March 10, 2013

Honorable Richard M. BermanU.S. District Judge, U.S. District Court (SDNY) Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 12 New York, NY 10007

Subject:United States v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, et al; (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB)

Reference: February 27, 2013 Court Conference & Transcript, The NYCDCC and Wall & Ceiling joint submission of Proposed Order for 100% Full Mobility, & Document 1231

Dear Judge Berman:

The February 27, 2013 “Proposed Order” on Job Rules and Anti-Corruption Compliance Procedures under Collective Bargaining Agreement, as drafted by the NYCDCC in-house counsel Murphy, in concert with the UBCJA International’s oversight, and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. is a smokescreen which by design is for the express purpose of steering the Court away from multiple violations of local, State & Federal laws, long settled NLRB Board precedent, Appellate Court & United States Supreme Court precedent via the stick & carrot approach for contract negotiations for new Multi-Employer Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA’S.)

The stick is – give us 100% Full Mobility or we shall refuse to bargain to impasse as required by long settled law; the carrot being proffered raises which shall never be seen as explained herein. Implementation of the Electronic Scanning Device and Compliance program for tracking Man-Hours reported to the Benefit Funds is the smokescreen which, by design is to distract the Court from material matters relevant to an actual negotiation with the requisite hard bargaining element.

The UBCJA International, District Council and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. and all other multi-employer Contractor Associations and their respective counsel of record and former Judge Conboy should be well versed in the labor laws, NLRB, Appellate Court & Supreme Court precedent, yet none have any intention of observing, acknowledging or complying with the requisite precedent of the aforementioned bodies of law.

The United States Attorney’s Office and the Review Officer although having direct standing to preserve and defend rank and file member rights seem incapable of applying settled law and precedent to the instant matter; therefore, we respectfully request via motion the court approve our request for standing so that we may address this court with respect to contract negotiations. This issue effects us every bit as much as the Bilello motion previously approved by the court with respect to elections and since our request is specifically limited, we pray you approve it.

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We respectfully request the Court issue an order which bans implementation of the Right to Work State 100% Full Mobility laws within the defined geographical jurisdictional boundaries of the Local Unions of the New York City District Council of Carpenters, as was proposed by in-house District Counsel Murphy and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., dated February 27, 2013.

We respectfully request the Court review and approve our proposed Order as related to the now near two year old failed contract negotiations for successor agreements to the CBA’s and that it apply it to all multi-employer Contractor associations under contract with the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters.

Respectfully,

Demian Schroeder

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GENERAL INDEX

COVER LETTER……………………………………….. 2-pages

TABLE of CASES………………………………………...2-pages

TABLE of STATUTES…………………………………...2-pages

ATTACHMENT “A”……………………………………..6-pagesTranscript excerpt, 2-27-13 100% Full Mobility

ATTACHMENT “B”……………………………………29-pages

PROPOSED ORDER…………………………………...5-pages

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TABLE of CASESU.S. v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of the UBCJA (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB) 3-10-13

167 NLRB No. 58, 9-15-67……………………………………………………………………………………pg. 18

226 NLRB No. 65, 10-18-76…………………………………………………………………………………...pg.18

288 NLRB No. 31, Garlock Equipment Company and District Lodge No. 77, IAMA………………..pg. 19

949 F.2d 199: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Debs, Defendant-appellant United States Court……………………………………………………………………………………………………………pg. 23

992 F.2d. 1418 (1993) UBCJA Dresden Local No. 267 v. UBCJA International and Sigurd Lucassen (92-3746) at 42…………………………………………………………………………………………………pg. 7

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935……………… pg. 16, 18, 20, 27

Andrew Kevin Price v. Carpenters District Council, U.S.D.C. SD Illinois (2011), case no.10-cv-0741 MJR-PMF……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pg. 22

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra at 285 U. S. 407……………………………………………...pg. 17

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986)…………………………pg. 3, 20, 22, 27

Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 36, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)…………………………………………………………………………pg. 24, 28

Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000………………………………pg. 22

Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 , 260 S., 43 S.Ct. 83……………………………….pg. 17

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 309 U. S. 119 (1940………………………………………………... pg. 7

J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944)……………………………………………………………………………pg 1, 21

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979)………………………………………………………….pg. 6

Mastro, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)……………………………………….pg. 2

NLRB Brief, DC Circuit Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2011, Nos. 10-1300, 10-1301, 10-1353, 10-1355………………………………………………………………………………………………………………pg. 22

NLRB Mountain Pacific, page 89…………………………………………………………………………….. pg. 9

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NLRB No. 354-122, Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, (2009)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………pg. 22

NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986)…………………………..pg. 20

NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)……………………………………….. pg. 10

NLRB V. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 308 US 241 (1939)………………………….. pg. 19

NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938)………………………………………………………………………………….. pg. 24

Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935)………………………. pg. 3, 20, 22, 27

Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976)………………………………………………….pg. 9, 17

Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985)………………………………………………………………pg. 22

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 US 808……………………………………………………………………………… pg. 8

Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969)…………………………………………………………………..pg. 21

Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964)………………………….pg. 4, 21

Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co. 323 US 192 (1944)…………………………………………………………….pg. 1

Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972)……………………………………………………………………… pg. 21

United States of America v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969)…………………………..pg. 11, 23, 25

United  States  v.  Santoni,  585  F.2d  667,  673  (4th  Cir.1978),  Ct. of Appeals, Sixth Circuit……………pg. 23

Virginia Power & Electric Co. 319 U.S. 533 (1939)………………………………………………………..pg. 1

United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978 …………………………………………..............................................................................................pg. 25

United States v. Gotti 459 F. 3d. 296 (2d Cir. 2006 …………………………………………………………………....................................................................pg. 28

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STATUTES/LAW/PRECEDENT VIOLATED

NLRA Sec. 8 (b) (1) - Rule invades, frustrates or impairs U.S. Policy of Labor Laws Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969)

L.M.R.A. 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. 151 - Mastro, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)Full freedom of association, self organization

L.M.R.A. 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b) - Mastro 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)

L.M.R.A. Taft-Hartley Act Section 8(a)(3) - Closed Shop Agreements illegal/ Taft-Hartley (1047), Pattern Makers v. NLRB 473 U.S. 95 (1985)

29 U.S.C. 158 (b)(1)(A) - Internal Union Rule, requiring Exhaustion NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968),

NLRA Section 158 (d) - Obligation to bargain collectively

29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a)(1) – NLRA, unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1).

NLRA Section 14(b) - Pre-emption RTW laws

NLRA Sec. 9(a) – Authorization cards, proof, failure to hold representation election

NLRA § 14(b) - Does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws.

Sec. 302 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 462) – Imposition of Trusteeships, 167 NLRB No. 58, 9-15-67 “In sum, we find the constitutional powers permit only a limited entry into local bargaining activity, and that the Local constitutes the initiating and pervasive force in dealing with employers.”

NLRA 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.” - 226 NLRB No. 65, 10-18-76 Domination by Employer.” The statute forbids all employer interference or domination whether benevolent or malevolent, NLRB V. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 308 US 241 (1939).”

NLRA Sec. 9(a) - 288 NLRB No. 31, Garlock Equipment Company and District Lodge No. 77, IAMAW, Pre-Affiliation Autonomy, Veto Power by International w/o conducting mandatory Representation Election or proving Majority by signed Authorization Cards

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National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158(5); 29 U.S.C.A. 157 Sec. 8(1) of the Act. - J.I. Case, 321 US 332 (1944) – requiring Employers-Workers to sign illegal individual contract

Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) - finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list.

The Association of Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. and The District Council of New York City & Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO

Article XXIII – Hardship and Advisory Committee & Grievance Procedure, Sec 4(c): pg. 46/71

It is the intent of the parties hereto that all disputes between them, both within and outside the Agreement shall be submitted to arbitration and that no defense to prevent the holding of the arbitration shall be permitted.

This Union Rule & Contract requirement impairs the policies imbedded in the labor laws for the filing of charges with the NLRB under the NLRA (1935) & thus violates & See Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), RE: Supreme Court precedent, Exhaustion Doctrine

NLRA Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).

MWA ARBITRATION: Violations of Public Policy, N.L.R.A. Sections:Reference: NLRB Brief, DC Circuit Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2011

Nos. 10-1300, 10-1301, 10-1353, 10-1355UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITE.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY v. NLRB

NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) – By Implementing Unilateral changes to Employee/Worker Wages, Benefits, Terms & Conditions of Employment, the MWA Contractor Association, notwithstanding the Arbitration clause/suit violated NLRA for:

29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) – Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining NLRA Section 8(d) – Failure to Bargain in Good Faith NLRA Section 8(a)(5) – Refusal to Bargain

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ATTACHMENT 'A' Transcript excerpt 2-27-13

11 THE COURT: Before we get to that, I would still like 12 to know a little bit more about the status of the other 13 contracts and where they are in the scheme of negotiation. 14 There were four or five all together?15 MR. MURPHY: Yes. There's a tentative agreement, the 16 details of which have been posted on the district council's web 17 site, with the building contractors association, which is a 18 large association with some overlap of membership with Wall 19 Ceiling. But there's a number of fairly large general 20 contractors that are members of the building contractors 21 association. They would provide, as I understand it, for the 22 same full mobility. Instead of being a contract -- it would 23 only be a three-year contract, because they have issues I think 24 internally, that association, between the smaller members and 25 their larger general contractor members. They're ongoing

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.(212) 805-0300 Pg. 14 14D2RTUSAC 1 negotiations. My office is not involved with them. They 2 negotiate without counsel with the general contractor's 3 association, including dock building, heavy highway 4 construction, and the like. 5 I understand they're fairly close do reaching an 6 agreement. We are, to be honest, at loggerheads with the 7 cement league over a lot of what provisions have been agreed 8 to, but there is not an impasse but there's a spirited 9 disagreement on the issue of market recovery rates with them. 10 And given all these negotiations, the negotiations for the 11 floor covers association has been on hold, and we have not met 12 with them except, I understand, informal contacts with them for 13 a number of months now. 14 THE COURT: Does that mean, with respect to the – 15 other than the Wall Ceiling contract, relations continue under 16 the existing -- whatever the existing agreement until such time 17 as there is a subsequent agreement?18 MR. MURPHY: Yes, most of those agreements expired by 19 their terms on June 30, 2011. And there's been a series of 20 continuation agreements where the money contributions are made 21 into the funds and everything is held in place as negotiations 22 continue. So there's been no disruptions of work or anything 23 like that. 24 THE COURT: So why don't you just spend a minute on 25 the issue of full mobility, what it was, for the record, and

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.(212) 805-0300 Pg. 15 15D2RTUSAC

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1 what it is now in this proposed agreement.2 MR. MURPHY: Well, what it was under the Court's 2009 3 order is that at least 33 percent of the hires for a job had to 4 come from the district council's out-of-work list, stated 5 clearly. Now with this change, no one will have to come from 6 the out-of-work list except for the certified shop steward, and 7 that's on obvious anti-corruption effort that the union is 8 insisting upon, and the association didn't have a problem with 9 that. 10 THE COURT: And the 33 percent was a negotiated figure 11 as opposed to 40 percent or 60 percent or some other number?12 MR. MURPHY: It was, as I understand -- it was before 13 my time -- it was semi negotiated, and it was imposed by Judge 14 Haight in his order of May 26, I believe it was, 2009. 15 THE COURT: How did he know to pick 33 percent versus 16 some other percent? It must have been a recommendation.17 MR. MURPHY: There were negotiations and new contracts 18 entered into in the early 2000s without, as at least as I read 19 the record, the knowledge or the approval of the government, 20 and so the government brought a contempt proceeding because it 21 believed -- as it turned out from the Second Circuit, it was 22 correct -- that it was a violation of consent decree. Judge 23 Haight disagreed, the government appealed to the Second 24 Circuit, the Second Circuit agreed with the government, and it 25 was remanded back to Judge Haight, and he issued a final order

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.(212) 805-0300 Pg. 16 16D2RTUSAC 1 in 2009 of judgment of contempt. 2 THE COURT: Which includes now the 33 percent?3 MR. TORRANCE: Yes, your Honor, Ben Torrance for the 4 government. It was a litigated matter. As I recall it, Judge 5 Haight essentially reached a compromise as his contempt remedy 6 exercising the equitable power of court instead of 50/50 or 7 100 percent, he came to 67 percent.

Movants note for the record: pg. 9-11 excerpt, July 1, 2011 Response to Restructuring Plan previously submitted to the Court regarding the above Transcript:

On March 1, 2011, the attorneys representing the NYCDCC, DeCarlo, Connor & Shanley, via letter, sought an opinion from the Court to allow “interested parties, e.g. parties to the collective bargaining agreement in question, the Consent Decree, and other interested parties, the opportunity to make submissions to the Court regarding their position on this issue, and have the Court issue a ruling that would clarify the matter.”

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The reference was made to the “Final Order and Judgment of Contempt and Remedy” (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 with respect to the 67% - 33% Request System for Hiring Workers and Employees from the NYCDCC Out of Work List (OWL).

On April 1, 2011, via letter, DeCarlo, Connor & Shanley stated “The District Council wishes to explore with the Association of Wall-Ceiling and Carpenter Industries of New York, Inc. (“Association”) a resolution of the issue that is acceptable to all parties and in accordance with the Order. Thus, the District Council does not wish to burden the Court at this time with this issue.” Brian F. Quinn subsequently withdrew the request prior to the April 6 th Conferencing session.

On May 26, 2011, 10-days after pro-se Movants filed the motion for relief, the UBCJA International and the NYCDCC published a 138-page Restructuring Plan, wherein their new position to avoid compliance with the Court Order dated May 26, 2009 regarding the 67% - 33% mandate for hiring from the OWL would be replaced by the UBCJA & the Wall & Ceiling Association simply eliminating the 50-50 Rule and the 67%-33% May 26, 2009 Court Order altogether.

This “position” does not make law. Moreover, said position is an express violation of the Consent Decree and the Court Order and is a Unilateral Change to both the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Consent Decree, as per NLRB v. Katz, 369 US 736 (1962); and, as such is a prima-facie violation of NLRA Sec. 8(a)(5).

The UBC statements regarding establishment of a Labor-Management Corporation are patently false, as one already exists, and members are already taxed and assessed for these services.

Moreover, their commentary that “and Wall & Ceiling and other employers’ willingness to participate may well hinge on the elimination of the so-called 50-50 rule” (Latham & Watkins letter at pg. 5) have no basis in fact or law. It is what they stated in their March 16, 2011 letter, nothing more than a “position”.

Painting it as a critical issue with the notation that UBC General President Douglas McCarron will seek a meeting with Review Officer Dennis Walsh and Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin Torrance within the next ten days to do so”, lends no more credence to their position. Ref: UBC at 5, Latham & Watkins 5-26-11 letter.

Movants request the Court issue an Order to Show cause, per standard Court Motion Practice and force the UBCJA International and the NYCDCC and their attorneys to bring the issues they wish to discuss directly to the Court. Movants further request a per-

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manent Injunction restraining the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC from any further attempts to back-door their desire to re-write the Consent Decree terms and conditions to suit their own agenda, and that of what has proved to be a corrupt Contractor association via informal Conferencing procedures and relaxed Court Rules.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which decision issued February 20, 2007 made it amply clear at 9, pg. 7 “The Consent Decree is clear and unambiguous. King , 65 F. 3d. at 1058. The Consent Decree addresses CBA’s in two places: Paragraph 4(f)(1)(b) and Job Referral Rule 5(B). However, neither empowers the Union to circumvent the Consent Decree through a CBA.”

At 14, pg 8, the Court of Appeals stated “Rule 5(B) does not permit the Union to make unlimited changes to the Job Referral Rules in a CBA. This is particularly true when Job Referral Rule 5(B) is read in conjunction with Consent Decree Paragraph 11, which again, provide that “[t}o the extent that this Consent Decree conflicts with any current or future rights, privileges or rules applicable to the District Council or its membership, the District Council…hereby waives compliance with any such right, privilege or rule an agrees that it and its membership will act in accordance with this Consent Decree.”

At 21, pg. 8, the Court of Appeals stated “Paragraph 11 further requires the Union to make the Job Referral Rules part of the District Council By-Laws.”

Movants note that the UBCJA International, the District Council and its attorneys of re - cord have failed to abide by this specific requirement and include the Job Referral Rules part of the District Council By-Laws as ordered by the Court. Ref: Exhibit “C”, pg. 94-125 of Latham & Watkins May 26, 2011 138-page Restructuring Plan – Status Update.

We note for the record that the predicate behind the August 5, 2009 grand jury indictment, arrest, trial and convictions of Forde, Greaney, Oliveri & others was Contractor initiated and sponsored fraud, corruption and payment of kick-backs as specifically related to the Out of Work List (OWL) Hiring Hall rules.

The D.C. & Contractor Associations were charged with contempt for violating the 50%-50% court ordered hiring. As a reward for their ‘contempt’ Judge Haight inexplicably increased the ra-tio of Contractor Hires for 50% to 67%. As a direct result of that ill fated decision & Order dated May 26, 2009, the corruption did not decrease – rather, it accelerated and increased and led dir-ectly to the subsequent indictments, trials & convictions.

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Now, as of this date, counselor Murphy of the D.C. and the Contractor Association seek a further reward, to increase the Contractor control of all Hiring to 100%, less a shop steward in direct contravention to plain old common sense; and, more importantly in violation of the NLRA (1935), Taft-Hartley (1947), the LMRDA (1959) and long settled NLRB Board precedent, Ap-pellate Court & United States Supreme Court precedent decisions and orders. The rationale & nexus behind their request and failed logic cannot stand.

A case in point is noted in the excerpt below:

ARGO STEEL 122 NLRB 1077 January 27, 1959

The General Counsel has requested application of the Brown-Olds 14 remedy to expunge the effect of the illegal closed-shop conditions of employment. It is now more than 10 years since Congress enacted a statute outlawing certain union- security provisions, particularly the closed shop. Notwithstanding the statutory prohibition, the Respondents as late as 1956 entered into a contract which incorporates working rules of the union which have the plain effect of retaining unlawful closed shop conditions of employment.

This is not the result of a mere technical oversight to the making of an otherwise lawful-union security contract.l5 Rather it seems to reflect a policy of deliberately ignoring and flouting the statutory prohibition. By enforcing closed-shop conditions of employment, the Respondents have inevitably coerced employees to pay the dues, fees, and assessments necessary to achieve and retain membership in the Respondent Union or to receive a permit entitling them to work within the Union's jurisdiction. At this late date it will not effectuate the policies of the Act merely to require the Respondents to cease and desist from their unfair labor practices. In order adequately to remedy the unfair labor practices found, and to encourage compliance with the Act in the future, the Respondents should be required to reimburse employees of the Respondent Company for any dues, fees, assessments, or other moneys that were unlawfully exacted from them as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment with the Company. Accordingly, we shall order the Respondents jointly and severally to refund to all employees of the Respondent Company the initiation fees, permit fees, assessments, dues, and other moneys paid by them as the price of their employment.ls The liability of the Respondents for reimbursement shall include the period beginning 6 months prior to the filing and service of the amended charges herein and shall extend to all such moneys thereafter collected, ex-13 For the reasons set forth by the Trial Examiner, we reject the contention of the Respondents that the terminal date for computing back pay should be August 2, when Worley obtained a letter from Acorn Iron Works saying he was not indebted to it. 14 United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry-(J. S. Brown-E. F. Olds Plumbing & Heating Corporation), 115 NLRB 594, 597--602. 15 Philadelphia Woodwork Company, 121 NLRB 1642. 1e N.L.R.B. v. Broderick Wood Products Company,

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261 F. 2d 548 (C.A. 10); Los Angeles- Seattle Motor Express, Incorporated, 121 NLRB 1629. ARGO STEEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 1085 empting the period between the date of the Intermediate Report and the date of this Order, as the Trial Examiner found that the 1956 contract was not invalid either in language or in application.17

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSION OF LAW

By maintaining and enforcing an agreement, understanding or practice whereby membership in or clearance from the Respondent Union is required as a condition of employment, and by granting travel allowances to employees referred through the Respondent Union Which are not granted to employees obtained from other sources, and by requiring employees or applicants for employment to pay dues, initiation fees, assessments, permit fees, or other moneys to the Respondent Union in order to obtain and retain employment, the Respondent Company has violated Section 8(a) (I) and (3) and the Respondent Union Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act.

In closing, we note:

The NYCDCC & WALL-CEILING proposed Order for 100% Full Mobility and their 2-year demand for same reflects the exact same policy – “of deliberately ignoring and flouting the statutory prohibition”, requires “membership in and clearance from” the NYCDCC as a condition of employment and requires employees or applicants for employment to pay dues, initiation fees, assessments, permit fees to the NYCDCC in order to obtain and retain employment.

The NYCDCC & WALL-CEILING are attempting to set up the closed shop scenario specifically outlawed by Congress’s passage of TAFT-HARTLERY in 1947. Without becoming exhaustive or reviewing the entire legislative history of that Act, suffice it to say that the current proposed Order by the aforementioned parties should be summarily rejected by this Court.

You cannot be the exclusive representative as stated within their contract proposal, take the dues, assessments, initiation fees, surcharges and/or other monies and then refuse to represent 40% of the members who rely upon the OWL hiring/referral hall for their only source of employment opportunity as it disenfranchises them and is discriminatorily applied and against the tenets of known/settled law.

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ATTACHMENT 'B'

In Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co. 323 US 192 (1944), the Supreme Court stated: “The purpose of providing for a representative is to secure those benefits for those who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of the benefits of collective bargaining for the advantage of the representative or those members of the craft who selected it.”….“The representative which thus discriminates may be en-joined from so doing, and its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action”….In both cases the right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's conduct. 'The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nev-ertheless to be derived from it and the federal policy which it has adopted.' Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200 , 201 S., 60 S.Ct. 480, 485; Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 , 60 S.Ct. 285; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 , 177 S., 63 S.Ct. 172, 173, 174; cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 , 63 S.Ct. 573. So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire member-ship of the craft.

In J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944) the Supreme Court stated…..“Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to ex-clude the contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement….'The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.' National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 364 , 60 S.Ct. 569, 577. Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. [321 U.S. 332, 338] It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement.

As such, and as the United States Supreme Court noted in Virginia Power & Electric Co. 319 U.S. 533 (1939) under a separate issue, but under the same legal theory – “it is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can be fairly said to effectuate policies of the act”.

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In Scofield v. NLRB, the Supreme Court stated: [409 U.S. 213, 216] 394 U.S. 423, 429 , that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating 8 (b) (1)." On the facts, we held that Scofield, where fines were imposed on members by the union, fell within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers. But we drew the line between permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows: ". . . 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., at 430. Under 7 of the Act the employees have "the right to refrain from any or all" concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those concerted activities.

In Mastro, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)

The Supreme Court stated: “A similar dual purpose is emphasized as follows in 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they [350 U.S. 270, 280] have occurred by encouraging the practice and pro-cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. 151. See also, the declaration of policy in 1 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b). The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon as-surance of "full freedom of association." Only after that is assured can the parties turn to effective negoti-ation as a means of maintaining "the normal flow of commerce and . . . the full production of articles and commodities . . . ." 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b).

However in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622-623; Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216 , and United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 542 -543.

In Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) the Supreme Court at III stated: Closed shop agree-ments, legalized by the Wagner Act in 1935, 15 became quite common in the early 1940's. Under these agreements, employers could hire and retain in their employ only union members in good standing. R. Gorman, [473 U.S. 95, 106] Labor Law, ch. 28, 1, p. 639 (1976). Full union membership was thus com-pulsory in a closed shop; in order to keep their jobs, employees were required to attend union meetings, support union leaders, and otherwise adhere to union rules. Because of mounting objections to the closed shop, in 1947 - after hearings and full consideration - Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.

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Section 8(a)(3) of that Act effectively eliminated compulsory union membership by outlawing the closed shop. The union security agreements permitted by 8(a)(3) require employees to pay dues, but an employee cannot be discharged for failing to abide by union rules or policies with which he disagrees. 16 Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment. If a new employee refuses formally to join a union and subject himself to its discipline, he cannot be fired. Moreover, no employee can be discharged if he initially joins a union, and subsequently resigns. We think it noteworthy that 8(a)(3) protects the employment rights of the dissatisfied member, as well as those of the worker who never assumed full union membership. By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union.

The Court's decision in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under the common law of associations, run afoul of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 26 There the union expelled [473 U.S. 95, 114] a member who failed to comply with a rule re-quiring the "exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union." Id., at 421. Under the common law, associations may require their members to exhaust all internal remedies. See, e. g., Medical Soc. of Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944). Nevertheless, the Marine Workers Court held that "considerations of public policy" mandated a holding that the union rule requiring exhaustion violated 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). 391 U.S., at 424 ; see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 430 (union rule is invalid un-der 8(b)(1)(A) if it "impairs [a] policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws").

The “100% Full Mobility” proposed order by THE ASSOCIATION OF WALL-CEILING & CAR-PENTRY INDUSTRIES OF NEW YORK, INC. and THE DISTRICT COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY & VICINITY OF THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPNETERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, July 1, 2011 – June 30, 2016 dated February 27, 2013 impairs the policies Congress has imbedded in the Labor Laws and it is an illegal exaction of the rank & file members source or element of wealth, and property rights. The UBC International, the District Council and the Wall-Ceil-ing & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. have colluded with each other by offering the proposed Or-der as a fait accompli; and, by directly threatening the rank & file members and this honorable Court with a Hobbs Act extortion scam by offering two untenable & illegal threats in an “either – or”, take it or leave it proposition to exact the property rights and monies of the District Council by:

The first threat was a wage and benefit cut of 25% to 40% concocted with the Building Trades Employers Association (BTEA) by creating an artificial need of re-training and re-certifying every journeyman Car-penter in the invented minutia of specialty crafts; and, the revocation of Journeyman Status via invention-creation of the Skills Form.

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The second threat comes in the form of the proposed order awarding the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Asso-ciation 100% control of any/all hiring, less shop stewards and a reversion of all control of the Union to their agents, officers & principals all of whom lie outside of the protections of the NLRA as employers. The proposed contract union security clause & maintenance of membership provision clearly establish each element of a closed shop outlawed by Taft-Hartley (1947) and therefore cannot stand.

In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated “Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Con-gress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot re-move their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.” Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

The NYCDCC’s Jurisdiction requirement, Article III, Section 3 above requires compliance to the Unions Constitution & By-Laws, as a condition of employment, and is thus facially unlawful, per: Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the union’s constitution and bylaws).

The NYCDCC’s Union Security clause requires members to maintain a maintenance of membership pro-vision, which also require as a condition of employment compliance to the UBCJA’s facially unlawful By-Laws Section 4A, 4B & 4C which grant all executive, legislative and judicial power, all plenary power unto the Council, which negate all Local Union Autonomy, wherein all positions shall cease to ex-ist, where said power is without limitation; and wherein the Local Union autonomy has not been restored by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiner of America, International upon the January 12, 2012 ending of its Trusteeship as required by Federal law.

The UBCJA has intentionally with-held its illegal Skill(s) Form, which effects a Union Rule requiring compliance to an illegal Individual Contract and illegal Internal Rule to be listed in the first instance, and to maintain their position on the OWL; and, to be considered eligible to collect State or Federal Unem-ployment Assistance and is an exaction of control of inter-state & intra-state commerce are also facially unlawful, per: Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list).

As the NLRB Board stated in Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Le-bovitz: “While unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Sec-tion 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423,

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430(1969) (unions are “free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against uni-on members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule”). Thus, employees must be free to resign their union membership and escape the rule. The rule here, however, requires employees to comply with the Union’s constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. Such a requirement violates the Act”.

NLRA SECTION 14(b) “MOBILITY OF WORKFORCE” RIGHT TO WORK & NON-RIGHT TO WORK STATES FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Movants note: The above captioned excerpt is from page 123 of 138 of the Latham & Watkins 5-26-11 NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, page 28 of the proposed By-Law changes. VIOLATION of the CONSENT DECREE & CONTRACT:NLRA Section 158 (d) Obligation to bargain collectively For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification— (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; (3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and (4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:

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The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) to (4) of this subsection shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board , under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title, and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158, 159, and 160 of this title, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the provisions of this subsection shall be modified as follows: (A) The notice of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be ninety days; the notice of paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be sixty days; and the contract period of paragraph (4) of this subsection shall be ninety days. (B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or recognition, at least thirty days’ notice of the existence of a dispute shall be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection. (C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute. Movants note that the Obligation to Bargain “through representatives of their own choosing” under the preamble & section 7 of the Act cannot be had where the Local Union autonomy has been temporarily suspended under an illegal By-Law change and 6th Circuit decision (UBCJA Local 267, Dresden) imposed by the International UBCJA. There is also a Constitutional issue at bar here, preventing the NLRB from adjudicating this claim on the Constitutional issues previously brought before the Court, which have yet been decided. This current “100% FULL MOBILITY” proposed Order offers no more, is an untenable either/or proposition with the directed threat of a refusal to bargain to impasse unless the corrupt UBCJA International, Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association & the District Council officers are allowed to establish a closed shop in violation of Taft-Hartley (1947) and long known and settled United States Supreme Court precedent.In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), Justice Thomas at II A stated “Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [502 U.S. 527, 532] [ 7]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers.” “MOBILITY” OR “100% FULL MOBILITY” AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE: In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated: First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. 8 The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national

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government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the [295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment- 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' Douglas J. McCarron proffered a false dogma of extra-ordinary circumstances created by the “sophisticated regional Contractors working intra-state and inter-state, therein requiring the Mobility of the Contractor workforce. This policy was presented in 1997 under the Consent decree and was implemented nationally in 1999.Predecessor actions to this new policy were reflected in the UBCJA Internationals prior lawsuits wherein they convinced the 6th Circuit that Union By-Laws created the right to vote for Business Representatives, therein, that right could be taken away by another by-law rules change, per, 992 F.2d. 1418 (1993) UBCJA Dresden Local No. 267 v. UBCJA International and Sigurd Lucassen (92-3746) at 42. As a matter of law, the 6th Circuit erred in stating “looking at the actual mechanics of the loss of the right to elect a business representative, the district court reasoned it was the adoption of the Council by-laws, not the reorganization that eliminated the Local’s right to elect a business representative. Indeed, it was the Capital District Council by-laws that created the right in the first place”. The District Courts reasons are not in accordance with the text of the NLRA or its Legislative history. No other Circuit Court has made such a similar ruling, nor could they as it is factually and legally incorrect, and can therefore not stand. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Dresden Local 267 issued on April 27, 1993, some 15-months after the Lechmere decision issued on January 27, 1992. The UBCJA International under Sigurd Lucassen and subsequently under Douglas J. McCarron has perpetuated this myth, this fallacy of so called law since the decision issued on April 27, 1993. The 6th

Circuit Court clearly erred in stating that the mechanical right of the loss of the right to elect a business representative…was the adoption of the Council By-Laws. The Council By-Laws did not create the right to vote, the United States Congress did so.As a general matter of law, Union members via a coerced or forced vote cannot alter, change or amend what Congress and the Executive branch of government pass into law, via amending an internal union by-law on demand of the International Union representing them. Were that true, then we would have anarchy, which is what we have in the UBCJA right now, an unfettered and out of control Dictatorship run amuck.The UBC International, as a labor organization cannot force their hidden agenda or position to refuse members the right to vote in Union matters which have as their predicate Federal law. Furthermore, the UBCJA International cannot force this upon a subordinate Regional or District Council or Local Union under the auspice of a simple internal rules change – when said rules change violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and the UBCJA International usurps the authority of the Legislative branch of government to initiate, pass, amend or alter Federal Laws. The SDNY has the authority to review the 6 th Circuits erroneous legal decision in Dresden for the clear reasons stated above, and it should issue a ruling sua-sponte to that effect; and the Movants here so motion and appeal to the District Court’s inherent ability to fashion its own remedies.

In Payne v. Tennesse, 501 US 808, regarding stare decisis, at page 501 U. S. 828, the Supreme Court stated:“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 309 U. S. 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra at 285 U. S. 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.

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111, 382 U. S. 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra at 285 U. S. 405-411 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472 (1924); @ 53 U. S. 458 (1852); the opposite is true in cases, such as the present one, involving procedural and evidentiary rules”.Thus, by application, when UBCJA Local Unions are stripped of essential and core NLRA Section 7 rights, their Local autonomy, UBC Union members must point out this simple fact to the Court – the Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, the Act (NLRA) which created the right to vote for rank & file workers and employees as noted within the Preamble and Policy of the United States, and in Section 7 rights. Upon enactment of the NLRA in 1935, any and all trade union constitutions and by-laws not in accordance with the law were effectively mooted.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) SECTION 14(b)APPLICABILITY TO THE NERCC/UBCJA’S MOBILITY CLAUSE14(b) [Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law] Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law. Currently, there are 28 - Non-Right to Work States & 22 - Right to Work States.

NLRA Section 14(b) operates in two ways: In all Non-RTW States (Union), Federal Pre-emption is applicable to the entire Act. In RTW States (Non-Union), Federal Pre-emption is waived under the Tenth Amendment, and the NLRB Board & General Counsel are free to apply the “Mobility” Provision to said Non-Union States, as State law(s) are controlling in the Right to Work (RTW) States.

In Non-RTW States (Union States), the 12-31-09 slip Opinion issued in Lebovitz has no application. The reason is fairly obvious, once people understand the base NLRA 9(a) & (8f) Representation issues as applicable to the Construction Industry. Once a “bargaining representative” has been chosen and subsequently “certified” by the NLRB; and, after the Contractor, Firm, Organization complies with the proviso to Sec. 8(a)(3) regarding the collection of Dues & Initiation Fees and the requisite 30-Day hold for Sec. 9(a) and 7-Day hold for Sec. 8(f), and after Workers or Employees are properly advised of their Beck Rights, to refrain from any & all activities under NLRA Sec. 7 – application of the Lebovitz Ruling is out.

The CBA is a “contract”. Within said contracts for particular Locals, District & Regional Councils of the UBC are well Defined Geographical Jurisdictional areas, comprised of cities, towns, counties or combinations thereof as the case may be in a particular Non-RTW (Union) state. The “Defined Geographical Jurisdiction” of a UBCJA Contract (CBA) is “intangible property”.

In [Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979), the United States Supreme Court noted….”one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”.

In a RTW State wherein Federal Pre-Emption operates as a waiver under the Tenth Amendment, Workers & Employees are free to be employed, or work anywhere they so choose, without exception, thus – the UBCJA signatory General Contractors or Subcontractors conducting their Union operations in any of the 22-Right to Work States, where a Union Security Clause is of no force or effect, in such States, the Mobility Clause would fall under the respective State Law.

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In a Non-Right to Work State such as New York and the remaining 27-non RTW States, and as here applicable to NYCDCC Union Carpenters & all other Trade Unions operating Exclusive or Non-Exclusive Hiring Halls (re: Employer Chooses, Worker or Employee Solicits or Union Hiring Hall(s) select candidates for employment), the intangible property right of exclusion, to the defined geographical jurisdiction becomes effective, or operative. After all other factors are properly weighed and compliance is had, the Locals are thus free to enforce the right of exclusion limiting this to the defined geographical jurisdiction, to the benefit of their properly indentured workers and employees; and, are free to employ their members first, all members – to the exclusion of all others.

The exclusion principle includes, Non-Union Workers, UBC Union Travelers – whether inter-state or intra-state, 1099 Independent Contractors, Cash Workers and Illegal Aliens/ Undocumented Workers & any others working off the books.

The NLRB Board, the UBCJA or their 36-subordinate Regional or District Councils cannot usurp the Congressional Authority to legislate. The UBC Constitution & Bylaws have been ruled “facially unlawful” as per slip opinion No. 354-122 Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz dated 12-31-09. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Union’s constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the union’s constitution and bylaws)

Even when illegal provisions within both documents are properly severed and they are then deemed to be in compliance with all mandates and requirements of law – the UBC Constitution & By-Laws do not supersede or usurp Congressional authority legislate.

Douglas J. McCarron, Frank Spencer and John Ballantyne suspended all NYCDCC Local’s autonomy as a fraudulent means to change the By-Laws, exercise a veto power, and to put forth a Restructuring Plan which incorporates 100% Full Mobility throughout the NYC District Council of Carpenters and one which incorporates the entire State of New York; and which merges and consolidates Local Union rank & file workers/employees. {Restructuring Plan dated 5-26-11 at pg. 131 at 2. and at By-Laws Section 38, pg. 123 of 138, or pg. 28 of bylaws as a separate document}

In NLRB Mountain Pacific, page 894, the portions not over-ruled, the Board noted:"The fact that the Agreement limits the unions exclusive control to a 48-hour period after a request for employees is immaterial, for if unqualified exclusive delegation of hiring to a Union is unlawful, the vice is not cured by a reversion back to the employer of the hiring privilege after the union is unable to enjoy the power conferred upon it."2

PRIMARY JOB SITUS – PER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, NLRA Sec. 14(b) In Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 the Supreme Court at pg 426 held:(b) Similarly, § 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.

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UBCJA INTERNATIONAL - RESTRUCTURING PLAN dated May 26, 2011The NYCDCC has 13,178 active working members (5th interim Report of R.O.) Of that, 5,000 men & woman rely wholly upon the OWL as their primary and only source to obtain employment and are registered on it at a given point in time. For rounding, this equates to 38%.

The entire predicate behind “100% FULL MOBILITY” is to evade the Consent Decrees terms & conditions and to permanently & forever disenfranchise the minority of dues paying members who rely upon the Out of Work List and the Union Hiring & Referral Hall as their only means to become employed. The District Council under Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co. 323 US 192 (1944), must represent all of its members equally and without reservation. The Court must recognize and see 100% Full Mobility it for what it is – a plan of evasion and deception.

This 100% Full Mobility rule is proffered as being required to accommodate the “sophisticated Contractors” all of whom work in multiple UBC intra-state Jurisdictions throughout New York and inter-State Jurisdictions. While these so called sophisticated Contractors are working in Non-Union States, running double-breasted non-union entities and/or alter-ego corporations, State Law for Right to Work States prevails as it applies to the 100% mobility rule issued in NLRB No. 354-122, Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, slip opinion dated 12-31-09 as per the NLRA Section 14(b) deferral granted to the States so choosing enact Right to Work legislation.

In the State of New York and specifically within the NYCDCC any & all form of the Mobility Exception must fail as a matter of Federal Law, the Federal Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine embedded therein as so noted within our June 1, 2011 response to the UBCJA Internationals counsel of record Latham & Watkins, LLP letter.

In NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 US 418 (1968), Justice Douglas noted - ”There cannot be any justification to make the public processes wait until the union member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of the complex problem concerning employer, union, and employee member. If the member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never had. The Court of Appeals recognized that this might be the consequence and said that resort to an intra-union remedy if it imposed unreasonable delay or hardship upon the complainant.” 379 F2d. at 707.

Congressman Griffin at 13 “[T]he proviso was not intended to limit in any way the right of a union member under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, to file unfair labor practice charges against a union, or the right of the NLRB to entertain such charges, even though a 4-month period may not have elapsed”.

Notwithstanding this fact lies the mandate of the Consent Decree that under 17 – “Retention of Jurisdiction and Application to the Court. This Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to supervise implementation of this Consent Decree and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any and all issues arising under the Consent Decree, and any and all disputes growing out of the issuance, interpretation or application of this Consent Decree.” “At 18, Future Actions. Except as specified in paragraph 15, nothing herein shall preclude the Government, or any of its department or agencies, from taking any appropriate action in regard to any of the defendant signatories hereto in reliance on any federal laws.”

Thus, per 17 & 18 and per the Supreme Court ruling in NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), there is a bar to member remedies which precludes action through the NLRB. Given said preclusion and the fact that the NLRB is a quasi-judicial Federal Agency, with limited quasi-legislative rule-making authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with final rule-making per Federal Register procedures; and, the fact that the specific issues of fact & law are predicated upon the Federal

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Constitution, the Board and its General Counsel are barred from ruling upon the issues presented, thus, the Constitutional issues are properly before this Court as jurisdiction & venue are proper.

“The separation of powers can be violated in two basic ways. One involves the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976)….Another occurs when a law, despite no inter-branch aggrandizement. “disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches” by preventing one of the branches from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” Nixon v. Adm’r. of Gen. Servs. 433 US 425 (1977).”

In United States of America v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969) the Second Circuit at 19 stated “The Hobbs Act 'speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence.' Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). The concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved from its legislative history and numerous decisions, is not limited to physical or tangible property or things (United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964); United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958)), but includes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth (Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915, 75 S.Ct. 604, 99 L.Ed. 1249 (1955), reh. denied, 349 U.S. 969, 75 S.Ct. 879, 99 L.Ed. 1290 (1955)) and does not depend upon a direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the property (United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 76 S.Ct. 522, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956)).” At 21… “The phraseology of the Act makes it clear that the interference or attempted interference with interstate commerce 'in any way or degree' is prohibited. Stated differently, extortion or threats of violence need affect interstate commerce only in a minimal degree to constitute a violation. The broad and extensive reach of the commerce clause under the Hobbs Act has been upheld in a variety of circumstances. United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1164, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969); Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907, 88 S.Ct. 817, 19 L.Ed.2d 874 (1968); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y.1956)”. The UBCJA International through a former Federal Judge and IRO from Latham & Watkins has deceived the Court by insisting in and untenable qualifier within the August 5, 2011 By-Laws which allows it to extort member property rights long after the Trusteeship has ended. Once ended, the UBCJA International has no legal right to exercise jurisdiction or control over contract negotiations in the NYCDCC. The second Circuit in Tropiano was clear…“The phraseology of the Act makes it clear that the interference or attempted interference with interstate commerce 'in any way or degree' is prohibited”.SECTION 20: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Following recommendation by the Executive Committee, the Council Delegate Body shall have the exclusive power and authority to ratify and execute Collective Bargaining Agreements for and on behalf of its affiliated Local Unions, except to the extent the International Union exercises its jurisdiction or authority.Here, the UBC International and NERCC – in 354-122, Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, Inter-state & Intra-state Commerce is involved as the contractual provision being challenged is the 6-State New England Regional Council of Carpenters (NERCC) collective bargaining agreement, the contract clearly controls the movement of the labor commodity, the worker and employee defined under the preamble & Section 7 of the NLRA; and attempted interference, if not actual interference, was clearly established by the circumvention of Congressional authority to legislate and should warrant a similar finding that the conduct of the UBCJA International constitute extortion or attempted extortion which affected interstate commerce - within the proscription of the Hobbs Act, per United States v. Provenzano, supra; United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), reversed on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960).

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The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America (UBCJA) International union, its General President Douglas J. McCarron and their counsel of record, Latham and Watkins, LLP have put the Lebovitz decision and the Mobility issue square on the table, via their incorporation of the National Restructuring Plan into the May 26, 2011 NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, Exhibit “D”, Page 131, which stated:UBCJA (undated) 8-page “Memorandum” by Phil Newkirk, Chief of Staff, page 131-138 at 5, “The proposed LU [Local Union] restructuring for the for the above referenced LU’S [Local Unions] is based on the premise that, while Local Unions play an integral role in the structure of the UBC, there exists an unnecessary number of LU’s that are holdovers from a previous construction era. During that earlier era, LU’s were structured in a way that was consistent with the provincial attitudes of the members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods throughout New York City. Additionally, in that era construction was largely localized and contractors rarely traveled outside of the boroughs they resided in, with many contractors not traveling beyond a limited number of neighborhoods within the borough.”“However, in today’s construction market, Union contractors are increasingly mobile, chasing work across borough, city and state borders. They employ Union Carpenters who may be members of a LU within a given borough, but are quite possibly residents of an entirely different borough or city. Given the mobility of today’s industry and workforce, it is not necessary to have numerous Carpenter LU’s [Local Unions] scattered throughout New York City. That simply results in unnecessary duplication of administrative resources and costs, resources that could be better directed towards organizing and work growth.”

Movants note that the “holdovers from a previous construction era” and the “provincial attitudes of members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods of New York City” lines are just that. There isn’t any factual basis for these lies, but they must tell a story to avoid the obvious – that being, following the law. NYC is the largest and most racially diverse city in the nation, and Newkirk’s statements appear racist and discriminatory, as neither have anything to do with the Mobility issue with the exception of creating a diversion to the Court to cloud the real issue, the UBC’S patent attempt to end run labor laws and avoid motion practice on same by slipping it in the back door via a CBA. Moreover, the NYCDCC through its Labor Technical College has for years accepted Federal funding to fund equal opportunity and access to training and employment opportunity for woman, people of color & ethnic minorities. Acceptance of said funding comes with the express duty not to discriminate. The 100% Full Mobility proposed Order will violate the requirements and unduly prejudice the rights of these members and disenfranchise older members as well.

The UBCJA Signatory General Contractors & Subcontractors have always worked across city, borough, county & state borders and have done so since the advent of the automobile, and prior to that as well. The UBCJA signatories noted above, although all are contractually bound to work Union, bound to pay the contracted wage and benefit rates, abide by Davis-Bacon regulations, prevailing wage laws, certified payroll requirements etc., said signatories also like to run afoul of the Union Contract and devise “double breasted and alter-ego corporation” so they can avoid paying the prevailing Union Contract Wage and Benefit scale; and, to substitute it with that of the Non-Union Associated Building and Contractor wage rates.

To get around this, and to end run the labor laws in Union States, large cities such as New York – and to afford themselves with the opportunity to skirt and avoid NRLA Sec. 14(b), the UBCJA devised the “100% Full Mobility Scheme” as the primary vehicle to bring in out of state travelers and pay them their lower wage rates when said workers came from an adjoining Union State and Regional or District Council; and to pay the Non-Union wage scale whenever they can get away with it.

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The real predicate behind the Mobility Scheme is furthered by the introduction of the non-union worker, the 1099 independent contractor category and predominately of the illegal alien & undocumented work force, all of whom work for cash without any benefits. As NYCDCC and this Court well know, the Mobility clause in Union Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA’s) is the primary magnet leading directly to the fraud in the first instance.

The fraud costs honest UBC Local Union members their jobs and robs them of their livelihood, property and ability to build and sustain wealth and costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the State of New York.

UBCJA Local Unions are sized proportionally to the dollar volume of work which a given Local Union in a defined Geographical Jurisdiction produces on a historical basis. Local union members who live, work, shop, own homes and who pay property taxes are effectively locked out of work when they are replaced with these “travelers”. When Local Union workers are not on the Projects in their jurisdictional areas, and where the predominant body of the work force is made up of a core group of travelers and illegal aliens/undocumented workers & employees, working for cash and without benefits, who are without any vested interest in the area where the project is located, and when no one is watching – the fraud & corruption only accelerates. The signatory Contractors encourage it, as was demonstrated within all of the testimony relevant to the August 5, 2009 indictments and subsequent convictions of Forde & Greaney of the NYCDCC and Oliveri, a Trustee of the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries.

The last line of defense, is the District Council assigned Certified Shop Steward, yet, as has just been proven, when he or she is the lone wolf on the job, the same Contractors who are defrauding the Benefit Funds and who fail to pay Workers Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, State & Federal Taxes, Social Security & Medicare/Medicaid etc, defraud the Local Union rank & file member, unduly increase the amount of time said members spend on the so called Out of Work List (OWL) and further induce Unemployment Insurance fraud by forcing the State & Federal Government to pay claims to Local Union members who would otherwise be working and paying all of the aforementioned taxes and insurance into the system.

100% Full Mobility is both a power grab and Hobbs Act extortion scheme, which by design enriches and lines the pockets of corrupt Union & Contractor Association employers who maintain their mob connections. The UBCJA does not have clean hands in these matters, as it is their direct policies and violations of the laws which directly caused the fraud. When you eliminate the Local Unions and consolidate them to the point of creating mega-locals, the specific intent is to increase the power for those at the top and to create a vacuum of eyes, ears and voices at the bottom; and negate and eviscerate the NLRA & LMRDA which the United States Congress via legislation created.

The UBCJA International & NYCDCC 100% Full Mobility scheme serves as an effective veto over the legislative branch or Congressional authority to author, write, pass or amend laws. The UBCJA, NYCDCC and/or any Multi-Employer Contractor Association cannot usurp what is clearly Congress’s, nor can it substitute its scheme under the false claim of an economic emergency or crisis, nor can the NLRB via colluding with the UBCJA International & its District Councils to hold a case in abeyance, as was done with Lebovitz until the extortion scheme is pushed through the District Court under the Consent Decree.

The UBCJA International through Judge Conboy & Doug McCarron, the Building Trades Employer Association (BTEA), RBNY and multiple Multi-Employer Contractor Associations have continued their direct interference with the ongoing 2-year old alleged contract negotiations by offering and “either/or” proposition and a direct and specific threat relative to “Mobility” or “Full Mobility”.

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The new position is eliminating the 50-50 Rule and the 67%-33% May 26, 2009 Court Order altogether and replacing it by reversion of all control, or 100% control of hiring and thus 100% control of the District Council and the Union to a historically corrupt Contractor Association, wherein its last director Oliveri was indicted, convicted & sentenced to Federal prison. Should the Union not give in to the threat, then there shall be no pay raises nor any bargaining let alone to impasse.

Corruption in the District Council was not eliminated with Judge Conboy’s 50%-50% rule, rather, it increased. After the suit by the U.S.A.O. for contempt and upon remand from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Haight wrongly increased the Employer Association control of all hiring to 67%-33% and the corruption & racketeering accelerated until the FBI & the government served indictments on August 5, 2009. Now, as a reward for 23-1/2 years of a failed Consent Decree, and 19-years under the Consent Decree, UBC JA International, the District Council and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. (the test case) proposed Order looks to create closed shop hiring which Congress specifically outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).

There are two parts to this continued racketeering scheme.

Part One consisted of the UBCJA International & the corrupt Contractor Associations put forth an illegal extension of the Trusteeship for the express purpose of evading contractual wage, benefit, term & conditions of employment duly owed and substituted that with a platform of 150+ long term ProjectLabor Agreements which shredded the contracts previously executed and the wages and benefits owed and granted public & private Project Developers & Owners $5 billion dollars in kick-backs.\

Part Two consists of rewarding the rank & file worker with a pay raise after they agree to the extortive demand of granting full control of all hiring and their Union to the corrupt Contractor Associations. The alleged pay raise, is not a raise at all, rather – it is but another extortive scam being foisted upon this honorable Court, wherein the proposal looks good on paper to the untrained eye, yet when broken down by the hidden language, hidden and unpublished addendums and analysis of the Market Recovery projects, the agreement (CBA) purports to cover, 95% of the men & woman of the NYCDCC will never see a raise at all, and shall be subject to wage rates as noted below.

WALL-CEILING CBA - ARTICLE XII, SECTION 8. Section 8 WAGES & BENEFITS - Wage and Benefit increases are not tied to any benchmarks such as total hours worked and are guaranteed throughout the term of this agreement. Wage rates and fringe benefit contributions within the bargaining unit shall be determined and/or reallocated by [the] sic, Union at its sole discretion.

The above language is laughable on its face. Sentence one is negated by sentence two. In any event, the buried language, hidden & unpublished addendums, side deals for 80% Market Recovery and differing rates for the same work for 1-20 stories & 21 stories and above when properly reviewed and analyzed reveal that 95% of the rank & file members will never see the guaranteed wage increases promised and will in fact be working for wage & benefit package rates of, on average, 25% less than what the figures shown to the Court promise.

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Proposed Wage & Benefit Package shown to the Court, dated 2-27-13:

YEAR TOTAL COLA2011 $85.03 +0.0% 2012 $85.03 +0.0% 2013 $87.16 +2.50% 3-4-13 2013 $89.56 +2.75% 6-1-13 2013 $91.96 +2.67% 7-1-13 2014 $94.36 +2.60% 7-1-14 2015 $96.76 +2.54% 2016 $99.16 +2.48%

Actual Wage & Benefit Package in the Pay Check, at 80% Market Recovery rate:

YEAR TOTAL COLA 2011 $68.02 -25.007%. 2012 $68.02 -25.007% 2013 $69.72 -25.014% 3-4-13 2013 $71.64 -25.013% 6-1-13 2013 $73.56 -25.013% 7-1-13 2014 $75.48 -25.013% 2015 $77.40 -25.012% 2016 $79.32 -25.012%

Notwithstanding the above, an either/or proposition put forth as a direct threat that refusal to acquiesce to the illegal extortive demands of the UBCJA International, BTEA, RBNY & the multiple Contractor Associations to revert full control of all hiring and by application full control of the Union, the District Council to a corrupt group of corporate interest divests the rank & file worker of any and all rights guaranteed by the policy of the United States in the preamble to the NLRA, NLRA Section 7 rights, Taft-Hartley prohibitions on Closed Shops and LMRDA rights.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS:The UBCJA urges that the national crisis in 1999 demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by the Contractor Associations, and that this necessary co-operation was carried out by the adoption and implementation of Mobility Rules on a National level. But the statutory plan is not simply one for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the UBCJA’s coercive exercise and the exaction of Congressional valid lawmaking and legislative power passed off as a simple “internal rules change” governed by the UBC Constitution and its subordinate Regional & District Council By-Laws. The UBC International and its subordinate Regional & District Councils seek to abolish the Congressional power to legislate, substitute their internal union by-laws and constitution for that of the United States and the Congress.

The UBCJA International & Regional/District Councils are exercising a veto power over the 22-Right to Work States inherent sovereignty to control & legislate their own Employment laws and in the instance of the 28-Non Right to Work States, they seek to pre-empt Federal laws by application of a Right to Work State law and apply those laws to all 50-States nationwide. The UBC International simply does not have such powers, nor can they violate the property right of the Local union jurisdiction and source of wealth for its members, the workers & employees which the act protects.

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In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the United States Supreme Court at second wrote: “Second. The Question of the Delegation of Legislative Power. - We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 , 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed . 446. The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is authorized 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested….. “But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress…”…..At Third….The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues after the property has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within the state and is there held solely for local disposition and use. The commodity at issue here, in terms of the UBCJA International & Regional/District Council Mobility Rule is labor. The commodity subject to the exploitation by Organized Crime and the UBCJA & NYCDCC Contractor Associations is the employment of illegal aliens/undocumented workers, which is the primary mean by which the NYCDCC Benefit Funds are defrauded.The inter-state and intra-state activity involves the transportation of Travelers from within and outside of the UBCJA member rank & file, the importation and use of 1099 workers, illegal aliens and cash workers long exploited by the LCN and mob – and put in force and effect to disrupt the flow of commerce such that Federal Income Taxes, Social Security, Medicare-Medicaid taxes go unpaid, as do State, County and Local income taxes, Workers Compensation and Unemployment Insurance programs. Moreover, a large aspect is with regard to the defrauding of lawful Pension, Annuity and Health & Welfare payments to NYCDCC Benefit Funds.Thus, where the “flow of the Labor Commodity may have ceased or stopped” once in the State of New York and the interstate transaction in relation to the labor commodity may have ended, serves as no bar, for that is where the corruption, exploitation, LCN and mob related corruption and extortion begin – thus the clear legal distinction between the commodity at bar in Schechter (food for human consumption), verses the human component of the labor commodity subject to the aforementioned crimes which have led to the 21-year Civil Consent Decree. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, taxes this labor commodity via the imposi-tion of a “per-capita tax”, whether said labor commodity is in inter-state or intra-state commerce and whether it is moving between the two or in-situs and at its final destination. Illegal aliens & undocu-mented workers are an exploitable labor commodity due to the direct threat of deportation (via ICE) on the one hand; by the government and/or expulsion by the union or the employer (under the threat to call ICE) on the other. The effect to workers & employees (the labor commodity) in both right to work states under state sover-eignty, or non-right to work states operating under federal pre-emption doctrines is telling. In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 , 260 S., 43 S.Ct. 83, the Supreme Court noted: “The action of the state as a regulation of interstate commerce does not depend upon the degree of interference; it is illegal in any degree.”Movants contend the same applies no less to the UBCJA & NYCDCC. Whether coal as in the instant case, or labor in the present one, both are commodities and the UBCJA International’s actions relating to their attempt to regulate interstate commerce, in the instance of taxing moving or non-moving humans,

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taxed as a labor commodity similarly does not depend on the degree of interference; whereas, it is illegal in any degree. Similar to Heisler, the tax is a tribute paid to the UBC International for an activity to which it is not competent to administer – inter-state commerce, and should thus be declared facially unlawful. The failure to pay Federal Income Taxes, Social Security, and Medicare & Medicaid certainly are matter affecting interstate commerce. The failure to pay Local, County & State Income Taxes and Workers Com-pensation and Unemployment Insurance are matters effecting intra-state commerce. Violation of Sur-Tan, IRCA of 1986 by Employer & Contractor Associations are additional matters affecting inter-state com-merce, as is the exploitation of the worker and employee and the failure to pay prevailing wages per the NYCDCC Collective Bargaining Agreements.Movants also note the continued Benefit Fund fraud, in that it violates Federal laws within the domain of ERISA, EBSA, PBGC and that it impacts the return on investments and may violate SEC regulations, and that the appropriate Federal Taxes are not paid, also violate the Internal Revenue Code – and all such violations readily impact and obstruct interstate commerce. Retirees depend upon their Pensions, which in turn depend upon the return on investments (ROI), noting that investments returns are generated both inter-state and intra-state; therein effecting interstate commerce when said Benefit Funds are being robbed of the necessary dollars and funding levels required to keep them stable & solvent – and from encroaching or being in “endangered or critical” status as defined by E.R.I.S.A.In “U.S. Supreme Court , Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 , Argued March 29, 1976 Decided June 14, 1976 426 U.S. 407, the Supreme Court ruled that :(b) Similarly, § 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.

The loss of the property right via mobility rules enacted by the UBCJA and the hiring and employment of illegal aliens are the primary magnet which has led to these direct losses and is the source of the continued fraud, manipulation, malfeasance and longstanding LCN involvement which necessitated the RICO charges in the first instance in 1990. It is also a deprivation of the member rights to secure work through his/her own Local Union, for projects in their Local Unions Defined Geographical Jurisdiction, above and before all others. The United States Supreme Court made this point amply clear , stating: “because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job-situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.” Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz No. 354-122, is one such individual case warranting the Constitutional questions presented by Movants, as noted within the June 1, 2011 letter to the Court.In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Justice Hughes noted: The distinction between direct and indirect effects has been clearly recognized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act. Where a combination or conspiracy is formed, with the intent to restrain interstate commerce or to monopolize any part of it, the violation of the statute is clear. Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 , 45 S.Ct. 551. But, where that intent is absent, and the objectives are limited to intrastate activities, the fact that there may be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce does not subject the parties to the federal statute, notwithstanding its broad provisions. This principle has frequently been applied in litigation growing out of labor disputes. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U.S. 344, 410 , 411 S., 42 S. Ct. 570, 27 A.L.R. 762; United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert, 265 U.S. 457 , 464-467, 44 S.Ct. 623, 33 A.L.R. 566; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 , 45 S.Ct. 403; Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 , 18 S., 53 S.Ct. 549, 551.

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EMPLOYER & UNION INTERFERENCE & DOMINANCE: Illegal “VETO POWER” over labor organizationsIn 167 NLRB No. 58, 9-15-67 the Board found “That save for Trusteeship, the general tenor of these powers is that of limited, procedurally safeguarded, restraint on local bargaining activity. The general president has no authority either to formulate local bargaining goals or to compel strike action to carry them out….While International Trusteeship could eliminate local control over bargaining, this danger appears to be somewhat muted by Sec. 302 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 462) which limits the purpose for which trusteeships can be imposed, and the pursuit of a pension fund financial interest would appear to fall outside the list of permitted objectives.”“In sum, we find the constitutional powers permit only a limited entry into local bargaining activity, and that the Local constitutes the initiating and pervasive force in dealing with employers.”In 226 NLRB No. 65, 10-18-76 the Board found at, 489 at (3) “Not only do the Advisory Committee's bylaws and Respondent's admissions establish that one purpose of the Committee is to deal with the Respondent concerning employees' grievances, labor disputes, and conditions of work but, additionally, as described in detail supra, the employees in fact transmit grievances and requests to the Committee concerning their conditions of work which the Committee brings to the attention of Respondent which takes these matters under consideration and, in some instances, has acted favorably upon them.'Based on all of the circumstances set forth above, I find that the Advisory Committee is an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in part , of dealing with the Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes , and conditions of work , thus, it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act . I have carefully considered Respondent's argument that the Commit-tee is not a labor organization because it does not bargain with the Respondent. Specifically, Respondent urges:

The committee is limited to advising management or advising the department heads as to the existence of a problem. They are free to propose solutions. However, they have no authority whatsoever, to take any final action or to negotiate with management regarding what action, if any, should be taken. Its function is solely to advise management of the existence of a problem, to delve into it and make the details avail-able so that management can make an intelligent decision.”

At 490, “The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument, holding that a commit-tee may be "dealing with" an employer-and hence be a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5), even though its activities may not be equated with the usual concept of collective bargaining. N. L. R. B. v. Cabot Carbon Company, supra at 210-211, 214, and fn. 15. I am persuaded that the record herein estab-lishes that the Advisory Committee was created and exists for the purpose, at least in part, of "dealing with" the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.” … “Only after top management read over and approved the planning committees ideas was it given the authority to schedule elec-tions to elect representatives for the advisory committee”.

At 490 at (2) “Respondent is in a position to exercise and in fact does exercise substantial control over the administration of the Advisory Committee.” Respondent exercised a veto power over the adoption of the Committee’s bylaws. The bylaws went into effect only after Respondent’s top management read an approved their content”

At 491, the Board stated “Based upon the aforesaid circumstances, taken in their totality, I find the Advis-ory Committee is a dominated labor organization, thus, as alleged in the complaint, I further find that the respondent has violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.”….” The statute forbids all employer inter-ference or domination whether benevolent or malevolent, NLRB V. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 308 US 241 (1939).”

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In 288 NLRB No. 31, Garlock Equipment Company and District Lodge No. 77, IAMAW, the Board stated at 247 “ As found by the judge, the GEC as initially constituted may & June 1980 was a “classic-ally simple democratic institution”

At 248 the Board stated “The record also supports the judge's finding that the affiliation vote effectively "transformed an amoeba-simple independent labor organization into a dependent affiliate of a large or-ganization, subject to new controls and restrictions and stripped of a substantial amount of pre-affiliating autonomy." As set forth by the judge, the basic unit of the IAM is the local lödge. The International con-stitution determines the governance structure of such lodges including the number of officers and trustees and the manner of their selection, the setting of initiation fees and dues, payment of per capita taxes and assessments, and restrictions on member conduct enforceable by fines and expulsion.

The amended certification, however, did not certify the GEC as a local lodge or affiliate of the IAM or of District Lodge 77, the Charging Party in this unfair labor practice proceeding. Rather, the Regional Dir-ector substituted the District Lodge as the certified bargaining representative. In 1980 District Lodge No. 77 represented approximately 10,000 to 12,000 employees within 11 local lodges located in 27 counties of Minnesota and Wisconsin. The bylaws of District Lodge No. 77 specifically require, in the context of general supervision of its local lodges, that all collective-bargaining agreements be negotiated and signed in the name of the District Lodge by an "authorized Representative and the Shop Committee."

The judge found, and we agree, that under these circumstances the requirement that a District Lodge representative must sign any final agreement essentially constitutes a veto power by the Dis-trict Lodge over the GEC's former exclusive authority to contract with the Respondent. In our view, the judge correctly characterized this precondition to any collective-bargaining agreement as a "meaningful diminution" in the GEC's autonomy.

In Western Commercial Transport, supra, the Board applied the "sufficiently dramatic" standard derived from NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986), for determin-ing when changed circumstances, such as organizational changes resulting from an affiliation, will raise a question concerning representation. Applying that standard here, we find that the changes associated with the affiliation—particularly the greatly lessened autonomy of the GEC—were sufficiently dra-matic to result in the substitution of a new entity for that originally certified. Consequently, a ques-tion concerning representation has been raised that must be resolved through an election under Section 9(a) of the Act. 4

We therefore will vacate our amended certification, dismiss the underlying petitions, and accordingly will also dismiss the instant refusal-to-bargain complaint.ORDERThe National Labor Relations Board orders that its Decision and Order in Case 18-CA-6846 (263NLRB 684) is vacated and the complaint is dismissed.4 Gulf Oil Corp., 135 NLRB 184 (1962) See also Port Chester NursingIn A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third: CONTINUED………“If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a state, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power. The government also makes the point that efforts to enact state legislation establishing high labor standards have been impeded by the belief that, unless similar action is taken generally, commerce will be

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diverted from the states adopting such standards, and that this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of wages and hours. The apparent implication is that the federal authority under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the authority of the states to deal with domestic problems arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce. It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.”In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated “Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.” Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

The UBCJA Constitution, its By-laws and the NYCDCC By-laws, the Collective Bargaining Agreements and the individual Trust Fund Agreements; and, the UBC Obligation, all form a contract. The UBC International and the NYCDCC have now jointly proposed that they be granted the Powers of the 3-branches of Government established by the Federal Constitution – that of the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch, via the Unilateral Implementation of a Centralized Restructuring Plan, wherein the Bylaw changes grant to them all plenary powers. The UBC International and the New York City District Council now pray that this honorable Court allow them such unilateral control as is only present within Dictatorships.It begs no more, to say that this Restructuring Plan makes a prima-facie case for violation of any & all due process rights, is proffered in bad faith, and that it wholly and completely eviscerates the NLRA, TAFT-HARTLEY & the LMRDA in one fell swoop. Moreover, under the limited controls granted to International Unions in federal LMRDA Trusteeships, those which seek illegitimate ends are expressly prohibited as a matter of law.

See J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944) “The Board held that the Company had refused to bargain collect-ively, in violation of 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158(5); and that the contracts had been utilized, by means of the circulars, to impede employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 157, with the result that the Company had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of 8(1) of the Act. It ordered the Company to cease and desist from giving effect to the contracts, from extending them or entering into new ones, from refusing to bargain and from interfer-ing with the employees; and it required the Company to give notice accordingly and to bargain upon re-quest.”…..“Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement.'The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.' National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 364 , 60 S.Ct. 569, 577. Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. [321 U.S. 332, 338] It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages

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are open to every employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his pre-existing contract of employment. “…See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the union’s constitution and bylaws);

See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are “free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule”).

See Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) wherein the Supreme Court stated “Yet when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. We noted in Scofield v. NLRB, [409 U.S. 213, 216] 394 U.S. 423, 429 , that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating 8 (b) (1)." On the facts, we held that Scofield, where fines were imposed on members by the union, fell within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers. But we drew the line between permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows:

". . . 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., at 430.

Under 7 of the Act the employees have "the right to refrain from any or all" concerted activities relating to collect-ive bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those con-certed activities.

See Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) “The Court's decision in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under the common law of associations, run afoul of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 26 There the union expelled [473 U.S. 95, 114] a mem-ber who failed to comply with a rule requiring the "exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union." Id., at 421. Under the com-mon law, associations may require their members to exhaust all internal remedies. See, e. g., Medical Soc. of Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944). Nevertheless, the Marine Workers Court held that "considerations of public policy" mandated a holding that the union rule requiring exhaustion violated 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). 391 U.S., at 424 ; see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 430 (union rule is invalid under 8(b)(1)(A) if it "impairs [a] policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws").

See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated “Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.” Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

See Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list).

See Carp. Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz (2009) wherein the Board citing the ALJ stated “5. Is the union-security clause facially unlawful? Finally, the union-security clause in article V is facially unlawful. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Union’s constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the union’s constitution and bylaws); Electrical Workers Local 3

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(White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list).

See Andrew Kevin Price v. Carpenters District Council, U.S.D.C. SD Illinois (2011), case no.10-cv-0741 MJR-PMF granting both a temporary Injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(3); and vacating same and issuing a permanent Injunction for free speech & other issues under LMRDA Sec. 411-415, dated 3-17-11. Movants note, the UBC Obligation prohibits free speech under the aforementioned re-quirements and also as a direct violation of NLRA Sec. 7 rights to refrain from any 7 all such activity – and thus should be similarly enjoined.

See NLRB Brief, DC Circuit Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2011, Nos. 10-1300, 10-1301, 10-1353, 10-1355 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, wherein the Board’s General Counsel argues against such illegal unilateral contractual conditions which effect employees terms & conditions of employment, citing:

See NLRB v. Kat (1962)z, the Supreme Court held: “that an employer violates the duty to bargain by unilaterally changing a term and condition of employment under negotiation, regardless of its motivation for doing so.83 The Court reasoned that such a change constitutes “a refusal to negotiate about the af-fected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy.”84, and…The proscription against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment applies with full force “where, as here, an existing agreement has expired and negoti-ations on a new one have yet to be completed.”87 When the contract expires, “terms and conditions con-tinue in effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is no unilateral right to change them.”88 This is required “in order to pro-tect the statutory right to bargain.”89

This Court has noted the serious damage inflicted by an employer’s implementation of unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment: A unilateral change not only violates the plain requirement that the parties bargain over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions,” but also injures the process of collective bargaining itself. “Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It interferes with the right of self organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent.”90

- 22 -For this reason, a violation of Section 8(a)(5) also derivatively violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: unilat-eral changes tend “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their right to engage in concerted activity.91 As the Supreme Court observed in NLRB v. Katz, unilateral changes “plainly frus-trate the statutory objective of establishing working conditions through bargaining.”92

PROPERTY RIGHTS as applied to NLRA sec. 14(b) & MOBILITYIn, 949 F.2d 199: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Debs, Defendant-appellant United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 949 F.2d 199 at 10 stated:

Courts have long held that the concept of property under the Hobbs Act is not limited to tangible prop-erty, but also includes "any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970). Intangible business rights, including the business rights of unions, are considered property. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 1221, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979); United States v. Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d

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267, 281-282 (3d Cir.1985). Intangible property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act includes LMRDA rights. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 627 F.Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y.1985).

At 15 stated:

By contrast, union politics is more like one-party government. The statutory right to participate in union government is not held accountable by anything remotely like a thriving two-party system. Here, the federal legislature and courts have a greater duty to combat labor corruption and electoral vice.

The Hobbs Act is an important instrument in service of this democratic objective. For all of these reasons, LMRDA rights are property under the Hobbs Act.

At issue here is the 100% full mobility system which the UBC International Union has implemented na-tionally under the decisions issuing from the NLRB in Carpenters Local 43….and Lebovitz. The defined geographical jurisdiction is part & parcel to the contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), as are all items within the May 26, 2011 Restructuring Plan. The By-laws are Contracts.

The rank & file UBC worker & employee, per the NLRA & LMRDA retains the right to vote, all contract and legal rights, the right to Local Union autonomy and more. This is true under the LMRDA, wherein, when an International Union orders a subordinate Regional or District Council and/or Local Union to be placed into a Trusteeship, that under the LMRDA, it is a temporary suspension of the autonomy which must be preserved intact and returned to the members., along with its tangible and intangible property and assets.

The UBCJA International’s proposed changes are facially unlawful, and will alter the former NYCDCC to the point where it is unrecognizable, to such a degree an extent that a new NLRA Sec. 9(a) Representa-tion Election shall be required.

Both, the contract rights of UBC Rank & File members, the LMRDA rights and the right of exclusion are property rights under the Hobbs Act. Any attempt by the UBC International, the NYCDCC or Wall-Ceil-ing & Carpentry Industries of NY, Inc. or any multi-employer Contractor Association to take these rights away is indicative of the exaction being required and as such warrant charges under the Act.

NLRB –ABEYANCE & WITHDRAWAL OF LEBOVITZ MOBILITY CASE

DATE UNKOWN, BUT POST MAY 16 TH BRIEF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDUNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS, LOCAL 43 and NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS (McDowell Building & Foundation, Inc.) and Case 34-CB-3047 KEVIN LEBOVITZ, an Individual

ORDEROn December 31, 2009, the two sitting members of the Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding, which is reported at 354 NLRB 122.1 Thereafter, Respondent- Carpenters Local 43 filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the General Counsel filed a cross-application for enforcement. Thereafter, the court ordered that the review and enforcement proceedings be held in abeyance, and the record in this case was not filed with the court.

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the powers of the National Labor Relations Board in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow

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and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Thereafter, pursuant to this delegation, the two sitting members issued decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.

On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635, holding that under Section 3(b) of the Act, in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board, a delegee group of at least three members must be maintained.

Accordingly, in view of the Court’s decision in New Process Steel, L.P., pursuant to Section 10(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board hereby sets aside the above-referenced Decision and Order.2 The Board will retain this case on its docket and take further action as appropriate.

By Direction of the Board:_______________________Lester A. Heltzer, Executive Secretary

2 Section 10(d) states “[u]ntil the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued byit.” See also In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938).The Hobbs Act was patterned after a New York extortion law, under which one New York court held that union membership rights are protected property interests. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 36, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)

2403 -Hobbs Act—Extortion By Force, Violence, or Fear

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In order to prove a violation of Hobbs Act extortion by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, the following questions must be answered affirmatively:

1. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights?

"Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411).2. Did the defendant use or attempt to use the victim's reasonable fear of physical injury or economic harm in order to induce the victim's consent to give up property?A defendant need not create the fear of injury or harm which he exploits to induce the victim to give up property. See United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978) (offer by employer to pay union official for labor peace held to be "simply planning for inevitable demand for money" by the union official under the circumstances); United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and superseded in part on denial of reh'g, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (causing some businesses to refuse operations with the victim sufficiently induced the victim's consent to give up property, consisting of a right to contract freely with other businesses, as long as there were other businesses beyond defendants' control with whom the victim could do business).Did the defendant's conduct actually or potentially obstruct, delay, or affect interstate or foreign commerce in any (realistic) way or degree? [ see page ____ re: Mobility, the condition precedent to initiate all other wrongs, inter-state & intra-state transport of illegal aliens, undocumented workers, 1099 & cash workers, defrauding Benefit Funds, State & Federal Tax Coffers, Workers Compensation programs, Insurance & Bonding companies, kick-backs and pay-offs to Business Representatives, Drug Trafficking & Money Laundering, theft of property & NLRA - LMRDA rights]The Hobbs Act regulates extortion and robbery, which Congress has determined have a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce by reason of their repetition and aggregate effect on the economy. Therefore, the proscribed offenses fall within the category of crimes based on the Commerce Clause whose "de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence." United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Hobbs Act convictions for robberies whose proceeds the defendant would have used to purchase products in interstate commerce), quoting, United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); material in brackets added; see also United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (robbery of out-of-state credit and ATM cards); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (robbery of commercial business); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995).

Hobbs Act violations may be supported by proof of a direct effect on the channels or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, as for example, where the threatened conduct would result in the interruption of the interstate movement of goods or labor. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir. 1996)

Indirect effects on such commerce are also sufficient, as for example, where the obtaining of

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property and resulting depletion of the victim's assets decreases the victim's ability to make future expenditures for items in interstate commerce.Taylor, supra (depletion of contractors' assets). However, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished Hobbs Act cases involving depletion of a business' assets from those involving the depletion of an individual employee's assets which, the court has ruled, are not as likely to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have agreed where the extortion or robbery of an individual has only an "attenuated" or "speculative" effect on some entity or group of individuals engaged in interstate commerce thereby diminishing the "realistic probability" that such commerce will be affected. Was the defendant's actual or threatened use of force, violence or fear wrongful?Generally, the extortionate obtaining of property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence in a commercial dispute requires proof of a defendant's intent to induce the victim to give up property. No additional proof is required that the defendant was not entitled to such property or that he knew he had no claim to the property which he sought to obtain. See United States v. Agnes, 581 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 293, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of right defense to defendant's use of violence to withdraw property from a business partnership).

In its labor-management context, the claim-of-right defense is not applicable where defendants do not have legitimate labor objectives. The labor claim-of-right defense has been held not to excuse the following kinds of coercive demands: payoffs to union officials and employee representatives in violation of the federal labor laws (29 U.S.C. § 186); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1975) (solicitation of church donation in return for removal of labor pickets); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (request for payoff to remove pickets); sham fees which labor unions are not entitled to collect under the labor laws; United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1983) (economic coercion of dues and initiation fees from truck drivers who were self-employed or who were told they would receive no member benefits); employee payments which violate existing labor contracts; United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (under threat of job loss, employees' payment of health and pension con-tributions which labor contract required employer to pay); employer payments to labor unions which are not included in existing labor contracts; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (violence used to collect fines on em-ployers for non-compliance with union rules which were not made part of the labor contract); demands that a non-union employer cease business operations during a sham union organ-izing campaign; United States v. Edgar Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (violent cam-paign by union officials and union-represented competitor to drive the non-union employer out of business under the pretext of persuading employees to join the union and enforce area wage stand-ards); employer payments for labor consulting to establish a bogus "sweetheart union" and thereby discourage legitimate organizing by other unions; United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). construction contractors' payments of money, wages for unwanted and superfluous employ-ees, and subcontracts with employee representatives which were unrelated to the hiring of employ-ees. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 and 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of contractors by leaders of minority labor coalitions).Where the claim-of-right defense applies, courts have generally held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was not entitled to receive the property which he sought to obtain. United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979) (demand by labor union

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official on employer that the official and others be hired for no-show employment using threat of labor unrest); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1989) (in prosecution involving debtor's withholding of property from a creditor-bank, "the term 'wrongful' requires the government to prove, in cases involving extortion based on economic fear, that the defendant knew that he was not legally entitled to the property that he received."); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to instruct that defendant must know he had no entitlement to property he sought by use of economic fear did not rise to the level of plain error; but "knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property.").

In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third: - cont. - “If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a state, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power. The government also makes the point that efforts to enact state legislation establishing high labor standards have been impeded by the belief that, unless similar action is taken generally, commerce will be diverted from the states adopting such standards, and that this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of wages and hours. The apparent implication is that the federal authority under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the authority of the states to deal with domestic problems arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce. It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.”In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated “Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.” Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

The UBCJA Constitution, its By-laws and the NYCDCC By-laws, the Collective Bargaining Agreements and the individual Trust Fund Agreements all form a contract. The NLRA, the Wagner Act and the Policy of the United States as stated in the Preamble and Sec.7 gave the worker & employee the Right to Vote on all matters regarding wages, hours and working conditions of employment. This new right gave members the right to bargain with representatives of their own choosing, which lead to negotiation for a contract, hence – giving rise to the “Collective Bargaining Agreement” or CBA.

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All CBA’s arise before or in unison with benefit provisions of the “contract” and thus, the CBA language is controlling. The UBCJA International Union and/or the NYCDCC Benefit Fund Trustees and Fiduciaries cannot remove the condition precedent or the operative effects of Federal Law(s) by making separate contracts about them and/or by the establishment of a separate corporation, albeit it a paper corporation to remove themselves from the requirements of Federal Laws, or to achieve illegitimate ends under the limited Trusteeship imposed – which by design and purpose is made to avoid compliance with the laws.

The UBC International and the NYCDCC have now jointly proposed that they be granted the Powers of the 3-branches of Government established by the Federal Constitution – that of the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch, via the Unilateral Implementation of a Centralized Restructuring Plan, wherein the Bylaw changes grant to them all plenary powers. The UBC International and the New York City District Council now pray that this honorable Court allow them such unilateral control as is only present within Dictatorships.

It begs no more, to say that this Restructuring Plan FOR 100% Full Mobility makes a prima-facie case for violation of any & all due process rights, is proffered in bad faith, and that it wholly and completely eviscerates the NLRA & LMRDA in one fell swoop.Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): “It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.” Movants further note that the United States District Court, SDNY is within the Judicial Branch of the Federal government. With all due respect and deference to the Court, it is not the role of the judiciary, the United States Attorney’s office or the Independent Review Officer to change, amend or alter federal law(s), a role specifically reserved for the Congress. A civil RICO Consent Decree does not authorize the abandonment of the United States Federal Constitution to achieve its ends. It must be done within the purview of the laws which are in place as put forth by Congress, and signed into law by the respective President. Lawyers are sworn to uphold the law and Courts are sworn to uphold precedent unless stare decisis be in play which does not appear to be the case here.The Hobbs Act was patterned after a New York extortion law, under which one New York court held that union membership rights are protected property interests. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 36, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)United States v. Gotti 459 F. 3d. 296 (2d Cir. 2006)93 Scheidler II, as set forth below, tightened the requirements for finding that a defendant has committed extortion under the Hobbs Act. To appreciate the significance of Scheidler II, it is therefore necessary to begin with the text of the Hobbs Act, upon which the challenged extortion counts here rested. It provides:94 Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.95 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (emphasis added). The Hobbs Act further defines "extortion" as96 the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.97 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added).98 Before Scheidler II, this Circuit (and others) had interpreted the phrase "the obtaining of property from another" quite broadly, in two key respects: (1) "property" had been held to encompass intangible as well as tangible property rights; and (2) "obtaining" had been held to encompass cases where the defendant caused a loss of or interference to the victim's property

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rights, even though the defendant had not actually sought to exercise those property rights for himself or herself. Clear examples of these two propositions can be found in our precedents.99 As to the first proposition—namely, the expansive interpretation of "property"— our Circuit's decision in United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969), stands as an early landmark case. The Tropiano defendants were partners in a garbage collection company who were displeased when a new competitor, Caron Refuse Removal, Inc. ("Caron"), started soliciting business in their vicinity and taking away some of their customers. Id. at 1072. They then used threats of violence to force Caron to stop recruiting their customers and to agree not to solicit any business in the area. Id. On appeal, this Court upheld the Tropiano defendants' Hobbs Act extortion convictions, rejecting their argument that "nothing more than `the right to do business' in the Milford area was surrendered by Caron and that such a right was not `property' `obtained' by the appellants." Id. at 1075. We explained:100 The concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved from its legislative history and numerous decisions, is not limited to physical or tangible property or things but includes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth and does not depend upon a direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the property.102 Id. at 1075-76 (internal citations omitted). More recently, this Circuit similarly held that "[t]he right of the members of a union to democratic participation in a union election is property; that the right is intangible does not divest it of protection under the Hobbs Act," and on that basis, crime families who sought to replace control of the union could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion. United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1999).127 We agree with the majority of district courts that have concluded that intangible property can qualify as extortable property under the Hobbs Act regardless of whether its exercise, transfer, or sale would be legal. The Supreme Court did not include a "legality" limitation in Scheidler II. Moreover, as the government points out, the Bellomo/Coffey approach adopted by one district court gives rise to the untenable implication that one can never "extort," under the Hobbs Act, illegal property (such as narcotics) because such property cannot be legally used, sold, or transferred. In Bellomo, the district court tried to distinguish this argument by stating that "[t]he victim's grievance in that hypothetical would surely not be the loss of his right to distribute drugs, but what the extortionist has obtained from him, the drugs." Bellomo, 263 F.Supp.2d at 576. It is, however, as illegal to possess tangible drugs as it is to exercise the intangible "right to distribute drugs." The Bellomo court thus seems to suggest that its "legality" gloss on Scheidler II only applies to intangible property. We see no basis in principle, policy, or the text of Scheidler II, however, for holding that tangible property is "obtainable" regardless of whether its use, transfer, or sale is legal, but that intangible property is "obtainable" only if its exercise, transfer, or sale is legal. Nor do we see any basis for imposing a "legality" requirement on the extortion of both tangible and intangible property. Accordingly, we hold that the ILA-related and Local 1-related Hobbs Act extortion counts all survived Scheidler II.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK………………………………………………………XUNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PLAINTIFF 90 Civ. #5722 (RMB) -against-

DISTIRCT COUNCIL of NEW YORK CITYand VICINITY of THE UNITED BROTHERHOODof CARPENTERS and JOINERS of AMERICA, et al,

DEFENDANT………………………………………………………..X

PROPOSED ORDER on JOB REFERRAL RULES UNDER ALL CONTRACTOR ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS MODIFYING: Final Order & Judgment of Contempt and Remedy” (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 by Judge Charles Haight

1) WHEREAS, This Court entered a Consent Decree on March 4, 1994 brought by the United States of America under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (R.I.C.O.) against & amongst other defendants and The District Council of New York City & Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (the “District Council”);

2) WHEREAS, The CONSENT DECREE required the District Council and all Multi-Employer Contractor Associations and their respective Signatory Contractors to Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA’s) to comply with Job Referral Rules as mandated and ordered by the Court;

3) WHEREAS, This COURT entered a Final Order & Judgment of Contempt and Remedy” (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 by Judge Charles Haight mandating specific hiring/referral ratios be followed by the parties to CBA’s, providing no more than 67% of the Union Carpenters on the Project could be hired by the Employer; and, that a minimum of 33% percent of the Union Carpenters shall be referred directly from the UBCJA-District Council Ultra-Out of Work List (OWL);

4) WHEREAS, the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., one of the multiple Multi-Employer Contractor Associations bound to the Consent Decree’s mandatory Job Hiring/Referral procedures ordered by this honorable Court have failed to abide by the Court approved

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August 5, 2011 By-laws, Section 5, 12 & 20 and the Past Practice of Contract Ratification, as approved by the Council Delegate Body (CDB), and, as voted upon by the rank & file Union Carpenter on March 27, 2012 wherein a reversion of control of all Hiring/Referral Ratio’s of 100% Full Mobility (Mobility) was soundly rejected at the ballot box, as certified by the American Arbitration Association (AAA);

5) WHEREAS, the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., have put forth a fraudulent vote of the Council Delegate Body, dated August 12, 2012, with 52-blank pages of a proposed contract not shown or disclosed; and, which contract proposal was not put to a contract ratification vote of the rank & file Union Carpenter as duly established by the past practice under the new August 5, 2011 By-laws, as the condition precedent required to sustain same;

6) WHEREAS, the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., have failed to negotiate the contract for a new successor Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in good faith; and, rather, have proceeded to violate the many statute’s, settled law & binding precedents of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the nations Appellate Courts and the United States Supreme Court as noted within the Table of Cases, Table of Statutes/Authorities and Argument presented herein;

7) Whereas, the prior 50% - 50% Contractor Hiring/Referral Ratio’s increased Contractor corruption; and, whereas the Final Order & Judgment of Contempt and Remedy” (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 mandating an increase of 17% changed the Contractor Hiring/Referral Ratios to 67% Contractor hires and 33% District Council hires and said increase favoring signatory Multi-Employer Contractor Associations also allowed said associations to increase their workforce percentages to near 100%; and, said increase favoring Contractors created a vacuum of rank & file eyes and ears on District Council projects and led directly to increased fraud, corruption, extortion, bribery, kick-backs and fraud upon the Benefit Trust Funds;

8) WHEREAS, the UBCJA International, the District Council have willfully & wantonly failed to expunge illegal provisions within the UBCJA Constitution and District Council By-laws which fail to comply with Federal law, settled NLRB, Appellate Court & U.S. Supreme Court precedent Decisions & Orders, and whereas, the District Councils in-house legal counsel has failed to vet same and strike illegal provisions under the existing severability clause;

9) WHEREAS; the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., have presented a DRAFT CBA which had 52-blank pages; and, whereas, the Electronic Reporting and Verification System Vendor presentation can and should be incorporated into the Benefit Trust Fund By-laws in

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the first instance and does not directly or expressly effect Contractor Hiring or the District Council Referral procedures;

10) WHEREAS, the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters have failed to demonstrate “EXCLUSIVE” or “MAJORITY” status as required by NLRA Sec. 9(a) and have willfully & wantonly refused to turn-over definitive proof of majority status by signed Authorization Cards;

11) WHEREAS, the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc, and District Council in house Legal Counsel have included within the DRAFT CBA an illegal Maintenance of Membership clause via ART. V, Sec. 2, and an “Authorization” demand via ART. V, Sec. 5, page 15 of the contract (CBA) submitted February 27, 2012 section for Dues and Assessments deductions found to be illegal under the Blue Card Vacation Wage extortion which the UBCJA International and District Council kept alive during the UBCJA’s Trusteeship from August 5, 2009 through January 12, 2012 and beyond – through to July 2012 after it was long proven to violate Federal Law and settled precedent of the NLRB Appellate & Supreme Courts; [Exhibit # 1 attached]

12) WHEREAS, Prong 1 of the Consent Decree requires the elimination of Racketeering; and, Prong 2 requires the Restoration of Democracy and the New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc., and other Multi-Employer Contractor Associations have failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree for Hiring/Referrals and/or otherwise failed to control Contractor corruption via the fostering of Hiring Ratio’s and Work Force percentage’s they have collectively championed for 19-years, under the former and current U.S.A.O. and I.R.O and R.O. and said corruption has continued unabated, ad-nausea;

NOW THEREFORE, IN DUE CONSIDERATION OF ITEMS NUMBERED 1-12; And UNDER THE INHERENT AUTHORITY OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

A) The Final Order & Judgment of Contempt and Remedy” (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 by Judge Charles Haight, wherein the Contractors were awarded 67% Hiring/Referral and the rank & file Union Carpenter working from the District Council OWL were limited to 33% Hiring/Referral, that said order being in contravention to the Public Policy of the United States of America, as declared by the preamble to the NLRA (1935), The Wagner Act; and, NLRA Section 7 and having failed to control or deter contractor corruption and fraud and, that the 67% - 33% Hiring Ratio be changed or modified as follows:

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NYCDCC Union Carpenters working from the list shall be allowed a Hiring/Referral ratio or percentage of 90% with 10% being reserved for direct Company hires for card carrying General Superintendents, Assistant Superintendents, General Foreman, Foreman and 2-key traveling non-working members, as is practiced by multiple other trades within New York City and the outer Boroughs; and/or an Order for no less than 70% NYCDCC Union Carpenters working from the District Council OWL, with the 30% balance reserved for the aforementioned Company/Contractor Association permanent employees and supervisors described above.

Respectfully submitted,

Demian Schroeder

358 NLRB No. 73 June 27, 2012 Comeau, Inc and Automated Systems Workers (AWS) Local 1123 affiliated with Carpenters Industrial Council and United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America & Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters (MRCC)

DUES CHECKOFF/AUTHORIZATION FORMS, pg. 4/26

3. We agree with the judge, for the reasons he set forth, that Comau violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees Nizar Akkari and Gasper Calandrino with discipline or discharge if they did not execute dues-check off authorization forms for the CEA.

We further agree with the judge, for the reasons he gave and for the additional reasons set forth

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below, that Comau and the CEA violated Section 8(a) (1) and Section 8(b)(1)(A), respectively, by making statements and engaging in other conduct that had a reasonable tendency to coerce employee Jeffrey T. Brown to execute a dues check off authorization form.

*An employer may not lead employees to believe that the dues-check off authorization method of fulfilling financial obligations to their union is compulsory. Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997). The Board has repeatedly held that “the Act guarantees to each employee the right to determine for himself, free from coercion, whether he shall sign a check off authorization or not.” Herman Bros., Inc., 264 NLRB 439, 442 (1982).13

“Any conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970)._____________________________________

* Neither may a Union

http://www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-052614

PROPOSED ORDEREXHIBIT 1

90-Civ. #5722

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