243 GT NMD Impact Stuff

8/14/2019 243 GT NMD Impact Stuff

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DDISPACE/EUROPE NMD FILETURNSTEIN 2K8 1 / 30

SPACE/EUROPE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE GOOD/BAD FILE

SPACE/EUROPE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE GOOD/BAD FILE ....................................................................1SPACE MILITARIZATION DESTROYS COOPERATION ..................................................................................2NMD BAD U.S. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR ....................................................................................................3

NMD BAD U.S. RUSSIAN RELATIONS ...........................................................................................................4NMD BAD ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH ................................................................................................................5NMD CAUSES MILITARIZED SPACE RACE ....................................................................................................6NMD BAD TACTICAL NUKES ........................................................................................................................7NMD BAD RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR ............................................................................................................8NMD BAD IRANIAN PROLIF ..........................................................................................................................9NMD BAD PREEMPTIVE WARS ....................................................................................................................10NMD BAD SPACE MIL ....................................................................................................................................11NMD FAILS - IRAN .............................................................................................................................................12NMD FAILS U.S. EUROPEAN RELATIONS ..............................................................................................13NMD IS A LONG TIME AWAY ..........................................................................................................................14

NMD GOOD NUCLEAR WAR .........................................................................................................................15NMD GOOD PROLIF ........................................................................................................................................16NMD GOOD NUCLEAR TERROR ..................................................................................................................17NMD GOOD IRAN ............................................................................................................................................18NMD GOOD IRAN ............................................................................................................................................19NMD GOOD STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION ...................................................................................................20NMD GOOD STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION ...................................................................................................21NMD GOOD NO WAR WITH RUSSIA ...........................................................................................................22NMD GOOD SYSTEM WORKS .....................................................................................................................23SPACE BASED NMD IS EASILY BEATABLE ...................................................................................................24SPACE BASED NMD CAN WORK ....................................................................................................................25

SPACE BASED NMD FAILS ...............................................................................................................................26SPACE BASED NMD FAILS ...............................................................................................................................27SPACE BASED NMD FAILS ...............................................................................................................................28SPACE BASED NMD FAILS ...............................................................................................................................29NMD GOOD IRAN ............................................................................................................................................30

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SPACE MILITARIZATION DESTROYS COOPERATION

U.S. Space militarization destroys any chance of co-operation in space.GEORGE ABBEY BAKER, BOTTS SENIOR FELLOW IN SPACE POLICY AT THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FORPUBLIC POLICY AT, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, AND, NEAL LANE IS THE MALCOLMGILLIS UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AT RICE UNIVERSITY AND SENIOR FELLOW OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, 2005, UNITED STATES SPACE POLICY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,HTTP://WWW.AMACAD.ORG/PUB LICATIONS/SPACEPOLICY.PDF

One of the most important questions plaguing the current NASA Plan 1S the degree to which other nations will be invited to join theUnited States as true partners and to participate in the early planning stages of future human exploration missions. President Bush, inhis speech of Januar) 14,2004, appeared to invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of his vision and the new eraof discovery. However, NASA leadership subsequently contradicted that promise when then NASA Administrator Sean OKeefestated that the new space initiative was very much going to be a U.S. led endeavor. Thats our intent. And, again, much of what wehad been directed and what the President envisions we do is to achieve this set of American, U.S. exploration objectives.23 This isnot an invitation to partnership. Partnership, of course, does not exclude national objectives, but it does require a sharing of vision,objectives, and commitments, at the earliest stages of planning. Otherwise, the United States cannot expect other nations to participateenthusiastically and to provide the necessary staffing and funding. Based on the authors conversations, it is clear that scientists,engineers, and policy makers around the world perceive that the United States has no interest in bringing other nations into the

planning process, though it expects them to take on the operation of the space station and to provide assistance for other U.5.-led spaceefforts when asked. Given the present limited U.S. capability to undertake a major pro-gram such returning humans to the Moon andsending them, eventually, to Mars, it is clear that international cooperation is necessary for these missions. Furthermore, even if theUnited States had all the necessary resources, why would it make sense to go it alone in the scientific and human exploration of space?For international cooperation to be a realistic possibility the United States will have to take a very different approach to prospectivepartnerships, in tone and in substance.

Space militarization destroys cooperation in spaceGEORGE ABBEY BAKER, BOTTS SENIOR FELLOW IN SPACE POLICY JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLICPOLICY AT, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, AND, NEAL LANE IS THE MALCOLM GILLISUNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AT RICE UNIVERSITY AND SENIOR FELLOW OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FORPUBLIC POLICY, 2O, UNITED STATES SPACE POLICY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,HTTP://WWW,AMACAD.ORG/PUBLICATIONS/SPACEPOLICY.PDF

Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause for alarm throughout the world 4, in the context of the issues addressed in thispaper, would create a major obstacle to international cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more restrictiveu.s. export control policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the willingness of othernations to join U.S-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The placement of weapons inspace would reinforce in the world community the feeling that the United states increasingly is basing its foreign policy on unilateralinitiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years towards multilateral internationacooperation.

Space co-operation and space militarization are zero-sum.MICHAEL KREPON, FOUNDING PRESIDENT OF THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, A NONPROFIT, NONPARTISANINSTITUTION, PREVIOUSLY WORKED AT AT CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, U.S. ARMS

CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, 2003, HTTP:I/WWW.STIMSON.ORG/PUBS.CFM?ID=8 I

The choice between space assurance and space dominance is fundamentally important since it will shape the contours of internationalsecurity, global commerce, alliance ties, and relations between major powers. The United States cannot have it both ways: The pursuitof space dominance will come at the expense of space assurance. And space assurance is undermined by the pursuit of spacedominance.

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NMD BAD U.S. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR

U.S. based NMD in Europe causes a full-scale U.S. Russian nuclear war.

Bronwen Maddox in Moscow London Times, June 4, 2007 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1878730.ece

President Putin has warned the US that its deployment of a new anti-missile network across Eastern Europe would prompt Russia topoint its own missiles at European targets and could trigger nuclear war. In an exclusive interview with The Times, the Russian leadersays: It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will haveto respond. This system of missile defence on one side and the absence of this system on the other ... increases the possibility ofunleashing a nuclear conflict. Russia has been alarmed at Americas plans to install a network of defences in Eastern Europe to shootdown incoming missiles it fears that Iran might launch. Mr Putin expressed scepticism of this motive, arguing that There are no suchmissiles Iran does not have missiles with the range. The US was insisting, he said, that the defence system was to be installed forthe protection from something that does not exist. Is it not sort of funny? It would be funny if it were not so sad. He speculated thatthe USs real motive was to provoke Russias retaliation and so to avoid further closeness of Russia and Europe. Mr Putins toughwarning comes days before the start of the G8 meeting of the worlds most powerful industrialised economies. His uncompromisingstand on Americas missile defence, Kosovo, Iran and climate change was partly blamed for the failure of last months summitbetween Russia and the European Union. Mr Putin had warm words for the cordial reception that Tony Blair had given him, and forGordon Brown, a high-class specialist. But he offered little room for compromise on Britains request for the extradition of AndreiLugovoy, the former intelligence officer, wanted on charges of the murder of dissident former agent Alexander Litvinenko byradioactive poisoning in London. No matter from what angle we look at this problem, its all stupid, stupid nonsense, he said ofBritains extradition request. I will not see any single positive component. Its complete nonsense. Russian authorities wereinvestigating the case and if enough evidence were found, the case would certainly be sent to court, he said. In theory, he added,there are possible circumstances in which Russia would comply with the extradition but it would require an amendment to theConstitution. But Britain had not provided justification for such a dramatic move, he said. If heads of British law enforcementagencies did not know that the constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens to foreign states then their competence isquestionable and they should work for parliament or newspapers because the request was at heart only a political public relationsstep. He also gave no quarter on the cases of Shell and BP, the British oil giants, who have recently seen the terms of theirinvestments in Russia rewritten because of alleged breaches of their licences. Mr Putin insisted that he wants cooperation notconfrontation, repeatedly blaming the US for its intransigence. But of all the potential clashes at the G8 meeting, which begins onWednesday in Germany, it is his warnings on Russian retaliation to the US missile defence plans that are likely to cause the greatestfriction. He called on our American friends to rethink their decision and warned that We cannot be responsible for our reciprocalsteps because it is not us who are initiating an arms race in Europe. He added: We will need to establish such systems which would

be able to penetrate the [US] missile defence systems... What kind of means will be used to hit the targets that our military believe arepotential threats ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, or some kind of new weapons system this is a purely technical issue?

And, war with Russia isnt so unlikely.Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Russia seems to be going through a new period of nationalistic assertiveness, one expression of which is the display of militaryaccomplishments. For example, Russia has announced the successful development of new ICBMs, warned that its nuclear weaponsmight have to be aimed at Europe, put its strategic bombers back in the air on training flights, and announced that Russia hassuspended its participation in the treaty restricting deployments of conventional forces in Europe. Some might say that these displaysare more to impress Russian voters than to impress America, as well as to secure Putin's future should he decide to run for presidentagain after sitting out for a term, as can be done under Russian law. Undoubtedly, Putin would not mind if he impressed Russianvoters, but we would argue that these developments are primarily aimed at the United States.

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NMD BAD U.S. RUSSIAN RELATIONS

And, deploying a NMD system in Europe would lower U.S. Russian relations below Cuban Missile Crisis

Levels.Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Moreover, the proposed missiles exacerbate U.S.-Russian relations to the point of creating a volatile situation that did not previouslyexist. In October 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew the analogy between the current situation and the 1962 Cuban missilecrisis, when the Soviet Union based missiles in Cuba that could easily reach the United States. "The situation is quite similartechnologically for us," said Putin. "We have withdrawn the remains of bases from Vietnam and Cuba, but such threats are beingcreated near our borders."7Just as forty-six years ago America saw Russian missiles in Cuba as an alarming threat, Russia clearlyfeels that the proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic are too close for comfort. True, the Soviet missiles inCuba were offensive, and the planned U.S. interceptors in Poland are to be defensive. Nevertheless, the U.S. proposal is in directviolation of the joint declaration issued in conjunction with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treatyalso known as the MoscowTreatysigned by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002.8 The joint declaration calls for joint research and development onmissile defense technologies and U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense for Europe. The Bush proposal to establish U.S. missiledefenses in Europe was neither joint nor cooperative, and was initiated unilaterally almost before the ink had dried on the jointdeclaration.

NMD in Europe would draw the U.S. into a diplomatic conflict against Russia.Eastern European Review, 12-11, 2007, Poland, Iran, Russia, and the Polish Missile Shield Base, online:http://www.masterpage.com.pl/outlook/200712/iranpolandrussia.html,

History has shown that Poland cannot depend on Europe to defend it. And given the current military might of the countries in Europe,future defense ability might be plausibly questioned. Germany - The Soft Underbelly of Europe But a base in Poland is a US asset thatwill be defended by the US against any aggressor. It fixes Poland position as not under the Russian sphere of influence. That is if theUS Congress agrees to build it. So Tusk has to balance many evils before him. Is it better to have a foreign military base that is not

wanted by his countrymen or take his chances with a rogue missile and/or a resurgent Russia? What are his risks and rewards?Tusk is in a difficult position. He will surely make a decision that he thinks best for Poland. And whatever that decision is, there willbe unhappy people and long term consequences for Poland. Its not just about Poland. Its about Poland, Europe, Iran and Russia withthe US waiting for a decision and having to make a decision of its own.

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NMD BAD ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH

NMD in Europe causes Russia to pull out of the Joint Data Exchange CenterPhilip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Other bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia, such as the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), could also sufferdue to relations distressed by a U.S. missile defense site in Europe. This was to be a spin-off of the successful Y2K center created atthe turn of the century to ensure that there would not be any unexpected misunderstandings due to Y2K glitches. From Peterson AirForce Base, Colorado, both Russian and U.S. officials monitored missile launches globally. The JDEC was to continue this effort atcooperation with the aim of creating "an uninterrupted exchange of information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launchvehicles from the early warning systems of the United States of America and the Russian Federation."28 However, it has been stuntedin talks almost from its June 2000 inception, largely due to concerns about liability and tax issues, and the program currently is inlimbo. If missile defense negatively affects relations, it will not help the JDEC progress.

JDEC key to prevent accidental launchPavel Podvig, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, February 2005, Reducing the risk of accidentallaunch: Time for a new approach?, online: http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/forces/20050204ponars.shtml,

Other projects that were discussed in the context of reducing risk of an accidental launch suggested providing Russia with independentearly-warning information, which was supposed to complement the data received by the Russian system. The most advanced of theseproposals called for establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), which would provide both sides with access to theircounterpart?s early-warning information. The logic of the project was that in a case of conflicting information from early-warningsatellites and radars, the United States and Russia could demonstrate to each other that no attack is underway. Cooperation like thiswould probably have helped to determine what happened during the January 1995 incident, but it is not certain if it would be of anyhelp in a serious crisis, when each side would have reasons to doubt information provided by its counterpart.

Accidental launch causes global escalation and nuclear war, killing billions

PR Newswire, 4-29-98

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles andspeeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peaceorganizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forcesunder former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games"it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions ofcasualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an " accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine thatwould kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnelkilled, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all butimpossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

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NMD CAUSES MILITARIZED SPACE RACE

NMD systems places in Europe causes a militarized space race.Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

A crack in relations between the United States and Russia could have longterm consequences for emerging national security issues,such as space weaponization. Until China's ASAT test in January 2007 there had been only two countries that had tested spaceweapons: the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the two adversaries tested ASATs fifty-three times.29 Rightnow the official U.S. policy is to eschew weaponizing space, but the new U.S. national space policy released in October 2006culminated several years of policy papers by the U.S. Air Force and indicated that it was becoming much more open to the idea.30Furthermore, the U.S. military has seized upon China's ASAT test as all the more reason for the weaponization of space. USA-193, theNRO satellite that was shot down by the United States in February 2008, had been launched in December 2006 and almostimmediately was unresponsive to ground control and began to deorbit outside the Pentagon's control. Pentagon officials claimed thatthe satellite was shot down out of health concerns, in order to prevent its hydrazine-filled fuel tank from crashing into a populated area(although these concerns appear to have been exaggerated). They have further alleged that it was a one-time event involvingmodifications to the software and mode of the three SM-3 missiles that were pulled aside for the mission (only one was used), and thatthe software and the other two SM-3 missiles were immediately changed back to their missile defense mode. However, one cannot be

certain which version of the SM-3 has been deployed from then on: is it the sort used for ballistic missile defense or is it theantisatellite kind such as was used to shoot down USA-193? Russia and the United States are major space players, and both havemuch to lose if the new international norm were to target satellites or to allow for the free creation of space debris that could damageor destroy expensive space assets. There is a movement to create some sort of space "rules of the road," which would not be a treatybut rather codes of conduct by which all space-faring nations could abide. If the United States and Russia have a rift in theirrelationship due to missile defense, this cooperative effort will not succeed. China, as a growing space power, would have to beincluded in these talks, and if the United States and Russia were not able to work together, we could see a repeat of the Cold Wardynamic whereby one country would try to pit other countries against each other.

This results in a nuclear war.Marko Beljac, Professor at the University of Melbourne, 4-1, 2008, Arms Race in Space, Foreign Policy In Focus, online:http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5113,

Though the latest Russian and Chinese space arms control proposal is flawed, because of the clumsy definition of what constitutes aspace weapon, this doesnt mean that space arms control is not possible in principle. A global space arms control regime wouldprotect U.S., Russian, Chinese, and even Australian space assets. An arms race in space will eventually lead other states to catch upwith the United States and thereby placing Washington's commercial satellites at risk. Space weaponization may well havecataclysmic consequences given the link between space weapons and nuclear weapons strategy. This is because Russia, and the UnitedStates, to a certain extent rely on satellites for early warning of nuclear attack. As other space nations with nuclear weapons developtheir space capacity it is expected that they will follow suit.The deployment of space weapons means that the first shot in a nuclearwar would be fired against these early warning satellites. Currently strategic planners in Moscow have about 10 minutes betweenwarning of an attack and the decision to launch nuclear weapons in response before they impact. Weapons in space would lower this incertain scenarios down to seconds. This would also apply for weapons placed in space that would be considered to be defensive suchas say a space based BMD interceptor or a counter-ASAT weapon. On occasion, ground warning radars falsely show that a nuclearattack has been launched. In the 1990s a false alarm went all the way up to President Boris Yeltsin and was terminated afterapproximately eight minutes. We are still here, noted analysts believe, because warning satellites would have given Moscow real timeinformation showing the alarm to be false. Should such a false alarm coincide with an accident involving an early warning satellitewhen space weapons are known to exist, an accidental nuclear exchange could result. The risk would increase if the false alarmoccurred during a crisis. Space weapons could lead to itchy fingers on nuclear triggers. They would therefore significantly increase theimportance nuclear weapon states place upon nuclear deterrence.

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NMD BAD TACTICAL NUKES

NMD in Europe would cause Russia and the U.S. to deploy tactical nuclear weapons.Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

Also linked to the proposed U.S. missile defenses are Russia's vague threats over the past several years to pull out of the 1987Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This treaty banned a whole range of ballistic missiles (those with ranges of 500 to5,500 kilometers, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles), and has held up even after the Soviet Union dissolved into its separaterepublics. Again, this is an idea that has been floated by Russian officials for the past several years, but also again, they seem to belatching on to the U.S. missile defense system in Europe as their primary motivating factor. The initial reason for the INF Treaty wasthat intermediate-range missiles were considered highly destabilizing, as their short flight times meant they could wreak devastationvery quickly and made a retaliatory response almost automatic. Because of the specific dangers inherent in intermediate-range ballisticmissiles, there has even been talk about internationalizing the INF Treaty and trying to get other countries in unstable parts of theworld to sign it as a way of creating confidence-building measures. However, if Russia pulls out of the INF, it would be almostimpossible to convince other countries to sign onto the treaty, and the U.S. incentive to continue to follow its provisions would bevastly reduced.

This turns into full-fledged nuclear war.Jan Lodal, Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, National Security Council, The Price of Dominance: The NewWeapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership, 2001, p. 23

Many of the 12,000 US and 20,000 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Atactical nuclear war would have killed tens or perhaps hundreds of millions, even without escalating to an all-out strategic nuclearexchange. But such a war probably would have escalated. Tactical nuclear weapons would not have led to a decisive outcome on thebattlefield, but their use would have broken the taboo against nuclear weapons. At some point, one side would begin to lose thetactical nuclear war. With a large strategic nuclear force in reserve, the losing side would have a strong incentive to escalate the warand use strategic forces in an attempt to regain the military initiative.

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NMD BAD RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR

U.S. deployment of NMD in Europe would cause Russia to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to

KaliningradSergei Blagov, Moscow-based correspondent for ISN Security Watch, 12-21, 2007, ISN Security Watch, Another AssertiveKremlin, online: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18490,

Against the backdrop of recent economic revival - and regardless of long-term economic growth prospects - Russian foreign policyhas become increasingly assertive, both domestically and internationally. Moscow's assertiveness, sometimes bordering the Cold War-era style of confrontational thinking, will persist in 2008.Above all, the Kremlin is not expected to review its negative attitudes towardUS plans for a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, which is perceived by the Kremlin as specifically targeting Russia.Inresponse to these plans, Moscow has already introduced countermeasures and threatened further moves, including the resumption ofstrategic bomber flights and the suspension of Russia's obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).Russian military officials, however, insist that the CFE treaty suspension, effective from 12 December, will not mean any immediatetroop redeployments on the country's western frontier, though some of the military elite have advocated such a move in the face of thethreats posed by an expanding NATO. The Kremlin has also indicated plans to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces(INF) treaty between the US and the former Soviet Union in order to deploy its own missiles in the country's western Kaliningradregion, and in Belarus, to target US strategic missile defense sites in Europe. Russian experts concede that short-range tactical missiledeployments have little chance of convincing Washington to re-think its missile shield plans in Europe. However, threats to moveRussian missiles close to EU borders have been perceived as a stratagem to create division in the West as the threat level would beobviously different for Europe and the US.

Russian TNW deployments to Kaliningrad cause escalation to full-scale nuclear warStanley Kober, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, February 11, 1998, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing #46,online: http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-046.html,

When the Cold War ended, people around the world breathed a sigh of relief, believing that the danger of a nuclear catastrophe hadpassed. Unfortunately, NATO expansion is raising that danger to new heights. In the first place, it is lowering the nuclear threshold onboth sides. "In the prevailing adverse conditions, Russia cannot ignore the overwhelming superiority of the potential adversary, eventaking all its CIS allies into account," writes a Russian general in the Independent Military Review. "Therefore, a stronger adversarycan be forced to cease his aggression on conditions acceptable to Russia only by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear

weapons. This is the logic of deterrence."(42)An article in a Polish newspaper has graphically outlined the danger: Thus, the Russiansspeak of reinforcing their troops on the Western border, aiming nuclear missiles at the [future] new member countries of NATO,deploying nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad Oblast, and breaking off talks on conventional and strategic disarmaments. It is hardlyconceivable that planning by the Russian military, who are mentally accustomed to treat NATO as the main enemy, does not providefor carrying out some of these threats. I think that we should consider the possibility of becoming a target of Russian missiles withnuclear warheads, owing not so much to our automatically becoming one of potential military enemies as to the current weakness ofthe conventional armed forces of the Russian Federation. . . . The status of Kaliningrad still remains unclear. . . . But any plan forturning Kaliningrad into a significant [conventional] military factor in Europe will remain unrealistic so long as military transports tothat enclave run across sovereign countries, which moreover aspire to membership in NATO (Lithuania). In this situation, the onlyway of turning Kaliningrad into a territory that matters, given the prospects for extending NATO to Poland, is to deploy nuclearweapons there. Such weapons had anyhow been deployed there during the cold war era (short- and medium-range missiles of theBaltic Fleet, mounted on submarines and missile cruisers). It is noteworthy that such a measure does not entail substantial financialoutlays, in contrast with the attempts to deploy troops in the western military districts of the Russian Federation. Even worse, just asNATO expansion would impel the Russians to lower the nuclear threshold, including the Baltic states would have the same effect onNATO. "A representative of the Pentagon, with whom Rzecspospolita had a chance to talk, said bluntly that NATO would 'havedifficulties defending' the region of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia," the Polish newspaper reported last November.(44) A prominentAmerican expert is even more blunt. "If, for example, NATO is expanded to include the Baltic states, no conventional defense wouldbe possible," former defense secretary James Schlesinger told Congress in October 1997. "If we were to fulfill a commitment toprovide protection, we would be driven back to threatening a nuclear response to a conventional attack, a commitment from which wehave only recently escaped."(45)It is an indication of how bizarre the debate over NATO expansion has become that apparentlyneither Schlesinger nor the Wall Street Journal, in which his testimony was excerpted, thought a return to the horrible situation fromwhich we had just recently escaped was something we should try to avoid.

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NMD BAD IRANIAN PROLIF

NMD in Europe destroys the co-operation necessary to prevent Iranian proliferationPhilip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relationsprogram at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, Missile Defense Malfunction: Whythe Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1

There are two serious nuclear proliferation issues facing the world today that require a united response, something that is unlikely ifhostilities are increased between the United States and Russia as a result of the U.S. missile defense plans. The first is Iran's nuclearprogram. While the November 2007 NIE acknowledged that as far as the U.S. intelligence community knew, Iran had stopped workon its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it still indicated that Iran's nuclear intentions are unknown. Furthermore, no one doubts thatIran continues to enrich uranium, possibly to the point where it will become weapons-grade fissile material. Iran is a signatory to theNPT, so in theory it admits there are limits to what it can do with its nuclear materials (although Iranian officials defiantly aver thatthey are free to do what they wish). This is all to say that the international community can still work together to lessen the threat of anIranian nuclear weapons program. In fact, the NIE states that Iran's nuclear weapons work "probably was halted primarily in responseto international pressure."23Russia in particular has a strong relationship with Iran and has been one of the holdouts againststrengthening international sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, Russia still indicates that it is holding fast to the option of finishing anuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran.24 Clearly, Russia is a key component to any solution to the Iranian nuclear question. Given howmuch Iran factors in the justification for extending the U.S. missile defense system to Europe, this cannot be ignored.

Iranian proliferation results in extinction.Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, June 2007, Commentary, online:http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882,

But there is, it has been reported, another consideration that is driving Bush. According to a recent news story in the New York Times,for example, Bush has taken to heart what [o]fficials from 21 governments in and around the Middle East warned at a meeting ofArab leaders in Marchnamely, that Irans drive for atomic technology could result in the beginning of a grave and destructivenuclear arms race in the region. Which is to say that he fears that local resistance to Irans bid for hegemony in the greater MiddleEast through the acquisition of nuclear weapons could have even more dangerous consequences than a passive capitulation to that bidby the Arab countries. For resistance would spell the doom of all efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and it would vastlyincrease the chances of their use.

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NMD BAD PREEMPTIVE WARS

NMD in Europe allows the U.S. to engage in preemptive strikesLukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish

Perspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

The public debate which followed that announcement revealed divergent opinions on the issue within the Polish strategic community analysts and foreign policy experts. The critics pointed to the dangers of aligning Polands security policy too closely with theUnited States in such a way. Development of the missile defence system was portrayed as a sign of the US willingness to securestrategic domination against present and future opponents. It was argued that the systems characteristics might be defensive, but itspresence would encourage the United States to try offensive strategies, possibly involving the use of force, in the confrontations withstates armed with ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities. Since the MD facilities is a logical target for an enemys first strike, Polandwould find itself in grave danger on account of the US deployment. Bilateral arrangements on the Missile Defence would also,according to the critics, put into question Polands credentials as a member of NATO and the European Union, not to mention theunavoidable deterioration of the relations with Russia. It was argued that any benefits obtained from the Americans could notcompensate for the overall worsening of the security of Poland.

Global Nuclear war.

Michel Chossudovsky, frequent contributor to the Centre for Research on Globalization, February 17, 2006, The Dangers of a MiddleEast Nuclear War, online: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060217&articleId=1988,

The Bush administration's new nuclear doctrine contains specific "guidelines" which allow for "preemptive" nuclear strikes against"rogue enemies" which "possess" or are "developing" weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)and Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (DJNO)). The preemptive nuclear doctrine (DJNO), which applies to Iran and North Koreacalls for "offensive and defensive integration". It explicitly allows the preemptive use of thermonuclear weapons in conventional wartheaters. In the showdown with Tehran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, these Pentagon "guidelines" would allow, subject topresidential approval, for the launching of punitive bombings using "mini-nukes" or tactical thermonuclear weapons. While the"guidelines" do not exclude other (more deadly) categories of nukes in the US and/or Israeli nuclear arsenal, Pentagon "scenarios" inthe Middle East are currently limited to the use of tactical nuclear weapons including the B61-11 bunker buster bomb. This particularversion of the bunker buster is a thermonuclear bomb, a so-called Nuclear Earth Penetrator or NEP. It is a Weapon of MassDestruction in the real sense of the word. Its utilization by the US or Israel in the Middle East war theater would trigger a nuclear

holocaust.

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NMD BAD SPACE MIL

NMD leads to space militarization.Gordon R. Mitchell, et al (David Cram Helwich, , and Kevin J. Ayotte, Professor of Communications at Cal State-Fresno), July 2001,ISIS Briefing on BMD, No. 6, online:http://web.archive.org/web/20020802215135/http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html,

As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry ' may well be a determined efforto develop a national ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the ABM Treaty or toabrogate the treaty entirely. Until then, it is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested andfielded'. Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive political opposition bothhome and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which the placement of space-based weapons will likelyoccur is under a second US space policy directive that of ballistic missile defense This could preempt any political umbrage frommost of the world's influential nations while positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'.32 Inthis scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US militarydomination of the heavens. A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, butthis rationale glosses over the tendency that ' the presence of space weapons will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.

Space militarization and war results in extinction.Gordon R. Mitchell, et al (David Cram Helwich, , and Kevin J. Ayotte, Professor of Communications at Cal State-Fresno), July 2001,ISIS Briefing on BMD, No. 6, online:http://web.archive.org/web/20020802215135/http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html,

It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tinyprojectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'.37In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defenceanalyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities ofmicrowave-grilled people'.38Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to spaceweapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental warsparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

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12/30


NMD FAILS - IRAN

NMD fails to contain Iran they can just strike outside its protection zone.Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The PolishPerspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

The fact that something is useful for the United States, does not make it equally useful for its partners. For Europe, even assuming thatIran would eventually have ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons, the strategic utility of some part of the continent being in the rangeof the American interceptors is close to zero. First of all, since command and control of the system stays with the United States, therecan only be a certain level of confidence, never a certainty, that the interceptors will be launched upon Iranian attack. It is sufficient tothink of a future Iranian arsenal of, lets say, about 10 ICBMs to reach the US and 30-40 missiles capable of reaching Paris, London,Berlin or Warsaw. With multiple launch of only part of those missile at different targets, the question of intercept priorities couldbecome rather disturbing. Secondly, the Iranians may be willing to strike (or threaten to strike) a target outside the perimeter coveredby the MD base. The perspective of destruction of Athens, Ankara or Sophia is as unacceptable to the European leaders as any city ofCentral or Western Europe. Thirdly, regardless of the technical advances of the MD, there cannot be a 100% guarantee that the systemwould work in the combat conditions. Taken all this into account, even with the complete system in place, it would be prudent forEuropean countries not to count on the Missile Defence cover when drafting their Iranian policy. Which may actually be a good thing,since it would quash any temptations of military adventurism vis--vis Iran.

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NMD FAILS U.S. EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Stationing BMD in Europe wont overcome other sources of anti-AmericanismTaylor Dinerman, writer for The Space Review, March 26, 2007, European missile defense: why bother?, online:http://www.thespacereview.com/article/836/1,

The tidal wave of anti-Americanism that is washing over Europe will not recede any time soon. Iraq and Bush are simply excuses forit. Before Iraq and before Bush they were complaining about America as a hyperpower and were trying to find ways to bring it toheel. Keeping up any sort of special relationship or friendship, especially in the missile defense field with a continent so full ofhostility, seems a bit illogical.

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NMD IS A LONG TIME AWAY

NMD would take years to be completed and effective.Eastern European Review, 12-11, 2007, Poland, Iran, Russia, and the Polish Missile Shield Base, online:http://www.masterpage.com.pl/outlook/200712/iranpolandrussia.html,

The missile shield, announced as a system to protect Europe from rogue missile attacks from countries such as, but not limited to, Iranis years from completion. Not only does the base not exist, the interceptor missiles don't work yet. In the mean time, Iran is movingforward on its missile development program. It has recently announced that it has a new missile. The billed missile range would,if themissile works as claimed, give Iran the possibility of hitting Europe, including the chance that it might hit both Warsaw and Moscow.Polish Missile Defense -Is Poland Now In Range Of Iran's Missiles?

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15/30


NMD GOOD NUCLEAR WAR

NMD is critical to avoid nuclear war.Investors Business Daily, 11-7, 2007 http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=279331529327444

Is it possible that Democrats are still skeptical that a missile shield will actually work? If so, evidence that it will has reached the pointthat it can no longer be denied. Or is their lack of support simply due to a reflexive opposition to the military and toward symbols ofwhat they perceive to be projections of U.S. power? Either way, their actions could leave us vulnerable to nuclear attack from a roguenation such as Iran (see editorial at left) or North Korea, which is supposedly backing down on its nuclear weapons program but willremain a threat as long as its communist regime stays in place. The risk doesn't end, however, with those two legs of the Axis of Evil,both of which are on the State Department's list of terrorist states. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now an ally, yet it could become anenemy depending on how its internal turmoil is resolved. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban have powerful bases in the region. What if theMusharraf government one day falls and one of those terrorist groups suddenly has the keys to a nuclear arsenal? It's just as plausiblethat the threat could come from any of the Mideast nations that want to keep up with Iran's nuclear program. With Egypt making itsannouncement last week, there are now 13 countries in the region that have in the last year said they want nuclear power. They canclaim, as Iran has, that they want it merely for energy. But the step from nuclear power to nuclear weapons is not that far. Given thevolatility of the region, it would be wise to make sure that all precautions and that includes a missile defense are taken. EvenRussia, with its extensive nuclear weaponry, could be a threat. President Vladimir Putin has raised objections to America's allying withformer Soviet satellites to place U.S. missile defense components in their countries. This, warns Putin in language reminiscent of the

Cold War, will turn Europe into a "powder keg." For his part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has declared: "The arms race isstarting again." Are congressional Democrats prepared to leave us only partly protected in a world where nuclear arms might soonbegin to spread like a Southern California wildfire? Some have looked at the Democrats' actions and said, emphatically, yes. "Theiraim," Heritage Foundation defense analyst Baker Spring said earlier this year, "is to force the U.S. to adopt a position that prohibits itfrom developing much less deploying missile defense interceptors in space under any circumstance and for all time."

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NMD GOOD PROLIF

NMD key to check proliferationPeter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the HeritageFoundation, 11-8, 2007, online: http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E2E0BCA0-8DDF-484C-B974-22FE89CF0715,

If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing effect on the securityenvironment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missiledefense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons ofmass destruction. There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against it. To makeAmerica and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to incur further proliferation. As PresidentBush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool forcounterproliferation."[8]

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NMD GOOD NUCLEAR TERROR

NMD in Europe is key to deter and prevent nuclear terror strikes on the U.S. and alliesJoe Pitts, U.S. Representative (R-PA), 11-2, 2007, online: http://www.truthnews.net/world/2007100430.htm,

The strange irony is that in the first decade of the 21st century the United States and its allies may be more vulnerable to the threat ofnuclear weapons and ballistic missiles today than we were during the Cold War. Though there were certainly serious times of raisedtensions, the dry logic of mutually assured destruction kept the major actors in the Cold War from ever actually using nuclear armedballistic missiles. Today, rogue nations and non-state terror organizations operate outside the realm of mutually assured destruction. Aterrorist organization has no territory or population it must protect. Pariah nations that chronically operate outside the realm of theinternational community, like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, under the rule of Saddam Hussein, may not follow the same rational logicthat prevented the U.S. and the Soviet Union from launching nuclear missiles. The United States continues to work on non-proliferation measures to keep nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of countries or groups that might use them against theUnited States and its allies. However, the global nuclear arms sales network of A.Q. Khan, of Pakistan, was evidence that nuclearweapons can and have been proliferated into the hands of enemies of the United States. It would take just one nuclear warhead todestroy an entire city. The toll in human lives would be massive and catastrophic. It is an issue that we should not take lightly. It is athreat that we must address. The U.S. Department of Defense began deploying long-range missile interceptors in Alaska andCalifornia in 2004. These interceptors would protect the United States from a long-range missile threat from rogue nations in Asia,such as a launch from North Korea. The United States has ground-mobile and sea-based systems as well that would combat short-

range ballistic missiles. What is currently missing from a global ballistic missile defense is a system that would protect our strategicinterests and allies in Europe. The threat from a potentially nuclear armed Iran cannot be ignored. I believe we should continueworking toward a diplomatic resolution with Iran over the issue of nuclear weapons. However, we cannot assume such a resolutionwill take place, and need to move forward in tandem with a plan to provide defense against a nuclear armed.

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NMD GOOD IRAN

NMD key to avoid Iranian proliferation.Charlie Szrom, research assistant in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute,12-21, 2007, The Weekly Standard, online:http://www.weeklystandard.com/Check.asp%3FidArticle%3D14496%26r%3Dnzhfp&cid=1125250328,

THE NEW NATIONAL Intelligence Estimate has led many to call for a new policy towards Iran. Sen. Hillary Clinton "vehementlydisagree[s]" that "nothing in American policy has to change." Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the report confirmed theRussian view that "there is no military element in [Iran's] nuclear program." Doesn't all this mean we should drop support for missiledefense? No. The threat has not changed significantly and missile defense remains one of the few options still available to lessen thepower of potential Iranian nukes. The program can also turn positive relationships with Central European states into long-term,mutually-dependent alliances. Iran tested a new missile, called the 'Ashura,' as recently as late last month. This 2000-kilometer-rangeweapon could potentially reach U.S bases in the Middle East and parts of Eastern Europe, including such U.S. allies as Romania,Georgia, or Ukraine. The announcement may just be bluster, but the unveiling alone shows that Iran has no intention of backing downmilitarily. A careful reading of the NIE makes an even stronger case for a continued menace. The report admits that Iran continues toenrich uranium, that Iran "probably would be technically capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for a weaponsometime during the 2010-2015 time frame," and that it "will be difficult" to convince the Iranian leadership to abandon eventualdevelopment of a nuclear capability. The basic facts remain the same; perhaps the only revelation is that Iran, if anything, has made a

tactical decision to delay warhead production so it can buy enough time for the more difficult task of enriching uranium. After themarathon of amassing sufficient fuel, Tehran just has to sprint through the relatively simple process of developing warheads. Ourmissile defense partners recognize the enduring danger. The Czech foreign ministry stated that, "'According to the report, Iran willprobably be capable of producing a sufficient quantity of nuclear material for the production of a nuclear bomb between 2010 and2015. This corresponds with the previous estimates. By this date the European pillar of anti-missile defense should be in place.'" Thethreat still exists. How can we continue to pressure Iran? The report dashed hopes for any broad UN sanctions against Iran, as Russiaand China, reluctant beforehand to impose serious punitive measures on Iran, now have a ready excuse. Military strikes now also seemhighly unlikely, given the lack of urgency precipitated by the NIE. Those opposed to an Iranian nuclear program might still enactsmart sanctions--targeting, for example, the participation of Iranian regime elements in the international financial system--incoordination with a few hardy European allies. One such ally, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, said through a spokesman that"the report confirms we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons." But such action will not be enough.The United States needs a response that will directly address the physical threat of Iranian nukes. Missile defense development avoidsthe problem of UN-based obstruction by Russia or China, and it remains one of the few remaining pressure points we can use against

Iran.

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NMD GOOD IRAN

NMD is key to counter Iranian proliferation and nuclear capabilities.PeterBrookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the HeritageFoundation, 11-8, 2007, online: http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E2E0BCA0-8DDF-484C-B974-22FE89CF0715,

In fact, the emerging Iranian threat is nothing less than a race against the clock. Iran is involved in both a long-range missile programand a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Both programs could reach initial operating capability in the 2013-2015 timeframe oreven earlier. Pending immediate approval, current projections forecast completion of the Polish and Czech "third site" installationswithin five years, which is only marginally ahead of Iran's estimated long-range ballistic missile capability and nuclear capability.[3]Moreover, with the possibility of a Manhattan Project-like effort by Iran, supported by countries such as North Korea, Iran's capabilitymay well be realized even earlier than currently expected. With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad saber-rattling andthreatening to "wipe Israel off the face of the earth,"[4] it is incumbent upon the United States to take the growing Iranian threatseriously by taking steps to protect itself, its forward-deployed troops, and its friends and allies.

NMD is critical to avoid Iranian proliferation.Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The PolishPerspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

To put it simple, the Americans feel they need to have an MD system and are able to build it. The decision to field a European MDcomponent comes directly from this logic, and it appears futile to look for some hidden motives (for example, an attempt to divide theEuropean Union). The radar is meant to provide better tracking of Iranian missiles, and the interceptor base would give the USadditional interception opportunities of an ICBM aimed at the US, plus some rudimentary level of protection for their bases in Europeand parts of European territory (excluding south-eastern part of the continent). On this last point, it is worth to point out that spendinglots of money and efforts on protecting someone elses territory makes in this case perfect strategic sense. After all, if the US isprotected by the anti-missile shield, what would be the next best thing for Iranian planners wishing to deter the West from interferingin Irans affairs?

NMD is critical to prevent Iran from proliferating it sends a clear signal.Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish

Perspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

Arguments pointing to the slow pace of the Iranian missile developments, lack of strategic rationale for Iran to build an arsenal forstriking Europe or the United States when better targets are available in the neighbourhood (e.g. American bases across the Gulf), orthe availability of other means of transporting WMD to the target, will have no impact on the United States. Scrapping the systemwould be equal with admitting the fundamental flaws of the undeterrable rogue states doctrine. Neither this, nor any nextadministration seems prepared to make such a move. Of course, as with every major armaments programme, there is also the self-perpetuating internal logic of we have advanced so far, and cannot stop here.

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NMD GOOD STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION

NMD is critical to prevent Russian expansion.Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the HeritageFoundation, 11-8, 2007, online: http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E2E0BCA0-8DDF-484C-B974-22FE89CF0715,

If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing effect on the securityenvironment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missiledefense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons ofmass destruction. There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against it. To makeAmerica and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to incur further proliferation. As PresidentBush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool forcounterproliferation."[8] However, the failure of third site negotiations would embolden those in Russia who believe that the UnitedStates is negotiating from a position of diplomatic and military weakness. Putin would claim--with some credibility--to have scored adiplomatic victory over the United States. Failure would also increase Russian boldness in intimidating former satellite states, addingto instability in Eastern Europe.

Russian military expansionism gets modeled by India and PakistanBusiness Week Online , September 30, 2002http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_39/b3801084.htm

But heightened activity in the Caucasus presents risks for the U.S., too. One is the danger that U.S. advisers in Georgia get targeted ina new flare-up of violence. America's global image could also suffer through a closer identification with aggressive Russian warmethods. And a dangerous precedent could be set. If Putin mounts a larger military effort with the tacit approval of Washington,countries in other hot spots could follow his example. Analysts fear India, for example, could invoke the same argument Putin is usingto launch a major strike against the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. ''This has got to be very carefully controlled'' by U.S.policymakers, says Fiona Hill, an expert on the Caucasus region at the Brookings Institution. Even as Putin cooperates with the war onterror, he's posing yet another dilemma for Bush's hard-pressed anti-terrorism team.

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NMD GOOD STOP RUSSIAN EXPANSION

NMD is key to stop Russian expansion.Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The PolishPerspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

Which threat is so potent that it requires the US base as an insurance policy against aggression? Most of the supporters of Polandsinvolvement in the Missile Defence project point unanimously at Russia and the possible future course of its policy. With the newstrength coming from gas and oil revenues, Russia looks determined to increase its influence not only in the near abroad (i.e. formerUSSR), but also globally. At home, the Kremlin-devised concept of sovereign democracy provides a basis for a stable systempolitical which has most of the attributes of a democracy (e.g. periodic elections), but little of its spirit (no real choices for the voters).According to some commentators, the new over-confident Russia may, in the medium to long-term perspective, try to use not only theenergy weapon, but also the threat of military force as a foreign policy tool.

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NMD GOOD NO WAR WITH RUSSIA

The U.S. will never go to war with Russia over NMD.Alexander Golts, St. Petersburg Times, 11-6, 2007 http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=23554

It is clear that Moscow has no desire to reach a compromise on the missile defense issue. On the contrary, the Kremlin has a vestedinterest in preserving an ongoing, smoldering conflict with the United States over nuclear weapons and missile defense. Putin and hisinner circle are convinced that this is the only way Russia can regain its status as a superpower and stand on equal footing with theUnited States -- at least in the nuclear sphere. This is why Moscow is always pushing for negotiations on nuclear weapons, such as theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I. And in order to underscore the importance ofsuch talks, the Kremlin periodically threatens to pull out of a treaty or to deploy a mysterious, miracle warhead capable of overcomingU.S. missile defense systems. In reality, however, the nuclear factor plays an increasingly minor role in U.S.-Russian relations. And,paradoxically, its importance began to diminish after the Cuban missile crisis, when it became clear that neither side was willing to useits nuclear weapons against the other. Despite having 20 times more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, the United States rejectedany plan involving a first strike against Moscow. In the late 1950s, Robert McNamara calculated the probable losses in the event of aSoviet first nuclear strike against the United States. After becoming defense secretary in the early 1960s, however, McNamaraacknowledged that Soviet nuclear weapons were not capable of inflicting the level of damage that he had earlier estimated, and he thusruled out any plan for a U.S. first strike. For nuclear weapons to be an important factor in politics, there must be a real fear that theleader possessing the weapons is crazy enough to actually use them. That is why the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea have

generated such heightened concern around the world. Putin, however, has shown whether he intended to or not that he is arational leader. And even drawing unfounded, exaggerated historical parallels with the Cuban missile crisis cant ruin that reputation at least not yet.

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NMD GOOD SYSTEM WORKS

Current NMD technology works and can stop nuclear attacks.Lukasz Kulesa, analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 12, 2007, Missile Defense Dossier: The PolishPerspective, online: http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf,

For many countries, the perspective of having a shield protecting its territory against long-range ballistic missiles may be attractive(the Russians only have a system protecting Moscow, using nuclear warheads), but only for the United States that option has becomeboth technically achievable and affordable. An impressive work has been done on the development and integration of the MD systemof sensors (including space assets and radars), weapons (maritime and ground component) and command & control architecture allthanks to the US technological potential and industrial prowess. Technical problems and failed tests notwithstanding, it seems nowthat the system will indeed offer high chances of intercepting a simple, non-decoys-included, ballistic missile. And in the gargantuanUS military budget, the money spend on Missile Defence (almost 100 billion USD so far) is just a fraction of the overall expenses.

Recent, demanding tests show that NMD system works.Investors Business Daily, 11-7, 2007http://www.freerepublic.com/tag/missiledefense/index?more=5814422

While the rest of the country went about its business Tuesday night, the Missile Defense Agency conducted another successful test,

this time hitting not one but two missiles. It was the first time multiple targets had been used. Shortly after 8 p.m. Pacific time, twoshort-range ballistic missiles were launched from Hawaii. Within minutes, interceptors fired from the USS Lake Erie's weapon systemstruck and destroyed the missiles more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The hits were the 10th and 11th for the Aegis sea-based part of the missile shield program. Adding to their significance is the fact that the Lake Erie crew was not informed of the time

of the launch, though it was on alert.

Successful dual-warhead tests are a significant improvement for NMDBrendon Nicholson The Melbourne Age, 11-9, 2007http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/successful-missile-tests-a-poser-for-us/2007/11/08/1194329414564.html

THE US Navy has tracked and destroyed two ballistic missiles in space within seconds of each other in a test that will haveimplications for Australia's next government. The successful destruction of two missiles almost simultaneously is a significant step inthe development of the controversial US anti-ballistic missile system in which Australia will play a part. Previously single missiles

have been destroyed in space by US warships armed with the Aegis anti-ballistic missile system.

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SPACE BASED NMD IS EASILY BEATABLE

Nuclear missile defense systems can be easily fooled by unsophisticated countermeasures.Rand.Orghttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1209/MR1209.appd.pdfAccessed 2008 - no date found.

Chapter Five asserted that unsophisticated countermeasures could readily saturate terminal and midcourse missile defenses based inthe continental United States. In discussing the urgency of boost-phase missile defenses, Chapter Three introduced thecountermeasures. This appendix contains a thought-experiment to illustrate the possibility of an unconventional, unsophisticatedcountermeasure against terminal-area ballistic-missile defenses. The appendix also illustrates a possible unconventional, space-baseddeterrent weapon. The straightforward approach to defeating midcourse and terminal missile defenses is to saturate them with multipleaim points. One way to saturate defenses during the midcourse portion of a missiles trajectory outside the atmosphere is to deployrelatively inexpensive, unsophisticated decoys (such as balloons or fragments of the booster) in large numbers and to alter theappearance of real targets to help confuse sensors trying to sort the real and false targets, for example, by deploying the real targets inwhat amounts to another decoy (APS, 1987; Lewis and Postol, 1997). By the time the decoys and a typical nuclear reentry vehiclereach the atmosphere, the lower ballistic coefficient of the decoys will cause them to fall behind and allow terminal-area defenses toconcentrate on the reentry vehicles in the time remaining before the weapon detonates (Bethe, Boutwell, and Garwin, 1986, pp. 6468Flax, 1986, pp. 4346; Garwin and Bethe, 1968).

Space based NMD systems can be fooled by unsophisticatedRand.Orghttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1209/MR1209.appd.pdfAccessed 2008 - no date found.

Because making a decoys ballistic coefficient and other observable signatures match that of a reentry vehicle carrying a weapon isroughly equivalent to making another reentry vehicle, the conventional approach to defeating the remaining terminal-area defenses isnormally not to saturate them with false targets but to try to outmaneuver them. This technique originally involved faster reentry(higher ballistic coefficients) and, as the technology evolved, maneuverable reentry vehicles. Alternatively, the attacker can saturatethe terminal defenses with real targets. Either of these two approaches, maneuvering or multiple reentry vehicles, requires some degreeof technical sophistication and more resources than we might associate with an unsophisticated opponent. However, anunsophisticated opponent may not follow the same development paths the United States or the Soviet Union took in developing theirown strategic deterrent arsenals. Launching a nuclear weapon in a reentry vehicle on a ballistic missile is not the only way to pose anunacceptable threat to the United States. Other possible weapons of terror or deterrence (depending on perspective and purpose)include chemical and biological weapons, and these may be more readily available to what might be called rogue states. Their

proliferation is more difficult to detect or interdict than nuclear weapons. Their development signatures are identical to those ofpharmaceutical research and production. Chemical weapons and agricultural chemicals need the same production infrastructure. Theinfrastructure for producing biological weapons is practically undetectable. Among these poor mans nuclear weapons, the spores ofanthrax bacteria have been described vividly in the open literature and in official information (DoD, 1998a; DoD, 1998b; OTA,1993a; OTA, 1993b; Taylor, 1996). A few kilograms of the spores delivered in an inhalable form can cause extremely large numbers offatalities in areas of high population density. Against that kind of a target area with that kind of lethality, precision delivery is notrequired, just widespread dispersal and rough timing relative to time of day and weather. Defending against the means of deliveringchemical and biological weapons for terrorist purposes (suitcases, shipping containers, car bombs, subway releases) is generally therealm of police, customs, coast guard, and intelligence agencies, rather than of the military. Some opponents of missile defenses arequick to point these means of delivery out as evidence of the futility of military missile defenses. However, if the weapons areintended as a military deterrent, their utility would be better served by more visible delivery means, such as aircraft or missiles. Thesedelivery platforms still provide the opportunity for effective, unsophisticated counters to terminal-area missile defenses. With shorter-range missiles, the acknowledged approach for saturating terminal defenses is to fractionate a unitary warhead into multiple

submunitions and deploy them early in the trajectory (Lewis and Postol, 1997, p. 62). Some might think this approach applies only toshort-range, theater missiles because the submunitions would not survive the heat of reentry associated with longer-range missilesunless their reentry vehicles were of the expense and complexity suitable for a nuclear weapon. However, that assumes an opponentwould adopt a design philosophy that mirrors historical practice for nuclear reentry vehicles.

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SPACE BASED NMD CAN WORK

Space based NMD can work empirically the nay-sayers have been the ones living in a fantasy.Mona Charen February 22, 2008 12:00 AM On Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet Missile-defense naysayers were the ones peddlingfantasies http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NGJhODU3MzAyYmUyNTkyOWM3NDEwYWVkNjljYmQ4YzM=

General rejoicing? Not exactly. The Washington Post reports that Scientists, arms-control advocates and others said the shoot-downwas based on questionable modeling by the government of the risks to human health and was a danger to the future peaceful use ofspace. Questionable modeling? Arent these the same people who argue that we must all abandon our passenger cars becausecomputer modeling suggests the world may be getting a bit warmer? As for arms-control advocates, where were they back in January2007 when China blew up a satellite that was orbiting the Earth? The Chinese were obviously testing military technology as theweather satellite they destroyed was in no danger of plunging to earth. Further, that satellite was orbiting at an altitude of 537 miles.Its destruction therefore spread debris through space, complicating the orbits of other satellites. But the arms control advocates werequiet. Theyve been dreading a U.S. anti-missile capability since Ronald Reagan first proposed it in the 1980s. Then congresswoman(now senator) Barbara Boxer called the Strategic Defense Initiative the presidents astrological dream . . . a dream of laser weaponspowered by nuclear explosions, particle beam weapons, chemical rockets and space based interceptors parked in garages in orbit.Then-senator Al Gore called SDI not feasible. Journalist Ted Koppel summed up the conventional wisdom among liberals when hedeclared I think that what is being proposed for expenditure on Star Wars [sic] . . . is absolute nonsense. Anything like an SDIprogram is going to put us in a position where, naturally, the Russians are going to feel threatened. Besides, he continued, reciting the

then prevalent Its Dangerous and it Wont Work mantra, There is no way it is going to work within the next twenty years and it isgoing to cost not billions, not tens of billions, not hundreds of billions, but trillions of dollars. The New York Times labeled the ideaa pipe dream, a projection of fantasy into policy. Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis was equally dismissive. Hecalled SDI a fantasy a technological illusion which most scientists say cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. The defensesthey envision wont make the United States more secure. . . . As recently as 1999, when Congress was considering funding formissile defense, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., OR) once again invoked the old George Lucas imagery to debunk the idea. Like the movie,this is a phantom solution hitting a bullet with a bullet in outer space. But hitting a bullet with a bullet has become almost routine.On September 28, 2007, also high above the Pacific Ocean (75 miles), another Star Wars fantasy vehicle successfully destroyed themock warhead of a long-range missile. Many other recent tests have shown similar success. In fact, the U.S. is joined by 30 othernations who are working on missile-defense systems. For those whose delicate constitutions forbid them to take comfort in militarystrength, they may consider that this same technology may one day save Earth from a catastrophic meteor strike. Contra Ted Koppel,our capability to shoot hurtling satellites and more dangerous flying objects out of the sky did not cost trillions of dollars. Since1983, weve spent approximately $100 billion on missile defense, a small percentage of overall defense spending during that period.

And in the end, it worked. American ingenuity can hit a bullet with a bullet. But there is still no cure for liberal short-sightedness

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SPACE BASED NMD FAILS

Space based missile defense systems are the biggest, most expensive failure in American history there is

no need to continue.Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor ofinternational affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan shocked the national security establishment by calling upon the nation's scientificcommunity, "who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the meansof rendering these weapons impotent and obsolete." Seventeen years have passed since that speech, and the United States has spentmore than $60 billion trying to develop a defense against ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") andits successors have cost more than twice as much as the Manhattan Project (in constant dollars), but these programs have yet toproduce a single workable weapon. This "achievement" is probably a record in the annals of defense procurement: never has so muchbeen spent for so long with so little to show for it.

The idea of a space based nuclear missile defense system is out of touch with reality.Stephen M. Walt "Rush to Failure: The flawed politics and policies of missile defense Stephen M. Walt, Kirkpatrick professor ofinternational affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is the author of The Origins of Alliances and Revolution and War., 2000

Explaining how this happened--and why--is the main aim of Frances Fitzgerald's Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, andthe End of the Cold War. The "Star Wars" saga, according to Fitzgerald, is the story of how the United States came to chase a chimera.For Fitzgerald, "Star Wars" illustrates "the extent to which our national discourse about foreign and defense policy is not aboutreality--or the best intelligence estimates about it--but instead a matter of domestic politics, history, and mythology. Not surprisingly,Fitzgerald's account begins with Ronald Reagan himself. Her portrait is a familiar one: an amiable but detached chief executive whowas poorly informed on most policy issues and unwilling to rein in his constantly warring subordinates. At the same time, sheconfirms that Reagan was a skilled public performer with a remarkable ability to adapt his message to the American people's pulse.Fitzgerald suggests that some of his political magic was t

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