1

TheCostsofUnitedStates’Post-9/11“SecurityAssistance”:HowCounterterrorismIntensifiedConflictinBurkinaFasoandAroundtheWorld

StephanieSavell1

March4,2021

Summary

Since9/11,PresidentGeorgeW.Bush’s“GlobalWaronTerror”hasmorphedintomanyUnitedStatesmilitaryoperationsandothergovernmentprogramsrunoutofcivilianofficesformilitarypurposesaroundtheworld.TheU.S.conductsasignificantportionofthepost-9/11wareffortinthenameofoffering“trainingandassistanceincounterterrorism”toover79countries.2

ManygovernmentsusetheU.S.narrativeofterrorismandcounterterrorism,along

withtheaccompanyingfinancial,political,andinstitutionalresourcesgiventhembytheU.S.,torepressminoritygroups,justifyauthoritarianism,andfacilitateillicitprofiteering,allwhilefailingtoaddresspovertyandotherstructuralproblemsthatleadtowidespreadfrustrationwiththestate.Thus,inaviciouscycle,whattheU.S.callssecurityassistanceactuallyaccomplishestheopposite.Aroundtheworld,ithasfedinsecurity,bolsteringthemilitantsthatreactagainstthegovernmentinjusticesexacerbatedbythisaid.

ThispaperexaminestheeffectsofU.S.securityassistanceandtheprofoundcostsof

“helping”othernationswagetheirown“warsonterror.”ThepaperdrawsonthecaseofBurkinaFaso,alandlockedcountryintheWestAfricanSahel,towhichtheU.S.hasbeenprovidingcounterterrorismfundingandtrainingsince2009.Itwasonlyseveralyearslater,startingin2016,thatBurkinaFasobegantoconfrontmilitantviolencelinkedtowhatlocalpeoplecall“jihadism.”Today’sconflictisrootedincomplexregionaldynamics,andseveralpartiesareresponsibleforcommittingviolence,butthefocushereisontheroleoftheU.S.ThoughtheU.S.isnotaprimaryactorontheground,thelargerU.S.understandingof—anddollarsspenton—counterterrorismhaveintensifiedthespiralingconflictthatnowdevastatesBurkinaFasoandthebroaderregion. 1StephanieSavellisCo-DirectoroftheCostsofWarprojectandSeniorResearchAssociateatBrownUniversity’sWatsonInstituteforInternationalandPublicAffairs.Email:stephanie_savell@brown.edu.TheauthorthanksNickTurseforhispartnershipinfieldresearchinBurkinaFaso;NetaCrawford,AllegraHarpootlian,CatherineLutz,HeidiPeltier,andparticipantsintheCostsofWarconferenceatBostonUniversityinMarch2020forhelpfulcomments;andOliviaHinchandAmselSaleemforresearchassistance.2Savell,S.(2021,Feb).U.S.CounterterrorismOperations,2018-2020.CostsofWar,WatsonInstitute,BrownUniversity.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/USCounterterrorismOperations.

2

Introduction

BurkinaFaso,acountryfewAmericanswouldassociatewiththeUnitedStates’post-9/11wars,offersawindowintothecostsofU.S.counterterrorismaroundtheworld.SinceBurkinaFasoenteredtheU.S.government’sTransSaharaCounterterrorismPartnership(TSCTP)morethanadecadeago,theBurkinabestatehasactedonthepremisethatwaginga“waronterrorism”isthebest,andindeedtheonly,waytorespondtoIslamistmilitantviolence.IthascarriedoutthiswarwithU.S.,European,andotherforeignresourcesandbaseditaroundaU.S.-sponsoredlogiccenteredoncapturingorkillingthoseidentifiedas“terrorists”andconductingmilitaryoperationsinspacesthatcouldpotentiallyharbormilitants.3Thisapproachisnotself-evident;militantviolenceneednotbetreatedasaproblemtobebattledwithadomesticwar.Infact,historicalresearchshowsthatgovernmentshavebeenmoreeffectiveincurtailingsuchviolencewhentheydealwiththesocialandpoliticalsourcesofpeople’sgrievances.4Sahelanalystsarguetheregion’sconflictisrootedindomesticpoliticalcrisis,soidentifyingtheproblemasoneofterrorismisafundamentallyflawedpresumption.5YetBurkinaFasohasadoptedtheframeworkofcounterterrorism,andindoingsohastargetedandabusedaminoritygroup,theFulani,aswellasjustifiedundemocraticgovernance.6

TheU.S.governmentpursuescounterterrorismassistancethroughasubstantialarrayofprogramsinwhattheCostsofWarprojecthasdocumentedisover79countries.7Theseincludetrainingforeignmilitariesandpoliceforces;conductingintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissancemissions;offeringlogisticalaid;commandingproxyforces;andassistingwithbordercontrolmeasuresandmaritimeoperations.8Since9/11,theU.S.governmenthasspenthundredsofbillionsofdollarsontheseprograms.Between2002and2016alone,theU.S.spent$125billionontrainingandassistanceinjust36

3Theterms“terrorist/ism”and“counterterrorism”arehistoricallyspecificandoftenconfoundingcategories.Peopleingovernment,themedia,andothersusethesewordsforpoliticalandbudgetaryreasons,buttheyareculturalconstructs,notnaturalcategoriesforatypeofpersonoraction.Eachandeverycaseinvolvesadifferentandoftencomplexmixofgovernmentactionandinsurgencythatisbestunderstoodinlocalcontext.Asmanyobservershavenoted,thelabel“WaronTerror”isproblematicforthewaysthatitfocusesonaparticularformofviolence–so-calledterrorism–withoutreferencetothemanydifferentgoalsofthatviolence.Thislabelisalsoproblematicbecauseofhowgovernmentshaveuseditlesstofocusontheharmdonetociviliansandmoretocreateacategoryofenemieswhomustbeopposedwithmilitaryforce.4Evangelista,M.(2011).Copingwith9/11:AlternativestotheWarParadigm.CostsofWar.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/Coping%20with%20911.pdf.5Reeve,R.,Pelter,Z.(2014).FromNewFrontiertoNewNormal:Counter-terrorismOperationsintheSahel-Sahara.RemoteControlProject,OxfordResearchGroup.6TheFulaniarealsocalledFulbe,Fula,andPeul(inFrench).TheirlanguageisFulfulde.7Savell2021.8ThePentagondefinescounterterrorismas“actionstakendirectlyagainstterroristnetworksandindirectlytoinfluenceandrenderglobalandregionalenvironmentsinhospitabletoterroristnetworks.”FederationofAmericanScientists.(2010,November)DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms.https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf;AccordingtotheStateDepartment,“theterm‘terrorism’meanspremeditated,politicallymotivatedviolenceperpetratedagainstnon-combatanttargetsbysubnationalgroupsorclandestineagents.”BureauofCounterterrorism.(2019,October).CountryReportsonTerrorism2018.UnitedStatesDepartmentofStatePublication,331.https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2018-FINAL.pdf.

3

countries.9TrainingandassistancehasopenedthedoortoadditionalbillionsinsalesofweaponsandmilitaryequipmentbyU.S.companiestothosegovernments.Worldwide,governmentsoftenusethesefunds,institutionalandpoliticalsupports,andequipmenttoenhancetheirabilitytorepresstheirpeopleandtoenrichsmalllocalelites.

Thispaperisbasedonfirst-handinterviewsinBurkinaFaso’scapital,Ouagadougou,ofdisplacedpeople,journalists,activists,scholars,formergovernmentofficials,staffofnonprofitgroups,andothersduringaninvestigativetripinJanuary2020,aswellasacademicarticles,analysesbythinktanksandnonprofits,andmediareports.10

Intheearly2000s,U.S.strategistsjustifiedcounterterrorismassistanceinthe

relativelypeacefulSahelbywarningthataradicalgroupinAlgeriawithlinkstoAl-Qaedacouldspreadthroughouttheregion.Today,BurkinaFasoisenvelopedinanescalatingconflictinwhichgovernmentforces,militantgroups,andstate-backedinformalmilitiasallterrorizecivilians.In2020,therewereatleast1,000attacks,massacres,andotherviolentincidentslinkedtomilitantIslamistgroupsacrosstheportionoftheSahelthatspansBurkinaFaso,MaliandNiger–asevenfoldincreasesince2017.11Ratherthanaddressingtherootcausesofthisviolence–includingpoverty,lackofdevelopment,andangeratgovernment,corruptelitesandneocolonialactivitiesbyWesternnations–BurkinaFaso’sgovernmenthasmilitarilytargetedtheFulani,whosemembersitaccusesofbeingorsupportingterrorists.12TheFulaniaresemi-nomadicherderswholiveacrossWestandNorthAfricaandwhohave,sincelongbeforethecolonialera,practicedIslamandsenttheirchildrentoKoranicschools.

Partiallyinresponsetogovernmentinjustices,militantgroupshavemushroomed

andstrengthened;theynowcontrolterritoryacrossbroadswathsofthecountry’snorthandeast.Theconflicthasinflamedethnicandintercommunaltensionstosuchanextentthatitishardtoimaginehowitmightend.ThousandsofBurkinabehavebeenkilledandoveronemilliondisplaced,mostofthemsufferingextremefoodshortagesandmadevulnerabletotheravagesofdisease,nowincludingCovid-19.

FewpeopleinBurkinaFasowouldidentifytheU.S.ashavinganyinvolvementinthestrife,asAmericansareseldomonthefrontlines.Manyactorsintheregioncommitviolence–amongthemfederalgovernments,militantssuchastheAl-Qaeda-affiliatedJama’atNusratalIslamwalMuslimeen(JNIM)coalitionandtheIslamicStateintheGreater

9SeetheSecurityAssistanceMonitor’sdatabase:https://securityassistance.org/security-sector-assistance/.;Goodman,C.,Arabia,C.(2018).CorruptionintheDefenseSector:IdentifyingKeyRiskstoU.S.CounterterrorismAid.SecurityAssistanceMonitor,CenterforInternationalPolicy.https://securityassistance.org/publications/corruption-in-the-defense-sector-identifying-key-risks-to-u-s-counterterrorism-aid/.10TheauthorbuiltonafoundationofpriorethnographicresearchinwestAfricaaswellasyearsofresearchonbroadpatternsofU.S.counterterrorismactivitiesacrosstheglobe.11Eizenga,D.,Williams,W.(2020,December).ThePuzzleofJNIMandMilitantIslamistGroupsintheSahel.AfricaSecurityBrief(38),AfricaCenterforStrategicStudies.https://africacenter.org/publication/puzzle-jnim-militant-islamist-groups-sahel.12TheFulaniarealsocalledFulbe,Fula,andPeul(inFrench).TheirlanguageisFulfulde.

4

Sahara,andotherarmedmilitiagroups–andmostBurkinabeunderstandtheconflictintermsofcomplexlocalandregionaldynamics.FranceratherthantheU.S.hastakentheleadinthe“waronterror”intheSahel(andinterviewswithsomeBurkinabewhoencounteredFrenchtroopsrevealedthatciviliansmayperceivethemasrespectinghumanrightsmorethanlocalsoldiers).Nonetheless,takingastepbacktolookatthelargerpicturerevealsthattheU.S.governmentiscomplicitinintensifyingtheconflict.

WereitnotfortheU.S.-led“waronterror,”BurkinaFaso’sresponsetothecurrent

crisiswouldhavebeenfarlessmilitarized.TherewouldhavebeenlessfundingfortheBurkinabemilitary,whosebudgetinthepastseveralyearshasskyrocketedintandemwithU.S.financialsupport.TherewouldhavebeenfewerBurkinabesoldiersandofficerstrainedtowagewaronthosethegovernmentcallsterrorists.Therewouldhavebeenfewerarmoredpersonnelcarriers,machineguns,andothermilitaryequipment.Onalargerlevel,theU.S.narrativeofcounterterrorismhasenabledtheBurkinabegovernmenttojustifyattackingtheFulaniandrestrictingfreedomofthepress.Behindthescenes,powerfulindividualshavelikelyprofitedfromU.S.funds.Allthis,inturn,hasfueledmilitantviolence,asmilitantsstrikebackagainstgovernmentrepression,corruption,andinactionagainstpoverty.TheAlgerianbranchofAl-Qaedahassplintered,multiplied,andspread,justasU.S.officialsfeared–innosmallpartbecauseofU.S.activities.

Thefirsttwosectionsofthepapercoverthehistoryandsubstanceof,aswellasfundingfor,U.S.counterterroreffortsinBurkinaFasoandtheSahel,andbackgroundofthecurrentregionalconflict.ThepaperthenturnstothecostsofBurkinaFaso’swaronterrorandshowshowthesehavestrengthenedmilitantgroups.Throughout,thepaperdrawscomparisonstoothercountries,fortheconsequencesofU.S.counterterrorisminBurkinaFasoareevidentinmanyotherplacesaswell.

Sources:L’ObservatoirePourLaDémocratieetlesDroitsdel’Homme(ODDH).(2020,June).BurkinaFaso:Risqued’unnouveauRwanda?BilandelaViolenceauBurkinaFaso,04avril2015–31mai2020.

Box1:TheHumanTollinBurkinaFaso,inNumbersCivilianskilled(April2015–Dec.2020):*Numbersarelikelyanunderestimate

>2,144–2,735,ofwhomapprox.1,092–1,219werekilledbymilitants,588–1,016bygovernmentforces,337–373bygovernment-backedmilitiassuchastheKoglweogo (+othersbyunidentifiedperpetrators).

Registeredinternallydisplacedpeople(asofSeptember2020):1,034,609

Over60%ofwhomarechildrenChildrenlackingaccesstoeducation(asofMarch2020,beforeallschoolscloseddue

tothepandemic):349,909, withover2,512schoolsclosedduetoattacksbyarmedgroups.Peopleinneedofhumanitarianassistance(asofAugust2020):2,900,000

5

https://lefaso.net/IMG/pdf/burkina_faso_risque_d_un_nouveau_rwanda.pdf.ODDHdocumentedeachdeathwithatleastthreesources(mediareports,socialmediaposts,armyorgovernmentsources).;ArmedConflictLocation&EventDataProject(2021).ViolenceAgainstCivilians,BurkinaFaso,2015-Jan.2021[DataSet].https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/;UNICEF.(2020,December).“BurkinaFaso:HumanitarianSituationReportNo.8.”https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/unicef-burkina-faso-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-reporting-period-1-30Figure1.BurkinaFaso,ReportedFatalitiesbyYearandRegion(ACLEDData)

VisualproducedbyJoséLuengo-Cabrerausingpublicly-availabledatabyACLED(2021).U.S.CounterterrorisminBurkinaFasoandtheSahel

Shortlyafter9/11,theU.S.militaryandStateDepartmentbegantoextendtheirfocustoso-calledfragilestateswhichcouldpotentiallyharborIslamistmilitantsandthusthreatentheU.S.InAfrica,U.S.militarypresencehadbeenlimitedsincetheendofWorldWarII;evenhumanitarianoperationswerelargelyhaltedafterthe1993“BlackHawkDown”incidentinSomalia,whenmembersofamilitiashotdownaU.S.helicopter.Inthewakeof9/11,however,theU.S.begantoreturntothecontinent.Startingin2002,theU.S.militarybegantobuildrelationshipsacrossAfrica,expandingabaseinDjiboutiandseekingaccesstoinformalbasesinKenya,Ethiopia,andtheSeychelles,thendispersing

6

throughoutthecontinent.Today,awidevarietyofU.S.basesand“lilypads”includestagingareasforquickreactionforces,smalloutpostswherespecialoperationsteamscanadviselocaltroops,andplacestoaccommodatecargoplanesorsurveillanceaircraft.13

In2007,theU.S.militarycreatedAfricaCommand(AFRICOM),signalinga

commitmenttoexpandingitsAfricanoperations,whichhadpreviouslyoperatedoutofothercommandcenters.TheCommandwasbasedinGermany,asnoAfricancountrywouldagreetohostit,seeingitastooredolentofWesterncolonialismandfearingitwouldcreateatargetformilitantstrikes.BasingAFRICOMtherealsomadeiteasiertocoordinatewithEuropeans,whoasalegacyofthecolonialerahadagreaterpresenceonthecontinent.AFRICOMwaschargedwithpreventingwarincountries“whereviolentconflicthasnotyetemerged,wherecriseshavetobeprevented.”14ThiswasreminiscentoftheCold-Wareradoctrineof“activedefense,”underwhichtheU.S.neededtobeableto“strikethefirstblow”by“applyingarmedforceatadistance.”After9/11,officialsarticulatedthissamedoctrineas“preemptivewar,”holdingthattheU.S.couldlaunchmilitaryinterventionstoremoveaperceivedthreat“beforethethreatwasimminent.”15

Overthepastnearlytwodecades,thePentagonhasspentbillionsofdollarsonits

militarypresenceinAfrica.Today,thereareanestimated6,000ormoreU.S.troopsstationedinAfrica,withpotentiallythousandsmorerotatinginforshorterperiodsoftimeontemporaryassignments.16TheU.S.militarycarriesoutitsbattleagainst“terrorists”onthecontinentthroughspecialopsmissions,intelligenceoperations,dronestrikes(inSomaliaandLibya),theuseofproxyforcesunderthe127elegalauthority(seefootnote),jointmilitaryexerciseswithothercountries,humanitarianmissionsthatserveheartsandmindsfunctions,agrowingrelianceonmilitarycontractingcompaniestobuildinfrastructureandperformotherservices,andaboveall,abroadsetoffinancialsupportandoperationalactivitiescharacterizedastrainingandassistanceforothercountries’forces.17InWestAfrica,theU.S.hasprovidedtheFrenchmilitarywithcriticalintelligenceandlogisticssupport.Ithasalsobuiltasprawlingnetworkoflow-profileU.S.basesintheregion,includingattheOuagadougouinternationalairportinBurkinaFaso.Between2013and2018,eightcountriesintheSahelregionalone(BurkinaFaso,Cameroon,Chad,Libya,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,andTunisia)sawcombatoperationsbyU.S.forces.18

13Vine,D.(2020).TheUnitedStatesofWar:AGlobalHistoryofAmerica'sEndlessConflicts,fromColumbustotheIslamicState.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

14Bachmann,J.(2010).Kickdownthedoor,cleanupthemess,andrebuildthehouse-TheAfricacommandandtransformationoftheUSmilitary.Geopolitics15(3):564–585.

15Vine2020,pp.298-299.16StatementofGeneralStephenJ.Townsend,UnitedStatesArmyCommander,UnitedStatesAfricaCommand,BeforetheSenateArmedServicesCommittee.January30,2020.https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Townsend_01-30-20.pdf.17Vine2020;“Section127e”isaU.S.legalauthoritythatallowsU.S.specialoperationsforcestoplanandcontrolcertainmissions,remaininginchargeofratherthanatthesideoftheAfricancounterpartstheyareostensiblyadvisingandassisting.SeeMorgan,W.(2018,July).BehindthesecretU.S.warinAfrica.Politico.https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005.18Additionally,in2019,theU.S.militaryusedlow-profilebasesacrosstheSahelandWestAfrica,includinginBurkinaFaso,Cameroon,Chad,Ghana,Libya,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,andSenegal.Turse,N.(2018,December).U.S.MilitarySaysItHasa‘LightFootprint’inAfrica.TheseDocumentsShowaVastNetworkof

7

IntheWestAfricanSahel,suchoperationsgainedstrengthfarbeforetheemergenceofmilitantIslamistviolence,whichexpandedonlyafterthe2012destabilizationofMali(describedbelow).(Toclarify,theSahelregiondoesnotincludeNigeria,whichhasitsownlongerhistoryofmilitantgroups,primarilyBokoHaram,andcounterterrorism).ThoughU.S.strategistssawthemainterroristthreatfromAfricaasemanatingfromtheHornandEastAfrica,theU.S.StateDepartmentestablishedthePanSahelInitiativein2003.ItbegantotrainrapidresponsemilitaryunitsfromChad,Mali,Mauritania,andNiger.Quickly,U.S.personnelbegantodescribetheinitiativenotasatrainingprogrambutasameansoftrackingdownsuspectedterrorists,especiallythoseaffiliatedwithanAlgeriangroupwithlinkstoAl-Qaeda(thepredecessorofwhatwouldlaterbecomeAl-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb).19In2005,thePan-SahelInitiativebecametheTransSaharaCounterterrorismPartnership(TSCTP)andwasexpandedtoincludeAlgeria,Morocco,Nigeria,Senegal,andTunisia.Yetaslateas2010,aregionalexpertestimated,“ThethreatofviolentjihadiactivityintheMauritanian,Malian,Nigerian,andChadianSahelregionisverysmall.”20BurkinaFasowasaddedtotheTSTCPin2009,despitethefactthatU.S.officialsidentifiednoterroristthreatthere.A2014StateDepartmentreportnoted,“In2013,therewerenorecordedterroristincidentsinBurkinaFaso,whichisnotasourceforviolentextremistorganizationrecruitmenteffortsorhometoradicalreligiousextremists.”21

ToexplaintheU.S.government’sincreasingmilitaryfocusonSahelianWestAfricasince2002despitetheregion’srelativepeaceandstability,somescholarshighlighttheregion’snaturalresourcesandtheperceivedimportanceofmaintainingageopoliticalpresencetocountertheinfluenceofChinaandRussia.22Otherscallattentiontoracist,neocolonialU.S.discoursesabouttheunknownandthereforethreatening“blankspaces”onthemap.23PresidentBushusedcenturies-oldracializedlanguagetoclaimhewantedtheU.S.militarytobe“readytostrikeatamoment'snoticeinanydarkcorneroftheworld.”24

Intheory,theTSCTPhadaholisticapproachtocounterterrorism,including

developmentaidandpublicdiplomacy.Tothatend,theprogramincludesaloosely Bases.TheIntercept.https://theintercept.com/2018/12/01/u-s-military-says-it-has-a-light-footprint-in-africa-these-documents-show-a-vast-network-of-bases/;Turse,N.,Naylor,S.(2019,April).Revealed:TheU.S.military's36code-namedoperationsinAfrica.YahooNews.https://news.yahoo.com/revealed-the-us-militarys-36-codenamed-operations-in-africa-090000841.html.19Ellis,S.(2004).Briefing:ThePan-SahelInitiative.AfricanAffairs103(412):459–464.20McGovern,M.(2010).Chasingshadowsinthedunes:IslamistpracticeandcounterterroristpolicyinWestAfrica’sSahara–Sahelzone.InSecuringAfrica:Post-9/11DiscoursesonTerrorism,editedbyMalinaS.Smith,79–98.Burlington,VT:Ashgate,81.21ReportobtainedbyTheNewYorkTimes.Turse,N.(2020,October).HowOneoftheMostStableNationsinWestAfricaDescendedintoMayhem.TheNewYorkTimesMagazinehttps://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/magazine/burkina-faso-terrorism-united-states.html22Ellis2004;Eizenga,D.,Charbonneau,B.(2019,April).“QuefaitlʼarméeaméricaineauSahel?”LesGrandsDossiersdeDiplomatie.23Besteman,C.,Savell,S.(2018,January).WhereintheWorldistheUSMilitary?Everywhere.USNews&WorldReport.https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-12/us-counterterrorism-forces-are-active-in-many-more-places-than-you-know.;Turse,N.(2015,October).TargetAfrica:TheUSMilitary’sExpandingFootprintinEastAfricaandtheArabianPeninsula.TheIntercept.https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/target-africa/.;Vine2020.24Vine2020,p.300.

8

coordinatedsetofinitiativesrunnotjustbythePentagonbutalsobytheStateDepartment,USAID,andDepartmentofJustice,includingactivitiessuchaspublicmessagingandvocationaltraining.Inpractice,however,ratherthanattemptingtoaddressthefundamentalstructuralchallenges,likewidespreadpoverty,thatdriveinstabilityintheregion,U.S.officialsfocusontrainingelitecounterterrorismunitsasthemostcost-effectivewayofconductinga“vital,albeitlimited”efforttocounterlocalAl-Qaedaaffiliates.25Overtheyears,theDepartmentsofDefenseandStatehavedisagreedastowhetheritwasbesttoworkthroughpartnernationmilitaries(theStateDepartmentposition),ortakedirect,boots-on-the-groundactionagainst“terrorists”(asthePentagonadvocatedfor).Ultimately,theagenciesdecidedonboth,agreeingtoasweepinggoalto“contain,disrupt,degrade,counter,andultimatelydefeatthethreatposedbyAl-Qaeda,itsaffiliates,andassociatedVEOs[ViolentExtremistOrganizations]intheTrans-Sahararegion.”26Eitherway,theTSTCP’sapproachwasskewedtowardsanemphasisonmilitaryoperations.Inthecontextofunderdevelopedcountrieswithfragilepoliticalandeconomicinstitutions,aninternalcriticcalledthisapproachakinto“throwingaband-aidonachestwound.”27

ThoughtheTSTCPhaslongbeenaccusedofmismanagementandinadequate

oversight,theU.S.hascontinuedtofundit,spendingover$1billionsince2005.Mostrecently,inSeptember2020,theStateDepartment’sOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralreleasedanauditofeightTSTCPefforts,concludingtheyweremarkedbywasteanddeficiencies.ThereportjudgedthatatleastsixTSTCPcontractsamountingto$201.6millionwere“potentialwastefulspending.”Morethanhalftheinvoicesforthesecontractslackedsupportingdocumentation.28Overtheyears,watchdoggroupshavesystematicallyhighlightedsimilarproblemsinregardstotheTSTCP.29

Since2009,whenBurkinaFasoenteredtheTSTCP,theU.S.governmenthasdonated

weapons,ammunition,andvehiclestotheBurkinabegovernmentandprovidedtrainingtoBurkinabeforcesthroughnolessthan15securityassistanceprograms:

Yearafteryear,U.S.taxdollarsflowedintoBurkinaFasointheformofarmoredpersonnelcarriersandtrucks,communicationsgearandgenerators,bodyarmorandnight-visionequipment,riflesandmachineguns.ItprovidedBurkinabetroopswithtraininginsurveillance,reconnaissance,detectionofroadsidebombsandtheuseofweapons,andhelpedthemimprovepeacekeepingcapabilitiesandbordersecurity.Burkinabesoldiersandpoliceofficersattendedmilitaryintelligencecoursesandcounterterrorismtraining;theylearnedleadershipskillsatFort

25Warner,L.(2014).TheTransSaharaCounterTerrorismPartnership:BuildingPartnerCapacitytoCounterTerrorismandViolentExtremism.CNAAnalysisandSolutions.Pp.66-67.26Warner2014,pp.57-61.27Warner2014,p.65.28OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,UnitedStatesDepartmentofState.(2020,September).“AuditoftheDepartmentofStateBureauofAfricanAffairsMonitoringandCoordinationoftheTrans-SaharaCounterterrorismPartnership.”https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/aud-mero-20-42.pdf29Turse,N.(2020,December).US-FundedCounterterrorismEffortsinWestAfricaAren’tHelping.Vice.https://www.vice.com/en/article/k7a7be/us-funded-counterterrorism-efforts-in-west-africa-arent-helping.

9

Leavenworth,Kan.,thebasicsofcommandinginfantrytroopsatFortBenning,Ga.,andtheytookcoursesondefeatingterrorismatbasesinCaliforniaandFlorida.30

Asnoted,thecontentofU.S.trainingsforBurkinabeforcesvaries,asdothespecificunitstrained.Forinstance,in2018,amongothercourses,thePentagonoffered45“gendarmes”(membersofapoliceforcewithmilitary-stylefightingunits)acourseinhumanrightsandtaught16soldiers“logisticsmanagement.”U.S.-basedcontractorsgaveunspecifiedtrainingstoatleast40gendarmesandsoldiersinbattalionsacrossBurkinaFaso(suchcontractorcoursesaresubjecttolittleifanyoversight).31OtherBurkinabeofficerstraveledtotheU.S.orEuropeforhigh-levelstrategycourses.Generally,researchhasshownhowsuchtrainingisakeymechanismincementingtiesbetweentheU.S.militaryandforeignmilitariesandspreadingU.S.militarygoalsandworldviews.Evenhumanrightscoursescanserveasthemilitary’sattempttojustifycontinuedtrainingwithoutaccountingforpastpractices.32Nomattertheintentofthetrainers,therecanbenegativeconsequences.

Unsurprisingly,thebudgetforU.S.securityassistancetoBurkinaFasosince2009

hasskyrocketed.Figure2,below,showsapartialaccountingofU.S.fundingsince2001.33Thefiguredoesnotshowthe$100milliontheU.S.gavetoBurkinaFasoin“securitycooperation”fundingin2018and2019(anamountuncoveredbyinvestigativejournalistNickTurse).34Figure2alsodoesnotincludethealmost$3.4millionintotalarmssalesthattheU.S.hasdeliveredtoBurkinaFasosince2010.35Howeverincomplete,thegraphshowsannualratesofU.S.securityfundinginthe$200,000rangebefore2009.In2010,fundingwasover$1.7million,andby2018,itwasmorethan$16million.Arelativelysmallportionofthissecurityassistancegoestotraining.In2018,forinstance,thetotalcostoftrainingswasinthehundredsofthousandsofdollars,comparedto$16millionoverall.36ThisindicatesthatthemajorityofU.S.securityfundinghasbeenintheformofequipmentandmilitaryoperations,likesurveillance,insupportofcounterterrorism.

30Turse,N.(2020,October).HowOneoftheMostStableNationsinWestAfricaDescendedintoMayhem.TheNewYorkTimesMagazine.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/magazine/burkina-faso-terrorism-united-states.html.31U.S.DepartmentsofStateandDefense.2019.ForeignMilitaryTraininginFiscalYears2018and2019,VolumesIandII.https://www.state.gov/reports/foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest-2018-2019/.32Gill,L.(2004).TheSchooloftheAmericas:MilitaryTrainingandPoliticalViolenceintheAmericas.DurhamandLondon:DukeUniversityPress.33ThedataisfromSecurityAssistanceMonitorattheCenterforInternationalPolicy,anonprofitthinktankinWashington,DCwhichdrawsfrompubliclyavailableinformation.SeeSecurityAidData,BurkinaFaso,2001-2019.http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Burkina%20Faso/2001/2019/all/Global//34Turse2020.HowOneoftheMostStableNationsinWestAfricaDescendedintoMayhem.35SecurityAssistanceMonitor.ArmsSales,BurkinaFaso,2001-2019.[DataSet].http://securityassistance.org/data/program/arms/Burkina%20Faso/2001/2019//Global//all36 U.S.DepartmentsofStateandDefense.(2019.)ForeignMilitaryTraininginFiscalYears2018and2019,VolumesIandII.https://www.state.gov/reports/foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest-2018-2019/.

10

Figure2.PartialU.S.SecurityAssistancetoBurkinaFaso,2001-2019

Whereasbefore2009,U.S.securityassistancewassmallcomparedtoother

economicaid,thatproportionhasgrownsubstantially,especiallysince2012,whenneighboringMaliwaswrackedbypoliticalupheaval(seeFigure3,below).37

Figure3.U.S.SecurityAssistanceComparedtoOtherU.S.EconomicAid,2001-2019

37SecurityAssistanceMonitor.EconomicAidData,BurkinaFaso,2001-2019.http://securityassistance.org/data/country/economic/country/2001/2019/all/Global//

$0

$2,000,000

$4,000,000

$6,000,000

$8,000,000

$10,000,000

$12,000,000

$14,000,000

$16,000,000

$18,000,000

2001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019

U.S

. Dol

lars

Fiscal Year

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

40,000,000

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

20152016

20172018

2019

U.S

. Dol

lars

Fiscal Year

Total U.S. Security Assistance Total U.S. Economic Aid

11

TheBurkinabegovernment’smilitaryexpenditureshaverisenintandem.DatafromtheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI)showamarkedincreasebeginningin2009(seeFigure4,below).In2009,theBurkinabegovernmentspent$115milliononitsmilitary;thatroseto$373millionin2019–welloverdoubleinjust10years(datainconstant2018USD).38Asmilitantviolencecontinuedtoescalate,militaryspendingin2019aloneincreased22%overtheprioryear.39TheSIPRIdatadoesnotspecifyhowmuchofthisspendingwasonarmsfromtheU.S.orelsewhere,butinalllikelihoodsomeofitwas.NotethatthisdatadoesnotreflectatotalamountthattheBurkinabegovernmenthasspentinbattlingmilitants,asitdoesnotinclude,amongotherledgeritems,thebudgetforgendarmes,thepartofthepoliceforcethatisheavilyengagedinbattlesagainstsuspectedjihadists.Figure4.MilitaryExpenditurebyBurkinaFaso,1988-2019

YearsbeforetheoutbreakofmilitantviolenceinBurkinaFaso,U.S.security

assistancesetthestagefortheBurkinabegovernmenttoaddresstheproblemofterrorism,whenitarose,withmilitaryforce.Beginningin2009andespeciallysince2013,theinfluxofU.S.fundingforBurkinaFaso’smilitarywentintandemwithadramaticriseinthatcountry’smilitaryexpenditures.WhenmilitantgroupseventuallymadeinroadsinnorthernandeasternBurkinaFaso,theU.S.logicthatpittedgovernmentforcesinabattleagainstterroristenemiesseemednatural–indeed,inevitable. 38StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute.SIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDataBase,1949-2019.[DataSet].https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.39StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute.2020.Globalmilitaryexpenditureseeslargestannualincreaseinadecade–saysSIPRI–reaching$1917billionin2019.https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-decade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Mill

ions

of U

SD (i

n Co

nsta

nt 2

018

Dolla

rs)

Year

12

OriginsoftheCurrentConflict

The2012politicaldestabilizationofMaliprecipitatedtoday’scascadinginstabilityinthesharedSahelianborderregionbetweenMali,BurkinaFaso,andNiger.Before2012,Malihadalonghistoryofethnically-infusedtensionbetweenthenomadicTuareginthefar-flungnorthernpartofthecountryandthecentralgovernment,basedinthesouth;severalnotableTuaregrebellionssincethe1960shavedemandedindependence.In2009,thegovernmentandrebelscametoatentativepeaceagreementafterthelatestuprising.Asthedustsettled,rebelsretreatedtoneighboringLibya,wheretheyhadclosenetworks.

Then,in2011,aU.S.-andNATO-backedrevolutioninLibyatoppledlongtimeLibyan

dictatorCol.MuammarQadhafi,andtheregime’sweaponsarsenalswerelootedbyvariousLibyanrebelgroupswithtiestonationalistTuaregnetworksandthemilitantAl-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)inMali.AQIM’srootswereinAlgeria,butthegrouphadbeeninMaliforthepastseveralyears,alongwithsplintergroupsthathadbrokenfromit.40BothnetworksracedtostockuponLibyanarms.

SomeoftheTuaregwhohadbeenfightinginLibyajoinedtheTuaregseparatist

movementinMali,andin2012begantotakeoverthenorthernpartofthecountry,attackinganddefeatingtheMalianarmyinseverallocations.Angerwithinthecountry’sarmedforcesoverthedemocraticallyelectedgovernment’sineffectiveresponsetotherebellionresultedinamilitarycoup.Yetthemilitarygovernmentprovedevenlesseffectiveindealingwiththeturbulenceinthenorth.There,IslamistmilitantssoongainedtheupperhandoverTuaregseparatists,publiclydiscardingtheseparatistmovementevenastheytookoverlargeswathsofterritory.

Internationalactorswereconcernedthattheviolencewouldnotonlyresultin

furtherlostterritoryinMalibutalsomightspillovertotherestoftheregion(asiteventuallydid).In2012and2013,FrancedeployeditsmilitaryinOperationServaltohelptheMaliangovernmentregaincontrolofitsterritories.Chadsenttroopstoassistinthefighting.Laterin2013,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilestablishedtheMINUSMApeacekeepingmissiontohelpstabilizethecountry.In2014,FrancebeganOperationBarkhanetocontinueOperationServalandcombatmilitantgroups.BoththeUNmissionandBarkhanearestillongoingtoday,asaremilitaryinterventionsbyregionalcoalitionsandotherEuropeancontingents.Todaythereareanestimated20,000soldiersfromEurope,theUN,andtheU.S.inMaliandtheregion.41Throughout,theU.S.hasprovidedcriticalsupporttoFrance’scombatoperationsbyairliftingsoldiersandsupplies,flyingrefuelingmissions,andprovidingdrone,signal,andsatelliteintelligence.“Without 40IntheSahara,themassivedesertnorthoftheSahelthatishometothenomadicTuaregaswellasothergroups,theriseof“politicalIslamwithaSalafistorientation”datestothearrivalinthe1990softheSouthAsianIslamistmovementTablighiJama’at,theemergencein2003ofAQIM’sancestorinAlgeria,andthelaunchingoftheU.S.Pan-Sahelinitiativein2002.SeeLecocq,B.,etal.(2013).Onehippopotamusandeightblindanalysts:amultivocalanalysisofthe2012politicalcrisisinthedividedRepublicofMali.ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy40(137):343–357.41Eizenga,D.(2019).LongTermTrendsacrossSecurityandDevelopmentintheSahel.WestAfricanPapers,25.OECDPublishing.

13

Americansurveillanceoperations,”arepresentativeoftheFrenchembassyinBurkinaFasotoldtheauthor,“Barkhanewouldnotbeabletooperate.Itisabsolutelyessential.”

Thesecounterterrorismmissionscoupledwithproblematicgovernmentresponses

pushedmilitantsintosurroundingterritories,effectivelycreatingnewzonesofconflict.OperationServaldispersednimblearmedjihadistgroupsfromnorthernintocentralMaliandlatertoneighboringNigerandBurkinaFaso.42ContinuedmilitaryinterventionsbytheFrenchandinternationalcoalitionshavealsoledtoagrowingnumberandstrengtheningofextremistgroupsinthetri-borderregion.43Amongstothertactics,militantgroupsrecruitlocalfollowerswithanti-Frenchrhetoric,tappingintopopularsentimentsofrageagainstthereviledformercolonizer.AccordingtoaBurkinabehistorian,anti-Westernsentimentplaysanactiveroleinmilitantrecruitment,as“thereisafeelingthattheWestcontrolsnationalrulersallwhileactingwithrankhypocrisyregardingdemocracy,acceptingonlyoutcomesthattheWestprefers.”44

Until2012,SahelianIslamistmilitantsweredirectedandcomposedmostlyof

AlgeriansandMauritanians,butsincethentheyhavesuccessfullyrecruitedmorelocalfollowers,andarenowdirectedattheintermediatelevelbyindividualsfromthecommunitiesinwhichtheyhaveimplantedthemselves.Inthe1970sand1980s,theSahelregion,aherdingzone,sufferedseveredroughtswhoseeffectsarestillbeingfelttoday.45Tensionsaroundnaturalresourceshavegrown,ashavetensionsbetweendifferentlivelihoodgroups(farmersvs.herders),andbetweencertaincommunitiesandthestate.Militantgroupsfocustheirrecruitingonimpoverishedruralareaswithlittlegovernmentpresencewherelocalsareoftenreceptivetoanti-statemessages.Militantsclaimtheyarecomingtotherescueofapeopleoppressedbytheirownstate,whichinturnisbeingusedbyWesternpowers.Theirattacksarelargelyonsymbolsofthestate,especiallysecurityforcesandstateagentslikeforestrangers,buttheyalsoattackinternationaltargetssuchastheUNMINUSMAmissioninMaliandlocalpowerholderssuchastraditionalchiefsandteachers.46Becauseoftheseattacks,schoolsthroughouttheregionhavebeenforcedtoclose.InBurkinaFasoalone,theviolenceledtotheclosureofover2,500schools,leaving350,000studentswithoutaccesstoaneducationevenbeforetheCovid-19pandemicshutdownschoolsacrossthecountry.47

42ReeveandPelter2014.43Assanvo,W.,DakonoB.,Théroux-BénoniL.,MaïgaI.(2019).Extrémismeviolent,criminalitéorganiséeetconflitslocauxdansleLiptako-Gourma.RapportSurL’AfriquedeL’Ouest(Vol.26).Institutd'ÉtudesdeSécurité.44Thurston,A.(2019).EscalatingConflictsinBurkinaFaso.RLSResearchPapersonPeaceandConflictStudiesinWestandCentralAfrica.RosaLuxemburgStiftung.Pp.30-31.45Lindqvist,S.,Tengberg,A.(2017).NewEvidenceofDesertificationfromCaseStudiesinNorthernBurkinaFaso.GeografiskaAnnaler:SeriesA,PhysicalGeography75(3):127-135.46Savadogo,M.(2019,September).Comments’expliquelaproliférationdesgroupesextrémistesauBurkinaFaso?TheConversation.https://theconversation.com/comment-sexplique-la-proliferation-des-groupes-extremistes-au-burkina-faso-122566.47UNICEF.(2020,April).BurkinaFaso:HumanitarianSituationReportNo.3.https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Burkina_Faso_Humanitarian_Situation_Report_No_3__April_2020.pdf

14

Since2015,violenteventshaveincreasedandageneralizedinsecuritylinkedtoIslamistmilitants,transnationalorganizedcrime,andtheintensificationofintercommunalconflictshasspreadfirstinMalitheninNigerandfinallyinBurkinaFaso.Illicitactivitiesareattheheartoftheimplantationandexpansionofmilitantgroups-theyarebeneficiaries,serviceproviders,and/orregulatorsofthetraffickingofweapons,drugs,motorcycles,andgas,aswellascattletheft,artisanalgoldmining,andpoaching.48Meanwhile,community-based“self-defense”groups(oftencreatedorsupportedbygovernments)havearisenthroughouttheregionasarmedmentakethefightagainstbanditryandjihadistsintotheirownhands.Thesemilitiasareattheforefrontoflocalconflicts,whichhavebecomeincreasinglycomplexastheybecomemorelocalized.

InBurkinaFaso,accordingtoanalystMahamoudouSavadogo,Sahelianmilitant

groupsarecreatingorco-optingtraffickingcorridorsfordrugs,gold,ivory,andotherrichesfromMaliandthedesertdowntothewestAfricancoast.Inaninterview,Savadogoshowedtheauthoramaphehadgeneratedbytrackingreportsofvariouskindsofattacksandconflictevents.ThemaprevealedthatmilitantshadforgedawidecorridorofterritorystretchingacrossthenorthofBurkinaFasoalongtheMalianborder,andturningperpendicularintheeast,anorth-southpathwaystretchingdowntowardsthesouthernborderwithBeninontheWestAfricancoast.Illicitactorshavetakenonthemantelof“jihadism”inordertofacilitatetheirillegalbusinessactivities.Theirself-brandingasIslamistjihadistsallowsthemtoearnsupportfromdisenfranchisedpopulationsthroughdiscoursesofgrievanceandfightingbackagainstthestate,elites,andWesternpowers.

PeopleinBurkinaFasooftenrecountthatjihadismintheircountrybeganwitha

high-profile2016attackbymembersofAl-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)onabar,restaurant,andhoteloftenfrequentedbyWesternersonthecentralAvenueKwameN’krumah.AfterwardsmanyBurkinabeidentifiedtheattackersas“Malians,”“Tuaregs,”or“Beberes,”basedontheirphysicalcharacteristics.49TheBurkinabeperceptionthatjihadistswereforeignerschangedwiththeemergenceofBurkinaFaso’sfirsthomegrownmilitantgroup,AnsaroulIslam,inthenorthernprovinceofSoum,laterin2016.ThegroupwasfoundedbyIbrahim“Malam”DickoandbeganasamovementbytheRimaïbé,asubgroupoftheFulaniwhohadhistoricallybeentheirslaves,againstthetraditionalhierarchiesofFulanisociety.Overtime,DickobecameincreasinglyradicalizedthroughhisassociationwithmilitantleadersinMaliandtwoyearsspentinaMalianprison.Dicko’smovementbegantargetingnotjusteliteFulani,butalsogovernmentrepresentatives.AsAnsaroulIslamgainednotorietyforitsviolentattacks,becauseitwasledbyDicko,aFulani,andrecruitedfollowersamongstdisenfranchisedFulani,theBurkinabepubliccametoassociatejihadismwith“Peuls”(theFrenchwordfortheFulani).ThisassociationfitwithalongstandingculturalprejudicethattheFulaniarecriminals.50

48Assanvoetal.2019.49Hagberg,S.,Kibora,L.,Barry,S.,Cissao,Y.,etal.(2019).Sécuritéparlebas:PerceptionsetperspectivescitoyennesdesdéfisdesécuritéauBurkinaFaso.UppsalaPapersinAfricaStudies5,editedbyStenHagberg.UppsalaUniversitet.50Hagbergetal.2019.

15

Manypeople,particularlythoseaffiliatedwithorinsupportofthecurrentadministrationofPresidentRochKaboré,seetheriseofmilitantviolenceinBurkinaFasoasaresultoftheousterofpreviousPresidentBlaiseCompaoréin2014.Compaoré,whohadbeeninpowerfor27years,hadallianceswithMalianmilitantgroupswhothereforesteeredclearofthecountryduringhisadministration.WithKaboréinpower,theseprotectionswerenolongerinplace,openingthecountrytothemilitants’inroads.

Today,BurkinaFasoishometotwoprimarymilitantgroupsandtheiraffiliates.In

thenorth,theAl-Qaeda-affiliatedJama’atNusratalIslamwalMuslimeen(JNIM)coalition(alsocalledthe“GrouptoSupportIslamandMuslims”).ItincludeswhatisleftofAnsaroulIslam,weakenedsinceDicko’sdeathin2017,aswellassmallerillicittraffickinggroupsthatJNIMprotectsandsupports.51Since2018,theIslamicStateintheGreaterSaharahasbeentakingterritoryineasternBurkinaFaso,southofthetri-borderareawhereit,MaliandNigermeet.52Formilitantgroupsfleeinginternationalmilitarypressure,theforestsofeasternBurkinaFasoareaperfectrefuge.Militantshavetargetedgovernmentemployeesandtakenoverlocaloppositionmovements,recruitingfightersamongstalllocalethnicgroups,includingFulani,Gourmantche,andMossi,aswellasincorporatingforeignerstotheregion.TheIslamicStateintheGreaterSaharanowcontrolsalmostalllocalartisanalgoldminesandpoachingintheregion’snaturereservesandhasbecometheleaderoflocalillicitgroupsinalongtimesmugglinghub.53Thesegroupsterrorizecommunitiesofallethnicgroupsandreligions,includingChristiansandMuslims. 51Savadogo2019.52TheIslamicStateintheGreaterSaharaisanoutgrowthofMali-basedMovementforUnityandJihadinWestAfrica(MUJWA),whichemergedin2011asasplintergroupofAl-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM).SeeThurston2019.53Quidelleur,T.(2020,January).TheLocalRootsofViolenceinEasternBurkinaFaso:Competitionoverresources,weapons,andtheState.NORIA:Networkofresearchersininternationalaffairs.https://www.noria-research.com/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso/;Savadogo2019.

Box2:VictimsofMilitantViolence

SeatedinfrontoftheabandonedschoolbuildingontheoutskirtsofOuagadougouwheretheyhadtakenrefugeforthepastfivemonths,agroupofMuslimwomenfromthenortheasttoldtheauthorhowbandsofunknownassailantsonmotorcycleshadarrivedintheirhamletstoattack,kill,andabducttheirmen.Theattackers“stoleourwealth,”saidthewomen.Thisincludedtheirgoatsandcattle.

Inthedaysfollowingtheattacks,localmenwhohadsurvivedbyhidinginthefieldsfledfortheirlives.Thewomenorganizedtheirchildrenandwhathouseholdgoodstheycould,includinganyremaininglivestock,tofollow.Twicetheyattemptedtotravelsouthtothecapitaloftheregion,oncewithdonkeycartscarryingtheirgoodsandoncebyrentedtruck,andbothtimes,groupsofmenattackedthemandstoleeverythingtheyhad.Themenabductedahandfulofwomenandheldthemcaptiveforanightinawoodedarea,wheretheylikelysufferedsexualassaultbeforetheywerereleased.Thewomeneventuallyfledonfoot,trudgingfordaysthroughdesertscrublandandcarryingthechildrenwhoweretooyoungtowalk.Asthegroupmarched,theypassedhumancorpsesandskeletonsbakingunderthehotsun.Oneolderwomansaid,“ItwouldtakedaystotellyouaboutallthehorrorsIsawonthatwalk.”

Thegovernmenthasregisteredthisgroupofdisplacedpeople,asmallcommunitywhichalsoincludeschildrenandsomemen,but,inanattempttosendamessageanddiscourageotherrefugeesfromsettlinginthecapitalregion,hasgiventhemnoassistance.Thegrouplivesoffthecharityofnearbyvillagers,eachpersoneatingonlyaportionofmilletorricejustonceaday.Thechildrenaresickwithcoldsandmalaria.Oneyoungboyhadrecentlydiedofmalariaandanemia;thoughtheyhadmanagedtogetadonationtobringhimtothedoctor,theyarrivedtoolatetosavehim.

16

RepressingMinoritiesandFuelingIntercommunalConflict

BurkinaFasoisamongmanycountrieswhosegovernmentsusetheideologyandresourcesofU.S.counterterrorismasthelatestjustificationforforcefullyrepressingminorityethnicgroupsattheperipheryofthestate.ThishasbeenatrendthroughouttheMuslimworldinplacestowhichtheU.S.hasextendeditspost-9/11wars.54TheBurkinabegovernmenttargetstheethnicFulanias“jihadists”;othercountriestargettheirownminoritygroups.UnderstandingtheheightenedtensionstheU.S.-ledwaronterrorintroducedintothehistoricallycomplexandlayeredrelationsbetweenthecentralBurkinabegovernmentandtheFulanioffersawindowintohow,inmanypartsoftheworld,counterterrornarrativesandfundingcaninflameintercommunalandethnictensionstothepointofcreatingcivilwar-likeconflicts.

InasweepinginvestigationoftheeffectsofU.S.counterterrorismin40countries

throughouttheIslamicworld,anthropologistAkbarAhmedshowsthatmanygovernmentshaveusedU.S.trainingandassistancetoconsolidatepowerovermarginalizedtribalgroups.55Thishasworseneddomesticconflicts,manyofwhichpredated9/11.Forgenerations,centralgovernmentscarriedoutharshassimilationpoliciesto“civilize”tribes,includingmassacre,forcedrelocation,systematicrape,andbanninglocallanguagesinthepressandinschools.Forinstance,theMaliangovernmentinthe1970sdealtwithTuaregrebellionsbycapturingandkillingTuaregleaders.Italsotargetedtheseherdersbypoisoningtheirwells,locatedinthemiddleofdesolatestretchesoftheSaharaDesert,andimplementedadeliberatepolicyofstarvation.56After9/11,accordingtoAhmed,"CentralgovernmentscynicallymanipulatedtheUnitedStatesintheirsuppressionoftheMuslimtribesandcommunities.”57Forinstance,inreturnforYemeniPresidentAliAbdullahSaleh’svowtosupportPresidentBush’swaronterror,theU.S.providedSalehmillionsinmilitaryaid,includinghelicoptersandweaponsaswellastrainingbySpecialOperationforcesandtargeteddronestrikesonenemiesofhisregime.TheseresourcesallowedSalehtofighttwomajordomesticinsurgencies:asouthernindependencemovementandinsurrectionamongstthenorthernHouthis.(SalehwaseventuallyoustedamidpopularprotestsandlateralliedwiththeHouthisbutbroketieswithandwaskilledbythem.)

SucheffectshavenotbeenlimitedtocountriestheU.S.directlytargetswithsecurity

assistance.Since9/11,otherglobalplayerslikeChinaandRussiahavebeenquicktoadoptthenewcounterterrorparadigm,whichatoncelegitimizedtheirownharshtreatmentofMuslimminoritiesandbolsteredtheircredibilitywiththeU.S.anditsallies.China,for

54Ahmed,A.(2013).TheThistleandtheDrone:HowAmerica’sWaronTerrorBecameAGlobalWaronTribalIslam.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress.55AnotethatwhileAhmed’sinsightsareimportant,histoneissometimesobjectionable,aswhenhewritesadmiringlyoftheBritishcolonialsystemofindirectrule.AhmedworkedasagovernmentadministratorinWaziristan,Pakistaninthe1980sandisnowascholarattheBrookingsInstitution.HehasadvisedtheWhiteHouseunderPresidentsGeorgeW.BushandBarakObamaandheframeshisbookasadviceonhowtheU.S.couldandshouldwagethe“waronterror”differently.56OtherexamplesincludeAlgeria’spersecutionoftheBerbersafterindependenceinthe1960sandTurkey’srepressionoftheKurdssinceWorldWarII.Ahmed2013.OnMaliseep.191.57Ahmed2013,pp.259-260

17

example,shifteditsrhetoricagainsttheminorityUyghurs.Before,ChineseofficialsdescribedUyghurswithwordslike"hooliganism"and"sabotage”;nowitattackedthemas“terrorists”withacampaignofculturalgenocide,detainingthousandsandcounting.58

OfBurkinaFaso’sapproximately19millioninhabitants,over1,200,000areFulani,

6%ofthepopulation.59ThecentralgovernmentisdominatedbytheMossi,thecountry’smajorityethnicgroup,andtensionbetweenthegovernmentandtheFulaniminorityisareverberationofthecolonialerainthelate19th-early20thcenturies.Duringthattime,Franceinstitutedapolitiquedesracesinordertofacilitateitssystemof“indirectrule.”TheFrenchnamedcertainethnicgroups“state”leaderswhiledenigratingothersas“tribes.”60TheFulani,amongotherminoritygroups,havelongfeltdiscriminatedagainstandmarginalizedbyagovernmentthatdoesnotfeeltheirown.

“It’snotthatallPeuls[Fulani]areterrorists,it’sthatmostterroristsarePeuls,”

explainedanarmycommunicationsofficerinaninterviewwiththeauthor.Hiswordsunwittinglyreinforcedratherthandismantledthestereotypethatguidesgovernmentactions.Thecountry’sForcesdeDéfenseetdeSécurité,whichmostBurkinaberefertoas“FDS,”haveextrajudiciallyexecutedatleast588to1,016civilians,andlikelymanymore,asitisdifficulttoconfirmsuchcases,accordingtohumanrightsgroups.61TherearereportedlyhundredsofFulaniwhohavebeenheldwithouttrialforyearsinanOuagadougouprison,thoughthesenumbershavedroppedsincemid-2018;awitnessinterviewedbyHumanRightsWatch(HRW)said,“nowthey’rejustkillingthem.”62

Everyday,Fulanipeoplefearfortheirlives.Asonemansaid,“TheFDSdonotallow

ustohavepeace,theyalwayssuspectthePeuls[ofjihadism].Wecan’tdenouncethembecausetheythreatenus.”MultipleintervieweestoldthestoryofhowsecurityforcesataroadsidecheckpointinaFulani-populatedregionstoppedtransportvansanddemandedtoseeeverypassenger’sgovernmentidentificationcards.Theforcesreportedlyshotanyonewhodidnothaveacard–anactionthatwouldhavekilledmanymoreFulanithanothers,astheFulaniareknowntobelesssubjecttobureaucraticregulationsandareoftenreluctanttoadoptmarkersofWesternization.Anintervieweesaid,“Theotherday,theFDSwerecheckingpapers,andtheykilled30people.Counterterrorismgivesthemagreenlighttokillanyonetheywant,withoutanyconsequences.” 58Ahmed2013,pp.264,269,289;Roberts,S.(2020).TheWarontheUyghurs:China’sInternalCampaignAgainstaMuslimMinority.PrincetonUniversityPress.59Sangare,B.2019,March.FulanipeopleandJihadisminSahelandWestAfricancountries.ObservatoireduMondeArabo-MusulmanetduSahel,FondationpourlaRechercheStratégique.;L’ObservatoirePourLaDémocratieetlesDroitsdel’Homme(ODDH).(2020,June).BurkinaFaso:Risqued’unnouveauRwanda?BilandelaViolenceauBurkinaFaso,04avril2015–31mai2020.https://lefaso.net/IMG/pdf/burkina_faso_risque_d_un_nouveau_rwanda.pdf.60Mahir,S.,Royer,P.(2001).WestAfricanChallengetoEmpire:CultureandHistoryintheVolta-BaniAnticolonialWar.Athens:OhioUniversityPress.61LowestimatefromODDH2020;HighestimatefromArmedConflictLocation&EventDataProject(ACLED).ViolenceAgainstCivilians,BurkinaFaso,2015-2020[DataSet].https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/.62HumanRightsWatch.(2019).‘WeFoundTheirBodiesLaterThatDay’:AtrocitiesbyArmedIslamistsandSecurityForcesinBurkinaFaso’sSahelRegion.https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/22/we-found-their-bodies-later-day/atrocities-armed-islamists-and-security-forces.

18

GovernmentsecurityforcesroutinelyarrestanddisappearFulanimenwhoothersaccusedofsympathizingwithorhelpingterrorists.SeveralintervieweesrecountedhowFDSforciblyremovedafather,brother,orsonfromtheirhomesorapublicmarketplace.Later,familiesfoundtheirrelatives’bodiesinthebushoralongaroadside,insomecasesblindfoldedwiththeirwriststiedbehindtheirbacks,atelltalesignofmurderbygovernmentforces.InJuly2020,HRWfoundmassgravesnearthetownofDjibocontainingthecorpsesofatleast180people,mostofthemFulani,allallegedlykilledbystatesecurityforces.63Previously,anotherHRWreportdocumented116unarmedFulanimenexecutedbyBurkinabeforcesbetweenmid-2018andFebruary2019.64ABurkinaFaso-basedhumanrightsgroup,L’ObservatoirePourLaDémocratieetlesDroitsdel’Homme(ODDH),estimatesthattheFDSsummarilyexecuted350peoplein2019andwarnsthatthegovernment’swidespreadethnickillingmaysoonmakethecountrythe“nextRwanda.”65

“We’renotshoutingthisfromtherooftops,butit’swhatwedo,”SimonCompaoré,a

politicalleader,toldtheauthorinaninterviewwhenaskedabouttheHRWallegations.CompaoréispresidentofthePeople’sMovementforProgress,therulingpoliticalparty,andpreviouslyoversawkeycomponentsoftheBurkinabesecurityforcesastheadministration’sinteriorminister.“Ifthejihadistskillfivetotensoldiers,themoraleinthearmyisgoingtobeverylow.Weneedtomakesuretheirmoraledoesn’tgetdestroyed.Ifwediscovertherearespies,weneedtoneutralizethemrightaway.”By“spies,”Compaorémeantpeopleinthevillageswhoweresupposedlysupportingthemilitants.CompaorétooktheopportunityofbeinginterviewedbyanAmericantomakeapleafordeepeningU.S.securityassistance:“Intelligenceisaveryimportantweapon.SometimestheAmericansshareintel–sometimes.Butwehaveasaying:whenyousleeponyourneighbor’smat,hecantakeitawayfromyou,andthenyouaresleepingonthefloor!Wewantourownmat.”

OnJanuary1-3,2019,amassacreofFulanimales,includingboysandelderlymen,occurredinandaroundthenortherntownofYirgou.LocalmilitiagroupscalledKoglweogo,consistinglargelyofMossimen,mobilizedinretaliationforthemurderofaMossichiefbymentheyaccusedofbeingjihadists.Overthecourseofseveraldays,inYirgouand17surroundinghamlets,theKoglweogokilledupto220Fulanicivilians.BurkinabehumanrightsgroupsdenouncedPresidentKaboré’sadministrationforfailingtocondemntheatrocity.OneintervieweewhohadfledYirgourecountedhow,aftertheattack,helearnedthatKaborécongratulatedthetown’sKoglweogoleaders.GovernmentsupportfortheKoglweogohasbecomesoovertthatinJanuary2020,theBurkinabeparliamentvotedtoarm“localvolunteers”acrossthecountrytofightjihadists.66

YirgouservedasamarkerformanyBurkinabeintervieweesofwhenthecurrent

crisisbecameserious–atellingindicatorofhowtheinvolvementoftheKoglweogohasescalatedandexpandedtheviolence.SinceYirgou,theconflicthastakenrootinmany 63HumanRightsWatch.(2020,September).BurkinaFasoExecutionsPromptBroadCallforInquiry.https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/16/burkina-faso-executions-prompt-broad-call-inquiry.64HumanRightsWatch.2019.65ODDH2020,p.15.66VOANews.(2020,January).BurkinaFasotoLightlyArmCitizensAfterTerroristsKill36.https://www.voanews.com/africa/burkina-faso-lightly-arm-citizens-after-terrorists-kill-36

19

placesandformerlypeacefulneighborshavebeguntotargetoneanother.Government-backedKoglweogomilitiasaremobilizinginvillagesacrossthecountry,andthoughtheyarecomprisedofmembersofvaryingethnicgroups,theyregularlytargettheFulani.Bysomeestimates,thereareover92,000armedmeninKoglweogomilitiastoday.67Meanwhile,Islamistmilitantstargetvillagesofallethnicgroups,includingtheFulani,withviolentattacksandattemptstoassertcontrol.Fulaniintervieweesclaimedtheyfeelcaught“betweentwofires”–vulnerabletotheattacksandtargeteddisappearancesofbothmilitantsandgovernmentsecurityforces,ofwhichtheyincludeKoglweogo.

ManyinternationalmediasourcesexplaintheconflictthathaseruptedinBurkinaFasoasterroristsinflamingethnicviolence,yetitisnotself-evidentornaturalthattherewouldbeconflictalongethniclines.ThoughhistoricallytheMossiandFulanimayhavehadsomesuperficiallyconflictualrelations,theinterconnectionsoffriendship,kinship,andreligionhavebeenfarmoreimportant,andeachgrouphashadaninterestinthewell-beingoftheother.68Additionally,insomecases,militantshaveservednotasinstigatorstointercommunalconflict,butasmediators.69Researchershaveshownthatamoreconvincingfactoristhetensionbetweendifferentlivelihoodgroups.70Severalintervieweeshadnarrowlyescapedwhenabrother,husband,father,orsonhadbeenassassinatedbyeitherFDSormilitantgroups.Theysuspectedtheirfamilywastargetedoutofrevengefororjealousyovermaterialpossessions.Oneintervieweerecountedhow,duringalongdrought,aFulanimantraveledwithhisherdforseveralyears.Asisoftendone,heallowedamanofadifferentethnicgrouptoborrowaplotoflandtofarm.Whentheherderfinallyreturned,hefoundthefarmerhadtakenovermuchmoreofhislandthanoriginallyagreedon.Shortlyafterwards,theherderwasapprehendedandlaterkilledbytheFDS.Theintervieweesuspectedthatthefarmerhadfoundanexpedientwaytotakeoverthelandhedesiredbyaccusingtheherderofbeingajihadist.Whetherornotthiswastrue,thisperceptionspeakstoabroadersocialcontextinwhichitisnotjustthegovernmentwhousescounterterrorismasapretextforaccomplishingothergoals–ordinarypeopledotoo.

MostBurkinabeexperiencetheconflictthroughtheselocalrelationaldynamicsover

thedistributionofwealthandpower.SuchtensionshavebeenfurtherexacerbatedbygovernmentandWesterndonor-leddevelopmentinterventionsandincentivesthathaveprivilegedsedentarymodesoflife(oftheMossi,amongothergroups)overnomadicones(suchasoftheFulani).DevelopmentinterventionsfollowingWesterneconomicmodelshavesoughttoencouragenomadicpeoplestosettlethroughfarminginitiatives,ormore

67ODDH2020,p.8.68Breusers,M.,Nederlof,S.,&VanRheenen,T.(1998).ConflictorSymbiosis?DisentanglingFarmer-HerdsmanRelations:TheMossiandFulanioftheCentralPlateau,BurkinaFaso.TheJournalofModernAfricanStudies36(3),370-371.69Theroux-Benoni,L,Dakono,B.(2019).AreterroristgroupsstokinglocalconflictsintheSahel?.InstituteforSecurityStudies.Pp.6–11.https://issafrica.org/iss-today/are-terrorist-groups-stoking-local-conflicts-in-the-sahel70Assanvoetal.2019.

20

implicitly,viaentrepreneurshipprogramsforyoungpeople.71Inrecentdecades,desertificationandclimatechangehavealsoincreasinglythreatenedthelivelihoodsofpastoralistgroupssuchastheFulani,forcingthemfurtherafieldinsearchofadequategrazingfortheirherdsandraisingtensionsoverlanduse.

Itisintosuchintricatesetsofhistorical,political,cultural,andenvironmental

relations–betweencentralgovernmentsandminorityethnicgroupsdatingbacktocolonialism,betweenstate-sanctioned“self-defense”militiasandtheirtargets,betweenlivelihoodgroups,betweenWesterndevelopmentmodelsandpastoralistlifestyles,betweenunequalneighbors,amongothers–thattheU.S.insertspost-9/11understandingsandresources.ThecaseofBurkinaFasoanditstreatmentoftheFulanishowshowlocalpowerdynamicsaremobilizedandenmeshedincounterterrorism.Thesedynamicsarefarmorecomplexthanalogicthatcategoricallypositsthata“good”statecombats“evil”terrorists.Onceintroducedintolocalcontexts–whichvarybycountrybutareuniformlycomplex–counterterrorismtakesonalifeofitsown.Deployedbygovernmentswhouseittotargetandrepressminoritygroups,ithasenormoushumanandsocietalcosts.U.S.securityassistancethusexacerbatesthegovernmentviolationsthatcaninflameintercommunalconflictonamassivescale.Figure5.CivilianCasualtiesbyAttributedPerpetrator,2011-2020(ACLEDData)

Source:VisualproducedbyJoséLuengo-Cabrerausingpublicly-availabledatabyACLED. 71MarkBreusers,Emailtoauthor,May15,2020:“Beyondinterethnicandfarmer-herderrelations,itiscrucialtolookintothewaysandtheextenttowhichthecurrentSaheliancrisisisperpetuatedbyacollapseoflivelihoodreproductioncausedamongothersbytheclosureofmobileformsoflivelihoodpursuit.”

21

UnderminingDemocraticGovernance

GovernmentsfrequentlyusetheU.S.narrativeofcounterterrorismtojustifyrepressingpoliticalopponentsandclampingdownonfreedomofspeech.InthePhilippines,thegovernmentusedthislogictoprosecuteanti-governmentactivistsandjournalistsaswellasmilitantsandciviliansonthesouthernislandofMindanao,hometoalongtimeseparatistmovement.72TheKenyanstate’santi-terrorismpolicerazedlow-incomeurbanneighborhoodspopulatedlargelybySomalirefugeesanddisappearedyoungMuslimmenacrossthecountry.73Cameroon’spresidentPaulBiyausesforeigncounterterrorismassistancetomaintainpowerandmilitarilycrushlegitimatepoliticaloppositionintheAnglophoneregions,allwhileignoringthreatsfromBokoHaramandthelocalaffiliateoftheIslamicState.74Atthesametime,theU.S.militarycontinuestotrainforeignmilitaryleaderswhogoontoleadcoupsanddestabilizedomesticpolitics.InMali,the2012militarycoupwasledbyAmadouSanogo,anofficerwhoreceivedextensivetrainingintheU.S.between2004and2010aspartofthePan-SahelInitiativeandTSCTP.Lastyear,anotherU.S.-trainedofficer,Col.AssimiGoita,overthrewyetanothergovernmentinMali.75ThesearejustafewofmanyexamplesofhowU.S.counterterrorismassistanceunderminesdemocraticgovernance.

InBurkinaFaso,U.S.militarytrainingplaysacomplicatedroleinnationalpolitics,

contributingtounrest.Lt.Col.IsaacZida,thearmyofficerwhoseizedpowerina2014coupduringthepopularproteststhatoustedPresidentCompaoré,hadattendedtwoU.S.-governmentsponsoredcounterterrorismtrainings.76Moregenerally,inthepastU.S.forcesfocusedontrainingtwoelitemilitaryunits–thePresidentialGuardandthe25thParachuteRegiment–bothofwhicharepopularlyseenasloyaltoCompaoré(ratherthanhisopponent,currentPresidentKaboré).77In2016,theKaborégovernmentdismantledthePresidentialGuardafteritsmembersledanattemptedcoup.Manyofthesehighlyskilledfightersarenowrogueactorswhosomerumorssuggestcouldbeinvolvedinmilitantviolenceagainstthecurrentadministration.BecauseoftheperceivedtiesbetweenthearmyandCompaoré,himselfaformersoldier,Kaboré’sgovernmenthasincreasinglymilitarizedthecountry’sgendarmestobattlejihadists.78TheU.S.hasbeguntraininggendarmesaswell,eventhoughtheyhavebeenimplicatedinabuses.InoneHumanRights

72Woon,C.(2011).Undoingviolence,unboundingprecarity:BeyondtheframesofterrorinthePhilippines.Geoforum42(3):285–296.73Glück,Z.(2017).SecurityUrbanismandtheCounterterrorStateinKenya.AnthropologicalTheory17(3):297–321.74Roberts,C.,Burton,B.(2020,November).Cameroon’sGovernmentisDeceivingtheWestWhileDivertingForeignAid.ForeignPolicy.https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/22/cameroons-government-is-deceiving-the-west-while-diverting-foreign-aid/.75Paquette,D.(2020,August).MaliCoupLeaderWasTrainedByU.S.Military.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/mali-coup-leader-was-trained-by-us-special-operations-forces/2020/08/21/33153fbe-e31c-11ea-82d8-5e55d47e90ca_story.html.76Whitlock,C.(2014,November).CoupLeaderinBurkinaFasoReceivedU.S.MilitaryTraining.TheWashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/coup-leader-in-burkina-faso-received-us-military-training/2014/11/03/3e9acaf8-6392-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html.77Warner2014.78ODDH2020,pp.6,15.

22

Watchreport,nearlyalldocumentedcasesofatrocitiesagainstsuspectsandcivilianswereallegedlyperpetratedbygendarmes.79

TheKaboréadministrationhassoughttocementitsholdonpowerthrough

undemocraticmeans,usingcounterterrorismtobolsterauthoritariancontrol.InJune2019,thegovernmentpassedlawN.044-2019criminalizinganyjournalismorpublicspeechthatcould“demoralizedefenseforces”or“compromiseaninterventionbysecurityforcesinanactofterrorism”andthus“drownnationalsecurity”[author’stranslation].Intheauthor’sinterviewswithjournalists,activists,andotherresidentsofOuagadougou,itwasclearthislawhadachillingeffect.Manypeoplewerehesitanttospeakopenlyabouttheirviewsofthecurrentconflictandseveralreferencedthenewlaw.TheBurkinabemedianowpublisheslittleabouttheviolencebeyondbare-bonesreportsofattacksorbattles.Alocalhumanrightsgroupstoppedtrackingnumbersofpeoplekilledbecauseitcouldnolongeraccuratelydoso,asithadpreviouslyreliedonmediareports.Oneintervieweedescribedhowthegovernmentusedthethreatofthelawtoobscureincriminatingdetailsinthenews.Forinstance,themediamightreportthatgovernmentforceskilledanumberofjihadistsinoneencounter,butnotthattheyalsoshotwomenandchildren.

InNovember2020,afterthislawwaspassed,Kaboréwasreelectedforasecond

terminelectionsthatinternationalobserversdeemedmostlyvalid(thoughnearly3,000pollingplacesdidnotopenbecauseofthreatsofviolenceintheirregions,preventingupto350,000peoplefromvoting).80ButtheKaboréadministrationhasbeenveryunwillingtodiscloseinformation.Despiterepeatedrequests,onlyonegovernmentofficial,ChiefComptrollerLucMarcusIbrica,grantedtheauthoraformalinterview.IbricahimselfhasbeenunabletoobtainanyaccountingforrecentdefensespendingfromtheBurkinabemilitary,whichcitestheneedforoperationalsecrecyinthenameofnationalsecurity.Thearmedforcesdidnotrespondtorequests,butanarmycommunicationsofficeragreedtoaninformalinterviewonconditionofanonymity.HeatfirstdeniedthatgovernmentsecurityforceswerecommittingextrajudicialkillingsofFulani,butthenwalkedbackhisstatement.Inwhatseemedlikeanabsurdfabrication,heclaimedthatjihadistssometimesstolearmyuniformsandvehiclesandimpersonatedstateforceswhentheykilledvillagers.Thegovernmentupholdsitslackofgovernmentaltransparencyanderadicationofthefreepressinthenameofcounterterrorism.IllicitProfiteering

U.S.counterterrorismfunds,andinsufficientscrutinybyU.S.andforeignauthorities

ofhowthosefundsarespent,areallowingpoliticalandmilitaryleadersaroundtheworldtoenrichthemselves.Accordingtoa2018reportbythenon-partisanSecurityAssistanceMonitor,“corruptionisoneofthemostsignificantstumblingblocksinU.S.effortstotackleterrorism.”Of36countriestowhichtheU.S.providedcounterterrorismassistancesince

79 HumanRightsWatch2019.80France24.(2020,November26).BurkinaFaso’sKaboréwinsre-election,accordingtofullpreliminaryresults.https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201126-burkina-s-kabor%C3%A9-wins-re-election-according-to-full-preliminary-results.

23

2002,theSecurityAssistanceMonitordocumented24,ortwo-thirdsofthetotalsample,asengaginginsignificantlevelsofdefensesectorcorruption.A2017SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction(SIGAR)reportdescribedhowAfghansecurityforces,whichreceivesignificantU.S.funding,participated“inthedrugtrade,extortion,pay-for-positionschemes,bribery,landgrabbing,andsellingU.S.andNATO-suppliedequipment,sometimeseventoinsurgents.”In2013to2014,U.S.-supportedNigerianmilitaryofficerswithheldammunitionandfuelfromgovernmentsoldierscombattingBokoHaram.Thelackofadequatesuppliesledthesoldierstofleetheirpostsinfear.Yemen’sformerPresidentSaleh,whilereceivingmillionsinU.S.assistance,engagedcertainAl-QaedamemberstoeliminatepoliticalopponentsandthenprotectedthemfromU.S.targeting.81Therearemanyothersuchglobalexamples.

AccordingtoTransparencyInternational’s2020“GovernmentDefenseIntegrity

Index,”BurkinaFasoisatcriticalriskofcorruptionacrossitsdefenseinstitutions,withlittleornotransparencyorcontrolsinfinancesandweaponsprocurement.82ResearchershavedocumentedevidenceofkeycorruptionindicatorsintheBurkinabedefensesector,includingnon-meritpromotions,delayedsalaries,widespreadbribery,andillicitmilitarybusiness.83In2011,juniorpersonnelintheBurkinabemilitaryledamutiny,revoltingagainstandaccusingseniorofficersofillicitprofiteering.Soldiersevensetfiretothehousesofsomeofficersinprotestoftheirlavishlifestyles,astheseofficersareamongthewealthiestmembersoftheirsocieties.Inthepastdecade,BurkinaFasowasoneofnineWestAfricancountriestoexperiencemilitarymutinies,signalingapatternofcorruptionandextremeinequalitybetweendifferentranks.84

Burkinabejournalistsandactivistsinterviewedbytheauthorspokeofwidelycirculatingspeculationsthatgovernmentofficialspersonallyprofitoffofforeignmilitaryassistance.85Accordingtoseveralinterviewees,theequipmentprocuredbytheBurkinabearmyhasbeenwoefullysecond-rate,suchas“bulletproof”veststhatfailtoblockbulletsandgunswhosepartsmeltaftertheyarefired.Intervieweesinterpretedthesemalfunctionsasindicationsthatgovernmentofficialsareembezzlingfundsandcuttingcornersinweaponsprocurements.Blowback

InaversionofwhattheCIAcalls“blowback,”ortheinadvertentnegativeeffectsofcovertoperations,U.S.-supportedgovernments’militarizedattacksonsuspectedmilitants

81Goodman,C.,Arabia,C.(2018,September).CorruptionintheDefenseSector:IdentifyingKeyRiskstoU.S.CounterterrorismAid.SecurityAssistanceMonitor,CenterforInternationalPolicy.Pp.2-3.;TheSecurityAssistanceMonitorrecommendsthattheU.S.strengthenitsriskassessmentsofpotentialcounterterrorismpartnersandprovideaidandpoliticalsupporttoencouragecountriestobetteraddresscorruption.82GovernmentDefenseIntegrityIndex.(2019).BurkinaFaso.TransparencyInternational.https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/burkina-faso/83GoodmanandArabia2018,p.25.84GoodmanandArabia.2018,p.27.85Theauthorheardsimilaraccusationsofembezzlementintherealmofhumanitarianfoodaid.TheMinistryofHumanitarianAffairsdeclinedaninterviewrequest.

24

onlystrengthensthesegroups.86Militantsoftenrecruitmembersthroughtheirdesiretoseekrevengeonstateforcesfortargetingfamilymembers,friends,andneighbors.Moreover,theofficialfocusoncombatleadstoanevendeeperfailuretoaddresstheunderlyingstructuralconditionsthatencouragemanytoovertly,oratleasttacitly,supportmilitantgroups.Peoplearedeeplyfrustratedwithsystemicinequality,povertyandpublicneglectofmanyplaces,especiallyruralareas,andthisangerfeedsmilitantrecruitment.InthePhilippines,forinstances,whichhaspartneredwiththeU.S.toattackpoliticalopponentsitcallsterroristsonMindanaosince2002,thatgovernmenthasdonelittletoamelioratetheabysmalsocialconditionsthatunderlierecruitmenttotheopposition.87Todaythecountryishometonumerousextremistgroups,someofwhichhaveaffiliatedwiththeIslamicState;forfivemonthsin2017,militantssuccessfullylaidsiegetotheentireterritoryofMarawi,anindicationoftheirstrength.88

InBurkinaFaso,interviewssuggestthegovernmenttargetingoftheFulanihas

givenmilitantsapowerfulrecruitingdevice.Aninterviewee,forinstance,describedhowBurkinabesecurityforcesmurderedasmalltownmayor,thefatherofarelativelywell-to-doFulanifamily.Hischildren,afemalenurseandamalecollegestudent,weresoenragedtheyjoinedamilitantgrouptoseekrevengefortheirfather’sdeath.Theseyoungpeopleweresomotivatedtheyspenttheirownmoneytobuythemotorcycletheyneededtojoin–atellingdetailinsuchanimpoverishedcountry.AccordingtoDialloSouaibou,presidentofthenonprofitTabitalAndalAssociationofKoranicMastersoftheSahel,whichworkswithFulanireligiousleaderstopromotepeace,“About80%ofthosewhojointerroristgroupstoldusthatitisn’tbecausetheysupportjihadism,itisbecausetheirfatherormotherorbrotherwaskilledbythesecurityforces.Somanypeoplehavebeenkilled–assassinated–buttherehasbeennojustice.”

MilitantgroupsintheSahelalsorecruitfollowersbyexploitinggrievancesamong

disaffectedpopulationswhoseetheirgovernmentsasactivelyfailingtoimprovequalityoflife.Acrosstheregion,impoverishedyoungpeople–thearea’slargestdemographicgroupandthemostlikelytoberecruited–areseethingwithdespairattheircircumstances,rageatthestate,anddesireforsocialchange.89AnethnographicstudyofFulaniyouthincentralMaliaftertheoutbreakoftheconflictin2012foundtheseyoungpeoplewereangryatastatewhichdidnothingtoalleviatepovertyandatlocalelites,whohadlongappropriateddevelopmentfundsandwhotheysawaspartofthestate.Thisangerconvergedwithotherimportanttrends,includingincreasingcellphoneconnectivityandrelatedly,globallycirculatingideasabouttherighttoadecentlife,tofacilitatetheir“radicalization.”WhengovernmentforcesretreatedfromcentralMali,Islamistmilitantgroupsestablishedtheirownformsofsecurityaswellasinformaljudicialsystems,whichhelpedthemwinconfidenceandgainlegitimacy.Militantdiscoursesplayedofflocaldisappointmentinelites 86Foradiscussionofblowback,seeVine2020,p.253.87Woon2011.88CounterExtremismProject.ThePhilippines:ExtremismandCounter-Extremism.AccessedonDec3,2020.https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/philippines#major_extremist_and_terrorist_incidents.89DeBruijn,M.(2019).Introduction:Biographiesofradicalization-hiddenmessagesofsocialchange.InBiographiesofRadicalization:HiddenMessagesofSocialChange,editedbyMirjamdeBruijn.DeGruyterOldenbourg.

25

andthestateaswellaswidespreadresentmentofFrenchandforeignmilitaryinterventions.Inmanypeople’seyes,statelegitimacywasfurtherunderminedbytheMaliangovernment’suseoftheglobalwaronterrorasthelatest“rent-seeking”opportunity.ThegovernmentportrayeditsenemiesasradicalIslamistsandtherebyrecruitedforeignfinancial,militaryanddiplomaticsupporttofightthem.Inresponsetothesemanyinjustices,Fulaniyouthdecidedtogotomilitanttrainingcampsandlearnviolentresistanceagainstthestate.90

Afurtherreasonpeoplejoinmilitantgroupsistoearnaliving,particularlyinruralareas.IneasternBurkinaFaso,Burkinabewhofeltneglectedbythestatewerenonethelesssubjecttostrictregulationsandtaxesonartisanalgoldmining,whichtheydeeplyresented.Aftermilitantstookcontrolofsurroundingterritories,theygrantedlocalpeoplepermissiontomineforgoldwhereverandhowevertheywanted.Similarly,militantsdidawaywithgovernmentprohibitionsonhuntingandfishingintheregion’sprotectedforests.Accordingtoonerecentstudy,youngpeopleineasternBurkinaFasohavewidelytakenuparms,becoming“bandits”orjoiningmilitantgroupsormilitiasfortheeconomicopportunitiestheyoffer.Manyyoungpeopletakeuparmsasaseasonaljob,combiningviolencewithagricultureandsmuggling.91Asanthropologicalresearchhasshown,peopleoftenjoinviolentgroupsnotbecauseofidentitypoliticsorethnicaffiliations,asobserversoftenargue,butbecausetheyseefightingasaformoflaborandthusamuch-neededincome-generatingopportunity.92

Suchethnographicfindingsabouthowandwhyyoungpeoplejoinandsupport

militantgroupsrevealwithparticularpoignancyhowmisguidedBurkinaFaso’smilitarizedcounterterrorismcampaignis.Militaryattacksandraidsonso-calledterroristsdonothingtoalleviateruralpeoples’povertyortheirdespairatstatecorruption,abandonment,andviolence.AndU.S.counterterrorismassistanceiscomplicitinpromotingandsustainingthisill-advisedstrategy.Inencouraging,supporting,andfinancingamilitaryapproach–indeed,inlayingthegroundworkforthislongbeforetheemergenceofmilitantviolenceintheSahel–theU.S.bearspartialresponsibilityforintensifyingtheviolence,death,anddisplacementintheregiontoday.Conclusion

Thecurrentmilitaryapproachbylocal,regional,andinternationalforcestomilitantviolenceinBurkinaFasoandthebroaderSahelhascontributedtotheveryscenariotheU.S.governmentfearedafter9/11.AsmallgroupinAlgeria,Al-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM),hasexpandedintoaconsiderablewaveoffighters,includingsomeaffiliatedwiththeIslamicState,acrossmanyborders–inpartbecauseofU.S.andotherforeigninterventions.Todayagrowingnumberofmilitantgroupsarekillingthousands,

90DeBruijn,M.,Both,J.(2017).YouthBetweenStateandRebel(Dis)Orders:ContestingLegitimacyfromBelowinSub-SaharaAfrica.SmallWarsandInsurgencies28(4–5):779–798.91Quidelleur2020.92Hoffman,D.(2011).Violence,JustinTime:WarandWorkinContemporaryWestAfrica.CulturalAnthropology26(1):34–57.

26

displacingmillions,andprofitingfromillicitenterprisesacrosstheSahel.Manyfactorshavecontributedtotheirspread,butaglobalviewcannotfailtonotethecentralroleoftheU.S.counterterrornarrativeandthedollarsandinstitutionalsupportbehindit.GovernmentssuchasBurkinaFaso’susecounterterrorismtoservetheirownends–toprosecuteminorities,toobscuretheneedtoprovideservicestotheirpeople,tojustifyundemocraticbehavior,andtoenrichlocalelite.Andtheseinjusticeshavesimplystrengthenedmilitantmovements.Thispatternishappeningaroundtheworld,inmanyplacestowhichtheU.S.hasstretchedthelongtentaclesofitspost-9/11wars.

ThispaperhasfocusedontheU.S.roleinthecrisis,butitisimportanttoemphasize

thatBurkinaFaso’sgovernmentisaprimarydriveroftheviolenceandmusthaltitsabusesifpeaceistoberestored.InpartasaresponsetoHumanRightsWatchreportsdocumentingabusesbysecurityforcesinBurkinaFasoandotherSaheliannations,theUnitedStatesgovernmenthaswarnedthatiftheseviolationsdonotstop,“U.S.securityassistancemaybeatrisk.”93SenatorPatrickLeahy(VT)issuedastatementthatU.S.officialsareaware“extremism”inBurkinaFaso,Mali,andNigerisfueledinpartbypublicoutrageaboutsecurityforces’abuses,butthattheU.S.must“demonstrate,notjusttalkabout”itscommitmenttoprotectingciviliansandcombatingimpunity.94Sofar,however,theU.S.hasdonelittlebeyondwhatLeahycalls“quietdiplomacy,”astheStateDepartment’sU.S.SpecialEnvoytotheSahelandotherofficialsurgeSahelianleaderstostopabuses.TheU.S.mustdomoretoholdthesenationsaccountablefortheviolence,notonlythatperpetratedbystateforces,butalsobytheinformalmilitiagroupstheyback.95

Thisreport’sfindingsalsohavelargerimplicationsfortheU.S.Asmanyobservers

havenoted,U.S.foreignpolicyintheSahelandgloballyisoverlyskewedtowardsmilitarism.EvenifU.S.officialsspeakofworkingtowardsdevelopmentgoalsintheSahel,theU.S.continuestofundthesecountrieswithmillionsinsecurityassistanceeachyearandprovideinstitutionalsupportfortheirdomesticwarsagainstmilitantgroups.TheU.S.militaryplaystoolargearoleinforeignrelationsinAfrica.Yet,astheevidenceclearlyshowsinBurkinaFaso,militarizedU.S.counterterrorismassistanceonlyshoresuphumanrightsabuses,corruption,andauthoritarianism–andthisiscounterproductive.Post-9/11securityassistancemustbecompletelyreconceptualized,evenandespeciallyinplacestornbyIslamistmilitantviolence.96TheU.S.governmentmustrelinquisharacializedstrategyoftryingtoextendauthoritytoAfrica’s“darkcorners.”AndAmericansmustworktowardsadifferentunderstandingofwhatitmeanstoprotectcivilianlife,bothathomeandabroad.

93U.S.DepartmentofState.(2020,July).AllegationsofHumanRightsViolationsandAbusesintheSahel.https://2017-2021.state.gov/allegations-of-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-in-the-sahel/index.html.94Leahy,P.(2020,August).StatementOnU.S.PolicyintheSahel.https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-on-us-policy-in-the-sahel.95Leahy’sstatementlistsseveralmeansofdoingso.96ThismaymeanprioritizingdiplomacyovermilitarismthroughsuchpolicychangesasbeefingupfundingforUSAIDwhilecuttingmoneyforthePentagonandincreasingU.S.governmenttransparencyaroundmilitaryoperations,assomehavecalledfor.Seee.g.CenterforAmericanProgress.(2020,October).TheFirst100Days:RebuildingandRebalancingOurNationalSecurityToolsandInstitutions.https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/10/19051545/NSIP100-2-RebuildingNatSec1.pdf?_ga=2.183310630.103015824.1611592730-365735694.1611592730.