2AC File - Amazon Web Servicesopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files… · Web viewDr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of

SDI 2010 File CategoryFile Name

2AC File 2AC File...........................................................................................................................................................1***TOPICALITY***.......................................................................................................................................2Topicality—Presence=Combat/Non-Combat...................................................................................................2Topicality—AT: Reduce..................................................................................................................................3Topicality—AT: Presence Excludes Infrastructure..........................................................................................4***DISADS***................................................................................................................................................52AC Oil............................................................................................................................................................52AC Oil............................................................................................................................................................62AC Russia Oil.................................................................................................................................................72AC START.....................................................................................................................................................82AC START – Impact Turns...........................................................................................................................92AC START...................................................................................................................................................10Obama Bad DA 2AC [1/3].............................................................................................................................11Obama Bad 2AC [2/3]....................................................................................................................................12Obama Bad DA 2AC [1/3].............................................................................................................................13No Link- No Spillover....................................................................................................................................14AT: Price Spikes.............................................................................................................................................152AC Fem IR...................................................................................................................................................162AC Fem IR...................................................................................................................................................172AC Fem IR...................................................................................................................................................182AC Fem IR...................................................................................................................................................192AC Fem IR...................................................................................................................................................202AC Midterm “Dems-Bad” Politics...............................................................................................................212AC Midterm “Dems-Bad” Politics...............................................................................................................222AC Midterm “Dems-Bad” Politics...............................................................................................................232AC Midterm “Dems-Bad” Politics...............................................................................................................242AC FCS DA 2/2............................................................................................................................................252AC FCS DA 2/2............................................................................................................................................262AC Heg/Irregular Warfare............................................................................................................................272ac Afghanistan Redeployment......................................................................................................................282ac Afghanistan Redeployment......................................................................................................................292ac Afghanistan Redeployment......................................................................................................................302AC CMR.......................................................................................................................................................312AC CMR.......................................................................................................................................................322AC CMR.......................................................................................................................................................332AC CMR.......................................................................................................................................................342AC Negotiation CP.......................................................................................................................................35***CONSULT NATO***..............................................................................................................................362AC Consult NATO.......................................................................................................................................362AC Consult NATO.......................................................................................................................................372AC Consult NATO.......................................................................................................................................382AC Consult NATO.......................................................................................................................................39NATO Declining Now...................................................................................................................................40Relations Resilient..........................................................................................................................................41EU Defense Turn............................................................................................................................................42Russia Turn.....................................................................................................................................................43Economy Turn................................................................................................................................................44Heg Turn.........................................................................................................................................................45***NEG UPDATES***.................................................................................................................................46Japan CP Text.................................................................................................................................................46START Uniqueness........................................................................................................................................47START Uniqueness—AT: Spies....................................................................................................................48

1


***TOPICALITY***

Topicality—Presence=Combat/Non-Combat 1. W/M – United States Forces Korea are not involved in combat activities

2. C/I - Presence includes both combat and non-combat operations – official budget planning for Iraq proves.Congressional Budget Office (CBO), September 20, 2007, “The Possible Costs to the United States of Maintaining a Long-Term Military Presence in Iraq,” http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8641/09-20-ConradLTpresenceinIraq.pdfAt the request of Senator Kent Conrad, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the possible costs to the United States of maintaining a long-term military presence in Iraq similar to the U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea and the Northeast Asia region. The nature and pace of operations of such a presence, if any, in Iraq for one or more decades into the future are uncertain. To accommodate a range of possibilities, CBO has projected costs under two scenarios: a “combat” scenario, which would involve rotating military units into and out of Iraq to sustain U.S. operations in a combat environment (as is now being done); and a “noncombat” scenario, which would involve stationing specific military units indefinitely at established bases in the region in a less hostile environment. If U.S. military operations in Iraq were to develop into a long-term presence, such forces could differ substantially from those assumed in either of the scenarios used in this analysis. Moreover, the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive over time: The more intensive pace of combat operations could give way to the slower pace of noncombat operations over some number of years. In any event, the ultimate costs of any long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq would depend heavily on the scale and pace of future operations. Under the combat scenario that CBO considered, the United States would maintain a long-term presence of approximately 55,000 military personnel in Iraq, deploying military units and their associated personnel there for specific periods and then returning them to their permanent bases either in the United States or overseas. The scenario also incorporates the assumption that units deployed to Iraq would operate at the same pace and conduct the same types of missions as the forces currently deployed there. In CBO’s estimation, this scenario could have one-time costs of $4 billion to $8 billion and annual costs of approximately $25 billion. (All costs in this analysis are expressed as 2008 dollars; see Table 1.) Under the noncombat scenario that CBO analyzed, the United States would maintain a long-term presence of approximately 55,000 military personnel in Iraq by indefinitely stationing specific units at established bases there in a manner similar to the current practice of assigning personnel to units based in Korea or Germany. The scenario incorporates the assumption of much less intense military operations than those under the combat scenario. Under this noncombat alternative, units stationed in Iraq would rarely, if ever, be engaged in combat operations. Up-front costs (mainly for construction) under the noncombat scenario would be approximately $8 billion, with annual costs of $10 billion or less, CBO estimates.

3. W/M our C/I – we reduce United States Forces Korea in non-combat operations

4. Prefer our C/I

a. Education – we should learn about Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be civically irresponsible to end discussion about wars were we are currently fighting.

b. Neg Interpretation Over limits – they limit out of 2 resolutional countries, while our interpretation allows affs the flexibility of 6 resoluitonal countries

c. Heart of the topic – There are many negative arguments against Iraq and Afghanistan, which get into to whether Iraq and Afghanistan withdrawal is good or bad.

5. Default to reasonability – as long we prove that our interpretation of the resolution is good enough, you should vote Aff. Reasonably prevents a race to the bottom – negatives will always find arbitrary and unpredictable definitions that serve only to limit out affirmatives

2


Topicality—AT: Reduce

1. W/E - we do not eliminate all forces

2. C/I - Federal code proves elimination is a way to reduce.US Code 2005 (Code of Federal Regulations - Title 26: Internal Revenue (December 2005), 26 CFR 54.4980F-1, http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/54-significantly-reducing-future-accrual-19711258) (c) Elimination or cessation of benefits. For purposes of this section, the terms reduce or reduction include eliminate or cease or elimination or cessation.

3. W/M our C/I – we are able to advocate an elimination of all United States Forces Korea personal

4. Prefer our C/I

a. Aff and Neg Ground – allowing affirmatives the ability to argue an elimination of troops gives negatives ample ground for CP, PIC and DA’s to removing all troops.

b. Heart of the topic – the resolution warrants elimination affs because an effective U.S. policy may be the complete elimination of military personal. This requires the aff to defend a specific course of military action


3


Topicality—AT: Presence Excludes Infrastructure

1. W/M – United States Forces Korea are troops

2. C/I - Presence includes both troops infrastructure.Barry M. Blechman et al, President of DFI International, Spring, 1997, Strategic Review, p.14Given its multifaceted nature, neither practitioners nor scholars have yet settled on a single definition of presence. Technically, the term refers to both a military posture and a military objective. This study uses the term “presence” to refer to a continuum of military activities, from a variety of interactions during peacetime to crisis response involving both forces on the scene and those based in the United States. Our definition follows that articulated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power deployed overseas (both permanently and temporarily) along with the requisite infrastructure and sustainment capabilities."

3. W/M our C/I – We Remove United States Forces Korea which includes troops

4. Prefer our C/I –

a. Limits Aff- we limit the Affirmatives to run only Aff’s that either reduce troops or bases. This still limits affirmatives out of running changing missions, ending missions, and removing technology affirmatives that are impossible to predict.

b. Education– bases are a critical to military strategy. They are what allows troops to be in one area. Limiting out of Bases ignores a huge part of such strategy and prevents debaters from learning about more than just the troop aspect of military deployments.


4


***DISADS***

2AC Oil

1. N/U - Oil Prices up nowYousef, 7/14/10CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/14/markets/oil/ DA: 7/16/10

Oil prices continue to swing in the mid- to upper-$70s this week as investors digest the first wave of quarterly corporate results, and mixed economic and supply data. A strong outlook for global crude demand pushed prices up 3% Tuesday, and oil continued to climb slightly higher Wednesday following a better-than-expected weekly government inventory report. Prices have been trading between $70 and $80 a barrel since May. Last week, they posted their biggest weekly gain since May, jumping 5.5% to hit $76.09.

3. No Unique Link – Iraqi troop presence is inevitable, which checks the link, and there is no spillover from South Korean deployment to oil markets.

4. Link Turn – Decreasing US militaristic foreign policy increase oil company investment --lowering oil prices. Hossein-zadeh (Prof. Economics @ Drake University) 2009Ismael, Perspectives on Global Development and Policy, 295-314, Vol. 8

Big Oil interests also know that not only is war no longer the way to gain access to oil, it is in fact an obstacle to gaining that access. Exclusion of US oil companies from vast oil resources in countries such as Russia , Iran , Venezuela , and a number of central-Asian countries due to militaristic US foreign policy is a clear testament to this fact. Many of these countries (including, yes, Iran) would be glad to have major US oil companies invest, explore and extract oil from their rich reserves. Needless to say that US oil companies would be delighted to have access to those oil resources. But US champions of war and militarism have successfully torpedoed such opportunities through their unilateral wars of aggression and their penchant for a Cold War -like international atmosphere. 5. No internal link - US Economy poor now so oil isn’t key.Wall Street Journal 7/16/10http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100716-709512.html DA: 7/16/10

Financials led U.S. stocks sharply lower Friday as a double dose of discouraging reports on the corporate sector and the economy sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average down more than 200 points. Bank of America's 8% drop led the blue-chips lower, erasing the index's weekly gains amid lingering concerns that the economy is growing too slow to spur corporate growth. Adding to the jitters was a morning report that showed consumer sentiment dropped to its worst level since March 2009, the latest in a string of downbeat data that slammed Wall Street. On the corporate front, investors turned pessimistic about growth prospects for major U.S. companies as Bank of America, Citigroup and General Electric posted lackluster results. There was also growing concern about how financial regulatory overhaul will hurt earnings for the banking sector, which was the biggest decliner on the Standard & Poor's 500 index on Friday.

5


2AC Oil

6. Case solves the economy by ending expensive military deployments - Extend Bandow 10.

7. Empirically denied A. Economic recession in past years didn’t cause war.

B. Oil prices sky rocketed in recent years with no escalation.

8. No Impact - OPEC can control prices despite the emergence of other producers

Bharati, Crain, and Kaminski 08,(Rakesh, Susan and Vincent, Professors at Southern Illinois, Missouri State, and Jesse H. Jones School of Graduate Management, respectively, OPEC Credibility and Clustering in Crude Oil Prices, Dec. 30th, http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/OPEC_Credibility_CLustering.pdf, Retrieved:7-15-10

Thus far strong evidence has been presented of OPEC’s ability to influence open market oil prices. Nevertheless, the hypothesis must be examined more closely to rule out the possibility of clustering due to other factors. Therefore other implications of OPEC market power are studied as well. If OPEC wields credible pricing power in some periods but not in others, the market would correctly infer the degree of pricing power under the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Imbalances in supply and demand in such periods would have a less pronounced impact on the price since OPEC should respond swiftly to restore the equilibrium. Therefore a stronger tendency to cluster-in-the-large is expected in low volatility periods (i.e., when the market infers OPEC to be credible). Interestingly, this is opposite to the case of clustering-in-the-small where existing literature has noted a positive relation between volatility and clustering-in-the-small due to price resolution. Further, as speculative periods are accompanied with higher volumes, they should also be accompanied with a lower degree of clustering. As noted earlier, the crude oil market has undergone different regimes based on the behavior of OPEC and the emerging importance of non-OPEC production – Russia, West Africa etc. Further collaboration among OPEC nations has varied based on the economic and security needs of the countries. Tang and Hammoudeh (2002) use monthly prices to propose the target price zone of $15-$25 (1988- 1999). Chapman and Khanna (2006) proposed two target pricing zones: $15-$20 (1986-1997) and $23- $30 (2000-2003)25 as a result of a Nash equilibrium. Slaibi, Chapman, and Daouk (2009) found support for this hypothesis using time series analysis and monthly price data. If prices are targeted by OPEC through supply management as proposed, there should be a preponderance of clustering in the TPZ subperiods. Further insights can also be gained about subperiods where OPEC behavior is not clearly modeled. Table III presents the analysis of clustering across subperiods based on the motivation of Chapman and Khanna (2006) and the results appear in line with the proposed TPZ hypothesis. As reported in the last column of Table III, the two combined TPZ periods of 1986-1997 ($15-$20) and 2000-2003 ($23-$30) show extremely strong evidence of clustering with the familiar pattern. Once again, the value 9 is most likely with the familiar pattern of rise from value 3 to 9 and the subsequent decline. The 9 centered half (digit values 7,8,9,0,1) occur 69 percent of the time. What is interesting is that, despite the fact that there are two different prices ranges both terminating in tens ($20 and $30), the closing spot price has managed to cluster at the value 9, at the top end of the scale. This suggests that OPEC possessed a strong ability to influence prices despite demand and supply shocks, other disruptions, and the fact that non-OPEC production had already surpassed OPEC production in 1982. In the first subperiod, where the $15-$20 range was applicable, the futures price closed below $15 only 248 times out of 3,015 trading days. Also, the 1983-1985 period is where OPEC established a price of $29 per barrel and Saudi Arabia took on the role as the swing producer. Consistently, the same clustering pattern is observed as in the TPZ subperiods. This time, the futures price closed at the 9- centered values on 83 percent of the trading days. Thus, in the subperiods of 1983-1985, 1986-1997, and 2000-2003, the tendency to cluster near the top end of the scale is quite strong. Further this ability to influence the price is impressive given that OPEC controls less than 50 percent of the market and appears driven by internal hostilities among member Gulf countries.

6


2AC Russia Oil

1. N/U -- Russia’s economy is growing for external reasons, proves oil isn’t key.Abelsky 2010“Russian Economy May Expand Annual 3% This Quarter, RenCap Economists Say” By Paul Abelsky - Jul 12, 2010 Date Accessed: July 16, 2010 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-12/russian-economy-may-expand-annual-3-this-quarter-rencap-economists-say.html

Russia’s gross domestic product may increase 3 percent this quarter from the same period last year as government spending bolsters industial output, Renaissance Capital said. GDP may advance 0.9 percent from the second quarter, RenCap said in a report today, raising its previous forecast from 0.7 percent. “The main positive growth drivers appear to be related to a direct impact of the government’s efforts to reinvigorate the economy,” economists led by Alexei Moisseev said in the report. 2. No internal link – Friedman evidence says natural gas and other resources are key to the Russian economy.

6. No impact – Weil says that a collapse in prices leads to reforms that solve Russian economic collapse. This makes short-term recover inevitable.

7. No Impact -- Alt Causality: Russian acquisition of Caspian Sea oilfields means they will never reform

Barana , Washington Quarterly January 5, 2010 (EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage, Zeyno Barana, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/280058_918013288_918257737.pdf)

As long as Russia maintains its dominance over the pipelines linking Caspian and Central Asian energy producers to Europe, it will not reform. The ties between the Kremlin and energy companies have enriched those in power, enabling them to chip away at democracy, rule of law, and human rights in Russia. Billions of dollars in energy revenue have allowed the state to buy up previously independent media outlets through Gazprom’s media division. Rcform before the pipelines are constructed, the EU should work to channel Russia toward more transparent and market-based behavior. Europe possesses the necessary legislation to prosecute businesses such as Gazprom or Transneft, the state-owned Russian oil pipeline company, for their monopoly power. The prohibitcd actions in Article 82 of the European Community Treaty read like Gazprom’s business strategy in Europe. Among other things, Article 82 prohibits “abuse ... of a dominant position within the comnion market,” “imposing ... unfair trading conditions,” and “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance ... of supplementary obligations which ... have no connection with thc subject of such contracts.’”

7


2AC START

1) WON’T PASS – DERAILED UNTIL AFTER MIDTERMS. THE HILL7-2-10. A U.S.-Russia arms treaty is teetering in the Senate, lacking support from Republicans and set back by an alleged spy ring. The White House was hoping that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed three months ago by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, would move quickly through the Senate. But now it may not get a vote on the floor until after the November elections. The pact to reduce warheads, missiles and launchers in both countries could be cleared by the Foreign Relations Committee this month, but that timetable could also be pushed back. While a simple majority is enough to pass it through the panel, 67 votes will be needed for ratification by the full Senate. The House does not vote on treaties. Given the partisanship of the upper chamber and the midterm elections four months away, there is little chance of securing the vote of every Senate Democrat and the backing of least eight Republicans anytime soon.

2) NO RISK OF A LINK – VOTES ON START ARE IDEOLOGICAL. KORB 6-25-10. [Lawrence, a part-time resident of Sugar Hill, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, former assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, “U.S. Senate must ratify New START” Atlanta Journal Constitution -- lexis]Unfortunately, in the poisonous partisan atmosphere that dominates Washington these days, it appears likely that some senators will oppose the New START Treaty either because they don't want to give President Obama a "win" heading into the midterm elections or because of an illogical impulse to oppose or distrust something that the president supports simply because he supports it.

3) WON’T PASS GOP OPPOSITION. THE HILL7-2-10. This week’s arrest of 11 alleged Russian spies in the U.S. has made the passage of the treaty an even steeper uphill climb. According to court documents, two of the alleged Russian agents were asked by Moscow to collect information about the treaty. Much of the push-and-pull in the Senate on START has centered on a struggle between Kerry and GOP Whip Jon Kyl (Ariz.), a skeptic of the treaty. Kyl has cited missle defense issues when expressing opposition to START. Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said the treaty “is not likely to come up before October” and perhaps not until after the election. He said there has been no Democratic whipping so far, but acknowledged the treaty will be a challenge to ratify. “Kyl is leading the charge against it,” Durbin said. If the treaty does not get approved this year, it would be a major setback for Obama, who has stressed the need to reduce arms while maintaining a strong U.S. defense.

4) No link, Obama’s political capital is already shot, he has to fight to GOP on the economy and immigration now and is focusing any capital he has on the BP spill

5. NO RISK OF BACKLASH FROM SUPPORTING WITHDRAWAL. BEINART 8. [Peter, senior fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, “Beinart Gets It, Many Left Blogs Don't” TalkLeft of the Politics of Crime July 6 – lexis]When Democrats worry about the backlash that awaits Barack Obama if he defends civil liberties, or endorses withdrawal from Iraq, or proposes unconditional negotiations with Iran, they are seeing ghosts. Fundamentally, the politics of foreign policy have changed. . . . Because Americans are less afraid and because Republicans have abandoned the foreign policy center, Democrats need not worry that Obama will suffer the fate of George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale or John Kerry. He won't lose because he looks weak.

8


2AC START – Impact Turns

START CAUSES NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS – TRANSPORTATION. Dr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University and a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of Defense., July 30, 2009, “Aligning disarmament to nuclear dangers: off to a hasty START?;,” lexisIn theory, further strategic offensive reductions should equate tofewer nuclear weapons to worry about. However, in practice post-START is unlikely to result in any Russian cuts that would not have happened in any case through the continuing attrition of its strategic posture. Moreover, depending on what counting rules apply, the reductions considered would not necessarily translate into fewer aggregate warheads; neither START nor the Moscow Treaty currently limits nondeployed warhead stockpiles. Indeed, from a nuclear security perspective, warheads deployed on strategic delivery platforms may be more secure in the near term than those removed (whether permanently or temporarily while awaiting dismantlement) to potentially less secure storage facilities. Moreover, the physical removal itself raises heightened risks because transportation is inherently the most vulnerable link in anuclear weapon's custody chain. Finally, post-START will not apply to the sources of Russia's greatest nuclear security risks: several thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons and stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material.

START KILLS MISSILE DEFENSE – IF IT DOESN’T THE RUSSIANS WILL PULL OUT. HEINRICHS 10. [Rebeccah, adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a former military legislative assistant for House Armed Services Committee member Trent Franks, “Hearing on what START treaty means for missile defense” The Hill -- 6/17]Despite Obama administration officials’ original claims to the contrary, the New START treaty does address missile defense -- in the Preamble, no less. It states that there is a connection between offensive and defensive weapons and that our current system does not threaten Russia’s offensive weapons. The Russians want to keep it that way , and even submitted a unilateral statement to make perfectly clear that the treaty, “may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America.” The Russians have made it quite clear that they will withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. builds a robust missile defense system. And the Obama administration knows this and wants ratification regardless. As Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller, Jr. casually admitted in his testimony, since the U.S. has only thirty ground-based interceptors and Russia plans to field over 1,000 ballistic missiles, Washington could build much more substantial missile defenses without appreciably challenging Russian forces. Yet President Obama is effectively promising President Medvedev he will ensure that the U.S. remains exposed to Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal. This was exactly what President Reagan intended to move us away from when he announced his plan to deploy defenses that would render all nuclear missiles obsolete. Miller went on to explain that the Obama administration’s missile defense proposal, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, will not affect the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. PAA is Obama’s substitute for the Bush administration’s plan to establish permanent bases in Europe for interceptors similar to those we now have in California and Alaska. Even though the Bush plan would not have been able to defend the U.S. against Russian missiles, the Kremlin protested its deployment on grounds that it would. The PAA will be deployed in four stages, the last of which will have the exact same capability that the Bush plan was going to have: The ability to knock down long-range missiles from Iran before they reach Europe or the U.S. And not only will it have the same capability, it will have added advantages because it will be sea-based, making it mobile and adaptable. If the Russians had a problem with Bush’s plan, they’re really going to choke on Obama’s -- unless of course they think he has no intention of following through on it. As a senior Russian official told Nixon Center president Dimitri Simes, “I can’t quote you unequivocal language from President Obama or Secretary Clinton in conversations with us that there would be no strategic missile defenses in Europe, but everything that was said to us amounts to this.”

9


2AC START

START CAUSES PROLIF – CRUSHES DETERRENCE AND SIGNALS WEAKNESS. Ferrara, ’09 (Peter, International Center for Law and Economics, director, Institute for Policy innovation, senior policy advisor, former senior policy advisor National Center Policy Analysis, American Spectator, 7/8)Obama's Nuclear Disarmament Even worse for America, however, is President Obama's American nuclear disarmament policy, which he is pursuing this week in Russia through a nuclear deal with the Putin dictatorship. In his foreign policy speech in Prague earlier this year, Obama called for worldwide nuclear disarmament, suggesting that American nuclear weapons are no more acceptable than Iranian nukes, and that the rest of the world would agree to give up its nuclear weapons if America would give up its own. This is an extreme left policy. North Korea responded soon thereafter with nuclear tests and the firing of new missiles. While Obama responded with bluff and bluster about real consequences, nothing much happened. Meanwhile, Obama's budget, passed by the Democrat-controlled Congress, substantially cuts funding for missile defense. When Japan suggested North Korea would fire missiles at Hawaii on the Fourth of July, the Obama Administration rushed available missile defense assets to the islands. But the action seemed hollow given Obama's long range funding plans for missile defense. Now President Obama has agreed with the Russians to complete a deal that would cut U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by another third, reducing America's nuclear warheads down to 1500. It is not clear how we can be sure that Russia will comply with its side of the bargain. But this arms control initiative reveals how badly Obama's thinking is frozen deeply in the past, analogously to his unreconstructed Keynesian economic policies from the 1930s. We no longer live in a bipolar world, with America and Russia the only relevant nuclear superpowers. China is now a more powerful threat than Russia with its own nuclear arsenal, and India, Pakistan, North Korea, and soon apparently Iran also pose nuclear dangers. A nuclear deal with Russia alone is not remotely adequate to protect America, even if we could be sure of Russian compliance. Indeed, if we don't successfully counter North Korea and Iran, and President Obama does not seem to be up to that, nuclear proliferation will spread to Japan, South Korea, and throughout the Middle East. In the face of these threats, cutting our own nuclear arsenal down to 1500 warheads, or even less as Obama ultimately advocates, may leave America vulnerable, particularly to attacks aimed at taking out our nuclear arsenal. Joining that policy with cutting missile defense and halting further development of Reagan's SDI initiative reflects a blinkered commitment to hopeless left-wing ideology and could not be more reckless and risky for America's national defense.

Case turns-Hegemony acts as enough deterrence to dissuade Russia from provoking a conflict even if relations are low.

10


Obama Bad DA 2AC [1/3]

1. Will pass – Reid is pushing. SAMUELSOHN 7-13-10. [Darren, staffwriter, “Reid warms to July climate vote” Politico -- http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39677.html DA 7/13/10]Senate Democratic leaders are set to roll the dice this month on a comprehensive energy and climate bill, including a cap on greenhouse gases from power plants, even though they don’t yet have the 60 votes needed to move the controversial plan. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) confirmed Tuesday that he would gamble on the high-stakes legislation — much as he undertook health care and Wall Street reform — that for now remains in the rough-draft stage but that will soon be the subject of intense negotiations. “Whatever I bring to the floor, I want to get 60 votes,” Reid told POLITICO shortly after announcing his strategy for a full Senate debate as early as the week of July 26. Reid confirmed the bill will have four parts: an oil spill response; a clean-energy and job-creation title based on work done in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; a tax package from the Senate Finance Committee; and a section that deals with greenhouse gas emissions from the electric utility industry.

2. Will pass – Industry support. MURRAY 7-16. [James, Business Green writer, “Senate clears path for run at climate legislation” 2010 http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2266590/senate-clears-path-run-climate -- DA 7/16/10]The Senate last night passed Barack Obama's financial reform bill, finally clearing the way for a vote on controversial climate change legislation. The president had signalled that he would throw his full weight behind trying to secure the 60 Senate votes needed to pass a comprehensive energy and climate change bill as soon as the proposed overhaul of financial regulation was completed. Speculation is now mounting that the Senate could debate a draft climate bill put forward by Democrat senator John Kerry and independent senator Joe Lieberman within the next few weeks after Senate majority leader Harry Reid hinted that he was preparing to move forward with the latest revised version of the bill. Senators Kerry and Lieberman have been circulating a 667-page draft version of the bill that scales back previous plans for an economy-wide emissions trading scheme in favour of a narrower carbon-pricing mechanism that initially focuses solely on energy utilities. The proposals have secured support from a number of influential business groups and energy firms and Kerry and Lieberman are confident that the scaled-back proposals, which also include substantial support for renewable- and nuclear-energy projects, can win over the Republican votes needed to pass through the Senate.

3. No Unique Link: either financial reform gave Obama enough political capital to overcome the plan and include Cap and Trade, or there is no spillover because politicians vote on the merits of individual bills.4. No Link- DoD shields.FORRESTER, 7 [Jason, visiting fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the U.S.–South Korea Relationship” May, d/a: 7/20/10, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070504_congressionalattitudes_final.pdf]Most interlocutors affirmed that the U.S. military presence in South Korea should be maintained. A number of congressional staff members expressed concerns that the Rumsfeld-led Pentagon14 had cut U.S. forces in South Korea without sufficient consultation with ROK officials. In the words of one Democratic source: “The Congress has basically left military/realignment issues up to the Pentagon, and it is not a big focus of discussion on the Hill. Congress would have oversight over any realignment arrangement but would not legislatively enshrine it.” In the wake of the street demonstrations against the U.S. presence in 2002 and 2003, some members such as Representative Henry Hyde argued that if U.S. forces were not wanted in South Korea then they should leave. Nonetheless, a number of other congressional interlocutors, while agreeing with the basic notion that U.S. forces will, and can, only remain in South Korea at the request of the ROK government, strongly disagreed with the undertone of Representative Hyde’s comment, which suggested that the United States under certain conditions would not be alarmed about the prospect of disengaging militarily from the peninsula. According to one Democratic interlocutor reacting to Hyde’s statement: That is rhetoric, not policy. We must view the relationship in this light. If the United States was off the Korean peninsula, we’d have even worse military options than we do today vis-à-vis North Korea When asked about the U.S. force level in South Korea, most interlocutors stated that they believed there were sufficient U.S. forces in South Korea to deter North Korea. Ongoing relocation of U.S. forces in South Korea generally receives little attention in Congress; despite the relocation of U.S. troops from Yongsan Garrison being behind schedule, no congressional interlocutors expressed concerns regarding the delay. Concerning the transfer of wartime operational control to South Korean forces, most people interviewed stated that the Pentagon had done a very poor job of keeping Capitol Hill informed of this process.15 A number of interlocutors expressed concerns that the transfer of wartime operational control (opcon) to South Korea could be misinterpreted by Pyongyang as a sign of a diminished U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea. When one staff member was asked if transferring wartime opcon to South Korea might send the wrong signal to North Korea, s/he emphatically answered: “Yes. It’s all about perceptions.” Democratic staff members stated that they expected that, with the Democratic takeover of both chambers of Congress, the Pentagon would be pressed to be more inclusive and informative on such matters in the 110th Congress (2007–2008).

11


Obama Bad 2AC [2/3]

5. Military lobby supports the plan – they think the alliance promotes U.S. weakness.FLAKE, 6 [L. Gordon, Executive Director of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, “U.S.-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS,” Testimony before Committee on House International Relations, Congressional Quarterly, Sep 27, l/n]

In and of themselves, the transfer of wartime operational control and even the redeployment and reduction of U.S. troop levels on the peninsula do not necessary speak of declining commitment to the alliance. Military officials are correct to point out that we should focus on capability, which may in fact be enhanced, rather than structure or numbers. However, if enacted as envisioned, particularly in the current political environment, it is easy to see the transfer of wartime operation control as tantamount to a divorce. The current joint command in Korea represents the only truly "joint" force in the world. The clear delineation of roles and reduced exposure to the increasingly suspect political will in Seoul for a potential conflagration that seems to be the objective in the U.S. support for transfer of wartime operation control would suggest at best a trial separation if not an amicable divorce. True, both the U.S. and the ROK proclaim unwavering support for the alliance and for the defense of the peninsula, but this support seems to be the equivalent of the assurances of separating parents that they are still "friends" and that they will still work together for the good of the child. The inevitable outcome appears to lay the groundwork for a much reduced U.S. presence on the Peninsula and, capabilities aside, a downgrade in the political perception of the alliance. In the end, as with the case with many divorces, this change may be for best, but it remains sad. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this process is only being driven by the civilian leadership of the Defense Department. Traditionally the bastion of support for the U.S.-ROK alliance, the defense establishment both in Washington and in Korea now arguably gives Capitol Hill a run for its money as being the leading skeptic, if not detractor, of the alliance, at lease in the context of current leadership in Seoul. Sensitive issues, such as anti-American incidents, the vilification of the USFK in blockbuster movies, and questions about environmental standards and basing, have all taken their toll. However, the most influential factors on U.S. military perceptions have likely been related to questions of preparedness. The last-minute withdrawal of South Korean support for joint Operations Plan 5029 left U.S. planners feeling exposed. In addition, the question of bombing ranges and whether the U.S. will have to travel to Alaska or Thailand to train appears to have been solved only by an unprecedented threat to withdraw the U.S. Air Force from Korea. Coupled with base relocation issues and the growing difficulty of coordinating plans and policies regarding North Korea (a nation the ROK Ministry of Defense no longer designates as its primary enemy), and of course the question of wartime operational control, these issues combine to challenge longstanding military support.

6. Plan is popular - Media exaggerates negative reports from South Korea.SHIN, 3 [Kim Dong, Institute for National Strategic Studies, “The ROK–U.S. Alliance: WhereIs It Headed?” April, d/a: 7/20/10, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2005/RP1074.pdf]

Nationalist anti-American sentiments seen among some South Korean media and citizens, and reactive anti-Korean sentiments in the United States that are often exaggerated by some American media reports, have led to an eruption of demands for reductions and relocations of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, further straining the time-honored alliance of the two nations. Differences appear to persist in their assessments of the current situation and expectations for the future, including on whether they can accommodate the unraveling situations and have confidence in their own capabilities to resolve them.

12


Obama Bad DA 2AC [1/3]

7. No Impact- DOESN’T COLLAPSE THE ECONOMY. BARR 9. [Colin, senior writer, “Forget $100 oil. $80 oil is a problem” CNN Money Nov 18 -- http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/18/news/economy/oil.prices.fortune/index.htm DA 7/16/10]None of this is to say a further rise in energy prices would necessarily send the economy into a tailspin. While consumers are still strapped, behavior changes should make the economy less vulnerable. U.S. oil consumption has slid 9% since 2007, Kopits notes. Americans also drove 3% fewer miles in the latest year through August than they did two years earlier, according to data from the Transportation Department. Hamilton points out that car sales reverted to depressed levels after the government's Cash for Clunkers promotion ended in August. Hillard G. Huntington, executive director at the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University, said that while oil markets remain exposed to a possible supply disruption, he believes the memory of last year's record prices is fresh enough that another oil shock is unlikely.

8. Case outweighs: Loss of military flexibility destroys hegemony and a North Korean attack will crush the American economy and overextend the US economy.

13


No Link- No Spillover

Congress doesn’t care about troops in South Korea – the debate will be quick and painless.

FORRESTER, 7 [Jason, visiting fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the U.S.–South Korea Relationship” May, d/a: 7/20/10, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070504_congressionalattitudes_final.pdf]

Members of Congress and their staff are generally optimistic regarding the future of the U.S.–South Korea military alliance and the U.S.–South Korea relationship in general. While positive expectations regarding the future of the relationship are broadly held, congressional understanding is narrow. Overall, Congress pays little attention to the U.S.–Republic of Korea (U.S.-ROK) relationship.1 When it does, however, critical comments from vocal members of Congress and staff tend to garner considerable media coverage. Issues in the U.S.-ROK relationship that have received the greatest attention in Congress in recent years include South Korea’s policies regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and human rights abuses; the perceived growth of anti-Americanism in South Korea; and U.S.–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) negotiations. Issues such as the realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and missions that the United States and South Korea might undertake together beyond the Korean peninsula have received relatively little attention on Capitol Hill. South Korea’s inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), while of great interest to Seoul, has not received a great deal of attention in Washington. Congressional resolutions concerning World War II “comfort women”/“sex slaves,” which the Korean-American community has taken the lead to advance, have made little progress through the U.S. legislative process in recent years. That said, this situation is changing primarily due to highprofile developments in Japan related to this issue.

14


AT: Price Spikes

CAP AND TRADE DOESN’T CAUSE PRICE SPIKES. Parry and Pizer 7 (Ian and William, Senior Fellows at Resources for the Future, Regulation, Vol 30 No 3, Fall 2007, p.21)

Second, the problem of permit price volatility can be addressed through provisions like "safety valves" and, to a lesser extent, permit banking and permit borrowing. With a safety valve, firms can buy additional permits from the government in periods when the permit price reaches a specified trigger level. This effectively relaxes the permit cap in that period, thereby keeping a ceiling on permit prices when permits would otherwise have been in excessive demand. Coupling a very tight cap with a safety valve would almost completely stabilize prices. Alternatively, transitory permit price spikes might be ironed out by allowing firms to borrow permits from the government during periods of high permit prices and pay them back through more stringent emissions control in some future period. Similarly, permit banking helps to create a floor under permit prices; under this mechanism, in periods when the demand for permits is slack because abatement costs are low, firms have an incentive to abate more in order to hold over some allowances for use in future periods when they expect higher permit prices. While still subject to fluctuations driven by longer-term price expectations, these mechanisms at least remove short-term volatility. Although arrangements for banking and borrowing permits strengthen the need for new financial institutions, such institutions would probably develop quickly and at relatively low cost.

15


2AC Fem IR

1. Framework – The Aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option.a) Ground – Negative frameworks are unpredictable and moot the 1AC. Aff Choice is the best compromise – they can read Kritiks when they are aff.b) Education – Switch-side debate and state-focused discussions are key to understand opposing arguments and gain necessary activist skills. Contextual evidence proves that engaging the substance of policies precedes epistemology.

Houghton 8 [David Patrick, professor of political science @ the University of Central Florida, International Politics, March, Volume 45, Issue 2, pg. 115]

Writing in 1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that 'the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession' (Biersteker, 1989). This observation -- while accurate at the time -- would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today. Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory, nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice IR. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do, and our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that IR scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such 'navel gazing' is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of IR that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently, to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars when we look at the world 'out there'. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. My own view, as the reader may have gathered already, is that the empirical claims of scholars like Der Derian and Campbell will not often stand up to such harsh scrutiny given the inattention to careful evidence gathering betrayed by both, but this is a side issue here; the point is that substantive theoretical and empirical claims, rather than metatheoretical or epistemological ones, ought to be what divides the international relations scene today.

2. Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative.Double bind- either the alternative is strong enough to overcome the instance of the plan or can’t overcome all the other instances of masculinity in the status quo.

16


2AC Fem IR

3. Perm solves best—need to combine methodological inquiry with immediate action. Molly Cochran Assistant Professor of International Affairs @ Georgia Institute for Technology, Normative Theory in International Relations. 1999, Page 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered . Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision . The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

4. Consequentialism is the best framework through which to evaluate impacts – accommodates both feminist goals and the impacts of the 1AC.Julia Driver, Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth, Hypatia, 2005, p.197I hope to have shown how one can be a consequentialist and at the same time be responsive to concerns laid out in feminist scholarship relating to partiality and the demands of morality. Universal benevolence does not lead inevitably to disavowal of the ties of friends and family or to rejection of special obligations. It does not lead to a complete and total subsumption of the individual. While this is true, it also recognizes the vulnerable, which indeed is one of its historical strengths—it was, after all, initiated as a vehicle for reform to eliminate policies and laws that served the interests and pandered to the prejudice of those in power at the expense of others. As Harriet Taylor wrote in one of her few surviving letters to John Stuart Mill, religion and superstition "must be superseded by morality deriving its power from sympathies and benevolence and its reward from the approbation of those we respect" (quoted in Sumner 1974, 516). I'm sure she would have also counted as rewards the love and the trust of those who depend on us, and the approbation of those who respect us, as well.

17


2AC Fem IR

5. Alt doesn’t solve:

a) the case – Alt leaves troops in South Korea which cause global proliferation, Chinese aggression, and Heg loss inevitable. The impact is nuclear war.

b) the K - avoiding the State makes the best solutions impossible.

Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, JD Yale, “Feminism and Int’l Law,” Human Rights Q, 22.3, 2000, MuseEven if there were a strong distinction on the international level, however, some feminists would take issue with the assumption that the Western concept of the public/private divide troubles women worldwide, or even most women in the West. In the first place, the criticism of the construct cannot be valid in those societies in which the public/private divide barely exists. 62 In those in which it does, the state is hardly "irrelevant" to most women. Women use the apparatus of the state domestically when they call upon it for economic assistance, or for protection from violence or discrimination. In real representative democracies, women have the same basic political tools as men (e.g., the rights to vote, assemble, and speak freely), although they may not have the same means of mass influence (e.g., disposable income and access to the media). More problematic to any feminist criticism of the concept of states is the observation that, even where the state structures break down, patriarchy still flourishes. 63 If removal of the state does not diminish patriarchy, women have little complaint against the concept of the state per se. Internationally, the state may or may not be an equally relevant source of protection and empowerment for women as it is for men. To claim that the state is simply irrelevant is to claim that gender overshadows nationality and culture--a highly contentious assertion among women and men alike, and particularly when coming from feminists who claim that gender itself is a construct of culture. 64 Karen Engle has claimed that when feminists [End Page 675] complain that international law has excluded regulation of the "private" (i.e., intrastate) sphere, they really mean to say that international law excludes women: "Paradoxically, we [feminists] are often the ones who attach the label 'private' to women's activity that we see as omitted." 65 More broadly, it is certainly possible, as Rebecca J. Cook and Doris Buss have argued, that, in some if not most cultures, the private world is a woman's refuge from unwanted public interference. 66 The alignment of private power determines the desirability of state intervention, and, in some cases, women have achieved the power they desire. Feminists in the United States and Ireland, for example, have sought to put women's reproductive choices beyond state jurisdiction precisely for this reason. Eliminating all distinction between acts that should be subject to state regulation and acts that are purely private, as some feminists have advocated, 67 exposes women as much as men to unwanted intrusions upon their personal liberty, and subjects them to the cultural patriarchy that democratic governments seek to moderate. For this reason, in spite of her earlier and confused claim that the distinction between public and private should be collapsed, Professor Engle has correctly argued that international law can offer women protection unavailable in the private sphere or in the domestic law of their respective countries. 68 Similarly, Professor Knop has cautioned that the diversity of women's experiences with the internal aspects of the public/private divide "suggests that a single strategy or theory concerning [the international aspects of state sovereignty] may be neither possible nor desirable." 69 International law is a potentially powerful tool for feminists to influence the state to protect them from individual abuses.

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2AC Fem IR

6. No Root Cause – a) Humans are self-interested, and this is the most accurate predictor of state behavior.

SOLOMON 1996 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, Vol 5, No 2, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)The post-modern/critical theory challenge to realism has been tested, and proved wanting. Realism remains the single most reliable analytical framework through which to understand and evaluate global change. Post-modernism can provide no practical alternatives to the realist paradigm. We know what a realist world looks like (we are living in one!); but what does a post-modernist world look like? As long as humanity is motivated by hate, envy, greed and egotism, realism will continue to be invaluable to the policy-maker and the scholar. In this regard it has to be pointed out that from the end of World War II until 1992, hundreds of major conflicts around the world have left some twenty million human beings dead.109 Neither has the end of the Cold War showed any sign that such conflict will end. By the end of 1993 a record of 53 wars were being waged in 37 countries across the globe.110 Until a fundamental change in human nature occurs, realism will continue to dominate the discipline of international relations. The most fundamental problem with post-modernism is that it assumes a more optimistic view of human nature. Srebrenica, Bihac, Tuzla, Zeppa, Goma, Chechnya, Ogoniland, and KwaZulu-Natal all bear testimony to the folly of such a view.

b) Even if realism is sometimes wrong, every international policymaker will make decisions based on realist predictions.Guzzini, senior research fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998 (Stefano, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p. 234-235) Consequently, taking realism seriously as a still widely shared device for constructing knowledge, helps in raising the awareness of the way in which often very contestable historical analogies influence our understanding, and can predispose to action. Such a conceptual analysis is hence not an idle thought, but a prerequisite to seeing a larger variety of policy options and to facing possible self-fulfilling prophecies. CONCLUSION This chapter made three arguments about the present development of realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. First, it showed that the unity between diplomatic discourse and the discipline of International Relations, so self-evident in the times of Morgenthau, can no longer be upheld. Both worlds of international politics and of diplomacy have changed. Second, it showed a similar failure when realists tried to save the overlap of realism with the central explanatory theory of International Relations, that is, to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory or paradigm. This was illustrated by a critique of the Logic of Anarchy, the most elaborate revision of Waltz's theory which aims at responding to the critics of realism and neorealism alike. This work can neither provide a metatheoretically coherent realism, nor a version which would be acceptable to the present academic criteria of an empirical theory. As a rcsult of this double failure, realism is at a crossroads. Either it follows thc scicntific road, and then pursues its fragmentation within and outsidc thc narrowed discipline. Or it goes back to its normative and historical roots but, then, it can no longer cover the research agenda of International Relations, nor claim the scientific core position that it has been used to taking since 1945. In the past, realists have resisted this dilemma. This resistance, played out in both ways, has given cadence to realism's evolution, and until now, also the evolution of International Relations as a discipline. This has been the double story of this book. As long as this resistance continues, the story will continue. Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand, realist assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in plural terms. On the other hand, to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empiri cally wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners of inter national affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandIngs and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is. Realism is not a causal theory that explains International RelatIons, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismsssal of some valuable theoretical insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly uncritically reproduce it.

19


2AC Fem IR

6. Turn—Essentialism: The kritik is essentialist, reproducing the exact stereotypes produced under patriarchyWhitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University 94 Sandra, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, p. 20

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend upon a 're-thinking' from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domina tion between men and women.46 Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism's reliance on the expe riences, behaviours and perceptions of 'women'. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal 'man', long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal 'woman'.47 And indeed, that notion of 'woman' not only ignores important differ ences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy.48 Those women who do not fit the mould - who, for exam ple, take up arms in military struggle - are quickly dismissed as expressing 'negative' or 'inauthentic' feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men).49 In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Keohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism.50 It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions and stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as do men under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.51

7. No Link – They assume we increase military presence, which is non-unique in every country except South Korea. We decrease a specific aspect of military presence, which mitigates their generic arguments.

20


2AC Midterm “Dems-Bad” Politics

1. Link Turn-The plan is an international signal of weakness – tanks democrats in the midtermFly, Exec Director of Foreign Policy @ CFR, 10James, Executive Director - Foreign Policy Initiative & Research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, Does Obama Have a Foreign Policy?, DA 7-14-2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/does-obama-have-foreign-policy

While it is understandable that given the state of the economy and lingering recession, most Americans are perhaps more focused on their job security than about what is happening in Kabul, Tehran, or Pyongyang, it is troubling that this president does not seem to have a clear agenda on these issues other than a retro-80s approach to twenty-first century challenges. If the Christmas Day bomber, growing concern about Yemen, instability in Iran, continued uncertainty about nuclear Pakistan, and the difficult months (and years) ahead in Afghanistan are any indication, 2010 will be just as consequential for U.S. foreign policy as any year in recent memory with the exception of 2001. President Obama came into office with a foreign policy agenda that was essentially limited to expressing concern about nuclear weapons and showing the world that he was not George W. Bush. He has now done the latter through speech after speech in Istanbul, Accra, Cairo, to cite just a few of the exotic venues. Despite focusing on the former with his “reset” of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the foreign policy challenges he faced during 2009 were largely thrust upon him by events. Despite several courageous decisions as commander in chief, he was clearly uncomfortable (witness the Afghanistan Strategy Review) with the issue set he was forced to focus on during year one. In this very political White House, foreign policy is viewed through the lens of mid-term elections in 2010 and the president’s reelection in 2012, just like any other issue. Thus, it is important for Team Obama to act tough on security and kill terrorists (preferably using classified means), but most other foreign policy issues become time consuming obstacles to the pursuit of a robust domestic agenda. This is foreign policy as a political tactic, not as a grand strategy or a coherent formulation of America’s global interests (with the exception of a headlong rush for disarmament). Despite the challenges the country faces on the domestic front, it would behoove the president in 2010 to do what he failed to do last night -- speak more frequently to the American people about what is at stake overseas and what his vision is for keeping Americans safe and advancing U.S. interests around the world. Otherwise, he risks being nothing more than a reactionary president doing little more than what is required to avoid the wrath of the electorate. He runs the risk of becoming an inconsequential commander in chief in very consequential times.

2. Non Unique-Dems will retain the Senate – 55 seats most likelySilver, most widely respected election predictor, 6-28Nate, widely accepted as the best independent election forecaster, Named TIME’s 100 most influential http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/search?updated-max=2010-07-01T21:29:00-04:00&max-results=10

Nationally, the trends are very flat. We are now using generic ballot polling, rather than the polling from individual Senate races, to create our trendline adjustment, a feature that was imported from our Presidential model. (Trust me, it's better this way.) However, we may as well not have bothered; we show essentially zero change in the national environment over the past several months, and only a net gain of one or two points for Republicans since the start of 2010. In contrast, Democrats lost about 12 points on the generic ballot over the course of 2009. They are not really climbing out of the hole the dug themselves, but on the other hand, it does not appear to be getting worse. Locally, Democrats helped themselves in the primaries. Democratic fortunes were improved by the primaries in Nevada and Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, and Kentucky, and worsened probably only in Arkansas (and South Carolina, which they had almost no chance of winning anyway.) This accounts for most of the movement in the rankings. Whereas, as of our last update, or simulations were projecting an average of 54.0 Democratic and 46.0 Republican seats, we now show 55.2 Democrats, 44.2 Republicans, and 0.6 Charlie Crists.

21

http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/06/construction-season-over-technical.html



3. Escalation empirically denied – past crises haven’t resulted in global war – Peso collapse, Asian financial crisis, 2007 US financial crisis and 9-11

4. No Link-Jobs issue comparatively outweighs all linksQuinn 10Justin, award-winning journalist, Most Important 2010 Midterm Election Issues, http://usconservatives.about.com/od/2010midtermelections/tp/2010-midterm-election-issues.htm

Of all the issues related to the 2010 midterm election, none will have more of an impact on its outcome than job losses. In early 2009, President Barack Obama suggested unemployment was one of the many problems his stimulus package would fix if Congress were to pass it. Congress obliged, but instead of seeing decreases in job cuts, the unemployment rate actually increased. Suggestions offered by conservative Republicans were ignored, and both the president and his Democratic allies continued to scapegoat the Bush Administration. Unfortunately, by the end of 2009, the president's oft-repeated disparagement of "the last eight years," now included one year of his own. Look for voters to remind him and other Democrats of this on Election Day.

5. Impact Inevitable-none of the evidence in this round points to either party getting a 2/3 majority in the Senate. Therefore, there will be gridlock whether the Republicans win or lose. Their Pantelli ev from the 1NC is specific to gridlock, not a Republican win.

6. Link Turn-Congress wants to contain China – they would hate the plan.FORRESTER, 7 [Jason, visiting fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the U.S.–South Korea Relationship” May, d/a: 7/20/10, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070504_congressionalattitudes_final.pdf]

South Korea has also suffered on Capitol Hill from being in a region of the world where more and more attention is being focused on the rise of China. According to a leading Democratic House staff member, when a congressional delegation traveled to East Asia in 2004, members focused primarily on China, but they also stopped in South Korea to examine the U.S. force posture there. In the words of the staff member: “If you had asked most members on that trip, they were going because of China. Most went with low expectations of the ROK and came back very impressed with ROK capabilities; they did not have a good understanding prior to the trip.” When asked how China’s rise affects their thinking about U.S.-ROK relations, most interlocutors stated that China’s rise makes it more important that the United States work to strengthen its alliance with South Korea. Most interlocutors were concerned that China’s military rise coupled with a weakening of the U.S.-ROK relationship could create a more precarious security situation for the United States in Northeast Asia. A number of interlocutors also expressed concerns regarding South Korea’s efforts to strengthen ties with China. In particular, some interlocutors worried that such cooperation might increase the likelihood that China would use ties with South Korea as a means to gather intelligence on the United States

22



7. No Link-Political issues don’t matter – the Dems can win their way out of trouble with their financial leadRothenberg 10Stuart, 2-4, author of the Rothenberg Political Report, DA 7-14-2010, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003289752&cpage=

In fact, GOP political consultants and strategists aren’t popping champagne corks yet. Instead, they worry about the euphoria on the right and believe that the party has a long way to go before it can nail down a big win in the midterm elections. Some Republican operatives are openly concerned about the party’s tactical disadvantages, most notably its financial position. Others fear that circumstances could change, robbing the GOP of its strategic advantage. The National Republican Congressional Committee ended 2009 with $2.6 million in the bank, far behind the $16.7 million that the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee had. While the DCCC raised $55.7 million for the cycle, the NRCC brought in about $20 million less. “I don’t care how great the political environment is,” one smart Republican asserted, “if you don’t have the cash, you are going to get smacked. [Democrats] can buy their way out of trouble if they have that kind of financial advantage in the fall, just the way that we used to do.”

8. No Impact – economic decline doesn’t cause warFerguson, Professor of History @ Harvard, 6Niall, Professor of History @ Harvard, The Next War of the World, Foreign Affairs 85.5, Proquest

There are many unsatisfactory explanations for why the twentieth century was so destructive. One is the assertion that the availability of more powerful weapons caused bloodier conflicts. But there is no correlation between the sophistication of military technology and the lethality of conflict. Some of the worst violence of the century -- the genocides in Cambodia in the 1970s and central Africa in the 1990s, for instance -- was perpetrated with the crudest of weapons: rifles, axes, machetes, and knives. Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

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9. Also, Dems will retain the HouseCook, former CQ analyst, 6-24Rhodes, MA from Penn State, For House Democrats: More Favorable Terrain Than ‘94, Center for Politics, http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/

In short, the playing field looks much friendlier for House Democrats in 2010 than it did 16 years ago. The number of “Blue” districts they hold has risen by 43, from 128 in 1994 to 171 today, while the number of “Purple” districts they must defend has dropped by 39 (from 77 to 38). Meanwhile, the total of “Red” districts occupied by House Democrats is down this year by four from 1994 (from 51 to 47). Arguably, the political landscape is more favorable for the Democrats this time because they are a more cohesive, top-down party than they were in 1994. Then, they were coming off a series of weak presidential showings in the 1970s and 1980s in which their standard-bearer only once could carry more than 138 of the nation’s 435 congressional districts (the exception being Jimmy Carter in 1976).

***Continued with text and graphics removed***Much more noteworthy have been the special elections held over the last year in a trio of “Purple” districts. Republicans were unable to win any of them. Two were in upstate New York, the other Murtha’s seat in southwest Pennsylvania. A GOP victory in the latter contest on May 18 would have been a loud reminder of 1974 – rekindling memories of how Murtha’s special election victory served as a harbinger of his party’s great success that fall. That the vote last month was a loss for the Republicans, though, underscored the opposite – that winning a House majority this year might not be nearly as easy for the GOP as many political observers have predicted. To be sure, there are plenty of targets for the Republicans this fall. But there are not as many ripe ones as was the case in 1994.

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http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2010062401/


2AC FCS DA 2/2

1. Non-Unique—Iraq troop withdrawal withdrew more troops than the planAssociated Press, staff writer, 8/30/2009 "U.S. military packing up to leave Iraq," http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32618785/ns/world_news-conflict_in_iraq/, da: 7/14

The U.S. military is packing up to leave Iraq in what has been deemed the largest movement of manpower and equipment in modern military history — shipping out more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment from tanks to antennas along with a force the size of a small city.The massive operation already under way a year ahead of the Aug. 31, 2010 deadline to remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq shows the U.S. military has picked up the pace of a planned exit from Iraq that could cost billions.The goal is to withdraw tens of thousands of troops and about 60 percent of equipment out of Iraq by the end of next March, Brig. Gen. Heidi Brown, a deputy commander charged with overseeing the withdrawal, told The Associated Press in one of the first detailed accounts of how the U.S. military plans to leave Iraq.

2. No Link- South Korea not key—all the neg evidence is specific to Iraq and Afghanistan—proves the plan is a drop in the bucket and those countries overwhelm the link to the plan

3. Non-Unique US will withdrawal from Afghanistan now.HYDE 7 – 14 -10[Justin, Free Press Washington Staff, “U.S. on track for Afghan withdrawal,” Freep -- http://www.freep.com/article/20100714/NEWS07/7140334/U-S-on-track-for-Afghan-withdrawal-Levin-says]WASHINGTON -- U.S. forces in Afghanistan are on track to meet the goal of beginning their withdrawal in July 2011, U.S. Sen. Carl Levin said Tuesday, but he warned that corruption and attacks by insurgents threaten the country's stability. Speaking after a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan last week, Levin reiterated that the deadline set by President Barack Obama for beginning a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan had been essential to pushing Afghan officials into action. But he said the date did not represent the end of U.S. involvement and that U.S. troops would remain for years. "It's not an exit from Afghanistan," Levin said. Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, long has called on Afghanistan's armed forces and political leaders to take more responsibility for fighting the Taliban and stabilizing the country. He said that by September, there should be roughly equal numbers of U.S. troops and Afghan troops fighting the Taliban, compared with a ratio of two or three U.S. soldiers for every Afghan soldier in January, which Levin called "totally unacceptable." "If we can get the Afghan forces equipped and trained and in the lead, it takes away a propaganda tool" of the Taliban, Levin said during a breakfast sponsored by the Christian Science Monitor. But he said several threats remain to U.S. efforts against the Taliban, including corruption in the Afghan police force and attacks by a warlord who also operates in Pakistan. And he said an upcoming offensive in Kandahar province would be key to showing the Afghan army's strengths. Levin also said he had called on Pakistani officials to step up efforts against the Haqqani network, a group of fighters led by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani that operates on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Haqqani has been launching increasingly aggressive attacks against NATO troops in northern Afghanistan. Violence in Afghanistan has risen over the past few months as the Taliban has stepped up attacks in response to increased operations by U.S. and NATO forces. According to iCasualties.org, 227 U.S. soldiers have died so far in 2010, including 25 in July alone, setting a pace that could make this year the deadliest so far in the nearly nine-year battle.

4. No Impact-FCS development takes too long—their evidence says its not ready for over 5 years and Iraq and Afghanistan should trigger the link by then

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2AC FCS DA 2/2

5. Turn: the plan saves money – withdrawing troops means there is LESS justification for weapons systems – the plan STOPS those from being funded

Christian Science Monitor 3/29/2k10 (“Defense budget: After Afghanistan and Iraq withdrawal, a peace dividend?,” pg online @ http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend da: 7/11 ) If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated." The Obama budget set 2011 defense spending at $739 billion. This amounts to 19 percent of total federal outlays. Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Mass., suspects defense spending could be cut as low as $650 billion without seriously damaging American security needs. To trim the deficit, Mr. Obama called for a freeze in discretionary spending but exempted defense. The US defense budget adds up, at the very least, to 47 percent of total worldwide defense spending. That reflects the US role as the sole superpower, the various US interests abroad, and the relatively high costs of the US military. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson raised defense spending almost 50 percent in constant dollars. President Reagan, with his ambition to financially clobber the Soviet Union, raised defense outlays by more than 50 percent.

6. No Impact-laser weapon impacts are conjecture—their evidence is from 1995 and discussing laser weapons that aren’t in FCS and no conclusive evidence they become lethal.

7. Laser Weapons—No riskKramnik 2-24-2010 Ilya Kramnik is a military commentator (http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/How_Real_Is_The_Threat_Of_Laser_Weapons_999.html )

On February 12, 2010, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) used the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) mounted on a Boeing B-747 jumbo jet to shoot down a liquid-propellant and a solid-propellant target missile. The ALTB project is one of the MDA's most ambitious and long-term programs. Washington launched its initial research in this sphere in the 1970s. At that time, an NKC-135-ALL aircraft, a modified version of the KC-135 Stratotanker, was built and used as an airborne laboratory. United Technologies built a 10-ton, 04-0.5-MWt CO2 laser system for the program. The NKC-135-ALL was involved in a series of tests in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Although the tests proved that a laser weapon was feasible, it had a range of just a few kilometers and therefore lacked any military prospects. In 1985, a laser weapon used in ground tests heated up the stationary fuel tank of a Titan-1 intercontinental ballistic missile simulating a Soviet ICBM a thousand meters away causing it to explode. Such tests, as well as the NKC-135-ALL program, were conducted under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. However it was impossible to develop a feasible missile defense system based on airborne laser weapons because most of the technical problems remained unsolved.

26

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/How_Real_Is_The_Threat_Of_Laser_Weapons_999.html

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend


2AC Heg/Irregular Warfare

Lasers were developed more than 40 years ago, hasn’t changed irregular warfare yet.The word laser is an acronym for "laser amplification by stimulated emission of radiation." Lasers are possible, because of the way light interacts with electrons, which exist at different energy levels. The first laser was invented more than 40 years ago. Interest in directed-energy weapons has been growing within the U.S. military services. The Air Force is developing a megawatt airborne laser that would destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The service, additionally, is in the early stages of developing a space-based laser, also as an anti-ICBM weapon.

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2ac Afghanistan Redeployment

Case outweighs- Heg prevents a global power vacuum that leads to nuclear war, extend Ferguson. The plan prevents North Korean prolif, which would lead to regional arms race and war, that’s Cimbala, and the plan encourages a regional security alliance to deter a rising China, that’s Bandow

US power projection key to deterring Indo-Pak nuclear escalation, extend Ferguson, Impact empirically denied by the Afghanistan surge

No link: The U.S. won’t deploy South Korean forces to other conflictsBANDOW, 7 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, the Bastiat Scholar in Free Enterprise at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Cobden Fellow in International Economics at the Institute for Policy Innovation, the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, the Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, former special assistant to President Reagan, former editor of Inquiry magazine, widely published in such periodicals as Foreign Policy, Harper's, National Interest, National Review, The New Republic, and Orbis, as well as leading newspapers, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post; “Why are We Still in Korea?,” Mar 10, d/a: 7/15/10, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea]

For some alliance advocates the defense of Korea long ago ceased to be an argument for defending Korea. Instead, they argue that U.S. forces serve a “dual use” function. That is, a garrison that protects the ROK also serves other military purposes in the region. But Japan isn’t going to attack either Korea. It’s hard to imagine Washington sending its Korea-based Army division to hold fractious Indonesia together, restore democracy in Thailand, or battle Burma’s brutal military junta. No one threatens Australia and New Zealand. Rather, the only plausible alternative mission is “containing” China. It’s a dubious goal. There isn’t much that a small American ground contingent could achieve against such a populous and geographically expansive power. Whatever the future course of U.S.-China relations, American participation in a ground war against the PRC seems inconceivable. Nor does the ROK have any interest in becoming a base for U.S. operations against Beijing. Two years ago President Roh stated that Washington would require his government’s permission to use its Korean-based forces elsewhere in the region, and that South Korea would not be drawn into a needless war. Although the conservative opposition might triumph in Korea’s presidential election at the end of the year, the Grand National Party seems no more likely to allow America to turn the ROK’s next door neighbor, a potential regional or global superpower, into a permanent enemy.

Link Non-Unique—Iraq troop withdrawal frees up more troops than the planAssociated Press, staff writer, 8/30/2009 "U.S. military packing up to leave Iraq," http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32618785/ns/world_news-conflict_in_iraq/, da: 7/14

The U.S. military is packing up to leave Iraq in what has been deemed the largest movement of manpower and equipment in modern military history — shipping out more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment from tanks to antennas along with a force the size of a small city.The massive operation already under way a year ahead of the Aug. 31, 2010 deadline to remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq shows the U.S. military has picked up the pace of a planned exit from Iraq that could cost billions.The goal is to withdraw tens of thousands of troops and about 60 percent of equipment out of Iraq by the end of next March, Brig. Gen. Heidi Brown, a deputy commander charged with overseeing the withdrawal, told The Associated Press in one of the first detailed accounts of how the U.S. military plans to leave Iraq.

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2ac Afghanistan Redeployment

No link: Afghan withdrawal inevitable—new troops won’t reverse Obama’s decisionJonathan Alter, Newsweek staff writer, 7/3/2010, "T Minus Two Years," http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/03/t-minus-two-years.html, da: 7/15And in truth, that’s exactly what’s happening: the commander in chief is calling the shots. On the way to the Oval Office before the Petraeus meeting, Biden asked Obama if beginning a significant withdrawal was a presidential order that could not be countermanded by the military. The president said it was. Petraeus has immense stature, of course, and after the firing of two commanding generals in a row (Gen. David McKiernan was relieved in early 2009), Obama can’t get rid of him without a firestorm. But the general knows that with Afghanistan already the longest war in American history, he has only a small window in which to combine military force with creative diplomacy in a way that yields real improvement on the ground. If he can’t do it fast enough, the president will conclude that 100,000 troops actually harm progress by making the U.S. look like occupiers. At which point he’ll revert to the Biden Plan—kill Al Qaeda operatives with drones—and forget about Petraeus’s theories of counterinsurgency. The country simply cannot afford a trillion-dollar commitment to nation building. The only way funding will continue much longer is if Republicans take control of Congress this fall. Even then, the war remains unpopular with the public, a point that won’t be lost on the GOP (as RNC chair Michael Steele’s antiwar comments last week attest). And Obama is hardly oblivious to the electoral implications. Let’s say that Petraeus insists that the July 2011 timeline be pushed back a year, which is quite possible considering the current problems on the ground. That means the de-escalation—and the political windfall—will begin around the summer of 2012, just in time for the Democratic National Convention. In other words, Americans should get used to it: we ain’t staying long.

Troop shift good—WITHDRAWAL WILL CAUSE CONFLICTS WITH PAKISTAN AND OTHERSDNA 7-15-10[DNA Read the World, “Catastrophic consequences of walking away from Afghanistan” -- http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_catastrophic-consequences-of-walking-away-from-afghanistan_1410016]Any hasty withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan could have catastrophic consequences and active cooperation of Pakistan is a must for comprehensively defeating al Qaeda and Taliban, America's point man for the region Richard Holbrooke has said. "This is my personal view, if we walk away from Afghanistan , again, as we did 21 years ago, the consequences will be similarly catastrophic because of the unique strategic position of Afghanistan and the reaction that it would have in Pakistan, China, India and the countries to Afghanistan's west," the Obama Administration's special envoy told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said to achieve success in the war torn country, it would involve continued American economic and development assistance. "This will not be cheap, but it will be a fraction of the money that is now being authorised and appropriated for the military campaign. When we will be able to transition to that is impossible for me or anyone to say, but it won't be on a single day. It will be a gradual process, and that is what the review in December and the President's decision making will focus on," Holbrooke said in response to questions from Senators. On Pakistan's role, he said, "We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's participation." Holbrooke told Senators that the very fact that he was appointed as the Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, in itself was a reflection of the fact. "The US government reorganised to reflect the fact that you cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's involvement." Indicating that Washington was putting pressure on Islamabad for a larger crackdown in the Waziristan tribal belt Holbrooke said, "We do not have enough action yet on the Pakistani side of the border. Here is a perfect example of why the two countries cannot be disaggregated for purposes of policy. We got what we wanted on one side of the border, but we haven't gotten it on the other yet. And Americans are being killed and wounded because of this." The American envoy also conceded that western part of Pakistan is a safe haven for terrorists. "The western part of Pakistan, the lawless areas, are the epicentre of the issues that threaten our country. They directly link to the Taliban but they're in Pakistan," he said responding to concerns from Senator Jim Webb. "We have made real progress in Pakistan in the last year and a half, but the focus is so overwhelmingly on Afghanistan -- for valid reasons; that's where our troops are -- that we have lost -- we haven't even recognised the movement in Pakistan across the board: economically, politically, strategically," Holbrooke said. To achieve the goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and prevent its ability to threaten the United States, Holbrooke said the US has to degrade the Taliban because they are part of the enemy structure, a different part but an integral part that America faces. "Now, the Afghan government doesn't yet have the capacity to deal with this on its own. How could they after 30 years of war? And so the civilian part of it, police, government capacity, rule of law, sub-national government, training provincial official, women's empowerment and a whole series of other major issues -- are part of our civilian programs," he said. The civilian strategy of the Obama Administration, he said, is designed from keeping al Qaeda at bay and it's designed to help Afghan institutions establish conditions for stable governance.

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2ac Afghanistan Redeployment No risk of instability:Army checksGrare ’06 (Frédéric,- Visiting Scholar @ Carnegie “Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/45.grare.final.pdf)As sectarian conflict has intensified in Pakistan, the army has been accused of having created an Islamic Frankenstein it could no longer control. Yet, careful examination shows that the army, including the ISI direc- torate, has always been able to maintain violence at an “acceptable” level by dividing groups, generating infighting every time an organization became too important, and sometimes physically eliminating uncontrolable elements. Azam Tariq, leader of the Lashkar-e-Janghvi, the most lethal sectarian Sunni terrorist organization, was assassinated on October 5, 2003, for example. The army nevertheless cannot maintain total control. In December 2004, two suicide attackers nearly succeeded in assassinating Musharraf. Some extremely militant groups have become so estranged by the army leadership’s turn to the United States that they are beyond the government’s control. In November 2003, when Musharraf banned fif- teen to seventeen violent sectarian organizations, other similar organizations that are useful in Afghanistan and Kashmir were merely kept on a watch list. Although sectarian violence is a serious law-and-order problem, it is not a threat to regime stability in Pakistan.

No risk of loose nukesBokhari ’07 (Farhan,- Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters “Pakistan's nuclear assets - myth vs reality” http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2007/12/09/42688.html)Since the controversy surrounding Khan erupted almost four years ago, Pakistan's structure of nuclear management has been significantly transformed . The country's nuclear establishment has overseen the induction of improved standards across the board . New safeguards have been applied for taking charge of nuclear assets in a variety of ways, ranging from closer monitoring of up to 2,000 individuals who hold key positions in the nuclear establishment to the enforcement of safe practices such as a two-man rule, which essentially means that key decisions in the use of nuclear materials will never be left to any individual. Takeover Besides, scenarios such as the danger of a Taliban takeover are just too far-fetched to become part of a serious discourse. For years Pakistan has been widely seen as a country which has seen a stark rise in the number of Taliban-type militants. The present anxieties in the Western world are probably fuelled by the reality of Taliban-type Islamists ruling the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for the past five years. As key partners in a ruling provincial coalition, those Islamists have also held sway over the provincial government in the south western Balochistan province. The truth, however, is that these two provinces represent well below 20 per cent of Pakistan's population of 165 million - a fact which is often ignored when political analysts blindly contemplate the Taliban sweeping through Pakistan and taking charge not only of the country but also of its nuclear assets. Further reassurance for the anti-nuclear proliferation lobby must be the fact that the management of Pakistan's nuclear assets lies squarely in the hands of the armed forces. Unlike political governments which can be voted in or out of office, the Pakistan army as an institution provides consistency in managing nuclear assets. In its short history as an independent state, Pakistan has seen a series of military coups and returns to civilian rule, political murders and times of reconciliation. When East Pakistan seceded from the country to become Bangladesh in 1971, there was also talk of the nation coming undone, but it survived that and will likely survive this. The fact that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons may make the current situation there more worrisome to us in the West, but it's also worth remembering that other nuclear powers of longer standing have been here before. Throughout the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, China remained in control of its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union survived the dissolution of its statehood, and so far at least, this hasn't led to atomic catastrophe. But whether elections go ahead next month as planned or a state of emergency is declared and the vote postponed, Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) will likely play a key role in the country's future. If anything, the blow of Bhutto's death will make the military -- which has seen its prestige among Pakistanis suffer during President Pervez Musharraf's rule -- all the more eager to see civilians back in charge of the country.

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2AC CMR

1. Non- Unique - CMR is doomed - structural problems are long term.Noonan, managing director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Jan. 2008 (Michael “Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil-Military Relations in America A Conference Report” Foreign Policy Research Institute DA 7/14/2010 http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200801.noonan.mindthegap.html )

Repairing the “rent fabric” of contemporary U.S. civil-military relations will require a sustained and comprehensive effort. One key element will be to address professional military education from pre-commissioning through the war college levels. Civil-military relations are too silent a theme throughout the military educational system. Among the services, for instance, only the Army and Marine Corps have civil-military relations books on their professional reading lists. Another element that is needed is an explicit code for the military profession. The code would define the fundamentals of the professional officer “dedicated to this republic’s values and institutions,” distinguish between the professional military and the National Guard and reserves, denote the rights, privileges, and obligations of retired senior officers, define the expectations for loyalty, obedience, and dissent in clear terms, and clarify for both branches of government the necessity for the institutional integrity of the armed forces of the United States above reproach. Once established, it needs to be taught to the military and civilians alike and enforced. “We all realize that civilians have a right to be wrong in our system, but we devote too little study to minimizing the frequency of its occurrence.” A national commission on the American military ethic, said Hoffman, should also be established to define and complete the ethical codification, with bipartisan political, civilian, and military representation. In conclusion, Hoffman stated, “Unless serious efforts are made to rectify the components that constitute the entire relationship between the nation and its uniformed servants, expectations for improved performance are low, and my expectation for greater volatility between institutions of government is high.” Our leaders failed us in the planning and conduct of the conflict in Iraq, and while this may not comprise a “dereliction of duty,” it is a failure nonetheless. “If we continue to ignore the difficulty inherent to the uneasy dialogue that supports the ultimate decision about going to war, and we fail to educate future leaders about the duty and professional obligation inherent to that decision, we are going to continue to pay a high price,” argued Hoffman.

2. Non-Unique - CMR low now due to wars, power-shifts, weapon systems, global warming, debt, and defense costsWong 9 [Dr. Leonard, Strategic Studies Institute,”Civil-Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World.” Colloquium Breif, Strategic Studies Institute, No date, July 16 2010]The third panel began by describing the recent changes in the national security arena. Currently there is a lack of consensus on what the threats, opportunities, and appropriate missions are for the military. This is partly due to an unprecedented degree of challenge with two ongoing wars, major shifts in power, nuclear weapons, global warming, growing debt, and soaring defense costs. The nation is contending with a form of warfare that seems to compress the strategic and tactical resulting in a blurring of lines between military expertise and civilian oversight. Recent civil-military clashes that occurred during the buildup to the Iraq War add to the complex environment. The high visibility of these experiences provides the potential for overcorrection in balancing the civil-military relationship.

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2AC CMR

3. No Internal Link - Policy disagreements don’t undermine overall CMR and don’t spill over Hansen 2009 – Victor Hansen, Associate Professor of Law, New England Law School, Summer 2009, “SYMPOSIUM: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR: ARTICLE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” South Texas Law Review, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 617, p. lexis

According to Sulmasy and Yoo, these conflicts between the military and the Bush Administration are the latest examples of a [*624] crisis in civilian-military relations. n32 The authors suggest the principle of civilian control of the military must be measured and is potentially violated whenever the military is able to impose its preferred policy outcomes against the wishes of the civilian leaders. n33 They further assert that it is the attitude of at least some members of the military that civilian leaders are temporary office holders to be outlasted and outmaneuvered. n34 If the examples cited by the authors do in fact suggest efforts by members of the military to undermine civilian control over the military, then civilian-military relations may have indeed reached a crisis. Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, a more careful analysis is warranted. We cannot accept at face value the authors' broad assertions that any time a member of the military, whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the views of a civilian member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch, including the President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates to either a tension or a crisis in civil-military relations. Sulmasy and Yoo claim there is heightened tension or perhaps even a crisis in civil-military relations, yet they fail to define what is meant by the principle of civilian control over the military. Instead, the authors make general and rather vague statements suggesting any policy disagreements between members of the military and officials in the executive branch must equate to a challenge by the military against civilian control. n35 However, until we have a clear understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, we cannot accurately determine whether a crisis in civil-military relations exists. It is to this question that we now turn.

4. Defense cuts coming nowCole 10 (August Cole, WSJ, Pace of Weapons Cutbacks likely to be slow, 2/17/10)

The Defense Department's top weapons buyer said Wednesday that the pace of cutting costly or badly performing weapons contracts should slow as the Obama administration has largely already targeted problematic and unnecessary programs. Ashton Carter, the under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, said that programs that were the "poorest performers" had been identified in the fiscal 2010 defense budget and that further cancellations were set out earlier this month in the White House's proposed 2011 budget.

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5. Cuts lead to massive CMR breakdown Kohn, Prof of History @ UNC, 2008 (Richard H., “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations” World Affairs, Winter, DA, 7/15/2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html)

The second source of civil-military conflict will revolve around the Pentagon budget. The administration’s request for the coming year, nearly $650 billion, is plainly unsustainable, although it accounts for only 20 percent of the federal budget and less than 4.5 percent of the gross domestic product. The figure understates true costs by excluding veterans affairs, homeland security, and other national security expenditures, which could boost the total upward of $850 billion, more than the rest of world combined spends on defense and larger than any military budget since World War II. This will be a red flag to a Democratic Congress, and certainly to a Democratic White House. However eager they may be to deflect charges of being weak on national defense, the Democrats will have no choice but to cut, and over time, cut deeply. That is because the dilemma is substantially worse than even these figures suggest. The bill does not include the wearing out of military equipment, from overworked transport jets to tanks and trucks, or the expansion of ground forces. Then, too, there is the need for additional spending on homeland security, which several presidential candidates have vowed to do. Port defense, transportation, border integrity, the stockpiling of vaccines—the ability of the United States to respond to and recover from a successful nuclear or biological attack remains rudimentary, and by consensus underfunded. Finally, the Pentagon budget will have to compete with domestic spending priorities: for roads, water systems, and other infrastructure; for the FBI, the air traffic control system, the IRS, and other national agencies; for Social Security and Medicare to support the flood of retiring baby boomers; and for expanding and reforming health care. Claims on the national treasury could arise suddenly, like the hundred billion–plus dollars promised to New Orleans. A Republican administration could press for further tax cuts. (Some years ago, before 9/11, I asked Newt Gingrich whether Republicans, if they had to choose, favored tax reduction or a stronger national defense. He answered: tax cuts.) Expanding deficits could relentlessly drive up interest costs. A recession in turn would diminish tax receipts and raise the deficit even higher, setting in motion a downward spiral that would challenge any Congress, administration, or Federal Reserve chairman. When presented with these fiscal challenges, military leaders are likely to cede nothing. They are at war around the world. They are charged not only with national defense, but with the stewardship of institutions rooted in past glory and expected to triumph over any and all foes. Officers recognize their historic role and they embrace it. Every year when budgets arise in discussion at war colleges, student officers—the up-and-comers in each service, many destined for flag rank—demand more money. In September, the air force asked for an additional $20 billion for aircraft. The Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders understand the squeeze. New weapons systems must be funded and the cost of recruiting and retention bonuses has jumped to more than one billion dollars a year for the army alone. One petty officer recently told me that the navy paid him $80,000 to re-enlist, something he intended to do anyway. Some specialties command $150,000 in douceurs. And even these fees do not suffice. “I have in the last several years arrived at a point,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said recently, “where I think as a country we’re just going to have to devote more resources to national security in the world that we’re living in right now.” Needless to say, Mullen was hardly speaking for himself alone. The ways out of this jam all invite some sort of conflict. Least controversial would be to tackle that old bugbear, Pentagon waste. Several of the presidential candidates have vowed to do exactly this. But the gold-plated weapons systems always survive. And, clichés notwithstanding, the actual savings would be minimal in any case. Another perennial favorite is centralization or consolidation, an impulse that led to the creation of the Defense Department in 1947 and something attempted regularly ever since. Certainly, there are more opportunities here. Are six war colleges really still necessary? Does each service really need its own weather, chaplain, medical, and legal corps? Do both the navy and Marine Corps need their own air forces, since they fly many of the same aircraft, all of them integrated on aircraft carriers? Are military academies a necessity? A larger percentage of ROTC graduates than of West Pointers stay in the army past the ten-year mark. Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generate from the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defense company about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howl—and mobilize. Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In the Pentagon, the battles have been epic.

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2AC CMR

6. No Impact - CMR resilientSchake 9 [Kori, “So far so good for civil-military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy, 9-4-2010, DA: 7-18-2010, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so_far_so_good_for_civil_military_relations_under_obama]It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

7. Disad doesn’t turn case – Civilian authority always trumps allowing AFF to be passedWASHINGTON INDEPENDENT, 11/13/08

Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obama’s authority to make it. “In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions,” said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. “Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions. That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force.” Moss agreed. “The military will just follow the order,” he said. “The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces out of Iraq. This is part of the reason Obama was sent to the White House.”

8. No impact to decreased CMR Desch 1 [Michael C., “Civilian control of the military: the changing security environment,” pg. 38, 2001]A state facing a significant external threat and few internal threats is likely to have firm civilian control of the military: the military will regularly do what civilian leaders want it to do. In contrast, a state facing a diminishing external threat and few internal threats is likely to have less firm civilian control of the military. The danger is not that the military will launch a coup or engage in outright insubordination; it will simply be harder for civilians to get the military to do what they want when civilian and military preferences are in conflict . During World War II and the Cold War, the United States faced a relatively challenging external security environment and was able to maintain relatively firm civilian control of the military. As it entered the less challenging threat environment of the post-Cold War era, controlling the military became more difficult. Things have not been all bad: though civilian leaders have had trouble getting the military to undertake significant social change s and to think seriously about changing roles and missions, they have succeeded in obtaining deep cuts in force postures and spending levels. In short, post-Cold War civilian control of the military has been a mixed bag, as my structural theory predicts.

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2AC Negotiation CP

1. Perm – do both, not mutually exclusive—solves any net-benefit to negotiations

2. No solvency—Nuclear negotiations will fail—empirically provenTed Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute Foreign Policy and Defense VP, 7/21/2009, “A Plan B for Pyongyang,” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9546 da: 7/14/10

There was relief throughout East Asia as well as within the Bush administration when North Korea submitted its long-awaited declaration regarding its nuclear program. Granted, it was fourteen months overdue, and contrary to the commitment that Pyongyang had made to the other participants in the six-party talks in February 2007, it was far from complete.Nevertheless, the Bush administration agreed to remove North Korea from the list of states that sponsor terrorism and to lift economic sanctions imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Optimists in the United States and other countries exude confidence that the six-party talks will now move forward and ultimately produce a settlement ending Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons. Indeed, a new round of talks just ended on Saturday with another promise from North Korea to permanently disable its nuclear program.One hopes that the optimists are correct, but North Korea's record does not inspire confidence . Over a period of more than two decades, Pyongyang has violated every agreement it has ever signed on nuclear matters. It is all too possible that Kim Jong-Il's regime is merely stalling for time while it continues to build nuclear weapons, and that even if the diplomatic process leads to a paper agreement, North Korea will find a way to cheat yet again.

3. Doesn’t solve hegemony—CP leaves troops in South Korea—sustains overstretch

5. CP doesn’t solve North Korea—Plan is a prereq—They won’t cooperate unless troops are gone—paranoiaUPI ASIA, 9 [Peter Van Nguyen, freelance contributor who has written for Asia Time Online, OpEdnews and Foreign Policy Journal, “U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” Oct 13, d/a: 7/16/10, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/]

However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security.

6. Doesn’t’ solve Asian Balancing—CP maintains US role in East Asian-- undermines regional security architecture causing regional instability—that causes North Korea and China war even if they solve North Korea prolif.AND—the CP doesn’t solve South Korea defense build-up—no reason for allies to build up their defense if the US maintains a strong military presence in the area

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***CONSULT NATO***

2AC Consult NATO

1. The counterplan is not competitive - The counterplan only questions how the plan should be implemented, not if it should

We don’t need to defend certainty, just desirability American Heritage, 2009, “should,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should

Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the traditional rules governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice . Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. · Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should've. See Usage Notes at if, rather, shall.

2. Prefer the aff interpretation – condition counterplans are bad

A. Infinitely regressive- there’s an unmanageble number of countries to consult—this explodes aff research–lack of a solvency advocate specific to the plan proves its unpredictable

B. Artificially inflates bad net benefits- there is no comparative research between the plan and the plan with genuine consultation makes it impossible to generate solvency deficits—guarantees the neg wins on contrived net-benefits

C. Disads solve their offense—if consult is important then disads to not consulting solve their education and neg ground arguments

D. It’s a voter—only rejecting the argument creates a perverse incentive to read illegitimate arguments, the risk/rewards for going for theory and time sunk into theory requires it’s a voter

3. Perm—Do the counterplan and then the plan—doesn’t sever certainty—only adds in time generated by the CP process

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2AC Consult NATO

4. NATO says no – they perceive it as falling outside of their mandate and EU members will blockSchmidt, Department of State European Bureau of Intelligence and Research Senior Analyst, 2006 [John" Last Alliance Standing?" Washington Quarterly 30.1]

If these trend lines are clear, the prospects for the future are not. U.S . ambitions for NATO clearly conflict with French ambitions for the EU. Furthermore, even though most EU NATO members find themselves caught in the middle, the current zero-sum nature of NATO-EU relations seems to portend continuing turmoil on the road ahead, to the detriment of both organizations and of transatlantic relations more generally . At the end of the day, the answer to how far Washington can take the alliance may depend as much on U.S. preferences as it does on how far the French and other NATO allies are prepared to have it go. Similarly, for the EU, the availability of resources, not just ambition, will have a profound effect on what kind of security and defense role the EU can play in the future. In considering the art of the possible, NATO and the EU are fundamentally different kinds of organizations. NATO is a defense alliance whereas the EU has the trappings of a supranational state. As part of a defense alliance, NATO members agree to defend each other in case of an attack, while EU members pledge to surrender various aspects of their national sovereignty across the full spectrum of governance, involving foreign and domestic issues. The EU's establishment of security and defense structures under the ESDP that putatively duplicate NATO structures is best seen as part of this broader process. In the realm of foreign affairs, the EU mandate extends well beyond that of NATO. The EU has given CSFP High Representative Javier Solana much more authority to pursue diplomatic initiatives on behalf of the EU than NATO has ever bestowed on a secretary general. The EU also routinely employs special representatives to act diplomatically on behalf of the organization, most prominently in Bosnia, where the EU high representative plays a critical role in national politics, something NATO has never done. Despite the recent rejection of the EU Constitution in two member states, which indefinitely stalled the latest attempt at further formal integration, it is reasonable to expect that the EU will continue to play an active, perhaps increasingly active, diplomatic role in world affairs. It is difficult to envision NATO taking on this kind of a role, at least to anywhere near the same extent. This is not simply a matter of French opposition but of U.S. preference. Expanding the range of political issues to be discussed at NATO, as de Hoop Scheffer has proposed, is one thing. Undertaking diplomatic initiatives under a NATO flag is quite another. This would require the United States to subordinate its diplomatic freedom of action [End Page 101] to political oversight by NATO, something it has never been willing to do, given the constraints this would place on U.S. flexibility, particularly on critical international issues such as the Middle East. Should the United States decide to pursue selected diplomatic initiatives through NATO nonetheless, prospects for success would be uncertain at best. Sympathetic EU members of NATO might be persuaded to go along, depending on the issue, while others might welcome the opportunity to constrain what they perceive to be unilateralist U.S. tendencies . Merkel's speech at Wehrkunde, for example, has a hint of the latter. The French and their allies, however, would probably reject the notion out of hand, motivated by what they would consider to be a direct threat to EU foreign policy prerogatives. The French are happy enough to work with the United States but seek to do so in the UN Security Council , the Group of Eight, or U.S.-EU forums, where their own influence can be maximized relative to the United States.

Prefer our evidence—South Korea isn’t NATO member—proves NATO would see it as outside its scope

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2AC Consult NATO

5. Do the plan and the CP— unconditionally doing the plan and non-binding consultation solves Daily Oklahoman - 6-12-2001

WITH his arrival in Spain this morning, President Bush begins a five-day trip to European countries, many of whose leaders are eager to lecture him on missile defense, global warming and - following the execution of Timothy McVeigh - the death penalty. We hope the president will listen politely but stay the course. The United States always should consult with its allies. But consultation doesn't mean conformity with a raft of liberal-to-socialist views now popular in a number of European capitals. "You can go through the motions of consulting as long as you don't ask and do tell," Kenneth Adelman, a veteran of the Reagan administration, told the New York Times. "You can ask opinions, but the fact is Europeans don't like change and Americans like change." Bush represents change - change from the arms-control dogma of the 1970s and '80s that remains gospel in Europe and change from reactionary environmentalism that mostly ignores the livelihoods of everyday people. We're not under any illusion that Bush can change minds while he visits Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Poland and Slovenia. But perhaps he can convince our friends that America's positions are principled and well-reasoned while dispelling the stereotype that the U.S. selfishly shoots from the hip. In fact, there's a fine line between the "unilateralism" of which the U.S. is accused by Europe and get-out-front leadership from which the world's lone remaining superpower should not shrink. Missile defense and global warming are excellent examples. Bush and his administration think mutually assured destruction as a deterrent to nuclear war is outdated and illogical. Mutual vulnerability to annihilation doesn't give terrorist or rogue states a moment's pause, nor does it leave options in the event of an accidental launch. This message Bush will deliver to Russia's Vladimir Putin near the end of the trip. On global warming, Bush accurately reflects the 97-0 sentiment of the U.S. Senate, which opposes the Kyoto treaty's unfair and unrealistic guidelines on the use of fossil fuels. The administration is working on rational responses to a warming planet, trying to determine the real effect of human activity. Bush wins if he can convince the Europeans to cool down their rhetoric until more is known. The president also wins if he can, on an overall level, help Europe understand who he is and how, in his governance, he will protect America and its sovereignty as a first course. Americans do care what Europeans think, but in the end they and their president must be prepared to lead even at the risk of ruffling some feathers along the way.

6. Normal means—relations double-bind – Either we consult NATO now and counterplan is normal means OR we don’t consult and no net-benefit. Any gain would collapses when we don’t consult on future issues like Iraq and Afghanistan

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2AC Consult NATO

7. Turn – one-shot consultation doesn’t solve and causes a backlash Crook, National Journal staff writer, 9/14/2002[Clive, “One Thing That Did Not Change: How the World Sees America," vol. 34, no. 37] Sometimes, admittedly, it is tempting to accommodate critics even when their thinking is wrong. In international relations, smoothing things over often seems best. But failing to say what you mean is usually a bad tactic. In the end, you get found out.President Clinton's support for the Kyoto accord on global warming was a much-praised instance of international cooperation. He took foreigners' concerns seriously. He backed the agreement , knowing it was unworkable and would never be implemented, to appease critics at home and abroad and to affirm his multilateralist outlook. Did the pretense serve America's longer-term interests? Just the opposite. In due course, when America stepped back from its commitments under the plan-as it was bound to do-it was reviled all the more furiously for reneging on its promises.

8. Delays – Consulting NATO results in long delaysGordon, Brookings US and Europe Center Director, 12/20/2005 [Phillip, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pgordon/emirates2006.htm]

One of the most serious challenges facing NATO concerns the internal consensus of an Alliance that now contains 26 members – stretching from Canada to Turkey, and Estonia to Italy – and which has a number of other potential members (Ukraine, Georgia and several Balkan states) waiting in the wings. Because of the sensitivity of military actions, NATO will always make its most important decisions by consensus, which means that any disagreements among the 26 members can block or severely delay action—as they have done repeatedly over the past several years. In that sense, missions such as peacekeeping in Afghanistan and earthquake relief in Pakistan may well be exceptions to the rule—and even those missions were (and remain) controversial.

AND—delays kill case solvency—now key to prevent solve Asia stability—North korea instability and aggression coming now—immediate action is necessary—that’s Bandow

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NATO Declining Now

NATO decline inevitable Carpenter ‘9. USA Today. Farmingdale. Vol. 138, Iss. 2774; pg. 26, A HOLLOW ALLIANCE 3 pgs

NATO once was a serious and capable military association with an important purpose. That no longer is the case, and there is little prospect that the process of decay can be reversed. NATO CELEBRATED its 60th birthday this past April. The prevailing view that the alliance is healthy and an essential political and security player in the 2 lsl century is reinforced by the apparent attitude of the new government of die North Atlantic Treaty Organization's leading power, the U.S. The Administration of George W. Bush often seemed to prefer a unilateral approach to foreign affairs. Pres. Barack Obama's foreign policy team repeatedly has emphasized its commitment to multilateralism in general and NATO in particular which helped Obama win the Nobel Peace Prize (albeit in dubious fashion) less than a year into his presidency. Moreover, during her confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed that Washington's policy should be one of "smart power," the meaning of which includes "strengthening die alliances that have stood the test of time, especially wilh our NATO partners and our allies in East Asia" However, the professed optimism on both sides of the Atlantic cannot conceal growing doubts about NATO's relevance to die policy challenges of the 21st century, and its ability to be an effective security mechanism. There are unmistakable signs of trouble in several areas: die weakness and vulnerability of new members and prospective new members: clumsy alliance policies that have created serious tensions with Russia: growing divisions within the burgeoning alliance over policy toward Russia: NATO's anemic performance in Afghanistan: and the alarming decline in the military capabilities of the alliance's core European members.

NATO decline happening nowHendrickson ‘7. Choice. MiddletownVol. 44, Iss. 7; pg. 1242, 1 pgs “NATO after 9/11: an alliance in continuing decline”

Rupp (Purdue Univ., Calumet) examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's evolution since the Cold War's end. Using an array of journalistic evidence, coupled with interviews with NATO officials, the author maintains that NATO is clearly in decline. While this military alliance will continue to survive, Rupp argues that its relevance in modern security affairs is increasingly in question. He points to a number of political factors to reach this conclusion, noting the wide military capabilities gap between the US and the rest of the allies, the unilateral tendencies of American foreign policy under President George W. Bush, the ongoing challenges in NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and the strong diplomatic differences between the US and Europe over Iraq. Much of Rupp's argument is based upon the general theme produced by Robert Kagan , who claims that the NATO allies share no perceived unifying threat to promote cooperative solutions. This book is well researched and provides much for NATO optimists to consider. Summing Up: Recommended Upper-division undergraduates through practitioners.-R. C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University

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Relations Resilient

No impact- The U.S. will maintain beneficial relations with key allies even if NATO collapsesMichael Gallagher, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Winter 2003 Houston Journal of International Law

NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The United States has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United States. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States-Europe security] partnership.”

U.S.-NATO ties resilient Powell, ‘3 (Colin Powell, “Powell Stresses Durability of Trans-Atlantic Alliance,” 5-7-2003)

Time and again for more than a decade, with great drama, pundits and analysts have predicted the demise of NATO, growing tensions between the Alliance and the European Union, and crises in the transatlantic relationships. Time and again, I've had to listen to charges of wither NATO. I have had to listen to people say, Well, the Warsaw Pact is over, it is gone. Why isn't NATO over and gone? I don t know how many former Soviet generals I have spoken to who kept saying to me, Well, Colin, since we no longer need an alliance, why do you need an alliance called NATO? And time and time again, they have not understood the reality at all. Time and time again, pundits have been wrong. What we have seen instead of the demise of NATO and other half-century old institutions, we are seeing them rapidly and successfully evolving and expanding and changing to meet profound geostrategic challenges. They have changed as the changes have come to them. We have gone through it all -- the collapse of Soviet communism, the consolidation of new democracies, and the chilling dawn of a post-September 11 world. Despite the dire prognostications, NATO shows absolutely no signs of shutting down. Why would it? Why should it? You don t close a club that people keep lining up to get in to. A few weeks ago, I warmly congratulated the European Union, when in Athens ten more countries signed their accession treaty for membership in the Union. And I know that tomorrow Javier will heartily greet the expected vote in the U.S. Senate for NATO's further enlargement seven more countries and Minister Geoana will be with us in Washington tomorrow and I hope can deliver that to you tomorrow, my friend.

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EU Defense Turn

Ending US participation will force NATO to restructure to defend EuropeBacevich, 10 (Andrew J. Bacevich, Ph.D., is a professor of international relations at Boston University, former director of its Center for International Relations, “Let Europe Be Europe: Why the United States Must Withdraw from NATO” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe?page=0,1)

If NATO has a future, it will find that future back where the alliance began: in Europe. NATO's founding mission of guaranteeing the security of European democracies has lost none of its relevance. Although the Soviet threat has vanished, Russia remains. And Russia, even if no longer a military superpower, does not exactly qualify as a status quo country. The Kremlin nurses grudges and complaints, not least of them stemming from NATO's own steady expansion eastward. So let NATO attend to this new (or residual) Russian problem. Present-day Europeans -- even Europeans with a pronounced aversion to war -- are fully capable of mounting the defenses necessary to deflect a much reduced Eastern threat. So why not have the citizens of France and Germany guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland and Lithuania, instead of fruitlessly demanding that Europeans take on responsibilities on the other side of the world that they can't and won't? Like Nixon setting out for Beijing, like Sadat flying to Jerusalem, like Reagan deciding that Gorbachev was cut from a different cloth, the United States should dare to do the unthinkable: allow NATO to devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs, upholding the safety and well-being of a Europe that is whole and free -- and more than able to manage its own affairs.

Lack of European orientation makes Balkan crisis and the collapse of NATO inevitableKober, 08 (Stanley Kober, Ph.D., is a research fellow in foreign policy at the Cato Institute “Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-608.pdf)

Would NATO members line up behind the United States in the face of this challenge? The answer is not clear, especially if violence breaks out in Kosovo. NATO is caught in the middle of a dilemma between the possibility of Albanian violence if independence is not granted, or Serbian violence if it is. It is questionable whether Serbia would meekly accept Kosovo’s independence. “If this plan happens, it will only give the Albanian terrorists a chance to finish the ethnic cleansing job against Serbs in Kosovo that has been going on for the past seven years,” Bishop Artemije, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, warned in Washington last February. “Serbia will react as any democratic country would do to the loss of its territory, and Serbs in Kosovo will react as any occupied people would do.”46 NATO, it should be remembered, is not the force it was in 1999; it is now heavily involved elsewhere. Would it be capable of handling renewed violence? Leaders may give assurances that the alliance can and would do so, but the major question concerns the willingness of the populations of the member states to become engaged in the Balkans once again. Already facing foreign challenges beyond what they expected, the outbreak of violence in the Balkans—in a conflict thought to be all but settled—could make them wonder about the competence of their leaders. If so, the prospects for effective action—indeed, for the future of the alliance itself—could be bleak.

Global nuclear warGlaser, 93 (Charles L. Glaser, Ph.D., is professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science “Why NATO is Still Best,” International Security Volume 18 No. 1)

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

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Russia Turn

Article V commitments to post-Soviet states makes war with Russia inevitableCarpenter, 09 (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf)

Taking on the obligation to defend the Baltic countries was especially unwise, because NATO now poses a direct geopolitical challenge to Russia right on Moscow’s doorstep. Relations between Russia and its small Baltic neighbors are testy, to put it mildly. At the moment, Russiamay be tooweak to challenge the U.S./NATO security commitment to those countries, but we cannot be certain that will always be true. The endorsement of NATO membership for Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance has nowentered the realmof farce.Themilitary capabilities of those two countries are minuscule. According to the 2009 edition of The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,Croatia’smilitary budget is a mere $962 million, and its military force consists of 18,600 active-duty personnel. Albania’s budget is $233million, and its force is 14,295. They will augment Estonia’s $425 million and 5,300 troops, Latvia’s $513million and 5,187 troops, Lithuania’s $500 million and 8,850 troops, and Slovenia’s $756 million and 7,200 troops. By not offering membership to Macedonia, though,NATO will have todowithout Skopje’s $163 million and 10,890 troops.5 Collectively, those countries spend less on their militaries inayear thantheUnitedStates spends in Iraq in twoweeks. The NewMembers Are Dangerous as Well as Useless Such new allies are not merely useless; they are potentially an embarrassment to the alliance, and possibly a serious danger. When Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed members would help “rejuvenate” NATO and rededicate the alliance “to the basic and fundamental values of freedom and democracy,” he showed how out of touch with reality U.S and NATO policy had become.6 Croatia is just a few years removed from the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman and continues to have frosty relations with neighboring Serbia. Albania is a close ally of the new, predominantlyAlbanian state of Kosovo, an entity whose independence both Serbia and Russia (as well as most other countries) do not recognize and vehemently oppose. Albania also is notorious for being under the influence of organized crime. Indeed, the Albanian mafia is legendary throughout Europe, controlling much of the gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking.7 Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, a policy that the Bush administration pushed and the Obama administration endorses, would be even worse than the previous rounds of expansion. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia’s relationship, of course, is even worse than that, as last summer’s warfare confirmed. Rational Americans should have breathed a sigh of relief thatGeorgiawas not aNATO member at the time the conflict erupted. Proponents of NATO’s enlargement eastward sometimes act as though the alliance is now merely a political honor society. Their underlying logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist democracies, they deserve to be members of the West’s most prominent club. But nearly all the newer members ofNATO, which are themost concerned about possible adverse security developments emanating from Russia, consider the alliance to bemore than a political body. They are counting on tangible protection from depredations by their large eastern neighbor. And, equally important, Moscow does not view the current incarnation of NATO as merely political in nature. The Georgian conflict should remind us That NATO is still officiallymuchmore than a political club. It remains a military alliance with extensive obligations—especially for the United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to assist in the defense of every member—no matter how small,how militarily or economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed thatmembermight be.8

Escalates to global nuclear warYesin, 07 (Colonel General Vladimir Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law. “Will America Fight Russia?;”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN July 2007)

Yesin: Should the Russian-American war begin, it will inevitably deteriorate into the Third World War. The United States is a NATO member and this bloc believes in collective security. In fact, collective security is what it is about. Vladimirov: This war will inevitably deteriorate into a nuclear conflict. Regardless of what weapons will be used in the first phase.

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Economy Turn

US withdrawal from the alliance is critical for economic reformsMARIAN L. TUPY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE PROJECT ON GLOBAL ECONOMIC LIBERTY AT THE CATO INSTITUTE, 2K3 (“NATO: AN ECONOMIC CASE FOR AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL.” HTTP://WWW.CATO.ORG/PUB_DISPLAY.PHP?PUB_ID=3094)

From a military perspective, the case for American withdrawal from NATO seems to have already been made. A number of commentators, including George Will and the British historian Paul Johnson, have pointed out that NATO is an anachronism rendered helpless by distrust and infighting. But there are also compelling economic grounds for American withdrawal. Simply, the American security guarantee perpetuates the continuation of the European welfare states and thus encourages economic sclerosis across the European continent. Thus NATO is not only useless, it's harmful. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw western military budgets shrink. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, between 1990 and 1999 the defense expenditure of all European NATO members decreased from 3 percent to 2.3 percent of GNP. American military spending fell from 5.3 percent to 3.1 percent of GNP over the same period. But spending as a proportion of GNP does not give an accurate picture of the underlying spending disparities. During the 1990s, the U.S. economy grew at a much quicker rate than the major economies of the European Union. Between 1992 and 2001, for example, the German economy grew by 1.45 percent per annum, on average, and the French economy by 1.88 percent. At the same time, the United States experienced an average growth of 3.46 percent per annum. As a result, despite the "decline" in military spending, U.S. military spending actually went up from $277 billion in 1995 to $283 billion in 1999. By contrast, the defense spending of all European members of NATO put together declined from $183 to $174 billion during that same period. The terrorist threat provided the impetus for an increase in American military spending to $380 billion in 2003. President Bush used the 2002 NATO summit to urge the Europeans to increase their military spending from the current 150 billion euros per annum. Only a month later, the German government actually slashed its spending by ordering fewer military transport aircraft and air-to-air missiles than originally planned. The technological gap between the United States and Europe in reconnaissance, communication, high-tech-weapons and mobility is thus bound to widen. According to Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board, the European militaries "atrophied to the point of virtual irrelevance." Yet there is no use complaining about European complacency. The Europeans behave in a rational manner. As long as the United States guarantees their security through NATO, the Europeans lack the incentive to invest more in their defense. Instead, they can use the money they save to preserve their inefficient welfare states. Even so, the budgets of some European states are stretched to the breaking point. According to the European Union Commission, the European economy is expected to grow only 1 percent in 2003. Because of a possible contraction of the European economy in the first quarter of 2003, that estimate may have to be adjusted downward. As a result of economic slowdown, a number of European countries, including Germany and France, have now breached the European "growth and stability pact" that limits their annual budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP. French President Jacques Chirac's insinuation that France's economic problems may have been caused by the American war against Saddam Hussein is a preposterous attempt to shift blame. In fact, France and Germany are beset by deep structural problems, including rigid labor markets, restrictive regulations, hurtful environment and safety standards, high taxes and large unfunded pension liabilities. But neither Germany's Schroeder nor France's Chirac exhibit the leadership qualities necessary to pull their countries out of economic malaise. The two built their careers on populism. They do not possess the reformist zeal exhibited by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain in the 1980s. They are thus relegated to tinkering with the margins of their welfare states. The longer those trivial changes continue, the further will the European states fall behind the United States. An American withdrawal from the European security guarantee would galvanize serious economic reform. Instead of remaining defenseless, the European states would find it necessary to raise more revenue by cutting the size of the welfare state and increasing their economic growth. A vibrant Europe with a strong economy and a credible military force could then contribute to making the world more prosperous -- and safe. Whether that will happen is up to Washington.

Economic collapse leads to extinctionMead 92 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer, p. 30)

The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.

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Heg Turn

Nato hurts us powerCHRISTOPHER LAYNE, VISITING FELLOW AT THE FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES AT THE CATO INSTITUTE, 2K1 (“DEATH KNELL FOR NATO? THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY,” CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 394, APRIL 4. HTTP://WWW.CATO.ORG/PUBS/ PAS/PA394.PDF)

No doubt, self-styled Atlanticists within the administration, and in the broader foreign policy community, will argue that NATO is as important as ever. But that is not true. After the Cold War, it became fashionable in some strategic circles to argue that NATO had to “go out of area or out of business.” In fact, the alliance does not add to U.S. capabilities outside Europe, and never has. Since the Korean War, with the partial exception of the Persian Gulf War, NATO and the Western European allies have either opposed, or refrained from supporting, U.S. strategy and military interventions outside Europe. Although some individual U.S. allies might come to Washington’s assistance in a future crisis in the Middle East or East Asia (as Britain and France did, for example, in the Gulf War), NATO as an institution almost certainly would not. In fact, far from augmenting America’s grand strategic posture, in important ways NATO has become a yoke that limits U.S. options. The European allies are attempting to use the alliance to constrain the United States’ taking strategic initiatives that Washington believes further U.S. strategic interests but the Europeans find inimical to their perceived interests. European opposition to American plans to deploy a national missile defense system is a case in point. Given the divergent strategic outlooks of the United States and Western Europe, Washington can expect similar European opposition in the future to American strategy in East Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The time has come for the United States to withdraw from Europe militarily and to let the Europeans take care of the Balkans and similar parochial matters while the United States directs its attention to maintaining its global geopolitical interests outside Europe. Implicitly, some Bush administration policymakers recognize the need for restructuring the U.S.-European relationship.4 4 If the administration accepts ESDP and the RRF as legitimate expressions of European autonomy —and thereby acknowledges NATO’s diminishing relevance—it no doubt will be subject to accusations that it is “isolationist.” The fear of such criticism—which truly is a canard—should not unduly trouble the administration, because it is easily rebutted

The impact is global nuclear warKhalilzad ‘95(Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, p. 84)

Global LeadershipUnder the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange . U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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***NEG UPDATES***

Japan CP Text

CP Text: The United States federal government should pass the Military Environmental Act. The United States federal government should relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station to Camp Schwab on Okinawa as per the United States-Japan Realignment Agreement of 2006.

The Military Environmental Responsibility Act requires the military to adhere to the same Federal and State environmental laws as private agents, regardless of location. This solves the entirety of their Biodiversity advantage

H.R.2154 Military Environmental Responsibility Act. Sponsor: Rep Filner, Rob [CA-50] (introduced 6/13/2001) Referred to the Subcommitee on Military Readiness.

Military Environmental Responsibility Act - Requires the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related agencies (the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Naval Nuclear Reactors, and any others as designated by the President) to fully comply with designated Federal and State environmental laws, including those related to public health and safety, to the same extent as any other entities subject to such laws. Waives any immunity of the United States with respect to such laws as applied to DOD and any defense-related agency. Provides for administrative enforcement actions. Requires the Secretary of Defense , for each weapon system for which congressional budget justification is required, to ensure that all development and procurement decisions comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Repeals: (1) a Federal provision prohibiting the use of certain military appropriation accounts for the payment of fines and penalties for environmental noncompliance; and (2) a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 which prohibits the use of defense funds to conduct treatment, storage, or disposal activities at sites designated under the Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program.

46


START Uniqueness

START passage now with key Republican support- but it must avoid partisan politicsJames Kitfield, July 19, 2010, “Lugar Calls for Passage of "New START"”, National Journal, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100719_3083.php

NJ: Do you believe that the New START pact will win the two-thirds majority needed for passage in the Senate? Lugar: I think its prospects are good. The Foreign Relations Committee is likely to have the last of the New START hearings soon, and all of the relevant intelligence information is now available to senators and their staffs. Senator John Kerry has indicated he hopes to move the treaty out of committee in this four-week session, and then it's up to [Majority Leader Harry] Reid (D-Nev.) to schedule a floor vote in the post-Labor Day period. That's not a slam dunk, however, because there will be a lot of pressure on Senator Reid to wind things up so members can go home to defend their seats in the November elections. So it will depend on his priorities. NJ: Do you worry that New START will be caught up in the partisan currents of an election season? Lugar: Well, I have some concerns. I'm about to go to a Republican lunch where I fully expect to hear for an hour and a half how everything the administration proposes might be blocked. If you're a Republican leader, that makes this a difficult task. There are some in our caucus who just don't trust the Russians, and others who believe that every day that goes by before the election with nothing happening is a victory, but I'm not one of them. Even though these are partisan times, there are also a good many Republicans who really don't want to pick a fight on this treaty. NJ: So you predict passage? Lugar: Yes, I think it will pass. I go back to my basic theme. I admire the Obama administration for taking this complex issue on, and it has offered a modest treaty that sets the stage for an ongoing relationship with the Russians that will allow us to work together on issues of common interest. That may prove especially important as we move forward in confronting the issue of Iran's suspected nuclear program.

START passage now- Lugar and Obama’s push is key James Kitfield, July 19, 2010, “Lugar Calls for Passage of "New START"”, National Journal, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100719_3083.php

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), shown last month, urged fellow lawmakers to support ratification of a pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. So wrote Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) in the opening to his 1988 book, "Letters to the Next President." Twenty-two years later, the warning from the venerable foreign-affairs expert has rarely seemed more apt. Even while the United States remains mired in two wars and the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, Barack Obama's signature nuclear nonproliferation initiative enters a crucial phase as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepares to vote on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, dubbed "New START," with Russia. As the ranking Republican on the committee and a respected arms control voice in the Senate, Lugar is doing his part to help the Obama administration capture the elusive, bipartisan center where the 67 votes needed for passage reside. National Journal Staff Correspondent James Kitfield recently spoke with Lugar about New START. Edited excerpts from that interview follow (see GSN, July 16). .

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START Uniqueness—AT: Spies

Start will pass – Spy scandel is a moot point

Katrina vanden Heuvel, editor of “The Nation” and publisher, 7/13/2010, “Resetting Spy Scandals,” http://www.thenation.com/blog/37377/resetting-spy-scandals

The cold war just isn’t what it used to be. More Spies Like Us than The Spy Who Loved Me, last week’s Russian-American espionage exchange had all the makings of a chilling Glienicke Bridge spy swap—until it didn’t. At least in John Landis’s comedy, Chevy Chase and Dan Aykroyd were actually able to do some good with their limited training and avert Armageddon. In contrast, the ten Russian spies, now duly deported, have been ridiculed both in Russia and in the United States for engaging in breathlessly surreptitious ineptitude. Charles McCarry drolly summed up the public’s evaluation of the story in a New York Times op-ed on Friday, writing, “These Russian spies were so inept that they weren’t even charged with spying. Instead, they were given a good talking-to and, in effect, released into the custody of their guardians. Being forbidden to go on pretending that they were Americans was punishment enough.” Times television critic Alessandra Stanley compared the Russians to the spies in another Dan Aykroyd vehicle, Coneheads. And in noting all of the pertinent, homeland-security details, the New York Post labeled superspy Anna Chapman as “sexy,” a “femme fatale” and a “vixen,” taking care to let readers know that while in court, “her sexy figure [was] hidden by her baggy beige jumpsuit.”So what’s really going on here? Perhaps the most meaningful result of the scandal is that both short- and long-term repercussions seem quite minuscule. This isn’t a Gary Powers situation , and not even a flurry of vulgar, Khrushchev-style Ukrainian folk proverbs can drape the fear and loathing of 1960 around Anna Chapman’s sexy figure. Mitt Romney’s and Senator Jon Kyl’s paranoiac The-Russians-Are-Coming hysteria notwithstanding, Obama’s and Medvedev’s New START Treaty still enjoys the bipartisan support of Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). And as Jacob Heilbrunn pointed out in the Los Angeles Times , “GOP foreign policy eminences such as Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz and Richard Burt endorse the treaty.” Provided that the Senate’s schedule cooperates, it’s likely that the treaty will be ratified this summer or fall.

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http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-heilbrunn-start-20100712,0,224364.story

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-heilbrunn-start-20100712,0,224364.story

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/u2.htm

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/international/the_russian_swap_stakes_PHNPkscc24EBBbu75rqc8M

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/arts/television/13covert.html?_r=1&emc=eta1

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/opinion/11mccarry.html?ref=russian_spy_ring_2010

http://www.glienicke-bridge.com/pageID_1283824.html

http://drush76.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/spywho.jpg

http://the4thstar.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/spies_like_us_v1.jpg

Documents

2AC File - Amazon Web Servicesopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files… · Web viewDr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of