2016 - The Eyes for Mind in Cinema a Met

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The following is a pre-proof version of a chapter that was published as:

Coëgnarts, Maarten, and Peter Kravanja. "The Eyes for Mind in Cinema: A

Metaphorical Study of the Viewer’s Experience." Embodied Metaphors in Film,

Television, and Video Games: Cognitive Approaches. Ed. Kathrin Fahlenbrach.London/New York: Routledge, 2016. 129-144. Print.

If you want to quote from it, please check the published version.

Maarten Coëgnarts, University of AntwerpPeter Kravanja, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

The Eyes for Mind in Cinema: A Metaphorical Study of the Viewer’s Experience

Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja

1. Introduction

Research in neuroscience and cognitive science increasingly shows that human cognitive

reality is deeply rooted in common sensory-motor experience (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008;

Gallese and Lakoff 2005). For instance, growing empirical evidence in the field of cognitivelinguistics suggests that human reasoning about abstract concepts (e.g., mind, time, causality)

is metaphorically structured in terms of concrete concepts related to the functioning of human

bodies (e.g., Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Sweetser 1990).

When considering the commonality of these metaphorical mappings, which adheres to the

generic-level metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY, visual metaphors or more general metaphors of

perception, are often hailed as one of the most universal conceptual metaphors. That is, a

number of studies indicate that languages, despite cultural differences, use the same kind of

tactile information to structure the concept of perception (Lakoff 1995; Lakoff and Johnson

1999; Sweetser 1990; Yamanashi 2010; Yu 2003, 2004). Thereby, the scientific literature often

designates two important conceptual systems for analyzing perception from the perspective of

embodied metaphor. In the first system, perception is studied as an abstract target domain.

According to this metaphorical structure, our perceptual system is understood in terms of

corresponding concepts that are grounded in our bodily experiences. In particular, the tactile

experience of physical contact presents itself as an important source domain for perception.

As can be demonstrated by such linguistic expressions as “A comet came into my sight” or



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“The noise came through the wall” (Lakoff 1995, 139). The second system, by contrast,

regards perception not as an abstract target domain, but as a concrete source domain in its

own right (Barcelona 2003, 211-212; Johnson 2007, 165; Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 238;

Sweetser 1990, 38; Yu 2003, 149; Yu 2004, 669). In this model, perception, once itself

metaphorically clarified, is, in turn, mapped onto the mental function of thinking, knowing, or

understanding. Examples include such expressions as “I see what you’re saying” or “I don’t

see the point”.

The main objective of this chapter, then, is to examine how both metaphorical systems

can be used to study the viewer’s mental experiences. The rhetorical structure of our chapter

is as follows.

In the first part, we develop a metaphorical model of cinematic spectatorship based on

three types of embodied metaphors. Firstly, we show how the CONTAINMENT schema can be

metaphorically extended towards the visual field of the viewer. Thereby, we offer a

description of film spectator ship in which the inside of the viewer’s visual field is correlated

with the inside events of another container, namely, the filmic frame. Using Dewell’s dynamic

model of CONTAINMENT, we further make the claim that the filmic frame, as belonging to the

inside of the viewer’s visual field, can be analyzed as a merger of two basic experiential

patters, namely, ENTRY and ENCLOSURE. Secondly, we show how the viewer’s act of

perceiving can be conceptualized in terms of the tactile experiences of touch and reception.

Thereby, we address the empirical question of how the viewer’s eye can be pulled towards

some particulars of the filmic frame. Thirdly, we show how perception, in turn, can be used to

help structure the viewer’s higher mental function of understanding (e.g., understanding the

film’s narrative).

In the second part of our chapter, then, we will show how the viewer’s mental

experience of understanding a film, in particular his knowledge about the story and the

characters, can be facilitated by the cinematic evocation of character perception. Indeed, if

knowledge depends on seeing, it follows that perceptual clarity – the lack of obstacles in the

visual field – enhances our understanding. Such clarity, we argue, often comes with the

perception of characters. It is through the perception of a character that one often gains

important narrative knowledge about the characters and the story of a film.

In order to back these assertions empirically, we conclude our chapter with a concise

case-study. Using Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) as an example, we examine how the

viewer’s understanding of the story is related to the perception of a character.



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2. Metaphors of viewer’s perception and cognition

2.1. The viewer’s visual field as container

One of the most widespread metaphors that contributes to our reasoning about

perception involves the understanding of our visual field as a container (Lakoff and Johnson

1980, 30; Lakoff 1987, 272). This metaphor originates in the bodily experience of our bodies

as containers and as things in containers, and states that when we look at some object or

entity, we conceptualize what we see as being something inside it. As Lakoff and Johnson

(1980, 30) argue, this metaphorical concept emerges naturally in that when we look at some

territory, our field of vision automatically defines a bounded physical space (i.e., the part that

we can see). Consider, for example, such linguistic expressions as “The ship is coming into

view”, or “That’s in the center of my field of vision” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 30).

When considering the act of viewing a film, then, one might assert that our visual field

(container A) designates a specific kind of container in that it includes an object, which can be

further addressed as a container in itself, namely, the screen (container B). However, the

difference with the visual field is that the screen cannot be conceived metaphorically, as there

is no metaphorical mapping from the concrete onto the abstract. Indeed, the boundary of the

container schema is physically instantiated in the concrete constitution of the object of the

screen itself. Therefore the physical object of the screen cannot be understood in terms of a

conceptual metaphor. Moreover, like the fixed frame of painting the screen in film acts as “an

absolute boundary” in that it “unequivocally severs the bounded space from its surroundings”

(Buckland 2000, 48).

The screen constitutes the first obvious and physical object when viewing a film. In

addition, our visual field also includes the projection of a series of frames (i.e., single images

on the strip of a film in case of traditional analog cinema) onto the container of the screen

(container B) in quick succession. Likewise, the frame can be considered a container in its

own right (container C) in which the physical edges of the frame designate a boundary with

an inside, containing the fictional story world, and an outside, containing, amongst others, the

viewer (see also Buckland 2000; Branigan 2003, 2006).1 From this internal structure, then,

one can infer the basic logic of the filmic distinction between on-screen and off-screen as

follows:

(1) If the frame (container C) is in the screen (container B), and X is in the frame

1 This kind of containment, of course, is not applicable to film sound. As Buckland (2000, 48) rightly points out,

sound is only contained by another container, namely, the space of the auditorium itself.



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(container C), then X is in the screen, i.e., X is on-screen.

(2) If the frame (container C) is not in the screen (container B), and X is in the frame

(container C), then X is not in the screen, i.e., X is off-screen.

The filmic frame, however, differs from the fixed frame of a photograph or a painting

in one important way, namely, that it shifts in relation to the scene being photographed (see

also Buckland 2000, 48). That is, the inside visual content of the frame’s container is not

permanent, but alters due to the effect on the screen of the moving camera, a zoom lens, or

certain special effects. For this reason, one might analyze the filmic frame as a dynamic

container in the sense defined by Robert Dewell (2005). In his study of the patterns of

CONTAINMENT, Dewell (2005, 69) makes the case that “even static locational relations are

structured as dynamic processes that incorporate image-schema transformations and scanning

processes by a ceaselessly active conceptualiszer ”. More specifically, the author considers

CONTAINMENT as a merger of two basic experiential patterns that are grounded in the construal

of motion events, namely 1) ENTRY and 2) ENCLOSURE. Both patterns can be considered as

two of the most apparent path types related to CONTAINMENT. As Dewell (2005, 381) stresses,

both pathways differ in that they have opposing figure-ground relations. In ENTRY the

container is stationary and the object is the moving figure. Consider, for example, the

experience of observing another person inserting something in an open container such as a jar

or a glass, or the experience of reaching into your pocket to retrieve something. In both cases,

a particular object (the trajectory - TR) moves into the static container (the landmark - LM).

In ENCLOSING, by contrast, the container serves as the mobile entity with the contained object

as the relatively stationary entity. Examples of this path include such basic experiences as

grasping (a cookie in the hand, a child in its mother’s arms) or wrapping (a cookie in a

napkin, a child in a red dress). In both instances, the container actively encloses an object.

Consequently, the primary variable involves the question as to how active the container

encloses the contained. Dewell (2005, 379) thereby makes a distinction between two kinds of

poles. At one end of the continuum, there are the fixed and stationary regions of the setting

where things can be located (e.g., jars, cribs, houses). At the other end, there are the

receptacles that are not intrinsic containers in their canonical states (e.g., hands, napkins).

From this dichotomy, then, one might infer a description of the filmic frame that goes

beyond the notion of the frame as a static bounded space.

On the one hand, the filmic frame can be related to the experiential pattern of ENTRY inthat it involves activities and paths, with things going in frame and out of frame. Consider, for



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example, a static shot in which a character appears on-screen by coming into view from the

right side of the frame. In this sense, the frame defines a static location (LM), with an entity

(i.e., the character) going into that basis location. The entry path, then, coincides with the

movement of the character (TR) from the outside of the frame (a source or starting point) over

a sequence of locations towards the inside of the frame (a destination or end point).

On the other hand, given the camera’s potential to move, the filmic frame can also be

understood in terms of ENCLOSURE in that the frame actively determines what will be visible

on-screen. That is, the edges of the frame are used to select and to compose the inside content

of the container (i.e., the notion of framing). Consider, for example, a camera movement in

which the camera pans from the right to the left, thereby centering on a stationary character.

In this case, the frame serves as the mobile container with the character in front of the screen

as the relatively stationary entity.

We have made the above distinction for analytical proposes. In practice, however, both

type of events, ENTRY and ENCLOSING, are of course intertwined with high frequency. The

camera often moves and selects, while at the same time characters move in and out of the

frame. The result of both dynamical layers is an aesthetic tension between the camera and the

filmic frame, on the one hand, and the photographed reality, on the other hand. Moreover, one

might adopt both patterns to typify the film style of certain directors. For instance, one might

argue that the event of ENCLOSING is often restricted in the films of a director like Robert

Bresson, while the cinema of, for example, Luchino Visconti often includes a correlated

combination of both ENTRY and ENCLOSING.

Having defined the frame as a dynamical container, we are now in a position to

consider briefly its implications for the viewer’s construction of the film narrative. In order to

clarify this relationship, we first need to recall some principles of narrative construction.

According to Bordwell and Thompson (2004, 70-71), the viewer makes sense of a

narrative by performing all kinds of mental and cognitive activities: from identifying and

linking events causally in time and space to making assumptions and inferences about events.

In order to describe these activities, both authors draw upon the distinction between story and

plot . The term story designates “the set of all the events in a narrative, both the ones explicitly

presented and those the viewer infers” (70). The term plot refers to “everything visible and

audibly present in the film before us” (71). Like the story, the plot includes all the explicitly

presented events. However, it differs from it in that it also incorporates all the added

nondiegetic material that is brought in from outside the story (e.g., the film’s credits, thesoundtrack). The plot is all that is presented before us when viewing a film. The spectator,



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then, develops the story in his or her mind on the basis of cues in the plot. Notice again that

we conceptualize both principles of narrative in terms of the CONTAINMENT schema, that is,

we extend the structural elements of an outside, a boundary, and an inside, metaphorically in

order to reason about the abstract concepts of plot and story.

Given that both concepts depend on the explicitly presented events in the frame, one

might infer, then, the following basic logic based on the LINK schema (Lakoff 1987, 274).

(3) If the narrative principles of story and plot are linked to the inside events of the frame,

then these principles are constrained by, and dependent upon these events.

In this sense, one might argue that the higher-level concepts of plot and story are

grounded in the lower-level perceptual content of the container of the frame. For instance, we

infer events on the basis of cues that are inside the frame. Because the inside depends on the

perceptual interplay between ENTRY and ENCLOSURE, it follows, that the construction of the

plot and the story depends on these lower-level events as well.

However, in order for the viewer to construct the film narrative, the viewer’s attention

first and foremost has to be directed towards some particulars of the filmic frame. Indeed,

before the viewer can draw some conclusions on a higher, more abstract level, he first has to

recognize the perceptual cues. This, in turn, implies that the viewer’s perceptual organs (e.g.,

eyes) have to be drawn towards some aspects of the filmic frame, i.e., there has to be some

kind of connection between the viewer as perceiver, on the one hand, and the perceived

objects on-screen, on the other hand. Raising this tactile question immediately brings us to the

next metaphor of perception.

2.2. Viewer’s perception and physical contact

The VISUAL FIELD AS CONTAINER metaphor is one of the general and natural resources

for human beings to express their visual or perceptual experience in language. In addition,

scholars have also emphasized the importance of a set of conceptual metaphors that are

grounded in our tactile experience. Notable in this regard is the distinction made by George

Lakoff (1995, 139) between two types of metaphors, both involving the physical domain of

movement and contact: PERCEIVING IS TOUCHING and PERCEPTION IS RECEPTION (see also

Yamanashi 2010; Yu 2004). In the first conceptual metaphor, there is a mapping from the

source domain of TOUCHING onto the target domain of PERCEIVING. In this metaphor perception occurs “when the perceiver moves his organs of perception to the thing perceived



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and touches it” (139). Linguistic manifestations of this metaphor include such expressions as

“My eyes picked out every detail of the pattern” or “My gaze is out over the bay” (133). As

Lakof f points out, the words “gaze” and “eyes” are conceived metaphorically as visual limbs

that can reach out and touch things.

By contrast, in the second conceptual metaphor, there is a mapping from the source

domain of RECEPTION onto the target domain of PERCEIVING. In this metaphor perception

occurs “when the thing perceived moves to the perceiver’s organs of perception” (139).

Examples include such expressions as “A comet came into my sight” or “The noise came

through the walls”. In both sentences, perception is construed in terms of perceptual sense

impressions that reach the perceptual organs.

In both types, the underlying schema at work is that of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image

schema (e.g.; Johnson 1987, 113; Johnson 2007, 183). Both metaphors involve movement

from a starting point (perceiver and object perceived, respectively), over a pathway, towards

an end point (object perceived and perceiver, respectively). Successful perception, then, takes

place when the character’s gaze or the sense stimuli ‘reaches’ the target (the object perceived

and perceiver, respectively).

Because both metaphors involve physical contact, Lakoff (1995, 139) also speaks of

the more general conceptual metaphor PERCEPTION IS CONTACT BETWEEN PERCEIVER AND

PERCEIVED.

In addition to the conceptual mechanism of metaphor, some scholars have also

stressed the importance of metonymy in that the perceptual organ (the part) usually stands for

perception as a whole (Barcelona 2003; Yu 2004, 665).2 When considering the domain of

sight, for example, Hilpert (2005, 127) speaks of the INSTRUMENT FOR ACTIVITY metonymy

EYE FOR WATCHING.

When examining the conceptual metaphor PERCEPTION IS CONTACT BETWEEN

PERCEIVER AND PERCEIVED, then, in the light of the viewer’s film experience, the following

question arises: How can the viewer’s perceptual organs (e.g., ears, eyes) be connected to a

particular feature of the film? That is, how, for example, can the viewer’s eye be pulled to a

portion of the frame (i.e., the portion that might be essential to the viewer’s construction of

the film narrative)? To raise this question, is to bring in the principles of Gestalt psychology to

the foreground (e.g., figure-ground segregation, principle of proximity, principle of

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The conceptual mechanism of metonymy differs from metaphor in that it does not involve conceptual mappingsacross different experiential domains, but conceptual mappings that occur across different subdomains within the

same experiential domain (Yu 2004, 664).



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similarity).3 Human perceptual operations determine which objects of the filmic frame’s

container immediately come into view of the spectator, and which elements stay unnoticed. To

use the PERCEPTION AS RECEPTION metaphor, they decide which perceptual sense impressions

reach the perceptual organs of the viewer and which perceptual features tend to resonate in the

background. Moreover, they provide the viewer with something that is not necessarily

apparent and objectively given in what the audience experience directly in the world. Instead,

what the viewer perceives is in part determined by his cognitive faculties.4

In film, then, many of these principles can be evoked by the techniques of cinema,

including the two techniques of the shot (mise-en-scene and cinematography), the technique

of relating two shots (editing), and the technique of sound. With regard to the technique of

mise-en-scene, Bordwell and Thompson (2004), for example, point out that, because our

visual system is most accustomed to perceiving change, it is the changes in the mise-en-scene

that will most likely attract our attention. As they write, it is our “sensitivity to these changes”

that “allows the filmmaker to direct our notice across the two-dimensional space of the frame”

(208). These changes include such spatial alterations as movement, colour differences,

balance of distinct components, and variations in size. Consequently, the evocation of these

changes in the frame, go hand in hand with the activation of Gestalt principles in the viewer.

For instance, the principle of figure-ground segregation can be provoked by exploiting the

principle of color contrast, etc.

2.3. From perceiving to understanding in cinema

In the previous two sections we have dealt with a conceptual system in which the viewer’s

perceptual experience of seeing a film is addressed as an abstract target domain. More

specifically, we have analysed how the visual field of the viewer and the viewer’s act of

perceiving can be conceptualised in terms of the concrete source domains of a container and

physical contact, respectively. From the opposite side, scholars have also pointed toward a

conceptual system in which the perceptual experience now serves as the source domain for

other abstract target domains. For instance, with regard to the mental function of

understanding, Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 238) have stressed the importance of seeing. More

specifically, they argue that there exists a dominant conceptual metaphor for understanding,

namely, the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor, in which the concepts related to knowing

and other mental activities are conceptualized in terms of corresponding concepts related to

3 For a good summary of these principles, see, e.g., Evans and Green (2006, 65-68).

4 See in this regard also Rudolf Arnheim’s (1969) non-dualistic notion of ‘visual thinking’.



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the physical activity of seeing (see also Johnson 2007, 165).5 In more general terms, Yu

(2004, 669) also speaks of the metaphor MENTAL FUNCTION (thinking knowing, and

understanding) is PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE (seeing), which in turn can be seen as a sub-

version of the central metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY (e.g., Sweetser 1990).

When we combine this metaphorical model (the upper level), then, with the

metaphorical and metonymical mappings of perception, as discussed in the previous section

(the lower level), one can schematize both models as in Figure 1 (after Yu 2004, 680).

Figure 1. The metaphorical and metonymical mappings of perception (after Yu 2004, 680).

Because our ability to gain knowledge largely depends on our capacity to see, it

follows, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 238), that the logic of the latter is also

metaphorically extended to structure the logic of the former. This extension takes the form of

mappings from the source domain of vision onto the target domain of understanding, some of

which Johnson (2007, 165) describes as follows (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 238; Yu

149):

5 Another metaphorical concept for understanding would be the UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING metaphor. For a

discussion, see, e.g., Johnson (2007, 166).



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(i).

Source: Object seen

Target: Idea/concept

(ii). Source: Seeing an object clearly

Target: Understanding an idea

(iii). Source: Person who sees

Target: Person who understands

(iv).

Source: Visual focusing

Target: Mental attention

Hence, when discussing the viewer’s understanding of a film, it follows that someone

who apprehends the story or meaning of a film “sees it”, while someone who is ignorant or

incapable of apprehending the narrative clues, is “blind” or is “in the dark” (Lakoff and

Johnson 1999, 239).

In what follows, then, we will argue that the viewer’s understanding of a fi lm can be

facilitated by the cinematic structuring of character perception in the container of the filmic

frame. That is, it is through the perception of a character that filmmakers often initiate an

understanding in the viewer concerning the events that constitute the story of a film. Thus,

looking into the question of how understanding can be achieved, first and foremost implies

that we find an answer to the question as to how character perception can be elicited in film. 6

3. Character perception as facilitator of viewer’s understanding

In our previous study on cinematic subjectivity (Coëgnarts and Kravanja 2014), we have

related the answer to this question, likewise, to the physical functioning of human bodies. In

correspondence with our analysis of the viewer’s experience, we have claimed that the

perceptual state of a character can be expressed via the metaphorical mapping of the source

domain of physical contact onto the abstract target domain of character perception. In other

words, we have retained the conceptual metaphor PERCEPTION IS CONTACT BETWEEN

PERCEIVER AND PERCEIVED, as discussed earlier in section 2.2 of this chapter, but used it, not

to conceptualise the viewer’s perceptual experience, but to understand the character’s

perceptual experience. Hence, the connection in our previous study did not focus on the

connection between the viewer, outside the frame, and the visual stimuli inside the frame, but

on the tactile relationship on-screen between the perceiving character (PR) and the object

6 For a good discussion of character perception in relation to cinema, see, e.g. Branigan (1992); Gaut (2010);

Smith (1995); Wilson (2006).



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perceived (OP) by the character. Consequently, when we put both relationships together, it

follows that the visual field of the viewer now contains an object which can be addressed in

terms of a structural relationship between the perceiving character, on the one hand, and the

object perceived by the character, on the other hand (PR-OP). That is, the perceptual input of

the frame is structured in such a way to elicit the concept of perception in the viewer.

The crucial question, then, is: How can this relationship be addressed cinematically?

How can the perceptual input of the frame be structured in such a way as to elicit the concept

of character perception in the viewer? Examining this question, is essential, as it is through

the contact between PR and OP that perception is construed, and by metaphorical extension,

knowing and understanding. We have attempted to answer this question by presenting a

categorization of four cinematic ways in which the contact between PR and OP can be elicited

in film (see Figure 2). They are divided into two categories: the category of the single shot

and the category of two shots. Furthermore, within each category both participating elements

can be shown simultaneously on screen or not (i.e., homospatiality and non-homospatiality,

respectively). Let us briefly recall each strategy in turn.



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Figure 2. The representation of character perception in film (after Coëgnarts and Kravanja

2014, 167)

The first strategy involves the combination of the single shot and homospatiality, and

states that the contact between PR and OP can be elicited by showing both elements together

in one shot. Consequently, this strategy is defined by the cinematic techniques of framing and

mise-en-scene. This strategy can take two forms. Either the relationship is established in a

point-of-view shot (henceforth, POV) or it is not. In the former case, the visual content of the

shot is wholly determined by the viewer ’s perceptual field of vision. In this case the container

of the filmic frame, as part of the viewer ’s visuals field, fully coincides with the visual field of

the perceiving character. In the latter case, the relationship is elicited in a personal or semi-



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subjective non-POV shot or an impersonal or objective non-POV shot.

The second strategy also considers the category of the single shot, except that in this

case both elements are not shown simultaneously in the lager frame (i.e., non-homospatiality).

The relationship between PR and OP is instigated by moving the camera’s point of view from

the perceiver towards the object perceived. This movement can be elicited from a fixed

position (i.e., the zoom function) or not (i.e., the mobile camera). In both cases, the underlying

schema is that of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. Both stylistic solutions involve movement

from a starting point (the perceiver), over a pathway, towards an end point (the perceived).

Successful perception, then, takes place when the character’s point of view reaches the target.

The third strategy mirrors the first strategy in that it deals with homospatiality, except

for now the relationship is established on the level of two shots: shot A, that establishes the

origin of the perceiver, and shot B, that shows the object perceived. In this case, both elements

(i.e., both shots), are shown simultaneously in the larger frame of the screen. This strategy is

usually elicited via such cinematic devices as superimposition or split screen imagery.

Finally, the fourth strategy also involves the level of two shots, but considers the case

of non-homospatiality. Both elements are shown successively: A shot of the perceived object

is pasted after a shot of the perceiver. Consequently, this strategy is defined by editing and

such standard techniques as the shot/reverse-shot or the eyeline match. In cinema, especially

narrative cinema, this strategy is usually considered the most common way to connect the

perceiving character with the perceived object.

Having discussed some of the ways in which character perception can be

metaphorically elicited in film, we are now able to move upwards to the domain of thinking.

How can character perception, once cinematically articulated, now serve as the source domain

for the character mental function of thinking, knowing, or understanding (and by extension

the viewer’s understanding of the story)? Similarly, this question can be answered by recalling

the conceptual mappings, as outlined in section 2.3 of this chapter . That is, the viewer’s

knowledge of the story is facilitated through the perception of a character, because it is the

object seen by the character (OP) that is mapped onto the idea or concept. In other words, if

the person who sees, is the person who knows, it follows that the viewer also knows what the

character is knowing, by seeing what the character is seeing. By instigating a contact between

PR and OP, in accordance with one of the strategies, as sketched out in Figure 2, the film

automatically gives expression to the character’s mental function of knowing, and by

extension, the viewer’s knowledge about the character and the story.Consequently, given that the viewer’s understanding of the story depends on the



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perception of the character, it follows that if the visual field of the character is impeded, the

knowledge of the character (and the viewer) is impeded as well. In Michelangelo Antonioni’s

modernist art film Blow-Up (1966), for example, the viewer is following a character Thomas

(David Hemmings), who has accidentally captured a murder on film. That is, the inside of the

photographs’ container coincides with the inside of the visual field of Thomas’ eye when he

was looking through the camera at that precise moment in time. However, because the

photographs remain unclear, despite the character’s attempts to blow-up the negatives, the

character, together with the viewer, is left bewildered. Like Thomas, we are not able to satisfy

our knowledge about the murder, because our vision is left obscured.

In contrast, in classical Hollywood cinema, the visual field of the character is often

presented in a more transparent and unimpeded manner.7 To illustrate this, we shall analyse

one particular scene from Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958).

4. KNOWING IS SEEING in Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo

The case-study that we are going to analyse involves the famous museum scene from Vertigo

in which Scottie (James Stewart) becomes aware of the physical resemblances between

Madeleine (Kim Novak), and the portrait of Carlotta Valdes. The scene is remarkable for its

many perceptual layers: the viewer (PR 1) watches a male character (OP1, PR 2) who is seeing a

woman (OP2, PR 3) who is looking at another female figure in a painting (OP3). The scene

opens with an objective shot of Scottie as he walks past some paintings in the museum (shot

1). As he turns towards Madeleine, the film cuts to his POV (i.e., the contact between PR 2 and

OP2 is elicited by the fourth strategy), showing a very long shot of Madeleine, sitting on a

bench, while looking in front of her at a portrait of her deceased great grandmother Carlotta

(shot 2) (i.e., the contact between PR 3 and OP3 is elicited by the first strategy) (see Figure 3).8

7 On the classical/modern distinction in the cinema, see, e.g., Bálint Kovács (2007).

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The film still in this contribution is treated as a visual citation, in accordance with the established guideline forfair use of film stills from DVDs in scholarly writings. Figure 3 is a capture from “Vertigo” (Alfred Hitchcock,

USA 1968; DVD edition: Universal, 2002, PAL, 128min).



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Figure 3. Madeleine (Kim Novak) in Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo

The inside content of the POV shot (the filmic frame’s container) wholly overlaps with

Scottie’s visual field. The camera, then, cuts back to an objective medium shot of Scottie in

the act of looking (shot 3). His gaze is directed towards the left side of the frame (i.e., the off-

screen space where Madeleine is situated). The conceptual metonymy involved is that of EYES

STAND FOR SEEING. Still from the perspective of Scottie, the scene continues by moving to a

detail of his visual field: the camera shows a close-up of a bouquet of roses which lies next to

Madeleine (shot 4). Editing is once more used to decrease the distance between PR 2 and OP2,

thus creating the conceptual metaphor PERCEPTION IS CONTACT BETWEEN PERCEIVER AND

PERCEIVED. Then, still in the same shot, the camera moves from the bouquet of flowers

towards its pictorial equivalent in the painting, thus visually joining both objects of Scottie’s

perception. The shot is followed by an equivalent of shot 3 (shot 5). Thus, perception is used

to render Scottie’s mental associations. In other words, Scottie’s act of seeing corresponds to

his act of understanding. The same strategy is mirrored in the subsequent shot in which spatial

movement of the camera is used to visually link Madeleine's hairstyle with Carlotta's haircut

in the painting (shot 6). In sum, then, one can schematize the underlying conceptual mappings

of the scene as follows:

(i) Source: Scottie’s perceptual act of seeing

Target: Scottie’s mental function of knowing



16

(ii)

Source: Things perceived by Scottie (i.e., coincides with what the camera shows to the

viewer)

Target: Ideas/mental connections

a.

The haircut of Madeleine resembles the haircut of Carlotta in the painting

b. The bouquet of roses next to Madeleine resembles the bouquet of flowers in

the painting

c.

Hence, the idea of Madeleine imitating Carlotta

It is through the perception of Scottie, then, that the viewer, like the character himself, comes

to an understanding of the narrative concept (i.e., the idea of Madeleine imitating Carlotta).

The conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING is elicited in the viewer (PR 1) (giving rise to

such linguistic expressions as “I see the point the film is making”), because his knowledge is

facilitated by the structural presence of a perceptual relationship (PR 2-OP2, PR 3-OP2) in the

inside of the frame’s container.9

5. Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to examine the metaphorical underpinnings of the viewer’s

experience of watching a film. In the first part, we have shown how the perceptual and

cognitive experience of the viewer can be conceptualized in terms of embodied metaphors

that are grounded in our common bodily experiences. Firstly, we have shown how the visual

field of the viewer can be metaphorically correlated to the concrete domain of a container

whose inside contains the dynamic container of the filmic frame. Secondly, we have shown

how the perceptual experience of the audience can be examined in terms of metaphors that are

related to the concrete domain of physical contact, in particular, touch and reception. Thirdly,

we have shown how the viewer’s perception, in turn, can be used to structure the abstract

target domain of understanding and such related mental functions as thinking and knowing. In

the second part, then, we have discussed how the viewer’s understanding of the narrative can

be enhanced by the metaphorical link with character perception. Using Alfred Hitchcock’s

Vertigo as an exemplary case, we have shown how the viewer’s understanding of the story can

be facilitated by the conceptual metaphor (CHARACTER ’S) KNOWING IS (CHARACTER ’S) SEEING.

Consequently, one of the potential avenues for further research would be the continued

9 The same analysis, for example, could be carried out with respect to the scene in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A

Space Odyssey (1968) in which HAL 9000, the computer of the space ship Discovery, comes to know aboutDave and Frank’s plans to disconnect ‘him’. For a discussion of this scene, see Coëgnarts and Kravanja

(forthcoming).



17

investigation of these metaphors in the light of different types of cinema. Indeed, if, according

to the embodied mind thesis, perception is related to cognition, then, it follows that changes in

perception automatically lead to changes in cognition. Hence, if we presume that different

types of cinema entail a different kind of seeing, then it is plausible to assume that

impediments to perception in cinema also lead to different ways of knowing. We expect such

analysis to be particularly fruitful with regard to the distinction between the classical narrative

cinema and the modern art film.

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