Ontology

The Structure of Possibility

William L. Reese

SUNY of Albany

ABSTRACT: I call attention to the following theses concerning possibility. 1)

Anything that has become actual must have been possible in the period of timeimmediately preceding its actualization. 2) The logically possible is a conception, and

conceptions exist within the mind. 3) The possible is not a mere name. 4) Thepossible is not a mental entity and that alone. 5) Every possibility, whether mental

entity or not must be, or image, an ontological entity, real although not (yet) actual.6) For all we know logical possibility is the sufficient condition of ontological

possibility. 7) Philosophers who lack the category of ontological possibility

nonetheless refer to it as an implicit, if hidden, feature of their systems. 8) In some

part of the period of time preceding its actualization, an ontological possibility

becomes a nascent actuality, and external consistency a necessary condition for

nascency. 9) The rise or fall of energy level through directed energy vectors, onhuman and nonhuman levels, is the third condition for the actualizing of possibilities,

or for their failure to actualize.

I call your attention to ten theses concerning possibility which seem to me to be defensible:

(1) Anything that has become actual must have been possible in the period of time

immediately preceding its actualization.

(2) The logically possible is a conception, and conceptions exist within the mind.

(3) The possible is not a mere name.

(4) The possible is not a mental entity and that alone.

(5) Every possibility, whether mental entity or not must be, or image, an ontological

entity, real although not (yet) actual.

(6) For all we know logical possibility is the sufficient condition of ontological

possibility.

(7) Philosophers who lack the category of ontological possibility nonetheless refer to

it as an implicit, if hidden, feature of their systems.

(8) In some part of the period of time preceding its actualization, an ontological

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possibility becomes a nascent actuality, and external consistency a necessarycondition for nascency.

(9) The rise or fall of energy level through directed energy vectors, on human andnon-human levels, is the third condition for the actualizing of possibilities, or for their

failure to actualize.

(10) Ontological possibilities have the form of the future.

I shall now comment on (1) through (6), and (10).

(1) Unable to think of any conditions which would falsify, or even qualify, I take it to be

necessarily true. For simplicitys sake alone, I insist on the necessity of its possibility in an

immediately preceding time, while not denying that it may also have been possible in a longer

stretch of time prior to its having become actual. It would be reasonable to believe this longer

stretch of time to be the normal case. Also, its possibility may be necessary, even though thelikelihood of its actualization is merely probable, and however slightly probable. We are interested

in determining the nature of this possible prior to its actualization. We approach the questionthrough consideration of three relevant definitions of the possible suggested by Bruce Aune. Aune

never uses the term possibility in his definitions, believing the term to suggest that the possible isan entity; and his program of ontological reduction is devoted to redescribing abstracta out of

existence.

We shall consider Aunes definitions without preserving the niceties of his program, at least partlybecause of our belief that, on analysis, there is an end to redescription, and possibilities do turn

out to be entities, although of an unusual kind. From now on I shall use the terms possible andpossibility as synonyms, employing either or both, somewhat randomly.

(2) Aunes first definition, that of the logically possible, defined as "the proposition that p does not

imply a contradiction," says to me that the logically possible is, first of all, a conception. As aconception, there is no question but that it exists within the mind. I do not know that Aune wouldagree. However it may be for him, Berkeleys distinction between what exists within, and without,

the mind works for me. Nor do I believe that the mind-brain problem need arise here. I do notethat no analysis of the brain waves which may be charted when one thinks of Platos idea of

justice can yield that idea, or any idea, of justice. From the intensional side of things, at least,mental activity is made up of conceptions. I think that is all I need, even if extensionally it is

composed of brain waves, passing through neural connections, and the like.

That the logically possible exists within the mind is convenient for getting on with the task ofseparating apparent logical possibilities, which harbor contradictions, from genuine logical

possibilities which do not. Existence within the mind allows one to probe for the condition ofconsistency. While consistency is no guarantee that qualifying logical possibilities have an

extramental existence (as actualities), no one expects to find contradictions existing outside themind. Some believe that they do not exist even within the mind, that a so-called contradictionwithin the mind is not a single mental entity, but two opposed entities, which we insist on jamming

together, even though we never quite succeed in thinking them together. Their apparenttogetherness is the result of the mind quickly strobing between two conceptions which are

inconsistent with each other. When we find, however, that an apparent possibility is logicallypossible, we accept it as a candidate for existing also outside the mind. (Such finding is, of course,

provisional in the sense that anything we take to be logically possible might contain a lurking

contradiction; but everyone agrees, I think, that the inconsistent has the negative purchase onactuality suggested here.)

Have logical possibilities, i.e., consistencies, a positive purchase on actuality corresponding to the

negative purchase of inconsistencies; that is to say, are they also ontologically possible, asinconsistencies are ontologically impossible? We shall consider this question in the context of the

three interpretations of the possible commonly offered in the history of philosophy. The three are:(a) The possible is a mere name (nominalism). (b) The possible is a mental entity and that alone

(conceptualism). (c) The possible is an ontological entity, real although not (yet) actual(philosophic realism in my 1952 designation).

(3) The condition of consistency eliminates the first of the three interpretations on the following

grounds: Were the possible a mere name, and that alone, its manner of existence would be that ofa flatus vocis, and that alone. But a flatus vocis is something actual, a puff of air, and not

something possible. If the possible were only an actual flatus vocis and nothing more then apossible flatus vocis would be a contradiction, since it is nothing actual, and therefore likewise notanything that is logically possible. Since a possible puff of air is not a name, it could not be a mere

name and that alone.

If the possible is not a mere name but a mental entity, it is some form of abstractum and thelocution possibility with its entitative suggestiveness becomes entirely appropriate.

Although the argument is framed in terms of possibility in general, we apply it in the first instance

to logical possibility, the only type of possibility now before us. It remains to be seen whether wecan advance beyond "logical possibility." If not, then all possibility is logical possibility, and that

alone. For the moment we say merely:

(4) Were the possible a mental entity and that alone, it would be no more than a mental possibility.Were it to exist as an entity in the mind then, on the interpretation in (2) above (that contradictions

do not exist, strictly speaking, within the mind), it is a genuine logical possibility. If, however, itexists in the mind alone, then in actualizing, the most it could become is a mental actuality. But amental actuality, having no extramental reference, has not actualized, after all, and remains a

mental possibility, i.e., there is no difference in meaning between the phrases "mental possibility"

and "mental actuality."

Nominalists and conceptualists, when speaking of possibilities actualizing, while confining their

existence to the mind, seem to be claiming that these actualizing logical possibilities leap out of the

mind into actuality. That would seem to be a miracle. Most of us mean, I suggest, that logicalpossibilities somehow image ontological possibilities, or they are, at the same time, logical and

ontological; and it is their latter aspect which, already outside the mind, turns into actualities. The

same argument can be made with "logical possibility." Were a logical possibility, pure and simple,

to actualize it would become a logical actuality. But either "logical actuality" has the same meaningas "logical possibility," or else a "logical actuality" is the same as an "ontological possibility." There

is an issue here, however, which we shall access below.

(5) The parenthetical "yet" in the fifth proposition signifies that only ontological possibilitiesbecome actual; it is not meant to imply that every ontological possibility becomes actual.

If (3) and (4) are acceptable, the only way to move from logical possibility to actuality is through

ontological possibility whose actualization can produce something in the actual world. The point of

(3) is that consistency is the sufficient condition of logical possibility. As sufficient condition of

logical possibility it is also, and inevitably, a necessary condition for ontological possibility (since

nothing inconsistent in itself could be either ontologically possible or a condition of ontologicalpossibility). Is logical possibility also a sufficient condition for ontological possibility? If so, then (a)

logical possibilities are eo ipso ontological as well. If (a) is accepted, then logical possibilities have

a positive purchase on ontology, paralleling the negative purchase of inconsistency (aka,impossibility). If consistency is merely a necessary condition of ontological possibility, then (b) at

least one further condition must be added to logical possibility in order to reach ontological

possibility. A further condition is readily at hand. Consistency with the laws of nature (external

consistency) may serve as a second condition, supplementing the first condition of logicalpossibility (internal consistency). If nothing else, internal and external consistency make a nice pair.

(6) Certainly, what is not consistent with the laws of nature cannot become actual. If inconsistency

with the laws of nature leads to impossibility might not internal and external consistency be jointconditions for possibility; and perhaps, if there are no further conditions, for actuality as well? Let

us call the expansion of (6) to include external consistency (6b). In (6b) the idea of a unicorn is

logically possible because internally consistent (let us suppose this to be the case); but not

ontologically possible because inconsistent with the laws of nature. The contrapositive, "What isconsistent with the laws of nature can become actual" would seem to follow. If it does then, since

it can become actual it would seem, by (1), to have been antecedently possible. From the possible

worlds standpoint, which we adopt only for the sake of the example, in some possible worlds thelaws of nature are consistent with the unicorn idea. In those worlds the unicorn is both logically

and ontologically possible. In worlds like ours the unicorn is only a logical possibility. In the

worlds of Peirce and Whitehead where the laws of nature change, evolving and devolving, the

unicorn idea might well be merely logically possible in some periods of time, while both logicallyand ontologically possible in others. In all periods of time it would be logically possible unless, of

course, its idea contains a (lurking) contradiction.

But there is a counter-argument to the above. Consider the discovery of the top quark at theFermi Laboratory in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the spring of 1995. As heavy as an atom of gold,

the top quark existed 10 billion years ago, under the early conditions of the universe, and had not

existed since, so far as anyone knows, until the time of the experiment. Then, under conditions ofintense energy produced by a particle accelerator the top quark appeared once again. Where had

it been in between? The natural response is to say that in between it had remained an ontological

possibility which lacked the conditions necessary for its actualization. Heisenberg made exactly

that response to the question where an electron is between orbits. It retreats, he suggested, intopossibility, and reactualizes in a different orbit. If this is so, is (6b) refuted, on the grounds that we

must take ontological possibility, no less than logical possibility, to be independent of the laws of

nature at any given time? One might express the point by saying that ontology is deeper than

cosmology.

Should ontology be deeper than cosmology, logical and ontological possibility are on the same

footing, internal consistency becomes a sufficient condition for ontological possibility, with external

consistency neither necessary nor sufficient for either one. In our example the actualization of thequark was inconsistent with the present course of nature, although consistent with an earlier

course, now replicated in the particle accelerator. One response is to say that the laws of nature

are not different in the two cases; but that a change in conditions, i.e., in energy level, allowed thequark to actualize. But how are we to think of conditions, courses of nature, and laws of nature?

Does a course of nature include only the conditions prevailing at a certain time, or both those

conditions and the laws governing them? And how are we to distinguish between conditions andlaws? Does an inoperant law of nature remain a law, while inoperant? Does the law hold even

when the condition, which would make it operant, is not present? We could say that inoperant

laws do not exist, operant laws do exist, and the shift between operant and inoperant is what

Peirce and Whitehead meant by the habit-taking feature of the universe. Our hold on these termsis so tenuous, however, that it is difficult to determine what belongs to (6) and what to (6b); and

since the added condition in (6b) did not turn out to be helpful in the top quark example, we have

no reason not to remain with (6).

In keeping with (6) we have to say that the idea of the unicorn, if logically possible, is also

ontologically possible, although in some given stretch of the universe, perhaps in many or most

such stretches, the conditions allowing its actualization are not present.

(10) We can now say that where actual things have the form of the present (they are what they

are and the principle of excluded middle applies to them), the mode of reality of an ontological

possibility, real although not (yet) actual, is that of the "may be," a "may be which also may notbe." The first is determinate; the second only quasi-so, depending upon its degree of nascency.

We can also say that every actuality is related to a cluster of further possibilities; and that these

relate to still further possibilities. Where an entity in the modality of the present, the "is," will be

determinate, an entity sharing the modality of the future will have a forked nature, one fork for"may be," the other for "may not be." Since every fork forks in turn, the future branches into a

pattern of possibilities beyond possibilities.

Aune urges that: "There could be a presumption in favor of accepting a certain general theory [ofabstract entities] only if the theory is relatively clear and determinate. But no such theory is actually

in hand for abstract entities. We have the words abstract entity, but almost no theory to back

them up." I deny that statement. The more than 200 references to eternal objects in the index toWhiteheads Process and Reality outline an extensive theory of such objects which, at the very

least, refresh the interpretation I am pursuing. A page later (p. 75) Aune claims that abstracta are

"fundamentally mysterious." There is certainly something to that. While I dont pretend that they

are, or should be, commonplace my contention is that the fundamental mysteries of Platoslanguage with respect to participating in, partaking of, or exemplifying the forms are considerably

reduced when the line of truth is toppled forward into the stream of time so that the forms coincide

with possibilities. Such a move would endorse the "horizontal platonism" which Robert Pollock

finds in modern pragmatism of the non-revisionist sort.

Unlike vertical platonism, its horizontal form participates in the flow of time. Since actual things

have the form of the present, it seems reasonable to follow Peirce and Whitehead, giving

possibilities the form of the future. Starting with any actual entity in the present, the possiblebranches in the following manner:

One might consider this to be too simple since, at times, one is aware of, e.g., 4 possibilities:

And some, although not Whitehead, have urged that a multi-valued logic is needed to handle thefuture. On reflection, however, decision may be considered to be 2-valued. When I am

considering A, the decisions are:

and the negated possibility, e.g. not-A, covers all of the remaining possibilities. If I have rejectedA, the decision becomes B or not-B. The A or not-A pattern continues through increasing

determination until some increasingly nascent possibility is translated into actuality. The process

represented by forking follows an iteration into actuality of Peirces triadic structure:

When considering A,B,C, or D, one is really considering A or not-A, B or not-B, C or not-C, D

or not-D, in a triadic pattern gradually becoming more determinate. Our interest, quite often,

extends not to the chain, but centers on A or not-A: "Will there be a sea fight tomorrow, or not?"

We simply prescind A or not-A from the chain of possibilities which might occur as alternatives to

a sea fight. When we think of A,B,C, and D as equally possible, we have jammed 4 triads into a

single tetrad. This is a decision that the chain of triads can be safely ignored for the sake ofhighlighting A,B,C, and D.

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