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Birth, death and truth: an essay in memory of EmmanuelChukwudi Eze

MB Ramose

University of South AfricaDepartment of Philosophy

P. O. Box 392UNISA 0003

Email: ramosmb@unisa.ac.za

AbstractThe birth of a particular individual is contingent even though the doctrine of

creation out of nothing teaches otherwise. Birth is an ontological invitation

alerting the individual to inevitable death. In the intervening period along the

path to death the individual is locked in the existential quest for truth. During

his lifetime Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, was engaged in the complex quest for

truth. His engagement in the search of the truth of and about Africa elevated

him to the status of one of the distinguished philosophers Africa has ever

produced. This essay is in memory of Eze as an African philosopher, a phi-

losopher engaged in the truth of and about post-colonial Africa.

IntroductionThe birth of Eze is recorded in many biographies (http://en.wikipedia.org./wiki/Em-manuel Chukwudi Eze). Though contingent, birth in Africa and some other cultures iscelebrated as a welcome moment. It is welcome to the world. No doubt there are con-ceivably other cultures in which birth is regarded as a point of entry into suffering withtransitory pleasure. On this view, birth is a moment of mourning. It is outside thescope of this essay to consider this latter view. For us the crucial point is that Eze was

born. The trajectory of his birth included his formal training in the discipline of philos-ophy. As a philosopher, Eze lectured in the field, participated in numerous philosophyconferences and produced many writings in the subject. Indeed, he edited the book,

Postcolonial African Philosophy and wrote the introduction thereof. One of his pri-mary concerns in the introduction is to understand and define the meaning of post inthe expression, postcolonial. He submits that the post of the postcolonial

serves as a signal and pointer to the (in many parts of Africa) unfulfilleddreams of the independence achievements of the 1960s. (Eze 1997: p. 6)

In this way Eze poses a double-edged question, namely; (i) what were the aims of the

independence of Africa? and, (ii) why were some of the aims not achieved? For thepurposes of this essay, this double-edged question constitutes the substance of Ezessearch for the truth of and about Africa. It is to Eze as the seeker of this two-fold butcomplex truth that I wish to turn. In pursuing this I wish to re-member Eze. To returnhim from the silence of death and thus reinstate him as a member of the ongoing con-versation or dialogue on the truth about postcolonial Africa.

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Memory: a lost struggle against death?In his celebrated novel, Lemonas Tale, Ken Sarowiwa contemplates birth and submitsthat children do not choose their parents. But this reflection must be complemented

by the correlative insight that parents do not choose their children apart from formaladoption. In this we discern that there is no market place of children or parents that ei-ther can visit to make their choice of parent or child before birth. The ontological im-

possibility of choosing beforehand ones parent or child speaks to the metaphysicalidea that birth and, indeed, life is contingent. The reluctance to accept contingency andadmit that humans, like so many other living entities, are no more than vital dust 1 ismanifested by many teleological theories imputing pre-ordained purpose and meaningto life. This reluctance is displayed particularly when death strikes. At this moment re-membering or memory takes many forms, for example, speeches or funeral orations,weeping, erection of tombstones including the construction of pyramids enduring the

passage of time. Remembering in this way is an attempt to overcome the transitorinessof birth. It is an attempt to deny death both its sting and its victory. No doubt in somecultures death has no sting since it is conceived as the happy return to life without suf-fering. Again, it is outside the scope of the present essay to deal with this conceptionof death. We shall concentrate on the former which understands death as the unhappyend of the path of birth. Does memory, as an act of remembering conquer death?When we stop to re-member and simply forget the deceased individual in what waydoes the individual continue to live? It would seem that oblivion is the final judge con-signing all dead individuals to the inaccessible black hole of infinity. Despite this, Iwrite this essay in the hope that Ezes death is an invitation to us to continue tore-member him into the longest and widest future of Africa and humankind. In thisway his engagement in the search of the truth of and about Africa will remain anenduring reality for those of us who have survived him.

Truth as experience and Idea

Long before Pontius Pilate asked Jesus the question: what is truth, humankind was al-ready in search for truth. It is indeed tempting to suggest that humankind was in searchfor the truth. Yet, there is a difference between truth and the truth. The latter inclinesto the view that the truth about anything is already in waiting to be grasped andgrabbed by those who have the light to see it. This line of reasoning rests more on theunderstanding that the truth is immutable and eternal. As such it speaks more toPlatos famous world of Forms or Ideas. Understanding the truth in this manner is

problematical in many ways. One of the problems is the high susceptibility to dogma-tism. In its turn dogmatism encourages dictation and imposition thereby blocking dis-cussion and conversation. There is no indication in his introduction to Postcolonial Af-rican Philosophy that Eze is in any way sympathetic to this understanding of the truth.On the contrary, in his search of the truth of and about Africa Eze argues for dialogue

between Europe and Africa in these terms:

And since the imperial and the colonial domination of Africa were, at root, con-

stitutive elements in the historical formation of the economic, political, and cul-tural expressions of the Age of Europe, including the Enlightenment, it is im-

perative that, when we study the nature and the dynamic of European moder-nity, we examine the intellectual and the philosophical productions of the time

1 The expression is a direct borrowing from Christian de Duves book under the title, Vital Dust.

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in order to understand how, in too many cases, they justified imperialism andcolonialism. (Eze 1997: p. 6)

The intellectual and philosophical productions of the time, including the Enlighten-ment must be examined because some of them are living examples of the invention ofAfrica and the construction of the idea of Africa (Mudimbe 1988, 1994). Such inven-tions and constructions often served as justification for the colonization and enslave-ment of the peoples of Africa. It is precisely through a critical interrogation of this jus-tification that African thinkers today are called upon

to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, andcontest identities imposed upon them by Europeans. (Eze 1997: p.12).

The imposition of identities is by no means a trivial matter. It is the concretization ofpower through naming. By giving a name to an aspect of reality those who do so arro-gate unto themselves the power to define and describe that reality. Acceptance of suchdefinition and description often entails practical consequences and these may not al-ways be to the benefit of the named. To challenge imposed identities is in effect toquestion the power of the name giver and, ultimately to reverse the adverse negativeconsequences that flow from the imposed identity. This may be exemplified by the

practice of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa especially from thelate 1960s. One of the activities of the Movement was to question the acceptability andvalidity of christian (Soyinka 1999: p. 32) names given to Black people at baptism.The point of argument was that once a Black person is named Mologadi by the parentsthen this name is valid and need not be replaced by the so called christian name ofMary. As a result of this questioning, many children born under the influence of theBlack Consciousness Movement in South Africa were given names such Nkululeko,Sefenyiwe, Nqobile or Koketso.

There is no doubt that the naming ceremony is very important in many cultures ofAfrica. Naming in these cultures is also significant in view of the triadic relationship

between the living, the living-dead and the yet-to-be-born. Against this background,complemented by the deliberate intention to challenge the power of the colonial namegiver, it is suggested that in writing about the Igbo culture on name giving Okere isimplicitly writing about many other cultures in Africa. He writes that:

Igbo names always bear a message, a meaning, a history, a record or a prayer.This is also to say that they embody a rich mine of information on the peoplesreflection and considered comment on life and reality. They provide a windowinto the Igbo world of values as well as their peculiar conceptual apparatus fordealing with life. Obviously their range of application spans the whole of lifeitself the names themselves demonstrate the power of the special techniquedevised by an illiterate culture to put into record some of the best thoughts andideas of its heritage.

(Okere 1996: p. 133 & 147)

And so do the above names given as examples in South Africa; they all have a bearingon the meaning and history of the struggle for liberation. They mean respectively Free-dom, Thou shalt not be conquered, Victory and Addition, that is, an addition to theforces engaged in the struggle for freedom.

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The necessity of dialogueFor Eze, a critical dialogue between Africa and Europe is necessary in discovering thetruth of and about Africa. Because of its dialogical character the search for the truth isin reality the search for truth. For this truth shall emerge out of the experience of theinteractive encounter between Africans and Europeans. In this sense truth is a con-struction arising out of the contemporaneous convergence of perception and action(Bohm 1994: p. 181). It is dialogue proper. For

In dialogue the value systems, experiences, analysis, synthesis and paradigmsof understanding of the other are welcome to inspire the process of a genuinedialogue, and are breathed, grasped and absorbed by it. It carries an openness tore-contemplating ones own stance and understanding. A genuine dialogue iseager for any external impetus, which suggests new explorations of order to

transcend another orbit of perception. In a dialogue, we are thus finally speak-ing to ourselves as well as through the medium of the other, since it invari-ably culminates in a new self-understanding. This radical change becomes pos-sible only if we are able to understand the others perspective(Jalali 2003: p.19).

In it is in this sense of dialogue that we should understand Ezes term to combat.

Africas independence: reality and illusionIt is common cause that the term Africa as a referent to the geographic expanse knownas such today is problematical in many ways. For African scholars like Ali Mazrui,this term is used only under protest and so does the present author. It is interesting thatin the introduction to postcolonial African philosophy Eze does not problematize theterm at all. The problematization is crucial since the name Africa is an imposition evenin Ezes own terms.

Colonisation is the experience and context out of which the struggle for the inde-

pendence of Africa was born. Colonisation itself was an unprovoked act of violence. Itcannot be justified on the terms of the just war doctrine. One of the consequences ofthe unjustifiability of colonization in terms of the just war doctrine is the demand forthe reversal of its adverse consequences on Africa. Concretely, this means the restora-tion of full and unencumbered sovereignty, reparations and compensation to decolo-nized Africa (Ramose 2003: p 463 500). The April 1994 Kampala conference onreparations to Africa was in part the reiteration of these concrete demands of naturaland historical justice. It is significant that this conference took place more than thirtyseven years after the independence of most of Africa and on the eve of the extensionof democracy to every population group in South Africa. Concerning the former, it isan implicit admission of Ezes insightful observation that the dreams of the independ-ence of Africa are yet to come true. With regard to the latter, it underlines the vital

point that by accepting government instead of state succession at the transition totrans-ethnic and colour-blind democracy, Black South Africa failed to learn from the

independence experience of other African countries. Accordingly, the dream of a lib-erated South Africa, currently imprisoned in an ill-timed constitutional supremacy, isyet to come true.

The apparently voluntary option by African countries for government succession de-nied Africa economic freedom at independence. Economic power at independence re-mained and continues to be vested in the hands of the successors in title to the unde-

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served economic privileges and benefits acquired initially at conquest in the unjustwars of colonization. In this way Africa was elevated to the status of political masterof her own affairs but reduced to an economic slave of the former colonial power. Thislegacy of Kwame Nkrumahs famous seek ye the political kingdom first and the restshall be added unto you, must continue to be examined and challenged if the politicaland economic exploitations that Eze stood against must be combatted. Ironically,

Nkrumah argued in some of his writings that political independence without economicindependence was empty. Yet, he allowed Ghana to opt only for political independ-ence. Ali Mazrui, one of the earliest analysts of this African condition described it ap-

positely as Africas transition from slavery by coercion to slavery by consent. It is thisparadoxical consent which has plunged independent Africa into the abyss of materialand intellectual poverty to date. In this situation, the African philosopher is calledupon to explode the myth that the widespread deadly but preventable poverty in Africais a natural condition established by divine ordination. In this way the African philoso-

pher engaged in the struggle to explode this myth shall make a solid contribution tothe second liberation struggle inaugurated by the concession to the politicalindependence of Africa. Keeping alive the memory of Eze is continuing this secondliberation until we meet him at the rendezvous of victory.

Another aspect of Africas second liberation struggle is philosophic and practicalracism. This was one of Ezes greatest concerns as his well considered article, Thecolor of reason: the idea of race in Kants anthropology shows. Indeed reason wasused in Western philosophy as the distinctive quality justifying the erection of the

boundary between humans and non-humans. Even before the Enlightenment, Aris-totles definition of man as a rational animal was used in the service of this boundaryin order to justify colonization and the enslavement of the African, the Amerindianand the Australasians. The bull of Pope Paul III, Sublimis Deus, declared boldly andunambiguously that all men are rational animals (Hanke 1937: p. 71-72). By this the

bull demolished theoretically the arbitrary boundary separating the European humans

from the putative non-human colonized peoples. But in practice, Sublimis Deus neitherobliterated nor overcame the apparent instinctive racism of the West. In the past thisracism was pursued under the standard bearer of the mission to civilize. Today it ismuted under the seemingly benign hierarchy separating the first and third worlds inthe name of development. But the promise of development is a subtle device to sustainthe development of the underdevelopment of Africa for the greater benefit of her for-mer colonizers as well as the new comers eager to exploit Africa. This modern racismunder the guise of development is supported by the far from just terms of internationaltrade contained in the various instruments of the World Trade Organization. On thisreasoning, Ezes struggle against racism is simultaneously a struggle for justice in thedomain of international economic relations.

One other aspect of Africas second liberation struggle is democracy. Ezes concernover this is reflected in his debate with Kwasi Wiredu contained in the same book,Postcolonial African Philosophy. The debate is relevant for our time for many reasons.

One is that it occurs at a time when the West and other countries impose democratiza-tion as a condition for providing development aid to Africa. But the imposition is attimes waived if African tyrants are able and effective defenders of Western economicinterests. Thus double standards is one of the problems pertaining to democratiza-tion. Another problem is that the imposition of democratization is the implanting ofa model of governance that is not by necessity consistent with indigenous African cul-

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ture on governance. Kwasi Wiredu argues plausibly and persuasively in his plea for ahomegrown African consensual democracy that there is no necessary connection be-tween democracy and the multiparty system (Wiredu 1997: p. 308). His argument iscrucial at the epistemic and political levels. At the former level, it is the reaffirmationof the indigenous African modes of knowing and doing even if they may require adap-tation and adjustment to modern conditions. At the latter level, it questions the as-sumption that the West has the power to impose its understanding of democracy onAfrica. It is in the light of these considerations that the imposition of democratiza-tion must be challenged. In 1994 South Africa experienced complete and comprehen-sive democratization. But this did not necessarily lead to governance vested witheconomic power to overcome the widespread deadly but preventable poverty underwhich the vast majority of the population continues to live. In challenging the imposi-tion of democratization and, in the critique of democracy it is crucial for African

philosophers to bear in mind that democracy is a means par excellence. I am awarethat this submission is contrary to Ezes predilection for democracy as a formalframework (Eze 1997: p. 320 321). It is this contradiction to Eze which contributesto keeping his memory alive.

Requiescat in pace

Perhaps it is now time to pronounce a requiescat in pace for Eze, to wish that he restsin peace since he is no longer physically with us. In this way we are acknowledginghis absence. But he is present to us and with us because we keep and preserve him inour memory. In this domain of remembrance, Eze is not resting in peace. He is stimu-lating, challenging and encouraging us to take the African condition seriously in orderto change it for the better. The more the condition becomes better the greater anddeeper the challenge to preserve and sustain the gains already made and to improveupon such gains in order to make them best. And so the struggle for the liberation of

Africa shall never come to an end because the new conditions brought about bychange shall demand new solutions. Accordingly, our conversations with Eze shallnever cease and our incessant engagement with his thoughts will be a tribute allowingus to say to him, well done son of the soil, requiescat in pace.

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Hanke, L. 1937. Pope Paul III and the American Indians, Harvard Theological Re-

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