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© 2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 106
Co-opetition based Strategic decisions
Dr. Sandeep Bhasin
Associate Professor, Amity University Uttar Pradesh
Introduction
Business is all about cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition when it comes to
dividing it up1(Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002). The current business environment, advances in information
and communication technologies, and the resultant development of network and virtual organizations have led
firms to cooperate and compete simultaneously2 (Preiss et al., 1996). Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) refer
to this phenomenon as co-opetition3. Knowledge (or often just information) is a source of competitive
advantage4 (Simon, 1992), and cooperation, in the form of interorganizational knowledge sharing, has the
potential to increase each partner's knowledge base and, thus, competitiveness5 (Lorange, 1996). However,
even if cooperation increases the total value for the partners and enlarges the "overall pie" for an individual firm,
what ultimately counts is its share of the new pie and, perhaps, what other new pies may be produced by the
knowledge6 (Loebecke and Fenema, 1998). The firms would rather not share (or transfer) knowledge if they
feel that what they gain from cooperation is outweighed by losses from relinquishing their monopoly over the
knowledge7 (Appleyard, 1996). Co-opetition is a double-edged sword that can, if not handled properly, spiral
out of control for the players involved. The dynamism changes completely with a new player enters
theoligopoly with clear disruptive strategies to make space for the self, resulting in the complete
structuralchange of the industry. This willhave a long-term impact on the industry. It is quite interesting to note
that over 50% of new cooperative alliances formed are between competitors8 (Harbison & Pekar, 1998), and
1 Barry J Nalebuff and Adam M Brandenburger, Co-opetition, Hachette, 2002 2Preiss, K., Goldman, S.L., and Nagel, R.N. (1996). Co-operate to Compete, New York: van Nostrand Reinhold. 3Co-Opetition and Knowledge Transfer, Claudia Loebecke et al..,Copenhagen Business School, The data base for Advances in Information
Systems - Spring 1999 (Vol. 30, No. 2) 4 Simon H.A. (1992). Models of Bounded Rationafity: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 5 Lorange, P. (1996). "Strategy at the Leading Edge - Interactive Strategy - Alliances and Partnership," Long Range Planning, Vol. 29, No.
4, pp. 581-584. 6 Loebbecke, C., and van Fenema, P.C. (1998). "Towards a Theory of Inter-rganizational
Knowledge Sharing During Co-opetition," Proceedings of European Conference on Information Systems, Aix-en-Provence, France, pp. 1632-1639. 7Appleyard, M. (1996). "How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry," Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 17, (Winter), pp. 137-154 8 Harbison, J. R., & Pekar, P., Jr. 1998. Smart alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
© 2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 107
that ―the phenomenon in practice is on the rise‖9 (Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004: 795). Scholars have argued
that ―firms can generate economic rents and achieve superior, long-run performance through simultaneous
competition and cooperation‖10
(Lado et al., 1997: 11) and that co-opetition is ―the most advantageous
relationship between competitors‖11
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000: 411).
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of co-opetition in an oligopoly and propose possible
solutionsusing scenarios clearly stating certain idealizations to support the arguments and solutions. The
solution attempts to determine of how much each player benefits with Co-opetition and its impact on the new
entrant. In general terms, we idealize the co-opetition problem by assuming that the players operating in
oligopoly are rational, that each player can accurately compare its objectives with other players‘ objectives, that
they equally own the skills to bargain with other players under co-opetition, and that each has full knowledge of
the strategic preferences of the other players operating in the market.I have tried to give a theoretical framework
to co-opetition taking the base of ‗Theory of Games and Economic Behavior‘12
. I have tried to mix it with the
element of ‗anticipation‘, covered through scenario planning and presented in the pay-off matrix.
Co-opetition and Complementary Businesses
Faster hardware prompts people to upgrade to a more powerful software, and more powerful software
motivates people to buy faster hardware (Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002). We can observe this in the
computer hardware industry. Even as the users move to mobile devices from desktops and laptops, one of the
market leaders in mobile telephony handset business recently accepted the strategy of deliberately making the
mobile phones slower and increasing the usage of battery even for regular activities to prompt people to
upgrade to the latest mobile handset. In both the industries discussed above, we observe a deliberate effort by
the marketer to ensure upgradation by the users thus resulting in higher sales through replacements. There is a
complementary arrangement playing a role between the software and the hardware developers here. In the
9 Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on competitive dynamics: Recent accomplishments and future challenges.
Journal of Management, 30: 779-804 10
Lado, A. A., Boyd, N. G., & Hanlon, S. C. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic rents: A syncretic model.
Academy of Management Review, 22: 110-141 11 Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. 2000. ―Co-opetition‖ in business networks—To cooperate and compete simultaneously. Industrial Marketing
Management, 29: 411-426 12John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and EconomicBehavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944
(Second Edition, 1947)
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IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 108
above example, the hardware industry will need a complementary industry (software developers) to help stay
relevant in the industry for a longer period and those operating in the complementary industry (Software
developers) will need the hardware industry to stay sustainable for a longer period of time. Both these acts must
happen together to ensure success for both the industries.
This phenomenon does not restrict only to the software industry. GM Motors have had trouble selling
the cars in India as the buyers knew they would find it difficult to get the required spare-parts and qualified
mechanics. This also increased the cost of ownership of a GM car in India. Ford, on the other hand, decided to
locally source the spare-parts, ensuring easy availability of spares in the market, including low cost of servicing.
They have survived in a market where one brand (Maruti Suzuki13
) controls over 48% of the market.
… a player is your complementor if its more attractive for a supplier to provide resources to you when it‘s also
supplying the other players than when it is supplying you alone. A player is your competitor if it‘s less attractive
for a supplier to provide resources to you when it‘s also supplying the other player than when its supplying you
alone (Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002).
Considering the above statement from the perspective of Co-opetition / Complementary industry, we
can conclude that that the customers and the suppliers play a in harmonic manner and the competitors and
complementors play in duplication. In many instances, we have observed the complementors entering the
market and help expand the market. This helps the incumbent as well as the new complementors expand the
size of the pie instead of fighting for a share in the existing pie. However, the conflict arises when the
incumbent wants a higher share in the new market as well. We can observe this in car rentals and Taxi market
in India. With the presence of players including locally grown Ola and international brand Uber, it has become
very convenient for the commuter to get a cab on demand. However, in the long run, we may have a situation
when these prospective customers (commuters) of car manufacturers may differ their car purchases or
completely avoid buying a new one for the car rentals or taxi services. We may consider the fact that with an
increase in car density and crumpling infrastructure, there is limited motivation for the car owners to drive their
13Maruti Suzuki Motors Limited started as joint venture between Suzuki Motors, Japan and Government of India and launched its first car
in 1983. Today, Suzuki Motors hold over 51% of the shares; Government of India has divested since.
© 2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 109
own car or replace an existing one with a new one. As this dynamism holds itself over a period, we may find
large players getting into cab or car rentals services in India to ensure better market share for their brand. We
have witnessed such strategic investments in the US where Ford Motor Company holds a stake in Hertz and
Budget; Chrysler and GM hold a stake in Avis.
Co-opetition and Utility Theory
Utility theory postulated in economics to explain behavior of individuals based on the premise people can
consistently order rank their choices depending upon their preferences. It is based on individual‘s beliefs and
preferences.Each individual show different preferences. It is safe to assume that these individual preferences are
intrinsic. Any theory, which proposes to capture preferences, is abstraction based on certain assumptions.We
use these assumptions to predict the individual‘s behavior under controlled conditions.
I have used the same assumptions used by John Nash in the paper titled ‗The Bargaining Problem‘
(1950)14
, which are reproduced below:
1. An individual offered two possible anticipations can decide which is preferable or that they are equally
desirable.
2. The ordering thus produced is transitive; if A is better than B and B is better than C then A is better than
C.
3. Any probability combination of equally desirable states is just as desirable as either.
4. If A, B, and C are as in assumption (2), then there is a probability combination of A and C which is just
as desirable as C. This amounts to an assumption of continuity.
5. If 0 < p < 1 and A and B are equally desirable, then pA +(1 - p) C and pB + (1 - p) C are equally
desirable. Also, if A and B are equally desirable, A may be substituted for B in any desirability ordering
relationship satisfied by B.
This utility function is not unique, that is, if u is such a function then so is au + b, provided
14 John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162
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a > 0. Letting capital letters represent anticipations and small ones‘ real numbers, such a utility function will
satisfy the following properties:
(a) u(A) > u(B) is equivalent to A is more desirable than B.
(b) If 0 < p <1 then u [pA + (1 - p) B] = pu (A) + (1 - p) u (B).
A probability combination of two two-person anticipations is defined by making the corresponding
combinations for their components. Thus, if [A, B] is a two-person anticipation and 0 < p < 1, then p[A, B] + (1
- p)[C, D] will be defined as [pA + (1 - p)C, pB + (1 - p)D].
Clearly the one-person utility functions will have the same linearity property here as in the one-person case
(Nash, 1950).
Extrapolating the same function to superimpose it on the strategic choices available with individual
companies, considering the sharing the quality of information based on Utility function suggested above, we
get:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1: 𝑢 𝐴 → 𝑢 𝐵 :𝑢 𝐴 = 𝑢 𝐵
𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 = 𝑝𝐵 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐴, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 …1 …
If the above condition is satisfied, we can conclude that the cooperation between two organizations is
equal as the utility of the information so shared by these two organizations are equal and the probability of
negative impact on the business for both the firms is the same. We find such a scenario when companies share
the information or resources with their competitors to get benefited on the long run purely by playing on their
competitive advantage. One such case in point is Indian carmaker Mahindra & Mahindra entering into a
partnership with American car giant Ford Motors Company. This association is expected to help Mahindra &
Mahindra expand its global outreach, and help Ford Motor Company gain some more market in India,
benefitting from the successful business model of its new partner15
.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2: 𝑢 𝐴 → 𝑢 𝐵 :𝑢 𝐴 > 𝑢 𝐵
15 Source: Business Today, September 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yd3eu6c9 [http://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/auto/mahindra-and-
mahindra-ford-motor-company-join-hands-to-expand-market-reach-develop-electric-cars/story/260518.html]
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𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 > 𝑝𝐵 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐴, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 … 2 …
If the above condition is satisfied, we can conclude that the cooperation between two organizations is
unequal as the utility of the information so shared by these two organizations are not equal and the probability
of negative impact on the business for either of the firms is the different. We find such a scenario when
companies share the information or resources with their competitors to get benefited on the long run purely by
playing on their competitive advantage but it helps one of the players more than the other. We saw this playing
when in the March of 2017, Tata Motors of India and German brand VW announced a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) for a long-term partnership to explore joint development of products for customers in
India and other markets, but was subsequently called off in August 201716
.
u{𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 = u 𝐶 }
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 … 3 …
Complementors and Competitive Advantage
Many companies working as complementors in the Auto Industry benefit from the services they provide
to the competitors, thus helping the competitors secure utility at desired levels. Companies including Sundram
Fasteners, Bosch India, and Sundaram Clayton among others have not only helped the corporates in automotive
industry with easy availability of spares (which happens to be an important factor in buying of cars in India) but
also have helped the competitors in international markets with supplying spares at competitive rates by getting
into Joint Ventures and tie-ups17
.
Taking 1, 2 and 3 above, we get18
:
16Source: Reuters, August 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yc83x36n [https://in.reuters.com/article/volkswagen-tata-motors-
cooperation/volkswagen-group-tata-end-talks-on-emerging-markets-tie-up-idINKBN1AQ12B] 17 Source: The Economic Times, 2015: https://tinyurl.com/ycjj8ndp [https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/auto-
components/indias-top-5-auto-component-suppliers-set-to-enter-the-global-top-100-list/46270043] 18 Adapted from John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162
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IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 112
Graph 1
Using Utility functions in the equations 1, 2 and 3, we can work out the impact of the utility function on
decision making process under co-opetition and cooperation scenarios. All co-opetitive relationships are
complex as they are built around diametrical different logics of interaction. The idea behind competition, one
part of the co-opetitive relationship, is built on the assumption that individuals act to maximize their own
interest19
. Graph 1 expresses this relationship.
19 Hobbes, Thomas: (1651) Leviathan, London, 1651, 1973
u1=u2
u1axis
u2 axis
u1
+u
2=
u2
u1
u2
=1
u1>u2
u1
u2
> 1
u1+u2=u3 u1
u2
=u
3
1 0 2
-1 -2
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A precondition for cooperation is that individuals participate in collective actions to achieve common
goals. However, individuals‘ interests and motives for action are not considered to explain collective action,
rather, it is the social structure that surrounds individuals that is considered to explain why people act
collectively to create a win–win relationship20
.
Table 121
Strategic Decisions, Co-opetition and Competition
Two of the major factors that work towards better clarity on the strategic decisions are Competitive
Advantage and Relative Costs. Table 1 represents three levels of costs on relative basis (High, Equal or Low
cost when compared to that of competition22
) and Competitive Advantage on relative basis (High, Equal or
Low). These relations are purely being looked at from the perspective of the Marketer, i.e., how does the
marketer place the competitiveness of its product/ brand (Competitive Advantage) over the existing competition
20 Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Co-operation. Basic Books, New York, 1982 21Adapted from Hunt and Morgan model published in the paper Competing Through Relationships: Grounding Relationship Marketing in
Resource-Advantage Theory, Journal of Marketing Management 1997, 13, 341-445 22High, Medium and Low Competitive Advantage are defied using the following equations:
Relative Advantage
Relat
ive
Cost
Low
Equa
l
High
Low Equal High
Absolute
Competitive
Advantage
Competitive
Disadvantage
Cost Advantage
Cost
Disadvantage
Parity
Competition
Relative
Competitive
Advantage
Parity
Competition
Relative
Competitive
Disadvantage
Parity
Competition
© 2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 114
in the marketspace. We use the following equation to calculate the competitive advantage of a brand over other
players in the marketspace:
For equation 1, 2 and 3 above:
C = α0+ α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4 + α5X5 + α6X6 + α7X7 + ε …4…
where,
C is the Competitive advantage, α0 is the constant, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6, and α7 are the independent
variables for each of the factors that would affect the competitive advantage of the organization. X1, X2, X3, X4,
X5, X6, and X7 are factors such as location, patents, financial advantages, rate of market growth, differentiation,
switching cost, and Infrastructure, and ε is the Standard Error23
. It may be noted that these advantages (X1, X2,
X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7) would change with changes in the industry and the position of the company in relation
to its competition on the PLC.
With every change (in Micro and Macro environment in which a business operates), the dynamism of
the decisions taken for co-opetition and competition would change. In the above equation (equation 4), if X1, X2,
X3, and X4 is minimal for all the players, they have a strong reason to consider co-opetition to ensure their
survival. Once they opt for co-opetition, they may work together to ensure minimizing losses in the short term
to ensure profits in the long term. For example, the telecom service providers in India created a consortium in
1995(Cellular Operators' Association of India (COAI)24
) to represent themselves as a single entity with the
Government to ensure policies in their favor. Over the years, they may have managed to influence the
government,however, with the entry of Reliance Jio, a disruptor in the telecommunications sector, the industry
moved towards co-opetition. COAI, where Jio is one of the core members, represents the telecom service
providers to the Governmentfor preferred policies on the one hand and compete for dominance within to ensure
the relevance of competitive advantage each of the members hold over other players in the marketspace.
Co-opetition and Competition
23The formula for calculating Error is [ 𝜀 =
# 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 −# 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
# 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗ 100 ]
24 Details here: https://tinyurl.com/y8y3x47w [https://www.gadgetsnow.com/tech-news/Airtel-Vodafone-Idea-engaging-in-cartelisation-
through-COAI-Reliance-Jio/articleshow/54519449.cms]
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To offer a theoretical treatment to the problem of Co-opetition (assessing the situations when
Cooperation is desired as compared to Competition, and where Competition is the choice as compared to
Cooperation), we can abstract from the equations mentioned above and develop the theory. To cover the issues
in a holistic manner, we create different scenarios with Utility, Competitive Advantage(s) and position of the
organization in the market. The same has been captured in the following table based on assumptions mentioned
below:
‒ We have assumed that the players have a clear Competitive Advantage over others and have a
measurable Utility with clear lead over other players.
‒ The Relative Utility Score will give the advantage to the players for Short-Term
‒ The Relative Competitive Advantage will give the advantage to the players for Long-Term
‒ The Calculation of Utility is based on the equations 1, 2, and 3 and the representation of the
same in the graph 1
‒ The calculation of Competitive Advantage is based on the equation 4 mentioned above. We take
the final score for the same instead of individual variables in the equation
‒ The weightage given to Competitive Advantage and the Utility is equal
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Player B Relative Competitive Advantage / Relative Utility
+ / + + / - - / + - / -
Pla
yer
A
Rela
tive
Co
mp
etit
ive
Ad
va
nta
ge /
Rela
tiv
e U
tili
ty
+ / + Not Applicable Compete/ Co-
operate
Compete/ Co-
operate
Compete/ Co-
operate
+ / - Co-operate/
Compete Not Applicable Co-operate
Compete/ Co-
operate
- / + Co-operate/
Compete Co-operate Not Applicable
Compete/ Co-
operate
- / - Co-operate/
Compete
Co-operate/
Compete
Co-operate/
Compete Co-operate
Table 2: The Players‘ First Strategy
The above grid may be attributed to the ‗Stag Hunt‘ strategic problem25
. The players need to take a
strategic call about when to compete and when to cooperate. The above grid captures the dimensions of relative
utility and relative competitive advantage for each of the players. If the player has no relative competitive
advantage and / or relative utility, she would prefer to cooperate. This would ensure her survival for a bit longer.
If the player has a clear advantage over its competition, ceteris paribus, she must compete rather than
cooperate.On the other hand, if the player has no clear advantage, she must opt to cooperate thus buying more
time towards building a sustainability plan.
The strategic decisions need to be taken at two levels to build a sustainability plan: first, at the industry
level, where the players together work towards ensuring the sustainability of the industry and second, at the
company level to ensure expected returns to the stakeholders. The Table 1 above tries to capture both these
aspects and the implication of the strategies put in place26
.
Conclusion:
25 Each group of hunters works with two options: either to work together to get the Stag, which would then get divided into the group or
independently work on hunting for the hare, which would belong to the hunter alone. If the hunter devotes the energies to hunt the hare, the stag
escapes. This could also be connected to the problem of Tragedy of the Commons, where the hunter may prefer to work with the group to begin with
but is more concerned about his own benefit rather than that of the group. 26 Competitive Advantage is calculated as mentioned in the equation number 4,
C = α0 + α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4 + α5X5 + α6X6 + α7X7 + ε, whereC is the Competitive advantage, α0 is the constant, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5,
α6, and α7 are the independent variables for each of the factors that would affect the competitive advantage of the organization.X1, X2, X3, X4, X5,
X6, and X7 are factors such as location, patents, financial advantages, rate of market growth, differentiation, switching cost, and Infrastructure, and ε
is the Standard Error.
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The Utility and Competitive Advantage (of the product or services offered) are the two most important
factors while building the sustainability plan for the organization.In this paper, I have presented the role the
Utility function and Competitive Advantage plays in choice of strategy implemented by the players. I have
looked at how the decisions at two levels, viz., Industry and Organization, impact the sustainability plan.
For a strategic decision of more than two players, the analysis will be much more complicatedas the
number of coalitions would increase exponentially. As a potential future research, we need to work on clearly
defining Utility and Competitive Advantage mathematically. This paper can be used as a basis for further study
of the concept of game based decision making using both, utility and competitive advantage.
References:
1 Barry J Nalebuff and Adam M Brandenburger, Co-opetition, Hachette, 2002
2Preiss, K., Goldman, S.L., and Nagel, R.N. (1996). Co-operate to Compete, New York: van Nostrand Reinhold.
3Co-Opetition and Knowledge Transfer, Claudia Loebecke et al..,Copenhagen Business School, The data base
for Advances in Information Systems - Spring 1999 (Vol. 30, No. 2) 4 Simon H.A. (1992). Models of Bounded Rationafity: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 5 Lorange, P. (1996). "Strategy at the Leading Edge - Interactive Strategy - Alliances and Partnership," Long
Range Planning, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 581-584. 6 Loebbecke, C., and van Fenema, P.C. (1998). "Towards a Theory of Inter-rganizational
Knowledge Sharing During Co-opetition," Proceedings of European Conference on Information Systems, Aix-
en-Provence, France, pp. 1632-1639. 7Appleyard, M. (1996). "How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry,"
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, (Winter), pp. 137-154 8 Harbison, J. R., & Pekar, P., Jr. 1998. Smart alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
9 Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on competitive dynamics: Recent
accomplishments and future challenges. Journal of Management, 30: 779-804 10
Lado, A. A., Boyd, N. G., & Hanlon, S. C. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic
rents: A syncretic model. Academy of Management Review, 22: 110-141 1 1
Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. 2000. ―Co-opetition‖ in business networks—To cooperate and compete
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© 2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 118
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