandmedia15 Civilsociety17 Securitysituation17 ElectionDay18 Logistics19 Votecounting20 The nokensystem21 Quickcounts21 Officialresultsandseatallocation22 Disputeresolution24 Thefinalresults

27 PART III - The presidential election27 Theelectorallegalframeworkandcandidateregistration27 Theroleofpoliticalpartiesandthecampaign28 Media28 Presidentialdebates29 Securityconcerns30 Out-of-countryvoting31 Electionday34 Presidentialquickcounts36 Electionadministration37 Theroleofcivilsociety38 Recapitulationofvotes40 Officialresults40 Disputeresolution

Table of Contents

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49 PART IV – Recommendations for future 49 elections49 Post-electionissues53 Lessonslearnedfrom2014andrecommendationsforfutureElections

57 List of Acronyms and References59 ListofAcronyms62 References

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Executive summaryIn2014,Indonesiasuccessfullyimplementeditslegislativeandpresidentialelectionsinaneffective,credible,andpeacefulmanner.Bydoingso, thecountry renewed its legislatureanddemocraticallychoseitsheadofstate.Whiletheelectoralcycleretainsmanyimperfections,itisaneventwithwhichthecountrycanbejustifiablyproudonly15yearsafteremergingfrommorethanthreedecadesofau-thoritarianrule.Theseelectoraleventswereaclearimprovementovertheflawed2009pollsandhavebuiltasolidfoundationforfutureelections.

With135millionvotescast,Indonesiaisnowhometotheworld’slargestone-dayelection,justaheadoftheUnitedStates.Thisvibrantandpromisingdemocracyhas,withits2014elections,takenadeci-sivestepforwardinitsprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.On22July,Indonesia’sGeneralElectionCommission(KomisiPemilihanUmum–KPU)declaredJoko“Jokowi”WidodothewinneroftheJuly9presidentialelection.Jokowireceived71millionoutof135million(53.15percent)validvotescastfora6.3percentmarginofvictoryoverhisopponent.1Histicket,withJusufKallaasthevicepresidentialcandidate,receivedamajorityin23of33provinces.Quickcountsfromeightcredibleandtrustedpoll-ingorganizationstrackedcloselywiththeofficialresult.Theresultwasalsoconfirmedbydatafromacrowd-sourcedresult-trackingwebsite-agroundbreakingcitizen’sinitiativethatcompileddatafrommillionspagesofpollingstationresultscertificatespostedonline.Thiscitizens’websitedatabolsteredthecredibilityoftheofficialresultandhighlightedtheimportanceofsuchnon-governmentaleffortsforensuringtransparencyandaccountability.TheConstitutionalCourt’scompleterejectionofallelec-tionchallengesbythePrabowo-Hattaticketon21Augustmadetheresultfinalandbinding.JokowiwassworninasIndonesia’sseventhpresidenton20October.

Thequalityofthe2014legislativeandpresidentialelectionswasdemonstrablymuchbetterthanpastevents.Anarcanedecentralizedvoterregisterwasconsolidatedintotheworld’s largestcentralized,computerizedvoterregistrationsystem,namedSIDALIH,whichdeliveredfarbetter lists than inthepast.ElectionDayorganizationsawfewsignificanttechnicalshortcomings,generallyallowingallIndo-nesianstofreelyexercisetheirrighttovote.Participationwashighwith75percentturnoutfortheleg-islativepollsand70percentforthepresidentialvote.Electionsunfoldedinacelebratoryenvironmentwithneighborhoodscomingtogetheratabouthalfamillion2pollingstations,conductingboththevoteandthecounttransparentlyinfrontofthecommunity.Notably,theprocesssawnegligibleviolence.

However,theseelectionswerenotwithouttheirflawsandsubstantialpossibilitiesforfutureimprove-mentsareevident.Thehotlycontestedpresidentialelectionsawseriouscampaignviolationsandtheintroductionofmuchmoresophisticatedcampaign techniques, suchasan increase invotebuying,openlynegativeattacks,andorganizedslander.Therewerenumerousanddiverseproceduralmistakesinthevote,countandtabulation.Althoughnoneofthesemistakessystemicallyaffectedtheresultonewayortheother,theycollectivelyhighlighttheneedfortighterproceduresandbettertrainingofthe4millionpollingstationofficialsaswellastheneedtoreplacethearcanemanualresultstabulationprocesswithamodernelectronicelectionresultsystemthatcanproduceofficialresultswithinseveraldays.Forlegislativeelectionstheelectoratewaited30daysfortheofficialresultsand13daysforthepresidentialelectionresults.

1 Jokowireceived71of133.5millionvalidvotes-135millionisthetotalvotescastincludinginvalidvotes.2 545,803pollingstationsforlegislativeand477,291pollingstationsforpresidentialelections.Thediscrepancyresults

fromconsolidationofupto500votersperpollingstationinlegislativeelectionstoupto800votersperpollingstationduringthepresidentialelection.

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Theelectoraldisputeresolutionprocessandthepossibilitytohavecomplaintsheardarefundamentalpartsofahealthydemocracy,andwiththeexceptionofoneminorscufflebetweenpoliceandsomePrabowo-Hatta supporters, it is a credit to Indonesia thatelectoraldisputeswere resolvedentirelywithintheboundsoftheappropriate institutions.Thecourthandeddownits4392-pageverdicton21August,findingnoevidenceofmassive,systematic,orstructuralproblemswiththeelection(a300pagesummaryoftheverdictwasreadinatelevisedcourtsession).Thiswasmirroredinsimilarver-dictsforthelegislativeelections.ThesewerelandmarkverdictsforIndonesiandemocracythathaveallowedforthecreationofanewandmaturetraditionofpresidentialtransitionbetweenincumbentandpresident-elect.Withpost-electionpollsshowingahighlevelofconfidenceamongvotersintheinstitutionsandtheresult,Indonesiansarelookingtowardsthefuturewithincreasedoptimism.Theworld’sfourth-largestcountryisbesetwithgreatchallenges;however,throughthe2014electioncycle,theIndonesianpublicelectedwithcertaintytheleaderstheyfeelbestsuitedtothechallengesahead.

Key RecommendationsOverall,theconductofthe2014electoralcyclehasbeenregardedasasuccess.However,roomforimprovementremainsinanumberofaspectsoftheelectioncycle.Inordertoaddresstheshortcom-ings,andcontinuealongapositivetrajectoryof improvement,anumberofrecommendationshaveemerged,including:

• MaintainandimprovetheSIDALIHsystem,whichhasbeensuccessfulinsignificantlyimprovingthequalityofthevoterlistcomparedtopreviouselections.

• Reform, strengthen,and consolidateelectoral framework, forexample,bypromulgatinganomnibuselectionlawwhichmergesseveralexistingelectorallegislationsintooneinordertostreamline regulations, remove inconsistencies, and improve theeaseof procedural imple-mentation.

• Implementacomputerizedresultmanagementsystem(e-recap)whichproducestransparentandcredibleelectionresultsatalllevelswithindaysaftertheElectionDay.E-recapshouldbedevelopedandimplementedtoreplacethearcane,slow,manualsystemcurrentlyinplace.

• ContinuetheprovisionoftransparencybythescanningofC1resultforms(resultformcom-pletedateachpollingstation)anduploadingthemtoKPU’swebsiteforpublicaccessandim-proveitsqualitybyestablishingclearregulationsforthistoensureitsconsistency.

• Strengthenpollingstationproceduresandtrainingforpollworkersonconductingthevotingusingthecurrentpaperballotsystem;andoptimizetheuseofthehighlytransparentandtrust-edmanualcountatpollingstationsinfrontofthelocalcommunity.Theuseofelectronicvotingmachines(EVMore-voting)woulddiscontinuethisgreattradition,thusshouldbeavoided.

• Improveperformanceofadhocelectionworkersinvariouslevelsbyimplementingopenre-cruitmenttorecruitthebestpersonnel,aswellasensureequalgenderrepresentation.Afteraperiodoftheirperformance,implementastreamlinedevaluationforallelectoralstaffandstoreevaluationresultsinacentralizeddatabasetoimprovefuturerecruitment.

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• Comprehensively reform the civil service and significantly improve the work ethic, perfor-mance,andcapacityofthehumanresourcesand,consequently,organizationalfunctionofthebureaucracyinvolvedinelectionmanagement.

• StreamlineIndonesia’selectoralcycleandcalendarbyorganizingelectionsintotwoseparateevents:onenationalelectionandoneregionalelection,heldtwo-and-a-halfyearapartfromoneanother.Theregionalelectionwouldincludeelectionsofgovernors,mayors,regents,andmembersoftheregional legislature(DPRD);whilethenationalelectionwouldincludeelec-tionsofthepresident/vice-presidentandthenationallegislatures(HouseofRepresentatives/DPRandthesenate/DPD).

• Establishawell-trainedandwell-resourcedspecializedelectoralcourttohandleandresolveelectiondisputesinatransparentandtrustedmannerwhichwillimprovetheelectoraldisputeresolutionprocesses.

• AddresstheprevalentpracticeofmoneypoliticsbystrengtheningoversightbyBawasluandimplementingastricterrequirementtoreportandauditcampaignincomeandcampaignex-penditures.PublicfinancingoftheelectioncanalsobeasolutionimplementedtominimizetheimpactofmoneyinIndonesianelections.

• Conduct stronger voter education and/or election evaluation efforts to minimize the highnumberofinvalidvotes.Thenumberofinvalidvotescastinthe2014LegislativeElectionwas14,601,436(around10percentofthetotalballotsused)whileforthe2014PresidentialElec-tionwas1,379,690(1.02percent).

• Addresstheincreasingconcernregardingwholesalevote-buyingperpetratedthroughthetra-ditionofproxyvotingbytribal leaders(forexample,thenokenpracticeinthePapuanhigh-lands). Such practices should end in order to protect voters’ fundamental right to vote aschampionedbythedemocraticstate.

PrefaceThispaperisnotafinalreportofasystematicElectionDayobservation.Itisbasedontwoinitialcom-mentarieswrittenimmediatelyafterthelegislativeandpresidentialelectionsinAprilandJuly2014,respectively.Thesedocumentsbroughttogetheropensourcematerialaswellasthe insightsofna-tionalandinternationalelectionexpertstocreateamorecompletetechnicalsummaryofkeyissuesofthiselectoralcycle.Whileitinvariablytouchesonmanypoliticalissues,thepaperisnotmeanttobeapoliticalanalysisoftheseelections,butratheramoretechnicaldocumenttoaiddiscussionoffuturereformoftheelectoralprocessinIndonesia.Thiscommentaryisprovidedasanon-paper.Recipientsarewelcometosharewithintheirorganization,tocopyorparaphrasetext,butnottoattributeordis-tributefurther.

PART I Election preparation

Source:www.beritadaerah.co.id

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PART I - Election preparation

The 2009 electionNationalelectionswereheldforthelegislaturein1999underIndonesia’soldconstitutionandthen,after a process of constitutional amendment,werecombinedwithdirectpresidentialelectionsin 2004 and 2009. The 2009 elections were re-garded as widely flawed, having fallen short ofimportantbasicstandardsofdemocraticelector-alperformance,andwereorganizedinanadhocmanner.Theaccessibilityandqualityoftheelec-toral process varied widely across the country.Adelayedandpoorlycrafted legal framework,alackofresourcesandadysfunctionalvoterregis-tryallcontributedtoasub-standardprocess.

The 2014 electoral legal frameworkThelegalframeworkgoverningdemocraticrepresentationinvolvesfivelawsandanumberofsubordi-nateregulations.Significantrevisionsweremadeforthiselectioncyclethataffectedtheelectoralandpoliticalenvironment,includingchangestoeligibilityrules,supervision,votingprocedures,andcounting.

Changestothelawhadtheimpactofdecreasingthenumberofpartiescontestingtheseelections.LawNo.8/2012governinglegislativeelectionsrequiredthateachpoliticalpartyundergoaregistrationandverificationprocesswiththeKPUtoruninagivenelection.In2009,therewere38nationalpoliticalpartiesontheballotandanadditionalsixAcehnesepoliticalpartiesthatcompetedinAcehonly.NinepoliticalpartieswonseatsintheDPR.Afterthe2009election,theseninepoliticalpartiesamendedtheelectorallawsandsetamuchhigherbarforregistering,competingandwinningseats.Thesebarriersarehighbyinternationalnorms.Apoliticalpartymusthavechaptersinall33provinces(permanentofficerequired),inatleast75percentofthe497regencies/municipalities(permanentofficerequired),andinatleast50percentofthe6,700sub-districts(permanentofficenotrequired).Forthe2014elec-tion,46politicalpartiesappliedforregistration,butaftertheKPUstrictlyappliedthesecriteriacreatedbythelegislatureonly12nationalpoliticalpartiesandthreeAcehneselocalpoliticalpartiesmadeitontotheballots.

ThethresholdtoobtainseatsintheDPR,DPRDProvinceandDPRDRegency/Municipality,wasraisedforthe2014electionsbyLawNo.8/2012from2.5percenttoanewlevelof3.5percent.ThenewthresholdwaschallengedintheConstitutionalCourtandupheldfortheallocationofseatsintheDPR,butwasabolishedforlegislaturesattheprovincialandregency/municipallevel.Thecourt’sdecisionshouldberegardedasapositivestepthatwillincreasetheinclusivenessoflocallegislaturesandre-ducethepotentialforpost-electionconflict.

Source:KPU-RI

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In2011,abodyuniquetoIndonesiawascreatedtodealwiththeethicaloversightofelectionman-agementbodiesbyLawNo.15/2011(onelectionmanagementbodies).TheHonoraryCouncilofElec-tionManagementBodies(DewanKehormatanPenyelenggaraPemilu–DKPP)isanational-levelethicscouncilestablishedtoreviewanddecideuponcomplaintsand/orreportsofallegedethicsviolationscommittedbymembersoftheKPUandBawaslu.TheDKPPevolvedintoanindependentbodyafterpoliticalpartiesfeltitsinstitutionalpredecessor,aninternalKPUdepartment,wasincapableofdealingfirmlyandindependentlywithethicsviolationsamongKPUcommissioners.

The DKPP has a forceful presence in the electoralenvironment. By 12 December 2014, the DKPP haddismissed 180 members of provincial and regency/municipallevelKPUandBawaslu3.Whileitcautionedmembersofthenational-levelKPUandBawaslu,noneweredismissed.UnderthechairmanshipofJimlyAs-shiddiqie, the foundingchief justiceof theConstitu-tionalCourt,thethreatofdismissalwasoftenpubliclywielded and this undermined the confidenceof theelectionmanagementbodiestotakeinitiative.Underthelaw,theDKPP’srulingsarefinalandbinding.However,oneofthedismissedofficialschallengedtheDKPP’sauthorityintheConstitutionalCourt.InMarch2014,thecourtruledthatofficialsdismissedasaresultofDKPP’srecommendationscanfileappealswiththeStateAdministrativeCourt(PTUN),whichcanissuefinalrulingsonindividualcases.

Therewereanumberof changes tovoting regulations thataltered theoperational conductof theelection.First,theKPUdecidedtoreturntopunchingballots(mencoblos),asmandatedbyLawNo.8/2012,ratherthanmarkingthepaperwithapen(mencontreng).Returningtotheoldsystemwasapositivemovethatseemstohavedecreasedtheextraordinarilyhighnumberofinvalidballotsseenin2009.Inlinewithinternationaltrends,theKPUissuedguidanceforthiselectiontoensurethatifavoter’sintentionwasclear,thenthevoteshouldbecounted.Therewasalsoalateinstructiontopoll-ingstationofficialstotryandrestricttheuseofmobiletelephoneswithcamerasinpollingboothsasapreventativemeasureagainstvote-buying.Theefficacyorimpactofthislastminutechangewasnotreadilyapparent.

Whilenotanactuallegalchange,thestrictapplicationoftheelectionlawbythecurrentKPUboost-edthenumberoffemalecandidatesinthiselection.Observersnotedthatthisyear,35-40percentofthecandidatesonpoliticalparties’ticketswerefemaleastheexistingprovisiondirectingthatatleasteverythirdcandidatewasfemalewasenforced.Byslightlyoverachievingthequota,politicalpartiesprovidedthemselvesabufferorasafeguardagainstwomenwithdrawingandinadvertentlydisqualifyingthewholeslate.ThereisahighlevelofsupportforwomenrunningforofficeinIndo-nesia,withtheDecember2013LSI-IFESsurveyreportingthat83percentofrespondentssupportedwomen servingas legislators.4 In the same survey,62percentofmenand60percentofwomensupportedthegenderquotaforpartylists.TheKPUinitiallydisqualifiedsomepoliticalparties’can-didatesinsomedistrictsbecausetheirlistslackedasufficientnumberoffemalecandidates–theywereallowedtoclearuptheirlistsandgetbackintherace.Atotalof97womenwereelectedto

3 GustiSawabi.18December2014.“IniDaerahPengaduanTerbanyakolehDKPP”.Tribun News. http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2014/12/18/ini-daerah-pengaduan-terbanyak-oleh-dkpp

4 LembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI)-IFESPre-electionsurveywith1890respondentsandmarginoferror±2.3%;Dec.2013

Source:KPU-RI

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theDPR,whichisslightlydownfrom103in2004.However,thisremainsclosetotheglobalandtheregionalaverageandhasbeenachievedwithouttheuseofreservedseats–femalecandidateswontheirseatsinopencompetition.

Duringthisnationalelectioncyclenoken votingwasonceagainusedinPapua.Whilethisproxy/com-munityvoting(inwhichacommunityleadercastsallvotesonbehalfofthecommunity)violatesmanyelectoralprinciples,theConstitutionalCourtuphelditsvalidityinthreedecisionsbetween2009and20125quotingtheneedtorespectandpreservetherightsofcommunitiestoupholdtraditions.Thenoken systemisdiscussedingreaterdetailbelow.

The renewed KPUAstrongersetofKPUcommissionerschargedwithimplementingtheelectionseemtohavenoticeablyimprovedelectionadministrationin2014.Collectively,themembersofthe2012-2017commissionhadextensiveexperienceinadministeringelectionsattheprovinciallevelaswellaswithelectoralreformduringthereformasi period.

Party registrationDuringthe2009election,Indonesianvotersenjoyeda multitude of choice with parties representing arange of agendas and objectives.While the abilityofpartiesandcandidatestospeakfreely,distributeliterature and campaign remainedundiminished in2014, changes to the election laws for this year’selections shrank the number of parties eligible tocompetefrom38to12.

Thepoliticalpartyregistrationprocessisoneofthemostcrucialaspectsinanelectioncycle,asitdeter-minespoliticalparties’faithinthenextstepofelections.TheprocessattheKPUwasmarkedbyinsti-tutionalcompetitionforlegaljurisdictionamongEMBs,aswellaslegalbattlesbetweenpoliticalpartiesandtheKPUontheoutcomeof theprocess.However, thewillingnessonthepartofbothpoliticalpartiesandEMBstoutilizeavailablelegalavenuesinsettlingelectoraldisputesandtohonorcourtde-cisionsinthosedisputeswasapositivedevelopmentanddisplayedahighdegreeofpoliticalmaturity.

InMay2012,LawNo.8/2012onlegislativeelectionswasenacted.Article8(1)allowedpoliticalpartiesthatstoodinthepreviouselection(2009)andreceivedmorethan2.5percentofthevotetoautomati-callybedeclaredeligibletostandinthe2014election.Morethan17partiesfiledforajudicialreviewofthelawattheMK.InAugust,theMKannulledtheprovisionandrequiredallpoliticalpartiestoundergoverificationattheKPU.InSeptember2012,theKPUannouncedthat34outof46politicalpartiesthathadregisteredhadpassedtheadministrativeverificationprocessandwouldenterthesecondphaseoftheprocess,whichinvolvedafactualverificationofmembershipandotherlegalrequirements.InOctober,theKPUannouncedthatonly16outof34politicalparties,includingPKPIandPBB,hadpassedthesecondphaseandwerefullyeligibletocompeteintheelection.

5 ConstitutionalCourtRuling(CCR)Number47/81/PHPU.A/VII/2009,CCRNumber19/PHPU.D-IX/2011,CCRNumber3/PHPU.D-X/2012

Source:KPU-RI

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Frustratedbytheoutcome,anumberofpartiesthathadbeendeclaredineligiblefiledcomplaintswithBawasluandtheDKPP,allegingtheKPUhaddeviatedfromthecodeofconductduringtheverificationprocess.Uponreview,theDKPPorderedtheKPUtoconductafactualverificationofthe18partiesthathadbeeneliminatedintheadministrativephaseofregistration.Followingtheconclusionofthefactualverificationprocess,theKPUfound10nationalparties(excludingPKPIandPBB)andthreeregionalpartiesinAcehwereeligibletocompeteintheelection.

InJanuary2013,partiesseekingtheirwayontotheballotadopt-edtwodifferentstrategiestoappealtheKPU’sruling.PKPIand14otherpartieschallengedtheKPU’sdecisionthroughBawas-lu,whilePBBlodgedanappealattheDKIJakartaAdministrativeHighCourt (PTTUN).Bawasluoverturned theKPU’sfinding inthecaseofPKPIandorderedKPUtoincludePKPIasaneligibleparty.However,theKPUrejectedBawaslu’sauthorityto issueafinalandbindingrulingonthematterandheldwithitspreviousfindingthatPKPIwasineligible.Inresponse,PKPIaskedtheSupremeCourt(MA)tosettlethedebateoverBawaslu’slegaljurisdiction,whilethe14otherpartieschangedtacticsandlodgedanappealattheDKIJakartaPTTUN.InaFebru-aryruling,thePTTUNoverturnedKPU’sfindingandorderedtheKPUtoincludePBBasaneligiblepartytocontestthe2014elections.However,the14otherpartieswereunsuccessfulintheirappeal.

InresponsetoPKPI’sappeal,theMAsidedwiththeKPUinfindingthatBawaslu’sdecisiononthere-sultsofthepoliticalpartyregistrationprocesswasnotfinalandbinding.PKPI,lookingtoPBB’ssuccess,thenlodgedanappealatthePTTUNtochallengetheKPU’sdecision.InMarch2013,thePTTUNruledthatPKPIwaseligibletocontestthe2014election.Ratherthanprolongtheprocesswithadditionalap-peals,theKPUacceptedtheruling,andclosedtheregistrationprocess.Intotal,12nationalandthreeregionalpoliticalpartieswereofficiallyregisteredandeligibletocompeteintheelection.

ThelawsconstrictthechoiceofIndonesianvotersandentrenchthepositionofthepartiesalreadyintheDPR.Whenthetoughregistrationrestrictionsarecombinedwiththehigherthreshold,thepositionofthemajorpartiesisreinforcedandsmallpartiesfindithardtocompete.PBBandPKPIwereaddedtothelistofregisteredpartiesafterwinninganappealattheStateAdministrativeCourttooverturntheKPU’sinitialrulingthatbothpartieshadfailedtomeeteligibilitycriteria.Despitethislegalvictory,theystruggledtobecompetitiveattheballotboxandneitherpartywonanyseatsinthenationallegislature.

“Moneypolitics”isaphraseusedinIndonesiatodescribeanumberofdifferentproblemsafflictingIn-donesia’spoliticalsystemincludingvote-buyingandelectoralfraud.TheDecember2013LSI-IFESsurveyreportedthat84percentofrespondentssaidtheyhadverylittleexperiencewithvote-buying.6Mediareportsclosertotheelectionhighlightedthepractice,includingreportsofcandidateshandingoutmoneyandhouseholdcommoditiesatrallies.Domesticobserverreportsfrom9AprilnotedthepracticewasnotuncommononElectionDay,withvotesbeingboughtforbetweenIDR10,000andIDR200,000(aboutUSD1toUSD20).Othersourcessaidinfluentialcommunityleaderswerepaidbypartiestogetoutthevoteontheirbehalfatparticularpollingstationsandpaidaccordingtothenumberofvotescast.

6 Ibid.

Partyregistration.Source:KPU-RI

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Qualitativevoterattituderesearchinrecentyearshasshownthatevenifvoterstakemoneyorgiftsitdoesnotnecessarilyinfluencetheirchoice,andrichcandidatesdonotalwayswininIndonesia.Whilethe2009movetoanopen-listsystemreducedincentivesamongcandidatestobribetheirwaytothetopofthelist,analystsfearthattheopen-listsystemcreatesthepossibilityforelectoralfraudamongcandidatesfromthesameparty,throughthetransferofvotesfromonecandidatetoanother.Thesetransfersarefacilitatedbycorruptlocalelectionofficials.Somearguewomencandidatesareespeciallyvulnerabletosuchtacticsastheyoftenlackcampaignresources,politicalexperience,andinfluenceinpartystructurescomparedtotheirmalecounterparts.Vote-buyingemergedasthemostdominantflawofthiselectioncycle–onewhichwillrequiresignificantinterventioniftheintegrityofthesystemistobeprotected.

Campaignfinancereformisneededinthelongtermtobreakthedependenceofpartiesonrichbusi-nesspeopletogetelected,andtoreducerent-seekingbehavioronceinofficetofundpartynetworksandcampaigns.Whilepoliticallyunpopular,astrongersystemofpublicfinancingofpartieshasbeenfloatedbysomeaswaytonotonlyaddresstheissueofmoneypoliticsbuttodecreasethehighcostof running foroffice.Withpoliticalparties regardedasbeingamong themost corrupt institutions,financingcampaignsfromthestatebudgetisunlikelytoreceivestrongpublicsupport.Intermediatecampaignfinancereformcouldinvolvereinforcingtheexistingsystembystrengtheningreportingre-quirementsandenforcementbyelectionsupervisorybodies.Shifting the focus from fundraising toactual campaignexpenditureswouldbean important step forward, ifparties’ reportswerecloselyexamined,auditedagainsttheiractualactivities,andsubjecttostiffsanctionsforviolations.

The voter listThedevelopmentofthenationalvoterlistforthe2014electionwasasuccessstoryworthhighlighting.Thislisthasprovednotonlytobefunctionalforconductingthelegislativeandpresidentialelections,buttherewerealsonoseriouschallengestoitsintegrityorpost-electioncontroversies.Itwasastrongindicatorofimprovedelectionmanagementin2014.

ThelistdevelopedbytheKPUforthe2009electionturnedouttobesoflawedthatitwaslargelyaban-donedwhenitcametimetopreparethevoterregistryforthe2014polls.The2009listwasaprimaryexampleusedbymanytoshowhowthatelectionwaspoorlymanaged:Itwaspreparedlate,andreliedonunmanageableandinaccuratecivilregistrationdatafromtheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MoHA).Bylaw,theKPUwascompelledtobasethevoterlistonthisofficialpopulationdata.

In2013,theKPUwasmandatedbylawtodevelopthevoterlistbasedonthesamesub-standardMoHApopulationdata,butitwasalsoallowedtouseothersourcessuchasthevoterlistsestablishedduringpost-2009localelectionsasacrossreference.TheKPU’sfirstachievementwastosuccessfullycomput-erizeoftheproductionofthelist.TheIndonesianvoterlisthasgonefromamanualdecentralizedanddisorganizedvoterlisttoasingle,centrallylocated,securelystoredandshareddatabasethatprovidestheKPUwithnationwidecapacitytotrulymanagethedataandfundamentallyimprovethequalityofthevoterlist.TheVoterDataInformationSystem(Sistem Informasi Data Pemilih–SIDALIH)isnowtheworld’slargestnationalcentralizedvoterregistrationsystem.Furthermore,theSIDALIHsystemisbuiltonanopen-sourcearchitectureandisexceptionallycosteffective,havingcostafewmilliondollarsasop-posedtothehundredsofmillionsofdollarsspentonothercountry’sregistrationsystems.Asidefromtheinformationtechnologyinfrastructure,italsodetermineswhichvoterregistrationdatawillbecollected,verified,sharedandusedforvoterliststhroughoutIndonesiaonElectionDay.Importantly,SIDALIHhas

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notonlycreatedamoreaccuratelistthaninpreviouselections,butitalsoprovidesthetoolstocontinu-ouslyidentifyproblemsandfixthem.

TheKPUfacedmanychallengesduringtheimplemen-tationofSIDALIH.Partlythesechallengeswereduetointernalresourceandleadershipissues,andpartlytheywereduetothequalityofthepopulationdatareceivedfromMoHA.WhiletheSIDALIHsystemitselfperformedasexpected,thequalityoftheKPUdoor-to-doordatacollectionandofdataentryitselfwasflawed.Whileitwasofmuchhigherqualitythan2009,thelistwasnotperfect and there remains room for further improve-ment.WhenthenewcivilregistryisfullyfunctionalandelectronicIDcards(E-KTP)7universal,SIDALIHwillgivetheKPUanditsregionalofficestheabilitytoprogressivelyproduceavoterregistryofincreasingquality.Ifthedataisprotectedandproperlymaintained,therewillnolongerbeaneedfortheKPUtoreinventthelistforfutureelectionsforeachnationalorregionalelectioncycle.

Aheadofthelegislativecampaignperiod,somepoliticalpartiescriticizedthevoterlist,allegingthatmanyvalidvotersweremissing,andthatthelistcontaineddead,duplicate,orfictionalvoters.Theinitiallistdidhavemanyinaccuracies,notasaresultofwidespreadfraud,butduetothepoorqualityofMoHAinforma-tionorinaccuratedataentry.Havingabetterlistandmakingitpubliclyavailableattractedmorescrutinyfromtheparties’andcitizens.This,inturn,identifiedmoreproblems,butthiswastheintentionandpartofanaturalprocessofimprovingthelistaheadoftheelection.ThroughtheSIDALIHsystem,theKPUwasabletopurgesome17millionduplicatenames,1.7milliondeceasedvoters,andfix60millionmissingnationalIDnumbers.UnderinstructionsfromBawaslu,thisprocesscontinueduntiltwoweeksaheadofElectionDay.

InkeepingwithLawNo.8/2012,whichrequiresthateveryeligiblevoterbelistedregardingher/hisadministrativestatus(withorwithoutKTP),theKPUworkedtoaccommodateeligiblevoterswhowerenotincludedinthefixedvoterlist(Daftar Pemilih Tetap)inadditionallists,includingthespecialvoterlist(Daftar Pemilih Khusus)andthespecialadditionalvoterlist(Daftar Pemilih Khusus Tambahan).Forthesamereason,theKPUalsocreatedanadditionalvoterlist(Daftar Pemilih Tambahan)forvoterswhointendedtovoteatapollingstationotherthantheonetowhichtheywereofficiallyassigned.

7 Atthetimeofwritingofthisreport,December2014,thee-KTPsystemhasbeenplacedonholdbyMOHAduetonu-merousproceduralproblems.

Source:KPU-RI

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VOTER LIST

NUMBEROFREGISTEREDVOTERS

NUMBEROFPEOPLEWHO

VOTED

%OFVOTERSWHOVOTED

DPS(DaftarPemilihSementara)

180,719,854

DPT(DaftarPemilihTetap)

188,268,987 130,831,174 69.5%

DPTB(DaftarPemilihTambahan)

473,416 438,972 93%

DPK(DaftarPemilihKhusus)

240,913 128,370 53%

DPKTB(DaftarPemilihKhususTambahan)

2,859,296 2,848,860 99.6%

FiguresbasedonKPUFormModelDCPPWP,recapitulationresult:http://www.kpu.go.id/

koleksigambar/DD1_Pilpres_2014.pdf

Source:IFES

PART II The legislative election

Source:IFES

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PART II - The legislative election

Voter educationForvoterstoproperlyexercisetheirrights, theyneedtobe well-informed about electoral rules and procedures.The national survey conducted by LSI-IFES in December2013, raised a number of concerns that pointed to theelectoratebeingpoorly informed. Itwaspositive in thatlikeothersurveys,LSI-IFESrecordedvoterenthusiasmtobehighwith90percentofrespondentssayingtheywereverylikelytovote.Atthatpoint,fourmonthsaheadoftheelection, justunderhalfof respondents (46percent)didnotknowwhentheelectionwouldbeheld.However,thatinformationwasclearlyconveyedtothecommunityastheevent approached.ByMarch,with theofficial campaignperiod under way, the Indikator Politik Indonesia polltrackedthosewhosaidtheywerecertaintovoteat76percent,whichmeasuredcloselytotheactualturnoutof75percent.Globally,thisisarespectableoutcome.

TheKPUremainedtheprimaryorganizationthatinformedIndonesiansabouthowtovote,withnearlyhalfofallrespondentsstatingtheyhadbeenmadeawareoftheJulypresidentialelectionbyinforma-tionfromtheKPU(47percent),followedbypartyandcandidatematerials(22percent)andthenewsmedia(20percent)8.TheKPUwasmorelikelytobementionedinruralareasthanurbanareas,whilenewsmediawasmorelikelytobementionedinurbanareas.

Thecommissionanditslocalstaffwerestillthemostimportantinde-liveringkeymessagesaboutwhenandhowtovote,butnationalad-vertisingcampaignsplayedapart.Thesamesurveyreportedthat46percent of respondents saw television advertisementswith a ballotboxasamascot,58percentsawpostersorpamphletswiththephrase'Ayo Memilih' (Let’sVote),44percentsaworheardmessageswiththephrase'Pilih, Coblos, Celup' (Select,CastandDip)informingvotershowtocasttheirballot,and45percentsawmessageswiththephrase'Pilih Yang Jujur' (VoteforTheHonest)encouragingvoterstovoteforcleancandidates9.Mostimportantweretheone-on-oneinteractionsoflocalelectionorganizingcommittees.Ninety-onepercentofIndonesiansre-spondedthattheyreceivedanotificationletterabouttheelectionattheirhome.Sixpercentsaidtheydidnot.

Despite thegenerallypositiveevaluationsof theelectionprocessandelectionmanagementbodies/officials fortheApril9election, Indone-

8 LembagaSurvei Indonesia (LSI)-IFES PostLegislativeElectionNationalSurveywith2009respondentsandmarginoferror±2.2%,June2014

9 Ibid

“Let’sVote”.Source:KPU-RI

“Everyonehasavoice”.Source:KPU-RI

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sians identifiedseveralareasasneedingsomeimprovementforfutureelectioncycles.Whenaskedtonamethemost important issuetheKPUshouldaddressforthenextelectioncycle,themostof-ten-citedissueswerevoterinformationonvotingprocedures(24percent),voterregistrationprocess(15percent),impartialityofresultsfromthepollingstation(9percent),adequacyofpollingfacilities(8percent),competenceofthepollingstationstaff(6percent),andinformationonwhenandwheretovote(5percent).10

Understanding voting proceduresSomevotingregulationsstillneededtobebetterexplained,includingproceduresforcitizenswhowerenotlistedonthepermanentvoterlistataparticularpollingstation.Thesurveyconductedbetweenthetwoelectionsreportedthatmost Indonesianswereunawarethattheycouldvoteatapollingstationotherthantheoneatwhichtheywereregistered,providedtheybroughtaletterexplainingthattheyhadmovedfromtheiroriginaladdress.Only38percentwereawareofthisprovisionandtheirabilitytobeaddedtotheAdditionalVoterList(DPTb)oftheirclosestpollingstation.11CitizenswhofulfilledtherequirementsbutwhowerenotlistedonthePermanentVoterList(DPT)couldbeaddedtoaSpecialVoterList(DPK).

TheKPUcreatedspecialprocedurestominimizedisenfranchisementofvoters.ThisincludedtheAd-ditionalSpecialVotersList(DPKTb).Thewidespreaduseofsuchproceduressuggeststhatthepublicwasawareofthem.Inthefinalhourofvoting,thosenotontheDPT,DPTb,ortheDPKwereeligibleforinclusionintheDPKTbandtocasttheirvote.Informalfiguresfromthepresidentialelectionsuggestthatmanypeopledidmakeuseoftheseoptions.Whilemorethan134millionvoterscastballots,itisestimatedthatmorethan400,000didsoviatheDPTb,135,000usingtheDPK,andmorethan2.9millionusingtheDPKTblist12.Whileimperfectandpossiblysubjecttosomeabuse,thesemechanismsappeartohaveenfranchisedabout3.5millioncitizens.Furtheranalysiswouldbehelpfultodetermineif theseprocedureswereoverused in someareas,whichmay revealvoter fraud.However, todatethereisnoevidencethatthosevotingviatheDPKTbfavoredonecandidateortheother,orthatasinglevoterwasabletocastmultipleballots.GiventhecriticismthattheKPUdisenfranchisedmanyvotersin2009,theseprocedureswereagenuineefforttoofferanopportunitytovoteforcitizenswhohadnotyetregistered,recentlybecomeeligible,recentlymoved,orwereawayfromhomeatelectiontime.

Revisions to the voting listSincethelegislativeelection,theKPUworkedcontinuouslytoimprovethequalityoftheFinalVoterList(DPT).Buildingoneffortsintheprevious14monthsofpreparationforthelegislativeelection,theKPUmobilized itsworkforceandcapitalizedon itsVoterData InformationSystem(Sistem Informasi Data Pemilih–SIDALIH). It isnowtheworld’s largestnationalcentralizedvoterregistrationsystem.SinceApril,officialsincorporatedmillionsofupdatesfromtheMinistryofHomeAffairsandfromKPUfieldstafftorefinethevoterlistandensureitwasaccurate,completeandup-to-date.TheDPTgrewfrom187,852,992votersforthelegislativeelectionsto190,307,134 forthepresidentialelection–anincreaseof2,454,142voters.

10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 134,953,967voterscastballots(domesticandoverseas);446,575usedDPTb;135,494DPK;2,910,323DPKTb(source:

http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_Final_2014_07_22.pdf)

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Anaccuratevoterlistisessentialtoensurethatvoterscanexercisetheirrighttovote,bothbyestab-lishingeligibilitybutalsobyservingasafoundationforElectionDayoperations.Theorderlyconductinpollingstations,aswasthecaseduringlegislativeelections,indicatedthattheKPUsucceededinestab-lishinganaccuratevoterlist.On13June,BawasluchairmanMuhammadsaidtheDPTupdateprocessconductedbytheKPUhadbeenoptimal.HerequestedthepresidentialcandidatepairsnottodisputetheDPTafteritsestablishment.ThisstatementindicatedthattheKPUhaddoneeverythingpossibletobuildonitsrecentsuccess.

TheDPTalsodidnotfeatureprominentlyincomplaintsmadebypartiesorcandidatestotheConsti-tutionalCourt(MK)afterthelegislativeelections.Aheadofthepoll,somepartiessuchasPDI-PandGerindramadedetailedpresentationsabouthowtheywereconcernedaboutthelist’squalityandindi-catedtheywouldlaunchlegalchallengesiftheproblemstheyhadidentifiedwerenotaddressed.Intheabsenceofsuchcontroversyinthepost-electionenvironment,thedevelopmentofthenationalvoterlistforthe2014electionsisasuccessstoryworthhighlighting.Thislistprovednotonlytobefunctionalforconductingbothelections,butit isalsoagoodfoundationonwhichtocontinuetoimprovethevoterregistrationprocessforfuturelocalpollsandthenationalelectionsin2019.

Theelectorate’sknowledgeabouthowtovotewasanimportantissuein2014giventhelargenumberofinvalidvotesin2009.Inthoselegislativeelections,invalidvotestotaledanextraordinarilyhigh14.4percent.Thiswasblamedonthedecisiontodepartfromthedecade’soldpracticeofpunchingtheballot(mencoblos)andvoterswereinsteadaskedtoexpresstheirpreferencebymarkingtheballotpaperwithapen(mencontreng).In2014,theKPUrevertedtotheoldmethod,whichwasaneasyonetocommuni-catetopublicundertheslogan“mencoblos lagi”orpunchingagain.InDecember2013,almostathird(32percent)ofLSI-IFESsurveyrespondentsdidnotknowhowtoproperlymarkaballotpaper.

Measurednationally,invalidvotesinthe2014legislativeelectionswereat10.77percent,lowerthan2009buthigherthaninternationalcomparisonssuggesttheyshouldbe.Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhepercentageof invalidvoteswas lowest for local legislaturesandhighest for thenationalupperhouse(DPD).InonenationallegislativedistrictinBantenprovince,invalidvotessoaredto22percent.TheunusualvariationinBantendemandsitsownaudittobetterunderstandthenatureofthislocalizedproblem,butthereasonsforinvalidvotingdeservesgreaterscrutiny.Duetoelectionregulationsre-searchersarenotabletogainaccesstothevotescasttoascertainthetruenatureofthehighervoting.Instead,theInstituteforSocialandEconomicResearch,EducationandInformation(LP3ES)interviewedelectoral stakeholders, including KPU commissioners and regional electionorganizers, in regencies,municipalitiesandindividualpollingstationsthatreportedahighpercentageofinvalidballotsinordertobetterunderstandreasonsbehindtheinvalidity.In-depthinterviewswouldbeconductedwithKPUCommissionersandregionalelectionorganizersattheregency/municipalitydowntothepollingsta-tionlevel.Basedontheresultsoftheseinterviews,LP3ESdeterminedthatinvalidvoteswereinmostcasescausedbyvoterbehavior.Voterscausedinvalidvoteswhentheydidnotknoworpreferanyofthelegislativecandidates,whentheypreferredapoliticalpartybutacandidatefromanotherparty,whentheyfeltobligedtovoteforeverycandidatethathasprovidedthemwithmoneyorgiftsduringthecampaign,orwhentheydidnotknowhowtovoteproperly.

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Election managementIndonesianpollingofficialshavethebasicexperiencerequiredtoconductanelection.Betweennation-al-levelpolls,mostIndonesianpollingstaffhavecompetentlyconductedlocalelectionsforregionalheadssuchgovernor,bupati,andmayor.Inoften-difficultconditionsincrowdedurbanareasorremotevillages,thereisawell-establishedsenseofhowapollingstationshouldbesetupandtheelectionconducted.Thisconfidenceamongpollofficialsthattheyknowwhataredoing,however,masksasystemicproblemthattheyoftenoperatetheirpollingstationsatoddswithimportantelectoralprocedures.WithweakdirectionfromthenationalKPU,poorlocalsupervision,nocascadetrainingandinadequatepollworkereducationmaterials,pollingstationsareruninaninconsistentmanneracrossthecountry.EvenpollingstationslocatedonlymetersfromeachotherincrowdedurbanareascanapplykeyproceduressuchascheckingvoterIDorinkingandcheckingthefingersofthosewhohavevotedinaninconsistentway.Inonepollingstation,voterlistsareproperlydisplayed,whileinanother,anofficialwillreportthatapublicdisplayofthevoterlistisnotallowed.

Whenvoterswereaskedinapost-legislativeelectionLSI-IFESsurveytocomparetheorganizationofthe2014electionwiththe2009election,aslightmajority(52percent)saidthatbothelectionshadthesameleveloforganization,while31percentsaythatthe2014electionswerebetterorganizedand12percentsaidtheywereworseorganizedthanthe2009elections.Respondentsineachpartofthecountryweresignificantlymorelikelytosaythatthe2014electionswerebetterratherthanworseorganizedcomparedtothe2009elections.13

AddressingtheissueofinconsistentpollworkerperformancecannotbeseparatedfromtheweaknessesinherentintheKPUitself,which,likemostIndonesiangovernmentinstitutions,hasproblemswithpoorperformanceduetolackofcapacity,corruption,andtheabsenceofmerit-basedappointments.Officialsseekingalternativesourcesofincomespendadisproportionateamountoftimefocusedonunnecessaryprocurementaswellasactivitiessuchasself-organizedout-of-townseminarsthatprovideadditionalperdiems.Thereisalsoanimbalancebetweentheappointedcommissionerswhoservefive-yeartermsandpermanentstaffwhospendlongperiodsoftheircareersintheinstitution.Duringthelifeofthecurrentcommission,thisimbalancemanifesteditselfincountlessbureaucraticbattlesandtensionbetweenthecommissionersandsecretariat.

TheappointmentprocessfortheKPUcommissionersatalllevelsdoesnotprioritizerelevantworkexpe-rienceandoftenleadstoweakappointees.Theimbalancebetweenthepermanentbureaucracy,whichisoftenresistanttochange,andpotentiallyreformistcommissionersisexacerbatedbytheconcurrentre-placementofallcommissionerseveryfiveyears.Thisresetstheinstitutioneveryfiveyearsandplacesnewcommissionersonasteeplearningcurve,oftenatacrucialpointintheelectioncyclewhentheKPUshouldbepreparingforthenextelection.Nationalandinternationalelectionexpertshaverepeatedlyrecommend-edastaggeringofcommissioners’termstoallowtheretentionofinstitutionalknowledgeandexperienceatthehighestleveloftheinstitution.GiventhatitisestimatedthatIndonesiamayspendwellinexcessof$1billion14onitsfive-yearlynationalelectioncycle,thereismoregenerallyacasetobemadeforthecre-ationofamorepermanentgroupofelectionadministrators,appointedonmerit,andmademoredirectlyaccountablefortheconductoftheelections.ThisprofessionalgroupofelectionsmanagersshouldbemaderesponsibleforimprovingthequalityoftheelectionbureaucracyatalllevelsinIndonesia.

13 LembagaSurvei Indonesia (LSI)-IFESPostLegislativeElectionNationalSurveywith2009respondentsandmarginoferror±2.2%,June2014

14 APBNallocated14.4trillionrupiahtoKPUfor2014election

15

Campaigning and mediaVoter surveysconductedbyLSI-IFES,TAF,and IRIhaveconsistently shown that television is themostimportantmediumforcommunicatingwithIndonesianvoters.InDecember2013,65percentofrespon-dentstotheLSI-IFESsurveysaidtelevisionwastheleadingsourceofinformationonelectionsaheadoffriendsandfamily(17percent)aswellaslocalofficialssuchastheneighborhoodchiefs(16percent)andvillageheads(12percent).DespitethefocusontherolesocialmediaplaysinIndonesia’sgrowingmiddleclass,thecountryisstillsubjecttoadeepdigitaldivideandinternetaccessremainslimitedoutsideurbanmetropolitanareasandamongthemajorityofthepopulation.TheLSI-IFESpollfoundthatonlyfourper-centofrespondentsregardedtheInternetasaleadingsourceofelectoralinformation.15

WhileIndonesiaishometoafreeanddynamicmassmedia,thecloseconnectionbetweentelevisionnet-workownershipandthoseaspiringtohighpoliticalofficeisregardedbysomeanalyststobeacauseforconcern.Ithasledtoquestionsabouttheneutralityofnewsreportingaswellasthereliabilityofopinionpollingandquickcounts.WhilenolongerdirectlycontrolledbyGolkar’sAburizalBakrie,theBakriefamilycompaniesownVisiMediaAsia,whichinturnownstwotelevisionstationsandoneonlinemediaoutlet.SuryaPalohofNasdem,throughMediaGroup,ownsatelevisionstationandthreenewspapers.TheMNCgroupofHanura’sHaryTanoesoedibjocontrols20television(primarilymassentertainmentsuchassoapoperas)and22radiostationsaswellassevenprintandoneonlinemediaoutlet.

Inthiselectioncycle,thecloseconnectionbetweenmediaownersandpoliticalpartiesraisedaddi-tionalconcernswithblatantattempts toworkaroundrestrictionsoncampaigningby incorporatingpartyfiguresandpartisanpoliticalinformationintonewsprogrammingthatfocusedonpartyactivities,quizshows,andevensinetron(soapoperas).TheinabilityofBawaslutosanctionsuchsubversionofrestrictionsputinplacebyelectionlawsandthenearcontemptuousresponsebythepartiesandme-diagroupswhenthesediscrepancieswerehighlightedhasagainflaggedtheweaknessoftheelectionsupervisorybody.

Civil societyWhilecivilsocietyorganizationsarestillactiveconductingobservation,advocacyandciviceducationac-tivities,thescopeandthenumbersofpeopleinvolvedcontinuestofallfrom2004whenhundredsofthousandsofwell-trainedobserversweredeployedacrossthecountry.Withtightinternationaldonor

15 LembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI)-IFESPre-electionsurveywith1890respondentsandmarginoferror±2.3%;Dec.2013

Source:acehonline.info Source:KPU-RI

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fundingandnationalfundingnotavailable,domesticobservationandotherelectionactivitieswerein-creasinglyrestrictedtosmallsamplesofprovincesandonlylimitednumbersoflocationswithinthoseprovinces.

JPPR,anetworkof37organizationsandmovements,includingtheNahdlatulUlama(NU),PSAPPemu-daMuhammadiyah,universitiesandinterfaithgroups,providedthelargestdomesticmonitoringeffort.However,itonlyhad100long-termobservers(LTOs)lookingatcampaignfundingbeforeandduringtheelections.OnElectionDay,JPPR’spartnerorganizationsreportedfielding2,011volunteersin25provinc-es.Kemitraansupportedmonitoringinfiveprovinces(Papua,NTB,Maluku,CentralJava,andNorthSu-matra).Itdeployed106LTOsinMarchwhoworkeduntiltheJulyelectionanddeployed1,062short-termobservers(STOs)onthethreedaysaroundthelegislativeelections.

Insummary,theJPPRobservationeffortfoundtheelectionwasadministeredwelloverall,andthevotingprocesswentsmoothly,thoughmanypollingstationsupervisors(KPPS)didnotmeetlegalcriteriaregard-ingageandeducation,andincludedadisproportionatenumberofmenasKPPS.Mostvotersreceivedanelectionnotificationletter(C6)priortothevote,andtheaccuratedistributionoftheselettersimprovedbetweenthelegislativeandpresidentialelections.Intheabsenceofsignificantresidencyrequirements,therecruitmentoflegislativecandidatesdrewheavilyfromthegreaterJakartaarea,eveniftheywererunningfordistrictsfarfromthecapitalcity.Thistendencywasparticularlypronouncedamongfemalecandidates.JPPRfoundthatthepracticeofmoneypoliticsremainedprevalentinthepollingstationsitobservedduringthelegislativeelection.Althoughnumberoflogisticalproblemswereencountered,theywereextremelylimitedinscope.AccessforvoterswithdisabilitiesduringthiselectioncyclewasthebestseentodateinIndonesia,however,significantroomforimprovementremains.Anumberofadministra-tiveproblemsanddelaysintherecapitulationprocessnegativelyaffectedaccountabilityandsocialtrustintheoverallelectionprocess.

Perludem,anelectionreformresearchandadvocacyorganization,conducteda“paralegal”observationinconjunctionwithbranchesoftheLegalAidInstitute(LBH)infourprovinces(Aceh,Jakarta,EastJava,andSouthSulawesi)forthelegislativeandpresidentialelections.Ineachprovincetheysupported20peopletoobserveelectionviolationsandtohelpmembersofthecommunitytolodgeelectioncomplaintswithBawaslu.Afterthelegislativevote,Perludembuiltonthisapproachtoobserveandreportonthemorethan700disputeslodgedbypoliticalpartiesandDPDcandidatesintheConstitutionalCourt(MK).

The2014electionsarealsodistinguishedfromthepreviousthreepost-Soehartopollsinthattherewerenointernationalobservationmissionsstudyingtheirconduct.Withothertransitionsgrabbingheadlinesandlimitedfunds,donorswhosupportedobservationinthepastjudgedIndonesiatobealowerpriority.Whileacknowledgingelectoralimperfectionspersisted,theybelievedthesystemtobesufficientlyeffec-tivewithouttheneedforoutsideverification.

Bawasluitselftriedtomobilizeanimprobablenumberofmorethan1millionvolunteerobservers(twoforeachpollingstation) ina logistical challenge that seemsoverwhelming for sucha smallagency.Therewasalmostnomoneyallocatedfortrainingthevolunteers,mobilizingthem,oranalyzinganyinformationtheymightcollect.Giventhescopeofmountingsuchaneffortandthatitwasplannedlessthantwomonthsbeforetheelection,theschemewasneverrealized.

Whilepublicopinionresearch,quickcountsandexitpollingwereintroducedtotheIndonesianelectionscenebyinternationalNGOs,thesetoolsarenowusedbycommercialresearchcompaniesorthinktanksandoftenfundedbymediagroups.

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Security situationComparedtotheturbulentyearsimmediatelyafterSoeharto’sresignation,Indonesiatodayismostlyatpeace.Whilemany Indonesians still fear violence,particularonthedayofthevote,itselectionsarenotmarredbysignificantviolence.Themainexceptionaheadof the legislativeelectionswasAceh,wherefightingbetweentwolocalpartiesformedbyformerrebelsisbelievedtobebehindthedeathofsixpeo-ple in the sixmonths ahead of the poll. Despite afearof violence, the security situation in theprov-

inceremainedcalmonthe legislativeElectionDay.Giventhebreadthandscopeofviolenceduringthedecadesoftheinsurgency,theincidentswereveryminor.AsuspiciouspackagewasfoundnearapollingstationinthecityofLhokseumawe,promptingabriefbombscare.Uponinspection,thepolicesaidtheparcelwasnotanexplosivedeviceandonlycontainedawatchandwoodenitems,andvotingwasabletoresumedespiteabriefdelay.Anecdotalobservationsindicatedthatvotingwasspreadoutthroughouttheday,alleviatingpotentiallylongqueuesatmostpollingstations.

Thesecurityconditioninotherconflict-proneareasofPapuaandCentralSulawesialsoremainedcalm.Inrecentyears,localelectionsinPapuahaveledtofightingbetweenclanstocontrolthelucrativeposi-tionofbupati,whichcontrolsvaluableblockgrantsfromtheprovincialandnationalgovernment.How-ever,withlessatstakeinthenationalelectionstherewerenoreportsofanysignificantviolence.Otherpost-conflictareassuchasCentralSulawesiandMalukuremainedcalmthroughoutthiselectioncycle.

Election DayAnimportanttestforanyelectoraleventiswhetheritisregardedathomeandabroadaseffective,credible,andisheldinapeacefulmanner.ItcouldbearguedthatIndonesia’slegislativeelectioneasilymetthreecriteria.

Effective

Insuchalargeevent,therewereboundtobelogisticalshortcomings,butgiventhescaleofthiselec-tion,theseproblemsaffectedarelativelysmallnumberofvotersanddidnotthreatentheoverallinteg-rityoftheelection.Forthelegislativeelection,Bawaslureportedanumberofminorissues.

Thelargestfindingwasthefailuretovotein35districtsinYahukimoregencyinPapuaafterbadweath-erandpoorfieldmanagementstoppedthedistributionofelectionmaterials.Delayedvotesweresaidtohavebeenorganized,butlegalchallengeslodgedattheConstitutionalCourtargueddifferently.Thesituationwasfurtherconfusedbythewideuseofaproxyvotingsystemknownasnoken,whereoneortwoleadersvoteonbehalfofawholecommunity.Whiletheseproblemsinthisremoteareaweregivenprominencebythenationalmedia,thisobscuredistrictwasspotlightedasothersystematichic-cupswerehardtofind.Ratherthantypical,theywereexceptionalandbestunderstoodinthecontextofwidespreadfailuresintheelectoralsysteminPapua.

Source:IFES

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TherewerealsoreportsofthewrongballotpapersbeingdistributedinvariouslocationsinNorthSu-matra,EastJava,WestJava,Banten,andEastNusaTenggara.On9April,theKPUissuedguidanceforhandlingoftheballotmix-up.ThereweredelaysinopeningpollsinMalukuduetoinsufficientvotingmaterialsandalatestarttovotinginAcehduetoconcernsaboutviolence.InBlitar,EastJava,apollingofficialwasallegedlyreportedforpunchinghundredsofblankballots.On21May,theKPUtestifiedataDPRsessionthattheyreceivedreportsofballotmix-upsinatotalof936pollingstationsin126re-gencies/municipalitiesin30provinces,withtheexceptionofGorontalo,SulawesiTenggara,andPapuaBarat.UnderKPUinstruction,anumberofre-runswereheldunderthesupervisionofBawaslu.

Credible

Oneconcretemeasureofcredibilityisvoterturnout.Participationinthelegislatureelectionswas75percent,which isasolidresult forasystemwhereparticipation isvoluntary.Voterturnout in2009was71percent.FifteenyearsafterreformasitheIndonesianelectorateisnotapatheticandremainspoliticallyengaged.

Anothermeasureishowvotersperceivetheelections.InpollingconductedforLSI-IFESaftertheelec-tion,73percentofIndonesianssaidtheyweregenerallysatisfiedwiththeoverallvotingprocessofthelegislativeelections,and9percentwereverysatisfied.Fifteenpercentreportedbeingveryorsome-whatdissatisfiedwiththeoverallprocess.Themajorityofrespondents inallregionsofthecountryexpressedsatisfactionwiththeelectionprocess.

Eighty-onepercent of Indonesians described theorganizationof the legislative elections as 'good',andanother7percentsaiditas'verygood'.Again,onlyaminority(9percent)thoughttheorganiza-tionoftheelectionprocesswas'bad'or'verybad'.MostIndonesians(64percent)believedthatthelegislativeelectionsweresomewhatfreeandfair,and16percentsaidthattheywerecompletelyfreeandfair.Thirteenpercentdidnotthinktheelectionswerefreeandfair.Whenthosewhothinktheelectionswerenotfreeandfairwereaskedtoprovidereasonsfortheiranswer,48percentmentionedvote-buyingduringtheelectionprocess,11percentmentionedfraudulentactivitiesatpollingstations,8percentcitedalackoftrustinvotecountingand5percentmentionedalackofpreparationamongelectoralauthorities.16

Peaceful

TherewerenosignificantreportsofviolenceonElectionDay.ThisisacredittoIndonesiaanditspeople.

LogisticsAstheresultofredistrictingprocessforthe2014election,therewasanincreaseinthenumberofelec-toraldistricts(daerah pemilihan-dapil)fortheprovincialandregency/municipallegislatures.Forthe2014electioncycle,therewere77dapilforDPR,33forDPD,259forprovincialDPRDsand2,102forregency/municipalDPRDs.TheKPUselectedaconsortiumof11printingcompaniesthroughastandardbiddingprocessinearly2014toprintthe2,471differentballotdesigns.Eachcompanywasresponsibleforprint-ing,sorting,packaginganddistributingtheballotstoregency/municipalKPUoffices,whichwereinturn

16 LembagaSurvei Indonesia (LSI)-IFESPostLegislativeElectionNationalSurveywith2009respondentsandmarginoferror±2.2%,June2014

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responsibleforsortinganddistributingthemtothefield. Although the sorting and packaging processwas done manually by workers with very limitedtraining,ballotmix-upsonlyaffected770outofthe545,791 (0.01 percent) polling stations across thecountry.Errorswereevenlydistributedacross107regencies/municipalitiesin30provinces,indicatingthat theseweregenuinemistakes.Wheremix-upshadoccurred,theKPUtookimmediatemeasurestodeterminethecauseofproblemandultimatelyor-deredrevotingattheaffectedpollingstationstobecarriedoutnolaterthan15Aprilinkeepingwiththecountingtimetable.

Vote countingThe initialvotecounting inmostof Indonesia isdone inpublicandwith remarkableopennessandtransparencyateachpollingstation.Onceagain,theexceptionisthosepartsofPapuausingthenoken systemwherevotingandcountingtakeplaceoutofpublicview.Beyondindividualpollingstations,tab-ulationandaggregationofvotesattheregionalornationallevelisopaqueandhighlyproblematic.Bylaw,therecapitulationmustbedoneonpaper.Afterafailedattemptatcomputerizationin2009,thereisnocentralizeddatamanagementsystemthatwouldallowforthereleaseofaprovisionalresultwith-indaysofthevote.Instead,officialresultsareannouncedonemonthaftervotingday.Thiscreatesanunhealthydependenceonprivatelyfundedquickcountstoprovideasubstituteforprovisionalresults.

Inthe2009elections,theKPUexperiencedsignificantproblemstransmittingthevotecountsfromtheindividualpollingstationsthroughtheKPU’sofficehierarchyandonwardstothepublic.Awidelyannounced,centralizedelectronicresultsystemthatwasmeanttoproducequickpreliminaryresultscompletely failed.Whilemostattentionhadbeenonthenewsystem,theneglectof theprimarypaper-basedsystemmeantachaoticanddelayedtabulationanddisplayoftheformalresult.Basedonthisexperience,therewasaclearneedforimprovingtheresultstransmission,tabulation,anddisplaymethodologyforthe2014election.TheKPUwasrepeatedlyadvisedbyexpertsthatimple-mentationofanynewresultmethodologyshouldstartnolaterthanoneyearbeforetheelection.ThisdidnothappenandtheKPUbegantheyearwithplanstouseapaperbasedsystemthatdidnotproduceanofficialresultuntilonemonthaftertheelections.Withoutanelectronicresultsystemtoprovidepreliminaryresultsfromanofficialsource,partiesandpublicdependedupononthenumer-ousquickcountsfundedbymediaorresearchorganizationsforprojectionsofresults.

Thehighlyproblematic2009electionwas furthercharacterizedbya low levelof transparencyastheKPUwasunabletoprovideanauditablesetofresults.Foranelectionmanagementbodynottopublishthefinalresultsdowntothelowestpollingdistrictsetaworryingprecedent.Thisisakeypartofensuringthecredibilityoftheprocessandtheupholdingthereputationofthe institutionchargedwithrunningit.Italsoallowsanyanomaliesorproblemstobelaterproperlyanalyzedintheinterestsofimprovingthesystemforfutureelections.Thelackofapapertrailthatwouldallowanauditoftheelectionwasabackwardstepbetween2004and2009.

Inalateinnovationforthe2014elections,theKPUannouncedafewweeksaheadofthelegislativepollthatitwouldscanmillionsofC1resultsformsthatcapturedtheresultfromeachpollingstation.These

Source:www.berisatu.com

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wouldthenbepostedasopticalornon-machinereadableimageson itswebsite.Thiswasanadhocapproachthatattempted to quickly resolve a systemic problem.Whilethere were many initial doubts whether the KPU couldproperly administer this new initiative, it worked wellenough to add some much-needed transparency to therecapitulationprocess.Itsuseforthelegislativeelectionsallowedtheprocesstobeimprovedandcomeintoitsownduringthepresidentialpoll.

Responsibility forscanningtheseformswasbeengiventotheKPUDofficesattheregency/municipalitylevelandtheimageswerethensenttoJakartaforpostingontheKPU’sweb site. In those instanceswhereC1 results formswerenotsystematicallyuploaded,suchasinPapua,theirabsencewasconsideredaproxyindicatorforotherseriousproblemswithelectionadministration.Ashoped,thepostingofthisdata allowed parties, voters, and other analysts to crosscheckpostedresultswiththeirownpollingstationlevelob-servation.Alongwithquickcounts,thepostingofC1formscontributedtotheintegrityandtrustintheelectoralsystem.

The noken systemTheuseofproxygroupvotinginPapua,knownasthenokensystem,firstapprovedbytheConstitutionalCourtin2009forelectionsmembersofHouseofRegionalRepresentatives(DPD).Itwasjustifiedoncul-turalgroundsasatraditionalpractice.Whileinpracticeittakesmanydifferentforms,itofteninvolvesonepersonoragroupofleadersvotingonbehalftheirwholecommunitywithlimitedornoconsultationwiththevotersthemselves.Fromwhatobservationhasbeenundertakenofitsuse,ithasbeenappliedinaninconsistentmanner.Therearenoadequateregulationscodifyingitsuse.Inremoteareas,itdecreasestransparencyofanelectoralprocessalreadymadeopaquebythedifficulttopographyandpooraccess.Theproblemismagnifiedbyunreliablepopulationdataandinflatedvoterslists.Evidencesuggestspop-ulationdataisinflatedtoattractgreatercentralgovernmentfundingandjustifythefurthersubdivisionofadministrativeareas.Thesituationbecomesdoublyproblematicwhenvoterrollsthenexceedalreadysuspiciouspopulationfigures.Manyanalystsareofthebeliefthatthenokensystemisbeingusedtocoverupwhatwouldotherwiseberegardedelsewhereasillegalelectoralmanipulation.

TheKPUDPapuareportedlybannedthenokenforthe2014legislativeandpresidentialelectionsbutthisdirectivedidnotstopitsuseinmanyremoteareas.Whileitscurrentuseonlyinvolvesasmallshareofthenationalvote,itisimportanttorecognizeandaddressconcernsaboutthispracticeasotherar-easofIndonesiaincludinginMaluku,Bali,andevenislandcommunitiesinSumatranprovinceshaveallexpressedaninterestinadoptingproxyvotingsystems.

Thosepromotingproxygroupvotersystemssometimesjustifytheirpositiononthebasisthatvotersarenotsufficientlyeducatedtomakeaninformeddecision.ApartfrombeingdirectlyagainsthumanrightsconventionstowhichIndonesiaisasignatory,thisisadangerouspathtogodownforademoc-

Source:IFES

Source:IFES

21

racyinadevelopingcountrywithwidedisparitiesineducationlevels.Itcreatesmultiplestandardsfordemocracywithinthecountry,erodesthevalueof“oneperson,onevote”usedelsewhereinIndone-sia,reinforcesexistingregionalinequalitiesandencouragescorruption.

Quick countsTheeightmostcrediblequickcounts releasedonElectionDayshowedaconsistentpattern for thevote,placingtheleadingpartiesinthesameorder.PDIPerjuangan(PDI-P)wasprojectedtofinishinfirstplacewith18.28-19.71percentofthevote.ItwasfollowedbyPartaiGolkar(15.16-14.30percent),PartaiGerindra(12.23-11.47percent),PartaiDemokrat(10.25-9.20percent),andPKB(9.51-8.74per-cent).Thesequickcountstrackedwithin1-2percentoftheofficialresult.

ThewidespreaduseofexitpollingwasanewfeatureofthiselectionaftertheConstitutionalCourtruledthattheKPUrestrictionsonpublicopinionpollingduringthepost-campaignquietperiodtobeanunconstitutionalrestrictionofthefreedomofspeech.Anumberofreputableorganizationsissuedexitpollswhilevotingcontinuedthroughoutthewesternandmostpopuloustimezone.TheCentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS)andCyrusNetwork(CN)putPDI-Pinfrontwith18.74percent,PartaiGolkarwith13.00percent,andPartaiGerindra9.94percent.Thesignificantvariationbetweenexitpollsandquickcounts–whichareasamplingofactualpollresults–showthatthissurveymeth-odologyisuntestedinIndonesiaand,aselsewhere,shouldbetreatedwithcaution.

Indonesianlawrequiresparties,orcoalitionsofparties,toreceiveeither25percentofthevoteor20percentoftheseatsinthenationallegislature(DPR)inordertonominateapresidentialcandidate.AsquickcountdataindicatedPDI-Phadfallenshortofthethreshold,coalitiontalksamongpoliticalpar-tiesintensifiedwithaneyeonthe9Julypresidentialrace.

Official results and seat allocationAftertheelectionon9April,therecapitulationandpreliminaryseatallocationwascompletedbytheKPUon14May,aheadoftheschedulelaiddowninthelegislativeelectionslaw.Thesystemofcalcu-latingseatallocationswassimplifiedin2014andtheregulationgoverningitmoreeffectivelypromul-gated.ItledtoabetterunderstoodprocessandnosignificantchallengestotheKPU’sdetermination.

Source:KPU-RI

22


Ofthe12partiesthatcontestedtheelectionsnationally,10receivedseats in theDPR.Twoparties(PBBandPKPI)wereeliminatedfromtheseatallocationprocessastheydidnotreceive3.5percentofthenationalvoterequiredtopassthelegislativethreshold.TheIndonesianParliamentaryCenter(IPC)developedatoolkitforparties,theircandidates,themedia,civilsocietyandinterestedcitizens,thatwasdesignedtoenhanceunderstandingoftheseatallocationprocess.Thekitincludedanexplanatoryvideo,amanual,abrochureandaweb-basedapplicationthatcouldcalculatetheseatallocationforanygivenelectoraldistrict.

In2009theseatallocationforDPR,DPRDProvinceandDPRDRegency/Municipalitywasacomplicatedprocessthatledtomisallocationofseatsandmanycorrections.Inthecurrentlegislativeelectionlaw(No.8/2012),theseatallocationprocesswassimplifiedintotwostages.

Inthefirststage,theKPUdeterminedthe‘quota’(Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih -BPP)foreachofthe77electoraldistricts(Daerah Pemilihan - dapil).TheBPPisthetotalnumberofvalidvotescastintheelectoraldistrictdividedbythetotalnumberofseatsinthatdistrict.ApoliticalpartyreceivesoneseatforeachtimetheirtotalnumberofvotesreceivedmeetstheBPP.Inthesecondstageofthecalculationanyremainingseatsintheelectoraldistrictwereallocatedtothosepoliticalpartieswiththelargestvoteremainders(thevoteremainderequalstheparty’stotalvotesminusallvotesusedtosecureseatsinthefirststageallocation).Shouldpoliticalpartiesendupwiththesamevoteremainderforonere-mainingseat,theseatisgiventothepoliticalpartywiththewidergeographicaldistributionofvotes.Oncethenumberofseatsforeachpoliticalpartyisdetermined,theseatswerefilledbycandidateswhoranforthepartyintheelectoraldistrictandreceivedthehighestnumberofvotes.

Bylaw,theelectioncommissionershavetoreadtheresultsfromeachelectoraldistrictintotherecordduringapublicplenarysessionofthecommission.With560DPRmembersin77dapil(district)and132DPDmembersin33provinces,itisatimeconsumingprocesstoreadalloftheresultsandthecommis-sionerstookturnsreading.Whilethismadeforlengthyproceedings,itproducedanunquestionablytransparentprocess.Thesefinalresultswerethensubjecttocourtchallengesbeforebeingconfirmedfourmonthslater.

Thenumberof femalecandidates intheDPRfell slightlywith97female legislatorsor17.3percentelectedin2014,comparedto103legislatorsor18.4percentchosenin2009.Thenumberoffemalesenators in theDPD is unchangedbetween2009and2014and stands at 35 senatorsor 26.5per-cent.Thisdoesnotconstituteasignificantchange.Whileobviouslymostwouldhave likedtoseearise,women’srepresentationintheDPRisclosetotheglobalandtheregionalaverageandhasbeenachievedwithoutanyfixedgenderquotabeingappliedandfemalecandidateswinningtheirseatsinopencompetition.

Dispute resolutionIndonesiaelectiondisputeresolutionmechanismsareweakandlackstronglegitimacy.Afterchangestotheelectionlaw,responsibilityfordisputeresolutioninthiselectoralcyclewassplitbetweentheKPU,Bawaslu,DKPP,police,andConstitutionalCourt(MK).AdministrativeirregularitiesarehandleddirectlybytheKPU,concernsover implementationgotoBawasluandethicalviolationsbyelectionofficialsaresenttotheDKPP.Criminalviolations,suchasbribery,obstructionofthevoteortheuseofviolencegotothepolice.Attheendoftheprocess,anyelectoralcontestantcanchallengetheelectionresultintheMK,whoserulingisfinalandbinding.

23

Thisdispersedresponsibilitymakesthemanagementofdisputescumbersome.Prescribedbylaw,elec-tionorganizersareobligatedtofollowthisawkwarddivisionof labor.Themultipleandoverlappingprocessdo,however,producewidespreadmediacoverage,andasaresult,ahigh-leveloftransparen-cyonelectiondisputes.Thismayhelpovercomethenaturaldistrustinthesegovernment-appointedinstitutions.

FollowingtheAprilpolls,theDKPPlookedintohundredsofcasesofallegedethicsviolationsbyelectionofficialsandfired180localcommissioners.Inahearingon21June,forexample,awitnessaccuseda topelectioncommissioner from thePapuandistrictof Tolikaraofbribing46 sub-district electionofficialstorigthe9April legislativepolls.ThewitnesssaidthateachofficialreceivedIDR50million(approximatelyUSD5,000).Thesmallnumberofofficialssanctioned,aswellastheirdispersednature,lefttheimpressionthatmostofficialsthroughoutthecountrydidtheirjobsinanhonestmanner.17

TheMK’sreversaloffortunewasashiftin2014electionlandscape.Previously,ithadbeenbelievedtobeamongthemosttrustednationalinstitutions.ThisreputationwaschallengedinSeptember2013whenChiefJusticeAkilMochtar,aformerGolkarpolitician,wasarrestedbytheCorruptionEradicationCommission(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi - KPK)onchargesoftakingbribestosettlelocalelectiondisputecases.In15localelections,hewasfoundtohavereceivedmorethanUSD5millioninexchangeforafavorableverdict.On30June,hewassentencetolifeinprisonforthesecrimes,theheaviestsen-tenceeverhandeddownbythecurrentcorruptioncourt.

After the scandal, the legitimacyof the courtwas furtherunderminedwhen its remaining justicesthwartedattemptsforreform.Thecourtannulledalawthatwouldhaveputitundertheauspicesofapermanentethicsbodyaswellasaprovisionthatwouldbartheappointmentofjudgeswithrecentlinkstopoliticalparties.ItalsostruckdownaJanuary2014presidentialdecreeintendedtoreinforcethebodybycreatinganindependentselectionpanelandpreventingpoliticiansmovingdirectlyfromthelegislaturetothebench.

AftertheofficiallegislativeresultsweredeclaredinMay,theMKreceived903complaints.Foranelec-toraleventofthisscale, involvingelectionsfor local,provincialandnational legislatures,thiswasarelatively smallnumber. AnexaminationbyPerludemrevealed thatof the14politicalparties thatsubmittedcases, thehighestnumbercamefromGolkar (91cases),PartaiDemokrat (73cases)andPKPI(71cases).ThetopthreeregionswherecomplainsweresaidtohaveoccurredwerePapua(80cases),Aceh(63cases),andWestJava(67cases).Thesecomplaintsprimarilyoccurredattheregency/municipalDPRDlevel(321cases)followbyDPR(186cases)andtheprovincialDPRD(117cases).TheNGOsaidthat59percentconcernedtheinflationanddeflationofvotesduringthetabulationprocess.Another29percentwerecategorizedascalculationerrors.Theremainderconcernedthemanagementoftheelection(27cases),neutralityofbureaucrats(21),manipulationofthevotinglist(nine),moneypolitics(four),andotherissues(two).18

InJuly,thecourtdismissed98percentofthecomplaints.Judgesruledinfavoroftheplaintiffinonly22cases.Mostoftheverdictsorderedlocalelectioncommissionstorecountasmallnumberofvotesfromspecificsub-districtsorwards.Someonlyundertooktherecountingofresultsfromisolatedpoll-ingstations.

17 InastatementfromSeptember2014,theKPUChairmansaidthatoutof4,101,490electionorganizesonly2,433com-mittedsomeviolationofelectionprocedure.

18 PerludemMonitoringReport,Potret Pemilu Dalam Sudut Pandang Sengketa” (2014)

24


The final resultsOn28September,theKPUheldaplenarymeetingtodiscussrevisionstofinalelectoralresultsforDPRandDPDcandidatestoreflectMKverdicts.Therecourt’sdecisionschangedtheDPRseatallocationinonlyoneseat.Followingacourt-orderedre-votein15kecamatan inKabupaten,Halmahera,Golkar,andPDI-Peachretainedtheoneseattheyhadwon,whiletheseatallocatedtoPANwasreallocatedtoNasDem.ThefinalDPRSeatAllocationsthenbecameasfollows:

Contestingnumber

PoliticalParty Seats %

01 NasDem(NationalDemocratParty) 36 6.4302 PKB(NationalAwakeningParty) 47 8.3903 PKS(ProsperousJusticeParty) 40 7.1404 PDI-P(IndonesianDemocracyPartyofStruggle) 109 19.4605 Golkar(FunctionalGroupParty) 91 16.2506 Gerindra(GreatIndonesiaMovementParty) 73 13.0407 PD(DemocratParty) 61 10.8908 PAN(NationalMandateParty) 48 8.5709 PPP(UnitedDevelopmentParty) 39 6.9610 Hanura(People’sConscienceParty) 16 2.86

TOTAL 560 100

PART III The presidential election

Source:IFES

27

PART III - The presidential election

The electoral legal framework and candidate registrationIndonesia’sambiguouslywrittenelectionlawsdidnotanticipatethepossibilityofapresidentialelec-tionwithonlytwocandidates.Thisledtosomelegaluncertaintyinthedaysbeforethepresidentialpoll.Themainlawgoverningthepresidentialelections(LawNo.42/2008)statesthatthewinnermustnotonlysecuremorethan50percentofthenationalvote,butmustalsowin20percentofthevoteinmorethanhalfofIndonesia’s33provinces(i.e.atleast17provinces).Basedonthisprovision,theKPUanticipatedascenarioinwhichthe9Julypresidentialelectionwouldnotresultinawinner,duetoageographicconcentrationofvotes,despitetherebeingonlytwocandidates.Whilethelikelihoodthatacandidatecouldwinmorethan50percentofthenationalvote,yetfailtocleartherequired20percentthresholdin17provinceswassmall,agroupofNGOactivistsplayedanimportantrolebyfilingacasewiththeConstitutionalCourt(MK)askingforaclarification.

On3July,thecourtruledthattherequirementtowinatleast20percentofvalidvotesinmorethanhalf of all Indonesianprovinces should not be applied in the casewhereonly two candidatepairswererunning.Thecourtsaidthatthecoalitionsofpoliticalpartiessupportingthenominationofthetwocandidatepairswereconsideredtoberepresentativeenoughofallregions.Thismeantthatthewinnerofthe2014presidentialelectionwouldbethecandidatepairthatwonanabsolutemajorityofvotes.Whilethecourt’sdecisionresolvedtheissueforthetimebeing,itaddedanotherissuetothelistoftechnicalmattersthatneedtobeaddressedinfuturerevisionsoftheelectorallaws.Thescopeofreformsneededalsoaddsweighttothecallsbycivilsocietyorganizationsforasingleomnibuselec-tionlawtoharmonizeandsimplifythefivelawsandmanysubordinateregulationsthatmakeupthelegislativeframework.

The role of political parties and the campaignIndonesianpoliticalpartiesplayanactiveandunimpededroleintheselectionofthecountry’sheadofstateasonlypartiesorcoalitionsofpartiescannominatecandidatesforpresidentandvicepresident.AccordingtoLawNo.42/2008,parties(orcoalitionsthereof)thatreceiveatleast20percentofseatsinthenationallegislatureor25percentofthepopularvotemaynominatecandidatesontheirown.AftertheApril9legislativeelectionleftnoneofthepartieswitheithersufficientvotesorseatstomeetthisthresholdontheirown,theywereforcedtobuildcoalitionstonominatecandidates.

Theoretically,ifthevoteweresplitintofourequalparts,uptofourticketsmighthavebeenformed.Withvotesandseatsdispersedunevenlyamongtwelveregisteredparties,onlythreepresidentialtick-etswereprobable.Onlytwopairsultimatelyemergedbecauseofpersonalityandpoliticalfactorsrath-erthanduetotheelectoralsystem.

Theone-monthcampaignperiodbetweenJune5andJuly5wasfreewheelingandoftendirty.Itwastaintedby“blackoperations”anddeliberateslander.Discussionofpoliciesandplatformsoftenbe-cameasecondaryissueinthemedia.Whilethetwocandidatessignedanintegritypacttopromoteapeacefulcampaign,smeartacticswerewidelyusedincampaignmaterials,aswellasmainstreamandsocialmedia.ThisledmanytoquestionwhetherIndonesia’selectionmanagementbodiescouldbetterregulatepoliticalcampaigns.

28


MediaThebiasshownbysomemediainthepresidentialcampaignhasraisedquestionsaboutwhetherfurtherregulationisneeded.Thebinarychoiceandthehighstakessawmanytelevisionstationsopenly take sides during thepresidential campaign and the concentratedownership of privatenetworks and their promotionof partisanpolitical interests came into the spotlight. Televisionplaysacrucialrollaroundelectiontime,especiallywithyoungpeople.Closetoeightin10Indo-nesiansreportobtainingelection-relatedinformationthroughtelevisionadvertisements(81per-cent)ortelevisionprograms(79percent).19

Theexistingregulatorystructurewasshowntobeineffective.Broadcastersflagrantlyviolatedrestric-tionsputinplacetopromoteeven-handeduseoftheairwaves.Theyshowednofearofthelawortheregulatorybody,theIndonesianBroadcastingCommission(KPI),whichcouldonly issuewarningsormakerecommendationsfortherevocationoflicenses.

Duringthepresidentialelectioncampaign,theKPIfelttheviolationstobesoobviousthatitpubliclyrebukedthecountry’stwotopnewschannelsMetroTVandTVOnefortakingsides.MetroTVisownedbySuryaPaloh,anallyofJokoWidodo,whileTVOneispartofthemediaconglomerationoftheBakriefamily,whoareinthePrabowoSubiantocamp.WhileKPIcanorderthestoppageofsuchprograms,ithasnopowertofineorotherwiseseverelypunishthetelevisionstations.Broadcastersfurthersubvert-edtheregulator’sordersbycreatingshowswithanewnamebutsimilarcontent.

Presidential debates

Giventheproblemswithunequaltelevisionaccessandbiasinreportingthenews,thefiveteleviseddebatesorganizedby theKPUwerean important sourceofunfiltered information forvoters.They

19 LSI-IFESPostLegislativeNationalSurveyJune2014.Accordingtothesurvey,othermassmediasourceswerelesslikelytobeusedwithprintedmedianewsbeingutilizedby28%andradiousagereportedbytwointenIndonesians.Only4percentsaythattheyutilizetheinternetasaprimarymeansforinformationonelections,eventhough17percentofIndonesiansareatleastoccasionalusersoftheinternet.

PresidentialDebates.Source:www.indopos.co.id

29

counterbalanced,tosomedegree,thedominancethatonecamphadovertheairwaves.Thereweretwodebatesorganizedforthetwocandidatepairs(9Juneand5July),twoforthepresidentialcandi-dates(15and22June)andoneforthevicepresidentialcandidates(June29).Thefivedebates,inturn,addressedthetopicsofdemocracy,cleangovernmentandlegalcertainty;economicdevelopmentandsocialwelfare;domesticaffairs,politics,anddefense;humanresources,science,andtechnology;andfood,energy,andenvironment.

Thedebateswere important forumsforvoters todirectlycomparetheticketsandweremorepoli-cy-orientedthanday-to-daymediareporting.Theywerelivelyattimesasthecandidatesprobedtheiropponents’perceivedweaknesses,providingactualpoliticaldebateratherthanjuststolidrecantationofpartyrhetoricandslogans.IftheKPUistoretaincontroloftheseevents,concertedeffortsshouldbemadetoprofessionalizethemasthesebroadcastsareakeysourceof informationforvoters. Intheend,thedebateswereunfilteredbybiasedmediaeditorsandprovidedasubstantialnumberofbroadcasthoursforcandidatestoairtheirviewsandshowvoterstheirpersonalitiesinanopenandtransparentmanner.

Security concernsGiventherecenthistoryofviolenceinIn-donesia,eachelection isaccompaniedbyreportingaboutthefearofviolenceasso-ciatedwiththepoll.Exceptforafewminorincidents,theseconcernswereunrealized.After the legislative election, a few smallincidentswere reported in Papua. Aheadof the presidential election, there weretwo minor incidents in Aceh. By globalstandardsofelectionviolence,thesewerelow.AftertheJokowicampclaimedvicto-ryonElectionDay,policeinJakartaandinBaliprotectivelybannedsupportersfromconductingparadesastheopposingcamphadnotconcededdefeatandtheyfearedclashes,thoughnoviolencewasreported.Thesefearswerethentransferredtotheannouncementoftheofficialresult.Aheadofthisevent,IndonesianMilitary(TNI)ChiefGeneralMoeldokoinformedjournaliststhat35,000soldiersand254,088policeofficerswouldbedeployedtoensuresecurityatthattime.Headdedthathisofficehasnotreceivedanysecuritythreatsbutthatthetroopswerealwaysreadytoaddresssecurityproblems.Heannouncedthatabout10mainentrypointstoJakartafromBantenandWestJavawouldbesecuredincasetherewasanattempttomobilizepeo-plefromthetwoneighboringprovincestoJakarta,followingtheannouncementoftheresult.

Despite theabsenceof violence, the fearpersists in theelectorateandanassociation remainsbe-tweenelectionsandconflict.WhileamajorityofIndonesianswerenotworriedaboutthepossibilityofviolenceintheirlocalcommunityiftheofficialelectionresultsfromthepresidentialelectionswerenotacceptedbyoneofthecontestingsides,asignificantpercentagedidexpressconcernsaboutthepossibilityofviolence inanLSI-IFESpoll conducted inOctober-November2014.20 Thedatashowed

20 LSI-IFESPostPresidentialElectionNationalSurvey,2,000respondents,MOE±2.1%;October-November,2014

Source:2.bp.blogspot.com

30


that32percentofrespondentsarenottooconcernedand24percentwerenotatallconcernedabouttheprospectsofviolenceintheircommunity.Ontheotherhand,eightpercentofrespondentswereveryconcernedand29percentweresomewhatconcerned.OlderIndonesianswerelesslikelytobeconcernedaboutthepossibilityofviolencewithonly28percentof Indonesiansover55expressingconcern,comparedto42percentof Indonesiansbetweentheageof25and39,and41percentofIndonesiansundertheageof25.ResidentsofWestJava/Banten/Jakartawerealsomoreconcernedaboutviolenceintheircommunity,with47percentexpressingtheirfears,comparedtoonly16percentinBali/NTT/NTB.

Indonesiansvaluedtherolethatmanyindividualsandinstitutionsplayedineasingtheirconcernsofelectoralviolencefollowingtheelection.Indonesiansrankedtherolesofthepolice(91percent),mil-itary(90percent),andcommunityleaders(85percent)asthemostimportantineasingconcernsofviolence.Indonesiansalsovaluetherolethatthepresidentialandvice-presidentialcandidatesplayedineasingconcernsofviolence,althoughtoalesserextentthansecurityinstitutions:JokoWidodo(73percent),JusufKalla(70percent),PrabowoSubianto(68percent),andHattaRajasa(65percent).21

Out-of-country votingTheIndonesianelectorateincludedoverseasvot-ers,whovotedaheadofElectionDaybackhome.ThisisanareawheretheKPU,incooperationwiththe Foreign Ministry (Kemlu), has room to im-proveitsperformance.Inanefforttoimplementaninclusiveelectionandincreasethelowturnout(22percent)ofoverseasvoters in the legislativeelection,theKPUimplementedamoreproactiveapproachforthepresidentialelection.Itallowedoverseaselectorstovotefrom30Marchto6Aprilforlegislativeelectionand4-6Julyforpresidential.Thereweremorethan2millionregisteredoverseasvoterswhowereallowedtovoteeitherdirectlyatoverseaspollingstations,usingadrop-box(whereballotsarefilledbyvotersoutsideofformalpollingstationsandputinsideaballotboxlocatedinanareaofhighvoterconcentration)orviathepostalsystem.

OnJuly6,hundredsof Indonesianvoters inHongKongstagedaprotestaftertheywereprohibitedfromvotingfollowingtheofficialcloseofthepolls.MostoftheseprotestorsweredomesticworkerswhoclaimedtheywouldhavevotedforpresidentialcandidateJokowi,whoisseenasthemanofthepeople.Theprotestersbecameanimatedaftertheyallegedlyheardanelectionorganizersayingthepolling stationwould reopen if theyvoted forPrabowo,who is seenas the symbolof thepoliticalestablishment.TheincidentoccurredinfrontoftwoKPUcommissionersandtheBawasluchairman.Reportssaidthataround2,000unregisteredvotersshowedupattheHongKongpollingstationsafewhoursbeforeclosingtimeanddidnothaveachancetovote.Bawaslu’sChairmanMuhammadsaidthatorganizersfailedtoanticipatethesurge.KPUChairmanHusniKamiManik latersaidthatthevoters

21 Ibid.

Votecounting.Source:kemlu.go.id

31

showedupafterthepollingstationalreadyclosed.22TheKPUshouldcontinueanticipatingtheneedsofoverseasvoters,especiallyduringapresidentialelection,inareaswithalargeIndonesianpopulation.

Election dayAn important test for any electoral event iswhetheronthedayit isheld,it isregardedathomeandabroadaseffective,credible,andisheldinapeacefulmanner.Aswiththelegisla-tive election, it could be strongly argued thatIndonesia’spresidentialpollmetallthreecrite-ria,althoughthepressureofthecampaigndidexposemoreweaknessesinthesystem.

Effective

In2014,theKPUrantwonationalelectionsinavastnationchallengedwithpoorinfrastructureanddifficultgeography.Whilenotperfect,thelegislativeelectionson9Aprilwereregardedbyvotersascredible.LSI-IFESsurveyinJune204foundthat88percentofrespondentsdescribedtheorganizationofthepollsaseither“wellorganized”or“verywellorganized”.23Inacountrytroubledbycorruptinsti-tutions,thisestablishedtrustwasimportantfollowingtheKPU’sannouncementon22Julyoftheresultofthepresidentialelection,andthesubsequentlegalchallenges.

Voterregistrationincreasedfrommorethan187milliontoalmost190millionvoters,withmorethan1.5millionadditionalvotescastinJuly.Despitepredictionsturnoutwouldsoarinahighlycontestedpresidentialrace,participationdroppedto70percentfrom75percentintheAprillegislativeelection. 24TurnoutwaslowestinRiauIslandsat59.34percent,butotherprovinceswerealsosignificantlybe-lowthenationalaverage,includingAceh(61.93percent),SoutheastSulawesi(62.38percent),CentralKalimantan(62.41percent),NorthSumatra(62.75percent),andRiau(62.73percent).Furtherresearchisrequired,butthismightbeexplainedbythenationalcampaignsbypassingtheseareas.TheturnoutwashighestinPapuaat86.07percent,whichmightbeexplainedbytheuseofnokenvotinginmanyhighlandcommunities,whichinflatesvoterparticipation.Intheseplaces,manypollingstationsrecord-edturnoutatanunnatural100percent.

TheKPUshouldbegivencreditforcompletingahugelogisticalfeat.Aftermajorfailingsduringthe2009elections, thecurrent seven-membercommissionmadesignificantadvances inelectionman-agementsinceitsappointmentin2012,especiallyincompilingacrediblevoterslist.OnElectionDay,188,268,423registeredvotersacrossthearchipelagowereeligibletogoto478,685pollingstations.Intheend,134,953,967votedwith1,379,690invalidballots,aspoilagerateofonly1.02percent.Presi-dentialelectionsaresimplertorunthanlegislativeones,withonlyoneratherthanfourballotpaperspervoter.Thisspeedsupvotingandjustifiesthelawallowingeachpollingstationtoaccommodate

22 ExplanationoftheCommissiononVotinginHongKong;July8,2014http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php/post/read/2014/3381/Penjelasan-KPU-atas-Pemungutan-Suara-di-Hongkong

23 TheLembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI)-IFESpollconductedfromJune1to10consistedofanationalsampleof2,009inter-viewsin33provincesofIndonesia.Additionalover-sampleinterviewswerealsoconductedinselectedprovinces(Aceh,Maluku,Papua,andWestPapua).ThedatawasbasedonweighteddatathatisrepresentativeofthenationalpopulationofIndonesiawithamarginoferrorofplus/minus2.3%.

24 Source:KPU,HasilpenghitunganperolehansuaraPemiluPresidendanWakilPresiden2014,pg.27

Source:IFES

http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_Final_2014_07_22.pdf

32


800votersratherthan500forthelegislativepolls.Throughaprocessofconsolidation,theKPUwasabletoeliminateabout67,000pollingstationsfromtheAprilelection,mainlyinurbanareas,savinganestimatedUSD20million.ThisisamodestamountconsideringthecombinedcostoftheseelectionsmaywellbeclosetoUSD1billion.25

Isolatedlogisticalproblemsdelayedthevoteforonedayinsomeareas,includinginPapua.Therewerereportsofre-votinginsomepollingstationsinfourprovinces.ThreeinKabupatenBantul(D.I.Yogyakar-ta),threeinKotaBandarLampung(Lampung),twoinKabupatenSijunjung(WestSumatra)andoneinKabupatenIndramayu(WestJava)reportedre-votingduetoirregularitiesduringthe9Julyelection.InthreepollingstationsinD.IYogyakarta,theKPUfoundthattheKPPS(pollingstationcommittee)let134votersvotewithoutanA5form,whichallowsvoterstochangetheirassignedvotinglocation.InapollingstationinWestSumatra,theKPPSfoundtherewasamismatchbetweentotalballotscastandtotalnum-berofvotersthatcastballots.However,accordingtooneofthecommissionersonKabupatenBantul’sregional-levelelectoralcommission(KPUD),theerrorswerenotdeliberatebutrelatedtopoorlytrainedofficials.TheKPUwasunabletoconductfulltrainingprogramsdowntothepollingstationlevelduetobudgetaryandotherconstraints.

Vote-buyingattemptsonElectionDayweresaidtobecommon, even though the efficacy and reliability ofsuchbriberyisstillquestioned.Votingcontinuestobeconductedwithhighlevelsofsecrecyandevenifmon-ey isaccepted, itdoesnotnecessarily influencevoterintention.Forthepresidentialelection,JPPRobserversreportedonevotebeingvaluedatbetweenIDR10,000-20,000(roughlyUSD1-2).Theynotedbothcampaignstriedtobuyvotesanditisthoughttobeawidespreadtactic.AccordingtotheJune2014surveyrunbyLSI,15percentofrespondentsreportedthattheywereofferedmoneyduringthe2014legislativeelectionsandanoth-

er5percentknewsomeonewhowasofferedcash.Comparingthe2014pollwith2009,34percentthinkthatmoneypoliticswasmuchmoreorsomewhatmoreprevalent.Bycontrast,only10percentthinkthatmoneypoliticswaslessprevalentinthe2014elections.Justoveraquarterofsurveyrespon-dents(26percent)believethatitwasthesameasin2009,while30percentdidnotofferanopinion.In69percentofcases,novotingproofwasrequiredofthevoterwhoacceptedthemoneyorreward.

Credible

ThevastmajorityofIndonesianssawthepresidentialelectionasacredibleprocess.InanLSI-IFESpoll,respondentssaidtheywereeitherverysatisfied(11percent)orsomewhatsatisfied(76percent)withtheoverallvotingandproceduresforthepresidentialelections.Only10percentexpresseddissatisfac-tion.Closetoninein10(89percent)alsosaidthatthepresidentialelectionwasverywellorwell-orga-nized.DatafromboththesequestionsissimilartodataonthesequestionsinanLSI-IFESsurveycon-ductedafterthe2014Aprillegislativeelections.AlargemajorityofIndonesiansinallmajorpopulationsub-groupsexpressedsatisfactionwiththeoverallelectionprocess,andthisopinionwasfoundamong

25 ThereisnoconsolidatedcostforelectionsinIndonesia,althoughresearchisunderwaytotrytoaccuratelycalculatethis.

Source:IFES

33

boththosewhovotedforPresidentJokowi(95percentsatisfied,3percentdissatisfied)andthosewhovotedforPrabowoSubianto(75percentsatisfied,23percentdissatisfied).Asanillustrationoftheor-ganizationoftheelections,only5percentofthosewhoreportedvotingsaidthattheyexperiencedanyproblemsduringthepresidentialelectioncomparedto95percentwhodidnotreportanyproblems.26

MostIndonesianshavepositiveevaluationsoftheelectionprocessforboththepresidentialandleg-islativeelectionsin2014.InthesurveyfollowingthepresidentialelectioninJuly2014,19percentofIndonesianssaidthattheelectionswerecompletelyfreeandfair,withafurther66percentsayingthattheyweresomewhatfreeandfair.Only12percentsaidthattheelectionswereeithernottoofreeandfair(11percent)ornotatallfreeandfair(1percent).TheseresultsmirroredfindingsfromtheLSI-IFESsurveyfollowingthelegislativeelectionsinApril2014,where80percentofIndonesianssaidtheelec-tionswereeithercompletelyfreeandfair(16percent)orsomewhatfreeandfair(64percent).Inthismostrecentsurvey,IndonesianswhovotedforJokowiinthepresidentialelectionweremorelikelytosaythattheelectionswereeithercompletelyfreeandfair(21percent)orsomewhatfreeandfair(71percent)thanthosewhovotedforPrabowoSubianto(16percentstronglyagree;57percentsomewhatagree).

MostIndonesianshadpositiveopinionsontheabilityofeligiblevoterstoparticipateintheelectionandonvotecountingatthepollingstationlevelingeneral.Eighty-fourpercentagreedthatalleligiblevotershadanequalopportunity toparticipate in theelection.Eighty-onepercentalsoagreed thatcasting,votecounting,andannouncingresultsweredoneaccuratelyatthepollingstationlevel.Solidmajoritiesofallmajorpopulationsub-groupssharedtheseopinions.

Thereweresomeconcernsnotedabouttheintegrityofelectionresultsamongasignificantminorityofthepopulation,focusedontheissueofmanipulationofresultsatsomepollingstations.Whilethereweresomeconcernsaboutresultsmanipulationatsomepollingstations,most Indonesiansdidnotthinkthatamassivemanipulationofelectionresultshadoccurred.Overall,amajorityofIndonesians(56percent)stronglyorsomewhatdisagreedthattherewasmassivemanipulationofelectionresultsduringthepresidentialelection,while21percentofIndonesiansfeltthatmassivemanipulationhadtakenplace.Resultsweremoremixedinopinionsonmanipulationatsomepollingstations.While48percentdisagreedthattherewasmanipulationofresultsatsomepollingstations,morethanathirdofIndonesians(35percent)agreedthattherewasthemanipulationofelectionresultsatsomepollingstations.ThisnumberrepresentsanincreasefromtheLSI-IFESsurveyafterthelegislativeelection,inwhichonly26percentofrespondentssaidthatsomemanipulationofelectionresultsoccurredduringthelegislativeelections.OpinionsthatmanipulationdidtakeplaceatsomepollingstationsarehighestinSulawesi/Gorontalo(40percent)andKalimantan(39percent).

AttitudestowardsthemanipulationofresultsfromtheelectionarehigheramongPrabowosupporters.Amongthesevoters,44percentsaythatmanipulationofresultstookplaceatsomepollingstations,comparedto31percentofJokowivoters.Inaddition,31percentofPrabowovotersagreedthattherewasmassivemanipulationofelectionresults,comparedtoonly16percentofJokowivoters.

26 LSI-IFESPostPresidentialElectionNationalSurvey,2,000respondents,MOE±2.1%;October-November,2014

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Peaceful

Indonesians should be proud of their peaceful elections.Domesticobservers reportedalmostnoviolence.Anymi-norproblemsandsmallviolationsobservedwere isolatedand scattered. National media monitoring by Perludemhighlightedthreeminorandunrelated incidentsofpoten-tialviolenceandintimidationinAcehandPapua.KemitraanandJPPRalsoreportedvotersbeingintimidatedandthreatsatsomepollingstations.IntheCentralJavatownofBanyu-mas,thePrabowocampaignfiledcomplaintsagainstthreejournalistsand twoanti-vote-buyingactivists for trespass-ingatthehouseofapro-Prabowocouncilwomanwhohad

allegedlydistributedmoney tovoters.The journalistswanted to interviewand takepicturesof thecouncilwomanbutherhusbandobjectedtobeingpushedintothemediaspotlightandbrandishedamacheteasheorderedthemtoleave.InRembang,alsoinCentralJava,theJokowicampaignfiledareportagainstawomanwhoallegedlygavemoneytoresidentswhiletellingthemtovoteforPrabowo.

Presidential quick countsTheofficialresultannouncedbytheKPUwasconsistentwiththeeightmost-crediblequickcountsre-leasedonElectionDay.Quickcountsarerandomizednationalsurveysthatsampleactualpollingstationresults,andaremethodologicallydistinctfromexitpolls,whichsampleindividualvoters.Quickcountshavebeenusedwithaccuracyandreliabilitysincethe2004polltopredicttheoutcomeofthepresiden-tialracebeforethecumbersomemanualtabulationprocessiscomplete.Whentheofficialresultsarereleased,thenumberscanbecompared.Iftheymatch,voterscanbefairlyconfidentintheresult.

Theseparallelvotetabulationsareatooltosafeguardthevote,makingmanipulationdifficultasvotesaretabulatedthroughthevariouslevelsofelectoraladministration.Iftheofficialresultsignificantlydiffersfromthequickcount,itcanbetakenasanindicationoffraudintheaggregationprocess.Inthepastthreeelectioncycles,thequickcountshavemirroredofficialresults,helpingtobuildagenerallyhighlevelofconfidenceandtrustintheelectoralsystemamongIndonesianvoters.

Quickcountswithpropermethodologyprovideanaccurateprojectionoftheresult,allowingcandi-dates,politicalpartiesandvoterstopreparefortheeventualannouncementoftheresult.Generally,

Source:IFES

Source:IFES

35

inIndonesia,withitsslow,paper-driventabulationprocess,quick-countshaveprovidedmuch-neededcontextandhavehelpedtoreducetensionasstakeholderswaitforofficialresults.WiththeKPU’san-nouncementoftheofficialresult(Jokowi-JK53.15percent,Prabowo-Hatta46.85percent),thecredibil-ityofthemethodisself-evident.AlleightpollstersaccuratelyforecasttheresultwithonlyCSIS-CyrusandPopuliCentrebeingoutsidetheirpolls’marginoferror.

Theinstitutionsthatconductquickcounts

Pollster Prabowo-Hatta Jokowi-Kalla

LingkaranSurveiIndonesia 46.70% 53.30%

IndikatorPolitikIndonesia 47.03% 52.97%

RadioRepublikIndonesia 47.46% 52.54%

KompasResearchDept 47.66% 52.34%

CSIS-Cyrus* 48.11% 51.89%

LSI-SMRC 47.03% 52.97%

PopuliCentre* 49.05% 50.95%

Poltracking 46.63% 53.37%

IndonesiaResearchCentre 51.11% 48.89%JaringanSurveiIndonesia 50.16% 49.84%Puskaptis 52.05% 47.95%LembagaSurveiNasional 50.56% 49.44%*Resultsoutside1percentmarginoferror;Source:Electionnightquickcounts

ThePrabowo-Hattacampaignclaimedvictorybasedupontheabove-fourquickcounts.TheIndonesianAssociationforPublicOpinionSurveys(Persepsi)istheindustrybodyresponsibleforitsself-regulation.Afterthepresidentialelection,Persepsiwasconcernedaboutthedeviationsbyitsmembersconduct-ingquickcounts. Itaskedmembers tosubmitdataon their sampling technique.Asa resultof thisinquiry,sevenfirmsthathaddeclaredJokowitobethewinnerwerefoundtohavecreatedscientificsamples.JaringanSurveiIndonesiaandPuskpatisdeclinedtosubmitdataontheirsamplingmethodol-ogytoPersepsi’sethicscouncil.Thesetwofirmswerethenreportedlyexpelledfromtheorganization.Despitetheseissueswithlowqualityordisreputablepollingpractitioners,electionmanagementbod-iesandothersshouldbecarefulabouttryingtoover-regulatequickcountsastheyremainusefultoolsthatshouldnotbeprohibitedinfutureelections.

Opinionpollingisimportantbecauseofthewayitisusedbythemediaandcampaignteamsbeforeandafterthepolls.Theintentionalmisuseofexitpollsandquickcountsisawell-knownpartisantacticforthoseengaginginelectoral“blackoperations”.Forexample,TVOne,thetelevisionstationownedbythepowerfulBakriegroup,akeyPrabowoally,onlyairedquickcountsthatcalledtheelectioninfavorofPrabowoSubianto.TVOnewaswidelycriticizedinsocialmediaonandafterElectionDay.ThewaveofcondemnationincreasedaftertheheadofpollingfirmPollTrackingInstitutesaidhisorganizationhadbackedoutofitscontractwithTVOneearlyonthemorningoftheelectionafterthestationinsistedonincludingtheresultsoflessreputablepollsters.PollTracking’squickcountshowedJokowiwinningoverPrabowo,53.37percentto46.63percent.

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Election administrationWhileIndonesianpollingstationsarecelebratedfortheirremarkableopennessinvotingandtranspar-encyincounting,poorstafftrainingmakesthemaweaklinkintheelectoralchain.AlthoughnumerousreportsofirregularitieshavebeenfiledwiththeKPUandvariouselectionoversightbodies,ElectionDaywentrathersmoothlyoverall,consideringitssizeandcomplexity.Apollingstationtechnicaldiag-nosticwasconductedbyIFESincollaborationwithLembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI)atarepresentativesampleof2,000pollingstations(TPS)nationwide. Itwas intendedtohelpelectoralstakeholderstoidentifysystemicflawsintheimplementationofElectionDayproceduresandtoprovideoverallcontextforareviewofprocedures.

Thesampleisnotlargeenoughtoallowforagreatdealofanalysisofregionaldifferencesinimplemen-tation,butitwaspossibletolookatsomeindicativetrends.Nationally,morethan90percentofpollingstationsopenedandclosedontime.Ninety-sevenpercentofpollingstationshadallofthematerialsnecessaryforconductingtheelectionsuchasballots,toolsforvotingandinkformarkingfingers.Emp-tyballotboxeswereshowntowitnessesbeforepollingin95percentofpollingstations.In97percentofstations,officialscheckedvoters’identificationproperly.Attheendoftheday,thevotetotalsarewrittenontheC1formthatispartofthefive-stagetabulationprocess27.Candidates’agentsareen-titledtoacopyoftheformandonewasprovidedin89percentofpollingstations.Whiletherehavebeennumerouscomplaintsfromthetwocampaignsaboutirregularitiesandsomeseriousallegationsoffraud,94percentofpoliticalpartyobserversinthefielddidnotregisteranycomplaintsabouttheproceduresattheTPSlevel.

Source: Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) Election Diagnostic survey, July 9, 2014

Theoneproceduralerrorthatstandsoutacrossalargeshareofpollingstationshadtodowiththenotification/invitationletter(surat pemberitahuan)thatissenttoallvotersandcontainsthevoter’spollingstationnumberandlocation.NeithertheelectionlawnortheKPUregulationsrequirevoterstopresentthelettertoTPSofficialsbeforebeingallowedtovote.Whiletheratevariedbetweenprovinc-

27 Oncecountedateachpollingstationtheballotsaretabulatedfirstatthevillage(kelurahan)level,thenatsubdistrict(kecamatan)level,regency/municipality(kabupaten/kota)level,provinciallevelandfinallyallprovincialresultsarecom-piledatthenationallevel.

37

es(seetablebelow),anaverageof16.4percentofpollingstationsdeniedvoterstherighttocastabal-lotbecausetheydidnotpresenttheirinvitationletter.Itisnotknownhowmanyvoterswereactually disenfranchisedinthismanner,butitisclearlyamatterfortheKPUtotakeintoaccountindesigningitstrainingandinformationprogramsforfutureelections.

Theinconsistentapplicationofvotingproceduresremainsasignificantproblem.Thisisadirectresultofpoortrainingforpollingofficials.WhiletheKPUemploysmorethan3.8millionpollworkers,ithasnosystemforcascadetraininginplace.Pollingstationofficialsarenotlackinginconfidenceandimple-menteachelectionastheydidthelast.Insomeneighborhoods,theyarereferredtoas“familyfran-chises”.Butthispatternofnarrowrecruitingmayentrenchmisunderstandingsandsloppypractices.ElectionDayobservationshowsthaterrors,whileoftenrandomandnotsystematic,canresultinvotersbeingdisenfranchised,aswasthecasewiththeuseoftheinvitationletter.Tofurtherinsurequalityandbettermentoftheelectionprocess,theKPUneedstoreviewitsElectionDaycommittee(KPPS)selection/recruitmentandtrainingprocedures.

The role of civil societyIndonesiancivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)playedactiveanddiverse rolesduringboth the legislativeandthepresidentialelection.Anumberofactivistsservedasdomesticmonitors,observingtheintegri-tyoftheprocess.LeadingthinktankCSISconduct-edaquickcount.Through initiativessuchaswww.rumahpemilu.org (Indonesia ElectionPortal), someCSOstookuprolesasciviceducators,helpingvotersunderstand theelection;others sponsored thede-velopmentof smartphoneapps. In coalitions, suchasGeneralNetworkforDisabilityAccess(AGENDA),groupsmonitoredpollingdayeventsandadvocat-edforbetteraccessibilityforpersonswithdisabilities.TheAssociationforElectionsandDemocracy(Perludem),togetherwithadvocatesSunggulHamonanganSiraitandHaposanSitumorang,filedajudi-cialreviewwiththeConstitutionalCourttoclarifyambiguityinthepresidentialelectionlawregardingwhetheroneortworoundswouldberequiredtochooseapresidentwhenonlytwocandidateswererunning.Perludemalsomonitoredthecourt’shandlingofcomplaints.TheinvolvementofCSOsinbothelectionsmarksthe2014nationalelectioncycleasthemostinclusiveandparticipatoryever. Perhapsthemostexcitingdevelopmentwasthespontaneouscollaborationbetweenhun-dredsofvolunteerswhopooledtheirworkonlinetoconductaparalleltabulationofthevoteastheKPUposteddatafromindividualpollingstations(C1),sub-districts(DB1),andregen-cies(DC1)online.These“crowdsourcing”initiativestookplacethroughwebsitessuchaswww.kawalpemilu.organdwww.merdeka.com.

WhilesuchspontaneousorganizingshowsthevibrancyofcivilsocietyinIndonesia,italsohighlightsinadequacies in the current system.With computerization, the KPU should be able to produce re-al-timeresults,eveniftheyareunofficial.For2014,however,thesevolunteergroupsplayedakeyroleinprovidingmuch-neededscrutinyfortherecapitulationprocess,especiallyfromthepollingstationtosub-districtlevel,which,accordingtoMKcourtcasesresultingfromthelegislativeelection,showedthegreatestleveloffraudandmanipulationbycorruptofficials.Civilsociety’sparalleltabulation,which

Source:IFES

http://www.rumahpemilu.org

http://www.rumahpemilu.org

http://www.kawalpemilu.org

http://www.merdeka.com

38


showedthefinalresultstobeconsistentwithquickcountsandsteadythrougheachleveloftabulation,significantlycontributedtoconfidenceintheintegrityoftheelectoralsystem.Inanenvironmentinwhichthepublic’strustinquickcountswasshaken,thisinitiativewasacriticaldeterrentagainstfraudandrepresentedaconfidence-buildingmeasurebuttressingfaithintheelectoralsystem.

Recapitulation of votes

Bycountingvotesateachpollingstationindaylighthours,Indonesiaishometoaremarkablytrans-parentprocess.Thisisasolidfoundationuponwhichtobuildanelectoralsystemwithhighlevelsoftransparencyandintegrity.IfIndonesiaweretomovetoasystemofelectronicvoting,assomehaveproposed,thentheseadvantageswouldbelost.Thepresidentialelectionlawregulatesthatamanualballotcount,withfivestagesofmanualtabulationisaformalandlegalvotecountingprocess.Intheabsenceofaproperelectronicvotetabulationsystem,theKPUdecidedtomakescannedcopiesofre-sultsformsfromthepollingstation,sub-districtanddistrictlevelavailableonitswebsite.Thisdecisionenablednewgroupstoconducttheirownparalleltabulationandincreasetransparencyintheelectoralprocess.Theofficial,paper-drivensystemtakesweekstofinalizeandleadstospeculationaboutthelikelywinner.Forthe2019nationalelections,theKPUshouldworktoputinplaceanelectronicresultsystemthatcanproduceanofficialresultquickeranddecreasethetensionscreatedbythisuncertainty.

Usingscannedpollingstationresults.Source:merdeka.com

Votecountingatpollingstationlevel.Source:IFES

39

Comparedtotheirpredecessorswhooversawthe2009election,thecurrentKPUhasbeenmoretrans-parent.Ithasmadeaconcertedefforttouploadtoitswebsiteallrelevantelectoralinformationinclud-ingitslaws,regulations,anddecisions.TheKPUwebsitehasalsoincludedextensivebackgroundinfor-mationonpoliticalparties,candidates,campaignfinancereports,andtheelectionresultsastheyarereportedfromthepollingstationandeachsubsequentadministrativelevel.ForIndonesianelections,thischangehasbeenrevolutionary,butmorecanandshouldbedonetobuildontheseadvancesandimprovetransparency.

The systemof scanning C1 formshas been a significant ad-vance,buthasnotbeenperfect.ThespeedatwhichC1formswere posted was uneven throughout the archipelago, withsignificantdelaysseenintheprovinceofPapua.Whilesomeprovinceshavepublished100percentoftheirC1forms,Papuahadonlyuploadedtwo-thirdsofitsC1formsmorethantwomonthsaftertheelection.Whiletheremotelocationofmanypolling stationsmaypartially explain this, electoral adminis-trationintheprovinceispoor.Thefailuretodeliverelectoralmaterialsontimeisoftenasmuchaproblemofsub-standardadministrationandbadplanningasitisofdifficultgeography.Contractsareslowtobeissuedandplanesareoftencharteredlatetodelivermaterialstoremotelocations.

The lack of C1 forms fromPapua contributes to the ongoingopacityoftheelectionprocessesintheprovince.Thisdeficiencyalsoblocksattemptstomonitorcorruptpracticesinthedistantprovince,especiallywiththehighlyproblematicnoken systemofproxyvoting.Thereisgrowingevidenceofapatternofwide-

spreadelectionirregularitiesinPapuaonascalenotseenelsewhereinIndonesia.Votinglistsareoftenlargerthanpopulationfigures,whereastypicallyaroundtwo-thirdsofthepopulationiseligibletovote.Inthesesamedistricts,oneanalystfoundvoterturnoutforthe9Aprillegislativeelectionswasoften100percentinmanyareas.Theseratesarenotevenachievedincountrieswithcompulsoryvoting.

AddressingtheproblemswiththenokensysteminPapuaisurgent.OtherpartsofIndonesia,especiallyinneighboringprovinces,arearguingthattheytooshouldbeallowedtouseit.Manyofthesame“cul-tural”argumentsareused.Somelocalleaderssaythelargeballotpapersweretooconfusingforpoorlyeducatedvoters.Ratherthanaddressthisthroughbettervotereducation,campaigninginremotear-eas,orpartyoutreach,theyseethesolutionistocedeavoter’sindividualrighttoasinglecommunityleader.Proxyvotingisadangerouserosionoftheprincipleof“oneperson,onevote”.Analystssuspectnoken ofprovidingaculturalsmokescreenforwidespreadvote-buyingbypartiesandmassivecorrup-tionbylocalelectionofficialsastheysellandre-sellvotestothehighestbidder.

TheKPUhasmadeagoodstartinimprovingtheauditabilityofitsdatabutmoreneedstobedone.TheKPUhaspublishedonlinescannedimagesofthepollingstationresults(C1)aswellasthetabu-lationsfromthesub-district,regency,provincial,andnationallevels.Thispublicarchivecanbeusedbyparties,media,andacademicsaswellaselectionprofessionalstocrosscheckandverifytheresult.Thepublichascapitalizedonthisdata,usingthearchivetoaudit individualpollingstationresults

SampleofC1FormuploadedintoKPUwebsite.Source:pilpres2014.kpu.go.id

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andeventocrowd-sourceelectionresulttabulation.Forfutureelections,theKPUshouldorganizeitsownelectronicresultstabulationefforttoproduceitsownelectionresultinhours,notweeks.Thatsaid,thestepstheKPUhastakenin2014havecreatedthemosttransparentandauditableIndone-sianelectionresulttodate.It ishopedthattheKPUcontinuestoraisethebarbypublishingfinalelectionresultsinaformatthatcanbereadilyusedforanalysisbyallinterestedparties,ratherthanindividualimagefileswhichrequireextensivedata-entryandverificationefforts.

Official resultsTheofficialresultwasannouncedbytheKPUon22July.ItdeclaredthatJokoWidodoandJusufKallahadreceived70,997,833votes (53.15percent)andPrabowoSubiantoandHattaRajasa62,576,444votes(46.85percent).Inpercentageterms,JokowihadamarginofvictoryoverPrabowoof6.3percentor8.4millionvotes.Itwasaclear,ifnotaclose,victorywhichwasproclaimedfinalafteralldisputeswereheardandadjudicatedbytheConstitutionalCourt.

Dispute resolutionDuring thepresidentialelection, theDKPPreceived16casesfiledby threegroups (Prabowo-Hatta,Jokowi-JusufKallaandan independentbody)concerningallegedviolationsofthecodeofethicsbyelectoralmanagementbodies(EMBs),includingthenationalKPU,regionalKPUs,Bawaslu,andregionalsupervisors(Panwaslu).On21August,theDKPPdelivered13verdicts,inwhichitdismissednineKPUDcommissioners(fivefromKabupatenDogiyai,twofromKabupatenSerang,andtwofromBanyuwangi);gaveareprimand/strongreprimandto30EMBcommissioners;not-guiltyverdicts for20EMBcom-missioners;andpraisefornationalKPUCommissionerHadarNavisGumayandtheheadofSukoharjoPanwasluforexceptionalperformance.TheDKPPalsopraisedtheuseoftheSpecialVoterList(DPK)andAdditionalSpecialVoterList(DPKTb)asabreakthroughforelectionadministrationthatguaran-teedprovisionoftheconstitutionalrighttovoteeventoIndonesianswhohavenotbeenregisteredintheFixedVoterList(DPT).BypraisingacontroversialKPUcommissionerwhowasattackedforallegedbiasandthetemporaryvotinglists,theDKPPstrengthenedthelegitimacyoftheprocessandresult.

In2009,theMKdismissedthecasesmadebythetwolosingpairs,thenJusufKalla-WirantoandMega-watiSoekarnoputri-Prabowo,andaffirmedthevictoryofSusiloBambangYudhoyono(SBY)andvicepresidentBoediono.TheSBY-Boedinoticketwonthesecond-roundelectionbyawidemarginof65

TheofficialresultwasannouncedbyKPU,22July2014.Source:KPU-RI

41

percent.While itacknowledgedthatsome“qualitativeproblems”wereprovedduringthehearings,theseproblemswerenotregardedas“structural,systematic,andmassiveviolations”ofthegeneralelectionsanddidnotinvalidatetheresult.28Toattractthecourt’sattention,anyplaintiffneedstomeetthissametest.ChiefJusticeHamdanZoelvalaidoutthecourt’sdefinitioninarecentmediainterviewasawell-plannedorhighlyorganizedeffortoffraudfromtoptobottomthatiswidespreadinatleastoneprovinceorafewregencies/municipalities. Itmustalsoimpacttheoutcomeoftheelection.29 The court’shighstandardofevidencealsocreatesachallengingburdenofproofasplaintiffsanddefen-dantsmustprovideoriginaldocumentsandeyewitnesstestimony.Initshandlingofcomplaintsfromthe2014legislativeelections,theConstitutionalCourtagainsetahighbar.

TheMKcameintothiselectionseasonwithacredibilityproblemofitsownmaking.Itsformerchiefjustice,AkilMochtar,wastriedfortakingmorethanUSD5millioninbribestoinfluenceaseriesoflocalelectioncases.On30June,hewassentencedtolifeinprisonbytheJakartaCorruptionCourt,oneoftheharshestpunishmentseverhandeddownforacorruptionconvictioninIndonesia.QuestionsalsoaroseastowhetherPrabowo'scampaignmanagerMahfudMD,aformerMKchiefjustice,wouldbeusedtoinfluencehisformercolleaguesduringthedisputeresolutionprocess,despitehisofficialresig-nationfromthecampaignonElectionDay.

On 22 July, hours before the official result was an-nounced, the Prabowo-Hatta team withdrew its wit-nessesfromthefinalrecapitulationhearingattheKPUoffices.Itwasadramaticgesturethatcreatedsome24hoursofambiguityasitremainedunclearwhethertheticketwouldacknowledgetheofficialprocessesandthelegal dispute resolutions options provided by the law.Thepair's initialcommentstothemediaalsogaveriseto confusion as towhether they hadwithdrawn fromtherecapitulationprocess,orfromtheracealtogether,whichwouldhavecarriedcivilandcriminalpenalties.On23July,Gerindrarepresentativesappearedtobacktrackwhentheysaidtheywouldchallengetheresultincourt.

The complaint that the Prabowo-Hatta team lodged at theMK claimed that irregularities at some52,000pollingstationsrepresentedasystematicefforttofavortheJokowi-Hattapairing.Allegationspointedtodiscrepanciesbetweenthenumberofvotersorballotpapersandthenumberofvalidandinvalidvotescast;excessiveuseoftheadditionalspecialvoterslist(DPKTb);and282pollingstationswherethePrabowo-Hattaticketreceivednovotesatalleventhoughtheyhadpollwatcherspresent.Theplaintiff’slegalteamsaidtheKPUignoredBawaslu’scallforare-votein5,000pollingstationsinJa-karta.TheheadoftheJakartaBawaslusaiditrecommendedarevoteat13pollingstations.AmemberofthenationalBawaslusaidthatthelawlefttheMKtoresolvetheissueiftheKPUdidnotagreewithaBawaslurecommendation.

ThePrabowo-HattateamlodgedaformalpetitionwiththeConstitutionalCourtby25JulyalongtheselinesandaseriesofpublichearingsbroadcastliveontelevisiontookplaceinearlyAugust.Prabowowasgivenanopportunitytodirectlyaddressthecourtintheinitialproceedings.Allcourtdocuments

28 MKDecisionnumber108-109/PHPU.B-VII/2009.29 ElikSusanto,“IniSidangPalingBerat”,Tempo, August31,2014.

Prabowo Subianto delivering his speech rejecting KPU’srecapitulation results at the Polonia House, his campaignheadquarters.Source:www.nusaonline.com

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weremadeavailableonlineandverbatimtranscriptsofproceedingswerepostedwithinadayofthehearingasisthecourt’spractice.Thishighleveloftransparencyandopennesscontributedtoconfi-denceintheprocessandthepublic’sacceptanceoftheeventualoutcome.

On21August, theConstitutionalCourt rejectedPrabowo-Hatta’scase in itsentirety.Given itssignifi-cance,itisimportanttoreviewthekeypartsofthe4392-pageruling.Whilefindingthattheelectionwasnotstolen,theconclusionsdrawnbytheninejudgesunderlinemanyoftheongoingchallengesofelec-tionadministrationinIndonesiaandpointsforconsiderationregardingfutureelectoralreforms:

1. TheplaintiffclaimedthatballotboxeswereillegallyopenedbytheKPUasitgatheredevidenceforthecase.Whilethecourtacknowledgesitwasagainstthelaw,theKPU’sinclusionofrepre-sentativesfrombothcandidates'teams,Bawaslu,andthepoliceaswellasitsproductionofanofficialreportmeantthattheevidenceobtainedinthiswaywasadmissible.

2. Thecourtrecognizedthattheintegrityofadministrativeprocedureswasextremelyimportantintheconductofanelectionandmustbebasedinlaw.However,anyproblemswithelectionadministrationneededtobesubstantiatedasbeing"massive,systematic,andstructural" innatureforthecourttoruleinfavoroftheplaintiff.Thecourtwasunconvincedthattheev-idenceprovidedofmismanagementorthemisallocationof fundsaffectedtheresultofthepresidentialelection.

3. WhilethePrabowo-Hattacampallegedthat1.2millionofitsvoteshadbeenstolenandsome1.5millionvotesweregainedillegallybyJokowi,thecourtdeterminedthattheplaintifffailedtopro-videconvincingevidenceshowingclearareasofcountingerrors.Furthermore,theplaintiff’swit-nessesdidnotlodgeanyobjectionsatthelowerlevelsoftherecapitulationprocesswhentheysigned-offonelectionresults,andequallyfailedtoprovideconvincingtestimonywhencalledtothewitnessstand.

4. TheplaintiffallegedtheDPK,DPTb,andparticularlyDPKTbwereusedwithoutlegalbasisandwereabusedduetothesizeofthesevoterlists.Thecourtsaidthatthesizeofthesevoterlistsmadesenseduetovoterreassignmentbetweenthelegislativeandpresidentialelections.Fur-thermore,therighttovotewasupheldasaconstitutionalrightthatshouldnotbeviolatedduetolower-priorityadministrativematters.ThecourtruledthattheKPUwasallowedtoregulatethesevoterliststhroughitsownregulations.Thisneededtobedone,inpart,becausetheMK’spreviousdecisionsthatmadeiteasierforvoterstocastaballothavenotbeenfollowed-upbylegislators.WhiletheuseofKTP/FamilyCard/otherdocuments informingtheDPKTbmaybeslightlyproblematicintermsofimplementation,therewasnoevidencepresentedthatsuchim-perfectionsfavoredanyspecificcandidate.ThecourtfoundthatthepublicinformationcampaignfortheDPKTbhadbeenconductedsuccessfullyandconcludedthattheuseofDPK,DPTb,andDPKTbwaslegalforthe2014presidentialelection.

5. CounselrepresentingthePrabowo-Hattaticketalegedanumberofproblemswithvotingandcounting,butthecourtruledthattheplaintiffdidnotpresentD1formstoclearlyshowwheretheproblematiccountinghappened.Inpollingstationswheretheplaintiffallegedthatintim-idationhadtakenplace,suchasinPapua,witnessesfailedtoclearlyshowwhich"parties"in-timidatedthem,howithappened,andwhatwasdone.Thejudgessaidthataclearchronology

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andproofwereneededbeforethecourtcouldtaketheseclaimsintoconsideration.InpollingstationswherePrabowo-Hattawonnovotes,suchas inSouthNias,Maluku,NorthMaluku,andMadura, the court believed that the conferral processes andproxy voting traditionallyacceptedinthosesocietieswerethecauseratherthananyindicationsoffoulplay.AlthoughnotalloftheseareasusethenokenthatisemployedinPapua,suchconferralprocessesareac-ceptedaspartofhowdemocracymanifestsitselfwithinIndonesiantraditionalcommunities.Assuch,thecourtrejectedallallegationsrelatedtoproblematicpollingstations.

6. TheplaintiffcomplainedthattheKPUhadnotfollowedBawaslu'srecommendationsonprevi-ouslyidentifiedelectoralproblems.LawyersrepresentingPrabowo-HattasaidthattheKPUhadonlypartiallyfollowedtheelectionsupervisor’sinstructionsinJakartaandEastJava.However,thecourtnotedthatBawasluitselfdidnotraisethisissue,andhadthereforetacitlyacceptedKPUmeasuresassufficient.InSouthNias,theKPUDdidnotpromptlyfollow-uponBawaslu'srecommendation,buthadre-countsorre-votesbeenheld,theywouldnothavechangedtheresult.Whileproceduresmighthavebeenflawed,thecourtfoundthesecasestohavenoimpactontheelectionresults.

7. Theplaintiff’scomplaintsaboutPapua’snokensystemweredismissedfirstonthegroundsthatallegationslackedclarityandconsistencyabouttheplacesandnumberswheretheallegedinfrac-tionstookplace.ThecourtruledthattheomissionofCentralandWestMapiadistrictsofDogiyaiRegency,wherenovotingwasallegedtohavetakenplace,fromtherecapitulationprocessattheregency-level,wasanacceptableapproachbylocalelectionauthoritiestosettlingacomplexissueastherewasnotimetore-runtheelection.InotherPapuancases,thejusticesnotedthatPrabowo’sagentshadinsomecasessignedtheofficialreportatlowerlevelsonlytolaterclaimfraud.Inothercases,evidencefromSarmiandYapenfailedtoclearlyidentifytheperpetratorsoftheallegedfraud.InWestPapua(particularlyManokwariRegency),theinvolvementofregionalheadsinmobilizingvoterswasnotconvincinglyproven,norhaditbeenreportedtoBawaslutoinvestigate.ThecourtnotedtestimonyfromtheKPU’switnessthatmanyregionalheadsinWestPapuawereGerindrafunctionariesormembersofpartiesinPrabowo’scoalition,andthereforewereunlikelytoabusetheirpowerinJokowi’sfavor.Allegationsofearlyvotingon8JulyinWestPapuawerenotproven.Numerousproblemswiththeplaintiff’sevidencepromptedthecourttodismissallegationsofwidespreadfraudinthisprovince.

8. WhiletheplaintiffhadclaimedfraudinvotinginSouthNiasaftersomepollingstationsreport-ed100percentturnout,thecourtnotedthatpoliticalpartyagentsonElectionDayhadsignedappropriateformsatlowerlevelsandthereforevalidatedthisturnout.InJakarta,theprovin-cialKPUfollowedBawaslu'srecommendationbyconductingare-voteat13pollingstations;andthehighnumbersofpeoplewhousedtheDPKTbintheprovincewerenotshowntohaveeithersignificantlyorexclusivelysupportedJokowi.

9. InEastJava,anotherareaclaimedtobesubjecttohighlevelsofirregularities,thejudgesde-scribedtheplaintiff’sclaimsoffraudas"assumptive"and"false".ClaimsthatJokowi’scampusedmoney-politicswerenotsupportedbystrongwitnesstestimony,reports,orspecificoccurrenc-esthatcouldbeproven.PollingstationwitnessesforthePrabowo-HattaticketdidnotprotestagainsttheDPKTbwhereitwasallegedlyabused.Furthermore,thecourtsaiditwasalsowrongtoclaimthat"toomanyvotersusedDPKTb"astherewerenomaximumlimitsestablishedinlaw.

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EvidencethatPrabowowonbysignificantmarginsinsomeareasdespiteDPKTbuse(suchasinMadura)signifiedthatthetemporarylistdidnotfavorJokowi.ThecourtfoundthattheKPUhadaddressedBawaslu'srecommendationsbyconductingatieredinvestigation,including,inseveralareas,name-to-addressre-checkingofDPKTbusers.Therefore,allegationsofwidespreadfraudinEastJavawerefoundtobebaseless.

10. Claimsregardingtheuseofmoney-politicsingeneralwerenotprovenandthecourtfoundnoevidencethatallegedvote-buyingparticularlyadvantagedJokowioverPrabowo.

TheConstitutionalCourtcaseallowedforalengthyairingoftheallegationsoffraudsurroundingthepresidentialelection. Inthissense,theelectiondisputeresolutionmechanismasprescribedby lawworkedwell.ThePrabowo-Hattalegalteamwasfoundtohavepresentedaweakcaseasitexhausteditsfinallegalchallengeagainsttheelectionresult,astheConstitutionalCourt’sdecisionsarefinalandbinding.

Inadesperateeffort,thePrabowo-Hatta’slegalteamfiledacasetochallengeproceduralaspectsofvotecountingandrecapitulationintheJakartaAdministrativeCourt(PTUN).On28August,thiscasewassummarilydismissedbyapanelofjudgesastheyregardedtheircourtasaninappropriatevenueforsuchanelection-relatedcase.

AlthoughthecoalitionthatbackedPrabowo-HattacanobstructJokowi’sgovernmentviathenewlegisla-ture,theformationofaspeciallegislativecommitteetorevisitissuesthatwerepreviouslyexaminedbytheConstitutionalCourtwouldonlyserverhetoricalpurposesandwouldbepowerlesstoaltertheresult.

TheresultannouncedbytheKPUon22JulystoodandJokowiwassworn-inasthePresidentoftheRepublicofIndonesiaon20October2014.

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Source:KPU-RI

PART IVRecommendations for future

elections

Source:IFES

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PART IV – Recommendations for future electionsTheneedforfutureelectoralreformwasmadeapparentbynumerousissues,technicalproblemsandpoliticalambiguitiesthataroseduringthiselectionseason.On23January, theConstitutionalCourtmadeafinalandbindingrulingtoupholdarequestforreviewbytheCoalitionofCivilSocietyforSi-multaneousElectionstosynchronizethelegislativeandpresidentialpolls.Whilefindinginfavoroftheplaintiff,declaringbothelectionsshouldbeheldonthesameday,thecourtsaidthedecisiondidnothavetobeimplementeduntil2019.ThisdecisionalonemeantIndonesianeedstoundergoanothermajoroverhaulofitselectionlaws.

Post-election issuesTheriseofPrabowoSubianto’s“RedandWhiteCoalition”asaunitedpoliticalforcehasbeenamixedblessing.AneffectiveoppositionisademocraticphenomenonIndonesiahasnoticeablylackedduringPresident’sYudhoyono’sdecadeinoffice.Theinabilityofnon-governmentpartiestoarticulatealter-nativesoropposehispolicieshasbeenanotedweaknessinthesystem.However,frustratedbyPra-bowo’sloss,thiscoalitionhasbecomepersonallyvindictiveandevendestructiveasittriestoimple-mentpoliciesthatvotersrejected,suchaswindingbackthechangesmadetotheconstitutionduringthepost-Soehartoreformasiperiod.

Legislature procedures bill

On8July,asthecountrywaspreoccupiedwiththepresidentialelectionthefollowingday,theoutgo-ingmembersoftheDPRpassedanamendmentofLaw27/2009asLaw17/2014governingMPR/DPR/DPD/DPRD,knownastheMD3law.Itgoverns,amongotherthings,theinternalselectionmechanismsforlegislativebodyleadershippositions.TheMD3Lawadoptsavotingmechanismtoreplaceprevi-ousregulationsthatallowedthepoliticalpartywiththemostseatsintheDPRtoappointthespeaker,deputyspeakerandcommissionchairs.Thelaw’spassagebythesamecoalitionofpartiesthatbackedPrabowo’scandidacymarksamoveawayfrompolicymakingbyconsensustowardsawinner-takes-allapproach.On29September,theConstitutionalCourtrejectedPDI-P’srequesttorepealthelaw.ChiefJusticeHamdanZoelvaexplainedthatPDI-Pdidnothavetherequiredlegalstandingasithadsufferednoinfringementofitsconstitutionalrightsasaconsequenceofthelaw.

Thecourt’srulingineffectaffirmedthedominanceoftheGerindra/Prabowo-ledRed-and-WhiteCoa-litionasaformidablesourceofopposition.WithastronggripovertheDPRandDPRDs,theRed-and-WhiteCoalitionislikelytohaveafreehandindictatingthelegislativeagendaunlessPresidentJokowiandhisalliescanbreakitupandgainaworkinglegislativemajority.Withoutsuchachange,ahostilelegislaturemayadverselyimpactJokowi’sabilitytoexecuteanumberofhisprograms.AfterheateddebatesbetweenthetwopoliticalpartycoalitionstocontrolleadershippositionswithintheDPR,theRedandWhitecoalitioncameoutvictoriousandinstalledSetyaNovanto(Golkar)asspeakerofthehouseandFadliZon(Gerindra),AgusHermanto(Demokrat),TaufikKurniawan(PAN)andFahriHamzah(PKS)asdeputyspeakers.ThiscleansweepofleadershippositionsleavesthePDI-P-ledcoalitionthatbackedthenewpresidentwithoutasingleDPRleadershippositioninthenewlegislature.Inorderto

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balancethiscleansweepandaccommodateconcernsraisedbytherepresentativesofGreatIndonesiacoalition,oneadditionalDeputyChairmanpositionhasbeenaddedtoeachofthe11DPRcommissionsandfivecommittees.

Asareactiontothis,partiesunderthePDI-P-ledGreatIndonesiaCoalitionestablishedacounter-lead-ershipwhichhadcausedadeadlock in theDPRforalmostamonth.Partyelites, inaddressing thisdeadlock,wasquitegallantastheyagreedtoholdameetingbetweenthetwocoalitionsandnegotiate,whichachievedaconsensus:revisinganumberofarticlesinLaw17/2014deemedastherootofDPR’sleadershipproblems.KMPretainedtheirseatsasspeakerandfourdeputyspeakersoftheDPR.

Local election law

Aftera12-hourdelayfromitsexpecteddecisiononthematter,aDPRplenarysessionfinallyheldastandingvote,whichcamedown226-135 in favorof the indirectelectionofdistrictandprovincialexecutivesviatherespectivelocallegislativecouncil.PresidentYudhoyono’sDemocratPartystagedawalk-outafterits10-pointplantoimprovedirectelectionswastakenoffthediscussiontable.Thesixmembersthatremainedfromtheparty's148-seatblocwereunabletostaveofftheiropponents,andPrabowo'sRedandWhiteCoalitionscoredamajorlegislativevictory.

Thenewlaw(LawNo.22/2014)removedtheauthorityofboththeKPUandBawasluwithregardtolocalexecutiveelections.DPRDsinsteadaretoappointanelectioncommittee(Panitia Pemilih–Panlih)comprisingthreerepresentativeeachfactionintheDPRD,andledbytheDPRDspeakeranddeputyspeakers.However,thelawprovidedexceptionsforautonomousregions,suchasAceh,thatmayhaveprevailinglawsgoverningtheelectionsoflocalexecutiveheads.

Inresponsetothenewlaw,KPUChairmanHusniKamilManiktoldthepressthathisinstitutionwouldwaituntilthenewlawhadformallybeenenactedbeforeputtinginternalregulationsinplaceforthe246localelectionsscheduledfor2015.Whilethemovetoreturntoindirectelectionsrepresentedamonumental legislativedecision, itwaswidelydenouncedbycriticsasasetbackfortheIndonesiandemocratictransition.CivilsocietyorganizationshavesignaledthattheywouldfileforajudicialreviewattheConstitutionalCourtifthislawwaseverpromulgated.

In linewithhispromisetofindawaytoblockthewidelycondemned indirectelectionsofregionalheads,asmandatedbythenewly-passedLocalElectionLaw(LawNo.22/2014),before leaving theoffice,presidentYudhoyonoissuedtwoGovernmentRegulationsinLieuofLaw(Perppu)torestoredi-rectelections.ThefirstPerppu(No.1/2014)wasdraftedtorevokethenewlypassedLawNo.22/2014,whilethesecondPerppu(No.2/2014)repealstwoarticlesinLawNo.32/2014onLocalAdministrationthatgivesregionallegislativebodies(DPRDs)thejurisdictiontoelectregionalheads.

Thepresidentexplainedhisbelated intervention,sayingthatdespitehisrespectfortheDPR’sdeci-sion-makingauthority,thetwoPerppuneededtobeissuedtoprotectpeople’ssovereigntyandde-mocracy.ThepresidentsaidthatheissuedthePerppuinresponsetothemassiveoutcryofthepeopleagainstindirectelectionsandasamovetoalloworganizerstoprepare204localelectionsin2015.Thepresident’suseofexecutiveauthorityhasbeenmetwithcautiousoptimismfrommanyobservers,al-thoughhadhenotvacillated,hecouldhaveorderedhispartytovoteagainstthelawinsteadofwalkingoutandthisadhocfixwouldnothavebeennecessary.

Inordertoentertheforceoflaw,PerppumustbeapprovedbytheDPR-whichwillbedeliberatedin

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asessionscheduledformid-January2015.ThechairmanoftheDemocratfactionintheDPRpromisedthepartywoulddefendthePerppuandfightforitsapprovalintheHouse.AfterhandingoverofficetoJokowion20October,YudhoyonosignaledthathispartywouldsupportthetwoPerppuhehadissuedwhenbothcomebeforethelegislatureforconsideration.

Support for local direct elections

Indonesiansareoverwhelminglyinfavorofkeepingtheelectionofgovernorsandheadsofdistrictasdirectelections.Overall,84percentofrespondentstotheLSI-IFESsupportedpollconductedinOcto-ber-November2104supporteddirectelectionsforgovernorsandheadsofdistricts,asopposedtoonly6percentwhosupportedindirectelectionsthroughtheDPRD.AlthoughthemeasuretosupportachangetodirectelectionsisbeingbackedbytheRedandWhiteCoalitionintheDPR,only8percentofIndo-nesianswhovotedforthecoalitioninAprilsupportthemovetoindirectelections.Additionally,amongsupportersofPrabowoSubiantointhepresidentialelection,whohaslikewiseadvocatedforthemovetoindirectelections,only10percentsupportedthemovetoindirectelections,comparedto78percentwhosupporteddirectelections.AmongthosewhovotedforPresidentJokoWidodo,89percentsup-porteddirectelectionsversusonly4percentwhosupportedindirectelections.Similarly,amongthosewhovotedforpartiesintheGreatIndonesiaCoalition,90percentsupportdirectelectionsand5percentsupportindirectelections.

Oneargumentthathasbeenutilizedinsupportofindirectelectionsisthatdirectelectionsaretooex-pensive.Onthispoint,slightlymoreIndonesiansagreethandisagree,butthatdoesnotmeanthattheywouldratherhaveindirectelectionsbecauseofthecostofelections.Aplurality(45percent)agreedthatelectionsforgovernorsanddistrictheadsaretooexpensive,while36percentdisagreedwiththisstatement.AgreementwiththisstatementwashigheramongsupportersofPrabowoSubianto,with52percentagreeing,comparedtoonly40percentamongsupportersofPresidentJokowi.However,two-thirdsofIndonesians(67percent)saidthatnomatterthecost,itismostimportantthatvotersgettochoosetheirlocalleaders,andnothaveothersdoitforthem,whileonly9percentsaidthatelectionsweretooexpensive,anditwouldthereforebebetterforlocalparliamentstochoosegovernors,districtheads,andmayors.AmajorityofsupportersofPresidentJokowi(71percent)andtheGreatIndonesiaCoalition(71percent)weremorelikelytosupporttheimportanceoflocalelections,aswereamajorityofsupportersofPrabowoSubianto(59percent)andtheRedandWhiteCoalition(66percent).ThedatamakesclearthatIndonesiansofallpoliticalleaningsprefertheyhaveavoiceintheelectionoftheirregionalandlocalheadsofgovernment,eveniftheyareconcernedaboutthecostofelections.

AnotherargumentthathasbeenusedforindirectelectionsisthatthesetypesofelectionswouldleadtoareductionofmoneypoliticsandcorruptioninIndonesia.Inthiscase,amajorityofIndonesiansdisagreewiththeargument.Lessthanone-in-threeIndonesians(29percent)agreedthatmovingtosystemwherelocallegislatorselectgovernorsanddistrictheadswouldreducemoneypolitics,transac-tionalpolitics,anddiscouragecorruption,whileamajority(52percent)disagreedwiththisstatement.AmajorityofsupportersofPresidentJokowiandPrabowoSubianto(52percentineachcase)disagreedthat indirect electionswould reduce corruption. Similarly, amajority of supporters of theRed andWhiteCoalition(51percent)andtheGreatIndonesiaCoalition(56percent)disagreed.

There isalsoevidencethatasignificantproportionof IndonesianvotersmighthavemadedifferentchoicesintheirvotesfortheirprovincialDPRiftheyknewthattheserepresentativeswouldberespon-sibleforvotingfortheprovincialgovernor.Thirty-sevenpercentofrespondentssaidthattheywould

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havevotedforthesamecandidate,eveniftheyknewthatwiththenewproposedelectorallaw,thiscandidatewouldvotetoelecttheirnewgovernor.Meanwhile,25percentsaidtheywouldhaveeitherdefinitelychosenadifferentcandidateorparty(8percent)ormighthavechosenadifferentcandidateorparty(17percent).Afurther38percentsaidtheydidnotknowwhattheywouldhavedonehavingknownthisinformationatthetime.

OnTuesday,20January2014theHouseofRepresentative(DPR),withunanimoussupportofall10politicalfactions,finallyapprovedtworegulationsinlieuoflaw(Perppu)ontheelectionofgovernors,regents, andmayorsandon local administration.The reinstatementofdirectelectionsmeans thattheauthoritytoimplementregionalelectionwasreturnedtoKPU.Despitetheendorsementfromall10partyfactionsintheDPR,the130pagedocumentandits206articlesthatresultedfromthefirstPerppuwaspoorlydraftedintermsofcontentandstructure.AcoalitionofCSOsfocusedonelectoralmanagementiscurrentlyhelpingtheDPRtoamendmentthePerppu,througha“DaftarIsianMasalah”orDIM,whichisaninventoryofproblematicarticlesalongwithrecommendedrevisions.Throughouttherevisionprocess,theCSOcoalitionalsohopestoadvanceitsworkondevisinganOmnibuselectionlawtounifythecurrentfiveseparateelectorallaws.

Electronic voting and counting technologies

Currently,thereisincreasingmomentumbehinddevelopingandapplyingavarietyofelectoraltech-nologiesinIndonesia.TheAgencyfortheDevelopmentandApplicationofTechnology(BPPT),incon-junctionwithseveralregionalKPUsandregionalgovernments,isstudyingtheuseofe-votingthroughelectronic votingmachines (EVM) in local elections. BPPT has pilot-tested the use of touch-screenEVMswithauditablepapertrailsinseveralvillageheadelectionsinSouthSumatra,WestJava,CentralJava,andSouthSulawesi.

Beforeimplementinganytechnology,theKPUmustconductacomprehensivefeasibilitystudy.Asu-perficialornarrowlyfocusedfeasibilitystudycanresultinthewrongdecisionsand,atbest,unsustain-ablesolutionsthatmustbereplacedintheshortterm.Atworst,theintegrityofanentireelectioncanbeunderminedtoagreateror lesserextent.Ameaningful feasibilitystudyshouldfirstaddressthequestion"Shouldwedothis?"Thereafter,thestudyshouldthenfocusonthequestion"Howdowedothis?"Itisimportanttoavoidbeingtrappedintechnologicaldeterminism–asituationinwhichstake-holdersfeelthatitisimperativetouseatechnologyjustbecausethetechnologyexists.

InIndonesianelections,aftervotesarecastsecretlythroughmanualpunchingofapaperballot,thevotecountingprocessatpollingstationsisconductedinpublicinanopenandtransparentway,theimportanceofwhichisdifficulttooverstate.Thevotecountingprocessthattakesplaceatmorethanhalfamillionpollingstations,embeddedinthecommunityintermsofbothproximityandownership,isverydemocratic.Pollingstationscloseat1p.m.,andcountingimmediatelybeginsatbroaddaylight.Inwhathasbeendescribedasacelebratoryenvironment,pollworkersopenandcounteachvoteinfrontoftheeyesofthepublic.Theofficialresultsdocument(theC1form)iscompletedandsignedbyofficialsandparty/candidateagentspresent.Suchaprocessprovidesbroadspaceforpublicparticipa-tionandoversight,thusallowingthepublictobecertainthattheresultiscredibleandvalid.Thisde-greeofopennessisauniqueandpositivequalityinIndonesianelections,andshouldnotbeanurgentpriorityforreform.

Themoreurgentandpressingproblem in Indonesianelections is thetieredrecapitulationprocess.Aftervotesarecountedatpollingstations,officialcountingresultsaredeliveredtothevillage/ward,

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sub-district,district,province,andnationallevelinaslowprocessthatcantakeweekstocomplete.Waitingfortheresultsofsuchaslowprocesshasledtospeculationandanxietyamongthegeneralpublic.Electionexpertshaveoftenstatedthatthemanualrecapitulationprocessispronetobothun-intentionalclericalerrorsaswellasintentionalmanipulationandfraud.Ratherthanfocusingonthepopularbutunnecessarye-votingtechnologies,itisimportantthattheKPUfocusesanyeffortstoim-provetheelectionusingelectronictechnologytoimprovetherecapitulationprocess–morepopularlyreferredtoas“e-recap”.

Result Management System

Electionresultsfaceintensescrutiny,anEMB’scredibilityandsuccesshingesonhowwellanelectionmanagementbodytabulatesandpublicizeselectionsresult.ThereneedstobearevisionofelectionlawthatobligestheKPUtodomanualtabulationateverylevelofadministration.Unlikethecount,currentlytabulationisoftenconductedbehindcloseddoorsandextremelyvulnerabletofraud.Indo-nesianeedsamodernelectronicelectionresultsystemthatcanproduceofficialresultstransparentlywithindaysinsteadofweeks.

Lessons learned from 2014 and recommendations for future ElectionsFollowingthe2014elections,academicsandrepresentativesofNGOworkingonelectionsmetforanumberoftimestoevaluateoftheelectioncycleandprovidetheKPUwithasetofrecommendationsforsomeofthefuturereforms.Listedbelowarekeyrecommendationsresultingfromthesemeetings.

End practices that encourage vote-buying

Post-electionsurveysindicatethatthepracticeofvote-buyingcontinuestobepervasivethroughoutthecountry.FifteenpercentofIndonesiansreportedhavingbeenapproachedwithmoneyorgiftsinadvanceofthelegislativeelectioninordertovoteforaparticularcandidate,withafurtherfivepercentsayingtheyknewsomebodyelsewhohadbeenapproached.30TheKPUshouldworkonsetofregula-tionsandinformationcampaignsthatwoulddiscouragethispracticebothinpoliticalpartycandidatesandvoters.Inaddition,theuseofproxyvotingbytriballeaders,stillpresentinsomepartsofIndonesia(suchasNoken practiceinPapuanhighlands)isveryconducivetovote-buying.TheKPUshouldcooper-atewithcivilsocietyandfileareviewofthispracticewiththeConstitutionalCourttoensurethateachvoter’sfundamentalrighttovoteisfullyprotected.

KPU’s formal evaluation system

TheKPU’ssystemofevaluationwithitsprovincialandregency/municipalbranchesisapoliteformalitythat lackssubstance.The2009evaluationreportsharedwiththepublicwasdisorganized.TheKPUneedstoimproveitsmonitoringandevaluationandcouldstartbystandardizingreportsateachtiertomakedatacollectioneasier.Theevaluationreportshouldincludeaperformanceevaluationofelectionworkers,thecentralizeddatabasecanimprovefuturerecruitment.Civilsocietyorganizationscouldbe

30 LembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI)-IFESPostLegislativeElectionNationalSurveywith2009respondentsandmarginoferror±2.2%,June2014

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involvedtoprovideacriticalanalysis.ThefinalreportshouldbesharedpubliclyandnotjustwiththeDPR.Thiswouldimprovecommunityengagement,increasetransparencyandhopefullyspurthecom-missiontoimprovethequalityoffutureelections.

Voter list

ElectionDayobservationbylocalmonitorsfoundmanyinstancesoftheimproperuseoftheperma-nent,temporary,andadditionalvoterlists.TheNGOsrecommendedthelistsbebasedonmoreup-to-datedatafromtheMinistryofHomeAffairs,begivenmoreself-explanatorynames,takeonbetterformatstoeaserecapitulationandbeprovidedbetterpublicinformationofthetypesofvoterslistsandtheirappropriateuse.

Election staff training

Manymistakesobservedatpollingstationsstemmedfromthepoortrainingofofficials.Moreofthestafftaskedwithoperatingpollingstationsshouldreceiveformaltrainingandwithgreaterfrequencythanisthecurrentpractice.

Civil service reform

Acomprehensivereformofthecivilserviceisnecessarytoimprovetheworkethic,performance,andthecapacityofthehumanresources.Thereformshouldinvolveastaggeringofcommissionerterms,whichallowstheretentionofinstitutionalknowledgeandexperienceatthehighestleveloftheinstitu-tionwhichwillreducethetimeneededfornewKPUcommissionerstoadapt,thereforeimprovingtheefficiencyoftheirworkschedule.Thiswillleadtoacreationofamorepermanentgroupofelectionadministratorsappointedonmeritandmademoredirectlyaccountablefortheconductoftheelec-tions.Inadditiontotheircurrentadministrativedutieswithintheinstitution,rolesandresponsibilitiesofthecurrentKPUcivilservicestaffshouldbeexpandedtoincludeassistingCommissionerswiththesubstantiveelectoralmanagementanddecision-makingprocess.ThiswouldassistinensuringthattheKPUinstitutionisnotfullydependentontheCommissioners’individualskillsandthattheinstitutioncanmaintainthissubstantiveelectoralcompetencewhenCommissionerschange.

IT support

TheadhocscanningoftheC1resultformsconductedbytheKPUduringthiselectioncyclewasagreatadvanceintransparencyandshouldbecontinued.Thisprocessshouldbecontinuedandprop-erlyregulatedbytheKPUtoensureconsistencyincompliance.Itneedstobebetterplannedwiththerightequipmentandpersonnelallocated,includingimprovingthecommission’stechnicalhelpdeskcapabilities.

Election Dispute Resolution

ToomanyelectionresultdisputeswenttotheConstitutionalCourtandcouldhavebeenresolvedbyBawaslu,whichholdsamandateforarbitrationandmediation.Bawasluneedstomoreactivelyadjudicatedisputesatthenationalandregionalleveltocorrectmistakesaswellastopunishthosefoundguiltyof fraudormanipulation.Bawaslushouldalsotakeupamoreactiverole inauditingcampaignfunding.

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Campaign Finance Reform

CampaignfinanceisaproblemoverdueinIndonesia,areformisnecessarytobreakthecostlyelection.Regulatingcampaignfinancewillreducethedependenceofpartiesonrichindividualstogetelectedandreducerent-seekingbehavioronceinoffice.Besidesstricterrequirementtoreportandauditcam-paignfinance,publicfinanceofpoliticalpartiesshouldalsobeavailabletodecreasethehighcostofrunningforoffice.

Omnibus election law

Toaddresstheoverlappingandcontradictorynatureofthecurrentelectorallegalframework,theincomingadministrationneeds toconsider combiningallelec-tionlawsintoonecomprehensivebill.Thiscouldhelpsynchronizeandstandardizeapproachesacrossalllev-elsofelections. Itwouldalsoframeelectoralreforminacomprehensiveratherthanpiecemealmannertoaddresstheproblemshighlightedbythisreport.

Earlyworkinthisregardbeganin2010throughaco-alitionofelectoralNGOs.Thefirstphaseoftheprogramwascompletedin2014,andproduceda367-pagereport31thatcontainedafirstdraftofacodifiedelectorallawfortheDPRtoconsider,alongwithsupportingacademicliterature.

Addressing Invalid Votes

Measurednationally,invalidvotesinthe2014legislativeelectionwerehigherthaninternationalcom-parisonssuggesttheyshouldbe.Inthelegislativeelectiontherewere14,601,436peoplewhovotedbutunaccountedfor.Thehighnumberofinvalidityshouldbemitigatedbyconductingacomprehen-siveresearchto identifythemaincause.TheKPUshouldalsoconductstrongerefforts forexamplevotereducationtoensurevotesarecastandcountedproperly.

Noken voting

Therearecurrentlyno legalprovisionsregulatingtheculturalpracticeofnoken voting. Initially, thepracticeusednoken bags inlieuofballotboxes.Overtime,thecourthasallowedtheuseofgeneralconsensusofthetribeand,worse,unilateraldecisionmadebythetribalchief.Suchpracticeofproxyvotingshouldendinordertoensurethattheprincipleof“oneperson,onevote”standstrueforeachandeveryeligiblevoter.Theproceduralconsistencyoftheelectionsystemshouldbemaintained.Al-lowingtheculturalpracticeinPapuahighlandsmaycreateadangerousprecedentbyjustifyingotherareastodemandproxyvotinginthenameoftraditionaswell.

31 Perludem’sstudycanbeaccessedatthefollowingaddress: http://www.perludem.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1883:buku-kajian-kodifikasi-uu-pemi-lu&Itemid=130

Source:IFES

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Streamline Indonesia’s electoral cycle and calendar

Until2019,thecountrywillcontinuetohaveseventypesofelectionthatwillbeheldseparately.2014,Indonesiaconductedanumberofelectionsseparately:legislative(DPR,DPD,ProvincialDPRD,andRe-gency/MunicipalDPRD),presidential,andregionalheads(gubernatorial,regent,ormayoral).ElectionsareheldindifferentpartsofIndonesiaeveryyear,leadingtomassiveelectoralexpenses,lackoffocusbypoliticalparties,aswellasvotersbeingoversaturatedbytheoverly-highfrequencyofoneelectionafteranother.Toaddressthisproblem,thoseelectionsshouldbestreamlined.

Since 2011, NGOs and academics, amongwhich is the prominent electionmonitoring and activistgroupPerludem,havecontinuouslyproposedthestreamliningofelectoraltimeline.MK’sverdict in2014statedthatasof2019,thelegislativeandpresidentialelectionmustbeconductedsimultaneous-ly.WiththerevisionofLaw1/2015,concurrentelectionforregionalheadshasbeenachievedthroughtheprovision inthis lawmandatingthatby2027, Indonesiahasonlytwoelections:oneelectiontosimultaneouslyelect thepresident/vice-president,membersofnational legislatures (HouseofRep-resentatives/DPR and the senate/DPD), andmembers of regional legislatures (DPRD); and anotherelectiontosimultaneouslyelectregionalheads(governors,mayors,andregents).Thisisagreatstep,butimprovementscouldstillbemade.

Thestreamliningofelectionscouldbeimprovedbyproposingthefollowingarrangement:oneregionalelectionandonenationalelection,heldtwo-and-a-halfyearapartfromoneanother.Theregionalelec-tionwouldincludeelectionsofgovernors,mayors,regents,andmembersoftheregionallegislature(DPRD);whilethenationalelectionwould includeelectionsofthepresident/vice-presidentandthenationallegislatures.Arrangingelectionsinthiswaywouldallowpoliticalparties,candidates,politicalstakeholders,andtheirconstituentstoadequatelyfocusbetweeneitherlocalornationalissues,butonlyoneatatimeandnotsimultaneously.

List of Acronyms and References

59

List of AcronymsAGENDA TheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsGeneralElectionNetworkfor

DisabilityAccess

Bawaslu BadanPengawasPemilihanUmum(TheElectionOversightBody)

BPP BilanganPembagiPemilih(VoterDivisorNumber)

Bupati Regent

C-1Form FormulirC1(PollingStationResultsForm)

Dapil DaerahPemilihan(ElectoralDistrict/Constituency)

DB1 FormulirDB1(SubDistrictResultsForm)

DC1 FormulirDC1(RegencyResultsForm)

DKPP DewanKehormatanPenyelenggaraPemilu(TheHonoraryCouncilofElectionManagementBodies)

DPD DewanPerwakilanDaerah(HouseofRegionalRepresentatives)

DPK DaftarPemilihKhusus(SpecialVoterList)

DPKTb DaftarPemilihKhususTambahan(AdditionalSpecialVotersList)

DPR DewanPerwakilanRakyat(People'sRepresentativeCouncil)

DPRDKabupaten/Kota DewanPerwakilanRakyatKabupaten/Kota(Regency/MunicipalPeople’sRep-resentativeCouncil)

DPRDProvinsi DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerah-Provinsi(ProvincialPeople’sRepresenta-tiveCouncil)

DPS DaftarPemilihSementara(TemporaryVoterList)

DPT DaftarPemilihTetap(FinalVoterList)

DPTb DaftarPemilihTambahan(AdditionalVoterList)

E-KTP KartuTandaPendudukElectronic(ElectronicIDCard)

Gerindra PartaiGerakanIndonesiaRaya(GreatIndonesiaMovementParty)

Golkar PartaiGolonganKarya(FunctionalGroupParty)

Hanura PartaiHatiNuraniRakyat(People'sConscienceParty)

IFES InternationalFoundationforElectoralSystems

IRI InternationalRepublicanInstitute

JPPR JaringanPendidikanPemilihuntukRakyat(ThePeople'sVoterEducationNetwork)

Kabupaten Regency

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Representative_Council





http://www.jppr.or.id/

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Kecamatan SubDistrict

Kemlu KementrianLuarNegeri(ForeignMinistry)

Kota Municipality

KPI KomisiPenyiaranIndonesia(IndonesianBroadcastingCommission)

KPK KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi(TheCorruptionEradicationCommission)

KPPS KelompokPenyelenggaraPemungutanSuara(PollWorkers)

KPU KomisiPemilihanUmum(GeneralElectionCommission)

KPUD KomisiPemilihanUmumDaerah(RegionalGeneralElectionCommission)

LP3ES LembagaPenelitian,PendidikandanPeneranganEkonomidanSosial(Insti-tuteforSocialandEconomicResearch,EducationandInformation)

LSI LembagaSurveiIndonesia(TheIndonesianSurveyInstitute)

MD3 LawonMPR,DPR,DPD,andDPRD

MK MahkamahKonstitusi(ConstitutionalCourt)

MPR MajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat(People'sConsultativeAssembly)

NasDem PartaiNasionalDemokrat(NationalDemocraticParty)

NGO Non-GovernmentOrganization

NTB NusaTenggaraBarat(WestNusaTenggara)

NTT NusaTenggaraTimur(EastNusaTenggara)

NU NahdlatulUlama(IndonesiaTraditionalistSunniIslamGroup)

PA PartaiAceh(AcehParty)

PAN PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty)

Panlih PanitiaPemilih(ElectionCommittee)

PBB PartaiBulanBintang(CrescentStarParty)

PD PartaiDemokrat(DemocratParty)

PDA PartaiDamaiAceh(AcehPeaceParty)

PDIP PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(IndonesianDemocracyPartyofStruggle)

Perludem PerkumpulanuntukPemiludanDemokrasi(AssociationforElectionsandDemocracy)

Perppu PeraturanPemerintahPenggantiUndang-Undang(GovernmentRegulationsinLieuofLaw)

61

Persepsi PerhimpunanSurveiOpiniPublikIndonesia(TheIndonesianAssociationforPublicOpinionSurveys)

PKB PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty)

PKPI PartaiKeadilandanPersatuanIndonesia(Indonesia'sJusticeandUnityParty)

PKS PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(ProsperousJusticeParty)

PNA PartaiNasionalAceh(AcehNationalParty)

PPP PartaiPersatuanPembangunan(UnitedDevelopmentParty)

PTUN PengadilanTataUsahaNegara(StateAdministrativeCourt)

PTTUN PengadilanTinggiTataUsahaNegara(StateAdministrativeHighCourt)

Puskaptis PusatKajianKebijakandanPembangunanStrategis(TheIndonesianAssocia-tionforPublicOpinionSurveys)

SIDALIH SistemInformasiDataPemilih(VoterRegistrationInformationSystem)

TAF TheAsiaFoundation

TNI TentaraNasionalIndonesia(IndonesianMilitary)

TPS TempatPemungutanSuara(PollingStation)

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2014 Elections in Indonesia Final Report by Rumah Pemilu · 2014 Elections in Indonesia Final Report by Rumah Pemilu ... • Strengthen polling stationprocedures and training for