21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 29

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 29

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M IS S IO N N O .29F L OW N 10FE81945

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~UARmRSX X I B OM BER00MM!\.W.. do. l l 34 .

TACTICAL MLSSION REl'ORr

Field Orders NO'. 28 Mission NQ. a9

Nakajima Mrarai't Factory

CfJ!A. J.'IP.lI.N

10 Fe hruery 1945

~abh of' Co.ntents

Part ~Navigat:i:..oD...

Pm:-ttU-Bombaraie r

Pert III--Flight Engineori:rg

Part IV--RndDr.

Part VI-,t.:Lr ..sen Ro.8cu C

~ll'incx C-.. Oanm.J.Lmic.ationsReports

Port n... olllllunic at ions Off ioo;l r I s Report

Annox. Jl..- Intlollli (!!p nccRcpart 5

Part I--EnellY .Fighter Reaction' Report

Part H--Flak Officer IS RepQl't

Port IH-Iblnbings RemIts and UlmngcAssessmont

.Annex E-ConBclddc.tod Si(atisticC'o.l Su.mm.!:u-y

Annox F....]'iold Orders

Proporcd By,


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,:.;. I'1: t =: : : 1:: : ~ ~ ~ =:: 1: ~: SECRETI E !Yw th. of tho e.G., XXI Bonitc r COllDllf.1.n:i

~ ZOhh- /S J. D.6-.,Ddto Initnnls

HE/.DQ.U1..RT:1RSX XI BO MBE .R C O MM iU ID

,'.FQ 2 3 4 .

SUBJE0T; Report of Operationa, 10 February 1945.

TO ~ Conmonding General, Twentieth Air' Forc:c t Wo.abington 25 . . D.C

a., IDENl'IFICJ.TION OF MISSION:

0.. Field Order No. 28" Hcndquortcrs XXI Bomber Colll!lDl'ld.dc.ted 6 ]}obrUCl"Y 1945. directed the 7.3rd urn 3~3th BOmb::.rdm ItWings to participato in an attc.ck on the IJckajinn. Ad..rorel't F.. O't.or-yat Ota.

b. Tm'gets Sp:ccifi ed~

(1) Primnry To.rget:. Nokojimo. ,:.rcrc.ft Factoryat otn: 1 ' I .AFObjective folder 90.13. tcrgct 1.544. (Rci'ex to XXIBomboz- Comnand Litho-Dosoic, exhibit 1, hor ceo , )

(2) Secondery Target: Port und urbcn :JrCC'.S ofTokyo: ,lJ.~ Objective folder 90.17.

(3) 4"\.9t Resort Target:; .:UI,y industrial city in

2. STN.TEGY ;1l:~WPlAN OF OPER.i.TIONS:

a., Selec) : ion or D-Day: The weather foreoas t presentedto the Commanding Gen~ral on9 February predicted good visunl bombicondi t ions at the tar~et and good base and route condi t ions . Fi rmdecis ion was ma.de to n tt o. ck t he Nnk r. jimo .A ir cr c. ft F a. ot or y o n 10February.

b . Impor t~nce of Tnrget :

(1) Nr~nj imn Alror~r t Factory ct Otr- i s one atthe key units in the .comp1ex system of fnotor ies opernted by Na1co.j imn. the oldest pr iv~te ly owned ~lrcr~f t compn~ in J~pnn and onea t the two leuding prod~ers of ni rcraf t and engines for the Armyi lhd No.vy. The otn pl .ant is Nnknj imn's mnin producer of nrmy pInnesmanufactures some compononts ~d sub-assembl ies . nnd repai rs ~i ror

(2) I t i s believed thnt the fol lowing plnnos (U'onBsembled nt the Ot~ Plant: two-engine medium-bombor Helen (Mar3s ingle-angina f ighter Toja (Mnrk 2) , and single-engine fighterOsOar (Mc.rk 2) . The tollow1ng mo.y be produoed there : s ingle e l l f iaet l&h te r Fr c.n k, nn d D . t wo -e ng in e moc ll um -b ombe r1182 (no code DD.. IM}thought to be des igned. to repIn.os the ai rcraft Helen .


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c. Detl'.ils of' PlrLnning--Operntionnl!

(1) Bombing PInns:

(o.) DGtermino.tion of Bomb Loa.d:

(1) The Ota. plant presents 0. compact,

ne 0.1' 1Y s q uo.r e tOol' gat, w th n mo.jority of the bui 1di ngs bei ngmodern in construction. The o.dministr~tion nnd inspection buildings(Lre or r0inforced conc z-eret,e with peo.ked roofs. Leas thnn 20 percent of the roof f.T0o. 10.be Liove d susceoptible to incendiu.ry t'-ttn.ck-.This type of t~rget necessitated concentrution upon ~ bomb londtho. t would c aus e ths greD.tes t dcmcge , The SOD-pound genero. l -purposbomb. HE type. the best Ii'.vnllnble for building dGmcli tion. wo.s recom-mended s inc e i t was of s urr ic ient s ize to d 'C.mngc.e ffec t1ve ly 1n -s tnl ln . t io l ' l s f t h is type, The Loud s el ec te d wus n mixt ure of 80per cent SOD-po undGP ~nd 20 per cen t M-76 incendiary bombs, Thisra t ic wns p lanned so thnt i f hi ts were scored f i res w uld spreadClndgren te r d ama .g ewoul d r es u lt .

(2) T he g en er al -p ur po se b om bs warefUBGd with an ins tantaneous tuil end P. 0.1 d el r. yn os e f or d et on -

at ion in the event, thnt the t r , i l fuse fni led to func t ion. Thei ns ta .n ta ne ou s s et ti .n g f or t he t ai l f us e w uld cnuse doton t ien ofthe bombs befo re they pe netrCl te1 bui ld ing f lo( 'rs . Mc.ximum b lasteffect t o n ef 'L l'i ss es w ou ld be os su re d , Furth erm0re. i f ta i l fuseswere nct i va ted by bui l ding r-ocfs , a i r burs ts wnuld r asu It .

(J) The M-76 inc endlnry b~mb hc.~ in6t~uneous nose nnd tai l fus ing in order to sprea .d the f i re ns quicklya s p os si bl e.

( 4) Minimum intevo. lometer s s tU ngswer0 usc: : to Lnc reaso the { lGnsi ty of bombs.

(b) Bombard ier ' s Planning:

(1) The north t ip of Lake Ko.sumigu wselected ns the in i t ia l point s ince i t is th0 bast visual pointfor this turget on ei ther un upwind or dcwnwinc run . I t l ies f~renough f rom the turget to give tho bombardier nn 18-minute b~mbrun. Approach w~s made upwind so that the lower gr~und speed ~give the bQmb~rdier mGre t ime fer accurate syncbroniz~ t i n .

(2) The cesignatec appronch, ~ is off" . t tnckof 282 degrees . was used s" th: . t the formntion would be onthe nxi ' s of the widest pa . r t of the seloctod t ' " ; . rget. reu. The l l imingpoint selected Wes between the ends of the westernmost pnr t s- f~br it iona nnd sub-assembly bui lding nnd the f innl nssembly and fuse-lage-erect ion bu i lding. Thi s point incluGe~ tho ent i re plant within

n 1500-foot rndids , which wns within the circulnr error prcbublefor thi s miss ion. Ef fect ive dnmuge w~s insured if the bombs weredropped in the nssigned c: . lmingpOint nr sn, The grie coordina testhe aiming point were 126133 on ~I Bombar Cornmnnd Mo~nic No.90.13,t c .rg et 15U.

(3 ) For rndnr b( ' lmbingof the seoonde.Jt r . rget , the ci ty nf Tokyo, the geogra .phic ooordinntas of 35 0 '1't6'N-139

048 'OOftE were se lected sinoe these 1escr ibe 0. point n e a r the


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and because the attack: from enemy a,ircraft was not anticipated tobe great'er than for other similar operations, enemy flghter reactioneonsiderationa did not enter into the planning for the mission.

(2) 8nemyAntlaircraftl Based on average winds forthis area. 260 degrees at 106 knots. the best route of apprGachinsofar a.s antiaircraft fire Vle.S concerned was on a heading between70 and 120 degrees. However, the strength of the antiaircraft

defenses. 12 heavy guns, did not warrant making enemy antiaircraftopposition a primary consideration in selecting the axis of attaCk.

3. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION:

a. Take-off: The f 1 rst group of the 73rd Win@) was sched-uled to take-off at 092005Z and the first group of the 313th "{ingat 092035Z. Actual take-off was accomp11shed as follows:

Aircraf t Fi rs t Las tWing Airbo rne Aircraf t Take-off Aircraf t Take -off

73rd 092106Z3 092154.2

313th 092126Z5 092150Z

Totals 092154Z18 092106Z

No assembly dif f icul t ies were exper ienced. Eighteen ai rcraf t werenon-eff ec t ive , deta i l ed reasons being given in Annex E. Par t I ,C on so li da te d S ta ti st ic al S umma ry.

b . Route out : The c our e e f lown WaS g en er al ly a s b ri ef ed .Use of severa l i s lands en route as nav igat ional check points gavethe nav igato rs severa l radar wind runs before reaching th~ in! t ia lpoin t . Airc raf t of the 73rd Wing made landfa l l as br i efed and wentahead on the axis of a t tack as br ie fed in a major i ty of Cases.The 3l3th Wing 's a i rcraf t a lso made landfa l l as br ie fed . but madetoo wide a tu rn and were blown eastward to Chesi Point which, combinwith a s t rong head wind, caused them to f ly d i rec t ly upwind for 4Sminutes . Weather on the route out was good.

c . Over Targe t :

(1) Pr imary Targe t : With vis ib i l i ty over the targetbeing es t imated at 30 miles and wi th weather cond i t ions being be t -ter than predic ted , 84 of the 100 e ffec t ive ai rc raf t bombed thepr imary ta rget . These ai rcra f t bombed in 9 format ions , wi th 70dropping thei r bombs on the 9 leader s and 5 making individualrange s ight ings . Clouds encountered were 4/10 st r a tocumulus between2000 and 8000 feet , wi. t h 1/10 to 2/10 coverage over the target .A tota l o f 187 tons of genera l purpose bombs and 49.5 tons of inoen-d iary bombs were dropped from al t i tudes of 26,000 to 29,400 feetf rom l00605Z to l00641Z . (See Annex E . Par t I , Conso l idat ed Sta-t i s t ica l Summary , for deta i l s . ) Damage asses sment revealed 755,900square fee t of roof area were damaged in the ta rget a rea .

(2) DI vers i onarY Primary Targe t : The two ai roraf taSsigned to s t r ike at Hamamatsu dropped four tons of inoendiarybombs at 100433Z from 30,000 to 30,050 feet , w i th the lead a i rcra f ts igh t ing the t arget and the other a i roraf t dropping on the leader .


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(3) Seco niln.ry T g;r Ibat.l No eJ.r or sf' t bombed th" seoond.e.ry

(4) Last Resort Te..rr;et; Three B~,29'.s bombed the c1.ty ofChest and aircraft insta11~:tiens in the city. dropping 6 ."1 tonsoi' gener!!.1Purpos.e bombs and 2,3 tons of lncEmdiary bombs, (Ford.etailE! see Annelt E,PS


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SECRElT--~---

1:. Operations Summary:

(1) No.vign.tion (See Annex A. Part I, for details),Navigation on "bl'l.ismissions VietS generally o.s briefed, with rC\dorCheck points being used effectively by the craws. The pr-ogrnminstituted to give increased turn and target traini~g is expectedto remedy some of the weaknesses displo.yed. As indica:ted. one ofthese errors caused the 3l3th Wing to make landfa.ll as briefedund then make 0. turn that was too wide, causing the aircraft tobe blown eastward.

(2) Bombing (See Annex At Part II, for deta.ils): Allbomb runs were made visually, a.1though there '{Ins 0. slight o.mountof' interference on some runs in the finnl seconds due to sCatteredclOuds, which also prevented adequate photogro.phic coverage.Observed results were gOOd. Mechnnical difficulties encounteredwere chiefly in the A-2 type bomb release. In a.ddition, personnelerrors caused a number of bombs to fa.ll short of the tnr get.

(.3) Flight Engineering (See Annex .A, Po.rt III, for de-tails)': Unfavorable surface winds caused both vrings to tnke20 to25 minutes longer than predicted to r-e ach the point of c11mb. usingan avero.ge of 130 additional go.llons of fuel per a1rcra.f~. Un-predicted (llti tude winds cnused the 73rd Wing to remain 20 minuteslonger at altitude than planned at an average cost of approximately250 gallons of gasoline per aircre1't. Unpredicted winds at (llti-tude, an attempt to avoid anti-a.ircrnft concentration, and drir~ing off course caused the 313th Wing to remain 40 minutes longera.t altitude than planned and cost 500 gallons of fuel per circraft.

(4) ~ (See Annex A, Part IV, for deto.ils): Norm!empleyment was mude of SCR-718 radio 0.1imeter and SCR-695 IFFequipment. Fixes were taken a.t an av~rage run~ of 750 miles.

(5) Gunnery (See Annex A, Pert V, for details): BothWings d1spla.yed high pr ot'Lcieney in equipment and gun opere.tionaEnemy a.ircrart ma.de~ttacks on loose forma.tions~ More effectiveUSe Was mude of the centra.l fire control system.

(6) ~ir-Sea Rescue (See Annex A. Purt VI, for deto.ils):Seven B-29' s ditched, with 30 survivors being picked up fran threea.ircraft. Nega.tive results were obta.ined in the other four searches

g. Weather (See Annex B, Purt I,. for details): Excellent'weather Wns foreca.st and weather conditions on the operations wereabcu t IlS predicted. The forecast of winds at target was low. Thetarget are~ had 4/10 stratocumulus and covera,ge over the targetwas 1/10 to 2/10. Winds were 270 degrees at 140 knots. Weatherconditions at bases were good for both take-off and landing.

h. Communications;

(I) Radar' Counter Me~Bures (See Annex C, Part I for de-tails): Six ReM searoh airoraft flew the mission, with five searoing for enemy signals from the main formations and od .~

the diversionary attaok made on Hamama u. A total :f 33 radarsignals Was logged. Results of the diversion were noticed and Signals for gun-laying radar were interoepted. There were no ement failures.

(2..) QODUIIWl1catiopsSee Annex c, Part II for detaUa)aAll strike frequencies were jammed or interferred wIth at d i t t e r . a tperiods during the mission. Radio diSCipline was @Pod, &lth~there Was some unnecessary talk. Seventeen strike reporta transmitted to the ground station.


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Commanding

i, Intelligence SWfu~arYl

(1) EnemYAir Opposition (See Annex D. Part It for details),Enemy air oppos.ition was moderate to strong, with 230 enemy air-craft making 330 attack's. a lower average ttlan on r ec eut, majorstrikes. One B-29. 'I per cent, vias destroyed and 21,8 per centdamaged by Japanese fighters. Eighty-five percent of all attackaWail made prior to bombs away. a hlgh mark for Japanese air de-fense, Tony again made the most attacks on our aircraft, 32 percent. Nose attacks totaled 50 percent of all attacks m~e andhigh attacks Were favored in 39 per cent of the Cases, 1' . tot'al

of nine coordinated attacks waS observed, Some new types of un-id6lntified aircraft Viera encountered over the ];lrimary target, Thedi ver S ionary raid rep or te d that 15 enemy aircraft of all typeswereenoountered, but no attacks were made, The B-29' s destroyed21 enemy aircraft; 15 wer e probably destroyed; and 2-5 Vlere dam-aged,

(2) jilnemyAnti-Aircraft' (See Annex D, Part II for de-tails): There were no losses to anti-aircraft. Enemyanti-air-craft fire was reported weak and inaccurate from initial point totarget area, and also the same in the target area, Once againone of our aircraft reported seeing what was believed to be II;phosphorous bomb, It spread in umbrella-like fashion, with longwhite streamers, Over the targetaree. at 29,000 feet an enemyaircraft t: ele ased a projec til e d.eac ri bed as a -ball of fire'. It

Was not seen to explode, passing about 200 ya.rds over the forma-tion.

( 3 ) Bomhing Results and DamageAssessment (See Annex D.Part III. for details): Interpretation of photographs obtained on12 February 1945 f1ssessed visible damage to 75S,900 square feet ofroof area. representing 33.5 per cent of the total building area.A : major po.rtic:m of damage Was confined to the east half of tooplant. It was reported possible that tne remaining part may bestill oP,6rational, or could be made operational in a relativelyshort time.

. I6 t : , " ; ,f~ ( 1 J J7 / 1 iCURTISE. LEYAYMajor General , U.S.A.


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a DAIMING POINT

. T A R G E T 1 5 4 4 -. N A K A J IM A P L A N T

OTA


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ANNEX

A

'___

O PE RATIO NS R EPO RT S

,Exhibit - Track Charts

Part I .. Naviga,tot ' $ Report

Part U -Bdmbardi er I a Report

P,"a,rt tIi .. Plight EngH.. eer l s ReportP'art IV .. Radar orr icer' s Report

'Part V -Gunnery Orricer! s Report

Part VI - Air-Sea Rescue Repo,rt

EXhibit - Air-Sea Rescue Report

M.i_ssion ,No, 29

10 February 1945


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MISSION NO. ~DATE &0 PI .. 'I~WING 73 re iGROUP

COJiFIDENTIA!- COMPILlD n SSTH PHOTO TICM

TAKE O FfF RSTl ST L....

+ 498499

500


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:1~MISSION NO. ztDATE 10 FEB.1945

13 rdINGGROUP

--- UlIJIID---- 4..,


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Toyam

JMats ...........

o -1005361

o

:1~ MISSION NO.a.OAT E 10 FEa . 194&

- r - - - - -T- - - - -+ - - - -~ - - - -~WING 3.3thGROUP

--- IIUEFEO---- 105--_-_- 504

CO)tPlLED BY 51TH


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1. Navigation to the as.sem':!ly point at lHsr,ino-Shima. IHI.I> gen-erally as briefed, but the time of dep9.rture YIa.S 11 minutes l'ate be-caus e of' eodelay ih tUe,-off. The OUilI"O "las initiat"d at 30-00'North ..... th the f i r,s't 9000 feat mad,e in instruaentcordi tiona. Alti-

tu,d_, was r-eaOhed at 340-00 Nor.th apposi te lli~lI.ke-J ima.

2, The 00 ur s ,e waS f Lovrn r..s br i ef'ed '.11 hi n 30 :ttlLe 6 0 f the:'anpto-qhoto Islands to provide navi&ational aid from AN I ).P~-13returns. T'ne UlS9 of these isl;-,nd:> and the ;",',9Sterr, Tokyo pens i a-s uLa gave the !'Is. vi gator s s ev ar aI r~ dar wi nd runs b afoTe r eac hi ngthe ini,tid po in t. "fi nds wer e br ier ad :.t 260 0 at 128 !


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b. unforseen headnandconditions at low and high altitudescaused an unexpected quantity of fUe l to be consumed. The ' a ve r age:fuel remaining per aircraft was 576 gallons for both wings.

~ For detailed fuel consumption data sea ~Dnsolidated Stat-istical SUmmary, nnex E.

PART IV - RADAR OFFICER'S FlEPORI'

1. Of the 112 aircraft equipped with AN!,APQ.-13. ninety-one poe -aes aed sets sd:.lsfactory: for bombing.

a. Windsuere obtained by ANV,AP~13on the island chains on ap-p~oach to IF as planned.

3. Normal employment was made of the SOFl-718 (Radar Al t:iJIleter)and SCR-695 (IFF). One SCR-695 failed due to batt:le damage.

4. AN. tKPN-h (loran) was normal, with :fixes taken at an averagerange of 750 nautical miles.

PbRT V - GUNNERY OFFICER'S :REPORI'

1. The zu.as i on from a gunnery standpoi nt was excellent. both.'l7iogs dis,playing high proficiency in eg_uipmc.nt and gun operation. The

upper forward and lower forward fired the g~eatcst percentage of am-munition since the nose attack was still tho. favored'attack b , y the.1apan0sc pilots.

Z. The enemy arcraft pressed attacks (on loose f'o:rnations andfleu through these formations. but this was not the case r:ith tightformations.

3. The gunners have gained confidence in the C.F.C system andare beg inning to use i t mor e e ff ic ie nt ly.

4. Combat D9.ta:

73rd Wing 313tjh TIing

92,448 rds (85 Mc) 97.508 rds (25 Ale) 189,956 ( l l

100%

ilmmo Expended

CFC l;luipment 100% 10'0%

Turre ts 99%' oper~ ti ve

93% .operat1 va 95% operative

99.2% oper99.4% opera.tive

50 Cal. M.G. 97% operative

For details of FJA destroyed, probably destroyed and dannged, turnto Ann.ex D, Par t It D llbonu Air Opposi honl!.

PART VI . - AIR-SFA R1iSCUEF.~{)RT

.Follooing is a summary of ditching inci.dcnts occa,trring on thismiss~on. (See Air-Sea Rescue map o n fo ll o~ in g page.)

1~ Aircraft No. 20V757: 31jth Wing _ 1hl.s airerai"e ditchedUapP5X1mately 101315Z, with a modif ied posi t ion given as ~ ~.~ -144 50' E. 1!J .ovensurvivors were s ighted at 102400Z at 22 0 JOIN. ~

-3-


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SUB:2 super CumboS' Orb,t

~-1~~~~---4---4---+--~---+--~~~~H---+-\ -,__ ~

..,'"U'''

145"

MISSION NO. 2:9.DATE 10F 11"'94$WING XXL B.C.GROUP AIAS,U R l !C ,U

- - - r-1--- '-r-_'__~__~~+-__-----1------+-------1l , I

---"t

1... -25"


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ANNEX

B

Ma.ssion No. 29

10 February 1945


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a. This operJ.tion was planned on the 9 February on the basi,s;of "'. fo recast which g;;,ve lIP ad b.l,se s.nd route c ond it 10ns ar.d, visual~o;;tblnG conditions at the b.rget. T:1is forecast VI;;;'S nev er changed and'the mi (>~ io n was c ar r I ad. NLt on t hi s bas t s,

b , E.J.r t E t wi nd fo r ec as ts whi C h;were to ... low.

2. Bases a.t Take Off:. There vras 5-8/10 cumulus and stra:toCU;-:l-ulus prese~t; -~ith'sc';ttG~ed showers in the vicinity. 'lisi'.lilitieswere 12 1::!iles, drop".ing, to 3 miles Ln ri.in shQ""'lers. Ceilings Vlere1000-1'5('0 fee;;, With- tops a.t 6000 feet. ~o difficulties were enco.unt>el'ed due '~o "ve~.t.r,eI" en t~lce-offs a,nli a.ssemblies.

3., ROJlt'! QutgO"ing: To ISoN ther e were a/rc curau l us wi til bas asat 1'300 feet ' ws s e stirn$. ted at 30 miles. Cne SOil. 1: clouddirectly over t.h.e trgetenc.:>untered b:' later groups prevented themfrom ohta.i ni ng p1Gi>ogr ap)ls o r thei r " :om J.O'bur st s , 'rile "lind 'nas esti:::.-ated at 270, 140 l(nots as ag:~inst the forecast of 26Co a't 1~ knct s ,

5. f ! .9 . ! : ! ; t~Retu.rnil]g: 'Ihe return route \'IRS similar to the weatheron the route 0Ut.

6 ! !? -. . .~~ . .Q . 9 :. .. ..Re tu r n: Sa ip .. :. nhad 7/10 cumulus, bases 1500 fset.tops 8-10.000 feE'lt with scattered showers in the area. 'Iisi1:>1 :_ ity was15 miles, droptint, '~o one mile 1;1 showers. Tini~n 2!ad a/IO str:.tocuUl-u'l us , -:Oases 1200 feet and lowHb.g to. 5011 feet in showers. VisibilityW,,-s 12 miles, 10"Hering to one mile in showers. Light to lLoderSO,tetur-bu l ence W:l.8 reported and ,~ low a,yproac!', had tc - be "::?de. T:1is provedto be d~ngerous and one plane hit the Vlater in ~ down dril.ft. No:showers fell On the runway dur Lng 1 anding.

7. K~_h: 1n g.?nerp,l the forecast for this mission was ex-cellent and ms.ny crew members remarked a1_,out it. The only noticeable1,,'or part Wi1.S t."'1.e forecnst for Tinhn bases on :-etllrn.


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,-,

II: i. J1M III ~Z a... =. . . a.. I I -a-u I c. . . .

I ..- I 0I

II

0


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z


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caUWNICi.'!IONS .REl?ORTS

Put I ... Ra,cill-r Cor.mter Measures

Part II "CoIlllllUllhe;t1oD,s O1'f foar I S Report

Jl:!.~a1cn No.. g

10 Fe'bllu.ary 1945


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170/800/7.5 32/30N - 141/10E189/1100/12 Possible shipbor~e194 /1100 /12 Near Haohijo Jima197/1200/17 Noar Nishi~o Shima75/500/58 34/ N - 14l/30E80/250/48-50 Near smith Island92/850/15 .93/5C:l - 14l/40E105/1000/18-20 Near ~orl Shima190/800/10 Near 'oriShima

TraokingTr .. ok.ingTraok.ingSweepingTraoki~TraokingSweepingIne~ularlrregular(very weak)

4. No Dhing of the above Signals waS impossible due to thelaok of suitable equipment. The looations listed above indioate wherethe s i gnal was intero epted.

a . Resul ts of Divers ion. Al though at f i rs t hand i t waSapparent that the div ers ion was suooessful in reduoing the enemyf ighter a t t aoks on the me. in r aid (305 f ig ht er a tt ac ks 0.8 oomparedwith an ave rage of 480 at t aoks for th is areal , the resul ts ware not

c cncLuatv e , An i nt er o ep te d e n emy oOl 1J JDun i oa tt oDt0604Z on a fre-quenoy of 4600 ko was transla t ed and ana lyze: ' !to determine the suo-oess of th i s divers ion. The informat ion conta ined in the reoordingwas as fol lows!

(1) Ishakaw a (appar ent ly a regional f igh ter oontro ls ta t ion) cal led what is bel ieved to be common Japanese surne .mes( pe rh ap s t he name s of pi lo ts) and told them to go to Nagoya. Tab-ula t ion ind icates that Ishikawa sent not less than 12 ai rplanes toNagoya from the vioini ty of Tokyo. If those whom Ishlkaw& cal ledwere format ion leaders . the number of planes diracted migh t havebeen mush gz:eater . Wlly Ishikawa sent the planes to Nagoya 1i boursaf tar the divers ion Dad reaoped thei r tax get and whi le ota was beingbombed is not olear ly unders tood. With the informat ion at band iti s impossible to draw any def ini te conc Lua rcns oonoer ning tbe in-format ion.

b . Ant ia i roraf t was repor ted as barrage type. beavy andi na oo ut fl .t e. C lo ud c ov er ag e w as 1/10 a ; main targe t . The r::. k wasc oo rd in at ed w it h t he s ig .n al s i nt er oe pt ed at 76 m o d es or ib ll d i n p ar a-graph 2b.

4. IlmIl?!lJENTI No equipment fa l luNs were noted on this miss ion.

5. QONCLUSIONSIThe 76 and 77 mo sign~ls in t eroepted with gunluying rada r oharaoter is t ios presumably or iginatod from the JapandaeM ar k T IL MOd elIII Type en emy eql l ipment .

a . The lobe switohed signnls in the 150 mo band have beeD

reoorded in many oasas . The l ise of th is s ignal is not known sinoe i thas no t baen thQS far def in i te ly assooia ted with enemy flak or fighters.h o lose watch is being kept of th is band on al l miss ions .

b . The tota l nu~ber o t s ignals in teroepted werG be tw8eD 76290 mo indioat ing a l~rgG amountot anomy e l eo tr on io e qu ipmen tbeon oonoentra ted within this speotrum.

andhas


30/65

o. The signal 290 / . _ / 4 14 is the only interoept above200 mo on this mission. While it may be e. splU' iousresponse, DOother s ignal interoepts in the same area were heard which couldgive r ise to a spur ious s ignal on this frequenoy. S1x s ig na ls b e-tween 200 and 400 mo were interoepted on the4 F ebr ua ry mi ssi on t othe Kobe-Osaka aree. and i t appears that new types of radfJ. r recomi ng i nt o w ide sp rea d Us e.

PieRT II - COliW"UNIC"TIONS OFFICER'S R.EPCRT

1. Strike Reports I A ir or n t r ad io o pe ra to rs t r~ nsmi tt eds eve nt ee n ( 17 ) St ri ke R ep or ts ( Bombs I ,w ay ): III were reoeivod byth e G rou nd S tat io n.

2. Fox Transmiss ions 1 Weather enooded inu eo J.eand TimeT io ks w er e t rE in sm itt ed si mUl ta ne ous ly on a ll s tri ke fr equ .e no ias o nthe half hour and the hour . respeotively. No requests for weathoror for time tioks were made by airoraf t in fl ight.

3. Frequenoies: Al l s tr ike frequenoies V iera ja ll l l l !ed r inter-fered with at dif ferent periods dur Lng this mission. Jamming overthe tar get on 11080 kos made reoeption diff icult . Sever d Btr i koreports were reoeived only af ter two and three attempts . In a per-cente.ga breakdown of traffic carr ied out dlU' ing t he miss ion. th ir ty-nine per oent was oarried out on 6 m .o . f ro qu en oi es ; t hi rt y- ei gh tper cent on.3 m.o. f requencios and twenty three per oent on 11 m.o.f requenoies .

4. N jl .v ig at io na lj ,i ds : 7 3r d ~ i) 'i ngi ro ra ft r ad io o pe ra to rs r e-q ue st ed t hi rt y- th re e H F / D Fbear ings from Wing ground sta tion; thi rty-two of these were obtained. n/F s ta tion oould not obtain bear ing forone request because of hea.vy CW interference .313th ' .11ngradio op-e ra to rs r eq ue st ed t hi rt y- tw o H /F n/F bearings from ~;ing g round st t ionTwenty six bear ings Were obtained. Four bearings were not obta .inedbeoause of interferenoe; two requests were not obtained beoause

ground stut ion V Ias h&.ndl ing a dis tressed aircraf t . Bearings forthese six requests were obtained during ~nother period. SaipGn B~dioRange and Ho.mer were ut il ized by all ai roraf t on the return lag ofthe mission. Those aircraf t us ing the O,tI Rad io s ta ti on s al pt .. nlr e-por ted good results f rom five hundred Idles out from br;.se . J, . iroraf trequested five VHF DIE' b ear ings from Condor Buei &11 were obtained.

5 Net Disoip1ine and Seouri ty : Genoral ly speaking. ai roraf trad~o operutors maintained good radio disoipl ine for this mission.Two oooasions where airoraft radio operators intarfared with ~otborradio operator ' s t ransmiss ions wero noted by tho Wing ground stat ions .A oonsiderable amount of unneoessary ohat ter is a ti l l being recordedon VHF. Speed and al t i tude wore spoken in olear on VHF near the taget . One radio operator t r&nsmit t1)d 0. a ea aa ga o on si st in g of olear

text and oode groups.6. Enemy Transmissions . The following inoidents of interFarGDD

and jamming were notod during this miss ion:

a . .3145 k08

(1) Jap voioo. effeot ive to ineffeot ive . a t 09101approximately six hundred miles from b~s

\

. . .,-,. ,. . ":. .


31/65

b. 6 0 . 5 5 kcs

(1) C1(1 .l1e1 iberate and effeot!'?,;; at O]OOZ a.ppro;(im.l>.t",~Iy six hundred miles from b E > s . " l

(2 ) From 0900z to 1200Z. intent ional 0101amming bloc ~ed all t.u.ff ~o dur ing this per Lod, J. bead ng ofbhrae hundred forty-seven tiegraes was taken on thisste. t 10n.

a ill'a80 kos

0) Intrimtional C', ' jamming during transmlss1onof allBombs J.Vlay reports. Ef'footiv.a in some instances.

(2) Hev.vy C';' inted' a t eDCEI from unknown stations onreturn leg of mission.

d. 3410' kos

(1) j,t llOOZ 0ont inuous t rans l I l iss ion of" N..,.P"follow-ed by five dots.

e.

> -'":.S ;

f' '.

7310' ke s

(1) Nsgl.igib 1G

11160' kcs

(1) Negligibls

7. Distress: Six reg,uasts were made for urgent HF /[f' boar-ings; all were obtaint3d. One airoraft sent three distr.J55 messagesusing ref't3rel'loe point oode. Later. this aircl'aft notified GroundStation that it was out of' immedi.ate danger and was able to make base.Ground Sta ti.on reoeivod one SOS from an airchft about to di toh;position and bOa>l'ing ware obtained by tho ground station.

8. Eglll.ipmont Ji.alfunctions 1 _'>.N/_$T-13. three antennas broken.one dynamoto1' inOpfll's.tivej BC-348. one i.Doperativo; i.N/J.RN-7. two aoElssive hunt Lng of indioator nGod1a. one indioator inopi3rativa. foUl'sense antennas br oken r SGR-.522. thr0e inollerative. Olla w.::Iaki RC-36,two inoperative, two mike buttons stioking. one 1'atermitten:t -In .. 11positions. one intt3rrnittsnt ill one positionj RL-42. one inoperative,two would not r~0l in . two stuok. -


32/65

D

ANNEX

Pa:rt I - :Enemy Fighter Reaction Report

Part II - Flak Officer1s Report

Part III - Damage Assessment Report

Mission No. 22

, ..10 Pebl't.: lary 1945 ..


33/65

I NTEU ,IGENCE REPORTS

PART I E~~IY FIGHTER ~~CTION nE?ORT

1. General: Enemyair opposit ion was moderate to strong, 230 enemya i r- c ra i t making 330 attacks. One B-29 (1% of our effort) was des-troyed and 22 9-29 '5 (21.13%)wer e d am ag edby e nemy f ig ht er s. . B-298 des-t royed 21, l>robably des t royed 15, a nd d amag ed 25 enemy aircraft.

2, S ig bt in Rs a nd A tta ck s:

a. Ratio of ' at tacks to sightings for last four atissions in Tokyoarea:

MISSION EfA EfA Ratio ofAttacks Si~hted Attacks to Sig!!t igss

THIS ~~I SS IO !I T330 2.30 1.4 to 1

Mission #24 98 4 275 3.6 to 1

Mission #18 200 150 1.3 to 1

Mission #16 272 140 1.9 to 1

b . Ratio of enemy aircraft sighted to number of B-29's over Japan:

lUSSION E / A No. B-29 ,s Ratio of Sightings toSightings Over Jaean Stre~h of our Force

THIS HISS ION 230 101 2.3 to 1

Mission # 24 275 63 4.4 to 1

Mission # 18 150 54 2.8 to 1

Mis'Sion # 16 140 52 2.7 to 1

c. Ratio of enemy aircraft at tacking to number of B-29's over Japa

MISSION E/A No. B-29's Ratio of Attacks toAttacks O v e r Japan StreQ8!h of our Force

TH I SMISSION 330 101 3.3 to 1

Mission # 24 98 4 63 15.6 to 1

Mission # 18 200 54 3.7 to 1

Mission # 16 272 52 5.2 to 1

3, Location of Attacks:

a. Eighty-five percent of all attacks were prior to bombs awq,a s c om pa re d w i t h 49%, 13%, a n d 3 0 1 , rewpectiva1y, on the three p r e -vious missions over the Tokyo area.

b. Following ta 'Qle shows areas where the attacks occurred:

Location N o . orAttacka

Percent atT ot a l A t t a c k .

Before reaching LandfallAfter Landtall to Initial Point. l f ter Initial. Point to Bomb . . . ,After Bomba AWIq to Coae1#Att.ezo OoaD1:. 1;0 4,0 mU.e. _ to s..

'roTAL5 JUles ott tlw

1*29

25142


34/65

4..T.ypeof EnemyAircraft Attacki.ru"t: Tony made 32% of all attack.],which is pract.ically the, samearon the three previous missinna overthe Tokyo area. Following .1s the breakdown of all attacks by enetllY"aircraft type.:

E/A'type No. of Attacks Percent of all Attacks

TonyTajaZekeOscarNickIrvingU/I S/ETsJackU/I T/E'sHanpV a lF r a n kRexRufeJake

TOTAL

10474

343419171511II332 )1)1)1)

330

3222

10106553311

2

5. Direction of Attacks

a. Nose attacks tota.led 5Q1;of all attacks, which is above aver-age. kttacks on the right quarter were 12~ of the total which is thelowest for any mission except Mission No. 12 flown 13 D811.1941..

6. Level of Attack:

a. Thirty-nine percent of attacks came frClll above, twentY'""sevenpercent from level and thirty-four percent from below.

b. Of the high att~cks, the nose at.tacks were five time as greatas those of any other high quarter.

c. Of the level attacks, nose and left quarter attacks pl'edott-inated.

d , Of the low attacks, nose and tail e.ttacks I"lere most numerous.

7. Direction and Level of Attack;

a. A n average of one 'out of every four att_cks was a high noseattack. other favorite approaches were low nose, low tail, levelnose and level left quarter.

b. The follolliing char-t shows the precentage distribution ofdirection and lavel of all attacks:


35/65

Direction and Level of Approacho f EnemyAircraft

Total Numberof Attacks

12%

39%3% FR OM ABOVE

FROM LEVE L

FROM BE L (JI~

S. Ene%y Tacties:

a. Pacinp;: The fourth group to make landfall encountered severalenemy fif,hters prior to Init ial Point, none of :hich at ta cke d. Th es eunident i f ied f i~hters appeared to be pacing and act ing as obsovers.

b . Coo rd in at ed A tt ac ks : A total of nine attacks wer e c oo rd in at ed2.71 of al l a t tacks . Fol lowing arc the reports of 7 of the 9 coordi-nated atb ,ck s:

(1) Over target , alt i tude 28,000 feet , thr ee Ta nya came infrom, (.) belovi at 11 o'clock, (b) level ~t 12, and, (c) above at 2o'clock. These A l coponed fire at appro~tc~y 1000 yards &nd p ro ssthe attack to :300 yards; 'Breaking lCM and undor our foi 'niationa.

(2) Over targ~t at 2~,OOO feet, a Tojo and a Zeke came in at9 O'clock level, oponed fire at 1000 yards and pressed within 25 and200 yards, respectively, breaking 811q low a n n out at 6 o'clock in adive.

(3) Betweeninitial point andthe te. .rgetat 29,500 teet ,Tonys came in on a pursl-it curve at 11 o'olock, in trail, frca bUllaltitude and dove under our aircraft. Our guntire was etteotJ: . done of the fishtors, causing destruction ot its Wing.

-3-


36/65

SECRET------

(4) In the same area as above. two Tonys came in fro.m highon a pursuit curve in formation. Our gunner's fire at 1000 yards ap-parently caused them to break away at 500 yards in a shallow dive.

(5) One enemy aircraft making a pass from one, s ide and twoor three immediately attacking high out of the sun on the other side.

(6) Three unidentified, single in-line engine enemy aircraftwith diamond shaped wings made coordinated high, low attack f!.t 12 0clock, breaking away close with slow rool turning bellies to our ~irewhich seemed to have n o n ot ic ea bl e effect.

(7) Four Tonya attacked from the left, the two leaders circl-ing around to attack our right wing and the other t..... attacking ourleft wing.

c. Ramming or New Type Attacks: None reported

d . B reakaw~s : Typeof b r e a k away s r e po r te d : dives. banks, sp l i t -S's, and left and r igh t turns.

9~ Types Enenw Aircraft Si"hted but not Attacking:

a. Several Tonys, Oscars, Tojos and Irviugs were sighted whichdid not attack ..

b. Onetwin-boom, twin-engine, twin-tail enemyaircraft wassighted between Initial Point and target.

c. OneBetty seen in same area on a parallel course driven offby a burst.

d. "Silver F-47 type, larger than Tajo. Bubble canopy. Planemovedslowly." Possibly George. Did not attack our aircraft.

e. "A plane that looked like an AT-6." Also, possible George.

10. T.7peand Accuracy of ffnemyFL e and TypePronectile:

a. 21.8~ of B-29, s over J:'.;~ were damagedby enemy aircraft,a s comparedwith 46. O% J 9. 5% and 17.3 ~ of B-29' s da.magedby enemyaircraft on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area.

b. Onepercent of 8-29' 5 over Japan were destroyed by enemy air-craft as co.mparedwith 7. 9~, 3. 7( and 1.9-t destroyed by enemyaircrafton the three previous missions over the Tokyoarea.

c. Total of 22.8~ Q f B-29's over J"pan were damagedand/or des-troyed by enemyaircraft, as co~ared with 53.9~, l3.2~ and 19.2~ ~r~29's damagedand/or destroyed on the three previous missions overthe Tokyoarea.

d. Accuracy of enem,yfire was considered poor g~nerally, althoughone group reported it to be the most accurato to date.

e. R.:ports indicl'.te that the enemyfired 7.7- and 12.7-nm mach-ine gun chiefly, and some 2O-mmcannon.

r. One Ni_cl~was reported as having a top turret.

g. Qn;: Jeck with three machine guns widely spaced in each winS

h. One Irving was reported as firing four wing guns plus twonose guns. Tbl",calibre was not observed.


37/65

SECR::i:T

i. Heav:i'machine gun fire was reported from four Tojos.

j. One twin-engine> in-line enemy aircraft was reper ted to havefour guns in each wing; the calibre comparable to our 50 calibre( prob-ably 12.7)

11. B-29 Diver s ionary Raid Against Enem"y Aircraft: TwoB-29 , s dis-pensed rope and bombed rramamatsu 43 minutes before our first combatgroup made Landfall. These two aircraft reported being trailed fromshortly before Landfall. Although fifteen enemy fighters were encount-ered (Tojos, Tonys, Nicks and Irvings), none initiated any attacks.

12. Enemy Air craft Marki.ngs: Most" of "the aic.raft seen were O.D colorwith roundels on "wings and fuselage. Other markings observed:

7 Taja - Silver2 Toja - Denk brown and olive crab9 Tojo - BlackI TOja - Olive d rab and purpleI Taja - Silver with red roundels and three large stripes

between cockpit and tail2 Taja - Dark greenI Taja - Black fuselage and red cowling1 Toja - Silver with red cowling and vertical fin

I Toja - Silver with orange insignia1 Tajo - Black cowling1 Tojo - Yellow belly2 TOllY- Silver4 Tony - Olive drab wi"h red ra~dels add orange belly

12 Tony - Silver with red roundels3 Tony - ~rown6 Tony - Bla"ck1 Tony - Drak blue1 Tony - Yellow stripes4 Jack - Silver"1 Jack - Brawn and purple1 Jack - Black with "dde red band behind cockpit1 Hamp - Blue and white stripes on wings

Zeke s Two white bande circlin..: -:.dngs parallel to fuselageZakes Two yellow bars on each side of roundel a n e redstripes on wing

Zekes All silver1 Frank- All silver

13. Claims by TYpe Snem,v f~ircraft_ and by Gun Posisi2!ll

Destroyed. Damaged Gun Positionrobably Destroyed

1 Tajo1 Tojo1 Tojo2 Tojo2 Tajo1 Tony2 Tony1 Tony2 Tony1 Oscar1 Oscar1 Nic~l'Hamp1 Rule1 ex1 Zeke1 Zeke

21 1 ojo

- -s-

TG,LG- q S GBomb.TGRGLGBomb.RSGRG' ! 'G-RG.'l'GRSG, Bomb.Unknown (A / cloftBomb.RSG.LGBomb.TGR S G


38/65

Destroyed P ro ba bl y D es t, ro yc d

3 Tony1 T o n y1 Osca r1 Zeke1 Z'eke2 Zeke2 Zeke1 Zeke1 Jack1 Jack

TOTA.L 15

Damaged

TOTra ,

2 TOj0,1 T ojo2 Tbjo1 Tajo2 Tony2 Tony1 on y1 ony -1 T o n y1 Oscar1 ick1 ick1 ick1 Z,eke1 Zeke 322 Irving1 rving1 Jack1 U/! 'TIl].1 l I TIE2 ,

G un P os it io n

Bomb .RGRSGRG,LG .ro,RSG,Bomb.RO,TGRGTOLG, Bomb .Bomb .

BombRGRSGRG,TGLGRSGBomb ,RGTG,RGTGTGascBomb . RGLGRGTGRSGB om b .Bomb .TG


39/65

PART II - FL.-.KOFFICER'S REPORT

J.. ED,emyi.ntiairoraf t Fire;

1. Heavy 1\." was first 'enoounte r ad e< t la:ndfallnear Ta teyama.1.ntiairorai't i'ire was moager and inaoourate. Burota werG lavel tolow, lea,dlng to tl'ailing. and to tho left. lI.ajorltyof i'ire msoontinuously pointed.

2. At the f .P. and in thotllrgot area 'w' was moager to mod-erate, and inaoourate to acc ur at.e , Bursts ware level to 10.""lead.ing to t.rc.lling. and loft to right. , ,11 three types of fireoontrol were usea.

3. Ono .~/C bombod IVlo Jillla at 19,500 ft. 1.." wo,smaager tomoderato and inaoourate to ao ourabe , Bursts waro mostly low andtrailing. One burst rooked. ;.IC. -:1hita streamer s went up vort-ioally tram ana of the bursts.

4. Two i./c obSGrved ..." over HaRa Jlma for about 30 seoonds.It was meager to moderate. and inaoourate. Bursts wore generallyloading.

5. Of the 55 1./C over tho primary target, 3 ware dame:.gedbyflak.

6. The 313th 1.~~ingpartioipated with the 504th e:.ndtho 505thGroups. 29 A l ebombing the primary targ~t5 and 2 . / e bombing lastrosort and targets of opportu.nity.

7. tHo formations flew at 26,500 - 27,000 feat, and the pri-mary targe't was bombed at 0630 - 06412, using the axis of attaok270 0 - 260 0

6. The 505th Group first onoounterodmeager and gonorallly in.oOlU'o.te. BLlrstsTho i... soamod to be continLlous ly pointed.d..muge.

flak at log J . . .. . 11& . 11woro lv.,nding ~d 1011.Ono .Ie sufforod tl_k

9. Ovor tho t: .l.rgat tl ...k Wtl.S aeugcr , in:'l.oolll'o.to to aoour.,to.Tho ma.jority of the bursts woro La.ding C o .faw tr ilteg), burst-ing high. lovol. ~,nd low. Tho bursts WON gonordly in lino withthe ./e and the firo W.J.S oontinllollsly pointod.

10. In tho vioinity of Mito (36 0 2,'N _ 140 0 2!5'E) ..:.t 26,000 rt.mougor, in~ooura.to f lak wna roportad. Thl firo .us oontinuollslypointed. o.nd tho bursts w~ro o.gc.in lo:~ding, 1... nel in lino withtho J . /C .

11. Tho S04th Group dotollrad log~ nre. Neo.r Chctll ~irfioldo.nd ~.lso nQu.r lonike airfhld fow in.:.ooW'uto blluts wore obsorv-

ode

12, Flak OVor tho targot aro~ and ovor ot~ ~I me~gar to mod-erD.to :.UldgQnorully inc.oollfa.tO. Faw burstll within 1'orJllll.c1oa OQoAUl04minor d... m.J.go. Tho m~jorlt:v o r tho b~ut. we,ze lOWe


40/65

13 On withdruwo.l this group enoou,ntorad intarroitte,nt hl_ f1~eall the way to the oOClst.

14. Of the 29 ,".Ie bombing tho primary to.rgat .5 }./C of th.:o313the 1ting wore dr.>m"'gedby flak.

15. The wind at the bombing ultltude ovor the pr1m~ry targetwus reported by va.rious formatioDS a s from 253

0- 280

0c.t 13.5 - 164

knots. and the undaroD.st Vat led fr om 2/10 - 6/10.

B. Our TClOtios VS. Jb/l.1

1. Dna group of tho 73rd "ring made 11 slight tUrn c.f 'ter bombaaway and lost r.ltitude. Threo othor groups of the 7jrd '~ing tookDO evasive aotion.

2. The 313th ;fJing uacd loss of ultitudo prior to bombs (.mLY.and loss of altitudo and changes in ocur s.e subsequently.

C. Air to i.it Bombing c..nd Rookets:

1. The 313th 'ling cbsorved nono ,

2. Tae. 73;rd Wing r.e por-t.s us follows

0.. i. t a point mid-wuy botwOOD tho II' nd the oo::.st. c..ndnorth of Chosl Foint, anlOsoo.r was enoountored ~t 28.000 ft. It~s obs~rved to drop ~ projectilo believed to be pbosphorous bombfrom a 1000-foot he ight above our [.Ie. Tho burst 'Wasu.pproxilr...taly15 feat in di~moter. and ~bGut 100 fcat ~bovo ~nd 500 ft to t horight of our .1\/C, It s pr ee.d in umbrelb fcshion with long whitestrecmers.

b. j, possible rooket attaok Was reported as follows IOvor the t ...rget ~ro::.. o.t 29.000 foot .. o.n~unidentifiod T I s J.le flewpo.rallel to our forma.tion a.t 3 o'olook. lev 1 o slightly ..bovo , tn distanoo of 2000 yc,rds. Tho Eli. moved into tho form tion Uld ro-leo-sed ... projectilo desoribod as ;l IIb.:lll of fire". This projeotilewns acourQte in defleotion. but pussed OVer tho form_tion by atloust 200 yards. It wu s not soon to explode ~nd oausod no observeddo.m..go.

D. Rem~rks: The 31.3th :~ing reportod that just prior to tha 001-lis ion of d./e No. 784 and J.le No. 815. whita burst or purr atsmoke wus obsorvod immodiatoly below J . / C No. 784. Ovar the t~gatthe I./C lost ~,ltitudo prior to bombs awuy and subsoquently ~othllrloss of ~ltitudo nnd oh ngo of oourse wus m do.


41/65

Miss ion No I 3PRSM 4S

PI.RT III - D.. M,.,GE ASSESSMENT REPORT

De.e .Flown; 12 Fa,br \.W.ry 1945 J,ir plana commander ': R.E_Rlokethier1st Lt. [,.e.

"ltituda: 33 .00 0'

Rafer enc o photography:

a. 3PR4M4 - 6R :55

b. 3PR5M 40 - 4R :,S1-53i4L:55

o. 3ffi5li h . , s -2.:50. ,S1. 52

This r:oPOl't ..l:Lssossas dumago toTarget 1544 (Nakajilila J,iroraft Co. NG'WOta Plant) inflioted by XXI Bombal' CommandMiss ien 29. 10 February 1945

Po st str ike pbotography shows sov,nedamag.e or destruction to 755. 900 sq. ft.of roof aroo.. representing a.bout 335%of' tho total building area.

The major portion of de-mage wasconfined to th~oost half qr the plant.It is possible that th0 remaining partmay be still op~rational. or could bemad


42/65

Bui.ld1n,g No, 51(1S0 ,dOO aq ft)

Bui 1din~CNo..GI(150 ,000 f i g , ft.)

BU.i 1 ding No, 1',1, I

050,000 sq ft)

Building No. 71(90.000 sqft)

Building No. 7BI(12,800 sq l't)

Building No. 11:(82.000 sq ft)

Bu:i.lding .No1lA :(180.,000 sq ft)

80,000 aq ft ( 55% ) destroyed29,000 sq ft (19%) gutted15.000 as rt PO$) roof d.!l;mag,a

l24,OOO :sq ft (82% l total D1O.1lla:gs

144.000 sq ft ( 9 B% ) gutted.

11',,.600 sq rt (1l%) d"u.tr oyell41. '500 39 ft (2m;;) gutted58.100 s q .ft ( :39%) total damage7.1',00 sq ft (8 .~.) guttad and roof damngo

lZ .800 sq ft (100%) gutted. It lspoBsib10 thatroof was r amoved prio!:' to str iitis .attaok.

405.00 sq ft (5.5%) gutted. Note: Original aNaof building waS 168,000 sq ft. but 66 ,000 aq ftof roof was. removed pr,svious: to str ike (r!.lf b).

10Q ,OQO sq rt (55%) de'stroyed32.000 59 ft pa r t ) jtutt132 ,000 sq ft (73%) total damage

Building No. 12: 12,000 sq rt (67%) dostroyed(18,000 sq rt)

Buil ding No .12.1..: 12 .000 sq ft (100%) des tr oyed(12,000 sq 't)

Building No.12B: IG,OOOsq rt (100.() destroyed(10,000 sq rt)

Building No .1,20 I .5,500 sq ft (51%) dostr'oyod(10,800 sq rt)

Bu.HdiQg NQ. l3 I 21300 sq rt (10Q '4 ) gutted

(2.300 sq ft)

Building No.13.'" 2,300 sq f t (10~) gu.tted(2,300 sq rt)

Building No. 141(84 ,000 sq r t )

Building No. 17:(119,000 sq rt)

Building No. 17J, t(179,000 sq re)

Rosume or damage:

I.n2Roor area destroyod

76.'&00 sq ft (91% ) gut todZ 6 o o s9 rt '~ loof .dnma.!1;e

84,000 sq ft (100%) to ta l damage

6 0 , 0 0 0 sq f t . (3~) gut ted

2.500 sq ft (1.4%) gutted

SgutU'o Feat2,36,lOO

feroant10.4


43/65

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SEe RET

MISSIO. 119 2.9 IOFE8RUA

N EW O T A PLANTN A K A J IM A A IR C R A F TCOMPANY

T O T A L A IRCRA FT D RO P P IN G .nP R IMARY-

",SUAL BOMBING

. Al(\.CR.AFT SIGMT"'G fOI\ A leDR.OPPlMG

ON 1.1.40 A . / e. ondO

A/r.60Ma"'G ."t

'" ADAR

I 70 N O N E5


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46/65


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48/65

ANNEX

E

CONSOLIDATED STATISTICAl. SUWARY

Mission No, 29

10 FebrUlU'y' 1945


49/65

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54/65

f.i!l nO't prIOlo ludo. hO\l/ever. load in!; w e c..bove minimum OOJ'lllistNlt with so.fety,a.bHtty .o f the individu;;.l camb;...terell', und known chllN.oterietios of the. 1ndividuu.1 :le. Go.chliG: Mixed load oonsistlng .o f 80% 500 gp bomb i\;sec:. ~t 0.1s e c r.a'se fend non~del!'l.Y tail r u s l ; \ !lad 2 0% 500 1"::. ~76 inoendf;.ry u s l D d instunto.neousr..nd non... delr.._ytail f u s e .

(b) 313.th 1,'l'ing:. Elaoh w eVii n t..rry e, minimum .o f 5.000 1 bs ofSOJn03t)'"cpa of bomb 1,oad spooified for 73rd ?tb.g.

(3) Intcrvl.loJ1'..Oter setting;: Minimu.m. (tiPl or AI') ,oorrect ion for r&.ng,ear r or due to differ.:nttio.l be.llistio v1inds will be s'et into bomb':'

si&;ht by the bomJ;l wing .

.supply aud Administration.A 4 E ine'rg6 1'1 0Yls.nding fields ..(1) Kohler Field, Se.ipo.n(:2) west ~HeId, :riIlJ an( 3) NO.vy Ag!l.n& I Gu('i)li(4) Depot piG Iii, GUam

COJ;ll!lunico.tions:A~ SOP XXI B0m:bet

' COl"!@und will gGverntl te use of tc.dio aids to navi~tion

und use of radio fer l'Iporting purposes,.

Ill'" O J i l a r e . t i om a lAir-Ground s t a t i o n :(1) 73rd Bombardment Wing 03011 sign oov5JO(2) 313th B0mbc.rdirlent l!{illg oE'-ll sign Q O V 5 3 5

L aMAY

c.o.

OFFICIAl,:WILSONO / O P N S


63/65

~ : . ...,.... . , . om oar CO IT I I , 1 o . n aAPO 234

CONSOLIDA~RD.Al; . .ENDUE!IlTSIi'" _ . OR F0f{28

ot 1: n , Add to po.r 3:73rd wing o'Qjeotive>s .(2) Div!;l)"6~on~ry 1'01'0"". The 7Jrd Win o- will d' , 6A /c ;';6 ad" i " < :> ' " - l.spll.toh

'lvers opary fOl'oe using ReM Th' rwill'p'rboe d 1 -_._. loS ioree,,' _,____e a _eng rou tQ speo if ied and 0 .tt[..o k thoc 1 y eente-r of HQno.n,,-tsu.

(4 ) Th~ d iva r s i onary fore e wn1 leo. ve thedepo.rturePOllil;t ~t UO" Hour minus 4 5 minutes,. Axis or ,,-tto.okus de~lred., Altit


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Copy No,

12

3456789

10111213-

14151617181920

2

22as24

25 - 262728

2930313233343536373839 - 4041 - 70

7172737475767778

DISTRIBUTION

TACTICAL MISSION REPORTS

Command in g Gen er al . Twent ie th A ir F or ceC omma nd in g G en er al . XXI B ombe r C omma nd

Deput y Commande r, Twent i et hAi! ForceC hi ef 'o f S ta ff . Twe nt ie th A ir F or ceChief of Staf f , XXI Bomber CommandDe puty C is, Opns, XX I Bombe r CommandDeputy cis. Sup &; Me.int . XXI Bombe r CommandAlc of S. 11.-2, XXI Bombe r CommandC omma nd in g G en er al , A rm y A ir F or ce s, A tt en ti on : 11.0/11.8Intell igenceCommanderIn Chi ef , P ac if ic O ce an AreaS lAdv. Rq. )Commander In Chief, Paci fic Ocean AreaS tRearRq.)Chief of Nav al Ope ra ti on s, OP- l6 -VJ oi nt I nt el li gl nc e Ce nt er , P ac if ic O ce an A re asC omma .n de rA i r F or ce . P ac if ic F le etC omma nd er . F if th F le etComm ander, First Carrier Task ForceCommander, Fo 'rwe .rdArea

C om .m an di ng G en er al . U .S , A rm y F or ce sin Fer EastComm anding Gene ral . U.S . Army For ces, Pe .cificOce an AreCommand ing G eneral , Allied Air Forc es. Southw est Pa cificAreasComma.nding Genera l.U. S , S tr a t eg ;i c Ai r F or ce s In EuropeC omma nd in g G en er a. l. E ig ht h A ir F or ceCommand ing Gen eral; Medi terranean All ied Air ForcesCommand in g Gen er al , F if te en th Ail' forceCommanding Genera l , Seventh Air ForeeCommand ing Gen eral . Sevent h Bomber Comma ndCommandi ng General . Seventh Fighter CommandCommanding Gen eral , Elev enth Air For ceGommand in g Gen er al ,XX Bombe r C omma ndCommand ing General , 58 th Bombardm ent Wi ngCOlll l l landingeneral , 73rd Bombardment WingC omma nd in g G en er al . 3 13 th B omba rdme nt~ngCommanding General . 314th Bomba rdment WingC omma nd in g G en er e. l. 3 15 th B omba rdme nt Win g( ad vhq)Commanding Officer, 3rd Photo Recon SquadronCommanding Officer. 33rd Statist icnl Control Uni tTactics & Training Section. A-3, XXI Bomber CommandHistGriCal Officer. XXI Bomber CommandCommand in g Gen er al ,Army Air Forces. At tention: AC/ASI nt el li ge nc e. C ol le ct io n D iv is io nCommanding Officer. 6th Bomb Group (VB)Commanding Offioer. 9th Bomb qroup (VB)Commanding Officer, 19th Bomb ,Group (V B)Commanding Officer, 29th Bomb Group (VH)Commanding Officer, 39th Bomb Group (V B)

Commanding Officer. 40th Bomb Group (VB)Commanding Officer . 330th Bomb Group (VB)

Documents

21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 29