329821 Ch01 pp3 - Cengage · Many are also struggling, often under intense pres-sure, to build democratic governments in very difficult economic and social circumstances and after

P A R T 1

IntroductionC H A P T E R 1

I n t roduc ingCompara t i ve Po l i t i c s

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 2

Cengage Learning

C H A P T E R 1

IntroducingComparativePoliticsMark Kesselman, Joel Krieger, and William A. Joseph

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 3

Cengage Learning

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 4

Cengage Learning

When did our current era begin? Although a precisemoment might be hard to identify, a frequently citeddate is 1989, which marked the crumbling of the BerlinWall. Until then, the wall separated communist-controlled East Berlin from West Berlin. More broadly,it separated the two Germanies: the German Democra-tic Republic, allied with the Soviet Union, and the Fed-eral Republic of Germany, part of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) alliance. At the mostgeneral level, the wall served as a powerful symbol ofthe division of the world into a communist bloc ofcountries, under the control of the Soviet Union, and the“Western” world, led by the United States. The collapseof the Berlin Wall swiftly ushered in a series of peace-ful revolutions against the communist party-states ofEast Central Europe and the Soviet Union. The implo-sion of these regimes, and their replacement by govern-ments proclaiming a commitment to democratic rule,marked the end of the grim and sometimes deadly coldwar that had pitted the Soviet and American alliancesagainst one another in many parts of the world.

At about the time when the Berlin Wall came tum-bling down, an important and controversial analysis ofworld events was published with an audacious title,“The End of History?”1 For its author, FrancisFukuyama, the failure of communism was of historicsignificance not only in itself, but also because it sig-nified the end of any feasible alternative to Western-style regimes, that is, regimes that combine capitalistorganization of the economy with a democratic politi-cal system. There was, he claimed, only one model ofpolitical and economic development for the world. Healso claimed that history had ended, in the sense thatnever again would there be the kind of global strugglebetween competing ideologies that had marked previ-ous eras and that, in the twentieth century alone, hadled to two world wars and the cold war. He did recog-nize that the political and economic transitions to thisnew era would not be easy for many countries. He pre-dicted that because of deeply entrenched nationalistand ethnic cleavages many parts of the world could noteasily escape history and would “be a terrain of con-flict for many years to come.”

Was Fukuyama correct? Proving that “history”has ended is a long-term proposition. But in the shortrun, his analysis, despite its underlying ethnocentrictriumphalism (We won!), does point to several crucialissues that present the contemporary world with bothpromise and peril in the uncertain international orderfollowing the cold war. Nearly every country (only afew isolated nations like North Korea and Burma areexceptions) faces the challenges of adjusting to aglobal economic system totally dominated by devel-oped capitalist countries and international organiza-tions committed to promoting free market capitalism.Many are also struggling, often under intense pres-sure, to build democratic governments in very difficulteconomic and social circumstances and after decadesof authoritarian rule. And Fukuyama was certainlyright—as the ethnic cleansing and genocide inRwanda and the Sudan painfully remind us—that his-torically rooted antagonisms continue to exact a terri-ble toll in some countries and still fester just belowthe surface in many others.

By the year 2000, a new and distinctive lens foranalyzing politics within and among countries seemedto be gaining great attention. This lens was globaliza-tion. The key new question that promised to dominatethe political agenda of the early twenty-first centurywas whether the processes of globalization—theglobal diffusion of investment, trade, production, andelectronic communication technologies—would pro-mote a worldwide diffusion of opportunity andenhance human development or whether it wouldreinforce the comparative advantages of the moreprosperous and powerful nations, transnational corpo-rations, and peoples; undermine local cultures; andintensify regional conflicts.

These issues are very much with us today andframe the country studies in this book. Yet the terror-ist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the UnitedStates and their aftermath have forced us to rethink, atleast in part, the meaning of globalization. BeforeSeptember 11, the economic aspects of globalizationclaimed major attention. Since 9/11, political and mil-itary concerns have been at the forefront, involving

5

Section B The Global Challenge of Comparative Politics

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 5

Cengage Learning

issues such as how U.S. power will recast global al-liances and affect both national politics and people’slives throughout the world. We have also learned thatinternational terror networks (another and especiallysinister example of globalization) can strike any-where—from the World Trade Center in New Yorkand the Pentagon in Washington to a nightclub inBali, Indonesia; and from a train station in Madrid,Spain, to an elementary school in Beslan, Russia, orin the subway and on a bus in London. Global politicshas been transformed by 9/11. Security concerns havebeen placed at the top of nearly every government’sagenda and transformed domestic politics. The war onterrorism has reshaped geopolitical alliances and redi-rected American foreign policy.

With wide international support and near-unanim-ity at home, the United States launched an attack inOctober 2001 on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,which, President George W. Bush claimed, harboredthe organization Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama BinLaden, who had masterminded the September 11 at-tacks. International solidarity quickly dissolved, how-ever, after the swift victory in Afghanistan of the coali-tion led by the United States. Despite the strongopposition of most governments and world publicopinion, President Bush and prominent administrationofficials—as well as key allies such as Britain’s primeminister Tony Blair—declared that there was irrefu-table evidence that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hus-sein possessed, and could rapidly deploy, weapons ofmass destruction, including nuclear, biological, andchemical armaments, and that there were close linksbetween Iraq and Al Qaeda. In 2003, the United States,Britain, and several other countries attacked Saddam’sgovernment, and “victory” quickly followed. How-ever, establishing order and reconstructing Iraq provedfar harder than toppling Saddam. Several years afterPresident Bush declared in May 2003 that major com-bat operations were over, military hostilities in Iraqcontinued to claim the lives of Iraqi insurgents and cit-izens, as well as American, British, and other troopsstationed there.

The events following September 11 have not re-placed concerns about economic globalization. In-stead, we are challenged to develop a more complexunderstanding of globalization and how it frames bothpolitics and the study of comparative politics. More-

over, the momentous events of the past few years haveled many people to conclude that Fukuyama was pre-mature and naive to predict that the history of globalideological conflict has ended.

Globalization and Comparative PoliticsThe terms globalization and global era are everywhereapplied as general catch phrases to identify the growingdepth, extent, and diversity of cross-border connectionsthat are a key characteristic of the contemporary world.Discussion of globalization begins with accounts ofeconomic activities, including the reorganization ofproduction and the global redistribution of the workforce (the “global factory”), as well as the increased ex-tent and intensity of international trade, finance, andforeign direct investment. Globalization also involvesthe movement of peoples due to migration, employ-ment, business, and educational opportunities.2

Globalization includes other profound changesthat are less visible but equally significant. For exam-ple, new applications of information technology (suchas the Internet and CNN) blur the traditional distinc-tion between what is around the block and what isaround the world—instantly transforming culturesand eroding the boundaries between the local andglobal. These technologies make instantaneous com-munication possible and link producers and contrac-tors, headquarters, branch plants, and suppliers in realtime anywhere in the world. Employees may berooted in time and place, but employers can take ad-vantage of the ebb and flow of a global labor market.A secure job today may be gone tomorrow. Globaliza-tion fosters insecurity in everyday life and presentsextraordinary challenges to governments in all coun-tries, large and small, rich and poor.

The dilemma that globalization represents for thepost–cold war world can be illustrated by the theme“Global Inequalities” chosen by the American Politi-cal Science Association (the official organization ofAmerican political scientists) for its 2004 AnnualMeeting. The program announcement for the Meetingdeclared, “While inequalities are hardly new, their rel-evance has become newly visible as the fading mem-ory of the Cold War is replaced by the omnipresenceof various North-South clashes. This invites system-atic reflection. The enormous concentration of wealth

6 CHAPTER 1 Introducing Comparative Politics

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 6

Cengage Learning

and power in some parts of the world coexists with themarginalization of other countries and people.”3 Themajor source of international tensions has shiftedfrom the East-West ideological conflict (betweencommunist powers and capitalist democracies) to aNorth-South split between the “have” nations, oftencalled the “North” because most developed countriesare located in the northern hemisphere, against the“have not” nations, many of which are clustered in thesouthern half of the globe.

Globalization has forged new forms of interna-tional governance, from the European Union (EU) tothe World Trade Organization (WTO), in an at-tempt to regulate and stabilize the myriad flows ofglobalization. An alphabet soup of other organizationsand agreements—such as UNDP, IMF, IBRD, OECD,NAFTA, and APEC,4 to name but a few—have alsobeen enlisted in this attempt.

Globalization has also provoked challenges fromgrassroots movements in every region of the worldthat are concerned with its negative impact on, forexample, poor people, the environment, and laborrights. The first such challenge occurred when theWorld Trade Organization sponsored a meeting ofgovernment ministers in Seattle in 1999 that was dis-rupted by fifty thousand protesters. Ever since then,conferences called to develop rules for global com-merce have been the site of demonstrations by coali-tions of environmental, labor-based, and communityactivists from around the world. Thus, to Seattle, onecan add the names of cities on many continents—Washington, D.C., Prague, Genoa, Miami, and Can-cun—where activists have assembled to protest theactivity of international financial institutions. Onecan also identify sites, notably, Mumbai, India, andPorto Alegre, Brazil, where activists from around theworld have assembled annually to exchange ideasand develop alternatives to the current form of eco-nomic globalization.5

All of these globalization processes complicatepolitics, just as they erode the ability of even thestrongest countries to control their destinies. No statecan secure the economic security and general well-being of its citizens in isolation from the rest of theworld. None can preserve pristine national models ofeconomic governance or distinctly national cultures,values, understandings of the world, or narratives that

define a people and forge their unity. Many of themost important problems confronting governmentsare related to globalization, including pandemics likeAIDS, global climate change, financial panics, and in-ternational terrorism. Although these problems maybe global in scope, a government’s popularity with itsown people depends in considerable measure on howsuccessfully it addresses these problems at home.

It is clear that countries face a host of challengessimultaneously from above and below. The capacitiesof states to control domestic outcomes and assert sov-ereignty are compromised by regional and globaltechnological and market forces, as well as by grow-ing security concerns. The very stability and viabilityof many countries are simultaneously assaulted byethnic, nationalist, and religious divisions that ofteninvolve both internal and external components. Thebright line separating domestic and international poli-tics has been rubbed out by the complex set of cross-border economic, cultural, technological, governance,and security processes, institutions, and relations thatconstitute the contemporary global order.

Making Sense of Turbulent TimesThe flash of newspaper headlines and television soundbites, the upheavals, rush of events, and sheer range andcomplexity of the cross-border phenomena of global-ization tend to make politics look overwhelming andchaotic beyond comprehension. Although the study ofcomparative politics can help us understand currentevents in a rapidly changing world, it involves muchmore than snapshot analysis or Monday-morning quar-terbacking. Introduction to Comparative Politics de-scribes and analyzes in detail the government and poli-tics of a range of countries and identifies commonthemes in their development that explain longer-termcauses of both changes and continuities. The book pro-vides cross-national comparisons and explanationsbased on four themes that we believe are central for un-derstanding politics in today’s world:

• The historical formation, internal organization, andinteraction of states within the international order

• The role of the state in economic management• The spread of democracy and the challenges of

democratization

SECTION 1 The Global Challenge of Comparative Politics 7

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 7

Cengage Learning

• The sources and political impact of diverse collec-tive identities, including class, gender, ethnicity,and religion.

We also expect that these four themes will be use-ful for analyzing where the countries discussed inthis book may be heading politically in the twenty-first century. Moreover, the themes illustrate howcomparative politics can serve as a valuable tool formaking political sense of even the most tumultuoustimes. The contemporary period presents an extraor-dinary challenge to those who study comparative pol-itics, but the study of comparative politics also pro-vides a unique opportunity for understanding thisuncertain era.

In order to appreciate the complexity of politicsand political transitions in countries around the world,we must look beyond any single national perspective.Today, business and trade, information technology,mass communications and culture, immigration andtravel, as well as politics, forge deep connections—aswell as deep divisions—among people worldwide. It

is particularly urgent that we develop a truly globalperspective as we explore the politics of differentcountries and their growing interdependence on oneanother.

There is an added benefit: by comparing politicalinstitutions, values, and processes in countriesaround the world, the student of comparative politicsacquires analytical skills that can be used at home.After you study comparative politics, you begin tothink comparatively. As comparison becomes morefamiliar, you will hopefully look at the politics ofyour own country differently, with a wider focus andnew insights.

The contemporary world provides a fascinatinglaboratory for the study of comparative politics andgives unusual significance to the subject. We hope thatyou share our sense of excitement in the challengingeffort to understand the complex and ever-shifting ter-rain of contemporary politics throughout the world.We begin by exploring what comparative politics ac-tually compares and how comparative study enhancesour understanding of politics generally.


To “compare and contrast” is one of the most com-mon human mental exercises, whether in the class-room study of literature or politics or animal behav-ior—or in selecting dorm rooms or listing yourfavorite movies. In the observation of politics, the useof comparisons is very old, dating in the Westernworld to at least from Aristotle, the ancient Greekphilosopher. Aristotle categorized Greek city-statesin the fourth century B.C. according to their form ofpolitical rule: rule by a single individual, rule by afew, or rule by all citizens. He also added a normativedimension (a claim about how societies should beruled) by distinguishing (“contrasting”) good fromcorrupt versions of each type, according to whetherthose with power ruled in the interest of the commonwelfare of all citizens or only in their own interest.The modern study of comparative politics refines andsystematizes the age-old practice of evaluating somefeature of X by comparing it to the same feature of Y

in order to learn more about it than isolated studywould permit.

Comparative politics is a subfield within the aca-demic discipline of political science as well as amethod or approach to the study of politics.6 The sub-ject matter of comparative politics is the domestic pol-itics of countries or peoples. Within the discipline ofpolitical science, comparative politics is one of four ar-eas of specialization. In addition to comparative poli-tics, most political science (or government) depart-ments in U.S. colleges and universities include coursesand academic specialists in three other fields: politicaltheory, international relations, and American politics.

Because it is widely believed that students living inthe United States should study American politics in-tensively and with special focus, it is usually treated asa separate subfield of political science. The pattern ofdistinguishing the study of politics at home from thestudy of politics abroad is also common elsewhere, so

Section c What—and How—Comparative Politics Compares

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 8

Cengage Learning

students in Canada may be expected to study Canadianpolitics as a distinct specialty, and Japanese studentswould be expected to master Japanese politics.

However, there is no logical reason that study ofthe United States should not be included within thefield of comparative politics—and good reason to doso. In fact, many important studies in comparativepolitics (and an increasing number of courses) haveintegrated the study of American politics with thestudy of politics in other countries.7 Comparativestudy can place U.S. politics into a much richer per-spective and at the same time make it easier to recog-nize what is distinctive and most interesting aboutother countries.

Special mention should be made of the distinctionbetween comparative politics and international rela-tions. Comparative politics involves comparing domes-tic political institutions, processes, policies, conflicts,and attitudes in different countries; international rela-tions involves the study of the foreign policy of and in-teractions among countries, the role of internationalorganizations such as the United Nations, and thegrowing influence of a wide range of global actorsfrom multinational corporations to terrorist networks.In a globalized world, the distinction sometimes be-comes questionable, and there is a large gray zonewhere the two fields overlap. In 2005, the U.S. govern-ment announced that it would phase out subsidies fordomestic cotton farmers in order to comply with a rul-ing by the World Trade Organization (WTO), an orga-nization to which the United States belongs that isdesigned to facilitate cross-border trade and invest-ment. Did this decision fall within the field of compar-ative politics or the field of international relations? Theanswer is both.8

However, it makes sense to maintain the distinc-tion between comparative politics and internationalrelations. Much of the world’s political activity con-tinues to occur within state borders, and comparisonsof domestic politics, institutions, and processes enableus to understand critical features that distinguish onecountry’s politics from another. Furthermore, we be-lieve that, despite increased international economicintegration (a key aspect of globalization), nationalstates are the fundamental building blocks in structur-ing political activity. Therefore Introduction to Com-

parative Politics is built around in-depth case studiesof a cross-section of important countries around theworld.

The comparative approach principally analyzessimilarities and differences among countries by fo-cusing on selected institutions and processes. Asstudents of comparative politics (we call ourselvescomparativists), we believe that we cannot makereliable statements about most political situations bylooking at only one case. We often hear statementssuch as: “The United States has the best health caresystem in the world.” Comparativists immediatelywonder what kinds of health care systems exist inother countries, what they cost and how they are fi-nanced, who is covered by health insurance, and soon. Besides, what does “best” mean when it comesto health care systems? Is it the one that provides thewidest access? The one that is the most technologi-cally advanced? The one that is the most cost-effec-tive? The one that produces the healthiest popula-tion? None of us would announce the best movie orthe best car without considering other alternatives ordeciding what specific factors enter into our judg-ment.

Comparativists often analyze political institu-tions or processes by looking at two or more casesthat are selected to isolate their common and con-trasting features. The analysis involves comparingsimilar aspects of politics in more than one country.For example, a comparativist might analyze the sim-ilarities and differences in the executive branches ofgovernment in the United States, Britain, andCanada.9 Some comparative political studies take athematic approach and analyze broad issues, such asthe causes and consequences of nationalist move-ments or revolutions in different countries.10 Com-parative studies may also involve comparisons of aninstitution, policy, or process through time, in one orseveral countries. For example, some studies haveanalyzed a shift in the orientation of economicpolicy that occurred in many advanced capitalistcountries in the 1980s from Keynesianism, an ap-proach that gives priority to government regulationof certain aspects of the economy, to neoliberalism,which emphasizes the importance of market-friendlypolicies.11

SECTION 2 What—and How—Comparative Politics Compares 9

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 9

Cengage Learning

Level of AnalysisComparisons can be useful for political analysis at several different levels. Political scientists oftencompare developments in different cities, regions,provinces, or states. Comparative analysis can also fo-cus on specific institutions in different countries, suchas the legislature, executive, political parties, socialmovements, or court systems, as well as specificprocesses and policies. The organization of Introduc-tion to Comparative Politics reflects our belief that thebest way to begin the study of comparative politics iswith countries. Countries comprise distinct, politi-cally defined territories that encompass political insti-tutions, cultures, economies, and ethnic and other so-cial identities. Although often highly divided byinternal conflicts, countries have historically been themost important source of a people’s collective politi-cal identity, and they are the major arena for orga-nized political action in the modern world.

Within a given country, the state is almost alwaysthe most powerful cluster of institutions. But just whatis the state? The way the term is used in comparativepolitics is probably unfamiliar to many students. In theUnited States, it usually refers to the states in the federalsystem—Texas, California, and so on. But in compara-tive politics, the state refers to the key political institu-tions responsible for making, implementing, enforcing,and adjudicating important policies in a country.12 Thus,we use phrases such as the “German state” and the“Mexican state.” In many ways, the state is synonymouswith what is often called the “government.”

The most important state institutions are the na-tional executive—usually, the president and/or primeminister and the cabinet—but in some cases, the ex-ecutive includes the Communist Party leader (such asin China), the head of a military government (as inNigeria until 1999), or the supreme religious leader(as in the Islamic Republic of Iran). Other key stateinstitutions include the military, police, administrativebureaucracy, the legislature, and courts.

States claim, usually with considerable success,the right to issue rules—notably, laws, administrativeregulations, and court decisions—that are binding forpeople within the country. Even democratic states—inwhich top officials are chosen by procedures that au-thorize all citizens to participate—can survive only if

they can preserve enforcement (or coercive) powersboth internally and with regard to other states and ex-ternal groups that may threaten them. A number ofcountries have highly repressive states whose politicalsurvival depends largely on military and police pow-ers. But even in such states, long-term stability re-quires that the ruling regime have some measure ofpolitical legitimacy; that is, a significant segment ofthe citizenry (in particular, more influential citizensand groups) must believe that the state is entitled tocommand compliance from those who live under itsrule. Political legitimacy is greatly affected by thestate’s ability to deliver the goods through satisfactoryeconomic performance and an acceptable distributionof economic resources. Moreover, in the contempo-rary period, legitimacy seems to require that statesrepresent themselves as democratic in some fashion,whether or not they are in fact. Thus, Introduction toComparative Politics looks closely at both the state’srole in governing the economy and the pressuresexerted on states to develop and extend democraticparticipation.

The fact that states are the fundamental objects ofanalysis in comparative politics does not mean that allstates are the same. Indeed, the organization of state in-stitutions varies widely, and these differences have apowerful impact on political, economic, and social life.Hence, the country studies in this book devote consid-erable attention to variations in institutions of gover-nance, participation, and representation—along withtheir political implications. Each country study beginswith an analysis of how the institutional organizationand political procedures of the state have evolved his-torically. The process of state formation fundamen-tally influences how and why states differ politically.

One critical difference among states that will beexplored in our country studies involves the extent towhich citizens in a country share a common sense ofnationhood, that is, a belief that the state’s geographicboundaries coincides with citizens’ collective identity.When state boundaries and national identity coincide,the resulting formation is called a nation-state. A ma-jor source of political instability is that they often donot coincide. Countries in Introduction to Compara-tive Politics where there is a strong sense of nationalidentity based on existing state boundaries includeFrance, Japan, and the United States.


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 10

Cengage Learning

In many countries around the world, nationalistmovements within a state’s borders challenge existingboundaries and seek to secede to form their own state,sometimes in alliance with movements from neigh-boring countries with whom they claim to share acommon heritage. Such is the case with the Kurds,who have large populations in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq,and have long sought and fought to establish an inde-pendent nation-state of Kurdistan. When a nationalistmovement has distinctive ethnic, religious, and/or lin-guistic ties opposed to those of other groups in thecountry, conflicts are likely to be especially intense.Nationalist movements may pursue their separatistgoal peacefully within established political institu-tions. Or, as we discuss in several of the country stud-ies, they may act outside established institutions andengage in illegal activity, including violence againstpolitical authorities and civilians. One of the majorsources of political instability throughout the worldinvolves nationalist movements challenging estab-lished states. India and Nigeria have, for example, ex-perienced particularly violent episodes of ethno-nationalist conflict.

Causal TheoriesBecause countries are the basic building blocks in poli-tics and because states are the most significant politicalorganizations and actors, these are the two critical unitsfor comparative analysis. The comparativist seeks tomeasure and hopefully explain similarities and differ-ences among countries or states. One influential ap-proach in comparative politics involves developingcausal theories—hypotheses that can be expressed for-mally in a causal mode: “If X happens, then Y will bethe result.” Such theories include factors (the indepen-dent variables, symbolized by X) that are believed toinfluence some outcome (the dependent variable, sym-bolized by Y) to be explained.

For example, it is commonly argued that if a coun-try’s economic pie shrinks, conflict among groups forresources will intensify. This hypothesis suggestswhat is called an inverse correlation between vari-ables: as X varies in one direction, Y varies in the op-posite direction. As the total national economic prod-uct (X) decreases, then political and social conflictover economic shares (Y) increases. This relationship

might be tested by statistical analysis of a very largenumber of cases, a project facilitated in recent yearsby the creation of data banks that include extensivehistorical and contemporary data. Another way tostudy this issue would be to focus on one or severalcountry cases and analyze how the relevant relation-ships have varied historically. Even when explanationdoes not involve the explicit testing of hypotheses(and often it does not), comparativists try to identifysimilarities and differences among countries and todiscover significant patterns.

It is important to recognize the limits on just how“scientific” political science—and thus comparativepolitics—can be. Two important differences exist be-tween the “hard” (or natural) sciences like physics andchemistry and the social sciences. First, social scien-tists study people who exercise free will. Because peo-ple have a margin for free choice, even if one assumesthat they choose in a rational manner, their choices, at-titudes, and behavior cannot be fully explained. Thisdoes not mean that people choose in a totally arbitraryfashion. We choose within the context of material con-straint, institutional dictates, and cultural prescriptions.Comparative politics analyzes how such factors shapepolitical preferences and choices in systematic ways;indeed, a recent study by three political scientists con-cluded that political beliefs are, to a certain degree, ge-netically determined.13 But there will probably alwaysbe a wide gulf between the natural and social sciencesbecause of their different objects of study.

A second difference between the natural and so-cial sciences is that in the natural sciences, experi-mental techniques can be applied to isolate the contri-bution of distinct factors to a particular outcome. It ispossible to change the value or magnitude of a fac-tor—for example, the force applied to an object—andmeasure how the outcome has consequently changed.However, like other social scientists, political scien-tists and comparativists rarely have the opportunity toapply such experimental techniques.

Some political scientists have conducted experi-ments with volunteers in controlled settings. But lab-oratories provide crude approximations of naturalsettings since only one or several variables can be ma-nipulated. The real world of politics, by contrast, con-sists of an endless number of variables, and they can-not easily be isolated or manipulated. Another attempt

SECTION 2 What—and How—Comparative Politics Compares 11

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 11

Cengage Learning

to deal with this problem is by statistical techniquesthat seek to identify the specific causal weight of dif-ferent variables in explaining variations in politicaloutcomes. But it is difficult to measure precisely how,for example, a person’s ethnicity, gender, or incomeinfluences her or his choice when casting a ballot. Norcan we ever know for sure what exact mix of fac-tors—conflicts among elites, popular ideological ap-peals, the weakness of the state, the organizational ca-pacity of rebel leaders, or the discontent of themasses—precipitates a successful revolution. Indeed,different revolutions may result from different config-urations of factors such that one cannot develop a sin-gle theory to explain the origins of all revolutions.

There is a lively debate about whether the socialsciences should seek scientific explanations compara-ble to what prevails in the natural sciences, such asphysics. Some scholars claim that political scientistsshould aim to develop what have been called coveringlaws to explain political outcomes: that is, politicalphenomena should be explained by universal laws ina similar way to how physicists develop universallyapplicable laws to explain specific features of thephysical world. Critics of this view claim that the so-cial world is essentially different from the naturalworld. Some contend that the social sciences shouldseek to identify particular patterns and structures thatfulfill similar functions that operate in different set-tings—but they recognize that this is a more modestgoal than fully explaining outcomes. Another group ofscholars claims that social science should focus onidentifying unique configurations of factors that coex-ist in a particular case. Proponents of this approach donot seek a definitive explanation or the developmentof covering laws.14 And yet a fourth approach advo-cates what the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, hasdesignated “thick description,” which seeks to conveythe rich and subtle texture of any given historical situ-ation, including the subjective and symbolic meaningof that situation for its participants.15 Comparativistswho favor this approach highlight the importance ofunderstanding each country’s distinctive political cul-ture, which can be defined as the attitudes, beliefs,values, and symbols that influence political behavior.

An approach largely borrowed from economics,called rational choice theory, has been especially in-

fluential—and highly controversial—in political sci-ence, as well as in comparative politics, in recentyears.16 Rational choice theory focuses on how indi-viduals act strategically (that is, rationally) in anattempt to achieve certain goals or maximize theirinterests when it comes to things like voting for aparticular candidate or rebelling against the govern-ment. Proponents of rational choice generally usehighly quantitative methods to construct models andgeneral theories of political behavior that they believecan be applied across all types of political systemsand cultures. This approach has been criticized forclaiming to explain large-scale and complex socialphenomena by reference to individual choices. It hasalso been criticized for dismissing the importance ofvariations in historical experience, political culture,identities, institutions, and other factors that are keyaspects of most explanations of the political world.

Issues involving the appropriate choice of theory,methodology, research approaches, and strategies area vital aspect of comparative politics. However, stu-dents may be relieved to learn that we do not deal withsuch issues in depth in Introduction to ComparativePolitics. We believe that students will be in a muchbetter position to consider these questions after gain-ing a solid grasp of political continuities and contrastsin diverse countries around the world. It is this goalthat we put front and center in this book.

Returning to our earlier discussion of the level ofanalysis, most comparativists probably agree on thevalue of steering a middle course that avoids both fo-cusing exclusively on one country and combining allcountries indiscriminately. If we study only individualcountries without any comparative framework, compar-ative politics would become merely the study of a se-ries of isolated cases. It would be impossible to recog-nize what is most significant in the collage of politicalcharacteristics that we find in the world’s many coun-tries. As a result, the understanding of patterns of simi-larity and difference among countries would be lost,along with an important tool for evaluating what is andwhat is not unique about a country’s political life.

If we go to the other extreme and try to make uni-versal claims, we would either have to stretch the truthor ignore significant national differences and patternsof variation. The political world is incredibly complex,


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 12

Cengage Learning

shaped by an extraordinary array of factors and an al-most endless interplay of variables. Indeed, after abrief period in the 1950s and 1960s when many com-parativists tried—and failed—to develop a grand the-ory that would apply to all countries, most compara-tivists now agree on the value of middle-level theory,that is, theories focusing on specific features of the po-litical world, such as institutions, policies, or classes ofsimilar events, such as revolutions or elections.

For example, comparativists have analyzed theprocess in which many countries with authoritarianforms of government, such as military dictatorshipsand one-party states, have gone on to develop moreparticipatory and democratic regimes. In studyingthis process, termed democratic transitions, com-parativists do not treat each national case as unique ortry to construct a universal pattern that ignores all dif-ferences. Applying middle-level theory, we identifythe influence on the new regime’s political stabilityof specific variables such as institutional legacies, po-litical culture, levels of economic development, thenature of the regime before the transition, and thedegree of ethnic conflict or homogeneity. Compara-

tivists have been able to identify patterns in the emer-gence and consolidation of democratic regimes insouthern Europe in the 1970s (Greece, Portugal, andSpain) and have compared them to developments inLatin America, Asia, and Africa since the 1980s andin Eastern and Central Europe since the revolutionsof 1989.17

The study of comparative politics has many chal-lenges, including the complexity of the subject matter,the fast pace of change in the contemporary world,and the impossibility of manipulating variables orreplicating conditions. What can we expect when thewhole political world is our laboratory? When we putthe method of comparative politics to the test and de-velop a set of themes derived from middle-level the-ory, we discover that it is possible to discern patternsthat make sense of a vast range of political events andlink the experiences of states and citizens throughoutthe world. If we will doubtless not achieve definitiveexplanations, we will hopefully be able to better un-derstand the daily headlines by reference to middle-range theoretical propositions.

SECTION 3 Themes for Comparative Analysis 13

We began this introduction by emphasizing the extra-ordinary importance and fluid pace of the globalchanges currently taking place. Next, we explained thesubject matter of comparative politics and describedsome of the tools of comparative analysis. This sectiondescribes the four themes we use in Introduction toComparative Politics to organize the information oninstitutions and processes in the country chapters.

These themes help explain continuities and con-trasts among countries and demonstrate what patternsapply to a group of countries and why, and what pat-terns are specific to a particular country. We also sug-gest a way that each theme highlights a particular puz-zle in comparative politics.

Before we introduce the themes, a couple ofwarnings are necessary. First, our four themes cannotpossibly capture the infinitely varied experience ofpolitics throughout the world. Our framework in In-

troduction to Comparative Politics, built on thesecore themes, provides a guide to understanding manyfeatures of contemporary comparative politics. Butwe urge students (and rely on instructors!) to chal-lenge and expand on our interpretations. Second, wewant to note that a textbook builds from existing the-ory but does not construct or test new hypotheses.That task is the goal of original scholarly studies. Thethemes are intended to provide a framework to helporganize some of the most significant developmentsin the field of contemporary comparative politics.

Theme 1: A World of StatesThe theme we call a world of states reflects the fact thatfor about 500 years, states have been the primary actorson the world stage. Although international organizationsand private actors like transnational corporations—and

Section D Themes for Comparative Analysis

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 13

Cengage Learning

ordinary citizens organized in political parties and so-cial movements—may play a crucial role, for the mostpart it is the rulers of states who send armies to conquerother states and territories. It is the legal codes of statesthat make it possible for businesses to operate withintheir borders and beyond. States provide more or lesswell for the social protection of citizens through theprovision—in one way or another—of health care, oldage pensions, aid to dependent children, and assistanceto the unemployed. It is states that regulate the move-ment of people across borders through immigration law.And the policies of even the most influential interna-tional organizations reflect to a considerable extent thebalance of power among member states.

That said, and as we noted above when discussingglobalization, there is increasing overlap between thestudy of international relations and the study of com-parative politics. An important trend in political sci-ence is toward courses in international relations,which integrate a concern with how internal politicalprocesses affect states’ behavior, and courses in com-parative politics, which highlight the importance oftransnational forces for understanding what goes onwithin a country’s borders. Therefore, in Introductionto Comparative Politics, we emphasize the interactiveeffects of domestic politics and international forces.

We distinguish two important components of theworld of states theme, one that focuses on a state’s re-lationship to the international arena, the other focus-ing on its internal development. The external elementhighlights the impact on a state’s domestic politicalinstitutions and processes of its relative success orfailure in competing economically and politicallywith other states. What sphere of maneuver is left tostates by imperious global economic and geopoliticalforces? How do CNN, the Internet, McDonald’s, tele-vision, and films (whether produced in Hollywood orin Bollywood, that is, Bombay, the city that has beenrenamed Mumbai and that is the site of India’s thriv-ing film industry) shape local cultures and values, in-fluence citizen perceptions of government, and affectpolitical outcomes?

A state’s international geopolitical situation has apowerful impact on its domestic politics. When GeorgeWashington warned the United States, in his farewelladdress as president in 1796, not to “entangle our peace

and prosperity” in alliances with other nations, hemeant that the United States would be more successfulif it could remain detached from the global power poli-tics of the time (centered in Europe). That kind of dis-engagement might have been possible in the eighteenthcentury. But not in today’s globalized world.

When President George W. Bush assumed officein 2001, he advocated a modest role for the UnitedStates in the world and opposed U.S. involvement innation-building projects abroad. Months later, withthe attacks of September 11, that policy orientationchanged. Since then, the United States has toppled theTaliban regime in Afghanistan and sought to shaperegimes in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, aswell as in other regions of the world, on the groundsthat stable democratic regimes are in the interests oftheir own citizenry and, because terrorism is likely toflourish in such regimes, in the interests of the UnitedStates as well. Even a president who proclaimed thevalue of unilateralism—going it alone—has spentconsiderable time trying to assemble internationalcoalitions to achieve his goals.

But no state, even the most powerful, such as theUnited States, can shape the world to suit its own de-signs. Nor is any state unaffected by influences origi-nating outside its borders. A wide array of interna-tional organizations and treaties, including the UnitedNations, the European Union, the World Trade Orga-nization, the World Bank, the International Mone-tary Fund (IMF), and the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), challenge the sovereign controlof national governments. Transnational corporations,international banks, and currency traders in NewYork, London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, and Tokyo af-fect countries and people throughout the world. Acountry’s political borders do not protect its citizensfrom global warming, environmental pollution, orinfectious diseases that come from abroad. Morebroadly, developments linked to technology transfer,the growth of an international information society, im-migration, and cultural diffusion challenge state su-premacy and have a varying but significant impact onthe domestic politics of virtually all countries.18

Thanks to the global diffusion of radio, television,and the Internet, people nearly everywhere can be-come remarkably well informed about international


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 14

Cengage Learning

developments. This knowledge may fuel popular localdemands that governments intervene to stop atrocitiesin, for example, faraway Kosovo or Rwanda, or rushto aid the victims of natural disasters as happened af-ter the great tsunami struck South and Southeast Asiain late 2004. And heightened global awareness mayencourage citizens to hold their own government tointernationally recognized standards of human rightsand democracy. In the recent past, dictatorial rulers inPeru, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have yielded power af-ter popular movements took to the streets to challengerigged election results. In mid-2005, hundreds of Iran-ian women demonstrated to protest sex discriminationin the Islamic Republic and to demand that candidatesfor the presidency discuss how they would address theissue.

States may collapse altogether when challenged bypowerful rivals for power. And a similar outcome mayoccur when leaders of the state violate the rule of lawand become predators, preying on the population. Po-litical scientist Robert Rotberg suggested the term“failed states” to describe this extreme situation, andcited as examples Sierra Leone, Somalia, andAfghanistan before and under the Taliban.19 The polit-ical situation in such countries has approached theanarchical state of nature described by the seven-teenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.In a state of nature, he warned in the Leviathan, the ab-sence of effective state authority produces a war ofevery man against every man, in which life involves“continual fear, and danger of violent death; and thelife of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Although few states decline to the point of com-plete failure, all states in this new century are experi-encing intense pressures from an expanding andincreasingly complex mix of external influences. Butinternational political and economic influences donot have the same impact in all countries, and a fewprivileged states have the capacity to shape the insti-tutional structure and policy of international organi-zations in which they participate. It is likely that themore advantages a state possesses, as measured by itslevel of economic development, military power, andresource base, the more global influence it will have.Conversely, the policies of countries with fewer ad-vantages are more extensively molded by other

states, international organizations, and broader inter-national constraints.

The theme we identify as a world of states in-cludes a second important component that recognizesthe fact that individual states (countries) are still thebasic building block in world politics. Our case stud-ies emphasize the importance of understanding simi-larities and contrasts in state formation and designacross countries. Here we study the ways that stateshave developed historically, diverse patterns of politi-cal institutions, the processes and limits of democrati-zation, the ability of the state to control social groupsand sustain power, and the state’s economic manage-ment strategies and capacities. In our country chap-ters, we emphasize the importance of what we callcritical junctures in state formation: that is, key eventslike colonial conquest, defeat in war, economic crises,or revolutions that had a durable impact on the char-acter of the state.

The world-of-states theme is also intended to drawattention to the importance of regime variationsamong states, in other words, the overall mix of theirpolitical institutions that distinguishes, for example,democratic from authoritarian regimes. This theme isalso intended to highlight the importance of variationsin the configuration of institutions within a givenregime type, such as the contrast between presidentialand parliamentary forms in democratic states.

A puzzle: How do states in the modern world dealwith the many challenges to their authority that theyface from both internal and external forces? Increas-ingly, the politics and policies of states are shaped bydiverse international factors often lumped togetherunder the category of globalization. At the same time,many states face increasingly restive constituencieswho challenge the power and legitimacy of centralgovernments. In reading the country case studies inthis book, try to assess what impact pressures fromboth above and below—outside and inside—have onthe role of the state in carrying out its basic functionsand in sustaining the political attachment of its citi-zens. To what extent can even the most powerfulstates (especially the United States) preserve their au-tonomy and impose their will on others? Or are allstates losing their ability to control important aspectsof policy-making and secure the political outcomes


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 15

Cengage Learning

they desire? And in what ways are the poorer and lesspowerful countries particularly vulnerable to the pres-sures of globalization and disgruntled citizens?

Theme 2: Governing the EconomyThe success of states in maintaining sovereign au-thority and control over their people is greatly af-fected by their ability to ensure that an adequate vol-ume of goods and services is produced to satisfy theneeds of their populations. Certainly, inadequate eco-nomic performance was an important reason for therejection of communism and the disintegration of theSoviet Union. In contrast, the economic achieve-ments of China’s Communist Party are a major factorin explaining why communist rule has survived inthat country.

Effective economic performance is near the topof every state’s political agenda, and how a state“governs the economy”20—how it organizes produc-tion and the extent and character of its interventionin the economy—is a key element in its overallpattern of governance. It is important to analyze, forexample, how countries differ in the balance be-tween agricultural and industrial production in theireconomies, how successful they are in competingwith other countries that offer similar products in in-ternational markets, and the relative importance ofprivate market forces versus government direction ofthe economy.

The term political economy refers to how gov-ernments affect economic performance and how eco-nomic performance in turn affects a country’s politi-cal processes. We accord great importance to politicaleconomy in Introduction to Comparative Politics be-cause we believe that politics in all countries isdeeply influenced by the relationship between gov-ernment and the economy in both domestic and inter-national dimensions. However, the term economicperformance may convey the misleading impressionsthat there is one right way to promote successful eco-nomic performance and one single standard by whichto measure performance. In fact, both issues are farmore complex.

There are many wrong ways to manage an econ-omy; there are multiple right ways as well. Economichistorian Alexander Gerschenkron pointed out long

ago that the major European powers were forced todevelop distinctive ways to promote industrialism be-cause of the different places they occupied in the se-quence of industrializing powers.21 Britain had thegood fortune to be the first country in the world to in-dustrialize. Britain enjoyed a head start in economiccompetition; hence, it was possible for the state toadopt a relatively hands-off posture and for a marketsystem of production to develop slowly, an arrange-ment that came to be known by the French termlaissez-faire, which literally means “let do,” and morebroadly refers to a free enterprise economy. All laterdevelopers, both those located in Europe in the nine-teenth century and those located elsewhere in theworld in the twentieth and twenty-first century, havehad to catch up to an industrial leader. As a result,they did not have the luxury of adopting the Britishstate’s style of low-profile management but wereforced to develop varieties of crash programs of eco-nomic development.

What formula of state management has made forsuccess in this later period? On the one hand, botheconomic winners and losers display a pattern of ex-tensive state intervention in the economy; thus, it isnot the degree of state intervention that distinguishesthe economic success stories from those that havefared less well. On the other hand, the winners do notshare a single formula that enabled them to excel. Forexample, a study directed by Peter A. Hall and DavidSoskice of the world’s affluent capitalist economiesidentifies two quite different patterns of politicaleconomy.22 Studies seeking to explain the Asian “eco-nomic miracles”—Japan, South Korea, and more re-cently China—as well as the variable economic per-formance of other countries highlight the diversity ofapproaches that have been pursued.23

There is agreement on a list of practices that hin-der economic development (although it borders onthe commonsensical): such states tolerate dishonestyand corruption, set tax rates so high as to discourageproductive economic activity, and fail to provide pub-lic goods like education and transportation facilitiesthat promote a productive economy. However, thereis less agreement on the economic policies that statesshould adopt.

The matter becomes even more complex whenone considers the appropriate yardstick to measure


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 16

Cengage Learning

economic success. Should economic performance bemeasured solely by how rapidly a country’s econ-omy grows? By how equitably it distributes thefruits of economic growth? By the quality of life ofits citizenry, as measured by such criteria as life ex-pectancy, level of education, and unemploymentrate? What about the environmental impact of eco-nomic growth? There is now much greater attentionthan just a few decades ago given to this question,and more countries are emphasizing sustainable de-velopment, which promotes ecologically soundways to modernize the economy and raise the stan-dard of living. We invite you to consider these ques-tions as you study the political economies of thecountries analyzed in this book.

A puzzle: What is the relationship betweendemocracy and successful national economic perfor-mance? This is a question that students of politicaleconomy have long pondered—and to which there areno fully satisfactory answers. Although all economies,even the most powerful, experience ups and downs,the United States, Canada, and the longer-standingcountries of the European Union (in particular, the fif-teen member-states prior to the 2004 enlargement totwenty-five members)—all durable democracies—have been notable economic success stories. On theother hand, several East Asian countries with authori-tarian regimes also achieved remarkable records ofdevelopment. The Republic of Korea (South Korea),Taiwan, and Singapore surged economically in the1960s and 1970s, and Malaysia and Thailand fol-lowed suit in the 1980s and 1990s. (Korea, Taiwan,and Thailand subsequently adopted democratic insti-tutions.) China, a repressive communist party-statethat has enjoyed one of the highest growth rate in theworld since the early 1990s, provides a vivid case ofdevelopment without democracy.

In light of the contradictory evidence, NobelPrize–winning economist and comparative public pol-icy analyst Amartya Sen has argued, “There is noclear relation between economic growth and democ-racy in either direction.”24 As you read the countrystudies, try to identify why some states have beenmore successful than others in “governing the econ-omy,” that is, fostering successful economic perfor-mance. Are there any consistent patterns that applyacross countries?

Theme 3: The Democratic IdeaOne of the most important and astounding politicaldevelopments in recent years has been the rapidspread of democracy throughout much of the world.There is overwhelming evidence of the strong appealof the democratic idea, by which we mean the claimby citizens that they should, in some way, exercisesubstantial control over the decisions made by theirstates and governments.

According to Freedom House (a research organi-zation based in the United States), in 1973 there were43 countries that could be considered “free” (or de-mocratic), 38 that were “partly free,” and 69 thatshould be classified as “not free.” By 2004, theircount was 89 free, 54 partly free, and 49 not free. Interms of population, in 1973, 35 percent of theworld’s people lived in “free” countries, 18 percent inpartly free, and 47 percent were citizens of countriesranked as “not free.” In 2004, the percentages were44 percent free, 21 percent partly free, and 35 percentnot free.25 And as authoritarian rulers have recentlylearned in Ukraine, Zimbabwe, Peru, and Kyrgyz-stan, once persistent and widespread pressures for de-mocratic participation develop, they are hard to resist(although not impossible, as China showed in itsbloody 1989 crackdown on protestors). As AmartyaSen has put it, “While democracy is not yet uni-formly practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, inthe general climate of world opinion, democraticgovernance has now achieved the status of beingtaken to be generally right.”26

What explains the recent trend toward democ-racy? Comparativists have devoted enormous energyto studying this question. One scholar notes, “For thepast two decades, the main topic of research in com-parative politics has been democratization.”27 Yet, forall the attention it has received, there is no scholarlyconsensus on how and why democratization occurs.Or, rather, what we have learned is that there is no onepath to democracy. Some of the country studies in In-troduction to Comparative Politics analyze the diversecauses and sources of support for democracy.

In certain historical settings, democracy may re-sult from a standoff or compromise among politicalcontenders for power, in which no one group can gainsufficient strength to control outcomes by itself.28


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 17

Cengage Learning

Democracy may appeal to citizens in authoritarian na-tions because democratic regimes often rank amongthe world’s most stable, affluent, and cohesive coun-tries. In some cases, a regional demonstration effectoccurs, in which a democratic transition in one coun-try provokes democratic change in neighboring coun-tries. (This occurred in southern Europe in the 1970s,Latin America and parts of East Asia in the 1980s, andEastern and Central Europe in the 1990s.) Anotherimportant pressure for democracy is born of the hu-man desire for dignity and equality. Even when dicta-torial regimes appear to benefit their countries—forexample, by promoting economic development or na-tionalist goals—citizens are likely to demand democ-racy. Although authoritarian governments can sup-press demands for democratic participation, thedomestic and (in recent years) international costs ofdoing so are high. However, not all authoritarianregimes have crumbled. Indeed, China, the world’smost populous country with most dynamic economy,remains resolutely undemocratic.

Is it possible to identify conditions that are neces-sary or sufficient for democracy to flourish? Compar-ativists have proposed, among the factors, secure na-tional boundaries, a stable state, at least a minimumlevel of economic development, the widespread ac-ceptance of democratic values, agreement on the rulesof the democratic game among those who contend forpower—one might extend the list, but the point shouldbe clear! But democracy can and has flourished in un-likely settings—for example, in India, a country witha vast population whose per capita income is amongthe lowest in the world—and has failed where it mightbe expected to flourish—for example, in Germany inthe 1930s. Democracies vary widely in terms of howthey came into existence and in their concrete histori-cal, institutional, and cultural dimensions.

Displacing authoritarian regimes and then holdingelections does not mean that democracy will prevailor endure. A wide gulf exists between what compara-tivists have termed a transition to democracy and theconsolidation of democracy. A transition involves top-pling an authoritarian regime and adopting the rudi-ments of democracy; consolidation requires fulleradherence to democratic procedures and making de-mocratic institutions more sturdy and durable. Below,

we further explore the important question of how todistinguish what we term transitional democraciesfrom consolidated democracies. We consider the dis-tinction of such great importance that it forms the ba-sis for our classifying countries throughout the world.

We want to emphasize that the study of compara-tive politics does not support a philosophy of historyor theory of political development that identifies a sin-gle (democratic) end point toward which all countrieswill eventually converge. One important work, pub-lished at the beginning of the most recent democraticwave, which began in Latin America in the 1970s,captured the tenuous process of democratization in itstitle: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: TentativeConclusions About Uncertain Democracies.29 Schol-ars have suggested that it is far easier for a country tohold its first democratic election than its second orthird. Historically, powerful groups have often op-posed democratization because they fear that democ-racy will threaten their privileges. But disadvantagedgroups may also oppose the democratic process be-cause they see it as unresponsive to their deeply feltgrievances. As a result, reversals of democraticregimes and restorations of authoritarian rule have oc-curred in the past and will doubtless occur in the fu-ture. In brief, the fact that the democratic idea is sopowerful does not mean that all countries will adoptor preserve democratic institutions.

Finally, the theme of the democratic idea requiresus to examine the incompleteness of democratic agen-das, even in countries with the longest experiences ofrepresentative democracy. In recent years, many citi-zens in virtually every democracy have turned againstthe state when their living standards were threatenedby high unemployment and economic stagnation.

At the same time, social movements have targetedthe state because of its actions or inactions in such var-ied spheres as environmental regulation, reproductiverights, and race or ethnic relations. Comparative stud-ies confirm that the democratic idea fuels politicalconflicts in even the most durable democracies be-cause a large gap usually separates democratic idealsand the actual functioning of democratic political in-stitutions. Moreover, social movements often organizebecause citizens perceive political parties—presum-ably an important established vehicle for representing


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 18

Cengage Learning

citizen demands in democracies—as ossified and outof touch with the people. Even in countries with im-pressive histories of democratic institutions, citizensmay invoke the democratic idea to demand that theirgovernment be more responsive and accountable.

A puzzle: Is there a relationship between democ-racy and political stability? Comparativists have de-bated whether democratic institutions contribute topolitical stability or, on the contrary, to political disor-der. On the one hand, democracy by its very naturepermits political opposition. One of its defining char-acteristics is competition among those who aspire togain political office. Political life in democracies isturbulent and unpredictable. On the other hand, andperhaps paradoxically, the very fact that political op-position and competition are legitimate in democra-cies appears to deepen support for the state, evenamong opponents of a particular government. The de-mocratic rules of the game may promote political sta-bility by encouraging today’s losers to remain in thegame, rejecting the use of violence to press their claimto power, because they may win peacefully in futurecompetition. Although there is a disturbing tendencyfor deep flaws to mar democratic governance in coun-tries that have toppled authoritarian regimes, the oddsare that, once a country adopts a democratic regime,that regime will endure.30 As you learn about differentcountries, look for the stabilizing and destabilizingconsequences of recent democratic transitions, thepressures (or lack of pressure) for democratization inauthoritarian states, and the persistence of undemoc-ratic elements even in established democracies.

Theme 4: The Politics of Collective IdentityHow do individuals understand who they are in politi-cal terms? On what basis do groups of people form toadvance common political aims? In other words, whatare the sources of collective political identities? Atone time, social scientists thought they knew. Ob-servers argued that the age-old loyalties of ethnicity,religious affiliation, race, gender, and locality werebeing dissolved and displaced by economic, political,and cultural modernization. Comparativists thoughtthat social class—solidarities based on the shared ex-perience of work or, more broadly, economic posi-

tion—had become the most important source of col-lective identity. They believed that most of the time,groups would pragmatically pursue their interests inways that were not politically destabilizing. We nowknow that the formation of group attachments and theinterplay of politically relevant collective identitiesare far more complex and uncertain.

In many long-established democracies, the impor-tance of identities based on class membership has de-clined, although class and material sources of collec-tive political identity remain significant in politicalcompetition and economic organization. Furthermore,contrary to earlier predictions, in many countries non-class identities have assumed growing, not diminish-ing, significance. Such affiliations are based on asense of belonging to particular groups sharing a com-mon language, region, religion, ethnicity, race, nation-ality, or gender.

The politics of collective political identity involvesstruggles to form politically influential groups and todefine which ones are influential participants in thepolitical process and which are marginalized or evenexcluded. This struggle involves a constant tug of waramong groups over relative power and influence, bothsymbolic and substantive. Issues of inclusion, politicalrecognition, and priority remain pivotal in many coun-tries, and they may never be fully settled.

In addition, questions of representation are hard toresolve: Who is included in a racial or ethnic minoritycommunity, for example? How is it determined whospeaks for the community or negotiates with a govern-mental authority on its behalf? One reason that conflictaround these questions can be so intense is that politi-cal leaders in the state and in opposition movementsoften seek to mobilize support by exploiting ethnic, re-ligious, racial, or regional rivalries and by manipulat-ing issues of identity and representation. Another rea-son is that considerable material and nonmaterialstakes derive from the outcome of these struggles.

Identity-based conflicts appear in every multiethnicsociety. And given the pace of migration and the tan-gled web of postcolonial histories that link colonizer tocolonized, what country is not multiethnic? In Britain,France, and Germany, issues of nationality, citizenship,and immigration—often with ethnic or racial over-tones—have been hot-button issues and have often


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 19

Cengage Learning

spilled over into electoral politics. These conflicts havebeen particularly intense in postcolonial countries, suchas Nigeria, where colonial powers forced ethnic groupstogether in order to carve out a country and where bor-ders were drawn with little regard to preexisting collec-tive identities. This process of state formation sowedseeds for future conflict in Nigeria and elsewhere andthreatens the survival of democracy and perhaps thestate itself in many postcolonial nations.

Even nations with a high degree of ethnic homo-geneity, such as China and Japan, may experience po-litical tensions based on ethnicity, although these ten-sions have certainly been much more extreme inChina as reflected both in Tibet and in the Muslim re-gions of the country. Many states are also challenged(sometimes violently) by nationalist movements thatseek to secede to form their own country. This was theroot cause of the civil war in 1971 that led to the cre-ation of Bangladesh, which was once part of Pakistan.The crisis in Northern Ireland, the separatist move-ment in Quebec, and the war in Chechnya show thatdeveloped countries like the United Kingdom,Canada, and Russia are not immune from high-stakesidentity clashes.

Religion is another source of collective iden-tity—as well as of severe political conflict, bothwithin and among religious communities. Violentconflict among religious groups has recently oc-curred in many countries, including India, Sri Lanka,Nigeria, and the United Kingdom (again, in NorthernIreland). Such conflicts may spill over nationalboundaries and involve an especially ugly form ofglobalization. For example, Al Qaeda, the networkresponsible for the September 11 attacks in theUnited States, identified the presence of non-MuslimWestern forces in what they regarded as the sacredterritory of Saudi Arabia as a principal reason for itsactions. At the same time, the political orientation ofa particular religious community is not predeter-mined but is rather a product of what has been called“political entrepreneurship,” that is, the efforts ofleaders seeking power by mobilizing support withinthe community. The political posture associated withChristian, Jewish, Muslim, or Hindu beliefs cannotsimply be read off the sacred texts, as is evidencedby the intense conflict within most religious commu-nities today that pits more liberal, secular elements

against those who defend what they claim is a moreorthodox, traditional interpretation.

A puzzle: How does collective identity affect acountry’s distributional politics, that is, the processof deciding who gets what and how resources are dis-tributed? Once identity demands are placed on the na-tional agenda, can governments resolve them by dis-tributing political, economic, and other resources inways that redress the grievances of the minority or po-litically weaker identity groups? Collective identitiesoperate at the level of symbols, attitudes, values, andbeliefs as well as at the level of material resources.However, the contrast between material- and nonma-terial-based identities and demands should not be ex-aggerated. In practice, most groups are animated byboth feelings of attachment and solidarity and by thedesire to obtain material benefits and political influ-ence for their members. Nonetheless, the analyticaldistinction between material and nonmaterial de-mands remains useful. Further, it is worth consideringwhether the nonmaterial aspects of collective identi-ties make political disputes over ethnicity or religionor language or nationality especially divisive and dif-ficult to resolve.

In a situation of extreme scarcity, it may provenearly impossible to reach any compromise amonggroups with conflicting material demands. But if anadequate level of material resources is available, suchconflicts may be easier to resolve through distribu-tional politics because groups can negotiate at least aminimally satisfying share of resources.

However, the nonmaterial demands of ethnic, reli-gious, and nationalist movements may be difficult tosatisfy by a distributional style of politics. The distri-butional style may be quite ineffective when, for ex-ample, a religious group demands that the governmentrequire all citizens to conform to its social practices orwhen a dominant linguistic group insists that a singlelanguage be used in education and governmentthroughout the country. In such cases, political con-flict tends to move from the distributive realm to thecultural realm, where compromises cannot beachieved by simply dividing the pie of material re-sources. The country studies examine a wide range ofconflicts involving collective identities. It is worthpondering whether, and under what conditions, theycan be resolved by the normal give and take of political


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 20

Cengage Learning

There are nearly 200 states in the world today, eachwith a political regime that is distinctive in someways. How can we classify them in a manageablefashion? One possibility would be not to classify themat all, but simply to treat each state as different andunique. However, comparativists are rarely contentwith this solution—or nonsolution. It makes sense tohighlight clusters of states that share important simi-larities, just as it is useful to identify what distin-guishes one cluster of relatively similar states fromother clusters. When comparativists classify a largenumber of cases into a smaller number of types orclusters, they call the result a typology. Typologies fa-cilitate comparison both within the same type as wellas between types of states. For example, what differ-ence does it make that Britain has a parliamentaryform of government and the United States a presiden-tial one? Both are long-established democracies, buttheir different mix of democratic institutions providesan interesting laboratory case to study the impact ofinstitutional variation.

We can also compare across clusters or types. Inthis type of comparison—comparativists call thismost different case analysis—we analyze what pro-duces the substantial differences we observe. Con-sider the fact that the world’s two most populouscountries, China and India, have such different politi-cal systems. How do their different political regimesaffect such important issues as economic develop-ment, human rights, and the role of women?

How do we go about constructing typologies ofstates? Typologies exist as much in the eye of their be-holder as in the nature of the beast. Typologies are ar-tificial constructs, made rather than born. They arebased on certain features that become the basis forclassification and implicitly downplay the importanceof others. It follows that what counts in evaluating atypology is not whether it is “true” or “false,” but

whether it is useful, and for what purpose. Typologiesare helpful to the extent that they permit us to engagein useful comparisons.

What is the most useful typology for classifyingpolitical regimes or states? For almost half a century,from the end of World War II until the 1980s, therewas a general consensus on the utility of one typol-ogy. Political scientists classified states as Westernindustrial democracies, dubbed the “First World”;communist states, the “Second World”; and the eco-nomically less developed countries in Asia, Africa,and Latin America, many of which had recentlygained independence, the “Third World.” As withany typology, it was imperfect. For example, whereshould one assign Japan, a democratic country not inthe West that rapidly developed in the 1960s and1970s and became the world’s second-leading eco-nomic power? Nevertheless, the typology was a gen-erally adequate way to distinguish broad groups ofcountries because it corresponded to what appearedto be durable and important geopolitical and theoreti-cal divisions in the world.

Today, the typology of First, Second, and ThirdWorlds is less useful. For one thing, in the past twodecades, scores of countries have become democ-ratic, or at least “partly free,” that are neither highlyindustrialized nor located in the North Atlantic re-gion, the geographic base of the “First World.” FromArgentina to Zambia, countries that were formerlycolonies or undemocratic states have adopted democ-ratic institutions, which we noted above is one of themost important and promising changes in the modernworld.

Linked to the swelling of the ranks of democraticcountries has been the near-disappearance of commu-nist regimes, that is, the “Second World.” Beginningin 1989, the implosion of communism in the formerSoviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe set off a

SECTION 4 Classifying Political Systems 21

Section e Classifying Political Systems

bargaining—and when, instead, they lead to the furyand blood of political violence.

These four themes provide our analytic scaffold.With an understanding of the method of comparative

politics and the four themes in mind, we can now dis-cuss how we have grouped the country studies thatcomprise Introduction to Comparative Politics andhow the text is organized for comparative analysis.

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 21

Cengage Learning

T his book makes frequent reference to threecommonly used measures of the overall strengthor power of a country’s economy:

• Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whichis a calculation of the total goods and ser-vices produced by the country during agiven year.

• Gross National Product (GNP), whichis GDP plus income earned abroad by thecountry’s residents.

• Gross National Income (GNI), which isa new name for GNP that has beenadopted by the World Bank.

The numbers generated by GDP or GNI/GNPare, of course, different, but not hugely so. As con-ventionally measured by GDP or GNI/GNP—whichis the total output—the United States has, by far, theworld’s largest economy, followed by Japan, Ger-many, Britain, France, Italy, and China.

A better way to measure the level of develop-ment and the standard of living in different countriesis to look at GDP/GNI per capita, in other words,total economic output divided by total population.From the perspective of GNP per capita, Luxem-bourg ranks first ($45,740), while the United Statesis fourth ($38,870), Japan is seventh ($34,180),and China is number 134 ($1,100) out of 208countries measured.

But these figures use a calculation based on theAmerican dollar and official international cur-rency exchange rates, which would, for exam-ple, tell you how many Mexican pesos or Russianrubles you could get for US$1. Many economistsbelieve this approach does not give a very accuratesense of the real standards of living in differentcountries because it does not tell what goods andservices (such as housing, food, and transportation)people can actually buy with their local currencies.

An alternative and increasingly popular meansof comparing levels of economic developmentacross countries is called purchasing powerparity (PPP). PPP takes into account the actual costof living in a particular country by figuring what thepurchasing price of the same “basket of goods” isin different countries. For example, how many dol-lars in the United States, pesos in Mexico, or rubles

in Russia does it take to buy a certain amount offood or to pay for housing? Many analysts think thatPPP provides a more reliable (and revealing) tool forcomparing standards of living among countries.

The data boxes at the beginning of each coun-try chapter in this text give both total and per capitaGNI at official exchange rates and using PPP. As youwill see, the differences between the two calculationscan be quite dramatic, especially for developingcountries. When PPP is used, China jumps from theseventh largest economy in the world to secondplace behind the United States. And, as notedabove, China’s exchange-rate GNP per capita is$1,100 (ranked 134th); using the PPP calculation itis $4,980, which places it at 119th out of 208 na-tions in 2003. Simply put, PPP takes into accountthat the cost of living in China is less than in theUnited States, so smaller incomes go farther when itcomes to purchasing things.

The data boxes also give information aboutother ways to measure a country’s development.The most important of these is the Human Devel-opment Index (HDI), which the United Nationsintroduced as a way to evaluate a country’s levelof development that considers more than just eco-nomic factors. The formula used to calculate acountry’s HDI takes into account longevity (life ex-pectancy at birth), knowledge (literacy and aver-age years of schooling), as well as income (accord-ing to PPP). Based on this formula, each country ofthe world, for which there are enough data, is as-signed an HDI decimal number between 0 and 1;the closer a country is to 1, the better is its level ofhuman development.

Out of 177 countries ranked according to HDIby the United Nations Development Programme ondata collected in 2002, Norway (.956) was at thetop and Sierra Leone (.273) was last. Countriessuch as the United States (8), Japan (9), Britain(12), France (16), Germany (19), the Republic ofKorea (28), Poland (37), Cuba (52), and Mexico(53) were classified as having “high human devel-opment”; Russia (57), Brazil (72), China (94), Iran(101), South Africa (119), and India (127) were inthe “medium human development” category; andPakistan (142) and Nigeria (151) were scored ashaving “low human development.”

Global Connection: How Is Development Measured?


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 22

Cengage Learning

revolutionary change in world politics. Only a hand-ful of countries in the world—China, Cuba, Vietnam,Laos, and the Democratic People’s Republic of(North) Korea—are now ruled by communist partiesand declare an allegiance to communist ideology.Even some of these (particularly China and Vietnam)are adopting market-based economic policies andforging close ties with capitalist nations. It followsthat the “Second World” has become a much less use-ful category to classify countries.

Finally, the “Third World” has also become lesshelpful in understanding the many countries formerlyclassified in this cluster. Countries that are oftencalled Third World share few features, other than be-ing less economically developed than industrializednations (see “Global Connection: How Is Develop-ment Measured?”). Their colonial legacies have re-ceded further and further into the past. In addition,some, such as Brazil and Mexico, have become moreindustrialized and economically powerful. Neverthe-less, even in the period after the cold war, the term“Third World” may be a useful shorthand way to re-fer to the roughly 130 countries that the United Na-tions classifies as “developing” and that are still sep-arated by a vast economic gulf from the 50 or soindustrialized nations. However, when using thisterm, one should also take account of the fact thatthere are about four dozen countries—for example,Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Haiti—that are classifiedby the UN as “least developed” and are so poor thatthe term “Fourth World” is sometimes used to de-scribe them. This group of countries has become ab-solutely and relatively more poor in recent years dueto the ravages of AIDS, civil war, and failed states.

If the “three worlds” method of classification is nolonger as useful as it once was, what alternative ispreferable? At present, there is no agreement amongcomparativists on this question. We suggest a typologybased on one of the most important dimensions for un-derstanding differences among countries in the contem-porary world—the extent to which their governmentsare democratic. However, we preface the discussion byemphasizing that one might imagine an altogether dif-ferent typology for classifying regimes. The categorieswe have established, the tools we use to measure, andthe decisions we have made in classifying particularcountries all lend themselves to discussion. We invitestudents to think critically about how to make sense of

the great variety of regimes in the world today and todevise alternative ways to classify countries.

Our typology classifies regimes into three groups:consolidated democracies, transitional democracies,and authoritarian regimes. The typology highlightsthe bedrock distinction between democratic and unde-mocratic regimes. Of course, the classification mustcarefully specify what is meant by democracy andauthoritarianism.

What Is the Meaning—or Rather, Meanings—of Democracy?As with many other important concepts, debate over themeaning of democracy is contentious. The wide popu-larity of the term conceals some important ambiguities.Should democracy be defined solely on the basis of theprocedures used to select top governmental officehold-ers? That is, for a political system to qualify as demo-cratic, is it sufficient that occupants of the highest of-fices of the state be selected on the basis of free and fairelections in which opposing parties are allowed to orga-nize to present candidates and all citizens are entitled tocast a vote for a contending party? Or must there be re-spect for citizens’ civil liberties (including rights of freeexpression, dissent, and privacy), regardless of what ademocratically elected government might desire? Whatis the relationship between religious practice and the ex-ercise of political power? To what extent must all citi-zens be guaranteed certain minimum economic and so-cial rights and resources in a democratic regime, asdistinct from political and civil rights (such as the rightto vote and criticize the government)? Otherwise put,what is the relationship between democracy defined inpurely procedural terms and democracy defined as asystem that provides an adequate level of resources toits citizens and promotes substantive equalities?

Despite intense debates about the meaning(s) ofdemocracy, a rough consensus has emerged amongpractitioners and scholars about the minimum politi-cal features required for a regime to qualify as demo-cratic. It is generally agreed that the following condi-tions must be present:

• Selection to the highest public offices is on the ba-sis of free and fair elections. For an election toqualify as fair, votes must be counted accurately,with the winning candidate(s) selected according


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 23

Cengage Learning

to preexisting rules that determine the kind of plu-rality or majority required to gain electoral victory.

• Political parties are free to organize, present candi-dates for public office, and compete in elections.The opposition party or parties—those not inpower—enjoy adequate rights of contestation, thatis, the right to organize and to criticize the incum-bent government.

• The elected government develops policy accordingto specified procedures that provide for dueprocess, transparency in decision-making, and theaccountability of elected executives (at the nextelection, through judicial action, and, in parliamen-tary systems, to the legislature).

• All citizens possess civil and political rights—theright to participate and vote in elections periodi-cally held to select key state officeholders—andcivil liberties—the rights of free assembly, con-science, privacy, and expression, including the rightto criticize the government.

• The political system contains a judiciary with pow-ers independent of the executive and legislature,charged with protecting citizens’ political rights andcivil liberties from violation by government andother citizens, as well as with ensuring that govern-mental officials respect constitutionally specifiedprocedures.

Although these points make a useful checklist ofthe essential elements of a democracy, several qualifi-cations should be added. First, this definition does notclaim that electoral outcomes are always (or possiblyeven often) rational, equitable, or wise. Democracyspecifies a set of procedures for making decisions, butit does not guarantee the wisdom of the outcomes. In-deed, as we discuss below, we believe that politicaloutcomes in all democracies, both elections to officeand the decisions of officeholders, are systematicallyand importantly influenced by economic inequalitiesthat limit the ideal of “one person, one vote.”

Second, no government has ever fully lived up todemocratic standards. All democratic governmentsat various points in their histories have violated themto a greater or lesser extent. For example, Britain re-tained a system of plural votes for certain citizensuntil after World War II; French women did not gainthe right to vote until 1945; and full suffrage did not

come to the United States until after the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Actof 1965.

Third, how the constituent elements on the check-list of democracy are interpreted and implementedcan be a contentious political issue. For example, inthe 1990s, and again in 2004, there was intense con-troversy in France about whether Muslim girls shouldbe permitted to wear a headscarf, signifying adher-ence to Islam, to public school. On the one hand,many public officials and citizens wanted to prohibitgirls from wearing the scarf on the grounds thatFrance is a secular state and that prominently display-ing the scarf constitutes proselytizing in publicschools and symbolizes girls’ subordinate status. Onthe other hand, defenders of the practice argued thatMuslim girls were entitled to exercise their fundamen-tal right of self-expression.

Fourth, economic inequalities stack the politicaldeck. Wealthy citizens, powerful interest groups, andbusiness firms can use their substantial resources to increase their chances of winning an election orinfluencing public policy. This creates a tension inall democracies, to a greater or lesser degree, be-tween the formal political procedures (such as vot-ing), in which all are equal, and the actual situation,in which the affluent are, in novelist George Or-well’s famous phrase from his satirical novel AnimalFarm, “more equal than others” because of theirgreater political influence.

Finally, although all democracies share the fiveelements outlined above, they vary widely in the po-litical institutions that implement these democraticprinciples. A common distinction among democra-cies involves differing relationships between the ex-ecutive and the legislature. In presidential systems,such as in the United States, the chief executive (thepresident) is elected independently of the nationallegislature (the House and the Senate) and eachbranch has powers independent of the other, whichmeans that there is a sharp separation of powers be-tween the executive branch and the legislature. Thissystem is actually an unusual form of democracy.Most of the world’s democracies (including Britain,Germany, and Japan) have parliamentary govern-ments in which executive and legislative powers arefused rather than separated: the chief executive


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 24

Cengage Learning

(whether called prime minister, premier, or chancel-lor) and the cabinet are chosen from elected membersof the legislature and generally are the leaders of thedominant party or party coalition in parliament. Infact, the chief executive in a parliamentary system re-mains a sitting member of the legislature even whileserving as, for example, prime minister.

The formal and informal rules of the game forreaching and exercising power are very different inpresidential and parliamentary systems. In presiden-tial systems, members of the legislature jealously pre-serve their autonomy. Because the legislature iselected separately from the president, it is constitu-tionally authorized to set its own agenda, initiate pol-icy proposals, defy presidential directives, and evenimpeach the president. Presidents have resources thatthey can deploy in an attempt to persuade the legisla-ture to go along, but even when the same party con-trols both the presidency and the legislature, the keyword is persuade. In most parliamentary systems, onthe other hand, the legislature may serve as a forumfor dramatic policy debate, but it rarely represents anindependent source of policy initiatives or poses a de-cisive obstacle to prevent the government from legis-lating its own proposals.

The distinction between presidential and parlia-mentary systems does not exhaust the range of insti-tutional variation within industrial democracies. Forexample, France’s hybrid semi-presidential system isquite different from both. France has a dual executive,with both a directly elected president and a primeminister appointed by the president. These differencesraise the kinds of questions that are at the heart ofcomparative politics: Which political institutions andprocedures are more likely to represent citizens’ de-mands? Which strike a better balance between partici-pation and leadership? What consequences do thesedifferences have for the effectiveness of governmentand the distribution of resources?

“So what?” you may ask in response to this dis-cussion of political institutions. Good question!31

Ponder what difference the type of system makes to acountry’s politics as you study various types of parlia-mentary and presidential democracies in this book.And note how rare presidential systems are—a pointthat may surprise those who think that the U.S. presi-dential system is typical.

We believe that in understanding political similari-ties and differences among countries, it is fundamen-tally important to focus on whether a state is democra-tic. Our typology of political systems involves afurther distinction between long-established, or con-solidated democracies, and newly established, or tran-sitional democracies. We claim that there is a differ-ence in kind, and not just of degree, between the twogroups. We use two criteria to distinguish these cate-gories. The first criterion divides democratic regimesaccording to whether or not their democratic institu-tions and practices have been solidly and stably estab-lished for an ample period of time. (Precisely howmuch time is open to question: more than a few years,possibly at least a decade? In part, the answer dependson the degree to which the next requirement is met.)

The second criterion for distinguishing betweenconsolidated and transitional democracies is the extentof their democratic practice. Consolidated democra-cies are regimes in which there is relatively consistentadherence to the five democratic principles that wespecified above. We do not mean to claim that consol-idated democracies never violate democratic norms—they do, and sometimes in shocking ways. For exam-ple, police abuse and unequal treatment of citizenswho are poor or from a racial or ethnic minority areall too common in countries generally consideredhigh in the democratic rankings, like Britain and theUnited States. More generally, a frequent source ofconflicts in consolidated democracies involves de-mands for more and better-quality democracy. Exam-ples of consolidated democracies are Britain, France,Germany, Japan, India, and the United States. Allhave been democracies for over fifty years and, againwith flagrant exceptions, generally practice the demo-cracy they preach.

The reason we highlight the quality of democracybecomes apparent when we turn to the second cate-gory of democracy. In many transitional democracies,a façade of democratic institutions conceals informalpractices that violate the checklist of bedrock featuresof democracy.32 As a general matter, there is greater le-gal protection of citizen rights and liberties in transi-tional democracies than in authoritarian regimes—butconsiderably less than in durable democracies. Transi-tional democracies are usually “hybrid regimes” inwhich democratic forms of governance coexist with a


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 25

Cengage Learning

disturbing persistence of authoritarian elements.33 Insuch systems, as compared to consolidated democra-cies, political authorities are much more likely to en-gage in corruption, control of the media, intimidation,and violence against opponents in order to limit criti-cism of the government, undermine opposition parties,and ensure that the ruling party is re-elected. Vote rig-ging and other abuses may be used if all else fails. De-spite what the constitution may specify, the judiciaryis often packed with ruling party faithful, and top mili-tary officers often exercise extraordinary politicalpower. Among the countries that can be classified astransitional democracies are Russia, Brazil, Mexico,Nigeria, South Africa, and Indonesia.

How do we define authoritarian regimes? Thesimplest way to identify their principal features is tochange the positive sign to negative in the checklist ofdemocratic characteristics specified above. Thus, au-thoritarian regimes are those lacking effective proce-dures for selecting political leaders through competi-tive elections based on universal suffrage; there are noinstitutionalized procedures for holding those withpolitical power accountable to the citizens of thecountry; oppositional politics and dissent are severelyrestricted; people of different genders, racial groups,religions, and ethnicities do not enjoy equal rights;and the judiciary is not an independent branch of gov-ernment capable of checking the power of the state orprotecting the rights of citizens.

Clearly, then, authoritarian states are nondemoc-racies. But it isn’t good social science to define some-thing only by what it is not. The term authoritarian-ism refers to political systems in which power (orauthority) is highly concentrated in a single individ-ual, a small group of people, a single political party,or institution. Furthermore, those with power claim anexclusive right to govern and use various means, in-cluding force, to impose their will and policies on allwho live under their authority.

As with states that are classified as democracies,there is an enormous variety of authoritarian regimetypes: communist party-states (e.g., China and Cuba);theocracies in which sovereign power is held by reli-gious leaders and law is defined in religious terms(e.g., present-day Iran), military governments (e.g.,Pakistan and Burma); absolute monarchies (e.g.,

Saudi Arabia); and personalistic dictatorships (e.g.,Iraq under Sadaam Hussein and Iran under the Shah).There are many ways in which these types of authori-tarianism differ from one another, including funda-mental beliefs (ideology) and the degree of repressionused to quash opposition.

Authoritarian regimes frequently claim that theyembody a form of democracy, particularly in the con-temporary era when the democratic idea seems so per-suasive and powerful. For example, according to theChinese Communist Party, the political system of thePeople’s Republic of China is based on “socialistdemocracy,” which is superior to the “bourgeoisdemocracy” of capitalist countries that, in the end,benefits wealthier citizens. But most political scien-tists would conclude that there is little substance tosuch claims and that in such states dictatorship faroutweighs democracy.

Nevertheless, even in those countries that can beclassified as authoritarian, we should not overlookcertain features that reflect democratic values andpractices. In Iran, which is a theocratic authoritarianregime, there are vigorously contested multipartyelections, although the extent of contestation is de-fined and limited by the Islamic clergy who ultimatelyexercise sovereign power. For the last decade or so, aform of grassroots democracy has been implementedin the more than 700,000 rural villages, where a ma-jority of China’s population lives. Even though thecommunist party still oversees the process to keep dis-sent from getting out of hand, China’s rural dwellersnow have a real choice when they elect their localleaders, and there have been many instances when ex-ercising that choice has resulted in the ouster of cor-rupt and unpopular officials. Such democratic ele-ments in Iranian and Chinese politics certainly makea difference in important ways to the citizens of thosecountries, but they do not alter the essential authori-tarian character of the state in which they live.

One more important point about authoritarianstates: like democracies, they, too, are not politicallystagnant, but change and evolve over time in responseto domestic and international influences. The SovietUnion under Joseph Stalin (1924–1952) and Chinaunder Mao Zedong (1949–1976) were extremely bru-tal dictatorships that closely approximated the model


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 26

Cengage Learning

of totalitarian regimes that seek to control nearlyevery aspect of public and private life. Yet the succes-sors to both Stalin and Mao began a process of reformthat, to a significant degree, reduced the extent of re-pression and control while preserving the ultimate au-thoritarian power of the communist party. In the Soviet case, this eventually led to the collapse of com-munism, while in China the outcome actuallystrengthened communist rule. Why the difference?This is just the kind of interesting and important ques-tion that lies at the heart of comparative politics!

Although there are, we believe, fundamental dif-ferences between democracy and authoritarianism,we want to be clear that the categories we suggestfor classifying political systems are not airtight; agray zone exists such that some countries may strad-dle two categories. Which ones? Consider Brazil,which we designate as a transitional democracy.Ever since democracy was restored in 1974, follow-ing a period of brutal military rule, Brazil has com-piled a solid record of democratic practice. For ex-ample, there have been several peaceful electoralalternations between dramatically different politicalcoalitions. One might claim that Brazil should beclassified as a durable democracy. We believe, how-ever, that given some disquieting violations of demo-cratic procedures, Brazil cannot at this point be clas-sified as a durable democracy.

Another example of the difficulty of classifyingstates: we consider India a durable democracy becauseit has generally respected most of the democratic pro-cedures on our checklist since it gained independencein 1947; there is intense political competition in India,elections are usually free and fair, and the Indian judi-ciary is quite independent. However, some might ques-tion our decision. For example, India has repeatedlyexperienced scenes of horrific communal violence, inwhich Muslim, Sikh, and Christian minorities have

been brutally massacred, sometimes with the activecomplicity of state officials.

Furthermore, some of the countries that can beclassified as transitional democracies are experiencingsuch political and economic turmoil that they couldvery well fall out of any category of democracy. TakeRussia, for example. We consider Russia to be a tran-sitional democracy because it has compiled a two-decade record of fairly free elections and partial ad-herence to the other elements on our checklist ofdemocracy. However, under both Boris Yeltsin andVladimir Putin’s leadership, the Russian governmenthas engaged in numerous undemocratic practices, in-cluding arbitrary detention and rigged trials of oppo-nents, as well as repeated violations of its constitu-tion. A strong case could be made that Russia shouldbe classified as authoritarian. (In fact, Freedom Houseclassifies Russia as “not free.”) Such potential volatil-ity illustrates our earlier point about the difference be-tween a state that is going through a democratic tran-sition and one where democracy has beenconsolidated with little chance of reversal.

Another comment on our typology: we do notmean to imply that there is an inevitable escalator ofpolitical development that transports a country fromone category to the next “higher” one. History hasdemonstrated that one should beware of subscribingto a theory of inevitable progress—whether political,economic, or social. It is not inevitable that countrieswill remain anchored in one category or another.Regimes may become more democratic—or a demo-cratic regime can be subverted and replaced by an au-thoritarian regime. When a new edition of this bookappears, several countries classified here as transi-tional democracies may qualify, according to our cri-teria, as consolidated democracies—or, on the con-trary, they may change in a way that tips the balancetoward the authoritarian profile.

SECTION 5 Organization of the Text 27

The core of this book consists of case studies selectedfor their significance in terms of our comparativethemes and ability to provide a reasonable sample of

types of political regimes and geographic regions. Al-though each of the country studies makes importantcomparative references, the studies are primarily

Section f Organization of the Text

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 27

Cengage Learning

intended to provide detailed descriptions and analy-ses of the politics of individual countries. At the sametime, the country studies have common section andsubsection headings to help you make comparisonsand explore similar themes across the various cases.The following are brief summaries of the main issuesand questions covered in the country studies.

1: The Making of the Modern StateSection 1 in each chapter provides an overview of theforces that have shaped the particular character of thestate. We believe that understanding the contemporarypolitics of any country requires some familiarity withthe historical process through which its current politi-cal system took shape. “Politics in Action” uses a spe-cific event to illustrate an important political momentin the country’s recent history and to highlight someof the critical political issues it faces. “GeographicSetting” locates the country in its regional context anddiscusses the political implications of this setting.“Critical Junctures” looks at some of the major stagesand decisive turning points in the state’s development.This discussion should give you an idea of how thecountry assumed its current political order and a senseof how relations between state and society have devel-oped over time.

“Themes and Implications” shows how the past pat-tern of state development continues to shape the coun-try’s current political agenda. “Historical Junctures andPolitical Themes” applies the text’s core themes to themaking of the modern state. How has the country’s po-litical development been affected by its place in theworld of states? What are the political implications ofthe state’s approach to economic management? Whathas been the country’s experience with the democraticidea? What are the important bases of collective iden-tity in the country, and how do these relate to the peo-ple’s image of themselves as citizens of the state? “Im-plications for Comparative Politics” discusses thebroader significance of the country for the study ofcomparative politics.

2: Political Economy and DevelopmentSection 2 in each chapter traces the country’s recentand contemporary economic development. It explores

the issues raised by the core theme of governing theeconomy and analyzes how economic developmenthas affected political change. The placement of thissection near the beginning of the country study re-flects our belief that understanding a country’s eco-nomic situation is essential for analyzing its politics.“State and Economy” discusses the basic organizationof the country’s economy, with emphasis on the roleof the state in managing economic life and on the rela-tionship between the government and other economicactors. How do the dynamics and historical timing of the country’s insertion into the world economy—and its current position and competitiveness withinthe globalized economy—affect domestic politicalarrangements and shape contemporary challenges?This section also analyzes the state’s social welfarepolicies, such as health care, housing, and pensionprograms. “Society and Economy” examines the so-cial and political implications of the country’s eco-nomic situation. It asks who benefits from economicchange and looks at how economic development cre-ates or reinforces class, ethnic, gender, regional, orideological cleavages in society. “The Global Econ-omy” considers the country’s global role. How havepatterns of trade and foreign investment changed overtime? What is the country’s relationship to regionaland international organizations? To what degree hasthe country been able to influence multilateral poli-cies? How have international economic issues affectedthe domestic political agenda?

3: Governance and Policy-MakingIn Section 3, we describe the state’s major policy-making institutions and procedures. “Organization ofthe State” lays out the fundamental principles—as re-flected in the country’s constitution, its official ideol-ogy, and its historical experience—on which the polit-ical system and the distribution of political power arebased. It also sketches the basic structure of the state,including the relationship among different levels andbranches of government. “The Executive” encom-passes the key offices (for example, presidents, primeministers, communist party leaders) that are at the topof the political system, focusing on those with themost power, how they are selected, and how they usetheir power to make policy. This section looks at the


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 28

Cengage Learning

SECTION 5 Organization of the Text 29

At the beginning of each of the following chap-ters is a data box that presents important fac-tual and statistical information about the

country. We hope most of this information is self-explanatory, but a few points of clarification maybe helpful.

• The social and economic data largelycomes from the CIA World Factbook, theWorld Bank World DevelopmentIndicators, and the United Nations HumanDevelopment Report, all of which are is-sued annually.*

• The data presented is as up to date as pos-sible. Unless otherwise indicated, it is from2002–2005.

• Several important terms used in the databoxes are explained in the Glossary, includ-ing Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GrossNational Product/Index (GNP/GNI), Pur-chasing Power Parity (PPP), and Gini Index.

• At the end of each data box are six broadcategories that rate and rank countries onthe basis of statistically derived measure-ments of various aspects of their political oreconomic development. We think theseprovide an interesting, if sometimes contro-versial approach to comparative analysis.The categories include the following:†• The Human Development Index

(HDI): A summary composite index usedby the United Nations “that measures acountry’s average achievements in threebasic aspects of human development:longevity, knowledge, and a decent stan-dard of living. Longevity is measured bylife expectancy at birth; knowledge ismeasured by a combination of the adultliteracy rate and the combined primary,secondary, and tertiary gross enrollmentratio; and standard of living by GDP percapita (PPP US$).” The higher the score,the better the HDI.

• The Gender-Related DevelopmentIndex (GDI): HDI “adjusted to account

for inequalities between men andwomen” by comparing, for example,gender differentials in life expectancy,literacy, and income. The higher thescore, the better the GDI.

• The Gender Empowerment Mea-sure (GEM): Also developed by theUN “to measure gender inequality inthree basic dimensions of empower-ment—economic participation and deci-sion making, political participation anddecision-making and power over eco-nomic resources.” The higher the score,the better the GEM.

• The Corruption Perceptions Index(CPI): A measure developed by Trans-parency International that “ranks coun-tries in terms of the degree to which cor-ruption is perceived to exist amongpublic officials and politicians. It is acomposite index, drawing on corruption-related data in expert surveys carriedout by a variety of reputable institutions.It reflects the views of businesspeopleand analysts from around the world, in-cluding experts who are locals in thecountries evaluated.” Range: 10 (highlyclean) to 0 (highly corrupt).

• The Environmental SustainabilityIndex (ESI): “A composite index devel-oped at Yale and Columbia Universitiestracking a diverse set of socioeconomic,environmental, and institutional indica-tors that characterize and influence envi-ronmental sustainability at the nationalscale.” The current range is from 29.2(worst) to 75.1 (best).

• Freedom in the World Rating: Anannual evaluation by Freedom House ofthe state of freedom in countries aroundthe world measured according to politi-cal rights and civil liberties through “amulti-layered process of analysis andevaluation by a team of regional experts

What’s in the Data Boxes?

(continued)

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 29

Cengage Learning

national bureaucracy and its relationship to the chiefexecutive and the governing party and its role inpolicy-making. “Other State Institutions” looks at themilitary, the judiciary and the legal system, semi-public agencies, and subnational government. “ThePolicy-Making Process” summarizes how public pol-icy gets made and implemented. It describes the rolesof formal institutions and procedures, as well as infor-mal aspects of policy-making, such as patron-clientrelations and interest group activity.

4: Representation and ParticipationThe relationship between a country’s state and societyis the topic of Section 4. How do different groups insociety organize to further their political interests, howdo they participate and get represented in the politicalsystem, and how do they influence policy-making?Given the importance of the U.S. Congress in policy-making, American readers might expect to find theprincipal discussion of “The Legislature” in Section 3(“Governance and Policy-Making”) rather than Sec-tion 4. But the United States is quite exceptional inhaving a legislature that in much of the policy processis a coequal branch of government with the executive.In most other political systems, the executive domi-nates the policy process, even when it is ultimatelyresponsible to the legislature, as in a parliamentary

system. In most countries other than the United States,the legislature functions primarily to represent andprovide a forum for the political expression of variousinterests in government; it is only secondarily (and insome cases, such as China, only marginally) a policy-making body. Therefore, although this section doesdescribe and assess the legislature’s role in policy-making, its primary focus is on how the legislaturerepresents or fails to represent different interests insociety.

“Political Parties and the Party System” describesthe overall organization of the party system and re-views the major parties. “Elections” discusses theelection process and recent trends in electoral behav-ior. It also considers the significance of elections (orlack thereof) as a vehicle for citizen participation inpolitics and in bringing about changes in the govern-ment. “Political Culture, Citizenship, and Identity”examines how people perceive themselves as mem-bers of the political community: the nature and sourceof political values and attitudes, who is considered acitizen of the state, and how different groups in soci-ety understand their relationship to the state. The top-ics covered may include political aspects of the edu-cational system, the media, religion, and ethnicity.How have globalization and events relating to Sep-tember 11 shaped collective identities and collectiveaction? “Interests, Social Movements, and Protests”


and scholars.” Countries are rankedin .5 gradations between 1.0 and 7.0,with 1.0–2.5 being “Free;” 3.0–5.0,“Partly Free;” and 5.5–7.0, “Not Free.”

*These reports and other statistics can be found atwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html,www.worldbank.org/data/, and http://hdr.undp.org/.

†The explanatory quotations for the composite categoriesare taken from:• The Human Development Index: http://hdr.undp.

org/statistics/indices/about_hdi.cfm

• The Gender-Related Development Index: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_282_1_1.html

• The Gender Empowerment Measure: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_283_1_1.html

• The Corruption Perceptions Index: http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004_faq.en.html

• The Environmental Sustainability Index:http://www.yale.edu/esi/

• Freedom in the World Rating: http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/methodology.htm.

What’s in the Data Boxes? (cont.)

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 30

Cengage Learning

discusses how various groups pursue their politicalinterests outside the party system. When do they useformal organizations (such as unions) or launchmovements (such as Green environmental, antiglob-alization, or peace movements)? What is the relation-ship between the state and such organizations andmovements? When and how do citizens engage inacts of protest? And how does the state respond tosuch protests?

5: Politics in TransitionIn Section 5, each country study returns to the book’sfocus on the major challenges that are reshaping ourworld and the study of comparative politics. “PoliticalChallenges and Changing Agendas” lays out the ma-jor unresolved issues facing the country and assesseswhich are most likely to dominate in the near future.Many of the country studies address issues that havegenerated intense conflicts around the world in the re-cent period—conflicts involving globalization, collec-tive identities, human rights and civil liberties, the warin Iraq, and the consequences of America’s exercise ofglobal hegemony. “Politics in Comparative Perspec-tive” returns to the book’s four core themes and high-lights the implications of the country case for thestudy of comparative politics. How does the history—and how will the fate—of the country influence devel-opments in a regional and global context? What doesthis case study tell us about politics in other countriesthat have similar political systems or that face similarkinds of political challenges?

We realize that it is quite a challenge to set out on ajourney with the goal of trying to understand contem-porary politics around the globe. We hope that thetimely information and thematic focus of Introductionto Comparative Politics will prepare and inspire you toexplore further the often troubling, sometimes inspir-ing, but endlessly fascinating world of comparativepolitics.

Key Terms

Suggested Readings 31

World Trade Organization (WTO)

collective identitiescomparative politicscomparativistscountrystateexecutivecabinetbureaucracylegitimacyregulationsstate formationnation-statepolitical culturerational choice theorymiddle-level theorydemocratic transitionsdictatorshipWorld BankInternational Monetary

Fund (IMF)political economylaissez-fairesustainable developmentsocial movementssocial classdistributional politics

typologymost different case

analysisgross domestic product

(GDP)gross national product

(GNP)gross national income

(GNI)official international ex-

change ratespurchasing power parity

(PPP)Human Development In-

dex (HDI)Gender-Related Devel-

opment Index (GDI)Gender Empowerment

Measure (GEM)Corruption Perceptions

Index (CPI)Environmental Sustain-

ability Index (ESI)Freedom in the World

Ratingtransitional democraciesconsolidated democraciestotalitarian

North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganization (NATO)

cold war

globalizationauthoritarianEuropean Union (EU)

Suggested ReadingsAnderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on

the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. London:Verso, 1991.

Anderson, Lisa, ed. Transitions to Democracy. New York: Co-lumbia University Press, 1999.

Berger, Suzanne, and Dore, Ronald, eds. National Diversityand Global Capitalism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996.

Brady, Henry E., and Collier, David, eds. Rethinking Social In-quiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, Md.:Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

Calleo, David P. Rethinking Europe’s Future. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press: 2001.

Cammack, Paul. Capitalism and Democracy in the ThirdWorld: The Doctrine for Political Development. London:Leicester University Press, 1997.

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 31

Cengage Learning

Coates, David, ed. Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Ap-proaches. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.

Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., eds. The Global Resur-gence of Democracy. 2d ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-versity Press, 1996.

Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F., Chu, Yun-han, and Tien,Hung-mao, eds. Consolidating the Third Wave of Democracy.2 vols. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Trans-formation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda,eds. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985.

Friedman, Thomas L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of theTwenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 2005.

Grindle, Merilee S. Despite the Odds: The Contentious Politicsof Education Reform. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 2004.

Hall, Peter A., and Soskice, David, eds. Varieties of Capitalism:The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage.New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Katznelson, Ira, and Milner, Helen V., eds. Political Science:The State of the Discipline. New York: Norton, 2002.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., and Verba, Sidney. DesigningSocial Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development: Political Power andIndustrialization in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2005.

Lahav, Gallya. Immigration and Politics in the New Europe:Reinventing Borders. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2004.

Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Zuckerman, Alan S., eds. Compar-ative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Linz, Juan J., and Stepan, Alfred. Problems of DemocraticTransition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, SouthAmerica, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1996.

Mahoney, James, and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, eds. Compara-tive Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Marx, Anthony. Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of theUnited States, South Africa, and Brazil. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1998.

Norris, Pippa, and Inglehart, Ronald. Sacred and Secular: Reli-gion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2004.

O’Donnell, Guillermo A., Schmitter, Philippe C., and White-head, Laurence, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 4vols. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Powell, G. Bingham. Elections as Instruments of Democracy:Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2000.

Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political andEconomic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

———, et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institu-tions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Putnam, Robert, with Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, RaffaellaY. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in ModernItaly. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes toImprove the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998.

Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization andNationalist Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000.

Stark, David, and Bruszt, Laszlo. Postsocialist Pathways:Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. NewYork: Norton, 2002.

Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements andContentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1998.

Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D.990–1992. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990.

Toft, Monica Duffy, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Iden-tity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Wolf, Martin. Why Globalization Works. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2004.

Woo-Cummings, Meredith, ed. The Developmental State.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Suggested WebsitesArea Studies and Comparative Politicswww.psr.keele.ac.uk/area.htmCIA World Factbookwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbookElections Around the Worldwww.electionworld.orgForeign Government Resources on the Webwww.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/foreign.html


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 32

Cengage Learning

Freedom Housewww.freedomhouse.orgNationMasterwww.nationmaster.comPolitical Resources on the Netwww.politicalresources.netWorld Auditwww.worldaudit.org

Endnotes1Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Inter-est 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18. The article is reprinted in MarkKesselman and Joel Krieger, eds., Readings in ComparativePolitics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 2006).2For collections of articles on globalization, see Mark Kessel-man, ed., Politics of Globalization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,2006), and Joel Krieger, ed., Globalization and State Power: AReader (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2006). For a livelyaccount of changes involved in the current phase of globaliza-tion, see Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief His-tory of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 2005).3PS: Political Science and Politics 37, no. 6 (July 2004): 566.This issue also has the full program from the 2004 APSA an-nual meeting.4United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Interna-tional Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Recon-struction and Development (IBRD), Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD), North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA), and Asia Pacific Economic Coop-eration (APEC) Forum.5For descriptions by sympathetic participant-observers, seeJohn Cavanagh and Jerry Mander, eds., Alternatives to Eco-nomic Globalization: A Better World Is Possible, 2nd ed. (SanFrancisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2004); and Robin Broad, ed.,Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). For spirited de-fenses of globalization, see Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense ofGlobalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); andMartin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 2004).6See Philippe Schmitter, “Comparative Politics,” in JoelKrieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World,2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 160– 165.For a more extended discussion and different approach, seeDavid D. Laitin, “Comparative Politics: The State of the Sub-discipline,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Politi-cal Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: Norton,2002), 630–659. For a collection of articles in the field of com-parative politics, see Kesselman and Krieger, eds., Readings inComparative Politics.

7See Anthony Marx, Making Race and Nation: A Comparisonof the United States, South Africa, and Brazil (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998).8For a landmark article that analyzed how political decisions of-ten reflect pressures from both the domestic and internationalarena, see Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization42 (Summer 1988): 427–460.9See, for example, Colin Campbell, Governments Under Stress:Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, Lon-don, and Ottawa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).10See, for example, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communi-ties: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, rev.ed. (London: Verso, 1991); and Theda Skocpol, Social Revolu-tions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1994).11Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of StateIntervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1986); and Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Eco-nomic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).12For reviews of recent literature on the state, see MargaretLevi, “The State of the Study of the State,” Miles Kahler, “TheState of the State in World Politics,” and Atul Kohli, “State, So-ciety, and Development,” in Katznelson and Milner, eds., Politi-cal Science: State of the Discipline. 84–117.13John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbin, “ArePolitical Orientations Genetically Transmitted?”, in AmericanPolitical Science Review, vol. 99, no. 2, May 2005, 153–167.14For diverse views, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, andSidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inferencein Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1994); Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman,eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Struc-ture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);Katznelson and Milner, eds., Political Science; Henry E.Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Di-verse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, Md.: Rowman andLittlefield, 2004).15Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Es-says (New York, Basic Books, 1973).16For discussion of rational choice theory in the popularpress, see “Political Scientists Debate Theory of ‘RationalChoice’,” in the New York Times, February 26, 2000, p. B11;and Jonathan Cohn, “Irrational Exuberance: When Did Politi-cal Science Forget About Politics?,” New Republic, October25, 1999, 25–31. For an application of rational choice theoryin comparative politics, see Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif,Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Wein-gast, Analytic Narratives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1998). For a lively exchange about the value of ap-plying this approach to explaining large-scale historical

Endnotes 33

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 33

Cengage Learning

change, see a critical review of Analytic Narratives by Jon El-ster, “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambi-tion,” and a reply by the authors of the book: Elster, “Ratio-nal Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition,” andRobert H. Bates et al., “The Analytic Narrative Project,”American Political Science Review 94, no. 3 (September2000): 685–702.17For the most influential example, see Juan J. Linz and Al-fred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consoli-dation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Commu-nist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1996). However, for a warning that generalizations of thiskind may neglect important differences among countries, forexample, between formerly authoritarian and communistcountries, see Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Democratization:Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,” World Politics55, no. 2 (Jan. 2003): 170–189. Selections of both are in-cluded in Kesselman and Krieger, eds., Readings in Compar-ative Politics.18One statement of the case that globalization has decisivelyweakened state supremacy is Martin van Creveld, “The Fate ofthe State,” Parameters (Spring 1996): 4–17, reprinted inKesselman and Krieger, Readings in Comparative Politics.Other articles in this collection develop the case that states re-tain a commanding position. See also Joel Krieger, Globaliza-tion and State Power: Who Wins When America Rules? (NewYork: Pearson/Longman, 2005).19Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” For-eign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July–August 2002). The article isreprinted in Kesselman and Krieger, Readings in ComparativePolitics. Rotberg was referring in his article to Afghanistanwhen it was hijacked by the Taliban.20This term is borrowed from Peter A. Hall, Governing theEconomy. 21Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Histori-cal Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).22Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism:The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2001). Also see HerbertKitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John Stephens, eds.,Continuity and Change in Advanced Capitalist Democracies(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and DavidCoates, ed., Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Approaches(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005).23For a sample of an enormous and diverse literature, seeChalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: TheGrowth of Industrial Policy (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1982); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery:The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Mancur J. Ol-son, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth,Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: YaleUniversity Press, 1982); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy:

States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-ton University Press, 1995); Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson,States and Economic Development: A Comparative HistoricalAnalysis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-nell University Press, 1999). For a review article questioningmany commonly offered explanations, see Robert Wade, “EastAsia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial In-sights, Shaky Evidence,” World Politics, 44, no. 2 (1992):270–320. Recent important contributions are Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrializationin the Global Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005), and Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Eco-nomic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: The PenguinPress, 2005).24Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal ofDemocracy 10, no. 3 (July 1999): 3–17 (http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/jod/10.3sen.html). This article is included in Kesselmanand Krieger, Readings in Comparative Politics. An influentialstudy of this question, on which Sen draws, reaches a similarconclusion: Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Develop-ment: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World,1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).For a study that reaches a different conclusion—that there is apositive correlation between democracy and economicgrowth—see Yi Feng, Democracy, Governance, and EconomicPerformance: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress, 2005).25Assorted Comparative Charts and Graphs, Freedom in WorldReports, 2003 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/free-world/2003/tables.htm) and 2005 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2005.htm).26Sen, p. 3 (Internet text version).27Andrew Roberts, “Review Article: The Quality of Democ-racy,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (April 2005), p. 357.28This view was first developed by Dankwart Rustow. His orig-inal article and commentaries are the focus of Lisa Anderson,ed., Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1999). This approach has been further developed byAdam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political andEconomic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).29Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncer-tain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1986). The concept of waves of democratization is taken fromSamuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in theLate Twentieth Century. (Norman, Ok.: University of Okla-homa Press, 1991).30Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.31For attempts to answer this question, see Alfred Stepan andCindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic


329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 34

Cengage Learning

Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism,” WorldPolitics 46, no. 1 (October 1993): 1–22, reprinted in Kesselmanand Krieger, Readings in Comparative Politics; and Juan J.Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of PresidentialDemocracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).32See, for example, Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions AboutConsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April 1996):34–51; Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Para-

digm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5–21;and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competi-tive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April2002): 51–65. All are reprinted in Kesselman and Krieger,Readings in Comparative Politics.33Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” in Jour-nal of Democracy, 13.2 (2002), 21–35.

Endnotes 35

329821_Ch01 pp3 11/8/05 12:40 PM Page 35

Cengage Learning

P A R T 2

ConsolidatedDemocraciesC H A P T E R 2

Br i ta inC H A P T E R 3

FranceC H A P T E R 4

GermanyC H A P T E R 5

JapanC H A P T E R 6

I nd iaC H A P T E R 7

Uni ted S ta tes

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 36

Cengage Learning

C H A P T E R 2

Britain

Joel Krieger

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 37

Cengage Learning

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Land and PeopleCapital London

Total area (square miles) 94,251 (Slightly smaller than Oregon)

Population 60.4 million

Annual population 1975–2000 0.2growth rate (%) 2000–2015 (projected) 0.3

Urban population (%) 89

Ethnic composition (%) White 92.1Minority ethnic population 7.9

Indian 1.8Pakistani 1.3Bangladeshi 0.5Other Asian 0.4Black Caribbean 1.0Black African 0.8Black Other 0.2Chinese 0.4Other ethnic groups 0.4

Major language(s) English

Religious affiliation (%) All religions 76.8Christian 71.6Muslim 2.7Hindu 1.0Jewish 0.5Sikh 0.6Buddhist 0.3Other Religion 0.3

No religion 15.5Not stated 7.3

EconomyDomestic currency British pound (GBP)

$US1 0.5462 GBP (2004)

Total GNI (US$) 1.68 trillion

GNI per capital (US$) 28,320

Total GNI at purchasing 1.64 trillionpower parity (US$)

GDP annual growth 1983–1993 2.5rate (%) 1993–2003 2.8

2002 1.82003 2.22004 3.2

GDP per capita average 1983–1993 2.2annual growth rate (%) 1993–2003 2.5

Inequality in income or Share of poorest 10% 2consumption (1999) (%) Share of poorest 20% 6

Share of richest 20% 44Share of richest 10% 28Gini Index (1999) 36.8

Structure of production Agriculture 1(% of GDP) Industry 26.3

Services 72.7

Labor force distribution Agriculture 1.5(% of total) Industry 19.1

Services 79.5

Exports as % of GDP 25.1

Imports as % of GDP 28.1

SocietyLife expectancy at birth 77.6

Infant mortality per 5.31,000 live births

Adult illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 0*

*The OECD estimates that Britain has a functional illiteracyrate of about 22%.

Access to information Telephone lines 588and communications Mobile phones 770(per 1,000 population) Radios 1446

Televisions 950Personal computers 366.2

Women in Government and the EconomyWomen in the National Legislature

Lower house or single house (%) 19.8Upper house (%) 17.8Female legislators, senior offices,

and managers (% of total) 31

Women in Cabinet 30.4

Female professional and technical workers (% of total) 44

Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) (%) 53.3

Estimated Earned Female 19,807Income (PPP US$) Male 32,984

Composite Ratings and RankingsHuman Development Index (HDI) ranking (value)

(out of 177 countries) 12 (.936)

Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) ranking (value) (out of 78 countries) 9 (.934)

38

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 38

Cengage Learning

Politics in ActionOn Saturday, January 24, 2004, Prime Minister TonyBlair was facing the most dangerous week of hispolitical life. He acknowledged that his job was on theline. On Tuesday, an extremely tough fight was antici-pated over the Higher Education Bill to raise studentfees in order to fund university education, a center-piece of his legislative program. But Wednesdaylooked far more ominous, for that was the day whenBlair would face the much-anticipated report of theHutton inquiry on the suicide of David Kelly, the for-mer UN weapons inspector and whistle-blower whohad challenged a key tenet of the government’s justifi-cation for the war in Iraq.

The report would bring to a climax the miserablesaga that began in May 2003, when the BBC reportedthat the most compelling evidence for the claim thatSaddam Hussein posed an imminent threat—that Iraq

could launch weapons of mass destruction on forty-five minutes’ notice—was wrong. For an increasinglybeleaguered Tony Blair, facing mounting criticism ofthe war in Iraq, the story could scarcely have beenmore damaging. Relying on an unnamed “senior offi-cial,” the BBC asserted that Downing Street hadordered the government’s claims against Saddam tobe exaggerated or, as the BBC reporter unforgettablyput it, “sexed up.” After three weeks of mercilesspounding in the media, Blair made a fateful decision:it was time to authorize a back-channel leak of theBBC’s source, David Kelly. If Kelly were discredited,the BBC would be put in its place, and the primeminister might reclaim the offensive.

His name revealed, Kelly was promptly placedbefore the harsh glare of television cameras on July 15and grilled by the House of Commons Foreign AffairsCommittee. Then, just two days later, he left his homein a village near Oxford for his usual afternoon walk.

39

Section B The Making of the Modern British State

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) ranking (value) (out of 78 countries) 18 (.698)

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking (value) (out of 146 countries) 11 (8.6)

Environmental Sustainability (ESI) Index ranking (value) (out of 146 countries) 65 (50.2)

Freedom in World Rating Free (1.0)

Political OrganizationPolitical System Parliamentary democracy, Constitutionalmonarchy.

Regime History Long constitutional history, origins subject tointerpretation, usually dated from the seventeenth century orearlier.

Administrative Structure Unitary state with fusion of powers.UK parliament has supreme legislative, executive, and judi-cial authority. Reform in process to transfer limited powersto representative bodies for Scotland, Wales, and NorthernIreland.

Executive Prime minister (PM), answerable to House ofCommons, subject to collective responsibility of the cabinet;

member of Parliament who is leader of party that can control amajority in Commons.

Legislature Bicameral. House of Commons elected by single-member plurality system with no fixed term but a five-yearlimit. Main legislative powers: to pass laws, provide forfinance, scrutinize public administration and governmentpolicy. House of Lords, unelected upper house: limitedpowers to delay enactment of legislation and to recommendrevisions; specified appeals court functions. Reform intro-duced to eliminate voting rights of hereditary peers andcreate new second chamber.

Judiciary Independent but with no power to judge the consti-tutionality of legislation or governmental conduct. Judgesappointed by Crown on recommendation of PM or lordchancellor.

Party System Two-party dominant, with regional variation.Principal parties: Labour, and Conservative; a center party(Liberal Democrats); and national parties in Scotland, Wales,and Northern Ireland.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 39

Cengage Learning

He chatted with a neighbor and never returned. Hisbody was found the next day in a wooded area, closeto his home in Oxfordshire, with a knife and a packetof pills nearby. There was little doubt that Kelly’sdeath was suicide, but his tragedy put a human face onthe misgivings many millions of Britons felt about thejustifications for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.It unleashed a furious debate about the lengths Blairhad gone to steamroll Parliament into backing his waraims and the pressure he was willing to exert to intimi-date a well-meaning whistle-blower.

Blair was feeling the heat on all sides. Polls indi-cated that nearly 60 percent of the British peoplethought Blair should resign if Hutton found he hadintentionally exaggerated the case for war. In addition,the prime minister made it clear that a defeat on theEducation Bill on Tuesday would be taken as a vote ofno confidence in his leadership and bring with it alikely resignation. London was buzzing with politicalintrigue, with many insiders speculating that byWednesday, Blair’s premiership might be crumbling.

So how bad a week did Blair have? On Tuesday,Blair’s party deserted him in droves. His 161-seat

majority all but evaporated, and his reputation wasbadly bruised, but the Education Bill squeakedthrough by five votes. A push from Hutton, and hecould be on the way out. Then on Wednesday, theHutton Report entirely vindicated his role in the Kellyaffair, roundly blamed the BBC, and the Blair govern-ment was back in business.

The week’s events signaled a short-term victoryfor Blair, but hardly a reversal in political fortunes.Blair’s decision to support the U.S.-led war in Iraqwas very unpopular in Britain, increasingly so asweapons of mass destruction—the key justificationfor war—never were found. Recurring questionsabout the war in Iraq hounded Blair right through thecampaign leading to his third electoral victory in May2005—a feat never before achieved by the leader ofBritain’s 105-year-old Labour Party.

Blair’s victory, however, was bittersweet—andthe slashing of his parliamentary majority by nearly100 seats was not even the worst of it. British electionnight tradition has each candidate in a constituencystanding side by side as the results are announced.Thus, television cameras captured a stony-faced

40 CHAPTER 2 Britain

Blair’s 2005 victory wasboth historic and humbling.In an image that promisedto be replayed endlesslyon television wheneverthe 2005 election wasdiscussed, Blair visiblyblanched as a defeatedindependent candidate,whose son died in Iraq,asked Blair to makeamends to the families ofthose who lost loved onesin the war. Source: Jeff J.Mitchell/Reuters/Corbis

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 40

Cengage Learning

prime minister standing just behind Reg Keys, an in-dependent antiwar candidate whose son had beenkilled in Iraq, as Keys solemnly intoned: “I hope inmy heart that one day the prime minister will be ableto say sorry . . . to the families of the bereaved.” Andbefore the final results were tabulated, the guessinggame that threatened to engulf Blair’s third termbegan, as pundits and Labour Party critics of theprime minister openly speculated about when Blairshould resign in favor of Gordon Brown, his chancel-lor and much-anticipated successor as prime ministerand leader of the Labour Party.

Geographic SettingBritain is the largest of the British Isles, a group ofislands off the northwest coast of Europe, and encom-passes England, Scotland, and Wales. The second-largest island comprises Northern Ireland and theindependent Republic of Ireland. The term GreatBritain encompasses England, Wales, and Scotland,but not Northern Ireland. We use the term Britain asshorthand for the United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland.

Covering an area of approximately 94,000 squaremiles, Britain is roughly two-thirds the size of Japan, orapproximately half the size of France. In 2004, the pop-ulation of the United Kingdom was 60.4 million people.

Although forever altered by the Channel Tunnel,Britain’s location as an offshore island adjacent toEurope is significant. Historically, Britain’s islanddestiny made it less subject to invasion and conquestthan its continental counterparts, affording the coun-try a sense of security. The geographic separationfrom mainland Europe has also created for manyBritons a feeling that they are both apart from and apart of Europe, a factor that has complicated relationswith Britain’s EU partners to this day.

Critical JuncturesOur study begins with a look at the historical develop-ment of the modern British state. History shapes con-temporary politics in very important ways. Once inplace, institutions leave powerful legacies, and issuesthat were left unresolved in one period may presentchallenges for the future.

In many ways, Britain is the model of a united andstable country with an enviable record of continuityand resiliency. Nevertheless, the history of state for-mation reveals how complex and open-ended theprocess can be. Some issues that plague other coun-tries, such as religious divisions, were settled long agoin Great Britain proper (although not in NorthernIreland). Yet others, such as multiple national identi-ties, remain on the agenda.

British state formation involved the unificationof kingdoms or crowns (hence the term UnitedKingdom). After Duke William of Normandy de-feated the English in the Battle of Hastings in 1066,the Norman monarchy extended its authoritythroughout the British Isles. With the Acts of Unionof 1536 and 1542, England and Wales were legally,politically, and administratively united. The unifica-tion of the Scottish and English crowns began in1603, when James VI of Scotland ascended to theEnglish throne as James I. Thereafter, England,Scotland, and Wales were known as Great Britain.Scotland and England remained divided politically,however, until the Act of Union of 1707. Henceforth,a common Parliament of Great Britain replaced thetwo separate parliaments of Scotland and of Englandand Wales.

At the same time, the making of the British stateincluded a historic expression of constraints onmonarchical rule. At first, the period of Norman ruleafter 1066 strengthened royal control, but the conductof King John (1199–1216) fueled opposition fromfeudal barons. In 1215, they forced the king to con-sent to a series of concessions that protected feudallandowners from abuses of royal power. These restric-tions on royal prerogatives were embodied in theMagna Carta, a historic statement of the rights of apolitical community against the monarchical state.Soon after, in 1236, the term Parliament was first usedofficially to refer to the gathering of feudal baronssummoned by the king whenever he required theirconsent to special taxes. By the fifteenth century,Parliament had gained the right to make laws.

The Seventeenth-Century Settlement

The making of the British state in the sixteenth andseventeenth centuries involved a complex interplay of

SECTION 1 The Making of the Modern British State 41

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 41

Cengage Learning

religious conflicts, national rivalries, and strugglesbetween rulers and Parliament. These conflictserupted in the civil wars of the 1640s and the forcedabdication of James II in 1688. The bloodless politi-cal revolution of 1688, subsequently known as theGlorious Revolution, marked the “last successfulpolitical coup d’état or revolution in British history.”1

By the end of the seventeenth century, the frame-work of a constitutional (or limited) monarchy, whichwould still exercise flashes of power into the nine-teenth century, was established in Britain. For morethan three hundred years, Britain’s monarchs havebeen answerable to Parliament, which has held thesole authority for taxation and the maintenance of a


Britain

0 100 Miles

0 100 Kilometers

Dublin

Edinburgh

Glasgow

Belfast

ManchesterLiverpool

Birmingham

CardiffLondonBristol

Southampton

PlymouthATLANTIC OCEAN

North Sea

Irish Sea

English Channel

Isle of Wight

Chunnel

Isle of Man

OrkneyIslands

ShetlandIslands

Isle ofAnglesey

Out

erH

ebrid

esIn

ner H

ebrid

es

Thames

REPUBLIC

OF

IRELAND

NORTHERNIRELAND

ENGLAND

SCOTLAND

FRANCE

WA

LES

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/10/05 11:38 AM Page 42

Cengage Learning

standing army. The Glorious Revolution also resolvedlong-standing religious conflict. The replacementof the Roman Catholic James II by the ProtestantWilliam and Mary ensured the dominance of theChurch of England (or Anglican Church). To this day,the Church of England remains the established (offi-cial) religion, and approximately two dozen of itsbishops and archbishops sit as members of the Houseof Lords, the upper house of Parliament.

Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, a basicform of parliamentary democracy had emerged. Exceptin Northern Ireland, the problem of religious divisions,which continue to plague many countries throughoutthe world, was largely settled (although Catholics andJews could not vote until the 1820s). As a result of set-tling most of its religious differences early, Britain hastaken a more secular turn than most other countries inWestern Europe. The majority of Britons do not con-sider religion a significant source of identity, and activechurch membership in Britain, at 15 percent, is verylow. These seventeenth-century developments becamea defining moment for how the British perceive theirhistory to this day. However divisive and disruptive theprocess of state building may have been originally, itstelling and retelling have contributed significantly to aBritish political culture that celebrates democracy’scontinuity, gradualism, and tolerance.

The Industrial Revolution and the British Empire

Although the British state was consolidated by theseventeenth century, the timing of its industrialdevelopment and the way that process transformedBritain’s role in the world radically shaped its form. TheIndustrial Revolution from the mid-eighteenth centuryonward involved rapid expansion of manufacturingproduction and technological innovation. It also led tomonumental social and economic transformations andresulted in pressures for democratization. Externally,Britain used its competitive edge to transform anddominate the international order. Internally, theIndustrial Revolution helped shape the development ofthe British state and changed forever the Britishpeople’s way of life.

The Industrial Revolution. The consequences of theIndustrial Revolution for the generations of people who

experienced its upheavals can scarcely be exaggerated.The typical worker was turned “by degrees . . . fromsmall peasant or craftsman into wage-labourer,” ashistorian Eric Hobsbawm observes. Cash and market-based transactions replaced older traditions of barterand production for local need.2

Despite a gradual improvement in the standard ofliving in the English population at large, the effects ofindustrialization were often profound for agriculturallaborers and certain types of artisans. With the com-mercialization of agriculture, many field laborers losttheir security of employment, and cottagers (smalllandholders) were squeezed off the land in large num-bers. The mechanization of manufacturing, whichspread furthest in the cotton industry, upset thetraditional status of the preindustrial skilled craftworkers and permanently marginalized them.

The British Empire. Britain had assumed a sig-nificant role as a world power during the seventeenthcentury, building an overseas empire and engaging


Critical Junctures in Britain’s Political Development

1688 Glorious Revolution establishespower of Parliament

c. 1750 Industrial Revolution begins inBritain

1832 Reform Act expands voting rights1837–1901 Reign of Queen Victoria; height of

British Empire1914–1918 World War I1929–1939 Great Depression1939–1945 World War II1945–1979 Establishment of British welfare

state; dismantling of British Empire

1973 Britain joins the EuropeanCommunity

1979–1990 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcherpromotes “enterprise culture”

1997 Tony Blair elected prime minister2001 Under Blair’s leadership, Britain

“stands shoulder to shoulder” withAmerica in war against terror

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 43

Cengage Learning

actively in international commerce. But it was theIndustrial Revolution of the eighteenth century thatestablished global production and exchange on anew and expanded scale, with particular conse-quences for the making of the British state. Cottonmanufacture, the driving force behind Britain’sgrowing industrial dominance, not only pioneeredthe new techniques and changed labor organizationduring the Industrial Revolution but also representedthe perfect imperial industry. It relied on importedraw materials and, by the turn of the nineteenth cen-tury, already depended on overseas markets for thevast majority of its sales of finished goods. Growthdepended on foreign markets rather than on domes-tic consumption. This export orientation fueled anexpansion far more rapid than an exclusively domes-tic orientation would have allowed.

With its leading industrial sector dependenton overseas trade, Britain’s leaders worked aggres-sively to secure markets and expand the empire.Toward these ends, Britain defeated Europeanrivals in a series of military engagements, culmina-ting in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), whichconfirmed Britain’s commercial, military, and geopo-litical preeminence. The Napoleonic Wars also se-cured a balance of power on the European continentfavorable for largely unrestricted international com-merce (free trade). Propelled by the formidable andactive presence of the British navy, international tradehelped England to take full advantage of its positionas the first industrial power. Many scholars suggestthat in the middle of the nineteenth century, Britainhad the highest per capita income in the world (it wascertainly among the two or three highest), and in1870, at the height of its glory, its trade representednearly one-quarter of the world total, and its industrialmastery ensured highly competitive productivity incomparison with trading partners (see Table 1).

During the reign of Queen Victoria (1837–1901),the British Empire was immensely powerful andencompassed fully 25 percent of the world’s popula-tion. Britain presided over a vast formal and informalempire, with extensive direct colonial rule over somefour dozen countries, including India and Nigeria.At the same time, Britain enjoyed the advantages ofan extensive informal empire—a worldwide network

of independent states, including China, Iran, andBrazil—whose economic fates were linked to it.Britain ruled as a hegemonic power, the state thatcould control the pattern of alliances and terms of theinternational economic order, and that often couldshape domestic political developments in countriesthroughout the world. Overall, the making of theBritish state observed a neat symmetry. Its globalpower helped underwrite industrial growth at home.At the same time, the reliance of domestic industry onworld markets, beginning with cotton manufacture inthe eighteenth century, prompted the government toproject British interests overseas as forcefully aspossible.

Industrial Change and the Struggle for VotingRights. The Industrial Revolution shifted eco-nomic power from landowners to men of commerceand industry. As a result, the first critical juncture inthe long process of democratization began in the late1820s, when the “respectable opinion” of the prop-ertied classes and increasing popular agitationpressed Parliament to expand the right to vote (fran-chise) beyond a thin band of men with substantialproperty, mainly landowners. With Parliament underconsiderable pressure, the Reform Act of 1832extended the franchise to a section of the (male)middle class.


Table 1

World Trade and Relative Labor Productivity

Proprotion of Relative LabourWorld Trade (%) Productivity a (%)

1870 24.0 1.631890 18.5 1.451913 14.1 1.151938 14.0 0.92

aAs compared with the average rate of productivity in othermembers of the world economy.Source: Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperationand Discord in the World Economy, p. 36. Copyright © 1984by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission ofPrinceton University Press.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 44

Cengage Learning

In a very limited way, the Reform Act confirmed thesocial and political transformations of the IndustrialRevolution by granting new urban manufacturing cen-ters, such as Manchester and Birmingham, more sub-stantial representation. However, the massive urbanworking class created by the Industrial Revolution andpopulating the cities of Charles Dickens’s England re-mained on the outside looking in. In fact, the reformwas very narrow and defensive. Before 1832, less than5 percent of the adult population was entitled to vote—and afterward, only about 7 percent. In extending thefranchise so narrowly, the reform underscored the strictproperty basis for political participation and inflamedclass-based tensions in Britain. Following the ReformAct, a massive popular movement erupted in the late1830s to secure the program of the People’s Charter,which included demands for universal male suffrageand other radical reforms intended to make Britain amuch more participatory democracy. The Chartistmovement, as it was called, held huge and often tumul-tuous rallies, and organized a vast campaign to petitionParliament, but it failed to achieve any of its aims.

Expansion of the franchise proceeded very slowly.The Representation of the People Act of 1867 in-creased the electorate to just over 16 percent but leftcities significantly underrepresented. The FranchiseAct of 1884 nearly doubled the size of the electorate,but it was not until the Representation of the PeopleAct of 1918 that suffrage included nearly all adult menand women over age thirty. How slow a process wasit? The franchise for men with substantial incomesdated from the fifteenth century, but women betweenthe ages of twenty-one and thirty were not enfran-chised until 1928. The voting age for both women andmen was lowered to eighteen in 1969. Except for someepisodes during the days of the Chartist movement, thestruggle for extension of the franchise took place with-out violence, but its time horizon must be measured incenturies. This is British gradualism—at its best andits worst (see Figure 1).

World Wars, Industrial Strife, and theDepression (1914–1945)

With the matter of the franchise finally resolved, in onesense the making of the British state as a democracy

was settled. In another important sense, however, thedevelopment of the state was just beginning in the twen-tieth century with the expansion of the state’s direct re-sponsibility for management of the economy and theprovision of social welfare for citizens. The making ofwhat is sometimes called the interventionist state wasspurred by the experiences of two world wars.

The state’s involvement in the economy increasedsignificantly during World War I (1914–1918). Thestate took control of a number of industries, includingrailways, mining, and shipping. It set prices andrestricted the flow of capital abroad and channeled thecountry’s resources into production geared to the wareffort. After World War I, it remained active in the man-agement of industry in a rather different way. Amid aset of tremendous industrial disputes, the state wieldedits power to fragment the trade union movement andresist demands for workers’ control over productionand to promote more extensive state ownership ofindustries. This considerable government manipulation


Figure 1

Expansion of Voting Rights

90

80

70

100

Perc

enta

ge o

f Adu

ltPo

pul

atio

n En

fran

chis

ed

Perc

ent

Incr

ease

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1830

1832

1865

1867

Year

1884

1918

1928

90

80

70

100

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1832

1865

1867

1884

Year

1918

1928

Expansion of the franchise in Britain was a gradualprocess. Despite reforms dating from the early nine-teenth century, nearly universal adult suffrage wasnot achieved until 1928.

Source: Jorgen S. Rasmussen. The British Political Process,p. 151. Copyright © 1993 Wadsworth Publishing Company.Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 45

Cengage Learning

of the economy openly contradicted the policy oflaissez-faire (minimal government interference in theoperation of economic markets). The tensions betweenfree-market principles and interventionist practicesdeepened with the Great Depression beginning in 1929and continuing through much of the 1930s and theexperiences of World War II (1939–1945). The fear ofdepression and the burst of pent-up yearnings for a bet-ter life after the war helped transform the role of thestate and ushered in a period of unusual politicalharmony.

Collectivist Consensus (1945–1979)

In the postwar context of shared victory and commonmisery (almost everyone suffered hardships immedi-ately after the war), reconstruction and dreams of newprosperity and security took priority over ideologicalconflict. In Britain today, a debate rages among politi-cal scientists over whether there was a postwar consen-sus. Critics of the concept contend that disagreementsover specific policies concerning the economy, educa-tion, employment, and health, along with an electoratedivided on partisan lines largely according to socialclass, indicated politics as usual.3 It seems fair to say,however, that a broad culture of reconciliation and adetermination to rebuild and improve the conditions oflife for all Britons helped forge a postwar settlementbased broadly on a collectivist consensus that endureduntil the mid-1970s.

Collectivism is the term coined to describe theconsensus that drove politics in the harmonious post-war period when a significant majority of Britonsand all major political parties agreed that the stateshould take expanded responsibility for economicgovernance and provide for the social welfare in thebroadest terms. They accepted as a matter of faiththat governments should work to narrow the gapbetween rich and poor through public education,national health care, and other policies of thewelfare state, and they accepted state responsibilityfor economic growth and full employment. Collec-tivism brought class-based actors (representatives oflabor and management) inside politics and forgeda broad consensus about the expanded role ofgovernment. In time, however, economic downturnand political stagnation caused the consensus tounravel.

Margaret Thatcher and the Enterprise Culture(1979–1990)

In the 1970s, economic stagnation and the dec-lining competitiveness of key British industries in in-ternational markets fueled industrial strife and keptclass-based tensions near the surface of politics. Nogovernment appeared equal to the tasks of economicmanagement. Each party failed in turn. The Conserv-ative government of Edward Heath (1970–1974)could not resolve the economic problems or thepolitical tensions that resulted from the previously un-heard-of combination of increased inflation and re-duced growth (stagflation). The Labour governmentof Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (1974–1979)fared no better. As unions became increasingly dis-gruntled, the country was beset by a rash of strikesthroughout the winter of 1978–1979, the “winter ofdiscontent.” Labour’s inability to discipline its tradeunion allies hurt the party in the election just a fewmonths later, in May 1979. The traditional centristConservative and Labour alternatives within the col-lectivist mold seemed exhausted, and many Britonswere ready for a new policy agenda.

Margaret Thatcher more than met the challenge.Winning the leadership of the Conservative Party in1975, she wasted little time in launching a set ofbold policy initiatives, which, with characteristicforthrightness, she began to implement after theConservatives were returned to power in 1979.Reelected in 1983 and 1987, Thatcher served longerwithout interruption than any other British primeminister in the twentieth century and never lost ageneral election.

Thatcher was convinced that collectivism had con-tributed to Britain’s decline by sapping British industryand permitting powerful and self-serving unions tohold the country for ransom. To reverse Britain’s rela-tive economic slide, Thatcher sought to jump-start theeconomy by cutting taxes, reducing social serviceswhere possible, and using government policy to stimu-late competitiveness and efficiency in the private sector.

In many ways, the period of Margaret Thatcher’sleadership as prime minister (1979–1990) marks acritical dividing line in postwar British politics. Sheset the tone and redefined the goals of Britishpolitics like few others before her. In November1990, a leadership challenge within Thatcher’s own


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 46

Cengage Learning

Conservative Party, largely over her anti-EU stanceand high-handed leadership style, caused her suddenresignation and replacement by John Major. Majorserved as prime minister from 1990 to 1997, leadingthe Conservative Party to a victory in the 1992 gen-eral election before succumbing to Tony Blair’s NewLabour in 1997.

New Labour’s Third Way

Some twenty electoral records were toppled as NewLabour under the leadership of Tony Blair (see“Leaders: Tony Blair”) won 419 of the 659 seats in Par-liament, the largest majority it has ever held. Blair waspropelled into office as prime minister with a 10 percent


Born in 1953 to a mother from Donegal, Ireland(who moved to Glasgow after her father’sdeath), and a father from the Clydeside ship-

yards, Tony Blair lacks the typical pedigree ofLabour Party leaders. It is very common in thehighest ranks of the Labour Party to find someonewhose father or grandfather was a union official ora Labour MP. The politics in the Blair family, bycontrast, were closely linked to Conservatism (aschairman of his local Conservative Party club, hisfather Leo had a good chance to become aConservative MP). Often, like Tony Blair’s twopredecessors—Neil Kinnock from Wales and JohnSmith from the West of Scotland—leaders of theLabour Party also have distinctive regional ties. Incontrast, Blair moved to Durham in the north ofEngland when he was five but spent much of hisyouth in boarding schools, moved south when hewas old enough to set out on his own, studied lawat Oxford, specialized in employment and indus-trial law in London—and returned to the north onlyto enter the House of Commons from Sedgefield in1983. Thus, Blair has neither the traditional politi-cal or regional ties of a Labour Party leader.*

Coming of political age in opposition, Blairjoined the shadow cabinet in 1988, serving inturn as shadow minister of energy, then of employ-ment, and finally as shadow home secretary. AnMP with no government experience, he easily wonthe contest for party leadership after his closefriend and fellow modernizer John Smith died of asudden heart attack in the summer of 1994. Fromthe start, Blair boosted Labour Party morale andraised expectations that the party would soonregain power. As one observer put it, “The newLeader rapidly made a favorable impression on

the electorate: his looks and affability of mannerappealed to voters whilst his self-confidence,lucidity and clarity of mind rendered him a highlyeffective communicator and lent him an air ofauthority.”† As prime minister, Blair combined firmleadership, eclectic beliefs, and bold politicalinitiatives as he transformed the Labour Party to“New Labour.”

Even before the war in Iraq, his lack of famil-iar roots and ideological convictions made Blair,for many, an enigmatic figure. His very personaldecision to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraqdeepened the impression that Blair would followhis own inner voice above the preferences ofparty. After the 2005 election, many both withinand outside the party hoped that the prime minis-ter’s inner voice would tell him to live up to his endof a deal with Gordon Brown that has been longrumored: that in exchange for Brown backingBlair for party leadership in 1994, Blair would atsome point in the future resign and hand the lead-ership of party and country to Brown. After heretires, Blair will doubtless be remembered as atowering figure in British politics. But two questionsremained. In light of the war in Iraq, what wouldbe Blair’s legacy? And would he leave the scenegracefully, handing power to his rival, while theeconomy was still robust and Brown would stillhave the opportunity to make his mark as primeminister for a couple of years before having toface the electorate?

*See Andy McSmith, Faces of Labour: The Inside Story(London: Verso, 1997), pp. 7–96.

†Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1945 (Oxford:Blackwell, 1996), p. 195.

Leaders: Tony Blair

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 47

Cengage Learning


swing from Conservative to Labour, a postwar record.The Conservative Party, which had been in power sinceMargaret Thatcher’s 1979 victory and was one ofEurope’s most successful parties in the twentiethcentury, was decimated.

New Labour aspired to recast British politics, of-fering what it referred to as a “third-way” alternativeto Thatcherism and the collectivism of traditionalLabour. Everything was at issue, from the way politicswas organized to the country’s underlying values, in-stitutions, and policies. In electoral terms, New Labourrejected the notion of interest-based politics, in whichunions and working people naturally look to Labourand businesspeople and the more prosperous look tothe Conservatives. Labour won in 1997 by drawingsupport from across the socioeconomic spectrum. Itrejected the historic ties between Labour governmentsand the trade union movement, choosing instead toemphasize the virtues of a partnership with business.

In institutional and policy terms, New Labour’sinnovations were intended to reverse the tendency ofprevious Labour governments in Britain to providecentralized statist solutions to all economic and socialproblems. Blair promised new approaches to eco-nomic, welfare, and social policy; British leadershipin Europe; and far-reaching constitutional changes torevitalize democratic participation and devolve (trans-fer) specified powers from the central government toScotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

In the early months of his premiership, Blair dis-played effective leadership in his stewardship of thenation during the period after Lady Diana’s death andin his aggressive efforts to achieve a potentially his-toric peace agreement for Northern Ireland, with far-reaching constitutional implications. By the summerof 2000, however, many began to say that New Laborwas better at sounding innovative than at deliveringthe goods (better at spin than substance). In addition,a set of crises—from a set of fatal train crashes since1997 to protests over the cost of petrol (gasoline) inSeptember 2000 to an outbreak of mad cow disease inspring 2001—made Blair seem a little shopworn.Nevertheless, until the war in Iraq, Blair remained aformidable leader, and a few months before the cata-clysmic events of September 11, 2001, New Labourwon what it most sought: an electoral mandate in June2001 for a second successive term.

After September 11. In the aftermath of theSeptember 11, 2001, attacks on the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon in the United States, Blairshowed decisive leadership in assuming the role of akey ally to the United States in the war on terrorism.With Britain willing and able to lend moral, diplo-matic, and military support, September 11 lent newcredence to the special relationship—a bond oflanguage, culture, and national interests, which cre-ates an unusually close alliance—that has governedU.S.-UK relations for 50 years and catapulted Blairto high visibility in world affairs. Before long, how-ever, especially when the central focus of the war onterrorism moved from Afghanistan to Iraq, manyBritons became disenchanted. Blair’s willingness torun interference with allies and add intellectual bal-last to President George W. Bush’s post-9/11 planswas a big help to the United States. But it lockedBritain into a set of policies over which it had little orno control, vastly complicated its relationships withFrance and Germany (which opposed the war), andgenerated hostility toward the United Kingdom inmuch of the Arab and Muslim world. The devastatingLondon bombings in July 2005, timed to correspondwith the G-8 summit in Gleneagle, Scotland, ap-peared to confirm that Britain faced heightened secu-rity risks because of its participation in the war. Thewar in Iraq, which was very unpopular in the UK,eroded Blair’s popularity. In addition, the convictionamong many Britons that Blair led them into warunder false premises seems to have permanentlyweakened his credibility and tarnished the legacy ofNew Labour.

Themes and ImplicationsThe processes that came together in these historicaljunctures continue to influence developments today inpowerful and complex ways. Our four core themes inthis book, introduced in Part I, highlight some of themost important features of British politics.

Historical Junctures and Political Themes

The first theme suggests that a country’s relativeposition in the world of states influences its ability tomanage domestic and international challenges. A

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 48

Cengage Learning

weaker international standing makes it difficult for acountry to control international events or insulate itselffrom external pressures. Britain’s ability to control theterms of trade and master political alliances during theheight of its imperial power in the nineteenth centuryconfirms this maxim. In a quite different way, Blair’stemptation to cling to the special relationship with theUnited States and Britain’s reduced standing and influ-ence today also confirm the theme of the world ofstates today.

As the gradual process of decolonization definedBritain’s changing relationship to the world of states,Britain fell to second-tier status during the twentiethcentury. Its formal empire began to shrink in the inter-war period (1919–1939) as the “white dominions” ofCanada, Australia, and New Zealand gained indepen-dence. In Britain’s Asian, Middle Eastern, and Africancolonies, the pressure for political reforms leading toindependence deepened during World War II and inthe immediate postwar period. Beginning with theformal independence of India and Pakistan in 1947,an enormous empire of dependent colonies more orless dissolved in less than twenty years. Finally, in1997, Britain returned the commercially vibrantcrown colony of Hong Kong to China. The process ofdecolonization ended any realistic claim Britain couldmake to be a dominant player in world politics.

Is Britain a world power or just a middle-of-the-pack country in Western Europe? It appears to beboth. On the one hand, as a legacy of its role in WorldWar II, Britain sits as a permanent member of theUnited Nations Security Council. On the other hand,Britain invariably plays second fiddle in its specialrelationship to the United States, a show of relativeweakness that has exposed British foreign policy toextraordinary pressures since September 11.

In addition, British governments face persistentchallenges in their dealings with the EU. As MargaretThatcher learned too late to save her premiership,Europe is a highly divisive issue. Can Britain afford toremain aloof from the fast-paced changes of eco-nomic integration—symbolized by the headlong rushtoward a common currency, the euro, which hasalready been embraced by every other leading mem-ber state—as well as several of the newest membersfrom East-Central Europe, who only gained admis-sion in May 2004? It is clear that Britain does nothave the power to control EU policy outcomes, andthe schism over the war in Iraq has, for a time at least,weakened the United Kingdom’s influence as an hon-est broker between the United States and Europe.

A second theme examines the strategies em-ployed in governing the economy. Since the dawn ofBritain’s Industrial Revolution, prosperity at home


One year after the start of thewar in Iraq, Blair’s credibilitywas hurt as key justificationsfor war such as WMDs and AlQueda links to Iraq remainunproven. During ananniversary demonstration,two protesters reached theclock face of Big Ben andunveiled banners reading“Time for Truth.” Source: ©Graeme Robertson/GettyImages

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 49

Cengage Learning

has relied on superior competitiveness abroad, andthis is even truer in today’s environment of intensi-fied international competition and global production.When Tony Blair took office in 1997, he inherited astreak of prosperity in Britain dating from 1992—anenviable circumstance. The Blair government couldthus work to modernize the economy and determineits budgetary priorities from economic strength. WillBritain’s “less-is-more” laissez-faire approach to eco-nomic governance, invigorated by New Labour’sbusiness partnership, continue to compete effectivelyin a global context? Can Britain achieve a durableeconomic model with—or without—fuller integra-tion into Europe? How can we assess the spendingpriorities and distributive implications of the third-way politics of the Blair government? Britain willnever again assume the privileged position of hege-monic power, so a lot depends on how well it playsthe cards it does have.

A third theme is the potent political influence of thedemocratic idea, the universal appeal of core valuesassociated with parliamentary democracy as practicedfirst in the United Kingdom. Even in Britain, issuesabout democratic governance, citizen participation, andconstitutional reform have been renewed with con-siderable force.

As the royal family has been rocked by scandaland improprieties, questions about the undemocraticunderpinning of the British state are asked withgreater urgency. Few reject the monarchy outright, butquestions about the role of the monarchy helpedplace on the agenda broader issues about citizen con-trol over government and constitutional reform. As aresult, in November 1999, a bill was enacted toremove hereditary peers from Britain’s upperunelected chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords,and although the final form of a reformed secondchamber is not settled, the traditional House of Lordshas been abolished.

Long-settled issues about the constitutional formand unity of the state have also reemerged with unex-pected force. How can the interests of England,Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland be balancedwithin a single nation-state? Can the perpetual crisisin Northern Ireland be finally resolved? Tony Blairhas placed squarely on the agenda a set of policiesdesigned to reshape the institutions of governmentand reconfigure the fundamental constitutional

principles. Key policy initiatives have included theformation of a Scottish Parliament and a WelshSenedd (the Welsh Assembly), and the negotiationsof a peace agreement for Northern Ireland that con-tains a comprehensive set of new political institutionsand power-sharing arrangements—some involvingthe Republic of Ireland—with far-reaching constitu-tional ramifications, should the stalemate be re-solved. Clearly, democracy is not a fixed result, evenin the United Kingdom, but a highly politicized andpotentially disruptive process, as constitutional re-form has taken a place front and center as perhaps theboldest item on Tony Blair’s agenda.

Finally, we come to the fourth theme, collectiveidentity, which considers how individuals define whothey are politically in terms of group attachments,come together to pursue political goals, and face theirstatus as political insiders or outsiders. In Britain, animportant aspect of the politics of collective identityis connected to Britain’s legacy of empire and itsaftermath. Through the immigration of its formercolonial subjects to the United Kingdom, decoloniza-tion helped create a multiracial society, to whichBritain has adjusted poorly. As we shall see, issues ofrace, ethnicity, and cultural identity have challengedthe long-standing British values of tolerance andconsensus, and now present important challenges forpolicy and the prospects of cohesion in Britaintoday. With the exception of Iraq, there is no morehot-button issue in Britain than nationality and immi-gration, issues that in an important way drove theConservative party election campaign in 2005. Indeed,the concept of “Britishness”—what the country standsfor and who comprises the political community—hascome under intense scrutiny. At the same time, genderpolitics remains a significant theme, from voting pat-terns to questions of equality in the workplace andpositions of political leadership. Moreover, the specificneeds of women for equal employment opportunitiesand to balance the demands of work and family haveassumed an important place in debates about socialand employment policies.

Implications for Comparative PoliticsBritain’s privileged position in comparative politicstextbooks (it almost always comes first amongcountry studies) seems to follow naturally from the


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 50

Cengage Learning

important historical firsts it has enjoyed. Britain wasthe first nation to industrialize, and for much of thenineteenth century, the British Empire was the world’sdominant economic, political, and military power,with a vast network of colonies throughout the world.Britain was also the first nation to develop an effectiveparliamentary democracy (a form of representativegovernment in which the executive is drawn from andanswerable to an elected national legislature). As aresult of its vast empire, Britain had tremendousinfluence on the form of government introduced incountries around the globe. For these reasons, Britishpolitics is often studied as a model of representativegovernment. Named after the section of London thatis home to the British legislature, the Westminstermodel emphasizes that democracy rests on thesupreme authority of a legislature—in Britain’s case,the Parliament. Finally, Britain has served as a modelof gradual and peaceful evolution of democratic gov-ernment in a world where transitions to democracy areoften turbulent, interrupted, and uncertain.

Today, more than a century after the height of itsinternational power, Britain’s significance in compara-tive terms must be measured in somewhat different

ways. Even in tough times, as today, the advantagesbestowed on prime ministers by the formidable leversof power they control, and the relative strength of theBritish economy provide a platform for success. Par-ticularly in the aftermath of September 11, with signsof intolerance rampant, all economies facing new chal-lenges, and European center-left politics in disarray,the stakes are high. Britain’s ability to succeed (or not)in sustaining economic competitiveness, resolving theeuro dilemma, and revitalizing the center-left will sendimportant signals to governments throughout theworld. Is significant innovation possible in establisheddemocracies? Can a politics beyond left and rightdevelop coherent policies and sustain public support?Can constitutional reforms help bind together a multi-ethnic, multinational state? What geopolitical sphereof maneuver does any state have in a global orderdominated by the United States (where it is not easy totell whether the “special relationship” is a blessing, acurse, or a one-way street with little benefit for theUnited Kingdom)? In fact, contemporary Britain mayhelp define what the prospects are for middle-rankestablished democracies in a global age.

SECTION 2 Political Economy and Development 51

In the first decade of the new century, it appears thatthe trend in government management of the economyhas gone in Britain’s direction. The high unemploy-ment and weak growth in the euro zone as well as thestagnation in the Japanese economy have breathednew life into the old economic doctrine of laissez-faireand raised doubts about the sustainability of morestate-led models. In addition, the pressures of globalcompetitiveness and the perceived advantages ofa one size fits all style of minimalist governmenthave encouraged the movement toward neoliberalapproaches for economic management (free markets,free trade, welfare retrenchment, and an attractiveinvestment climate as the end game of every state’spolitics). A legacy from Thatcher’s Britain, neoliber-alism is a touchstone premise of Tony Blair’s NewLabour. Government policies aim to promote freecompetition among firms, to interfere with the pre-rogatives of entrepreneurs and managers as little as

possible, and to create a business-friendly environ-ment to attract foreign investment and spur innovation.

This section analyzes and evaluates the range ofstrategies that Britain has applied in post–World WarII Europe for managing the economy, culminating inNew Labour’s economic and social model. We thenconsider, in turn, the social consequences of economicdevelopments, and the political repercussions ofBritain’s position in the international economic order.

State and EconomyThirty years ago, there was not much to admire in theBritish economy. Growth was low, and unemploymentwas high, and in 1976 the country received a ThirdWorld–style bailout from the International MonetaryFund to help stabilize the economy. Britain was rou-tinely called the “sick man of Europe.” But times havechanged for the better. Since the mid-1990s, Britain

Section c Political Economy and Development

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 51

Cengage Learning

has avoided the high unemployment and recessionthat have plagued many of the member nations of theEuropean Union (EU).

The pattern of growth reveals the two-track char-acter of the UK economy, with growth in the servicesector—the UK is especially competitive in financialservices—offsetting a much weaker industrial sectorperformance. But in general the British economyexhibits overall strength, and stands up well in know-ledge-intensive high-technology industrial sectors,which account for one-quarter of the country’s totalexports. International comparisons also reveal supe-rior microeconomic competitiveness, with first- orsecond-place rankings in global comparisons of na-tional business environment and company operationsand strategy.

Although many are beginning to wonder howmuch longer the good times will continue to roll, withlow unemployment, low interest rates, low inflation,and sustained growth, the UK performance profilethrough the middle of the century’s first decade wasone of the best in the OECD.

On the negative side, however, must be counted aproductivity gap in manufacturing between the UnitedKingdom and key competitors, a persistent deficit inthe UK balance of trade, as well as ongoing concernabout low rates of domestic investment and spendingon research and development. Housing prices haveescalated rapidly beyond the reach of many middle-class Britons as home mortgage refinancing hasfueled a huge boom in consumer spending for the“haves” and—augmented by a frenzy of credit cardborrowing—pushed record numbers onto the edge ofpersonal bankruptcy. Working-class families werelargely excluded from this new affluence, spurred bya rapid rise in the equity generated by home owner-ship.4 In addition, the British system of productiontends to generate nonstandard and insecure jobs with-out the traditional social protections associated withthe European social and economic model. Women andethnic minorities are significantly overrepresented inthis sector. As a result, within EU Europe (at leastbefore the May 2004 enlargement eastward), Britainassumed a specialized profile as a producer of rela-tively low-technology, low-value-added products inthe manufacturing sector, buttressed by a more com-petitive service economy.

Neoliberalism drives the economic policy orienta-tion of Tony Blair’s New Labour, and the economicperformance of the UK economy today. Britain’s sus-tained growth—which began during Major’s govern-ment in 1993 and continued through eight years ofNew Labour governance—as well as its high inequal-ity (discussed below in “Society and Economy”),reflects both the strengths and the weaknesses of themodel. Government policies aim to promote freecompetition among firms, to interfere with the prerog-atives of entrepreneurs and managers as little as pos-sible, and to create a business-friendly environment tohelp attract foreign investment and spur innovation.At the same time, Britain’s Labour government insiststhat its third way—as distinct from Conservative orconventional center-left projects—can blend thedynamism of market forces with the traditional cen-ter-left concern for social justice and commitment tothe reduction of inequalities. How new is NewLabour’s approach to economic management? AreBritons across the board enjoying the fruits of thelongest period of sustained economic growth, asBrown trumpeted, that Britain has enjoyed for over200 years? How have the economic processes of glob-alization changed the equation? In this section, weanalyze the politics of economic management inBritain and consider the implications of Britain’s less-is-more, laissez-faire approach.

Two central dimensions, economic managementand social policy, capture the new role of the state.Analysis of these policy areas also reveals how lim-ited this new state role was in comparative terms.

Economic Management

Like all other states, whatever their commitment tofree markets, the British state intervenes in economiclife, sometimes with considerable force. However, theBritish have not developed institutions for state-sponsored economic planning or industrial policy.Instead, the British state has generally limited its roleto broad policy instruments designed to influence theeconomy generally (macroeconomic policy) byadjusting state revenues and expenditures to achieveshort-term goals. The Treasury and the Bank ofEngland dominate economic policy, which has oftenseemed reactive and relatively ineffectual. Despite


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 52

Cengage Learning

other differences, this generally reactive and minimal-ist orientation of economic management strategies inBritain bridges the first two eras of postwar politics inBritain: the consensus era (1945–1979) and the periodof Thatcherite policy orientation (1979–1997). Howhas the orientation of economic policy developed andchanged during the postwar period? How new is NewLabour when it comes to economic policy?

The Consensus Era. With control of crucial indus-tries during World War I and the active managementof industry by the state in the interwar years, the stateassumed a more interventionist role that belied itslaissez-faire traditions. After World War II, the senseof unity inspired by the shared suffering of war andthe need to rebuild a war-ravaged country helped crys-tallize the collectivist consensus as the British stateboth broadened and deepened its responsibilities forthe overall performance of the economy.

The state nationalized some key industries, assum-ing direct ownership of them. It also accepted theresponsibility to secure low levels of unemployment(referred to as a policy of full employment), expandsocial services, maintain a steady rate of growth(increase the output or GDP), keep prices stable, andachieve desirable balance-of-payments and exchangerates. The approach is called Keynesian demand man-agement, or Keynesianism (after the British econo-mist John Maynard Keynes, 1883–1946). State budgetdeficits were used to expand demand in an effort toboost both consumption and investment when theeconomy was slowing. Cuts in government spendingand a tightening of credit and finance were used tocool demand when high rates of growth brought fearsof inflation or a deficit in balance of payments. Takentogether, this new agenda of expanded economic man-agement and welfare provision, sometimes referred toas the Keynesian welfare state, directed governmentpolicy throughout the era of the collectivist consensus.

Before Thatcher became leader of the Conserva-tive Party in 1975, Conservative leaders in Britaingenerally accepted the terms of the collectivist con-sensus. By the 1970s, however, public officials nolonger saw the world they understood and could mas-ter; it had become a world without economic growthand with growing political discontent. Edward Heath,the Conservative centrist who governed from 1970 to

1974, was the first prime minister to suffer the fullburden of recession and the force of political opposi-tion from both traditional business allies and resurgenttrade union adversaries. Operating in an era markedby increased inflation and reduced growth (stagfla-tion), Heath could never break out of the political con-straints imposed on him by economic decline.

From 1974 to 1979, the Labour government ofHarold Wilson and James Callaghan reinforced theimpression that governments could no longer controlthe swirl of events. The beginning of the end camewhen trade unions became increasingly restive underthe pinch of voluntary wage restraints pressed onthem by the Labour government. Frustrated by wageincreases well below inflation rates, the unions brokewith the government in 1978. The number of unoffi-cial work stoppages increased, and official strikes fol-lowed, all fueled by a seemingly endless series ofleapfrogging pay demands that erupted throughout thewinter of 1978–1979 (the “winter of discontent”).There is little doubt that the industrial unrest that dra-matized Labour’s inability to manage its allies, thetrade unions, contributed a lot to Thatcher’s electoralvictory just a few months later in May 1979. The win-ter of discontent helped write the conclusion toBritain’s collectivist consensus and discredit the Key-nesian welfare state.

Thatcherite Policy Orientation. In policy terms,the economic orientations that Thatcher pioneeredand that Major substantially maintained reflected agrowing disillusionment with Keynesianism. In itsplace, monetarism emerged as the new economicdoctrine. Keynesian demand management assumedthat the level of unemployment could be set and theeconomy stabilized through decisions of government(monetary and fiscal or budgetary policy). By con-trast, monetarism assumed that there is a “natural rateof unemployment” determined by the labor marketitself. Monetary and fiscal policy should be passiveand intervention limited (so far as this was possible)to a few steps that would help foster appropriate ratesof growth in the money supply and keep inflation low.

By implication, the government ruled out spend-ing to run up budgetary deficits as a useful instrumentfor stimulating the economy. On the contrary, govern-ments could contribute to overall economic efficiency


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 53

Cengage Learning

and growth by reducing social expenditure and down-sizing the public sector, by reducing its work force orprivatizing nationalized industries. Monetarism re-flected a radical change from the postwar consensusregarding economic management. Not only was activegovernment intervention considered unnecessary; itwas seen as undesirable and destabilizing.

New Labour’s Economic Policy Approach. CanNew Labour thinking on macroeconomic policy endthe short-termism of economic policy and provide thecohesion previously lacking? In British commentarieson New Labour, much has been made of the influenceof revitalized Keynesian ideas and reform proposals.5

In some ways, government policy seems to pursue con-ventional market-reinforcing and probusiness policies(neoliberalism). In other ways, the New Labour pro-gram stands as an alternative to Thatcherite mone-tarism and traditional Keynesianism. Whether NewLabour’s approach to economic management consti-tutes a distinctive third way or a less coherent blend ofdisparate elements is the subject of endless politicaldebate.

The first shot fired in the Blair revolution was theannouncement within a week of the 1997 election byGordon Brown, the chancellor of the exchequer(equivalent to the minister for finance or secretary ofthe treasury in other countries), that the Bank ofEngland would be given “operational independence”in the setting of monetary policy, and charged withmaintaining low inflation (which has been achieved).The decision transferred from the cabinet a critical,and highly political, prerogative of government. WithBrown attuned to the pressures of international finan-cial markets, and the control of inflation and stabilitythe key goals of macroeconomic policy, the transfer ofauthority over monetary policy confirmed the neolib-eral market orientation of economic policy.

Central to the concerns of Brown and his Treasuryteam from 1997 were issues of macroeconomic stabil-ity. Brown (the “iron chancellor”) insisted on estab-lishing a “platform of stability” through explicitacceptance of the preexisting (and Conservative spec-ified) limits on public spending and gave a very highpriority to policies designed to reduce the public debt.Only as he turned that debt into a surplus did the ironchancellor reinvent himself as a more conventionallyLabour and social democratic chancellor.6 Deciding to

use economic growth to increase spending on keysocial policies (rather than cut taxes), spending on theNational Health Service (NHS), which was 6 percentof GDP, jumped to 8 percent of GDP in 2005. Simi-larly, annual expenditure on education is scheduled tonearly double between 2002 and 2008.7 Both Brown’ssuccess in achieving growth and economic stabilityand the credit he is given for a commitment to fundsocial policy position the chancellor well to make themost of his much-anticipated opportunity to assumeleadership of the Labour Party.

Does the third way represent a genuine departurein economic policy? Although there is no ready agree-ment on how to best answer this question, the claim ofa distinctive policy design is quite clear in the wayBlair and Brown have articulated their priorities.Above all, New Labour’s economic policy approachemphasizes pragmatism in the face of global eco-nomic competition. Since capital is international,mobile, and not subject to control, industrial policyand planning that focus on the domestic economyalone are futile. Rather, government can improve thequality of labor through education and training, main-tain the labor market flexibility inherited from theThatcher regime, and help to attract investment toBritain. Strict control of inflation and tough limits onpublic expenditure help promote both employmentand investment opportunities. At the same time, eco-nomic policy is directed at enhancing the competitivestrength of key sectors and developing a partnershipwith business through research and development,training, technology, and modernization policies. NewLabour is very focused on designing and implement-ing policies to create new jobs and get people, partic-ularly young people, into the work force.

Political Implications of Economic Policy. Differ-ences in economic doctrine are not what matter mostin policy terms. In fact, British governments in thepast have never consistently followed any economictheory, whether Keynesianism or monetarism. Today,the economic policy of New Labour is pragmatic andeclectic. The political consequences of economic ori-entations are more significant: each economic doc-trine helps to justify a broad moral and cultural visionof society, to provide motives for state policy, and toadvance alternative sets of values. Should the govern-ment intervene, work to reduce inequalities through


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 54

Cengage Learning

the mildly redistributive provisions of the welfarestate, and sustain the ethos of a caring society (collec-tivism/“Old Labour”)? Should it back off and allowthe market to function competitively and thereby pro-mote entrepreneurship, competitiveness, and individ-ual autonomy (Thatcherism)? Or should it help securean inclusive “stakeholder” economy in which busi-ness has the flexibility, security, and mobility tocompete and workers have the skills and training toparticipate effectively in the global labor market (NewLabour)? As these questions make clear, economicmanagement strategies are closely linked to social orwelfare policy.

Social Policy

Observers have noted that the social and political roleof the welfare state depends as much on policy goalsand instruments as on spending levels. Does the stateprovide services itself or offer cash benefits that canbe used to purchase services from private providers?Are benefits universal, or are they limited to thosewho fall below an income threshold (means-tested)?Are they designed to meet the temporary needs ofindividuals or to help reduce the gap between richand poor?

The expanded role of government during WorldWar II and the increased role of the Labour Party dur-ing the wartime coalition government led by WinstonChurchill prepared the way for the development of thewelfare state in Britain. The 1943 Beveridge Reportprovided a blueprint for an extensive but, in compara-tive European terms, fairly shallow set of provisions.The principal means-tested program is social secu-rity, a system of contributory and noncontributorybenefits to provide financial assistance (not servicesdirectly) for the elderly, sick, disabled, unemployed,and others similarly in need of assistance.

In general, welfare state provisions interfere rela-tively little in the workings of the market, and policy-makers do not see the reduction of group inequalitiesas the proper goal of the welfare state. The NHS pro-vides comprehensive and universal medical care andhas long been championed as the jewel in the crownof the welfare state in Britain, but it remains an excep-tion to the rule. Compared with other Western Euro-pean countries, the welfare state in Britain offers rela-tively few comprehensive services, and the policies

are not very generous. For the most part, Britons mustrely on means-tested safety net programs that leavefew of the recipients satisfied.

The Welfare State Under Thatcher and Major.The record on social expenditure by Conservativegovernments from 1979 to 1997 was mixed. GivenBritons’ strong support for public education, pen-sions, and health care, Conservative governmentsattempted more limited reform than many at firstanticipated. The Thatcher and Major governmentsencouraged private, alongside public, provision ineducation, health care (insurance), and pensions. Theyworked to increase efficiency in social services,reduced the value of some benefits by changing theformulas or reducing cost-of-living adjustments, andcontracted out some services (purchasing them fromprivate contractors rather than providing themdirectly). In addition, in policy reforms reminiscent ofU.S. “workfare” requirements, they tried to reducedependency by denying benefits to youths whorefused to participate in training programs. Despitethese efforts, the commitment to reduced spendingcould not be sustained, partly because a recession trig-gered increases in income support and unemploymentbenefits.

To a degree, however, this general pattern masksspecific and, in some cases, highly charged policychanges in both expenditures and the institutionalizedpattern of provision. In housing, the changes in statepolicy and provision were the most extensive, withrepercussions in electoral terms and in changingthe way Britons think about the welfare state. By1990, more than 1.25 million council houses (publichousing maintained by local government) were sold,particularly the attractive single-family homes withgardens (quite unlike public housing in the UnitedStates). Two-thirds of the sales were to rental tenants.Thatcher’s housing policy was extremely popular. Byone calculation, between 1979 and 1983 there was aswing (change in the percentage of vote received bythe two major parties) to the Conservative Party of17 percent among those who had bought their councilhouses.8

Despite great Conservative success in the cam-paign to privatize housing, a strong majority ofBritons remain stalwart supporters of the principle ofcollective provision for their basic needs. Thus, there


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 55

Cengage Learning

were limits on the government’s ability to reducesocial spending or change institutional behavior. Forexample, in 1989, the Conservative government triedto introduce market practices into the NHS, with gen-eral practitioners managing funds and purchasing hos-pital care for their patients. Many voiced fears that thereforms would create a two-tier system of medicalcare for rich and poor.

More generally, a lack of confidence in the Con-servatives on social protection hurt Major substan-tially in 1992, and it has continued to plague the party.Nothing propelled the Labour landslide in 1997 morethan the concern for the “caring” issues. The tradi-tional advantage Labour enjoys on these issues alsohelped secure victory for Blair in June 2001, andagain when he needed a boost from traditional Laboursupporters to offset their opposition to the prime min-ister on the war in Iraq.

New Labour Social Policy. As with economic pol-icy, social policy for New Labour presents an opportu-nity for government to balance pragmatism andinnovation, while borrowing from traditional Labouras well as from Thatcherite options. Thus, the Blairgovernment rejects both the attempted retrenchment ofConservative governments that seemed mean-spiritedas well as the egalitarian traditions of Britain’s collec-tivist era that emphasized entitlements. Instead, NewLabour focuses its policy on training and broader so-cial investment as a more positive third-way alterna-tive. At the same time, New Labour draws politicalstrength from the “Old Labour” legacy of commitmenton the “caring” social policy issues.

For example, following Bill Clinton, Blair’s NewDemocratic counterpart in the United States, the primeminister promised a modernized, leaner welfare state,in which people are actively encouraged to seek work.The reform of the welfare state emphasizesefficiencies and attempts to break welfare dependency.Efforts to spur entry into the labor market combinecarrots and sticks. Positive inducements include train-ing programs, especially targeted at youth, combinedwith incentives to private industry to hire new entrantsto the labor market. The threats include eligibilityrestrictions and reductions in coverage. Referred to asthe “New Deal” for the young unemployed, welfarereform in the United Kingdom has emphasizedconcerted efforts to create viable pathways out of

dependence. Although beginning with a focus on mov-ing youth from welfare to work, New Deal reformefforts expanded in several directions.

The New Deal was quickly extended to single par-ents and the long-term unemployed. In 1999, the gov-ernment launched a “Bridging the Gap” initiative toprovide a more comprehensive approach for assistingsixteen- to eighteen-year-olds not in education,employment, or training to achieve clear goals by agenineteen through a variety of “pathways” (academic,vocational, or occupational). “Better Government forOlder People” was launched in 1998 and was fol-lowed quickly by “All Our Futures,” a governmentreport issued in the summer of 2000 with twenty-eightrecommendations to improve the quality of life andthe delivery of public services for senior citizens.A new initiative, The IT New Deal, was launched in2001 as a government-business partnership to addressskill shortages in information technologies.

Although the jury is still out on the follow-through and effectiveness of New Labour social andwelfare policy initiatives, the intent to create innova-tive policies and approach social policy in new andmore comprehensive ways is clearly there. Late in1997, the government inaugurated the Social Exclu-sion Unit, staffed by civil servants and external policyspecialists. Initially located within the Cabinet Officeand reporting directly to the prime minister, the SocialExclusion Unit moved to the Office of the DeputyPrime Minister in May 2002. It was charged broadlywith addressing “what can happen when people orareas suffer from such problems as unemployment,poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crimeenvironments, bad health, and family breakdown.”The Social Exclusion Unit has been actively involvedin developing the New Deal initiative as well as inwriting reports and recommending policies to takeon problems such as truancy and school exclusion,homelessness, neighborhood renewal, and teenagepregnancy. This effort to identify comprehensive solu-tions to society’s ills and reduce the tendency for gov-ernment to let marginalized individuals fall by thewayside captures the third-way orientation of theBlair project.

Nevertheless, New Labour, like all other govern-ments in Britain and many other countries, will beaccountable above all for the failure or success ofmore traditional social policies, especially health care


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 56

Cengage Learning

and education. By 2004, there was mounting evidencethat record growth in the NHS budget had nettedresults. Despite the report of a House of Commonsselect committee on the health dangers of obesity(particularly for children), there was widespread con-fidence that NHS quality and performance wereimproving, with waiting lists shorter and significantadvances in the treatment of life-threatening diseases.After years of skepticism about New Labour’s abilityto deliver on promised improvements in the provisionof key public services, by 2005 the tides of opinion—and massive budgetary increases—were beginning tohave the desired effect. New Labour had gained con-siderable credibility on health care as well as educa-tion—and increasing success on core policies gaveLabour a huge boost heading into the 2005 election.

Society and EconomyWhat were the distributional effects—the conse-quences for group patterns of wealth and poverty—ofthe economic and social policies of Thatcher andMajor? To what extent have the policies of Tony Blair’sLabour government continued—or reversed—thesetrends? How has government policy influenced thecondition of minorities and women? It is impossible toascertain when government policy creates a given dis-tribution of resources and when poverty increases ordecreases because of a general downturn or upswing inthe economy. The evidence is clear, however, that eco-nomic inequality grew in Britain during the 1980sbefore it stabilized or narrowed slightly in the mid-1990s, and that ethnic minorities and women continueto experience significant disadvantages.

In general, policies initiated by the ConservativeParty, particularly during the Thatcher years, tendedto deepen inequalities. The economic upturn thatbegan in 1992, combined with Major’s moderatingeffects on the Thatcherite social policy agenda, servedto narrow inequality by the mid-1990s. Since 1997, asone observer noted, Labour has “pursued redistribu-tion by stealth, raising various indirect levies on thebetter-off to finance tax breaks for poorer workers.”9

As a result, Britain has witnessed a modest downwardredistribution of income since 1997. Attention tosocial exclusion in its many forms, a 1999 pledge bythe prime minister to eradicate child poverty (eventhough Britain at the time had one of the highest rates

of child poverty in EU Europe), and strong rates ofgrowth augur well for a further narrowing of the gapbetween rich and poor in Britain. Data from 2004indicates that in 2002–2003, 17 percent of the popula-tion lived in low-income households (down from apeak of 21 percent in the early 1990s). After rising toa peak of 27 percent in the early 1990s, the percentageof children living in low-income households has heldsteady at 21 percent for each of the three years from1999–2000 to 2002–2003.10

Into Blair’s third term, there were clear indicationsthat the government was committed to an ambitiousagenda to reduce childhood poverty through a new setof inclusive tax credits for children as well as othermeasures to transfer resources to poor families. Inaddition, since January 2005, the payment of vouchersto the parents of all British children born since 2002,with a promise to top up the funds periodically, repre-sented an innovative effort to provide a sizeable nestegg of savings available for eighteen-year-olds. This“asset-based” welfare held the promise of reducingpoverty and providing a new generation with new eco-nomic opportunities. Comparative analysis of povertyrates indicates that despite these efforts the UnitedKingdom has greater problems regarding incomeinequality than do many of its EU counterparts prior tothe 2004 enlargement (see Figure 2).

Inequality and Ethnic Minorities

Poverty and diminished opportunity disproportion-ately characterize the situation of ethnic minorities (aterm applied to peoples of non-European origin fromthe former British colonies in the Indian subcontinent,the Caribbean, and Africa). Official estimates place theethnic minority population in Britain at 4.7 million in2003 (the most recent data available) or 7.9 percent ofthe total population of the United Kingdom. Indianscomprise the largest ethnic minority, at 21.7 percent;Pakistanis represent 16.7 percent, Bangladeshis, 6.1percent, and Afro-Caribbeans and other blacks, 27.1percent.11 Because of past immigration and fertilitypatterns, the ethnic minority population in the UnitedKingdom is considerably younger than the white pop-ulation. More than one-third of the ethnic minoritypopulation is younger than age sixteen, nearly half isunder age twenty-five, and more than four-fifths is un-der age forty-five. Thus, despite the common and often


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 57

Cengage Learning

disparaging reference to ethnic minority individuals as“immigrants,” the experience of members of ethnicminority groups is increasingly that of a native-bornpopulation.12

Britain has adjusted slowly to the realities of amulticultural society. The postwar period has wit-nessed the gradual erosion of racial, religious, andethnic tolerance in Britain and a chipping away atthe right of settlement of postcolonial subjects inthe United Kingdom. During the Thatcher era, dis-cussion of immigration and citizenship rights wasused for partisan political purposes and assumed adistinctly racial tone. Ethnic minority individuals,particularly young men, are subject to unequal treat-ment by the police and considerable physical harass-ment by citizens. They have experienced culturalisolation as well as marginalization in the educa-tional system, job training, housing, and labormarkets. There is considerable concern about theapparent rise in racially motivated crime in majormetropolitan areas with significant ethnic diversity.Recognizing these problems, in 2000 the governmentbrought to Parliament a bill to amend the Race Rela-

tions Act 1976 by outlawing direct and indirectdiscrimination in all public bodies and placing a“positive duty” on all public officials and authoritiesto promote racial equality. The Race Relations(Amendment) Act 2000 received final parliamentaryapproval in November 2000.

In general, poor rates of economic success rein-force the sense of isolation and distinct collectiveidentities. Variations among ethnic minority commu-nities are quite considerable, however, and there aresome noteworthy success stories. For example, amongmen of African, Asian, Chinese, and Indian descent,the proportional representation in the managerial andprofessional ranks is actually higher than that forwhite men (although they are much less likely to besenior managers in large firms). Also, Britons ofSouth Asian and, especially, Indian descent enjoy ahigh rate of entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, despitesome variations, employment opportunities forwomen from all minority ethnic groups are limited.13

In addition, a distinct gap remains between the jobopportunities available to whites and those open toethnic minorities in Britain. It is clear that people


Figure 2

U.K. Poverty Rates in Comparative European Perspective

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Denmark

Austria

France

Germany

Belgium

Ireland

Spain

United Kingdom

Italy

Portugal

Greece

5 10

Percentage of Households Below Poverty Ratea

15 200 25

aPoverty rate is defined as income below 60 percent of the national median.

Britain has experiencedmore persistent prob-lems with poverty andincome inequality thanmost of EU Europe priorto the 2004 enlarge-ment. New Labour’s at-tention to social exclu-sion, its concern forchildhood poverty, astrong economy, andsome innovative pro-grams suggest thatpoverty may decreasein the years ahead, butimprovements havebeen relatively modest.Source: Adapted from thefigure entitled “Poverty,”OECD Economic Surveys:United Kingdom 2001/2002, OECD, 2002.Reprinted by permission.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 58

Cengage Learning

from ethnic minority communities are overrepre-sented among low-income households in the UnitedKingdom (see Figure 3). Almost 60 percent of Pak-istani or Bangladeshi households are in low-incomehouseholds (defined by income below 60 percent ofthe median). Just under half of black non-Caribbeanhouseholds also live on low incomes after housingcosts are deducted, as do nearly one-third of blackCaribbeans. In contrast, only 16 percent of white peo-ple may be found in such low-income households be-fore housing costs are deducted, and 21 percent afterhousing costs are deducted.14

Then there is the human side behind the statisticsthat reveals how difficult it remains in Britain for eth-nic minorities to achieve top posts and how uneven theprospects of success are, despite some pockets of mod-est success. It seems that the police have been moreeffective in recent years in recruiting and retainingethnic minority police officers, and moving them up

through the ranks, than have the further-education col-leges (non-degree-giving institutions providing mainlyvocational training for sixteen- to eighteen-year-oldsnot headed to university). “We don’t have one blackcollege principal in London in spite of having one ofthe most ethnically diverse student populations in thecountry,” observed the mayor of London’s senior pol-icy director in 2004. There are many more young Afro-Caribbean men in prison than there are in university,and more black Met [London police] officers thanthere are teachers.15 Ethnic minority police officersnow make up 3 percent of the United Kingdom’s122,000-member police force, but only 2 percent ofjunior and middle managers in the more than fourhundred colleges in Britain, only five of which haveethnic minority principals. It speaks volumes to thelevel of ethnic minority inequality that a 3 percent rep-resentation of ethnic minority police officers is consid-ered evidence that “the police have in recent years


Figure 3

Distribution of Low-Income Households by Ethnicity

80

Gre

at B

ritai

n Pe

rcen

tage

s

60

40

20

0

White Indian Pakistani/Bangladeshi

Households on low income: by ethnic group of head of household, 2001–02

BlackCaribbean

BlackNon-

Caribbean

Other

Before housing costs

After housing costs

People from Britain’s ethnic minority communities are far more likely than white Britons to be in lower-incomehouseholds, although there are important differences among ethnic minority groups. Nearly 60 percent ofPakistani or Bangladeshi households are low-income households, while about one-third of black Caribbeanhouseholds live on low incomes.

Source: National Statistics Online: www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=269&Pos=1&ColRank=2&Rank=384

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 59

Cengage Learning

been undertaking a much-needed overhaul of equalopportunities.”16

Inequality and Women

Women’s participation in the labor market when com-pared to that of men also indicates marked patterns ofinequality. In fact, most women in Britain work part-time, often in jobs with fewer than sixteen hours ofwork per week and often with fewer than eight hours(in contrast, fewer than one in every fifteen men isemployed part-time). More than three-quarters ofwomen working part-time report that they did notwant a full-time job, yet more women than men (inraw numbers, not simply as a percentage) take on sec-ond jobs. Although employment conditions forwomen in Britain trail those of many of their EUcounterparts, the gap in the differential betweenweekly earnings of men and women in the UnitedKingdom has narrowed. In fact, in 2004 the gendergap in pay dropped to its lowest value since recordshave been kept: women’s median hourly rate was 85.7percent of men’s.17

The Blair government remains committed to gen-der equality in the workplace and has affirmed itsresolve to address women’s concerns to balance workand family responsibilities. The government hasimplemented a set of “family-friendly” work-relatedpolicies, including parental leave and flexible work-ing arrangements and working times. Most of theseinitiatives were at the minimum EU standard as re-quired by treaty commitments (once the UK underBlair signed on to part of the Social Chapter of the1991 Maastricht Treaty to which previous UK gov-ernments had opted out, and further took on theobligations under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty). Othermeasures include a commitment in principle to fillinghalf of all public appointments with women, a reviewof the pension system to ensure better coverage forwomen, draft legislation to provide for the sharing ofpensions after divorce, tax credits for workingfamilies as well as for child care, and a NationalChildcare Strategy, to which the Blair governmenthas committed extensive financial support and givenhigh visibility. Nevertheless, the gap between child-care supply and demand is considerable, and the costfor many families remains prohibitive. Moreover,

despite its efforts to make it easier for women to bal-ance work and family obligations, “Labour has fo-cused its efforts on persuading employers as to the‘business case’ for ‘family friendly’ working condi-tions.”18 This approach limits New Labour’s agenda,as witnessed by the government’s willingness to letemployers opt out of a forty-eight-hour ceiling on thework week (a serious impediment to a healthyfamily-work balance, given that UK fathers work thelongest hours in Europe).19 Thus, New Labour’s corecommitment to management flexibility makes itlikely that the general pattern of female labor marketparticipation will change relatively little in the yearsahead. A recent report commissioned by the CabinetOffice’s Women’s Unit confirms a significant patternof inequality in lifetime earnings of men and womenwith an equal complement of skills, defined by botha gender gap and a “mother gap.”

Britain in the Global EconomyIs Britain making the most of globalization? Theanswer to this critical question begins with the under-standing that Britain plays a special role within theEuropean and international economy, one that hasbeen reinforced by international competitive pressuresin this global age. For a start, foreign direct invest-ment (FDI) favors national systems, like those ofBritain (and the United States), that rely more on pri-vate contractual and market-driven arrangements andless on state capacity and political or institutionalarrangements. Because of such factors as low costs,political climate, government-sponsored financialincentives, reduced trade union power, and a largepool of potential non-unionized recruits, the UnitedKingdom is a highly regarded location in Europefor FDI.

From the mid-1980s onward, the single-marketinitiative of the EU has attracted foreign investmentby according insider status to non-EU-based compa-nies, so long as minimum local content requirementsare met. Throughout this period, all British govern-ments have, for both pragmatic and ideological rea-sons, promoted the United Kingdom as a magnet forforeign investment. For the Thatcher and Majorgovernments, FDI was a congenial market-drivenalternative to state intervention as a means to improve


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 60

Cengage Learning

sectoral competitiveness. It had the added benefit ofexposing UK producers to lean production techniquesand to management cultures and strategies thatreinforced government designs to weaken unions andenforce flexibility. New Labour has continued thisapproach, which helps advance its key third-waystrategy orientation to accept globalization as a givenand to seek ways to improve competitiveness throughbusiness-friendly partnerships.

FDI is only one part of a bigger picture. In veryimportant ways, New Labour accepted the legacy ofeighteen years of Conservative assaults on trade unionpowers and privileges. It has chosen to modernize, butnot reshape, the system of production in which non-standard and insecure jobs without traditional socialprotections proliferate—a growing sector in whichwomen and ethnic minorities are significantly over-represented. As a result, within EU Europe, Britain hasassumed a specialized profile as a producer ofmedium-technology, relatively low-value-added mass-market products through the use of a comparativelylow-paid, segmented, weakly organized, and easilydismissible work force.

That said, the UK scores extremely well in inter-national comparisons of growth competitiveness. Ithas also achieved significant competitive success inparticular pockets of quality-competitive high tech-nology industries. For example, the UK preserves anextremely strong position in its global market share intelecommunications equipment. It is second behindthe United States in its exports, slightly ahead of

Japan, and 15 percent above Germany. Britain is alsostrong in pharmaceuticals and aerospace.20 The pic-ture of UK global competitiveness remains clouded,however, by weak industrial performance—illustratedby the 2005 closure of Rover, Britain’s last mass-mar-ket automobile manufacturer.

Tony Blair’s Britain preaches a globalization-friendly model of flexible labor markets throughoutEU Europe, and its success in boosting Britain’s eco-nomic performance in comparison with the rest ofEurope has won some reluctant admirers, even con-verts. (For example, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’seconomic reform package, Project 2010, had much incommon with Blair’s neoliberal approach to eco-nomic governance). Thus, Britain has been shaped bythe international political economy in important waysand hopes to take full advantage of the economicprospects of globalization, even as it tries to reshapeother European national models in its own image.

As our world-of-states theme suggests, a country’sparticipation in today’s global economic order dimin-ishes autonomous national control, raising unsettlingquestions in even the most established democracies.Amid complicated pressures, both internal and exter-nal, can state institutions retain the capacity to admin-ister policy effectively within distinctive nationalmodels? How much do the growth of powerfulbureaucracies at home and complex dependencies oninternational organizations such as the EU limit theability of citizens to control policy ends? We turn tothese questions in Section 3.

SECTION 3 Governance and Policy-Making 61

An understanding of British governance begins withconsideration of Britain’s constitution, which isnotable for two significant features: its form and itsantiquity. Britain lacks a formal written constitution inthe usual sense; that is, there is no single unified andauthoritative text that has special status above ordinarylaw and can be amended only by special procedures.Rather, the British constitution is a combination ofstatutory law (mainly acts of Parliament), commonlaw, convention, and authoritative interpretations.

Although it is often said that Britain has an unwrittenconstitution, this is not accurate. Authoritative legaltreatises are written, of course, as are the much moresignificant acts of Parliament that define crucial ele-ments of the British political system. These acts definethe powers of Parliament and its relationship with theCrown, the rights governing the relationship betweenstate and citizen, the relationship of constituent nationsto the United Kingdom, the relationship of the UnitedKingdom to the EU, and many other rights and legal

Section D Governance and Policy-Making

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 61

Cengage Learning

arrangements. Thus, it is probably best to say that“what distinguishes the British constitution from oth-ers is not that it is unwritten, but rather that it is partwritten and uncodified.”21

More than its form, however, the British constitu-tion’s antiquity raises questions. It is hard to knowwhere conventions and acts of Parliament with consti-tutional implications began, but they can certainly befound dating back to the seventeenth century, notablywith the Bill of Rights of 1689, which helped definethe relationship between the monarchy and Parlia-ment. “Britain’s constitution presents a paradox,” aBritish scholar of constitutional history has observed.“We live in a modern world but inhabit a pre-modern,indeed, ancient, constitution.”22 For example, severalindustrial democracies, including Spain, Belgium, andthe Netherlands, are constitutional monarchies, inwhich policy-making is left to the elected governmentand the monarch fulfills largely ceremonial duties. Infact, Western Europe contains the largest concentra-tion of constitutional monarchies in the world. How-ever, Britain alone among Western democracies haspermitted two unelected hereditary institutions, theCrown and the House of Lords, to participate in gov-erning the country (in the case of the Lords, a processof reform was begun in 1999).

More generally, constitutional authorities haveaccepted the structure and principles of many areas ofgovernment for so long that appeal to convention hasenormous cultural force. Thus, widely agreed-on rulesof conduct, rather than law or U.S.-style checks andbalances, set the limits of governmental power. Thisreality underscores an important aspect of British gov-ernment: absolute principles of government are few. Atthe same time, those that exist are fundamental to theorganization of the state and central to governance,policy-making, and patterns of representation. Yet, thegovernment is permitted considerable latitude.

Organization of the StateThe core constitutional principle of the British politicalsystem and cornerstone of the Westminster model isparliamentary sovereignty: Parliament can make oroverturn any law; the executive, the judiciary, and thethrone do not have any authority to restrict or rescindparliamentary action. In a classic parliamentary

democracy, the prime minister is answerable to theHouse of Commons (the elected element of Parliament)and may be dismissed by it. That said, by passing theEuropean Communities Act in 1972 (Britain joined theEuropean Economic Community in 1973), Parliamentaccepted significant limitations on its ability to act withpower. It acknowledged that European law has force inthe United Kingdom without requiring parliamentaryassent and acquiesced to the authority of the EuropeanCourt of Justice (ECJ) to resolve jurisdictional dis-putes. To complete the circle, the ECJ has confirmed itsprerogative to suspend acts of Parliament.23

Second, Britain has long been a unitary state. Bycontrast to the United States, where powers not dele-gated to the national government are reserved for thestates, no powers are reserved constitutionally for sub-central units of government in the United Kingdom.However, the Labour government of Tony Blair intro-duced a far-reaching program of constitutional reformthat created, for the first time, a quasi-federal systemin Britain. Specified powers have been delegated (theBritish prefer to say devolved) to legislative bodies inScotland and Wales, and in Northern Ireland (althoughconflict there leaves the ultimate shape of the constitu-tional settlement still in doubt). In addition, some pow-ers have been redistributed from the Westminster Par-liament to an authority governing London with adirectly elected mayor, and additional powers may bedevolved to regional assemblies as well.

Third, Britain operates within a system of fusionof powers at the national level: Parliament is thesupreme legislative, executive, and judicial authorityand includes the monarch as well as the House ofCommons and the House of Lords. The fusion of leg-islature and executive is also expressed in the functionand personnel of the cabinet. Whereas U.S. presidentscan direct or ignore their cabinets, which have no con-stitutionally mandated function, the British cabinetbears enormous constitutional responsibility. Throughits collective decision making, the cabinet, and not anindependent prime minister, shapes, directs, and takesresponsibility for government. As we will see, this coreprinciple, cabinet government, may at critical junc-tures be observed more in principle than in practice.

Finally, sovereignty rests with the Queen-in-Parliament (the formal term for Parliament). Britain is aconstitutional monarchy. The position of head of state


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 62

Cengage Learning

passes by hereditary succession, but the government orstate officials must exercise nearly all powers of theCrown. Taken together, parliamentary sovereignty, par-liamentary democracy, and cabinet government formthe core elements of the British or Westminster modelof government, which many consider a model democ-racy and the first effective parliamentary democracy.

It may seem curious that such a venerable consti-tutional framework is also vulnerable to uncertaintyand criticism. Can a willful prime minister overstepthe generally agreed-upon limits of the collectiveresponsibility of the cabinet and achieve an undue con-centration of power? How well has the British modelof government stood the test of time and radicallychanged circumstances? These questions underscorethe problems that even the most stable democraciesface. They also help identify important comparativethemes, because the principles of the Westminstermodel were, with some modifications, adopted widelyby former colonies ranging from Canada, Australia,and New Zealand to India, Jamaica, and Zimbabwe.British success (or failure) in preserving citizens’ con-trol of their government has implications reaching wellbeyond the British Isles.

The ExecutiveThe term cabinet government is useful in emphasizingthe key functions that the cabinet exercises: responsibil-ity for policy-making, supreme control of government,and coordination of all government departments. How-ever, the term does not capture the full range ofexecutive institutions or the scale and complexity of op-erations. The executive reaches well beyond the cabinet.It extends from ministries (departments) and ministersto the civil service in one direction, and to Parliament(as we shall see in Section 4) in the other direction.

Cabinet Government

After a general election, the Crown invites the leaderof the party that emerges from the election with con-trol of a majority of seats in the House of Commons toform a government and serve as prime minister. Theprime minister usually selects approximately twodozen ministers to constitute the cabinet. Among themost significant assignments are the Foreign Office(equivalent to the U.S. department of state), the Home

Office (ministry of justice or attorney general), and thechancellor of the exchequer (a finance minister or amore powerful version of the U.S. treasury secretary).

The responsibilities of a cabinet minister areimmense. “The Cabinet, as a collective body, isresponsible for formulating the policy to be placedbefore Parliament and is also the supreme controllingand directing body of the entire executive branch,”notes S. E. Finer. “Its decisions bind all Ministers andother officers in the conduct of their departmentalbusiness.”24 In contrast to the French Constitution,which prohibits a cabinet minister from serving in thelegislature, British constitutional tradition requiresoverlapping membership between Parliament andcabinet. (In fact, this point was made in dramatic fash-ion after Blair’s 2005 electoral victory when heappointed a former head of his policy unit to theHouse of Lords so that he could appoint him as ajunior education minister.) Unlike the informal statusof the U.S. cabinet, its British counterpart enjoys con-siderable constitutional privilege and is a powerfulinstitution with enormous responsibility for the politi-cal and administrative success of the government.

The cabinet room at 10 Downing Street (the primeminister’s official residence) is a place of intrigue aswell as deliberation. From the perspective of theprime minister, the cabinet may appear as loyal fol-lowers or as ideological combatants, potential chal-lengers for party leadership, and parochial advocatesfor pet programs that run counter to the overall objec-tives of the government. Against this potential fordivision, the convention of collective responsibilitynormally ensures the continuity of government byunifying the cabinet. In principle, the prime ministermust gain the support of a majority of the cabinet fora range of significant decisions, notably the budgetand the legislative program.

The only other constitutionally mandated mecha-nism for checking the prime minister is a defeat on avote of no confidence in the House of Commons(discussed in Section 4). Since this action is rare andpolitically dangerous, the cabinet’s role in constrain-ing the chief executive remains the only routine checkon his or her power. Collective responsibility is there-fore a crucial aspect of the Westminster model ofdemocracy. Does collective responsibility effectivelyconstrain the power of prime ministers, or does it


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 63

Cengage Learning

enable the prime minister to paint “presidential” deci-sions with the veneer of collectivity?

A politician with strong ideological convictionsand a leadership style to match, Margaret Thatcheroften attempted to galvanize loyalists in the cabinetand either marginalize or expel detractors. In the end,Thatcher’s treatment of the cabinet helped inspire themovement to unseat her as party leader and stretchedBritish constitutional conventions. John Majorreturned to a more consultative approach, in keepingwith the classic model of cabinet government.

Tony Blair, like Thatcher, has narrowed the scopeof collective responsibility. Cabinet meetings are of-ten dull and perfunctory, and debate is rare. The primeminister, a few key cabinet members, and a handful ofadvisers take decisions in smaller gatherings. In astriking example of this process early in the Blair pre-miership, right after the election when the full cabinethad not yet met, the government announced the deci-sion to free the Bank of England to set interest rates.Blair has accentuated the tendency for shorter cabinetmeetings (they are usually less than an hour) thatcannot seriously take up (much less resolve) policydifferences.

More recently, the role of the cabinet in the deci-sion to go to war in Iraq underscores its weakenedcapacity to exercise constitutional checks and bal-ances. The subject was often discussed in cabinet—and endlessly in bilateral meetings with key minis-ters and unelected policy advisers—but was neversubjected to the full-scale debate and formal cabinetapproval that is associated with the model of cabinetgovernment and collective responsibility. “We havenot had cabinet government in the textbook sense fora very long time,” affirmed Bernard Crick in TheGuardian. “To gain assent for the Iraq war the primeminister had summoned cabinet ministers individu-ally.”25 In addition, when the cabinet did take up theissue of the war in Iraq, the conversation was moredesultory than the strict exercise of cabinet responsi-bility would imply.

The point is not that Blair lacked a majority incabinet, but that cabinet meetings had become largelybeside the point. In addition, with eyes turned towardbruising debates in Parliament, where, as Blairacknowledged, defeat would compel him to resign,the prime minister took no steps to discipline minis-ters who spoke out against the war plan. In fact, Blair

permitted both Robin Cook (former foreign secretaryand the leader of the House of Commons) and ClareShort (secretary of state for international develop-ment) each to resign in a manner and at a time oftheir own choosing in protest of the decision to go towar. In March 2003, Blair won the formal support ofParliament he sought. In so doing, perhaps he set aprecedent that the presumed prerogative power of theprime minister or Crown to declare war had beenhanded over to Parliament.26 Alternatively, manycontend that the real decision to go to war in Iraq hadbeen taken by the prime minister and President Bushlong before, probably at President Bush’s ranch inApril 2002. Either way, there is no denying that thecabinet played a minor, almost incidental role.27

As the decision to go to war in Iraq underscores,both Blair and his close aides seem skeptical aboutthe effectiveness and centrality of the cabinet as wellas cabinet committees. The prime minister prefers tocoordinate strategically important policy areasthrough highly politicized special units in the Cabi-net Office such as the Social Exclusion Unit, theWomen’s Unit, and the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordina-tion Unit. In June 2001, the Prime Minister’s Deliv-ery Unit was introduced to take strategic control ofthe delivery of public services, a central commit-ment of Blair’s second term of office and one withgreat significance since it further eroded the princi-ples of collective responsibility and the centrality ofthe cabinet.

On balance, cabinet government represents adurable and effective formula for governance,although the cabinet does not presently function in therole of supreme directing and controlling body it oc-cupies in constitutional doctrine. It is important to re-member that the cabinet operates within a broadercabinet system or core executive as it is sometimescalled (see Figure 4) and that the prime minister holdsor controls many of the levers of power in the core ex-ecutive. Because the prime minister is the head of thecabinet, his or her office helps develop policy, coordi-nates operations, and functions as a liaison with themedia, the party, interest groups, and Parliament. AsMartin J. Smith puts it, “The culmination of a long-term process of centralization of power in the handsof the Prime Minister is seen in the declining role ofthe Cabinet and the increased development of re-sources inside Number 10.”28


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 64

Cengage Learning

Both cabinet committees (comprising ministers)and official committees (made up of civil servants) sup-plement the work of the cabinet. In addition, the Trea-sury plays an important coordinating role through itsbudgetary control, while the Cabinet Office supportsday-to-day operations. Leaders in both the Commonsand the Lords, the whips, help smooth the passage oflegislation sponsored by the government, which ismore or less guaranteed by a working majority.

The cabinet system, and the complex interplay ofresources, interdependencies, and power within thecore executive that tend to concentrate power at thetop, ensure that there is no Washington-style grid-lock (the inability of legislature and executive toagree on policy) in London. On the contrary, if thereis a problem at the pinnacle of power in the UnitedKingdom, it is the potential for excessive concentra-tion of power by a prime minister who is prepared to


Figure 4

The Cabinet System

Prime Minister's Office• Private office• Political office• Policy unit• Press office

TreasuryCoordination by control of spending

Government Departments

Executive AgenciesQuangosLocal Government

Parliament

Prime MinisterAppoints and chairs cabinet,approximately 22 ministers

• makes or ratifies major decisions• plans parliamentary business• arbitrates between departments• coordinates government

Cabinet OfficeHeaded by Cabinet Secretary

• coordination by circulating minutes and agendas• progress by chasing decisions• policy innovation by special units

WhipsLeaders of Commons and Lords

• coordinate and plan parliamentary business

Ad hoc

Cabinet committees(ministers)

Official committees(civil servants)

Standing

Ad hoc Standing

PartyMedia

InterestGroups

Source: Her Majesty’s Treasury Budget Bulletin as found in British Politics: Continuities and Change, Third Edition, by Dennis Ka-vanagh, p. 251, Oxford University Press, 1996.

The cabinet is supported by a set of institutions that help formulate policy, coordinate operations, and facilitatethe support for government policy. Acting within a context set by the fusion of legislature and executive, theprime minister enjoys a great opportunity for decisive leadership that is lacking in a system of checks and bal-ances and separation of powers among the branches of government.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 65

Cengage Learning

manipulate the cabinet and flout the conventions ofcollective responsibility.

Bureaucracy and Civil Service

Policy-making at 10 Downing Street may appear to beincreasingly concentrated in the prime minister’shands. At the same time, when viewed from Whitehall,the executive may appear to be dominated by its vastadministrative agencies. The range and complexity ofstate policy-making mean that in practice, the cabinet’sauthority must be shared with a vast set of unelectedofficials.

How is the interaction between the civil serviceand the cabinet ministers (and their political assis-tants) coordinated? A very senior career civil servant,called a permanent secretary, has chief administrativeresponsibility for running a department. Other seniorcivil servants, including deputy secretaries and under-secretaries, in turn assist the permanent secretaries. Inaddition, the minister reaches into his or her depart-ment to appoint a principal private secretary, anup-and-coming civil servant who assists the ministeras gatekeeper and liaison with senior civil servants.

Successful policy requires the effective translationof policy goals into policy instruments. Since nearly alllegislation is introduced on behalf of the governmentand presented as the policy directive of a ministry, civilservants in Britain do much of the work of conceptual-izing and refining legislation that is done by committeestaffers in the U.S. Congress. Civil servants, more thanministers, assume operational duties, and, despite a cer-tain natural level of mutual mistrust and incomprehen-sion, the two must work closely together. In the eyes ofthe impartial, permanent, and anonymous civil servants,ministers are too political, unpredictable, and tempo-rary—they are tireless self-promoters who may neglector misunderstand the needs of the ministry. To a consci-entious minister, the permanent secretary may beprotecting his or her department too strenuously fromconstitutionally proper oversight and direction. What-ever they may think, no sharp line separates the respon-sibilities of ministers and civil servants, and they haveno choice but to execute policy in tandem. Many of theactivities traditionally undertaken by civil servants arenow carried out in executive agencies established sincea 1988 report on more effective government manage-ment. In addition, quite a range of administrative func-

tions previously performed in house are now providedthrough contracting out services to the private sector.

Like ministers, civil servants are servants of theCrown, but they are not part of the government (takenin the more political sense, like the term the adminis-tration in common American usage). The ministers, notthe civil servants, have constitutional responsibility forpolicy and are answerable to Parliament and the elec-torate for the conduct of their departments. Since theearly 1980s, the pace of change at Whitehall has beenvery fast, with governments looking to cut the size ofthe civil service, streamline its operations, replace per-manent with casual (temporary) staff, and enhance itsaccountability to citizens. As a result of the ongoingmodernization of Whitehall (known as new publicmanagement, NPM), the civil service inherited by NewLabour is very different from the civil service of thirtyyears ago. It has been downsized and given a new cor-porate structure (divided into over 120 separate execu-tive agencies). Few at the top of these agencies (agencychief executives) are traditional career civil servants.More generally, the old tradition of a career service isfading, a service in which nearly all the most powerfulposts were filled by those who entered the bureaucraticranks in their twenties. Many top appointments nowa-days are advertised widely and filled by outsiders. TheBlair government has continued the NPM trends to-ward accountability, efficiency, and greater trans-parency in the operations of the executive bureaucracy.

In recent years, many observers have expressedconcern, however, that New Labour has done—andwill continue to do—whatever it can to subject theWhitehall machine to effective political and ministerialdirection and control.29 A related concern, that the cen-trality and impartiality of civil servants is being erodedby the growing importance of special advisers (who areboth political policy advisers and civil servants), cameto a head as Blair made the case for war in Iraq. Keyspecial advisers played critical roles in making the casein the famous “dodgy dossier” of September 2002 thatthe threat of weapons of mass destruction justifiedregime change in Iraq. In recent years, many observershave noted that the political neutrality of the civil ser-vice is a core element in British governance and policy-making. Some have expressed concern that the bound-aries between ministers and civil servants as well asbetween special advisers and civil servants are not asclearly drawn as they should be.


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 66

Cengage Learning

Public and Semipublic Institutions

Like other countries, Britain has institutionalized a setof administrative functions that expand the role of thestate well beyond the traditional core executive func-tions and agencies. We turn now to a brief discussionof semipublic agencies—entities sanctioned by thestate but without direct democratic oversight.

Nationalized Industries. The nationalization ofbasic industries—such as coal, iron and steel, gas andelectricity supply—was a central objective of theLabour government’s program during the postwar col-lectivist era. By the end of the Thatcher era, the idea ofpublic ownership had clearly run out of steam. ForNew Labour, a return to the program of public owner-ship of industry is unthinkable. Instead, when thinkingof expanding state functions, we can look to a growingset of semipublic administrative organizations.

Nondepartmental Public Bodies. Since the 1970s,an increasing number of administrative functions havebeen transferred to bodies that are typically part of thegovernment in terms of funding, function, andappointment of staff, but operate at arm’s length fromministers. They are officially called nondepartmentalpublic bodies (NDPBs) but are better known as quasi-nongovernmental organizations or quangos. Quangoshave increasing policy influence and enjoy consider-able administrative and political advantages. Theytake responsibility for specific functions and can com-bine governmental and private sector expertise. At thesame time, ministers can distance themselves fromcontroversial areas of policy.

Despite Thatcher’s attempts to reduce their num-ber and scale back their operations, by the late 1990s,there were some six thousand quangos, 90 percentoperating at the local level. They were responsible forone-third of all public spending and staffed byapproximately fifty thousand people. Key areas ofpublic policy previously under the authority of localgovernments are now controlled by quangos, whichare nonelected bodies. Increasingly, the debate aboutNDPBs is less about the size of the public, semipub-lic, or private sector, and more about the effectivedelivery of services. For example, in 2004, the healthsecretary announced detailed plans for a quangopurge: the number of quangos sponsored by thedepartment would be cut by one-half in order to

reduce 20 percent of their spending (nearly one billiondollars) and streamline the staff by 25 percent.30

The elected authority in London, as well as theWelsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament, acquiredextensive powers to review and reform many of thequangos under their responsibility. We will returnlater to consider local government in Britain, but wemove now to a discussion of a set of formal institu-tions within and outside the executive.

Other State InstitutionsIn this section, we examine the military and thepolice, the judiciary, and subnational government.

The Military and the Police

From the local bobby (a term for a local police officerderived from Sir Robert Peel, who set up London’smetropolitan police force in 1829) to the most seniormilitary officer, those involved in security and lawenforcement have enjoyed a rare measure of popularsupport in Britain. Constitutional tradition and profes-sionalism distance the British police and militaryofficers from politics. Nevertheless, both institutionshave been placed in more politically controversial andexposed positions in recent decades.

In the case of the military, British policy in thepost–cold war period remains focused on a graduallyredefined set of North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) commitments. Still ranked among the top fivemilitary powers in the world, Britain retains a globalpresence, and the Thatcher and Major governmentsdeployed forces in ways that strengthened their politi-cal positions and maximized Britain’s globalinfluence. In 1982, Britain soundly defeated Argentinain a war over the disputed Falkland/Malvinas Islandsin the South Atlantic. In the Gulf War of 1991, Britaindeployed a full armored division in the UN-sanctionedforce arrayed against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. UnderBlair’s leadership, Britain was the sole participantalongside the United States in the aerial bombardmentof Iraq in December 1998. In 1999, the United King-dom strongly backed NATO’s Kosovo campaign andpressed for ground troops. Indeed, the Kosovo cam-paign and Blair’s “doctrine of international commu-nity,” which the prime minister rolled out in a majorspeech in Chicago on the eve of NATO’s fiftiethanniversary in 1999, assumed an important role in


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 67

Cengage Learning

Blair’s justification for the war in Iraq.31 According toBlair, global interdependence rendered isolationismobsolete and inspired a commitment to a new ethicaldimension in foreign policy. Throughout the war inIraq and its bloody aftermath, Blair has persistentlysought to characterize Iraq as an extension of Kosovo,an effort to liberate Muslims from brutal dictatorships,whether Serbia’s Milosevic or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.

Until Blair’s decision to support the Americanplan to shift the venue of the war on terror fromAfghanistan to Iraq, the use of the military in interna-tional conflicts generated little opposition. Indeed,even in the case of the 2003 war in Iraq, the role of themilitary (as distinct from the decision to go to war)has generated relatively little controversy. Allegationsof mistreatment raised far fewer questions than thosedirected at the United States for its abuse of prisonersat Abu Ghraib. In addition, UK forces are widelycredited with operations in and around Basra that havebeen as culturally sensitive and effective as could beexpected under very difficult circumstances.

As for the police, which traditionally operate as in-dependent local forces throughout the country, the pe-riod since the 1980s has witnessed growth in govern-ment control, centralization, and level of political use.During the coal miners’ strike of 1984–1985, the policeoperated to an unprecedented, and perhaps unlawful,degree as a national force coordinated through ScotlandYard (London police headquarters). Police menacedstrikers and hindered miners from participating in strikesupport activities. This partisan use of the police in anindustrial dispute flew in the face of constitutional tra-ditions and offended some police officers and officials.During the 1990s, concerns about police conduct fo-cused on police-community relations, including racerelations, corruption, and the interrogation and treat-ment of people held in custody. In particular, wide-spread criticism of the police for mishandling their in-vestigation into the brutal 1993 racist killing of StephenLawrence in South London resulted in a scathing reportby a commission of inquiry in 1999.

The Judiciary

In Britain, the principle of parliamentary sovereigntyhas limited the role of the judiciary. Courts have nopower to judge the constitutionality of legislative acts(judicial review). They can only determine whether

policy directives or administrative acts violate com-mon law or an act of Parliament. Hence, the Britishjudiciary is generally less politicized and influentialthan its U.S. counterpart.

Jurists, however, have participated in the widerpolitical debate outside court, as when they haveheaded royal commissions on the conduct of indus-trial relations, the struggle in Northern Ireland, andriots in Britain’s inner cities. Some observers ofBritish politics are concerned that governments haveused judges in these ways to secure partisan ends,deflect criticism, and weaken the tradition of parlia-mentary scrutiny of government policy. Nevertheless,Sir Richard Scott’s harsh report on his investigationinto Britain’s sales of military equipment to Iraq in the1980s, for example, indicates that inquiries led byjudges with a streak of independence can prove highlyembarrassing to the government and raise importantissues for public debate. The intensely watchedinquiry conducted by Lord Hutton, a senior jurist, intothe death of David Kelly confirmed this importantpublic role of judges in the United Kingdom, althoughthe question of Hutton’s independence became verycontroversial in light of a “verdict” that exoneratedthe prime minister.

Beyond the politicization of jurists through theirrole on commissions and public inquiries, potentiallydramatic institutional changes in law and the adminis-tration of justice are under consideration. In June2003, Blair announced the government’s intention toabolish the office of Lord Chancellor and move thelaw lords (who hold the ultimate authority of appealin British law) from the House of Lords to a new“supreme court.” The constitutional reform bill, intro-duced in 2004, faced strong opposition in the Lords(where Labour does not hold a majority), and theprospects for ultimate passage remain clouded.

The European dimension has also significantlyinfluenced law and the administration of justice. As amember of the EU, Britain is bound to abide by theEuropean Court of Justice (ECJ), as it applies anddevelops law as an independent institution within theEU. For example, two decisions by the ECJ led to theenactment of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1986,since previous legislation did not provide the fullguarantees of women’s rights in employment man-dated to all members by the EU’s Equal TreatmentDirective. Moreover, with the passage of the Human


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 68

Cengage Learning

Rights Act in 1998, Britain is required to comply withthe European Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) as well as with the rulings of the EuropeanCourt of Justice on Human Rights (ECJHR). This hasfar-reaching potential for advancing a “pluralistichuman rights culture” in Britain and providing newground rules in law for protecting privacy, freedom ofreligion, and a wider respect for human rights.32 Per-haps an indication of its broad influence to come, theadoption of the ECHR forced Britain to curtail dis-crimination against gays in the military. The HumanRights Act has also provided the judiciary with a legalframework (which Parliament cannot rescind) for ad-dressing specific concerns such as asylum.33 In addi-tion, the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on HumanRights now reviews all bills for their compatibilitywith the Human Rights Act, thus imposing animportant filter on controversial legislation as wellas reporting on positive steps to secure humanrights––for example, through a bill prohibiting thephysical punishment of children.34

Subnational Government

Since the United Kingdom is a state comprised ofdistinct nations (England, Scotland, Wales, and North-ern Ireland), the distribution of powers involves twolevels below the central government: national govern-ment and local (municipal) government. Because theBritish political framework has traditionally been uni-tary, not federal, no formal powers devolved to eitherthe nation within the United Kingdom or to subna-tional (really subcentral or sub-UK) units as in theUnited States or Germany.

Although no powers have been constitutionallyreserved to local governments, they historically hadconsiderable autonomy in financial terms and discre-tion in implementing a host of social service andrelated policies. In the context of increased fiscalpressures that followed the 1973 oil crisis, theLabour government introduced the first check on thefiscal autonomy of local councils (elected local au-thorities). The Thatcher government tightened thefiscal constraints on local government. Finally, in1986, the Thatcher government abolished the multi-cultural-oriented city government (the Greater Lon-don Council, GLC) under the leadership of Ken Liv-ingstone, as well as several other metropolitan

councils. In 1989, the Thatcher government intro-duced a poll tax, an equal per capita levy for local fi-nance, to replace the age-old system of local prop-erty taxes. This radical break with tradition, whichshifted the burden of local taxes from property own-ers and businesses to individuals, and taxed rich andpoor alike, was monumentally unpopular. The polltax proved a tremendous political liability, made lo-cal politics a hot-button national issue, and helpedlead to Thatcher’s departure.

Although much of New Labour’s agenda concern-ing subcentral government is focused primarily on thepolitical role of nations within Britain, devolutionwithin England is also part of the reform process.Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were intro-duced throughout England in April 1999 as part of adecentralizing agenda, but perhaps even more to facil-itate economic development at the regional level.Despite the fairly low-key profile of RDAs and theirlimited scope (they are unelected bodies with nostatutory authority), they opened the door to popularmobilization in the long term for elected regionalassemblies. Since 2002, the government’s chief eco-nomic advisor has argued for a “new localism” to linklocal initiative and public policy coordinated throughthe No. 10 Delivery Unit.35

In addition, the Blair government placed changesin the governance of London on the fast track. Theintroduction of a directly elected mayor of London inMay 2000 proved embarrassing to Blair, since thegovernment’s efforts to keep Livingstone out of thecontest backfired and he won handily. Livingstone hasintroduced an expansive agenda to spur long-termsustainable growth and advance a policy agenda thatemphasizes ethnic diversity and the enhanced repre-sentation and leadership of women in London publiclife. In addition, London’s determined effort to reducetraffic congestion by levying per day per vehiclecharges within a central London zone have won wide-spread admiration for one of England’s most contro-versial political leaders.

The Policy-Making ProcessParliamentary sovereignty is the core constitutionalprinciple of the British political system. However,when it comes to policy-making and policy implemen-tation, the focus is not on Westminster (the legislative


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 69

Cengage Learning

arena) but rather on Whitehall (the administrative cen-ter of UK government). In many countries, such asJapan, India, and Nigeria, personal connections andinformal networks play a large role in policy-makingand implementation. How different is the Britishsystem?

Unlike the U.S. system, in which policy-making isconcentrated in congressional committees and sub-committees, Parliament has little direct participation inpolicy-making. Policy-making emerges primarily fromwithin the executive. There, decision making isstrongly influenced by policy communities—informalnetworks with extensive knowledge, access, andpersonal connections to those responsible for policy. Inthis private hothouse environment, civil servants, min-isters, and members of the policy communities workthrough informal ties. A cooperative style develops asthe ministry becomes an advocate for key players in itspolicy community and as civil servants come perhapsto overidentify the public good with the advancementof policy within their area of responsibility.

This cozy insider-only policy process has been chal-lenged by the delegation of more and more authority tothe EU. As one observer neatly summarized this devel-opment, “The result is a new kind of multilevel politicalsystem in which political power is shared between the

EU, national and subnational levels, and decisions takenat one level shape outcomes at others.”36

When it comes to policy-making, the consequencesof the European dimension are profound. Both minis-ters and senior civil servants spend a great deal oftime in EU policy deliberations and are constrainedboth directly and indirectly by the EU agenda and di-rectives. Although still effectively in charge of manyareas of domestic policy, more than 80 percent of therules governing economic life in Britain are deter-mined by the EU. Even when the United Kingdom hasopted out, as in the case of the common currency, Eu-ropean influences are significant. Decisions by theCouncil of Finance Ministers and the European Cen-tral Bank shape British macroeconomic, monetary,and fiscal policies in significant ways. Nor are foreignand security policy, the classic exercises of nationalsovereignty, immune from EU influences, since mul-tilevel governance has been extended to these spheresby the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.Little is certain about the processes of European inte-gration. But if the history of UK-EU relations is a pro-logue to future developments, the increasing Euro-peanization of policy-making will be one of the mostinteresting and potentially transformative develop-ments in British politics in the next decade.


As discussed in Section 3, parliamentary sovereigntyis the core constitutional principle defining the roleof the legislature and, in a sense, the whole systemof British government. The executive or judiciarycan set no act of Parliament aside, nor is any Parlia-ment bound by the actions of any previous Parlia-ment. Nevertheless, in practice, the control exertedby the House of Commons (or the Commons) is notunlimited. In this section we investigate the powersand role of Parliament, both Commons and Lords, aswell as the party system, elections, and contempo-rary currents in British political culture, citizenship,and identity. We close by offering an analysis of sur-prising new directions in political participation andsocial protest.

The LegislatureIs Parliament still as sovereign in practice as itremains in constitutional tradition? Clearly, it is not aspowerful as it once was. From roughly the 1830s tothe 1880s, it collaborated in the formulation of policy,and members amended or rejected legislation on thefloor of the House of Commons. Today, the Commonsdoes not so much legislate as assent to governmentlegislation, since (with rare exceptions) the governingparty has a majority of the seats and requires no cross-party voting to pass bills. In addition, the balance ofeffective oversight of policy has shifted from the leg-islature to executive agencies. In this section we dis-cuss, in turn, the legislative process, the House of

Section e Representation and Participation

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 70

Cengage Learning

Commons, the House of Lords, and reforms and pres-sures for change.

The House of Commons

In constitutional terms, the House of Commons, thelower house of Parliament (with 646 seats at the time ofthe 2005 election), exercises the main legislative powerin Britain. Along with the two unelected elements ofParliament, the Crown and the House of Lords, theCommons has three main functions: (1) to pass laws,(2) to provide finances for the state by authorizing tax-ation, and (3) to review and scrutinize public adminis-tration and government policy. (The elaborate path fol-lowed by prospective legislation is described in“Institutional Intricacies: The Legislative Process.”)

In practical terms, the Commons has a limitedlegislative function; nevertheless, it serves a very

important democratic function. It provides a highlyvisible arena for policy debate and the partisan colli-sion of political worldviews. The high stakes and theflash of rhetorical skills bring drama to the historicchambers, but one crucial element of drama is nearlyalways missing: the outcome is seldom in doubt. Thelikelihood that the Commons will invoke its ultimateauthority, to defeat a government, is very small. MPsfrom the governing party who consider rebellingagainst their leader (the prime minister) are under-standably reluctant in a close and critical vote toforce a general election, which would place their jobsin jeopardy. Only once since the defeat of RamsayMacDonald’s government in 1924 has a governmentbeen brought down by a defeat in the Commons (in1979). Today, the balance of institutional power hasshifted from Parliament to the governing party andthe executive.

SECTION 4 Representation and Participation 71

To become law, bills must be introduced in theHouse of Commons and the House of Lords,although approval by the latter is not required.

The procedure for developing and adopting apublic bill is quite complex. The ideas for prospec-tive legislation may come from political parties,pressure groups, think tanks, the prime minister’spolicy unit, or government departments. Prospec-tive legislation is then normally drafted by civilservants, circulated within Whitehall, approved bythe cabinet, and then refined by one of some thirtylawyers in the office of Parliamentary Counsel.*

According to tradition, in the House ofCommons the bill usually comes to floor threetimes (referred to as readings). The bill is formallyread upon introduction (the first reading), printed,distributed, debated in general terms, and after aninterval (from a single day to several weeks),given a second reading, followed by a vote. Thebill is then usually sent for detailed review to astanding committee of between sixteen and fiftymembers chosen to reflect the overall partybalance in the House. It is then subject to a report

stage during which new amendments may beintroduced. The third reading follows; normally,the bill is considered in final form (and voted on)without debate.

After the third reading, a bill passed in theHouse of Commons follows a parallel path inthe House of Lords. There the bill is eitheraccepted without change, amended, or rejected.According to custom, the House of Lords passesbills concerning taxation or budgetary matterswithout alteration, and can add technical andeditorial amendments to other bills (which must beapproved by the House of Commons) to add clar-ity in wording and precision in administration.After a bill has passed through all these stages, itis sent to the Crown for royal assent (approval bythe queen or king, which is only a formality), afterwhich it becomes law and is referred to as an Actof Parliament.

*See Dennis Kavanagh, British Politics: Continuities andChange, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1996), 282–288.

Institutional Intricacies: The Legislative Process

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 71

Cengage Learning

The House of Lords

The upper chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords(or Lords), is an unelected body that is comprised ofhereditary peers (nobility of the rank of duke, mar-quis, earl, viscount, or baron), life peers (appointed bythe Crown on the recommendation of the prime min-ister), and law lords (life peers appointed to assist theLords in its judicial duties). The Lords also includethe archbishops of Canterbury and York and twodozen senior bishops of the Church of England. Thereare roughly 1,200 members of the House of Lords, butthere is no fixed number, and membership changeswith the appointment of peers. Not surprisingly, theConservatives have a considerable edge in the upperhouse, with just over one-half of peers; Labour runs adistant second at roughly one-sixth. About one-thirdare crossbenchers, or independents.

Traditionally, the House of Lords has also servedas the final court of appeal for civil cases throughoutBritain and for criminal cases in England, Wales, andNorthern Ireland. This judicial role, performed by thelaw lords, drew international attention in 1998 and1999 when a Spanish court attempted to extradite Gen-eral Augusto Pinochet of Chile on charges of genocide,torture, and terrorism. As discussed in Section 5, ifmade into law, the constitutional reform bill, whichwas introduced in 2004, would transfer that functionfrom the Lords to a new “supreme court.”

In modern times, however, the Lords, which hasthe power to amend and delay legislation, has servedmainly as a chamber of revision, providing expertisein redrafting legislation. Recently, for example, theHouse of Lords, which considered the Nationality,Immigration and Asylum Bill too harsh, battled thegovernment for weeks and forced revisions beforeapproving the legislation.

In 1999, the Blair government appointed a RoyalCommission on the Reform of the House of Lords(the Wakeham commission) and in the same yearintroduced legislation to remove the right of heredi-tary lords to speak and vote. With the passage ofHouse of Lords Act 1999, the number of hereditarypeers was reduced to 92. In January 2000, thecommission recommended a partly elected secondchamber, enumerating alternative models. In February2003, the Commons rejected seven options, rangingfrom a fully appointed chamber (Blair’s preference) to

an entirely elected one. The failure of a joint commit-tee of MPs and peers to achieve consensus left reformplans in tatters. The government remains committedto the removal of hereditary peers and to an upperhouse that would be largely elected, but multiple divi-sions cloud the fate of reform legislation.

Reforms in Behavior and Structure

How significant are contemporary changes in theHouse? How far will they go to stem the tide in Parlia-ment’s much-heralded decline?

Behavioral Changes: Backbench Dissent. Since the1970s, backbenchers (MPs of the governing party whohave no governmental office and rank-and-file opposi-tion members) have been markedly less deferentialthan in the past. A backbench rebellion against theMajor government’s EU policy took a toll on theprestige of the prime minister and weakened himconsiderably. Until the war in Iraq was on thehorizon, Blair seemed less likely to face significantrebellion from Labour MPs, although divisions didoccur––relatively early in his premiership, for example,over social welfare policy and the treatment of tradeunions. The opening vignette in Section 1 described therebellion Blair faced in January 2004 over theEducation Bill. The defection of some one-third ofLabour MPs on key votes in February and March 2003authorizing the use of force in Iraq represents a farmore historic rebellion. Looking ahead, it is likely thatany vote to adopt the euro would inspire significantbackbench dissent once more.

Structural Changes: Parliamentary Committees.In addition to the standing committees that routinelyreview bills during legislative proceedings, in 1979 theCommons revived and extended the number and“remit” (that is, responsibilities) of select committees.Select committees help Parliament exert control overthe executive by examining specific policies or aspectsof administration.

The most controversial select committees arewatchdog committees that monitor the conduct ofmajor departments and ministries. Select committeeshold hearings, take written and oral testimony, andquestion senior civil servants and ministers. They thenissue reports that often include strong policy recom-


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 72

Cengage Learning


mendations at odds with government policy. As oneside effect of the reform, the role of the civil servicehas been complicated. For the first time, civil servantshave been required to testify in a manner that mightdamage their ministers, revealing culpability orflawed judgments. As discussed in Section 4, thepowerful norms of civil service secrecy have beencompromised and the relationship with ministers dis-turbed. On balance, the committees have beenextremely energetic, but not very powerful.

Political Parties and the Party SystemLike the term parliamentary sovereignty, which con-ceals the reduced role of Parliament in legislation andthe unmaking of governments, the term two-party sys-tem, which is commonly used to describe the Britishparty system, is somewhat deceiving. It is true that since1945, only leaders of the Labour or Conservative par-ties have served as prime ministers. Also, from 1945through 2001, the Conservative and Labour parties haveeach won eight general elections, with 2005 tipping thelead to Labour. It is also true that throughout the post-war period, these two parties have routinely divided atleast 85 percent of the seats in the House of Commons.But since the 1980s center parties have assumed a highprofile in British electoral politics, with the Liberal De-mocrats (Lib Dems) emerging as an important alterna-tive to Conservative and Labour—or perhaps a coalitionpartner with Labour in the not too distant future. In ad-dition, Britain has several national parties, such as theScottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland or the PlaidCymru in Wales as well as a roster of parties competingin Northern Ireland. (These parties are described belowunder “Trends in Electoral Behavior.”)

The Labour Party

As one of the few European parties with origins outsideelectoral politics, the Labour Party was launched bytrade union representatives and socialist societies in thelast decade of the nineteenth century and formally tookits name in 1906. But it would be decades before theLabour Party became a contender for government lead-ership. Its landslide 1945 victory promoted the party tomajor player status. At the same time, Labour beganmoderating its ideological appeal and broadening itselectoral base by adopting the collectivist consensus

described in Section 1. In the 1950s and early 1960s,those not engaged in manual labor voted Conservativethree times more commonly than they did Labour;more than two out of three manual workers, bycontrast, voted Labour. During this period, Britainconformed to one classic pattern of a Western Europeanparty system: a two-class/two-party system.

The period since the mid-1970s has been markedby significant changes in the party system and a grow-ing disaffection with even the moderate social democ-racy associated with the Keynesian welfare state andLabourism. The party suffered from divisions betweenits trade unionist and parliamentary elements, consti-tutional wrangling over the power of trade unions todetermine party policy at annual conferences, and dis-putes over how the leader would be selected. Divisionsspilled over into foreign policy issues as well. On de-fense issues, there was a strong pacifist and an evenstronger antinuclear sentiment within the party. Sup-port for unilateral nuclear disarmament (the reductionand elimination of nuclear weapons systems with orwithout comparable developments on the Soviet side)was a decisive break with the national consensus onsecurity policy and contributed to the party’s losses in1983 and 1987. Unilateralism was then scrapped.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a period of rela-tive harmony within the party, with moderate tradeunion and parliamentary leadership agreeing on majorpolicy issues. Labour has become a moderate left-of-center party in which ideology takes a backseat toperformance and electoral mobilization, althoughdivisions over the war in Iraq have inspired some soulsearching about what values the party represents.

The Conservative Party

The pragmatism, flexibility, and organizational capa-bilities of the Conservative Party, a party that datesback to the eighteenth century, have made it one ofthe most successful and, at times, innovative center-right parties in Europe. Although it has fallen on hardtimes in recent years, it would be unwise to underes-timate its potential as both an opposition and a gov-erning party.

Although the association of the Conservative Partywith the economic and social elite is unmistakable, itis also true that it was the Conservative government ofPrime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (1874–1880) that

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 73

Cengage Learning

served as midwife to the birth of the modern welfarestate in Britain. The creation of a “long-lasting alliancebetween an upper-class leadership and a lower-classfollowing” made the Conservative Party a formidableplayer in British politics.37 Throughout the postwarperiod, it has also routinely (with some exceptions)provided the Tories, as Conservatives are colloquiallycalled, with electoral support from about one-third ormore of the manual working class.

Contemporary analysis of the Conservative Partymust emphasize the cost to the party of its internal divi-sions over Britain’s role in the EU. Wrangling amongthe Conservatives over Europe lead to Thatcher’sdemise as leader and weakened Major throughout hisyears as prime minister. The bitter leadership contestthat followed Major’s resignation after the 1997 defeatonly reinforced the impression of a party in turmoil;subsequent rapid departures of party leaders after elec-toral defeat in 2001 as well as the forced resignation ofthe leader in 2003 lent an aura of failure and self-doubtto the Conservatives.

Once the combative, experienced, and highlyregarded Michael Howard—who had served in thecabinets of both Margaret Thatcher and John Major—assumed the party leadership in 2003, the Conserva-tives seemed revitalized. But it was not easy forHoward to translate his assured performances from thefront bench in Parliament into popular support.Although Howard pounded Blair on the failures ofintelligence in the run-up to the war in Iraq and hishandling of the David Kelly affair, Conservatives gavethe prime minister far less trouble on Iraq than didmembers of the Labour Party itself. Nor could he makemuch headway against New Labour on central socialand economic policy concerns—and thus despite anenergetic campaign, one which will likely be remem-bered for its xenophobic edge, Howard succumbed tothe same fate as his recent predecessors: electoral de-feat followed by a quick resignation as party leader.

Liberal Democrats

Since the 1980s, a changing roster of centrist partieshas posed a potentially significant threat to thetwo-party dominance of Conservative and Labour.Through the 1970s, the Liberal Party, a governingparty in the pre–World War I period and thereafter the

traditional centrist third party in Britain, was the onlycentrist challenger to the Labour and Conservativeparties. In 1981, the Social Democratic Party (SDP)formed out of a split within the Labour Party. In the1983 election, the Alliance (an electoral arrangementof the Liberals and the SDP) gained a quarter of thevote. The strength of centrist parties in the mid-1980sled to expectations of a possible Alliance-led govern-ment (which did not occur). After the Conservativevictory in 1987, the Liberal Party and most of the SDPmerged to form the Social and Liberal DemocraticParty (now called the Liberal Democrats or LibDems). Especially against the backdrop of an ineffec-tual Tory opposition to New Labour, the Lib Demshave become a major political player.

Their success in the 2001 general election—theparty increased its vote tally by nearly one-fifth andwon fifty-two seats, the most since 1929—positionedthe party as a potentially powerful center-left critic ofNew Labour. That said, Labour has not made it easyfor them. As the Blair government began to spendmassively to improve education and health care, itnarrowed the range of policy issues on which theLiberal Democrats could take on New Labour.Although Charles Kennedy, party leader since 1999and a highly regarded figure in British politics, wonthe political gamble in spring 2003 by opposing thewar in Iraq, challenging the weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) claim, and even attending the hugeantiwar rally in February, it has not been easy forhim—or the party—to take electoral advantage ofBlair’s political weakness.

ElectionsBritish elections are exclusively for legislative posts.The prime minister is not elected as prime minister butas an MP from a single constituency (electoraldistrict), averaging about 65,000 registered voters. Par-liament has a maximum life of five years, with nofixed term. General elections are held after the Crown,at the request of the prime minister, has dissolvedParliament. Although Blair has in effect set a prece-dent of elections with four-year intervals, the ability tocontrol the timing of elections is a tremendouspolitical asset for the prime minister. This contrastssharply with a presidential system, characteristic of the


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 74

Cengage Learning

United States, with direct election of the chiefexecutive and a fixed term of office.

The Electoral System

Election for representatives in the Commons (whoare called members of Parliament, or MPs) is by a“first-past-the-post” (or winner-take-all) principle ineach constituency. In this single-member pluralitysystem, the candidate who receives the most votes is

elected. There is no requirement of a majority and noelement of proportional representation (a system inwhich each party is given a percentage of seats in arepresentative assembly roughly comparable to itspercentage of the popular vote). Table 2 shows theresults of the general elections from 1945 to 2005.

This winner-take-all electoral system tends toexaggerate the size of the victory of the largest partyand to reduce the influence of regionally dispersedlesser parties. Thus, in 2005, with 35.2 percent of the


Table 2

British General Elections, 1945–2005

Percentage of Popular Vote Seats in House of Commons

Conser- National Conser- National GovernmentTurnout vative Labour Liberala Partiesb Other Swingc vative Labour Liberala Partiesb Other Majority

1945 72.7 39.8 48.3 9.1 0.2 2.5 –12.2 213 393 12 0 22 1461950 84.0 43.5 46.1 9.1 0.1 1.2 +3.0 299 315 9 0 2 0.51951 82.5 48.0 48.8 2.5 0.1 0.6 +0.9 321 295 6 0 3 171955 76.7 49.7 46.4 2.7 0.2 0.9 +2.1 345 277 6 0 2 601959 78.8 49.4 43.8 5.9 0.4 0.6 +1.2 365 258 6 0 1 1001964 77.1 43.4 44.1 11.2 0.5 0.8 –3.2 304 317 9 0 0 41970 72.0 46.4 43.0 7.5 1.3 1.8 +4.7 330 288 6 1 5 30Feb. 1974 78.7 37.8 37.1 19.3 2.6 3.2 –1.4 297 301 14 9 14 –34d

Oct. 1974 72.8 35.8 39.2 18.3 3.5 3.2 –2.1 277 319 13 14 12 31979 76.0 43.9 37.0 13.8 2.0 3.3 +5.2 339 269 11 4 12 431983 72.7 42.4 27.6 25.4 1.5 3.1 +4.0 397 209 23 4 17 1441987 75.3 42.3 30.8 22.6 1.7 2.6 –1.7 376 229 22 6 17 1021992 77.7 41.9 34.4 17.8 2.3 3.5 –2.0 336 271 20 7 17 211997 71.4 30.7 43.2 16.8 2.6 6.7 –10.0 165 419 46 10 19 1792001 59.4 31.7 40.7 18.3 2.5 6.8 +1.8 166 413 52 9 19 1672005 61.5 32.3 35.2 22.1 2.1 8.4 +3.0 197 355 62 9 22 65e

aLiberal Party, 1945–1979; Liberal/Social Democrat Alliance, 1983–1987; Liberal Democratic Party, 1992–2005.bCombined vote of Scottish National Party (SNP) and Welsh National Party (Plaid Cymru).c”Swing” compares the results of each election with the results of the previous election. It is calculated as the average of thewinning major party’s percentage point increase in its share of the vote and the losing major party’s decrease in its percentagepoint share of the vote. In the table, a positive sign denotes a swing to the Conservatives, a negative sign a swing to Labour.dFollowing the February 1974 election, the Labour Party was thirty-four seats short of having an overall majority. It formed aminority government until it obtained a majority in the October 1974 election.eDue to the death of a candidate in one constituency, only 645 parliamentary seats were contested in the May 2005 general elec-tion, with one additional seat to be filled through a by-election.Source: Anthony King, ed., New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1998), p. 249. Copyright© 1998 by Chatham House. Reprinted by permission. For 2001 results, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/vote2001/results_constituencies/uk_breakdown/uk_full.stm. For 2005 results, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/constituencies/default.stm.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 75

Cengage Learning


popular vote, Labour won 355 seats. With 22.1 percentof the vote, the Liberal Democrats won only 62 seats.Thus, the Liberal Democrats achieved a share of thevote that was approximately two-thirds of that achievedby Labour, but won less than one-fifth of the seats wonby Labour. Such are the benefits of the electoral systemto the victor (as well as the second major party).

With a fairly stable two-and-a-half party system(Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat), theBritish electoral system tends toward a stable single-party government. However, the electoral systemraises questions about representation and fairness. Thesystem reduces the competitiveness of smaller partieswith diffuse pockets of support. In addition, the partyand electoral systems have contributed to the creationof a Parliament that has been a bastion of white men.The 1997 election represented a breakthrough forwomen: the number of women MPs nearly doubled to120 (18.2 percent). The 2001 election saw the numberof women MPs decline to 118 (17.9 percent). But arecord 128 women were elected in 2005 (19.8 per-cent). As a result of using women-only shortlists forthe selection of candidates in many winnable seats,Labour sent far more women (94) to Parliament thanany other party.

In 1992, 6 ethnic minority candidates were elected,up from 4 in 1987, the first time since before WorldWar II that Parliament included minority members. Thenumber of ethnic minority (black and Asian) MPs rosein 1997 to 9 (1.4 percent), to 12 in 2001 (1.8 percent),and to 15 in 2005 (2.3 percent). Despite the generaltrend of increased representation of women and minori-ties, they remain substantially underrepresented inParliament.

Trends in Electoral Behavior

Recent general elections have deepened geographicand regional fragmentation on the political map.British political scientist Ivor Crewe has referred tothe emergence of two two-party systems: (1) competi-tion between the Conservative and Labour partiesdominates contests in English urban and northernseats, and (2) Conservative-center party competitiondominates England’s rural and southern seats.38 Inaddition, a third two-party competition may beobserved in Scotland, where competition betweenLabour and the Scottish National Party dominates.

The national parties have challenged two-partydominance since the 1970s. The Scottish NationalParty (SNP) was founded in 1934 and its Welsh coun-terpart, the Plaid Cymru, in 1925. Coming in a distantsecond to Labour in Scotland in 1997, the SNP won21.6 percent of the vote and six seats. In 2001, supportfor the SNP declined by 2 percent, and the party lostone of its seats. The 2005 election showed some inter-esting results in Scotland. Labour lost five seats and theSNP gained 2 seats (for a total of 6). But the Lib Demsovertook the SNP’s share of the vote. Both electoraland polling data indicate that Scottish voters are moreinclined to support the SNP for elections to the Scottishparliament than to Westminster and that devolutionmay have stemmed the rising tide of nationalism.39 Inboth 1997 and 2001, the Plaid Cymru won four seatswhere Welsh is still spoken widely. In 2005, after anabsence of eight years, three Conservative MPs wereelected in Wales, as the Plaid Cymru lost one seat.

How can we come to terms with the May 2005election? All three major parties could claim some kindof victory, but also had to come to terms with elementsof failure. Blair secured an historic third term with acautious campaign, riding a strong economy and im-provements in education and health care—and recur-rent images of Gordon Brown by his side—to victory.But the election nevertheless left Blair humbled, hismajority slashed, his support often grudging. NewLabour won by putting off tough decisions—on pen-sion reform, public spending, climate change, Europe,and a timetable for the withdrawal of British troopsfrom Iraq. They won, too, by locking in the middle ofthe electoral sentiment. They are perfectly positioned:slightly center-right on security and immigration;slightly center-left on the economy and social policy.

Hence, the other parties couldn’t lay a glove onBlair on the core issues that drive domestic politics.With little to say about the government’s solid eco-nomic record or about the war in Iraq (which they sup-ported, whatever criticisms they might muster aboutBlair’s credibility), the Conservatives played the racecard. As The Economist put it, their campaign was an“unseemly scramble for the anti-immigrant vote.” TheTories could take solace in the fact that they had a netgain of 31 seats, but Michael Howard’s hasty departuremade it obvious that the campaign was a failure.

One of the most significant features of the 2005election, an element of continuity with 2001, was the

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 76

Cengage Learning

growing importance of the Liberal Democrats. Theyenjoyed a net gain of 10 seats and, perhaps moreimportantly, their share of the popular vote rose to animpressive 22 percent. On the down side, like Howard,Kennedy could not chip away at Labour’s dominantposition on the core economic and social policies. Buthe benefited from a consistent and articulate opposi-tion to the war in Iraq, which paid dividends especiallyin constituencies with a strong presence of students orMuslims. With a Labour majority down to 67, a lot ofbackbench opposition to the prime minister withinLabour ranks, and the Conservatives left with little tooffer, Kennedy could look forward to the role of defacto leader of the opposition. And he could dream ofa scenario full of delight for the Lib Dems—a dimin-ished Labour party needing a coalition partner whenthe next election rolled around.

Political Culture, Citizenship, and IdentityIn their classic study of the ideals and values thatshape political behavior, political scientists GabrielAlmond and Sidney Verba wrote that the civic (orpolitical) culture in Britain was characterized by trust,deference to authority and competence, pragmatism,and the balance between acceptance of the rules of thegame and disagreement over specific issues.40 Viewedretrospectively, the 1970s appear as a crucial turningpoint in British political culture and group identities.

During the 1970s, the long years of economic dec-line culminated in economic reversals in the standard ofliving for many Britons. Also for many, the historicbonds of occupational and social class grew weaker.Union membership declined with the continued transferof jobs away from the traditional manufacturing sectors.More damaging, unions lost popular support as they ap-peared to bully society, act undemocratically, and ne-glect the needs of an increasingly female and minoritywork force. At the same time, a growing number of con-servative think tanks and the powerful voice of mass-circulation newspapers, which are overwhelmingly con-servative, worked hard to erode the fundamental beliefsof the Keynesian welfare state. New social movements(NSMs), such as feminism, antinuclear activism, andenvironmentalism, challenged basic tenets of Britishpolitical culture. Identities based on race and ethnicity,gender, and sexual orientation gained significance.Thus, a combination of economic strains, ideological

assaults, and social dislocations helped foster politicalfragmentation and, at the same time, inspired a shift tothe right in values and policy agendas.

Thatcher’s ascent reflected these changes in polit-ical culture, identities, and values. It also put the fullresources of the state and a bold and determinedprime minister behind a sweeping agenda for change.As a leading British scholar put it, “Thatcher’s objec-tive was nothing less than a cultural revolution.”41

Although most observers agree that Thatcher fell con-siderably short of that aim, Thatcherism cut deep. Ittouched the cultural recesses of British society, recastpolitical values, and redefined national identity.

To the extent that the Thatcherite worldview tookhold (and the record is mixed), its new language andethos helped transform the common sense of politicsand redefined the political community. Monetarism(however modified) and the appeal to an enterpriseculture of competitive market logic and entrepreneur-ial values fostered individualism and competition—winners and losers. It rejected collectivism, the redis-tribution of resources from rich to poor, and stateresponsibility for full employment. Thatcherism con-sidered individual property rights more important thanthe social rights claimed by all citizens in the welfarestate. Thus Thatcherism set the stage in cultural termsfor the New Labour consolidation of neoliberalismand the core political-cultural orientation in Britain.

Social Class

One of the key changes in political culture in Britainin the last quarter-century has been the weakening ofbonds grounded in the experience of labor. During theThatcher era, the traditional values of “an honestday’s work for an honest day’s pay” and solidarityamong coworkers in industrial disputes were charac-terized as “rigidities” that reduced productivity andcompetitiveness. New Labour has persisted in thenegative characterization of social class as an impedi-ment to competitiveness.

As many have noted, being “tough on the unions”is a core premise of New Labour, and this has con-tributed to a fundamental erosion of the ability ofworking people in the United Kingdom to improvetheir lot through collective bargaining or to exertinfluence over public policy through the politicalmuscle of the trade union movement. Class still


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 77

Cengage Learning

matters in the United Kingdom, but not in the domi-nating way that it did in the nineteenth century or inthe collectivist era. Importantly, it no longer explainsmore than about 2 percent of voting behavior.

The sources and relative strength of diverse groupattachments have shifted in Britain in recent decadesunder the combined pressures of decolonization,which created a multiethnic Britain, and a fragmenta-tion of the experiences of work, which challenges asimple unitary model of class interest. National iden-tity has become especially complicated in the UnitedKingdom. At the same time, gender politics hasemerged as a hot-button issue.

Citizenship and National Identity

Questions about fragmented sovereignty withinthe context of the EU, the commingled historiesof four nations (England, Scotland, Wales, andIreland/Northern Ireland), and the interplay ofrace and nationality in postcolonial Britain have cre-ated doubts about British identity that run deep. Asethnicity, intra-UK territorial attachments, and theprocesses of Europeanization and globalizationcomplicate national identity, it becomes increasinglydifficult for UK residents automatically to imaginethemselves Britons, constituting a resonant nationalcommunity.

Thus, the British political community fragmentedinto smaller communities of class, nation, region, andethnicity that existed side by side but not necessarilyin amiable proximity. Can New Labour recreate amore cohesive political culture and foster a moreinclusive sense of British identity? Unlike Thatcher,Blair is a conciliator, and he has worked hard to revi-talize a sense of community in Britain and to extendhis agenda to the socially excluded. But the results aremixed, with every effort to eradicate an emergingunderclass, it seems, offset by the divisive aftereffectsof 9/11 and fingers pointed at ethnic minorities, immi-grants, and asylum seekers.

Ethnicity

Britain is a country of tremendous ethnic diversity.Beyond the numbers—nearly 8 percent of the peoplewho live in Britain are of African, African-Caribbean,

or Asian descent—there is the growing reality of lifein a multiethnic society. The authors of a recent com-mission report on multiethnic Britain explained:“Many communities overlap; all affect and areaffected by others. More and more people have multi-ple identities—they are Welsh Europeans, PakistaniYorkshirewomen, Glaswegian Muslims, English Jewsand black British. Many enjoy this complexity butalso experience conflicting loyalties.”42

While there are many success stories, ethnicminority communities have experienced police in-sensitivity, problems in access to the best publichousing, hate crimes, and accusations that they arenot truly British if they do not root for Britain’scricket team. In addition, harsh criticism directed atimmigrants and asylum seekers, coming as it does inthe wake of intense scrutiny of the Muslim commu-nity since September 11, contributes to the alien-ation of the ethnic minority community, particularlysections of the Muslim citizenry. And yet, in the af-termath of the attack on the World Trade Center andthe Pentagon, public debate included a range of ar-ticulate, young, and confident Muslims from a vari-ety of perspectives, and Faz Hakim, chief race rela-tions adviser to the prime minister, played a visiblepublic insider role. It is true that ordinary law-abidingMuslims—or people perceived to be Muslims—have experienced intensified mistrust and intimida-tion since the terror attacks by British Muslims inLondon in July 2005. But it is equally true thatMuslim university graduates are assuming leadingroles in the professions, while there are more than160 Muslim elected city councilors, and British so-ciety has become increasingly sensitive to Muslimconcerns.43

Gender

Historically, the issues women care about most—child care, the treatment of part-time workers, do-mestic violence, equal pay, and support for familycaregivers—have not topped the list of policy agen-das of any political party in Britain. Has New Laboursignificantly changed the equation?

It is probably fair to say, on balance, that Labourdoes well among women voters less because of anyspecific policies and more because it has made the


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 78

Cengage Learning

effort to listen to concerns that women voice. Labourstalwarts would insist that they have addressed keyconcerns that women (and men) share concerninghealth care, crime, and education. They would pointwith pride to the policy directions spurred by theSocial Exclusion and Women’s units; to the imple-mentation of a national child-care strategy; to poli-cies intended to help women to balance work andfamily commitments; and to the creation of women-only shortlists in 2005 for candidates to compete insafe Labour constituencies.

As a result, New Labour has obliterated the oldgender gap in which women favored the Conserva-tives and has begun to establish a new pro-Labourwomen’s vote, which may be particularly significant,for its ability to mobilize young women (and morethan a few young men, too). These developments arediscussed in detail in “Current Challenges: Genderand Generation Gaps and Trends.”

Interests, Social Movements, and ProtestIn recent years, partly in response to globalization,political protest has been on the rise in Britain. Asprotesters demand more accountability and trans-parency in the operations of powerful internationaltrade and development agencies. London becamethe site of protests timed to correspond with theSeattle meeting of the World Trade Organization(WTO), which generated some 100,000 protesters inNovember 1999.

In addition, since the mid-1990s, the level andintensity of environmental activism really took offwith the growing attention to genetically modified(GM) crops in the late 1990s. A newly radicalizedmovement, worried that long-term consumption ofGM food might be harmful and that once let loose,GM crops—referred to as “Frankenstein food”—might cross-pollinate with “normal” plants, cap-tured the popular imagination. Opinion polls indi-cated that nearly 75 percent of the population didnot want GM crops in the United Kingdom, and inNovember 1999, the government announced a banon commercially grown GM crops in Britain.

In a movement that galvanized the country andraised critical questions about Blair’s leadership,

massive demonstrations that cut across constituen-cies and enjoyed huge popular support erupted inSeptember 2000 to protest high fuel prices. A verysuccessful and well-coordinated week-long proteststalled fuel delivery throughout the country, forced90 percent of the petrol stations to run out of un-leaded gasoline, and required the Queen, on the ad-vice of the prime minister, to declare a state ofemergency. By the time the blockades came down,opinion polls for the first time in eight years showedthe Conservatives for the moment surging pastLabour. In fact, polling data indicates that Blair’spopularity has never recovered from the bump ittook over fuel prices.44

A quite different kind of activism spread to thecountryside among a population not usually knownfor political protest. Farmers who had been badlyhurt by the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopa-thy, more popularly known as “mad cow disease”)crisis and other rural populations concerned aboutthe perceived urban bias of the Labour governmentlaunched massive protests.45 As the banning and li-censing of fox hunting roiled Parliament, theCountryside Alliance, which represents countrydwellers who see restrictions on fox hunting asemblematic of domineering urban interests, heldmass demonstrations in an effort to block restric-tive legislation. Even after a law banning the huntwent into effect in 2005, they kept up the heat withlegal challenges.

On the far more significant matter of war in Iraq,a series of antiwar rallies were held in London. InSeptember 2002, a huge protest rally was organizedin London, led by the Stop the War Coalition andthe Muslim Association of Britain. It was one of Eu-rope’s biggest antiwar rallies. Another antiwar rallyin mid-February 2003 challenged Blair’s stand onIraq with at least 750,000 demonstrators.

Both within the United Kingdom and amongobservers of British politics and society, many stillendorse the view that British culture is character-ized by pragmatism, trust, and deference to author-ity. This may be true, but the persistence and mobi-lizing potential of a wide range of social movementssuggest that quite powerful political subcurrentspersist in Britain, posing significant challenges forBritish government.


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 79

Cengage Learning


The issue of a gender gap in voting behaviorhas long been a mainstay of British electoralstudies. From 1945 to 1992, women were

more likely than men to vote Conservative. Inaddition, since 1964 a gender-generation gaphas become well established and was very clearin the 1992 election. Among younger voters(under thirty years old), women preferred Labour,while men voted strongly for the Conservatives,producing a fourteen-point gender gap favoringLabour; among older voters (over sixty-five yearsold), women were far more inclined to vote Con-servative than were their male counterparts, creat-ing a gender gap of eighteen points favoring theConservatives.

The modest all-generation gender gap thatfavored the Tories in 1992 (6 percent) wasclosed in 1997 as a greater percentage ofwomen shifted away from the Conservatives (11percent) than did men (8 percent). As a result,women and men recorded an identical 44 per-cent tally for Labour. The gender-generation gapcontinued, however, with younger women morepro-Labour than younger men and the pattern re-versing in the older generation. Moreover, one ofthe most striking features of the 1997 electionwas the generational dimension: the largestswing to Labour was among those in the agegroup eighteen to twenty-nine years (more than18 percent), and among first-time voters; therewas no swing to Labour among those over agesixty-five.*

After the 2001 election, analysis pointed to ageneration gap in turnout. BBC exit polls revealedthat young voters had the lowest turnout, mostoften saying the election “didn’t matter.” The homesecretary worried aloud that youth had “switchedoff politics.” Polling data tend to confirm theimpression that there is a gender gap in the con-nection between citizens and mainstream politics,and that younger Britons are more divorced frompolitics than older ones. Three-quarters of youngpeople aged fifteen to twenty-four have never mettheir local councilor, compared with just overhalf of those aged fifty-five or older. Also, older

citizens are more than twice as likely to say thatthey know the name of their local councilor (46percent compared with 20 percent of fifteen- totwenty-four-year-olds).†

That said, the unprecedented participationof British youth in the massive antiwar protests inFebruary and March 2003 tells a differentstory—one of young people with strong politicalviews and an unexpected taste for political en-gagement. A BBC poll of schoolchildren in Febru-ary 2003 reported that 80 percent opposed thewar, while Britain as a whole was more evenlydivided. As part of a coordinated day of antiwarprotests, thousands of teenagers across the coun-try walked out of school and congregated in citycenters, while some five hundred protested at theHouses of Parliament. “What’s shocking isn’ttheir opposition but the fact they’re doing some-thing about it,” noted one electronic journalist ona youth-oriented website. “Considering that most18–25 year olds couldn’t even be bothered toput a cross in a box at the last general electionthis is a pretty big thing.”‡ It was a big enoughthing that New Labour strategists were left toponder the consequences, knowing that the mo-bilization of support among young people,which was already a cause for concern, waslikely to become more difficult in the aftermath ofthe war in Iraq.

What are the gender and generational story-lines in Blair’s historic third electoral victory inMay 2005? The most talked about theme regard-ing youth was their continued disaffection fromelectoral politics. According MORI, Britain’s highlyregarded political polling organization, only 37percent of the possible 18–24-year-old votersturned out to vote in 2005 (down from 39 percentin 2001). But this is only one side of the genera-tional story. The other side is that the “grey vote”rose. Voters 55 and older made up 35 percent ofthe electorate in 2005 (up 2 percent from 2001)and since 75 percent voted, they represented 42percent of those casting ballots. As for women—they delivered a very big chunk of Blair’s majority.While men split evenly between Conservatives

Current Challenges: Gender and Generation Gaps and Trends

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 80

Cengage Learning

SECTION 5 British Politics in Transition 81

and Labour an identical 34 percent (and 23 per-cent for the Lib Dems), women swung decisively toLabour, giving them a 10 percent advantage overthe Conservatives (32 percent to 22 percent).§

*Pippa Norris, Electoral Change in Britain Since 1945(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 133–135; Pippa Norris,“A Gender-Generation Gap?” in Pippa Norris and Geof-frey Norris, eds., Critical Elections: British Parties andVoters in Long-Term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999).

†Market & Opinion Research International, “ManyCouncillors ‘Divorced’ from the Electorate,” April 30,2002, www.mori.com/polls/2002/greenissues.shtml.

‡David Floyd, “British Youth Oppose ‘Bomber Blair,’”WireTap, March 28, 2003; www.wiretapmag.org/story.html?StoryID=15505.

§Robert Worcester, “Women’s Support Give Blair theEdge,” Guardian Unlimited, May 8, 2005, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election/story/0,15803,1479238,00.html#article_continue.

Current Challenges: Gender and Generation Gaps and Trends (cont.)

In the fall of 1994, cease-fire declarations made by theIrish Republican Army (IRA) and the Protestant para-military organizations renewed hope for a peace settle-ment in Northern Ireland. Then, in a dramatic newdevelopment in early spring 1995, British prime minis-ter John Major and Irish prime minister John Brutonjointly issued a framework agreement, inspiring mount-ing optimism about a political settlement. AlthoughMajor did what he could to secure public and parlia-mentary support, he lacked the necessary politicalcapital to bring the historic initiative to fruition.

With his 1997 landslide victory, Tony Blair hadpolitical capital to spend, and he chose to invest achunk of it on peace in Northern Ireland. Blairarranged to meet Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein,the party in Northern Ireland with close ties to theIRA—and shook his hand. He was the first prime min-ister to meet with a head of Sinn Fein since 1921. Blairlater spoke of the “hand of history” on his shoulder.

Under deadline pressure imposed by Blair and thenew Irish prime minister, Bertie Ahern, and thirty-threehours of around-the-clock talks, an agreement wasreached on Good Friday 1998. It specified elections fora Northern Ireland assembly, in which Protestants andCatholics would share power, and the creation of aNorth-South Council to facilitate “all-Ireland” cooper-ation on matters such as economic development,

agriculture, transportation, and the environment. Bothparts of Ireland voted yes in May 1998 in a referendumto approve the peace agreement. It appeared that a newera was dawning in Northern Ireland.

Handshake or not, devastating bombs haveexploded from time to time in Northern Ireland sincethe agreement, and violent turf battles within andbetween each camp have created fear and repeatedcrises in the peace process. Insisting that Sinn Feincabinet ministers be barred from discussion until theIRA disarmed, hardliners in the Protestant camp cre-ated a rash of challenges to David Trimble, the UlsterUnionist leader who remained committed to the suc-cess of the process. Sinn Fein, in turn, accused Trim-ble of sabotage and warned that the IRA would not beable to control its own dissidents if the power-sharingarrangements were unilaterally dismantled.

In October 2001, the IRA began disarming underthe sponsorship of third-party diplomats, and yetviolence rose despite cease-fires by paramilitarygroups. In October 2002, home rule government wassuspended, and British direct rule was reimposed.Since then, on numerous occasions, Tony Blair andhis Irish Republic counterpart, Bertie Ahern, havepledged to redouble efforts to get Northern Ireland’sfaltering peace process back on track, but progress hasnot been easy.

Section f British Politics in Transition

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 81

Cengage Learning

In January 2005, hope for a settlement was dashedby the blockbuster announcement that linked the IRAto a $40 million bank robbery. In February, the brutalmurder of Robert McCartney, a Sinn Fein supporter,by IRA members in a Belfast bar—who had accusedhim of looking inappropriately at one of their femalecompanions—may have permanently shattered sup-port for the IRA. McCartney’s murder, the wall of si-lence the IRA imposed on some 70 witnesses, and theIRA’s offer to kill the men responsible, have had sig-nificant political repercussions. Despite the May 2005election, which ousted Unionist moderate DavidTrimble and strengthened the hands of the more radi-cal parties (Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party),the increasingly vocal popular demands for an end tosectarian violence may finally break the deadlock. Bymid-2005, the IRA had exhausted its leverage, GerryAdams seemed ready to press for their dissolution,and—despite denials—insiders spoke of a pendingsettlement or even a secret deal that is all but agreedupon.

The decades-long crisis in Northern Ireland con-firms the important proposition that unresolved ten-sions in state formation shape political agendas forgenerations. Northern Ireland, however, is but one ofa host of challenges facing Britain and New Labour asTony Blair begins his third term under relentless pres-sure to yield power to Gordon Brown.

Political Challenges and Changing AgendasAs our democratic idea theme suggests, no democ-racy, however secure it may be, is a finished project.Even in Britain, with its centuries-old constitutionalsettlement and secure institutional framework, issuesabout democratic governance and citizens’ participa-tion remain unresolved.

Constitutional Reform

Questions about the role of the monarchy and theHouse of Lords have long been simmering onBritain’s political agenda. “Why is the House ofCommons not sovereign?” wondered one observersomewhat caustically. “Why does it have to sharesovereignty with other, unelected institutions?”46 Inaddition, the balance of power among constitutionally

critical institutions raises important questions about ademocratic deficit at the heart of the Westminstermodel. Britain’s executive, whose strength in relationto that of the legislature may be greater than in anyother Western democracy, easily overpowers Parlia-ment. Add to these concerns the prime minister’s ten-dency to bypass the cabinet on crucial decisions andthe bias in the electoral system that privileges the twodominant parties, and it seems appropriate to raisequestions about the accountability of the British gov-ernment to its citizens.

In fact, in the heady days after Blair’s 1997 elec-tion victory, amidst talk of an expanding array of con-stitutional reforms, it was commonplace to suggestthat constitutional reform might become NewLabour’s most enduring legacy. But the reformagenda has been sidetracked or subjected to powerfulpolitical crosscurrents—or administrative complexi-ties—that have slowed or stalled agreement on keyelements. For example, the Freedom of InformationAct was passed in 2002, but a second stage of imple-mentation began only in January 2005. It was alsoweakened by the extensive range of information itpermitted ministers to withhold and by its limited pro-vision for independent review of such ministerialdecisions.47 The Blair government has begun toimplement far-reaching reforms of Parliament, includ-ing the removal of the right of hereditary peers tospeak and vote in the House of Lords, and theredesign of the historic upper chamber, but as dis-cussed in Section 4, the form of the new upper cham-ber has yet to take shape. In addition, the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights has been incorporatedinto UK law, and, more controversially, plans havebeen announced for the creation of a “supreme court,”but strenuous opposition in both chambers hasclouded the prospects for passage. New systems ofproportional representation have been introduced forWelsh and Scottish elections, as well as for the Euro-pean Parliament. But the potential use of proportionalrepresentation in UK general elections will come onlyfrom a Labour government in dire straights: if it isunable to control a majority in the next election with-out the support of the Lib Dems and the Lib Dems areable to wrest a commitment to proportional represen-tation from Labour as a condition for backing Labour


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 82

Cengage Learning

or forming a Labour–Lib Dem government. Such ispolitical life in a country without an entrenchedconstitution!

Finally, the power-sharing initiatives in NorthernIreland (if the political deadlocks are ever broken) and arrangements among Westminster, the WelshAssembly, and, most importantly, the Scottish Parlia-ment represent basic modifications of UK constitu-tional principles. Devolution implies both an elementof federalism and some compromise in the historicparliamentary sovereignty at the heart of the Westmin-ster model. But the potentially unsettling conse-quences feared by some have not come to pass.

New Labour’s constitutional reform agenda repre-sents a breathtaking illustration of a core premise ofour democratic idea theme: that even long-standingdemocracies face pressures to narrow the gap betweengovernment and citizens. At the same time, the rela-tively limited results and slowed pace of reforms arean important reminder that democratic changes arenot easy to implement.

Identities in Flux

Although the relatively small scale of the ethnicminority community limits the political impact of themost divisive issues concerning collective identities,it is probably in this area that rigidities in the Britishpolitical system challenge tenets of democracy andtolerance most severely. Given Britain’s single-member, simple-plurality electoral system and noproportional representation, minority representationin Parliament is very low, and there are deep-seatedsocial attitudes that no government can easilytransform.

The issues of immigration, refugees, and asylumstill inspire a fear of multiculturalism among whiteBritons and conjure up very negative and probablyprejudiced reactions. In fall 2000, the report of theCommission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britainraised profound questions about tolerance, justice,and inclusion in contemporary UK society. In a pow-erful and controversial analysis, the report concludedthat “the word ‘British’ will never do on its own. . . .Britishness as much as Englishness, has systematic,largely unspoken, racial connotations.”48

Against the backdrop of intensified finger point-ing directed at the Muslim community, the post–September 11 period has witnessed a hardening ofgovernment policy on asylum, refuge, and immigra-tion. This controversial process culminated in theformal announcement in November 2003 that theAsylum Bill would force a heart-wrenching choice onfailed asylum seekers: they must either “voluntarily”accept a paid-for return flight to the country fromwhich they fled or see their children taken into gov-ernment care.49 By spring 2004, race, immigration,and asylum issues were even stealing headlines fromthe war in Iraq. Charges that there had been wide-spread fraud in the treatment of East European appli-cations for immigration as well as efforts by the min-ister in charge of immigration and asylum, BeverlyHughes, to mislead Parliament led to her resignation.Official government data revealed record levels ofhate crimes in England and Wales. After an episode inwhich British-born Muslims set fire to the Union Jackin London, debate raged about the validity of “sepa-rateness” among ethnic communities, and the chair-man of the Commission for Racial Equality, TrevorPhillips, called for a return to “core British values”and the abandonment of the government’s commit-ment to building a multicultural society. As Britainexperienced increased ethnic tension, polls indicatedwidespread unease with ethnic diversity. By the startof the election campaign in April 2005, nearly one-quarter (23 percent) of the British people rankedimmigration and asylum as the single most importantissue facing the nation—nearly double the percentagewho thought health care (13 percent) was the biggestissue. A strong majority thought that laws on immi-gration should be tougher (nine out of ten supportersof the Conservatives, but also six out of ten Laboursupporters).50

How about other dimensions of collective identity?The situation is fluid. In political terms, the gender gaphas tilted quite strongly toward Labour, as it hasresponded to concerns about women’s employment,the disparate impact of social policy, the problems ofbalancing family and work responsibilities, and parlia-mentary representation. The electoral force of classidentity has declined almost to the vanishing point inBritain. By Labour’s second term, however, the


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 83

Cengage Learning

country faced an upsurge in industrial action. Publicsector workers such as local government staff and fire-fighters have led the unrest. A new generation of mili-tant leaders in two railway unions, the postal workers’union, and the government and health workers’ unionhas created new challenges for the government. Anydownturn in the economy will likely intensify unionmilitancy during Labour’s third term.

The Challenges of Europe and the World

Tony Blair came to office determined to rescueEurope for Britain—to redress the problems causedby Thatcher’s anti-Europe stance and to repositionthe United Kingdom both as a major player in Europeand as a powerful interlocutor (respected in bothcamps) to build bridges, when necessary, between theUnited States and EU Europe. To advance thisagenda, Blair enthusiastically supported initiativesfor a common foreign and security policy and helpedbring Europe into the war in Kosovo in accordancewith Blair’s doctrine of international community,which insisted on military interventions when neces-sary to prevent or contain humanitarian catastrophes,such as ethnic cleansing. As one lesson of Kosovo,Europe tried to come to terms with its reliance onAmerica’s military muscle and unrivaled wartimetechnological capacities. Hence, Blair worked withFrance and Germany to develop a more robust Euro-pean military capability.

Yet the ambivalence of Britain toward Europeremains very strong. Britain remains on the outsidelooking in when it comes to the euro (it is one of butthree of the fifteen members of the EU before enlarge-ment on May 1, 2004, to remain outside the eurozone). On another European front, in April 2004,under merciless sniping from the Conservatives, andworried that his own declining political fortunes madeparliamentary passage of a bill on the EU Constitutionincreasingly contentious, Blair suddenly—and withvirtually no consultation—announced that the EUConstitution would also be put to a referendum.

As the French and Dutch votes approached, nearlyeveryone thought that Blair was hoping that anothercountry might reject the constitution before any refer-endum in the UK, to minimize the wrath of EUstalwarts that would otherwise be directed at Britain,where defeat of the Constitution—should it ever come

to a vote—was a foregone conclusion. (Assent byeach of the twenty-five member states was required.)

In the end, however, even the French and Dutch novotes on the Constitution in May–June 2005 did notmake life easier for Blair. Both German ChancellorGerhard Schröder and French President JacquesChirac pinned as much blame as possible on Blair, ifnot directly for the defeat of the Constitution, then forBritain’s insistence that agricultural subsidies and theUK’s longstanding budgetary rebate be considered intandem as part of a reform package to resolve theincreasingly acrimonious budget wrangling.

Especially against the backdrop of Britain’s breakwith Germany and France over the war in Iraq—andwith the limited time remaining for him as prime min-ister—Blair is unlikely to realize his expectations thatBritain could, under his leadership, assume a leadingrole in Europe, heal old wounds, and bridge the gapbetween Europe and the United States. That said, dur-ing the first year of his final premiership, Blair willhave an unusual opportunity for EU and global lead-ership, as the UK assumes the rotating presidency ofboth the EU and the G8.

Together with Brown, Blair has an extremelyambitious agenda for far-reaching global commit-ments: to eliminate poverty and disease in Africa, toincrease financial aid and narrow the developmentgap, and to make significant progress on climatechange. They are also issues—as are his commitmentto make progress toward peace in the Middle East andinsistence on diplomacy, not force, in the showdownwith Iran over nuclear weapons—that burnish his pro-gressive credentials, reconnect Britain with key Euro-pean allies, and are likely to place the United Statesand the UK in opposing camps. These are all legacyissues for Blair, with solid mainstream support inBritain, that present him with the opportunity—per-haps the last opportunity—to leave his mark on Euro-pean and global affairs.

British Politics, Terrorism, and Britain’sRelationship with the United States

In the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks on theUnited States, Blair’s decisive support for PresidentBush struck a resonant cord in both countries and(despite some grumbling) boosted Britain’s influencein Europe. But by the spring and summer of 2002,


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 84

Cengage Learning

Blair’s stalwart alliance with Bush was looking moreand more like a liability.

As Britons’ instinctive post–September 11 supportfor America faded, many wondered whether TonyBlair had boxed himself into a corner by aligning him-self too closely with George W. Bush—without know-ing where the president’s foreign policy initiativesmight lead in the Middle East and Asia—and in a hostof policy areas from trade policy to the conduct of thecontinuing campaign in Afghanistan, to global warm-ing, to the International Criminal Court. Yet, through-out the diplomatic disputes in the run-up to war inearly 2003, Blair persevered in his staunch support forBush’s decision to go to war––this despite Blair’sstrong preference for explicit Security Council autho-rization for the use of force and his strong preferencethat significant progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute be made before any military inter-vention to topple the Saddam Hussein regime.

Nonetheless, despite his inability to achieve eitherof these preferences, Blair refused all advice (includ-ing advice from members of his cabinet as well as hischief of defense staff) to make support of the war con-ditional on achievement of these ends. Blair was con-vinced that the threats of weapons of mass destruction

(WMDs), Al Qaeda terrorism, and rogue states justi-fied the invasion of Iraq and that Britain should andmust support the United States in its leadership of aglobal war against terrorism. Despite initial denialsby the prime minister, most Britons instinctivelydrew a connection between the war in Iraq and thebombs that exploded in London in July 2005. Britonswho displayed enormous resolve in the face of terror-ism were shaken by a set of troubling revelations—first, that the July 7th bombers were all British and,second, after a botched bombing attempt two weekslater, that London police had shot and killed an inno-cent man on a subway. Thus, the repercussions ofIraq continued.

As we know from the 2005 election, Blair’sunconditional commitment to support America’s warin Iraq has cost Blair and New Labour dearly in polit-ical terms, especially as the initial justifications forwar lost credibility. In the years ahead, the experienceof the war in Iraq may contribute to a constructivereconsideration of the “special relationship” betweenthe United States and the United Kingdom. It will cer-tainly loom large in any assessment of Blair’s contri-bution to British politics and the legacy of NewLabour.


Throughout the 2005 elec-tion campaign, it appearedas if the prime minister wasrunning on the chancellor’scoattails, relying on Brown’scredibility, the strong econ-omy, and improvements inhealth care and educationto bring reluctant Labourand Lib Dem voters into thefold. With the election over,one question was on every-one’s lips: “When do we getBrown?” Source: Steve Bell,Guardian Unlimited. http://www. guardian.co.uk/car-toons/archive/stevebell/0,7371,33776400.html

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 85

Cengage Learning

British Politics in Comparative PerspectiveUntil the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997, itwas an axiom of comparative politics that economicsuccess required a style of economic governance thatBritain lacks. Many argued that innovation and compet-itiveness in the new global economy required the strate-gic coordination of the economy by an interventioniststate. Interestingly, however, the United Kingdomescaped the recession that plagued the rest of Europe formuch of the 1990s. Britain is outperforming most majorworld economies and exhibits a good overall perfor-mance with low unemployment and inflation and withsteady growth. Britain is not an economic paradise, butthere is cause for continued optimism, notwithstandingpersistent poverty, weak investment, problems with pro-ductivity, and trade imbalances. In many countriesthroughout the world, politicians are looking for aneconomic model that can sustain economic competi-tiveness while improving the plight of the sociallyexcluded. Tony Blair’s third way—a political orienta-tion that hopes to transcend left and right in favor ofpractical and effective policies—will be carefullywatched. If the third way can be sustained, and makethe expected transition from Blair to Brown, it will bewidely emulated.

Beyond the impressive size of Blair’s victory,nothing about the May 1997 election was clearerthan the unprecedented volatility of the electorate. Inprevious elections, commitment to party (partisanidentification) and interests linked to occupation(class location) had largely determined the results. In1997, attachments to party and class had far lessinfluence.

Beginning with the historically low turnout, the2001 election underscored, as one journalist put it, that“instinctive party support” based on class and partisantraditions has been replaced by “pick and choose” poli-tics. The tendency of voters to behave as electoral shop-pers lends a perpetual air of uncertainty to elections. Itseems that Blair’s success in transforming Labour intoNew Labour blunted the social basis of party identifica-tion. At the same time, the modernization agenda ofNew Labour resolutely emphasized fiscal responsibilityover distributive politics. The 2005 election continued

this trend. It saw a slight upswing in participation, witha turnout of 61.5 percent (up 2.1 percent from 2001)—but substantially below the postwar average of just over76 percent.

Without the traditional constraints of partisan andclass identities, citizens (whether as voters or aspolitical activists) can shift allegiances with lightningspeed. “What have you done for me lately?” becomesthe litmus test for leaders and politicians. As the dic-tates of a post-9/11 war against terror, European inte-gration, and globalization blur the distinctionbetween governing the economy and the world ofstates, the scope of the “What have you done for melately?” test may be expanding, and the ways to failin the eyes of the electorate may be growing. It isclear that lately Blair has lost the trust of manyBritons over his rationale for going to war in Iraq.Blair has also, as David Sanders argues, become avictim of his own (or was it Gordon Brown’s?) suc-cess. The better the economy has performed, the lessvoters worried about the economy, and the lesssalient it became in the voters’ decisions about whichparty to support.51

Clearly these are tough times for national govern-ments to maintain popular support and achieve desir-able goals. They are sufficiently demanding that onthe day after Blair’s third victory in a row—the firsttime this has ever been achieved by a Labour primeminister—he was routinely referred to as “humbled”or “chastised” and felt called upon to acknowledgethat he’d gotten the message. Victory brought imme-diate calls for his resignation in favor of Brown—anda relentless guessing game about when he woulddepart and under what circumstances. In fact, Laboursupporters, anticipating a decline in Britain’s eco-nomic performance—due to credit bubbles, deficits,underinvestment, and the vulnerabilities of the globaleconomy—were heard to mutter that this would havebeen a good election to lose! The world will bewatching to see whether Blair stumbles and falls dur-ing his last years in office. Or can he depart on histerms, after a settlement in Northern Ireland, perhaps,or success in his global development initiatives? Ifnot, many will conclude that these tough times justgot tougher.


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 86

Cengage Learning

Key Terms

Suggested Websites 87

free tradehegemonic powerlaissez-fairewelfare statespecial relationshipWestminster modelneoliberalismmacroeconomic policyKeynesianismmonetarismsocial security

gender gapforeign direct investmentparliamentary sover-

eigntyparliamentary democracyunitary statefusion of powerscabinet governmentconstitutional monarchyquangos

Kavenagh, Dennis, and Seldon, Anthony. The Powers Behindthe Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten.London: Harper-Collins, 1999.

King, Anthony, ed. Britain at the Polls, 2001. New York andLondon: Chatham House, 2002.

Krieger, Joel. Globalization and State Power. New York:Pearson Longman, 2005.

Krieger, Joel. British Politics in the Global Age. Can SocialDemocracy Survive? New York: Oxford University Press,1999.

Landes, David S. The Unbound Prometheus: TechnologicalChange and Industrial Development in Western Europefrom 1750 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1969.

Lewis, Philip. Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identityamong British Muslims. London and New York: I. B.Taurus, 2002.

Marsh, David, et al. Postwar British Politics in Perspective.Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

Marshall, Geoffrey. Ministerial Responsibility. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989.

Middlemas, Keith. Politics in Industrial Society: The Experi-ence of the British System Since 1911. London: AndréDeutsch, 1979.

Modood, Tariq. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, andMuslims in Britain. Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 2005.

Norris, Pippa. Electoral Change in Britain Since 1945. Oxford:Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

Parekh, Bhiku, et al., The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: TheParekh Report. London: Profile Books, 2000.

Riddell, Peter. The Thatcher Decade. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1989.

Särlvik, Bo, and Crewe, Ivor. Decade of Dealignment: TheConservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the1970s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Shaw, Eric. The Labour Party Since 1945. Oxford: BlackwellPublishers, 1996.

Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class.New York: Vintage, 1966.

Wright, Tony, ed. The British Political Process. London:Routledge, 2000.

Suggested WebsitesDirectgov – Portal to public service information from the

UK governmentwww.direct.gov.ukNational Statistics Online—Home of official UK statistics www.statistics.gov.uk

Suggested ReadingsBeer, Samuel H. Britain Against Itself: The Political Contradic-

tions of Collectivism. New York: Norton, 1982.

Coates, David. Prolonged Labour. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.

Coates, David, and Krieger, Joel. Blair’s War. Cambridge, UK,and Malden Mass.,: Polity Press, 2004.

Coates, David, and Lawler, Peter, eds. New Labour in Power.Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.

Cook, Robin. The Point of Departure. London: Simon &Schuster, 2003.

Cronin, James E. New Labour’s Pasts. Harrow, UK:Pearson/Longman, 2004.

Dunleavy, Patrick, et al. Developments in British Politics 7.New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003.

Gamble, Andrew. Between Europe and America: The Future ofBritish Politics. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003.

George, Bruce. The British Labour Party and Defense. NewYork: Praeger, 1991.

Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way: The Renewal of SocialDemocracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.

Gilroy, Paul. “There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack”: TheCultural Politics of Race and Nation. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1991.

Hall, Stuart, and Jacques, Martin, eds. The Politics of Thatch-erism. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983.

Hobsbawm, E. J. Industry and Empire. Harmondsworth, UK:Penguin/Pelican, 1983.

Howell, Chris. Trade Unions and the State: The Constructionof Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Kampfner, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003.

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 87

Cengage Learning

The UK Parliamentwww.parliament.ukThe cabinet officewww.cabinet-office.gov.ukThe Scottish Parliamentwww.scottish.parliament.ukBritish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)www.bbc.co.ukMarket & Opinion Research International (MORI), Britain’s

leading political polling organizationwww.mori.com

Endnotes1Jeremy Black, The Politics of Britain, 1688–1800 (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 6.2E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (Harmmondsworth,UK: Penguin/Pelican, 1983), pp. 29–31.3See Duncan Fraser, “The Postwar Consensus: A Debate NotLong Enough?” Parliamentary Affairs 53, no. 2 (April 2000):347–362.4David Coates, Prolonged Labour (London: Palgrave, 2005),p. 172.5Will Hutton, The State We’re In (London: Jonathan Cape,1995).6This discussion of the tenets of the third way and the evaluationof its economic policy draws heavily on collaborative work withDavid Coates. See Joel Krieger and David Coates, “New Labour’sModel for UK Competitiveness: Adrift in the Global Economy?”7Andrew Gamble, “The British Economic Miracle: NewLabour and the Economy,” paper presented at the Conferenceon Cool Britannia: Britain After Eight Years of Labour Govern-ment, Montreal, Cerium, May 4–6, 2005.8Ivor Crewe, “Labor Force Changes, Working Class Decline,and the Labour Vote: Social and Electoral Trends in PostwarBritain,” in Frances Fox Piven, ed., Labor Parties in Postindus-trial Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),p. 34. See also David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, “Implement-ing Thatcherism: Policy Change in the 1980s,” ParliamentaryAffairs 45, no. 1 (January 1992): 34–37.9Steven Fielding, “A New Politics?” in Patrick Dunleavy et al.,eds., Developments in British Politics 6 (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 2000), p. 2.10National Statistics Online, “Low Income: Fewer Children inPoverty in Recent Years,” March 31, 2004; www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget_print.asp?ID=333. See also Adrian Sinfield,“UK Shows the Way on Child Poverty,” New Zealand Herald,May 26, 2004; www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3568524&thesection=news&thesubsection=dialogue. 11National Statistics Online, “Population Size: 7.9% from aMinority Ethnic Group,” February 13, 2003; www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=273.

12Office of National Statistics Social Survey, Living in Britain:Results from the 1995 General Household Survey (London: TheStationery Office, 1997).13Gail Lewis, “Black Women’s Employment and the BritishEconomy,” in Winston James and Clive Harris, eds., InsideBabylon: The Caribbean Diaspora in Britain (London: Verso,1993), pp. 73–96.14National Statistics Online, “Low Income for 60% of Pakista-nis/Bangladeshis,” December 12, 2002; www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=269&Pos=1&ColRank=2&Rank=384.15“All White at the Top,” Guardian, May 25, 2004; http://education.guardian.co.uk/egweekly/story/0,5500,1223478,00.html. 16Ibid.17National Statistics Online, “Gender Pay Gap: Narrows slightlyto record low,”; www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=167. 18Jane Lewis, “The Pursuit of Welfare Ends and Market Meansand the Case of Work/Family Reconciliation Policies,” p. 10,paper presented at the Conference on Cool Britannia: BritainAfter Eight Years of Labour Government, Montreal, Cerium,May 4–6, 2005.19Lewis, ibid.20See Joel Krieger, Globalization and State Power (New York:Pearson Longman, 2005), p. 67.21See Philip Norton, The British Polity, 3rd ed. (New York:Longman, 1994), p. 59, for a useful discussion of the sources ofthe British constitution.22Stephen Haseler, “Britain’s Ancien Régime,” ParliamentaryAffairs 40, no. 4 (October 1990): 415.23See Philip Norton, “Parliament in Transition,” in RobertPyper and Lynton Robins, eds., United Kingdom Governance(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 82–106.24S. E. Finer, Five Constitutions (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:Humanities Press, 1979), p. 52.25Bernard Crick, “Blair Should Beware the Boiling Up of LittleIrritations,” September 29, 2003; www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1051720,00.html. 26Iain Byrne and Stuart Weir, “Democratic Audit: ExecutiveDemocracy in War and Peace,” Parliamentary Affairs 57, no. 2(April 2004): 455. 27See Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London: The Free Press, 2005),p. 294.28Martin J. Smith, “The Core Executive and the Modernizationof Central Government,” in Patrick Dunleavy et al., eds., Devel-opments in British Politics 7 (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan,2003), p. 60.29See Kevin Theakston, “Ministers and Civil Servants,” inPyper and Robins, eds., United Kingdom Governance,pp. 39–60.30Nicholas Timmins, “Health Ministers Back Purge of Quan-gos,” Financial Times, May 21, 2004.


329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 88

Cengage Learning

31Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,”speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel,Chicago, April 22, 1999. For a detailed discussion of the speechand its implications for the war in Iraq, see David Coates andJoel Krieger, Blair’s War (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004),chap. 6.32See Bhiku Parekh et al., The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain:The Parekh Report (London: Profile Books, 2000), pp. 90–102.33See Andrew Gamble, “Remaking the Constitution,” in PatrickDunleavy et al., eds., Developments in British Politics 7 (NewYork: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), pp. 34–36. 34Sue Prince, “The Law and Politics: Upsetting the JudicialApple-Cart,” Parliamentary Affairs 57, no. 2 (2004): 288. 35Andrew Gray and Bill Jenkins, “Government and Administra-tion: Too Much Checking, Not Enough Doing?” ParliamentaryAffairs 57, no. 2 (2004): 274.36Ibid., p. 48.37Samuel H. Beer, The British Political System (New York:Random House, 1973), p. 157.38Ivor Crewe, “Great Britain,” in I. Crewe and D. Denver, eds.,Electoral Change in Western Democracies (London: CroomHelm, 1985), p. 107.39John Bartle, “Why Labour Won—Again,” in Anthony King etal., eds., Britain at the Polls, 2001 (New York: Chatham House,2002), p. 171.40See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Almond and Verba,eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980);and Samuel H. Beer, Britain Against Itself: The PoliticalContradictions of Collectivism (New York: Norton, 1982),pp. 110–114.

41Ivor Crewe, “The Thatcher Legacy,” in King et al., eds.,Britain at the Polls 1992, p. 18. 42Bhiku Parekh et al., The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: TheParekh Report (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. 10.43For an excellent treatment of the complex experiences ofBritish Muslims, see Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain (London andNew York: I. B. Tauris, 2002).44David Sanders, “The Political Economy of Labour Support,1997–2005,” paper presented at the Conference on Cool Britan-nia: Britain After Eight Years of Labour Government, Montreal,Cerium, May 4–6, 2005.45See: Helen Margetts, “Political Participation and Protest,” inPatrick Dunleavy et al., eds., Developments in British Politics 6(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 185–202. 46Stephen Haseler, “Britain’s Ancien Régime,” ParliamentaryAffairs 40, no. 4 (October 1990): 418.47Iain Byrne and Stuart Weir, “Democratic Audit: ExecutiveDemocracy in War and Peace,” Parliamentary Affairs 57, no. 2(2004): 453–468.48Bhiku Parekh et al., The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: TheParekh Report (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. 38.49See Liza Schuster and John Solomos (and respondents),“Debate: Race, Immigration and Asylum,” Ethnicities 4, no. 2(June 2004): 267–300.50MORI, “State of the Nation,” April 10, 2005; http://www.mori.com/pubinfo/rmw/state-of-the-nation.shtml.51Sanders, “The Political Economy of Labour Support,1997–2005” paper presented at the Conference on CoolBritannia: Britain After Eight Years of Labour Government,Montreal, Cerium, May 4–6, 2005.

Endnotes 89

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 89

Cengage Learning

329821_Ch02 pp4 11/8/05 12:41 PM Page 90

Cengage Learning

C H A P T E R 3

France

Mark Kesselman

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 91

Cengage Learning

French Republic

Land and PeopleCapital Paris

Total area (square miles) 211,208 (Slightly less thantwice the size of Colorado)

Population 59.8 million

Annual population 1975–2000 0.5growth rate (%) 2000–2015 (projected) 0.3

Urban population (%) 75.4

Ethnic composition* (%) French-born 91Other European 3North African 4

(mostly Algerian)Other 2

*French law prohibits gathering statistics in public opinionpolls and census surveys on ethnic or racial identity, so thefigures provided are rough estimates.

Major language French

Religious affiliation (%) Roman Catholic 83–88Protestant 2Jewish 1Muslim 5–10Unaffiliated 4

EconomyDomestic currency Euro

US$1: .8039 EU

Total GNI (US$) 1.521 trillion

GNI per capita (US$) 24,730—2003

Total GNI, 1.656 trillionpurchasing powerparity (US$)

GNI per capita, purchasing 24,640power parity (US$)

GDP annual growth 1983–1993 2.5rate (%) 1993–2003 2.3

2002 1.22003 0.12004 2.1

GDP per capita average 1983–1993 2.0annual growth rate (%) 1993–2003 1.9

Inequality in income or Share of poorest 10% 2.8consumption (1995) Share of poorest 20% 7.2(% of population) Share of poorest 10% 3

Share of richest 20% 40.2Share of richest 10% 25.1

Gini Index (1995) 32.7

Structure of production Agriculture 2.7(% of GDP) Industry 24.5

Services 72.8

Labor force distribution Agriculture 3(% of total) Industry 27

Services 71

Exports as % of GDP 25.8

Imports as % of GDP 24.6

SocietyLife expectancy at birth 79.3

Infant mortality 4per 1,000 live births

Adult illiteracy 5%*(% of population 15+)

*The OECD estimates that France has a functional illiteracyrate of about 17 percent.

Access to Telephone lines 573information and Mobile phones 605communications (per Radios 9501,000 population) Televisions 632

Personal computers 337

Women in Government and the EconomyWomen in the national legislature

Lower house or single house (%) 12.7Upper house (%) 16.9

Women at ministerial level (%) 19

Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) (%) 49.1

Female labor force (% of total) 45

Estimated Earned Income Female 19,923(PPP US$) Male 33,950

Composite Measures and RankingsHuman Development Index (HDI)

ranking (value) out of 177 countries 16 (.932)

Gender-related development index (GDI) ranking (value) out of 144 countries 15 (.929)

Gender empowerment measure (GEM) ranking (value) out of 78 countries Not available

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking (value) out of 146 countries 22 (7.1)

Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) ranking (value) out of 146 countries 36 (55.2)

Freedom in World Rating (1.0)

92

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 92

Cengage Learning

coalition in National Assembly, and responsible to NationalAssembly.

Legislature Bicameral. Senate (upper house) has power todelay legislation passed by lower house. National Assembly(lower house) can pass legislation and force government toresign by passing a censure motion.

Judiciary A nine-member independent Constitutional Councilnamed for nonrenewable nine-year terms; president of repub-lic names three members, president of each house of parlia-ment names three. They exercise right of judicial review.

Party System Multiparty. Principal parties: Socialist Party(PS); Union for a Popular Movement (UMP); minor parties:Union for French Democracy (UDF); National Front (FN);Communist Party (PCF); and Green Party.

Politics in ActionThroughout the history of the European Union (EU),the organization of twenty-five European countriesthat seeks to promote economic and political integra-tion, the French have been the guiding force. Francehas taken the lead in setting European agendas and ini-tiating new measures to strengthen European union.French citizen Jean Monnet was informally known asthe father of Europe: he conceived the European Coaland Steel Community after World War II that replaceda century of French-German hostility with economiccooperation. In the 1980s, another Frenchman,Jacques Delors, as President of the European Com-mission, provided the energy and vision to breathenew life into the Union. For example, Delors initiatedthe plan for Economic and Monetary Union that led tothe creation of the euro, which has replaced thenational currency in 12 EU member states.

In 2005, the French exerted their unique influenceon the EU again, but in a very different way. In areferendum held on May 29, 2005, French votersrejected the constitution by the wide margin of 55–45percent. Their action precipitated the most intense cri-sis in the EU’s 50-year history.

The constitution was largely a codification ofexisting treaty obligations and regulations, but it alsoincluded some key proposals to streamline decision-making, enhance the influence of the European parlia-ment, guarantee the fundamental rights of citizens,and create both a president and a foreign minister whocould represent the EU and speak authoritatively withnational counterparts. It was also extraordinarily longand complicated. Few citizens, and probably not allthat many political leaders, bothered to read its 448articles. But the symbolic and substantive messagedelivered by the draft constitution was clear: it was in-tended to represent another giant step forward in theprocess of European integration.

After more than two years of tortuous negotiationsto draft the treaty, all that remained for it to becomebinding in 2005 was ratification by member states.(EU regulations required that all 25 member statesapprove the treaty.) The ratification process was wellunderway when French voters went to the polls.Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia had had alreadyapproved the treaty by parliamentary vote, and Spainhad approved it by referendum. No country hadrejected it.

93

Section B The Making of the Modern French State

Political OrganizationPolitical System Unitary republic. Semipresidential system;popularly elected president, popularly elected parliament,and prime minister and government appointed by presidentand responsible to National Assembly.

Regime History Bewildering variety of regimes since theFrench Revolution of 1789. Most recently, a dictatorialregime based on Vichy collaborated with the Nazis duringWorld War II; the Fourth Republic existed from 1946–1958;and the Fifth Republic, originating in 1958, has becomeuniversally accepted.

Administrative Structure Unitary, with 22 regions and 100departments.

Executive Dual executive: president (five-year term); PMappointed by president, generally leader of majority

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 93

Cengage Learning

The French constitution authorized two alternativeprocedures for approving treaties such as the draftEuropean constitution. French president JacquesChirac could have requested that the French parlia-ment approve the treaty. Given the fact that his partyhad a solid majority in parliament, approval wouldhave been a foregone conclusion. Instead, Chiracsponsored a nationwide referendum, in which allFrench citizens were asked to vote on whether to rat-ify the treaty. He probably chose this riskier route inorder to give France’s approval a more dramatic char-acter—as well as to enhance his own domestic andinternational standing.

The route of approval by referendum did notappear to pose a great challenge when PresidentChirac proposed it in 2004: polls at the time suggestedthat it would be approved by a wide margin, around 60percent. However, as months passed, oppositionswelled; by early 2005, it was clear that Chirac hadcommitted a major blunder by choosing the route of areferendum. Despite the fact that all three majorFrench governing parties—usually bitter opponents onmost issues—officially supported passage of the refer-endum, a solid majority of French citizens voted to re-ject the constitution. We analyze below the multiplefactors that produced the “non” vote. What can be saidhere is that the outcome of the referendum illustratesimportant features of contemporary (and past) Frenchpolitics, including a gulf between the established polit-ical class and ordinary French citizens, the volatility ofpolitics, and citizens’ determination to maintainFrance’s independence and distinctive way of life in anuncertain world. The controversy invites us to analyzethe character of French political culture and its relationto political institutions, policies, and economy.

Geographic SettingFrance is among the world’s favored countries, thanksto its temperate climate, large and fertile land area, andhigh standard of living. Its natural beauty and superbarchitecture, culture, and cuisine make France by farthe most popular tourist destination in the world. (Withthat said, the most visited tourist site in France is nei-ther Notre Dame Cathedral, the Louvre museum, northe Eiffel Tower—but Disneyland-Paris!)

The French have a reputation for living well (joiede vivre is the French term), ranging from a love ofart, culture, and romance to appreciation of fine foodand wine. On a more mundane level, however, thecountry is poorly endowed in natural energy and min-eral resources. For example, most petroleum must beimported, which is why the government has spon-sored an extensive nuclear power program.

With a population of about 60 million, France isone of the most populous countries in WesternEurope, but its large size—211,000 square miles—means that population density is low (about half thatof Britain, Germany, and Italy). An unusual feature ofFrench national boundaries is that five overseas terri-tories—the Mediterranean island of Corsica, theCaribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique,French Guyana in South America, and the island ofRéunion in the Indian Ocean—are considered anintegral part of the country. Their inhabitants areFrench citizens with the same civil rights and libertiesas mainland French citizens; for example, they electrepresentatives to the French legislature. (Their situa-tion parallels that of citizens of Alaska and Hawaii inthe United States political system.)

France’s gross national product (GNP) of over $1.5trillion and per capita income of approximately$25,000 make the country among the most affluent inthe world. Nine families in ten own a color television,two-thirds own a VCR, 97 percent have a telephone,62 percent a cell phone, and four-fifths an automobile.1

Over half of all families own their own home. Franceranked sixteenth among the 177 countries of the worldin the 2004 United Nations Development Pro-gramme’s Human Development Index, a widely re-spected measure of the overall quality of life.

France occupies a key position in Europe, border-ing the Mediterranean Sea in the south and sharingborders with Belgium, Switzerland, and Germanyon the north and east, Spain in the southwest, andItaly in the southeast. France is Britain’s closest con-tinental neighbor. The two are separated by a meretwenty-five-mile stretch of the English Channel, adistance that further narrowed in 1994 following theopening of the “Chunnel,” the railroad tunnel underthe English Channel linking the two countries.France has quite secure natural borders of mountains

94 CHAPTER 3 France

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 94

Cengage Learning

and seas everywhere but on the open plains of thenortheast on the borders with Belgium and Germany.The flat, unprotected terrain enabled German forcesto invade France three times in the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.

France has a modern economy, and most peoplework in the industrial and service sectors. However,agriculture continues to occupy a significant place in theeconomy and—because until recently most Frenchlived in villages and small towns—a strong place in thecountry’s collective memory. (A significantly higherproportion of the French still live in rural areas and

small towns than do the British and Germans.) No otherFrench city rivals Paris, the capital, in size and influ-ence; Lille, Lyons, and Marseilles are the only otherlarge cities in France.

Critical JuncturesA central feature of French history—from premod-ern times to present—has been the prominent roleplayed by the state. France was created by monarchswho laboriously united the diverse regions andprovinces of what is present-day France—actions

SECTION 1 The Making of the Modern French State 95

Rouen

Amiens

Reims

Strasbourg

Dijon

Lyons

Nice

MarseillesToulouse

Bordeaux

Paris

BRITAIN

BELGIUM

LUXEMBOURG

GERMANY

SWITZ.

ITALY

SPAIN

Nantes

Nancy

GrenobleVichy

Lille

Le HavreR

hône

Rhine

LoireSeine

Bay of Biscay

English Channel

MediterraneanSea

RHÔNE-ALPS

AQUITAINE

MID-PYRENEES

CENTER

LIMOUSIN

AUVERGNE

BURGUNDY

PAYS DE LALOIRE

ILE DEFRANCE

POITOU-CHARENTES

BRITTANY

LOWERNORMANDY

UPPERNORMANDY PICARDY

NORTH

LORRAINE

FRANCHE-COMTÉ

PROVENCE-ALPS-CÔTE D'AZUR

CORSICA

CH

AM

PAGNE-

ARD

EN

NE

LANGUEDO

C-

ROUSSIL

LON

ALS

AC

E

France

0 100 Miles

0 100 Kilometers

Chunnel

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 95

Cengage Learning

that provoked periodic resistance. The French haveoften displayed both great respect for the state’sachievements and intense resentment of its high-handed intrusion in local life. However, France’sparticipation in the globalized economy and the EU,along with economic reforms and decentralizationmeasures dating from the 1980s, have jostled theFrench state’s preeminence. Nowadays, Paris—thenational capital and seat of the ministries that governFrench life—must vie with regional and local gov-ernments throughout France, as well as with Brus-sels, headquarters of the EU; Frankfurt, where theEuropean Central Bank is located; and Strasbourg,home of the European Parliament.

Critical Junctures in Modern French PoliticalDevelopment

Until 1789 Ancien régime (Bourbon monarchy)

1789–1799 Revolutionary regimesConstituent Assembly,1789–1791 (Declaration of Rights of Man, Aug. 26, 1789)

Legislative, 1791Convention, 1792–1795:

Monarchy abolished andFirst Republic established,1792

Directory, 1795–1799

1800–1814 Consulate and First Empire (Napoleon Bonaparte)

1814–1830 Restoration

1830–1848 July Monarchy

1848–1851 Second Republic

1852–1870 Second Empire (Louis Napoleon)

1871 Paris Commune

1871–1940 Third Republic

1940–1944 Vichy regime

1946–1958 Fourth Republic

1958–Present Fifth Republic

Creating Modern France

For five centuries at the beginning of the modern era,the area that is now France was part of the RomanEmpire. The Romans called the area Gaul (the sourceof the term Gallic, sometimes used to describe theFrench). France took its current name from theFranks, a Germanic tribe that conquered the area inthe fifth century A.D., after the breakup of the RomanEmpire. The Frankish Merovingian dynasty ruledFrance for several centuries, during which time mostof the population became Christian. It was succeededby the Carolingian dynasty, whose most noteworthyruler, Charlemagne, led the Holy Roman Empire inthe ninth century and dominated much of WesternEurope.

Following Charlemagne’s death in 814, the empiredisintegrated. Norsemen from Scandinavia eventuallyestablished a duchy in Normandy, in northwest France;their ruler, William the Conqueror, led a force thatinvaded England and defeated English troops at theBattle of Hastings in 1066. (The Bayeux Tapestry,woven soon after the invasion and now displayed inthe Bayeux Museum in Normandy, describes the battlein rich detail.)

During the next two centuries, French monarchsstruggled to subdue powerful provincial rulers andgroups in Burgundy, Brittany, and elsewhere. Thecountry was invaded and nearly conquered by theEnglish during the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453).Joan of Arc, a peasant who believed she had a divinemission, led French forces to victory against theEnglish army, although Joan herself was captured andburned at the stake. She remains a symbol of intensenational pride.

France flourished during the next several centuries,especially after Henri IV (who ruled from 1589 to1610) eased religious conflict between Catholics andHuguenots (Protestants) by issuing the Edict of Nantesin 1598 granting Protestants limited religious toler-ation. Protestants lost many of these rights when theedict was later revoked under Louis XIV. For a centuryand a half, France and England competed to gain con-trol of North America. The rivalry ended with France’sdefeat in the French and Indian Wars. The Treaty ofParis in 1763 signified France’s acceptance of Britishdomination in North America and India. (At a later

96 CHAPTER 3 France

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 96

Cengage Learning

period, France engaged in further colonial conquests inAfrica, Asia, and the Caribbean.)

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were thehigh point of French economic, military, and culturalinfluence throughout the world. France was the mostaffluent and powerful country in continental Europe.France was also the artistic and scientific capital ofEurope, home of the Enlightenment in the eighteenthcentury, the philosophical movement that emphasizedthe importance of scientific reason rather than reli-gious belief or folk wisdom.

The Ancien Régime

A turning point in the struggle between French mon-archs and provincial rulers came when Louis XIV(r. 1643–1715) sponsored the creation of a relativelyefficient state bureaucracy, separate from the Crown’spersonal domain. France began to be administeredaccording to a legal-rational code applied throughoutthe country.

The absolutist state created by Louis XIV and hissuccessors coexisted with a complex system of taxesand feudal privileges that weighed heavily upon peas-ants, urban workers, and a rising middle class. Anothertarget of popular discontent was the CatholicChurch—a large landowner, tax collector, and ally ofthe feudal authorities. This complex patchwork ofinstitutions was later described as the ancien régime,or old regime.

Pressure on the regime increased as Louis XIVand his successor, Louis XV, engaged in militaryadventures in Europe and colonial conquests over-seas. From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenthcentury, France was usually at war with its neighbors.As historian Simon Schama notes, “No other Euro-pean power attempted to support both a major conti-nental army and a transcontinental navy at the sametime.”2 When Britain began to reap the benefits of theAgricultural and Industrial Revolutions and France’seconomy remained stagnant, the French monarchywas forced to borrow heavily to compete withBritain. By 1788, interest on past French loans con-sumed over one-half of current state expenditures.3

When Louis XVI tried to raise taxes in 1789, he pro-voked a violent reaction that sealed the fate of theFrench monarchy.

The Two Faces of the French Revolution,1789–1815

The angry crowd that burst through the gates ofParis’s Bastille prison on July 14, 1789, to free theprisoners helped launch the French Revolution. Inshort order, the French monarchy and the entireancien régime of nobility and feudal privileges wereabolished. A succession of revolutionary regimesquickly followed, including the Constituent Assembly(which in 1789 issued the world-famous Declarationof the Rights of Man and the Citizen), the LegislativeAssembly, the Convention, and the Directory.

It is difficult to overestimate the impact of theRevolution on French and world history. HistorianLynn Hunt observes, “The chief accomplishment ofthe French Revolution was the institution of a dramat-ically new political culture. . . . The French Revolu-tion may be said to represent the transition to politicaland social modernity, the first occasion when thepeople entered upon the historical stage to remake thepolitical community.”4 The First Republic, created in1792, was the first modern European regime based onthe belief that all citizens, regardless of social back-ground, were equal before the law.

The Revolution of 1789 was at the same time anational revolution, which affirmed the people’s rightto choose their own political regime; an internationalrevolution, which inspired national uprisings else-where in Europe, often promoted by French armedintervention; a liberal revolution, which championedindividual liberty in the political and economicspheres, as well as secularism and religious freedom,instead of state-mandated dominance by the CatholicChurch in religious affairs; and a democratic revolu-tion, which proclaimed that all citizens have the rightto participate in making key political decisions. TheRevolution’s provocative ideas have spread farbeyond France’s borders and have become part of ouruniversal heritage.

The revolution exhibited serious flaws. Althoughthe revolutionary regime proclaimed the values of lib-erty, equality, and fraternity, it treated opponents withbrutality. During the Reign of Terror, the Jacobinstate—so named for the radical faction that triumphedover moderates within the revolutionary camp—guil-lotined opponents of the revolution, along with many


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 97

Cengage Learning

revolutionaries who belonged to other factions.Despite some reforms that were in women’s interests(for example, short-lived divorce legislation), the rev-olution was quite hostile to women: “The [First]Republic was constructed against women, not justwithout them, and nineteenth-century Republicans didnot actively counteract this masculinist heritage ofrepublicanism.”5

In other ways, too, the revolution left a complexlegacy. Alexis de Tocqueville, a brilliant French aristo-crat and writer in the nineteenth century, identified twoquite opposite faces of the revolution: it both produceda rupture with the ancien régime and powerfullystrengthened state institutions, a goal pursued byFrench monarchs. Many of the centralizing institutionscreated by the revolutionary regime and by NapoleonBonaparte, the popular general who seized power in1799 and proclaimed himself emperor in 1802, remainto this day. For example, the Napoleonic Code of Lawis a detailed legal framework; its two hundredthanniversary was celebrated with great pomp in 2004.Since Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, French politics hasoften involved the question of how to reconcile stateautonomy—the state’s independence from pressurecoming from groups within society—with democraticparticipation and decision making.

The revolution produced enduring scars. Twoexamples: the revolution’s hostility toward organizedreligion, in particular the Catholic Church, deeplypolarized French society. Further, the revolution’sdisdain for pragmatism and compromise has intensi-fied political conflict. Scholars often contrast theFrench style of historical development described herewith British development. Although Britain saw itsshare of instability in an early period (notably, theRevolution of the 1640s and 1650s), since then it hasexhibited a pattern of relatively peaceful, incrementalchange—dramatically different from France’s politi-cal style.

Many Regimes, Slow Industrialization:1815–1940

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Franceconfronted the powerful and complex legacy of theRevolution of 1789. Following Napoleon’s defeat in1815, the monarchy was restored (hence the name, the

Restoration). It was overthrown in a popular uprisingin July 1830, and the king’s distant cousin, LouisPhilippe, assumed the throne. (This regime is knownas the July Monarchy.) In 1848, another revolutionproduced the short-lived Second Republic. LouisNapoleon, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, over-threw the republic after three years and proclaimedhimself emperor. When France lost the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, a revolutionary upheavalproduced the Paris Commune, a brief experiment inworker-governed democracy. The Commune was vio-lently crushed after a few months, to be succeeded bythe Third Republic, created following France’s mili-tary defeat and civil war in 1871. Thus, in the centuryfollowing the revolution of 1789, France oscillatedbetween monarchy and radical democracy. Ever sincethe creation of the Third Republic, France has beenruled by democratic republics, save for a brief periodduring World War II.

The Third Republic was a parliamentary regimewith a feeble executive. Given the legacy of Napoleon’sillegal seizure of power and the ideologically frag-mented state of French society, the republic wasdesigned to prevent decisive leadership. The ThirdRepublic never commanded much support. (It wasdescribed, in a famous phrase by conservative politicianAdolphe Thiers, as the regime “that divides us [French]least.”) Yet it has proved France’s most durable modernregime. It survived the terrible ordeal of World War Iand held firm against extremist forces on the right dur-ing the 1920s and 1930s, when republics were crum-bling in Germany, Italy, and Spain. However, the ThirdRepublic collapsed when it failed to check the Naziinvasion of France in 1940.

The regime changes in the nineteenth and twenti-eth centuries highlight the sharp cleavages and theabsence of political institutions capable of regulatingconflict. However, in sharp contrast with the dizzyingpace at which regimes came and went, the rate of eco-nomic change in France during this period was quitegradual. Compared with Germany, its dynamic neigh-bor to the northeast, France chose economic stabilityover modernization.

Although France began the nineteenth century asthe world’s second economic power, close behindBritain in terms of economic output, by 1900 it trailedthe United States, Great Britain, and Germany. A large

98 CHAPTER 3 France

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 98

Cengage Learning

peasantry acted as a brake on industrialization, as didthe fact that France was poorly endowed with coal,iron, and petroleum. Historians have also pointed tothe relatively underdeveloped entrepreneurial spirit inFrance. French manufacturers excelled in producingcustom-made luxury goods, such as silk fabrics andporcelain, which did not lend themselves to mecha-nized production and for which mass markets did notexist.

Another factor inhibiting industrial developmentwas the slow growth of the French population. In themid-nineteenth century, France was the most popu-lous nation in Europe after Russia. However, althoughthe British population tripled in the nineteenth centuryand the number of Germans doubled, France’s popu-lation increased by less than one-half.6 Slow popula-tion growth meant smaller demand and less incentivefor businesses to invest.

State policies also played a key role in explainingFrance’s lag in economic modernization. In Britain,the government removed restrictions on the free oper-ation of market forces, and in Prussia (later Germany),the powerful chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, imposedindustrialization from above. Economic historianRichard Kuisel observes that “rarely, if ever, did [theFrench state] act to promote economic expansion,plan development, or advance economic democracy.”Instead, the French state aimed to “maintain an equi-librium among industry, commerce, and agricultureand attempt[ed] to insulate France from the distressand upheaval that had struck other nations bent uponrapid economic advance.”7 In order to shield farmers,manufacturers, and artisans from foreign competition,France retained some of the highest tariff barriers inWestern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies.

Yet the state did not simply prevent economicmodernization. In a tradition dating back to Colbert,the finance minister of Louis XIV who directed thecreation of the French merchant marine, the statesponsored several large-scale economic projects.For example, in the 1860s under Louis Napoleon, thestate organized an integrated national rail network;encouraged the formation of the Crédit Mobilier, aninvestment bank to finance railroad development; andguaranteed interest rates on bonds sold to underwriterailroad construction.

On balance, however, through much of the nine-teenth century and well into the twentieth, the statesought to preserve political stability rather than pro-mote economic modernization. Slow economicgrowth did not prevent political conflict. But it didcontribute to France’s humiliating defeat by Germanyin 1940.

Vichy France (1940–1944) and the FourthRepublic (1946–1958)

World War II was one of the bleakest periods inFrench history. When France was overrun byGermany in 1940, Marshal Pétain, an aged Frenchmilitary hero, effectively destroyed the Third Repub-lic by signing an armistice that divided France in two.The north was under direct German occupation; inthe south, Pétain presided over a puppet regime,whose capital was at Vichy. The Vichy governmentattacked progressive elements in the Third Republic.It collaborated with the Nazi occupation, for example,sending French workers to factories in Germany andshipping French manufactured goods and food toGermany. It was the only political regime in WesternEurope that targeted Jews in areas not directly underGerman occupation. It sent about 76,000 French andforeign Jews, including 12,000 children, to Nazi deathcamps.

Contrary to a myth created after the war, the vastmajority of French citizens accepted the Vichy gov-ernment’s authority. However, a small resistancemovement led by Charles de Gaulle, an army generaland junior cabinet minister, developed among Com-munists, Socialists, and progressive Catholic forces.At great personal risk, its members provided intel-ligence to the Allied war effort, blew up bridges, andassassinated Vichy and Nazi officials.

After World War II, a widely shared (althoughinaccurate) view held that the Vichy regime had beenisolated and despised. It took fully half a century for aFrench president to publicly acknowledge Frenchresponsibility for the Vichy regime. In 1995, PresidentJacques Chirac declared, “Those dark hours will for-ever tarnish our history and are a disgrace to our pastand to our tradition. We all know that the criminalmadness of the [Nazi] occupying forces was assistedby the French, that is, the French state.”


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 99

Cengage Learning

In 1945, following the Nazi defeat, de Gaulle, theheroic symbol of French patriotism, sought to sponsora regime that would avoid the errors that he believedhad produced France’s moral decline and militarydefeat. In his view, the parliamentary system of theThird Republic blurred responsibility for governingand prevented forceful leadership. He proposed aregime with a powerful and independent executive.With the memory of the authoritarian Vichy regimestill fresh, French citizens opposed de Gaulle’s plan.When his proposal was rejected, de Gaulle abruptlyretired from politics.

The Fourth Republic, which was created in 1946and survived for a dozen years, embodied an extremeform of parliamentary rule and weak executive. Theconstitution gave parliament a near-monopoly ofpower, which it exercised in quite destructive fash-ion: governments were voted out of office about onceevery six months! An important reason for theabsence of stable governing coalitions in the NationalAssembly, the powerful lower house of parliament,was that elections were held by proportional repre-sentation, and many parties were represented in par-liament. As in the Third Republic, rapid shifts inparty alliances meant that governments lacked the co-hesion and authority to make tough decisions and de-velop long-range policies. Despite some importantachievements, notably setting France on the road toeconomic expansion and modernization, the FourthRepublic was a failure. However, it would doubtlesshave survived had it dealt effectively with a rebellionby forces seeking independence in Algeria, a territoryin North Africa that the French considered part ofFrance.

De Gaulle cleverly exploited the military stale-mate in Algeria to regain power in 1958. When theFrench army threatened to topple the republic toprotest what it claimed was indecisive leadership, deGaulle persuaded parliament to authorize him to scrapthe Fourth Republic and propose a new regime thatembodied the strong executive leadership that he con-sidered essential.

The Fifth Republic (1958 to the Present)

The contrast between the Fourth and Fifth republicsprovides a textbook case of how institutions shape

political life. The Fourth Republic could be describedas all talk and no action: parliament endlesslydebated, and voted to make and unmake governments;political leaders were unable to address the nation’spressing problems. On the other hand, in the FifthRepublic, political leaders are empowered to act deci-sively, but many scholars believe that mechanisms tohold leaders accountable to parliament and publicopinion are inadequate.

Despite the fact that de Gaulle seized power underunsavory circumstances, he commanded wide popularsupport. Resistance hero and commanding presence,de Gaulle persuaded the French to accept a regimethat endowed the executive with extensive power.Although the constitution of the Fifth Republic wasapproved by a large majority in a popular referendum,de Gaulle’s high-handed governing style eventuallyprovoked widespread opposition.

The most dramatic example came in May 1968,when students and workers engaged in the largestgeneral strike in Western European history. Forweeks, workers and students occupied factories,offices, and universities, and the regime’s survivalhung in the balance. Although de Gaulle regainedcontrol of the situation, he was discredited and re-signed from office the following year.

The Fifth Republic was again severely tested in1981. For twenty-three years, the same broad politicalcoalition, representing the conservative forces thattook power in 1958, had won every single nationalelection. In 1981, economic stagnation and divisionsamong conservative forces enabled Socialist Partycandidate François Mitterrand to be elected president.In the parliamentary elections that followed, Mitter-rand’s Socialist party won a decisive victory. Thepeaceful transition demonstrated that the institutionsof the Fifth Republic were sturdy enough to accom-modate political alternation.

President Mitterrand’s Socialist governmentsponsored an ambitious reform agenda that includedstrengthening the autonomy of the judiciary, themedia, and local governments. The centerpiece wasa substantial increase of industrial firms, banks, andinsurance companies in the public sector. However,conservative leaders Margaret Thatcher in Britainand Ronald Reagan in the United States wereelected to leadership positions on an opposite plat-

100 CHAPTER 3 France

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 100

Cengage Learning

form just when Mitterrand captured the French pres-idency. After the Socialist experiment began to pro-voke a crisis in 1983–1984, because of political op-position and the high cost of funding the reforms,Mitterrand reluctantly decided to pull back. Sincethen, governments of left and right alike have pur-sued market-friendly policies, and the ideologicalwar of left and right in France, which had raged forcenturies, has declined.

Does the convergence between the major center-left and center-right parties mean the end of majorpolitical conflict in France? Not at all, as the 2005referendum on the EU and the 2002 presidentialelections described below demonstrate.

2002: The Le Pen Bombshell

Dramatic evidence of malaise in French politicsoccurred in the 2002 presidential elections, whoseresults sent shock waves around the world. Tworounds of elections are usually required to select aFrench president. If no candidate gains an absolutemajority at the first round, the typical case, a runoffballot is held between the two front-runners. When

the 2002 election campaign opened, it was universallyassumed that the two candidates who would face offin the decisive runoff ballot would be Lionel Jospin,incumbent Socialist prime minister, and JacquesChirac, president and candidate of the center-right.Jospin and Chirac were perennial opponents: they hadcompeted in the runoff in the previous presidentialelection, held in 1995, that resulted in Chirac’s elec-tion as president. It was assumed in 2002 that the firstballot was merely a prelude to the runoff betweenChirac and Jospin. A day before the election, a NewYork Times reporter explained why the campaign wasso lackluster: “Part of the problem, experts say, is thatthere is little suspense.”8 A best-selling book pub-lished during the campaign, The Duel, whose coverfeatured a drawing of the two men in classic duelingposition, said it all.

However, soon after the polls closed, apathy turnedto stupefaction. Although Chirac came in first, accord-ing to script, Jospin was nudged out of second place byJean-Marie Le Pen, candidate of the Front National(FN), a far-right demagogue whose targets includeMuslim immigrants, Jews, and mainstream politicians(see “Leaders: Jean-Marie Le Pen”). The fact that LePen outpolled Jospin by less than 1 percent (17.0 per-cent to 16.1 percent) was less important than that LePen made it into the runoff. Commentators routinelyused terms like bombshell and earthquake to describethe fact that a racist, xenophobic politician was one ofthe two candidates competing in the runoff election. LeMonde, France’s most influential newspaper, spoke formost French when its front-page editorial declared,“France is wounded.”9 A cartoon in Le Monde graphi-cally depicted Le Pen’s success as the French equiva-lent of the September 11, 2001, attack against theUnited States.

Immediately after the first ballot, virtually everyonewho had voted for Jospin and other leftist candidatesswallowed their distaste and supported Chirac. At therunoff ballot, he trounced Le Pen 82 to 18 percent, themost lopsided vote in the history of the Fifth Republic.Yet Le Pen’s exploit remains a vivid memory, and theFN remains a significant presence in contemporaryFrench politics. A sizeable proportion of Frenchcitizens support Le Pen’s authoritarian views aboutMuslims, immigration, and law and order. Le Pen hashighlighted a disturbing cleavage in French politics that


“What!?? The president’s a Socialist and the Eiffel Tower isstill standing!??” “Incredible!” Source: Courtesy Plantu,from Le Monde, May 1981.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 101

Cengage Learning


Born in Brittany in 1928, the son of a fishingboat owner–fisherman, Jean-Marie Le Pen be-came politically active in a far-right organiza-

tion as early as 1947. He quickly displayed aknack for arousing crowds by his charismatic pres-ence and fiery oratory. He became a paratrooperin 1953 and fought briefly in France’s last-ditch(and unsuccessful) effort to retain its empire inIndochina. When he returned to France, Le Penjoined a right-wing populist political movement ledby Pierre Poujade and in 1956, at the age oftwenty-seven, was elected to the National Assem-bly, the youngest deputy in France. He volunteeredto fight in the French army during the Suez expedi-tion in 1956 and also served in Algeria, when theFrench army was engaged in a brutal war withthe Algerian independence movement. In 2002,several Algerians publicly testified that Le Pen hadtortured them at this time (he had admitted thisearlier, in a published interview).

In 1960, Le Pen helped found a small right-wing political movement whose aim was to pre-vent Algeria from gaining independence. Whenthis effort failed, he engaged in a variety of unsuc-cessful political ventures. For example, in the early1970s, he created a neofascist movement calledNew Order (Ordre nouveau) and later helped cre-ate the National Front (FN). Assisted by formermembers of the French branch of the Nazi SS, hetried to consolidate the many small groups on thefar right. For years, the movement was stalled.

The FN scored its first big victory in the 1983municipal elections at Dreux, a small city in Nor-mandy, where a member of the party was electedmayor on an anti-immigrant platform. Le Pen, headof the FN, began to appear on television talkshows, his blunt, crude humor contrasting dramati-cally with the approach of most other politicians.

The FN scored a major breakthrough in the1984 European elections, where the partyreceived 11 percent of the vote. The system ofproportional elections used in the election facili-tated voters choosing smaller parties like the FN.Commentators attributed the FN’s performance tocitizens on the far right who blamed center-right

parties for allowing the Socialist-Communist coali-tion to gain election in 1981.

Following 1984, Le Pen was much moresuccessful in building a personal following than increating an effective party organization. In whatlater proved to be a preview of the 2002 elec-tions, he received an amazingly high 14.5percent of vote in the 1988 presidential elections,coming in third behind incumbent presidentFrançois Mitterrand and challenger JacquesChirac. Le Pen’s electorate, which had at first beenbased on the far right and among lower-middle-class shopkeepers, began to expand to working-class and popular elements who felt betrayedby the Socialist government’s right turn in themid-1980s.

Le Pen also captured wide media attention byhis flamboyant use of inflammatory phrases—atthe same time that he was convicted in Frenchcourts for defending war crimes, as well as forprovoking racial discrimination and violence. Inthe 1980s, Le Pen also began to oppose the EU,economic liberalism, and globalization because,he claimed, they damaged France’s economicwell-being and national identity. He coupled thesethemes with a denunciation of policies that permit-ted the arrival of large numbers of Muslim (oftenArab) immigrants. The result, he charged, was tojeopardize the Catholic heritage of white France.Thus, Le Pen proved masterful in constructing asingle response—expel immigrants—to multipleinsecurities, consisting of unemployment, crime,restructuring of commerce that eliminated manysmall retail stores, and industrial restructuring thatresulted in the layoffs of many manual workers.

Le Pen slightly improved his performance inthe 1995 presidential elections and appearedheaded for further success. However, he suffereda severe setback in 1999 when he was indictedon a charge of assaulting a politician and prohib-ited from running for political office for severalyears. One of his closest associates bolted theFN to form a rival organization, taking with himmany of the FN’s top leaders. The FN’s supportdeclined significantly to about 9 percent in the

Leaders: Jean-Marie Le Pen

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 102

Cengage Learning

raises troubling questions about the Fifth Republic’sinstitutions.

France after September 11

France is home to the largest Muslim population inWest Europe, and, following the terrorist attacks onthe United States of September 11, 2001, the countryhas been deeply involved in the post-9/11 conflicts ofglobal politics. In 2002, Zacarias Moussaoui, a Frenchcitizen, was tried in the United States on charges thathe helped plan the September 11 attack. Also in 2002,eleven French technicians working in Pakistan weremurdered, and a French oil tanker near Yemen wasdamaged by an explosive charge. In 2003, RichardReid, a British citizen, was convicted of attempting toignite explosives during a plane flight from Paris toMiami; and French antiterrorist police detained eigh-teen Algerians and Pakistanis in the Paris area oncharges that they were linked to Al Qaeda. In 2004,police arrested a dozen men near Paris on charges thatthey were seeking to wage a holy war in Iraq. Policealleged that the group’s leaders had participated in thebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia in 2002 in whichnineteen people were killed.

At the same time that France has energetically tar-geted terrorism, it has strongly criticized U.S. policiesrelated to the war on terrorism. Although Francesupported the U.S. military action against Al Qaedaand the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, andFrench troops served in Afghanistan during the war,France helped lead an international coalition opposingthe U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Following the war,it refused to cooperate in postwar reconstruction inIraq. Fahrenheit 9/11, Michael Moore’s documentaryfilm highly critical of President George W. Bush, wasawarded the Palme d’or (grand prize) at the Cannesfilm festival in 2004. For a country passionate aboutfilms, the award speaks volumes!

The conflict between France and the United Statesover Iraq had its comic aspects, as when french frieswere renamed freedom fries on the menu of the Houseof Representatives dining room! But anti-French opin-ion was often dead serious. For example, in “Our Warwith France,” New York Times columnist Thomas L.Friedman claimed, “France is not just our annoyingally; it is not just our jealous rival. France is becomingour enemy.”10 A book about French-American rela-tions published in 2004 provided extensive evidence tosupport the claim that France is Our Oldest Enemy.11


1999 European elections. The aging Le Pen—sev-enty-three years old during the 2002 presidentialelections—appeared headed for forced retirement.However, his dramatic breakthrough in 2002 re-sulted from skillfully capitalizing on citizens’ apa-thy and disgust with the prevailing political class,as well as the media’s nonstop coverage ofFrance’s rising crime rate in early 2002. It was aheaven-sent opportunity for Le Pen to claim that hewas the only candidate who advocated toughmeasures to restore law and order.

Le Pen has shifted from an exclusive appealto anti-immigrant and antisemitic sentimenttoward right-wing libertarian economic and so-cial populism. Among his specific proposals were

eliminating the income tax, France’s withdrawalfrom the EU, protectionism, outlawing abortion,and restricting immigrants’ access to social bene-fits, jobs, and citizenship. In a statement follow-ing his first-round victory in 2002, he declared,“I’m a man of the people, I’ll always be on theside of those who suffer, because I myself haveknown cold, hunger, and poverty.” Le Pen askedfor support of “miners, metalworkers, and work-ers from industries ruined by EU-style globaliza-tion, as well as of farmers doomed to a miser-able retirement and victims of insecurity [that is,crime].” The fact that so many voters answeredhis call invites analysis of weaknesses in Frenchdemocracy.

Leaders: Jean-Marie Le Pen (cont.)

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:42 AM Page 103

Cengage Learning

The roots of French anti-Americanism predate theIraq war or George W. Bush’s presidency, although thepresident was certainly not a favorite of the French. (A2004 public opinion poll reported that 85 percent ofthe French were critical of Bush.)12 French distrust ofthe United States has deep social, cultural, and geopo-litical roots. A summary of French public opinion sur-veys reports that the French are “apprehensive aboutthe United States acting as world leader, fearful of itshegemony, and mistrustful of its alleged ambitions andits motives. They, moreover, dislike many of America’ssocial policies and are critical of our values.”13

Years before the Iraq war, the French feared that thecollapse of the Soviet Union elevated the United Statesto the status of hyperpower, a notch higher in the geopo-litical scale than superpower. President Chirac repeat-edly proclaimed the virtues of what he called a multipo-lar world, in contrast to the present situation, in whichthe United States exercises sole leadership. Althoughleaders in both countries sought to mend relations fol-lowing the Iraq war, conflict persisted. For example, in2005 U.S. policy-makers dismissed the attempt ofFrance and other European powers to negotiate withIran over its nuclear research program; the UnitedStates proposed instead imposing punitive sanctions.

The French “Non”—Now or Forever?

This chapter began with a description of France’sresounding “non” to the draft European Constitu-

tion, the most recent critical juncture in Frenchpolitics. Three factors help explain the defeat of thereferendum.

The Economy or the EU? A first question iswhether the vote was primarily about the EuropeanConstitution. Good question! Of course, it was atleast in part. But only in part—and maybe not in ma-jor part. Evidence that Europe may not have been up-permost for voters derives from exit polls conductedwith voters leaving the polling booth. In one poll,nearly half of “non” voters stated that they opposedthe treaty because it would produce an increase inFrance’s already high unemployment rate. The nextmost frequently cited reason by opponents of thetreaty was that they were fed up with the entire situa-tion in France (“ras le bol” is the idiomatic Frenchformulation). About a third of opponents of the treatystated that their opposition was a result of its promot-ing neo-liberal policies; that is, it would strip awaystate social and economic protections. And anotherthird reported that their vote was based on the factthat the treaty was too complicated. (Respondentscould choose more than one reason.)14

However, it may be misleading to regard domes-tic economic and social factors as opposed to onesinvolving the EU. For, in voters’ minds—and for un-derstandable reasons—the EU and France’s domes-tic situation are closely intertwined. During theyears when the French economy was booming, theEU benefited from the favorable situation. However,


Le Monde’s cartoonistcompares Le Pen’s at-tack on Chirac andJospin to the bombingof the twin towers ofthe World Trade Center.Source: Plantu, LeMonde, April 23,2001, p 1.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 104

Cengage Learning

France’s economic difficulties have worsened withthe strengthening of the EU. Above all, the steadyincrease in France’s unemployment rate to a levelexceeding 10 percent has occurred in the last twodecades—the period coinciding with closer Euro-pean integration.

Class Cleavages and the “Non” Vote. That “non”voters blamed the EU for France’s economic difficul-ties becomes more clear when one analyzes the linksbetween class and the vote in the EU referendum. Forit was the most economically vulnerable sections ofthe population, those most in danger of losing theirjobs, who opposed the treaty: an astonishingly high81 percent of workers and 60 percent of lower middleclass voters opposed the treaty. Further, rightly orwrongly, the EU is widely interpreted as promoting astripping away of France’s extensive social safety net,described in Section 2. Thus, the EU referendum pit-ted a more prosperous, economically secure Franceagainst a France more fearful of the increased insecu-rity that a stronger EU would produce.

A symbol of the hard times ahead if the EU con-stitution was approved was symbolized by the Polishplumber that was much cited in the referendum cam-paign. Opponents of the treaty claimed that the com-bination of enlarging the EU to the ten new membersfrom Central and Eastern Europe and further open-ing French economic borders would encouragelower-paid workers (like Polish plumbers) to replacethe French. Thus, the recent enlargement of theEU (and the fear that Turkey might eventuallyaccede to membership) stoked already intense eco-nomic insecurity.

The Partisan Factor. A final factor explaining thedefeat of the referendum was a severe split in theSocialist Party (PS), one of France’s three major gov-erning parties and a traditional supporter of the EU.When President Chirac announced the referendum onthe EU constitution in the fall 2004, the PS held aninternal consultation to decide the party’s officialposition. Although the party was unanimous in itsopposition to conservative President Chirac, mostparty leaders reluctantly supported the referendumand counseled members to vote in favor. When 58percent of Socialist party members voted for a yesvote, most party leaders lobbied hard for this out-come in the referendum campaign itself. However,

several prominent PS leaders refused and lobbiedagainst the referendum. The fact that prominent andrespected party leaders opposed the party’s officialposition doubtless persuaded many Socialist voters toswing to the “non” camp. The exit poll cited aboverevealed that 59 percent of PS sympathizers voted“non” in the referendum—a sufficient number tosway the overall vote in favor of rejection.15 The hos-tility of Socialist sympathizers for President Chirac,who led the referendum campaign, was an importantreason why many voted “non.”

The outcome of the referendum was a bombshell,perhaps second only to the 2002 presidential election.The biggest losers were the politicians who led thecampaign for a yes vote, notably, President Chirac,along with his political allies, and Socialist Partyleaders. President Chirac immediately became a lameduck president. The speculation about whether hemight seek re-election in 2007 was settled by thedefeat of the referendum. The second casualty of thereferendum was Chirac’s hand-picked prime minister,Jean-Pierre Raffarin. The prime minister immediatelyresigned after the defeat.

Leaders of the PS, the major opposition party,could take little comfort from the humiliation sufferedby the leaders of the government and ruling party. Forthe PS also campaigned in favor of the referendumand shared responsibility for its defeat. Further, the PSwas severely weakened by the fact that several of itstop leaders opposed the party’s official position andopenly campaigned for a “non” vote.

The referendum has had an important short-termimpact on domestic French politics, but it is difficult topredict what the long-term impact will be. It may pre-cipitate a split within the PS and intensify disputesamong political leaders in the UMP to succeed Chirac.It may strengthen forces outside the mainstream thatare opposed to the major parties. Or the parties thatdominate the Fifth Republic may recoup and “digest”the challenge of the referendum. Stay tuned!

Themes and ImplicationsOur analysis of the evolution of French developmenthas identified some key turning points in French his-tory. It is useful to highlight the distinctive ways that


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 105

Cengage Learning

France has addressed the four key themes that provideour framework for analyzing comparative politics.

Historical Junctures and Political Themes

Analyzing the four themes that frame Introduction toComparative Politics reveals dramatic changes inFrench politics in the past few decades.

France in a World of States. For over a centuryfollowing Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, the country dis-played an inward-looking, isolationist orientation bymaintaining high tariff barriers to minimize inter-national trade. This was offset by the fact that, at theend of the nineteenth century, France aggressivelyincreased its colonial possessions beyond NorthAfrica to Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and thePacific. Until the 1950s, France benefited from themineral resources of its colonies and exported to themits manufactured goods on terms favorable to France.Yet, in the long run, this exploitative relationship washarmful not only to the colonies but to the Frencheconomy, for sheltering France from internationalcompetition stifled technological and industrial devel-opment. France’s integration in the EU and participa-tion in the global economy have proved a shot in thearm. The French economy has become more modernand efficient, enabling France in recent years to com-pete on favorable terms in the international economy.Yet many French have come to blame membership inthe EU for France’s troubled economic situation inrecent years.

France’s tortured relationship with Germany—the two countries fought three devastating wars inless than a century—weighed heavily on state devel-opment. The fact that France and Germany have hadcordial relations since the end of World War II,thanks to the EU and the expansion of the Europeanand world economies, has provided France withvastly increased security. The alliance between thetwo countries has been vital in promoting Europeaneconomic and political integration. The countriesalso sponsored a joint military force that served inAfghanistan—a project that would have been un-thinkable during the century of mutual hostility. Theyalso jointly opposed the U.S. and British military in-tervention in Iraq in 2003.

Although a middle-rank power, France remains animportant player on the world stage. For example, ithas developed nuclear weapons and sophisticated mil-itary technology, and is among the world’s leadingarms exporters. France has been a major participant inthe Western alliance led by the United States. But, incontrast to Britain and Germany, it has often been agadfly to the United States.

The French state has been a powerful, capableinstrument, helping the country adapt to the challengesposed by global economic competition. In recentdecades, the state promoted internationally acclaimedhigh-tech industrial projects, including high-speed railtravel (the TGV, that is, train à grande vitesse); leader-ship in the European consortium that developed theAirbus wide-bodied airplane; and relatively safe andcheap nuclear-powered electricity. In 2004, the world’stallest and longest multispan bridge opened for trafficin Millau, in central France. These projects were madepossible by France’s powerful, energetic, and well-fi-nanced state. Yet they may also represent the end of awave of state-sponsored innovation. International eco-nomic competition, EU and other treaty commitments,ideological shifts, and citizens’ demands for more au-tonomy have challenged France’s statist tradition.

Governing the Economy. The heyday of statismwas in the period following World War II. Thanks tostate planning, loans and subsidies to private business,and crash programs to develop key industries, theFrench economy soared. However, the postwar styleof state direction, useful in an era when France wasrelatively underdeveloped, is problematic in the cur-rent period, when rapidly changing technology andeconomic globalization put a premium on flexibility.Section 2 describes the state’s more modest althoughstill central role.

The Democratic Idea. France has a complex rela-tionship to the democratic idea. On the one hand, an an-tidemocratic orientation that is linked to France’sstrong statist tradition regards popular participation anddecision making as preventing rational direction byqualified leaders. On the other hand, France has pas-sionately promoted two quite different democratic cur-rents. The first, inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau inthe eighteenth century, stipulates that citizens should


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 106

Cengage Learning

participate directly in political decisions rather thanmerely choose leaders. This idea nourishes the protests,like those of May 1968, that periodically challenge es-tablished institutions. A second democratic current,identified with republican values, rejects direct democ-racy in favor of representative or parliamentary govern-ment. Opponents of de Gaulle regarded him as tram-pling on representative democracy and indulging in lepouvoir personnel (personal power).

France’s democratic theory and institutions faceimportant challenges. The no vote in the referendumof 2005 on the EU constitution highlights that Frenchcitizens fear entrusting their fate to distant and, intheir view, undemocratic institutions in Brussels,Belgium (the headquarters of the EU). Another prob-lem involves the chronic difficulty of reconciling stateautonomy and democratic participation within France.

Politics of Collective Identity. French nationalidentity has always been closely linked to state forma-tion. The Revolution championed an assimilationistposition that welcomes newcomers into the politicalsystem—on condition that they accept dominantrepublican values. Such an approach stresses the im-

portance of shared political values rather than inher-ited racial or ethnic characteristics. This progressivemessage has a repressive aspect, however: as it dic-tates that collective identities should remain in theprivate sphere and play no role in the public arena.The French generally regard multiculturalism as a de-structive approach that fragments the body politic.

At the same time, the French are deeply dividedby social, economic, and cultural cleavages. In thepostwar period, there was sharp opposition between aworking-class subculture, closely linked to the power-ful French Communist Party (Parti communistefrançais—PCF), and a Catholic subculture, in whichthe church played a key role. In recent decades, thesesubcultures have declined in importance. The PCF is ashadow of its former self and nowadays only 12percent of French Catholics attend mass weekly.16

As old cleavages declined, new ones have devel-oped. French national identity has been destabilized re-cently by ethnic conflict and globalization. Jean-MarieLe Pen and the FN gained widespread support bycharging that unemployment, crime, and urban decayare caused by Muslim immigrants and their children.At the same time, many second-generation immigrants


The world’slongest andtallest multispanbridge; Millau,FranceSource: ChrisHellier/Corbis

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 107

Cengage Learning

consider themselves fully French yet reject dominantcultural norms. A particularly disturbing developmenthas been a wave of violence against French Jews byneo-nazis and Muslim youth. French national identityhas also been jostled by French participation in theEU and globalization.

Implications for Comparative Politics

The study of French politics offers rich lessons for thestudy of comparative politics. Scholars have coinedthe term French exceptionalism to highlight thatFrench politics is distinctive. A central feature isintense ideological conflict, which in turn has fueledpolitical instability reflected in frequent regimechange. Does the exceptional character of French pol-itics rule out comparison? Quite the contrary! Forwithout comparison, we cannot identify and explainwhat is exceptional about France.

Because France has continually tried to reshape itsdestiny by conscious political direction, it provides anatural laboratory in which to test the importance ofvariations in institutional design. To illustrate, because

France’s electoral procedures (along with many otherfeatures of political institutions) have often changedwithin a brief period, comparativists can make fine-grained comparison of the impact of institutional varia-tion. A recent example of how electoral procedures canbe used to affect political outcomes is a 1999 constitu-tional amendment mandating gender parity in politicalrecruitment. From one election to the next, female rep-resentation doubled on municipal and regional coun-cils, and virtually all municipal and regional councilsnow have nearly equal numbers of men and women.

At a more general level, the French have oftenlooked to the state to achieve important economic andpolitical goals. In countries without a strong statist tra-dition (for example, the United States and Britain), pri-vate groups are forced to rely on their own efforts. Whatcan we learn from comparing the two approaches?What are the strengths and weaknesses of statism?

A place to begin our analysis of current Frenchpolitics is with France’s political economy, for the waythat a country organizes economic governance deeplyinfluences the functioning of its political system.


France’s gross national product (GNP) makes it theworld’s sixth-largest economy. It has accomplishedthis feat by a combination of skill, state management,and favorable historical and geographic circum-stances. (France is in the center of one of the world’smost economically developed regions.) After alengthy period in which the state played a key role inshaping and steering the economy, there has been asharp increase in the importance of markets and acorresponding decline in the state’s role because ofan ideological shift, EU commitments, and globaliza-tion. Accompanying these changes has been a shiftfrom an inward-looking economic posture to anexport orientation that has transformed France intoa major global economic actor. France now ranksamong the top few countries in the world in theamount of capital invested abroad and as a locationfor foreign investment. Yet the French economicrecord is not simply a success story: economic

benefits are unequally distributed, unemployment isat alarmingly high levels, and new and old economicfissures have produced intense political challenges.

The New French RevolutionDuring the nineteenth century, when Britain andGermany were becoming the leading industrial pow-ers in Western Europe, the French state sought to pre-serve traditional groups and contain political conflict.However, the weaknesses of this pattern were cruellyhighlighted by the Third Republic’s failure to meetthe Nazi threat in 1940.

When France was liberated and the FourthRepublic was created in 1946, influential groupsactive in the Resistance concluded that economic andsocial modernization was essential and that this pro-ject required a fundamental transformation in thestate’s relationship to the economy. “After the war,”

Section C Political Economy and Development

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 108

Cengage Learning

Richard Kuisel observes, “what was distinctive aboutFrance was the compelling sense of relative economicbackwardness. This impulse was the principal stimu-lus for economic renovation and set France apart fromother countries.”17 The modernizers were enormouslysuccessful. One study described the postwar shift as“a new French Revolution. Although peaceful, thishas been just as profound as that of 1789 because ithas totally overhauled the moral foundations andsocial equilibrium of French society.”18

State and EconomyThe new French Revolution ushered in sweepingchanges in the economy, society, and values. As aresult of its statist tradition of economic management,France was potentially able to develop the institu-tional capacity to steer the economy—once the stateshifted from economic protection to economic expan-sion. From guardian of the established order, the statebecame the sponsor of social and economic progress,an approach often described as dirigisme. The resultwas to transform France from a relatively stagnant,rural society to a dynamic industrialized participant inthe world economy.

French-Style Economic Management

The French developed a variety of techniques to fos-ter economic modernization. The state was the nervecenter of the enterprise.

Planning. After World War II, the French developedtechniques of state economic management. A key ele-ment was indicative planning, in which a nationalPlanning Commission of civil servants appointed bythe government established broad national economicand social priorities for the next four or five years.The Planning Commission was assisted by modern-ization commissions, whose members were publicand private officials. Successive plans establishedmaximum feasible rates of economic growth, pro-posed crash programs for the development of specificindustries and regions, and identified social prioritiessuch as educational targets. Perhaps more importantthan the specific goals chosen was that planning sym-bolized that change was desirable—a striking contrastto the traditional conservative pattern.

De Gaulle’s Leadership. Planning began in theFourth Republic, but the process was given a shot inthe arm in 1958 when Charles de Gaulle, the mostinfluential politician in twentieth-century French his-tory, returned to power.

De Gaulle was a complex, controversial, and con-tradictory figure. On the one hand, he was a faithfulrepresentative of traditional France, deeply attachedto the values of order and hierarchy, which earned himthe enmity of the left. On the other hand, he believedthat if France was to play a leading role on the worldstage, shock therapy was needed to strengthen theFrench economy.

Dirigisme. General de Gaulle extended the style ofstate-led industrialization and growth originating in theFourth Republic. The state financed favored industrialsectors and firms, and it encouraged the creation oflarge firms, which were dubbed “national champions.”Key economic decisions were made in governmentalministries and the planning agency. The state’s multi-faceted leadership compensated for the relatively weakrole played by private entrepreneurs. Among the toolsthat the state deployed were the following:

• Subsidies, loans, and tax write-offs. Until the1970s, the state provided the bulk of capital for newinvestment, limited the outflow of French capital,created a host of parapublic banking institutions,and controlled private bank loans.

• Restructuring key sectors, including steel, machinetools, and paper products, by steering credit andpressuring medium-sized industrial firms to mergeto create “national champions” able to compete inworld markets.

• Creating and managing entire industries. Some state-created and state-managed firms were in the van-guard of technological progress throughout theworld. A prime example was nuclear power. Thestate reduced its dependence on imported petroleumby developing safe and reliable nuclear energy.Three-quarters of France’s electricity is produced bynuclear reactors, and France is a world leader in de-signing, building, operating, and exporting nuclearpower installations.

In sum, in the French economic model, the state was a(indeed, the) chief economic player.


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 109

Cengage Learning

France’s Economic Miracle

During the period that a French economist called “thethirty glorious years” (1945–1975), the planners andtheir allies were remarkably successful. France’s rateof economic growth was among the highest duringthis period—a striking contrast to the 1930s, when theFrench economy declined at the rate of over 1 percentannually (see Table 1).

Economic growth produced higher living stan-dards and the birth of a consumer society. Averageyearly income nearly tripled between 1946 and 1962.After a century of economic stagnation, Franceleapfrogged into the twentieth century.

May 1968 and Beyond: Economic Crisis andPolitical Conflict

And yet, despite the dramatic economic growthof the 1950s and 1960s—or because of the way thateconomic restructuring was carried out—economicchange generated political conflict. Political scien-tist Peter A. Hall identified a central dilemma in theplanning process: “The reorganization of productionto attain great[er] efficiency tends to intensify thesocial conflict that planning is also supposed to pre-vent.”19 The Gaullist regime was superbly equippedto direct change. But it dominated the process and

limited private consultation and participation to thebusiness elite.

The result was that, despite the appearance ofstability, the regime was fragile. The most dramaticchallenge was the May 1968 strikes and demonstra-tions, which immobilized the entire country forweeks. The opposition movement was triggered bygovernment-imposed wage restraint, the reduction oftrade union representation on the governing boards ofthe social security (public health) system, and thechaotic expansion of higher education. What unitedthe diverse opposition groups was anger at the high-handed style of authority in universities, politicalinstitutions, and workplaces. Other European coun-tries were also modernizing during this period. But,with the exception of Italy, no other country experi-enced such intense opposition movements.

The May movement was followed by years of in-tense labor mobilization. Strikes in the early 1970swere frequent and often involved highly militant tac-tics: occupying factories, sequestering managers, andeven organizing production directly. A rapid increasein female employment, beginning in the early 1970s(see Figure 1), also provoked some important strikesby women protesting unequal treatment.

Economic Instability

Discontent initially focused on the way that eco-nomic modernization was being orchestrated; it wascompounded by a slowdown in economic growth inthe mid-1970s. First, the shift of workers out of agri-culture and from rural to urban areas began to reach itslimit. Second, France was affected by steep increasesin petroleum prices. The restructuring of internationalcapitalism in the 1970s further challenged Frenchindustry. When developing nations, including Taiwan,South Korea, and Brazil, developed basic industries,such as textiles, steel, and shipbuilding, the result wasto eliminate hundreds of thousands of French jobs inthese three industries alone. Entire regions were dev-astated. At the same time, advanced industrializednations outstripped France in high-tech sectors likemicroelectronics, bioengineering, and robotics.

These trends provoked a crisis in the Frenchmodel of development. The postwar state-centeredapproach was highly successful in promoting crash


Table 1

Average Growth Rates in Gross NationalProduct, 1958–1973

Japan 10.4%France 5.5Italy 5.3West Germany 5.0Belgium 4.9Netherlands 4.2Norway 4.2Sweden 4.1United States 4.1United Kingdom 3.2

Source: Reprinted by permission of the State University of NewYork Press, from The Fifth Republic at Twenty by William G.Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann (Eds). © 1981 State Univer-sity of New York. All rights reserved.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 110

Cengage Learning


Students and workers unite in a mass demonstration on the Left Bank of Paris, May 27, 1968.Source: AP/Wide World Photos.

40

Perc

ent

4442

3638

48

5250

5654

46

1954 1962 1971 1974 1980 19831968 1977 1987 2002

Source: INSEE, in Louis Dirn, La Société française en tendances (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 108;2002 data from INSEE, Tableaux de l’Économie Française, 2003–2004 (Paris: INSEE,2003), p. 77).

Figure 1

Women in the Labor Force

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 111

Cengage Learning

programs for industrial reconstruction and moderniza-tion. But it was not equipped to adapt rapidly, decen-tralize economic decision making, and compete in theglobal economy.

French Socialism in Practice—andConservative Aftermath

After conservative governments failed to meet theeconomic challenges of the 1970s, the left had itschance to try. A new era began in 1981 when, aftertwenty-three years of conservative governments,Socialist candidate François Mitterrand defeatedincumbent president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in the1981 presidential election, and the Socialist Party andits allies gained control of the National Assembly (themore powerful legislative chamber). The governmentquickly sponsored an array of measures to revive theailing economy, create jobs, and recapture domesticmarkets. They included the following:

• Sharp increases in social benefits, including hikesin the minimum wage, family allowances, old-agepensions, rent subsidies, and state-mandated paidvacations

• The creation of public sector employment• State assistance to develop cutting-edge technolo-

gies (including biotech, telecommunications, andaerospace)

• The nationalization of many firms in the industrialand financial sectors. Following the nationalizationmeasures, public sector firms accounted for 28percent of France’s gross domestic production,23 percent of French exports, and 36 percent ofinvestments.20 Thirteen of France’s twenty largestindustrial firms and virtually all banks were inte-grated into the public sector.

The Socialist approach extended the postwar di-rigiste approach and supplemented it with expandedsocial benefits and mechanisms for increasing partici-pation by rank-and-file workers and labor unions ineconomic decision making. Many citizens achievedsignificant gains from the Socialist program, and manyof the newly nationalized firms were strengthened bythe infusion of government subsidies. But the programfailed to revive economic growth, which was essentialto fuel job creation and to generate revenue to financethe reform program. Why not? One reason is that busi-ness interests in France and abroad bitterly opposedthe government’s socialist policy orientation. Privateinvestment by French and foreign firms declinedsharply in the early 1980s. Further, an internationaleconomic recession in the early 1980s reduced the de-mand for French exports, just when increased socialspending enabled French consumers to buy foreignimports. The result was a severe trade imbalance.

The Socialist reform agenda helped to modernizethe French economy, society, and state in the long run.However, in the short run, it drove France to the brinkof bankruptcy. Budget deficits soared, internationalinvestors avoided France like the plague, and France’sinternational currency reserves were rapidly exhausted.Something had to give—and fast.

The crisis cruelly demonstrated how limited wasthe margin of maneuver for a medium-rank power likeFrance. Mitterrand reluctantly ordered an about-facein economic policy in 1983 and set France on a con-servative course from which it has not departed since.

France’s failure to achieve autonomous state-sponsored development in the early 1980s has oftenbeen cited as demonstrating the futility of nationally


“It’s touching to see all these graduates.” (ANPE is thestate employment office.)

Source: Courtesy Plantu, Cartoonists & Writers Syndicate,from Le Monde.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 112

Cengage Learning

based radical or democratic socialist reforms. WithinFrance, it dealt a body blow to the traditional di-rigiste pattern.

An indirect effect of the 1983 “right turn” was topropel European integration forward. Concluding thatFrance could not exercise global power on its own,Mitterrand turned to the EU as the next-best alterna-tive. Abandoning his initially lukewarm attitude to-ward European integration, Mitterrand energeticallybegan to promote European economic, monetary, andpolitical integration in the mid-1980s.

France’s Neoliberal Modernization Strategy

Although the state has continued to play an importantrole in economic governance since 1983, it has scaledback its commanding role and often defers to privatedecision makers. Among the elements in this market-friendly “neoliberal modernization strategy” areprivatization, deregulation, and liberalization.21

Privatization. Since 1983, governments of left andright alike have sponsored a sweeping privatizationprogram. The decision to support privatization wasespecially wrenching for the Socialists, who had pas-sionately championed nationalization for generationsand, as we have seen, had sponsored an extensiveincrease in public sector firms when elected in 1981.However, privatization involved an about-face forconservatives as well, for General de Gaulle hadregarded public ownership as a way to maximizeFrance’s economic and political power.

Although privatization involves a drastic shiftfrom public to private control, the change is less sub-stantial than meets the eye. One reason is the consid-erable continuity in managerial ranks when firms areprivatized. Many of France’s largest private firms aredirected by executives trained in state-run eliteschools and belong to cohesive elite networks,described in Section 3, that span the public-privatedivide. Another reason is that state-owned banks usethe shares they own in private firms to influence man-agerial decisions.

Employees of firms slated for privatization oftenmount strikes in key sectors like transportation andpower supply. Employees fear a reduction in wages

and fringe benefits, job security, and rights to repre-sentation within the firm. These fears have oftenproved accurate.

Deregulation and Liberalization. Until the rightturn in 1983, state officials often defined technicalstandards for manufactured products; specified mar-ket share; set prices, interest rates, and terms of credit;and determined the type and location of investment.The state regulated labor markets by restrictingemployers’ freedom to schedule work time and to layoff workers.

State management could be highly effective. Forexample, the public railway network has a superbrecord for safety and performance. State labor inspec-tors limited arbitrary employer actions. However,critics claimed that the French economy was beingstrangled by kilometers of red tape.

A key element in the Socialists’ right turn, ex-tended by governments of left and right since then,was the deregulation of labor, financial, and commod-ity markets. For example, administrative authorizationto lay off workers has been eliminated, and employershave greater freedom to schedule work in a flexiblemanner. Price controls have been largely eliminated.

Deregulation has been especially sweeping in thefinancial sector. Market forces, not ministry of financeofficials, now determine how loans and investmentswill be made. Private firms are forced to fend forthemselves, both for better—since they are forced tobe more efficient—and for worse, since private banksgrant loans according to narrow economic criteria.

Impact of the European Union. France’s participa-tion in the EU has further reduced the state’s role ineconomic management. The adoption of the Single Eu-ropean Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, andthe Growth and Stability Pact in 1997 have tied Francemore tightly to its European neighbors and limited statediscretion. Opponents of the European Constitutioncharged that it would increase these constraints.

The policies mandated by EU requirements en-countered stiff popular resistance in France beginningin the 1990s. In 1995, when Prime Minister AlainJuppé proposed austerity measures to trim the budgetdeficit, the initiative provoked massive strikes by public


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 113

Cengage Learning

sector workers that threatened the Juppé government’svery existence. In 2003, Prime Minister Jean-PierreRaffarin pushed through a pension reform despite mas-sive strikes and demonstrations. In the 2005 referen-dum, popular opposition to what was regarded as theheavy hand of the EU boiled over once again. (For

more detail about France’s relation to the EU, see“Global Connection: France and the European Union.”)

The End of Dirigisme or Dirigiste Disengagement?If recent French governments have sponsored reformsto free market forces, they have done so in a distinc-


France has been a charter member and one ofthe most powerful states in the European Unionsince it was founded in 1958. (The EU was

originally known as the European Economic Com-munity.) Before World War II, France had pre-ferred isolation to international cooperation. Butthree devastating wars in less than a century be-tween France and Germany taught both countriesthat there was no alternative but to cooperate. TheEU was a resounding success in fostering closerties between the two countries and the other mem-ber states of the organization. (The number ofmembers has steadily increased to twenty-five by2005.)

The EU enjoyed widespread support inFrance during the first decades of its existencebecause it was credited with contributing to eco-nomic prosperity and political stability. Frenchfarmers received the largest share of the EU’s lav-ish program of agricultural subsidies. As a resultof the EU’s adoption of a common currency, theeuro; its sponsorship of lower tariffs among mem-ber states; as well as other measures to liberalizetrade and investment, France developed extremelyclose economic relations with her West Europeanneighbors. The EU has emerged as one of thethree major economic regions in the world, alongwith North America and East Asia.

Yet French participation in the EU has notbeen without controversy. Many French citizensfear that France’s distinctive culture and identity,as well as extensive welfare state programs, arethreatened by membership in the EU. There hasbeen criticism of the EU’s relatively opaqueprocess of decision-making and what has beencalled the democratic deficit: the inadequatemechanisms for democratic representation within

the EU. Citizens railed against what they regardedas unreasonable directives by faceless and arbi-trary eurocrats in Brussels. Moreover, some of theEU decisions (agreed upon, it should be empha-sized, by the French government) involve the needfor sacrifice, notably, a requirement to limit gov-ernment deficits.

When economic prosperity turned to stagna-tion in the 1980s, the EU began to be seen less asa blessing and more as a liability. A referendumheld in France in1992 to ratify the MaastrichtTreaty, which involved closer economic integra-tion, barely passed. It should have been a warn-ing to Jacques Chirac in 2005 that holding areferendum on Europe is fraught with danger.

President Chirac’s decision to hold a referen-dum to ratify the draft European constitutionproved a major blunder. It came at a time whenunemployment in France remained at double-digitlevels, and when the recent enlargement of the EUwas quite unpopular in France. (Polls revealed thatFrance was the EU member country in whichpublic opinion was the most opposed to enlarge-ment.) In the referendum campaign in 2005, muchwas made of the “Polish plumber,” a symbol of alow-paid worker from the East poised to snatch ajob from his French counterpart as soon as the EUconstitution became operative.

The vote by France does not mean the end ofthe EU: the many thousands of pages of EU treatyregulations and directives remain in force. But,clearly, the French vote has halted forward move-ment within the EU and has posed a challenge forthose who seek closer European integration. It hasalso revealed a wide chasm between rank and fileFrench voters and the governing parties, whoseclaim to represent the French fell flat in 2005.

Global Connection: France and the European Union

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 114

Cengage Learning

tively French manner. Political scientist VivienSchmidt observes that France has not

abandoned its statist model. . . . Governmentshave not stopped seeking to guide business,albeit in more indirect ways . . . even as theyengineer the retreat of the state.22

Schmidt calls the shift in France’s political econ-omy “dirigiste disengagement.” In recent years, thestate has supervised the retrenchment of industriesand steered the French economy toward integrationwithin the EU. Thus, for better or worse, statism isalive and well in France.

Social Policy

The French have enacted among the most extensivearray of welfare state programs in the world. Cradle-to-grave social services begin before birth, withpregnant women entitled to free prenatal care. Publiceducation is excellent in France, and all students pass-ing a stiff high school graduation exam are entitled tovirtually free university education. Extensive publichousing and rent subsidies make housing affordablefor most citizens. The minimum wage is far higherthan the level prevailing in the United States, andemployees are entitled to six weeks of paid vacationannually. The unemployed receive extensive unem-ployment insurance payments and job retraining. Thelong-term unemployed are eligible to participate in aminimum income program. Many citizens are eligibleto retire around age 60, and pensions come close toreplacing retirees’ wages or salaries.

A key element of the social security system, as itis known in France, is health insurance, financedmostly by payroll taxes on employers and employees.In return for moderate co-payments, most Frenchhave coverage for prescription drugs as well as out-patient, specialized, and hospital care. In 2000, theWorld Health Organization ranked the French healthcare system first in the world.

The French system reflects the belief that the stateshould provide generous benefits to all citizens, notonly to the very poor. A journalist describes theFrench system “as a global ideological rival” to theAmerican model of social provision.23 The extensivewelfare state enables many French citizens to live in

dignity. However, there are three steep and interre-lated costs associated with French social provision.The first is financial: social expenditures account fornearly one-third of France’s gross domestic product,second only to Sweden among EU countries.24 More-over, tax revenues to finance social programs areperennially outstripped by soaring medical costs, highlevels of unemployment, a slowdown in birthrates(which means fewer active workers to finance welfarebenefits), and a demographic imbalance between re-tired and younger, employed workers. Nor will thesestructural problems ease with time. Currently, forevery retired worker there are three adults who work;by 2050, the ratio will drop to 1.5 employed workersfor every retired worker. Since, under France’s pay-as-you-go system, employed workers mostly pay thetaxes that finance pensions for the elderly, strains onsocial programs are bound to increase.

Second, hefty social spending may slow economicgrowth and inhibit job creation. For decades, Frenchgrowth rates have been anemic. The result is a low rateof social mobility and increased economic inequalities.In 1975, the wealthiest 10 percent of French house-holds owned 40 percent of all assets; thirty years later,the wealthiest tenth owned 54 percent. Economic stag-nation also means high unemployment. For thirtyyears, France has had among the highest levels of un-employment of industrialized countries. For years, ithas hovered around 10 percent. Because the bulk ofthe social security system is financed by payroll taxes,employers are deterred from adding new workers tothe payroll. Those hurt worst are young adults seekingtheir first job. For years, voters have consistentlyranked unemployment among the most pressing prob-lems in France. The failure of successive governmentsto deal with the problem has contributed to the fre-quent electoral gyrations of the recent period.

The Socialist government of Lionel Jospin(1995–2002) sought to reduce unemployment byreducing the work week from 39 to 35 hours. The aimwas to share work and encourage employers to addworkers to the payroll. Since the reform also containeda provision enabling employers to schedule work moreflexibly, it provided benefits to both business firms andworkers. Controversy continues about the reform, andthe Raffarin government sponsored a measure to au-thorize increases in the work week.


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 115

Cengage Learning

Third, some needy groups receive relatively fewpublic or private benefits. The result is to divide the so-ciety into those living relatively well and marginalizedcitizens. The French have coined the term the socialfracture to describe the new pattern of inequality. Twogroups of citizens are unusually well organized andhave obtained extensive social benefits: full-time, sta-bly employed workers (especially civil servants) andolder citizens. (Retirees receive relatively generouspensions, and retirement benefits constitute the lion’sshare of social spending.) On the other side of theledger, youth, immigrants, and women receive fewersocial benefits and are more likely to be unemployed.Historian Timothy B. Smith claims that imbalances inthe distribution of social benefits explain why “Frenchpublic policy, despite its rhetoric of solidarity, createsor aggravates as many inequalities as it corrects.”Smith estimates that over one-third of the working agepopulation “is either poor, unemployed, or underem-ployed with access to limited social benefits.”25

Society and EconomyFrench economic performance has traditionally beenhindered by stormy relations between managementand labor. Typically, employers refused to bargain col-lectively with unions, and workers resorted to strikesand pressuring the state to mandate gains. Frenchlabor unions have long had a beleaguered existence.For example, they obtained the legal right to organizeplant-level locals only as a result of the May 1968 up-rising. Employers were not legally required to bargaincollectively with unions over wages and hours untilthe Socialist government passed reform legislation in1982. The labor movement has historically been quiteweak. It was further weakened when economicgrowth slowed and industrial restructuring destroyedlabor’s traditional bastions of organized labor. Cur-rently, less than 10 percent of the wage-earning popu-lation belongs to a labor union.

Inequality and Ethnic Minorities

France long prided itself on its ability to integrate eth-nic minorities. Yet France’s vaunted openness was par-tially misleading. (This issue is discussed in Section4.) Immigrants face significantly greater hardships in

the labor market. In 2002, a government study reportedextensive racial discrimination and the existence of aglass ceiling that limits social mobility among immi-grants and first-generation French citizens.26

Inequality and Women

France has been at the forefront of providing social ser-vices, such as daycare facilities, that enable women towork outside the home. Mothers are entitled to fromfour to six months of paid maternity leave, and in 2002fathers were granted two weeks of paid paternity leave.Low-cost daycare facilities staffed by highly qualifiedteachers have facilitated an enormous increase infemale employment rates in recent decades. The pro-portion of women aged twenty-five to forty-nine in thepaid labor force has soared—from 49 percent in 1970to 82 percent in 2003.27

However, French women are far from achievingeconomic and social equality. Although laws mandategender equality in the workplace and outlaw sexualharassment, France has the lowest proportion offemale managers and administrators, along with Japan,among industrialized countries. The gender wage gapin France—that is, the wage disparity between menand women for comparable work––is 20 percent.

The Generation Gap

France’s extensive welfare state arrangements havecreated a sharp generation gap. Young adults are morethan twice as likely to be unemployed as the nationalaverage. Thus, they indirectly absorb the costs of agenerous welfare state. Recent government measuresto deregulate labor markets have proved a mixedblessing for the young. Although flexibility in sched-uling work encourages new hiring and is especiallyhelpful for those seeking their first job, two-thirds ofnewly hired workers in France have temporary orpart-time jobs, which provide lower wages and fewerfringe benefits.

France in the Global EconomyFrance has become closely integrated in the Europeanand global economy. At the same time that this hasproduced benefits, it has also aroused the fear that


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 116

Cengage Learning

globalization and Europeanization will jeopardizeFrance’s cherished social model.

France and the EU

France’s participation in the EU has produced a bedrockshift in France’s economic orientation. Whereas thebulk of its international trade and investment in thepostwar period were with its former colonies in Asiaand Africa, over 60 percent of French imports and ex-ports are currently with other member states of the EU.

The EU is not simply external to France. After all,the Franco-German tandem has provided the leader-ship largely shaping the pace and character of Euro-pean integration. The EU has enabled Europe to aspireto the status of a world-class economy. EU member-ship has contributed to French economic growth andhas benefited many sectors of the French economy. Ofparticular importance is the fact that, ever since thecreation of the EU, French farmers have received thelargest agricultural subsidies of any single group in theEU. Indeed, soon after the defeat of the 2005 referen-dum on the European constitution, British prime min-ister Tony Blair called for the phasing out of these sub-sidies—and provoked an angry and virtuallyunanimous response from the French.

The EU provides challenges and dilemmas as wellas opportunities. The EU’s decision to limit budgetdeficits and state subsidies challenges the state-ledpattern by which France achieved economic successand cultural distinctiveness. EU regulations prohibitstates from engaging in the kind of dirigisme that wasthe hallmark of the French state in the postwar period.France has been forced to make greater adjustments inits style of economic management than is the case forother member countries of the EU.

The weight of the EU is evident in virtually everypolicy area imaginable. For example, in late 2002,when French truckers mounted a strike for higher

wages, they set up roadblocks throughout France. Sincesome of Europe’s most crucial transportation routeslinking southern and northern Europe pass throughFrance, the move threatened to bring commercethroughout Europe to a halt. The EU warned the Frenchgovernment that if this were to occur, it would violateFrance’s EU treaty commitments not to impede the freeflow of goods and subject France to stiff fines. Foryears, groups in France criticized what was regarded asEU-mandated austerity measures. That sentimenthelped fuel the outcome of the 2005 referendum.

France and Globalization

France is highly integrated in the global economy.The value of imports and exports account for fullyhalf of French GDP. Foreign investors, especiallyAmerican pension funds, own nearly half of all sharestraded on the French stock exchange. About one-thirdof all French workers are employed in firms that are atleast partly foreign-owned. France ranks among thetop countries of the world both as an exporter of capi-tal and as a location for foreign investment. Contraryto the stereotype of France as a bucolic, rural econ-omy, only about 3 percent of the population is em-ployed in agriculture. France is a highly industrializedeconomy that can boast a large number of world-classindustrial, banking, and high-tech firms. In 2003, thebusiness magazine Forbes compiled a list of theworld’s four hundred best-performing companies.France was second only to the United States in thenumber of companies on the list.28

At the same time, French participation in the globaleconomy, as well as the performance of the Frencheconomy more generally, has caused intense strains indomestic politics. The ways that economic factors arerefracted in internal politics depends heavily on theshape of political institutions and partisan coalitions.We analyze these issues in the next two sections.


Despite frequent changes of regimes in the past twocenturies, three guiding principles of the Frenchstate have remained nearly constant. That all three

have changed recently suggests that a fundamentalshift is occurring in the character of the Frenchstate. First, for centuries, few questioned the value

Section D Governance and Policy-Making

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 117

Cengage Learning

of a unitary state. (Article 2 of the French constitu-tion specifies, “France is a Republic, indivisible,secular, democratic and social.”) Although no oneproposes altering the unitary character of the state,an important change occurred in the 1980s, whenthe Socialist government transferred substantialpowers to local, departmental, and regional govern-ments. In 2003, the conservative government ofJean-Pierre Raffarin sponsored additional transfersof power to subnational governments, along with aconstitutional amendment affirming the principle ofdecentralization.

Second, the state’s relation to French society hasshifted. Although the state continues to have an ex-ceptionally central role, it now consults and per-suades more, and commands less.

The third change involves constitutional mecha-nisms limiting state action. Until recently, the Frenchaccorded little importance to the principle of consti-tutional supremacy. A nation that emphasizes the im-portance of formalized legal codes and that boaststhe modern world’s second written constitution (af-ter the United States) did not consider that the con-stitution should be scrupulously respected. Frenchdemocratic theory held that the legislature, chosenby democratic elections, should have a free hand togovern and should not be hindered by constitutionalor judicial restraint. Similarly, the executive safelyignored the judiciary. This too has changed. Theconstitution of the Fifth Republic has come to be re-garded as the authoritative source for allocatingpower among political institutions, and the Constitu-tional Council has gained the vital power of judicialreview, that is, the power to nullify legislation andsanction executive actions that it judges to be in vio-lation of the constitution.

In brief, recent changes require analyzing Frenchpolitical institutions with a fresh eye.

Organization of the StateThe Fifth Republic is usually described as a semi-presidential system, combining elements of presi-dential and parliamentary systems. In a presidentialsystem, such as in the United States, the executiveand the legislature are chosen separately, and thetwo branches have independent powers; neither

branch selects the other, is directly accountable tothe other, or controls the other’s agenda. Moreover,both institutions have fixed terms in office, and nei-ther one can force the other to resign and face newelections. The one exception in a presidential systemis that the legislature can impeach and force thepresident to resign when it deems that he or she hascommitted treason or other grave misdeeds. There isa similar impeachment procedure in the French FifthRepublic, although it has never been used: an ab-solute majority of both houses of parliament mustvote articles of impeachment. The president’s case isthen judged by a High Court of Justice comprisingtwelve deputies and twelve senators elected by thetwo houses.

In a parliamentary system, the executive and leg-islature are fused. The government is accountable toparliament and usually must resign if parliamentpasses a motion of no confidence. At the same time,the government has substantial control over the parlia-mentary agenda and can dissolve parliament, therebynecessitating new elections.

In the Fifth Republic, both the president and par-liament are popularly elected. In contrast to both pres-idential and parliamentary systems the French systemprovides for a dual executive: the president appoints aprime minister and government. As in parliamentarysystems, the parliament can force the governmentto resign (but, recall, not the president) by voting amotion of no confidence—what the French call amotion of censure.

Why is the Fifth Republic considered a semipres-idential system? The semi refers to the fact that intwo key respects—notably, the existence of a govern-ment responsible to parliament and the government’sability to dissolve parliament and call new elec-tions—the legislature and executive are not whollyseparate, as they are in a pure presidential system.The system is called semipresidential, not semiparlia-mentary, because whenever the Fifth Republic devi-ates from a purely parliamentary or presidentialmodel, the result is to strengthen the executive. Thefusion of executive and legislative powers character-istic of parliamentary regimes enables the executiveto control the parliamentary agenda and dissolve par-liament. The executive is further strengthened by thefact that, in contrast to parliamentary regimes, the


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 118

Cengage Learning

French parliament cannot vote censure of the presi-dent, although the National Assembly (the more pow-erful house of parliament) can vote a motion censur-ing the government, thus forcing it to resign. The factthat the president—the key office within the dual ex-ecutive––is not answerable to parliament, a featurethat reflects the separation of powers found in presi-dential systems, provides the executive with excep-tional power in the Fifth Republic.

Despite the lopsided relationship between theexecutive and legislature, the Fifth Republic is amongthe most stable regimes in modern French history.Support for the regime has been bolstered by France’seconomic prosperity and a peaceful international con-text. Thus, for the first time in modern French history,political conflicts are now played out within a widelyaccepted institutional framework.

Since the early 1980s, the Fifth Republic hasovercome two daunting political challenges. The firstwas a shift in political control (alternation) betweenopposing partisan coalitions in 1981, when FrançoisMitterrand defeated incumbent Valéry Giscard d’Es-taing. Contrary to widespread fears, the institutionsof the Fifth Republic proved quite adequate to thechallenge. Since then, alternation has occurred sev-eral times.

The second challenge involved the emergence ofdivided institutional control, when the president ledone political coalition and parliament was controlledby a rival coalition. The French call this cohabita-tion, or power sharing. In the early years of the FifthRepublic, many feared that this situation would pro-duce stalemate or even a crisis of the regime. TheGaullist party’s dominance of both the presidencyand parliament prevented a test from occurring for along time. However, the unthinkable finally did occurin 1986, during the presidency of François Mitter-rand, when parliamentary elections produced a con-servative majority in the National Assembly. Presi-dent Mitterrand immediately bowed to politicalrealities by appointing Jacques Chirac, leader of theconservative coalition, to be prime minister. Theevent proved to be the mouse that roared. The twoseasoned politicians quickly devised workable solu-tions to governing, and despite a few tremors theregime held firm. As with alternation, cohabitationhas occurred several times since then.

However, the most recent experience of cohabita-tion, in 1997–2002, provoked an important institu-tional reform. When the Socialists and their allies wonthe 1997 parliamentary elections, Jacques Chirac,who had been elected president only two years earlier,was forced to name Socialist leader Lionel Jospin asprime minister. The long duration of cohabitation thistime—five full years—proved highly unpopular. In anattempt to prevent a repeat performance, major partiesagreed to reduce the president’s term from seven tofive years, the same length as that of the National As-sembly, and to hold elections for the two branches atabout the same time. Doing so would greatly increasethe chance that the same coalition would win bothelections. In the first elections held under the new sys-tem, in 2002, Jacques Chirac was resoundingly re-elected president, and his conservative supporters wona large majority in the National Assembly. Unifiedcontrol of the executive and legislature will probablyendure until at least 2007.

Three reasons might be suggested for why politi-cal institutions have been able to overcome thechallenges of alternation and cohabitation. First, theideological distance between Left and Right haddeclined prior to these challenges. Second, theConstitutional Council (whose powers are describedbelow) has helped maintain a balance (equilibrium)among institutions. Finally, public opinion polls sug-gested that most French citizens strongly prefer politi-cal stability. These developments signify the develop-ment of a more pragmatic political style.

The ExecutiveFrance was the first major country to adopt a semi-presidential system. After the fall of communism,Russia was inspired by the French example. Othercountries that have adopted semipresidential systemsinclude Austria, Finland, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Iceland,and (most recently) Iraq.

In parliamentary regimes, the head of state—eithera president or a monarch—exercises purely ceremonialduties, while the bulk of executive power is wielded bythe prime minister and cabinet (collectively known asthe government). In France, the president is designatedas the head of state but also enjoys extensive policy-making and executive power. However, the president


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 119

Cengage Learning

also shares executive power with the prime ministerand cabinet—who are appointed by the president butresponsible to parliament.

The balance of power between the two heads ofthe executive depends in large measure on the politi-cal situation. When the president and prime ministerare political allies and lead the same governingcoalition, presidential preeminence is ensured be-cause the prime minister defers to the president’sleadership. During cohabitation, the situationchanges dramatically. Recognizing that the NationalAssembly would overturn a government composedof the president’s political allies, the president isforced to name the leader of the opposing coalitionas prime minister, and the president and prime min-ister share power.

The President

When both the executive and the legislature arecontrolled by the same party coalition—what we willterm united control—the president combines thepowers of the U.S. president—notably, command ofthe executive branch and independence from thelegislature—with the powers that accrue to thegovernment in a parliamentary regime—namely, con-trol of parliament’s agenda and the ability to dissolveparliament. During periods of united control, thepresident’s power exceeds that of the chief executivein virtually any other democratic nation.

The presidency is such a powerful position be-cause of (1) the towering personalities of Charles deGaulle, the founder and first president of the FifthRepublic, and François Mitterrand, the Socialist pres-ident from 1981 to 1995; (2) the ample powers con-ferred on the office by the constitution; and (3) politi-cal practices of the Fifth Republic.

Presidential Personalities. Charles de Gaulle(1890–1970) was the most influential politician inmodern French history. After leading the Resistanceforces in France during World War II and helping totopple the Fourth Republic in 1958, he designed theFifth Republic to facilitate strong leadership. As firstpresident in the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle set the stan-dard for his successors. (Table 2 lists the Fifth Repub-lic’s presidents and their terms of office.)

The next president to expand presidential powerswas François Mitterrand. (The two presidents whogoverned between de Gaulle and Mitterrand, GeorgesPompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing were nothighly influential.) Mitterrand was a youthful leaderin the Resistance during World War II and an ally ofde Gaulle. But when de Gaulle returned to power in1958, Mitterrand joined many on the left in opposingthe Fifth Republic as undemocratic. In the 1960s and1970s, he was an ardent opponent of de Gaulle, deGaulle’s policies, and the constitution of the FifthRepublic. Mitterrand ran for president in 1965 and1974, losing both times. However, he succeeded inremaking the Socialist Party into a major alternativeto the Gaullist coalition, and in 1981, in his thirdpresidential bid, he defeated incumbent presidentValéry Giscard d’Estaing. Mitterrand was re-electedin 1988 and remained in office until 1995, the longestpresidential term in the history of the Fifth Republic.

On becoming president, Mitterrand ruled in amonarchical manner that was strikingly similar tothat of his archrival, de Gaulle. He was largely res-ponsible for the Socialist government’s initial radicalreform agenda, as well as for its right turn in 1983. Hesponsored seven major architectural projects thatreshaped the geography of Paris. He worked closelywith German chancellor Helmut Kohl to promoteEuropean economic integration and monetary union.Mitterrand retired after two terms in office. The win-ning candidate in the 1995 presidential election wasJacques Chirac. During much of his first term,Chirac’s power was severely limited because he wasforced to govern with Socialist prime minister LionelJospin, leader of the Socialist coalition that dominated


Table 2

Presidents of the Fifth Republic

President Term

Charles de Gaulle 1958–1969Georges Pompidou 1969–1974Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 1974–1981François Mitterrand 1981–1995Jacques Chirac 1995–Present

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 120

Cengage Learning

the National Assembly. Although he gained freedomof action when he was reelected in 2002 and his con-servative allies won the 2002 legislative elections,Chirac has not yet placed a distinctive stamp on thepresidency. His gamble that he could persuade theFrench to approve the 2005 referendum on the Euro-pean constitution proved disastrous, and the resultwas to leave Chirac weak and humiliated.

The Constitutional Presidency. The constitutionof the Fifth Republic endows the president with theceremonial powers of head of state. He resides in theresplendent Élysée Palace, in a fashionable section ofParis, and represents France at international diplo-matic gatherings. The constitution also grants thepresident important additional powers that enable himto shape policy.

The president is the only political official directlychosen by the entire French electorate. This providesan enormously important source of personal support.In order to be eligible to run, one must be a Frenchcitizen at least twenty-three years old. Presidents areeligible for re-election without limit. The office ofvice president does not exist in France; if a presidentdies in office, the president of the Senate (the upperhouse of parliament) acts as interim president, and anew election is held within a short time.

A two-ballot system of election is used for presi-dential elections. To win on the first ballot, a candi-date must obtain an absolute majority, that is, over 50percent of those voting. If no candidate receives afirst-ballot majority, the case in every presidentialelection to date, a runoff election is held two weekslater between the two front-runners.

To qualify as a presidential candidate, five hun-dred mayors or regional legislators must sign a nomi-nating petition. Because there are about forty thou-sand such officials, it is not too difficult to obtainenough signatures; thus, many candidates typicallycompete in presidential elections. The record was2002, when the field contained sixteen candidates! Al-though only candidates nominated by major politicalparties stand a realistic chance of winning, minor-party candidates can affect which candidates make itto the runoff ballot. The most dramatic example oc-curred in 2002, when Lionel Jospin, the major center-

left candidate, came in third, behind Chirac and far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen. A large number ofleftist candidates that year drained enough votes toprevent Jospin from making the runoff.

The constitution grants the president the followingpolitical powers:

• The president names the prime minister, approvesthe prime minister’s choice of other cabinet offi-cials, and names high-ranking civil, military, andjudicial officials.

• The president presides over meetings of the Coun-cil of Ministers (the government). Note that theconstitution charges the president, not the primeminister, with this responsibility.

• The president conducts foreign affairs, through thepower to negotiate and ratify treaties, as well as toname French ambassadors and accredit foreign am-bassadors to France.

• The president directs the armed forces, bolstered bya 1964 decree that grants the president exclusivecontrol over France’s nuclear forces.

• The president may dissolve the National Assemblyand call for new elections. If he (there has neverbeen a female president) does so, he cannot do soagain for a year.

• The president appoints three of the nine membersof the Constitutional Council, including its presi-dent, and can refer bills passed by parliament tothe council to determine if they conform to theconstitution.

Four other constitutional grants of powerstrengthen the president’s position. Article 16 autho-rizes the president to assume emergency powerswhen, in his or her judgment, the institutions of the re-public, the independence of the nation, the integrity ofits territory, or the execution of France’s international(treaty) commitments are threatened. It is unthinkablethat a president would invoke Article 16 except in avery grave crisis. Nonetheless, its existence providesthe president with vast potential power if such a situa-tion were to occur.

Article 89 authorizes the president, with the ap-proval of the prime minister, to propose constitutionalamendments. Each chamber of parliament mustapprove the amendment, following which it must be


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 121

Cengage Learning

ratified either by a national referendum or by a three-fifths vote of both houses of parliament meetingtogether as a congress. The amendment procedure hasbeen used with increasing frequency in recent years;about two-thirds of the amendments have been addedsince the 1990s.

Article 11, amended in 1995, authorizes the presi-dent to organize a national referendum to approveimportant policy initiatives or reorganize politicalinstitutions, provided that the proposed change is firstapproved by the government. (This procedure is dis-tinct from the process of amending the constitution—which, as we have just seen, may also involve callinga referendum.)

The referendum was used several times in theearly years of the Fifth Republic. But, as the referen-dum of 2005 dramatically illustrated, using it canbackfire. When voters rejected a referendum that deGaulle called in 1969 to approve his proposal to re-structure the Senate and create regional governments,he considered that he had lost popular confidence andresigned from office. While no other referendumsince then had been defeated prior to 2005, subse-quent referenda received quite lukewarm support. Forexample, turnout in the referendum of 2000 toshorten the president’s term was an embarrassinglylow 31 percent. The defeat of the referendum thatPresident Chirac proposed in 2005 ensures that futurepresidents will be extremely hesitant to call a refer-endum. Article 5 directs the president “to ensure, byhis arbitration, the regular functioning of the govern-mental authorities, as well as the continuance of theState. He shall be the guarantor of national indepen-dence, of the integrity of the territory, and of respectfor . . . agreements and treaties.” The precise meaningof this clause is not clear. But the president is the soleofficial delegated the awesome responsibilities of ar-bitrating among state institutions and guaranteeingnational independence.

The Political President. The constitution createsa powerful office on paper. But to be effective, apresident must translate formal powers into the actualexercise of influence.

The fact that the president is the only officialelected by the entire nation provides a powerful

weapon that can be used against the opposition, aswell as to keep the president’s own allies in line.When the president delivers a television address orholds a news conference, this is the lead news story ofthe day. However, presidential leadership hinges onwhether the president commands a parliamentary ma-jority. When a party coalition hostile to the presidentdominates parliament, presidential power is consider-ably reduced.

During periods of unified control, presidents haveused their formal and informal powers to the hilt. Inaddition to the constitutional power to designateprime ministers, presidents have successfully claimedthe ability to dismiss them (a power not granted in theconstitution). The effect is to make the governmentresponsible not only to the National Assembly, asspecified in the constitution, but also to the president.During periods of unified control, presidents have alsoassumed the power, assigned to the government by theconstitution, to shape policy in virtually any domainthey choose. Yet even the most powerful presidents donot direct the day-to-day operation of the far-flungexecutive. That responsibility falls to the prime minis-ter and government.

The Prime Minister and Government

Although the constitution provides the president withample powers, it does not authorize the president tomake many key policy decisions. The constitutiondesignates the government, not the president, as thepreeminent policy-making institution. Article 20states that the government “shall determine and directthe policy of the nation. It shall have at its disposal theadministration and the armed forces.” And Article 21authorizes the prime minister to “direct the action ofthe government. He [the prime minister] is responsi-ble for national defense. He assures the execution ofthe laws.” Thus, prime ministers accept the president’sleadership, as they invariably do during periods ofunified control, because of political dynamics ratherthan constitutional directive.

The constitution authorizes the president toappoint the prime minister. Prime ministers are usu-ally leaders of the major party in the dominant coali-tion in the National Assembly in order to ensure


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 122

Cengage Learning

parliamentary support for the prime minister and gov-ernment. (The boxed feature on institutional intrica-cies further explores the complex relationship of pres-idents and prime ministers.)

The prime minister in turn nominates, and the pres-ident appoints, members of the cabinet or government,a collective body under the prime minister’s direction.Most cabinet members, also known as ministers, are se-nior politicians from the dominant parliamentary coali-

tion. The constitution specifies that members of the Na-tional Assembly who are named to the cabinet must re-sign their parliamentary seat. Positions in the cabinetare allotted to political parties in rough proportion totheir strength in the majority parliamentary coalition.An attempt is also made to ensure regional balance.

Cabinet ministers direct government departmentsand propose policy initiatives in their domain. If sup-ported by the government and president, these proposals


The relationship between the president andprime minister is a key element in the FifthRepublic. There are two possible situations:

(1) when the president and prime minister arepolitical allies and (2) the periods of cohabitation,when the two are political opponents. The firstsituation occurred from the beginning of the FifthRepublic in 1958 until 1986. During this longperiod, when the president enjoyed the support ofa parliamentary majority, he was able to name aclose political ally as prime minister. The resultwas undisputed presidential supremacy. Most ofthe time, presidents selected the prime ministerfrom the ranks of leaders of the majority partycoalition. Loyal prime ministers can provide thepresident with important political assets: parlia-mentary support for the government’s policies, skillin gaining sympathetic media treatment, andexperience in directing the state bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, even when the same politicalcoalition controls the presidency and parliament,tensions between the prime minister and presidentare inevitable. Prime ministers are constantlytempted to stake out a position independent of thepresident in the hope that, one day, they will movefrom the Matignon (the prime minister’s official res-idence) to the Elysée. In order to do so, a primeminister must be more than a presidential lapdog.

During cohabitation, the balance shifts fromopen displays of cooperation to open displays ofrivalry. The president cannot expect the primeminister and parliament to support presidential

initiatives. The president is now forced to assumethe mantle of dignified and ceremonial head ofstate, while the prime minister assumes the respon-sibility—and risks—of policy leadership. The situa-tion somewhat resembles that in parliamentaryregimes—save that the French prime minister mustalso contend with the ever-present danger that thepresident may publicly criticize the prime minis-ter’s decisions (the parallel situation in Britain—that the queen would openly oppose the govern-ment—is unthinkable). When cohabitation inFrance occurred in 1986, following the election ofa Conservative parliamentary majority, it lastedonly briefly because the electoral calendar pro-vided for a presidential election to be held withintwo years. Mitterrand won reelection that year,dissolved the National Assembly, and persuadedthe electorate to produce a Socialist victory (thusending divided control).

In 1997, the Socialists’ victory in legislativeelections occurred only two years into PresidentChirac’s seven-year term. This meant that cohabi-tation lasted for five long years, an experiencethat prompted extensive criticism. A constitutionalreform was enacted in 2000 reducing the presi-dent’s term to five years, in part with the aim ofminimizing the chances of cohabitation.

When President Chirac was reelected in2002 and a center-right coalition swept thelegislative elections that followed, cohabitationended, and the chances were that it would notrecur for many years. Few lamented its passing.

Institutional Intricacies: Of Presidents and Prime Ministers

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 123

Cengage Learning

are included on the legislative and administrativeagenda. One way for ambitious politicians to rise is bydynamic performance as ministers.

The prime minister and other government minis-ters have extensive staff assistance to help them super-vise the immense and far-flung bureaucracy. Forexample, the prime minister’s office includes, in addi-tion to his personal staff, the General Secretariat ofthe Government, the General Directorate for Admin-istrative and Financial Services, and the GeneralSecretariat for National Defense. These powerfulagencies are charged with coordinating and supervis-ing policy implementation by government ministries.

Although the respective responsibilities of presi-dents and prime ministers vary because of politicaland personality factors, an informal division of laborexists. During periods of unified control, the presidentformulates the state’s overall policy direction, whilethe prime minister is responsible for translating thesegeneral policies into specific programs and supervis-ing the implementation of policy.

During cohabitation, presidents retain predomi-nant responsibility for overall defense and foreignpolicy but the prime minister gains the power to shapethe government’s policy orientation. Most prime min-isters have been prominent politicians, and serving asprime minister is regarded as a stepping stone to thepresidency. During periods of unified control, primeministers provide the president with important assis-tance: leadership in shepherding government propos-als through parliament, obtaining sympathetic mediatreatment, and supervising the bureaucracy. Again,when control is unified, the prime minister’s most un-pleasant function is to serve as a lightning rod to de-flect criticism from the president. There is an inherenttension in the relationship between prime minister andpresident. This is most apparent during periods ofcohabitation, when the two may express their dis-agreements in public—a major reason why cohabita-tion became so unpopular and why the president’sterm was reduced to five years. But even during peri-ods of united control, open conflicts occasionally flareup. Political scientist Robert Elgie describes the primeminister’s thankless position: “When things go well,the President often receives the credit. When things gobadly, the Prime Minister usually takes the blame. Ifthings go very badly and the President starts to be crit-

icized, then the Prime Minister is replaced. If thingsgo very well and the Prime Minister starts to bepraised, then the Prime Minister is also replaced.”29

The prime minister is responsible for coordinatingand supervising the work of the cabinet, whichinvolves arbitrating conflicts among cabinet ministersover policy and budget priorities.

Cabinet ministers direct the government ministries.Cabinet positions differ widely in power. The ministerof finance informally ranks second to the prime minis-ter because the ministry’s ability to influence spendingpriorities gives it great influence over other governmentministries. The Ministries of Defense, External Affairs,and Interior also rank high in importance.

Even more than is the case for cabinets in other po-litical regimes, the French cabinet is not a forum forsearching policy debate or collective decision making.Cabinet meetings are occasions where constitutional re-quirements are met—for example, authorizing appoint-ment of key administrative officials—and where thepresident and prime minister announce decisions. Im-portant policies are shaped at a higher level—at theÉlysée or Matignon (official residence of the prime min-ister)—or by interministerial committees, that is, infor-mal working groups of ministers and high administratorsdirected by the president, prime minister, or their staff.

Bureaucracy and Civil Service

To describe France as having a dual executive ob-scures the power of the bureaucracy, a third con-stituent of the executive. The bureaucracy is a largeand sprawling organization that reaches far and wideto regulate French society. The three elements of theexecutive provide the motor force of the French state.

The most prominent administrators in the Frenchstate are found in the Élysée, the Matignon, and theornate government ministries scattered throughoutParis. The day-to-day work of the state, however, isperformed by an army of civil servants, including 2.3million in the state administration and another 2.7million who staff public hospitals and subnationalgovernmental bureaucracies. In brief, about one intwelve French citizens is a civil servant!

The bureaucracy has long played a key role in shap-ing the country’s social and economic life. The FifthRepublic further bolstered its influence by limiting


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 124

Cengage Learning

parliament’s legislative power and extending the gov-ernment’s authority to issue binding regulations withthe force of law. Securing a position in the bureaucracyprovides lifetime employment, considerable prestige,and good pay and fringe benefits (significantly higherthan in the private sector). Indeed, there is a strongcleavage between public and private sector workers inFrance. For example, unions are nearly nonexistent inthe private sector and are powerfully organized in thepublic sector.

The upper reaches of the bureaucracy, on which wefocus here, offer among the most prestigious and pow-erful careers in France. Recruitment is on the basis ofacademic excellence. In order to be selected for a toppost, one must graduate from one of the highly com-petitive educational institutions known as grandesécoles. While over 1 million students are enrolled inhigher education at any given time (mostly public uni-versities), only 3,000 students attend the very bestgrandes écoles.30 At the very top are the École Poly-technique, which trains engineers and scientists, andthe École Nationale d’Administration, which trains topcivil servants and executives. Despite rhetoric aboutmeritocracy, children from culturally and economi-cally favored milieux have an immense advantage inthe fierce competition for places in the grandes écoles.

Students who graduate at the top of their class at agrande école, especially the two most prestigiousones, join an even more select fraternity: a grandcorps—small, cohesive networks with particular ad-ministrative specialties, such as the financial inspec-torate or foreign service. Membership in a grandcorps is for life and guarantees a relatively amplesalary, high status, and considerable power. Recently,members of the grands corps have also gained topexecutive positions in public and private industrialfirms and banks. Many enter politics, serving in par-liament or gaining appointment as cabinet ministers.Over half of all prime ministers in the Fifth Republicwere members of grands corps, as were two of thelast three presidents (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing andJacques Chirac).

The state and the bureaucracy that is the primaryorganizational instrument for implementing statepolicies remain a formidable presence in French soci-ety. However, the diminished scope of state activity,the increased power of the private sector, ideological

changes, and the growing importance of the EU haveall reduced the morale and prestige of the civil service.

Public and Semipublic Agencies

The past two decades have produced a steep declinein the number of public sector enterprises in basicindustry, banking, transportation, energy, and telecom-munications. Large and powerful semipublic agenciesremain––for example, Electricity of France, theagency that monopolizes the distribution of electricitythroughout France and that has been described as astate within the state. But like the civil service, semi-public agencies no longer enjoy the prestige and powerof yesteryear. Many formerly state-owned bastionslike France Télécom, Air France, and the Renaultautomobile company have been fully or partiallyprivatized.

Other State InstitutionsGiven the far-flung reach of the French state, manystate institutions warrant close attention. We focushere on those with great power or that are described inthe constitution.

The Military and the Police

In all countries, the military and police are key execu-tive agencies that provide the coercive force to main-tain law and order. In some countries, the armedforces play an important role in shaping policy anddirecting the state. The French army has traditionallyplayed a minor role in politics. However, in a fewinstances, the army has intervened, most recently in1958 when it helped de Gaulle return to power.

For many years, French armed forces weredeployed in France’s former colonies in Africa andthe Pacific to prop up friendly dictators. Prime Minis-ter Jospin announced in the late 1990s that the Frencharmy would no longer intervene to bolster repressiveregimes in France’s former colonies. However, Franceretains armed forces in francophone Africa andremains allied with corrupt regimes in the region.

Partly to compensate for its more modest unilateralrole, France has become a major participant in UnitedNations–sponsored peacekeeping forces in postcon-flict situations, such as in Bosnia and Afghanistan.


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 125

Cengage Learning

France has committed more troops to these efforts thanany other country in the world.

The police forces in France operate with consider-able freedom—far too much, according to critics. The“forces of order,” as they are called in France, have areputation for engaging in illegal surveillance, arbi-trary actions, and torture. Immigrants and French citi-zens from North Africa, black Africa, and theCaribbean are especially likely to be subject to iden-tity checks, strip searches, and other indignities.Judges and high executive officials have rarely actedvigorously to restrain police abuses.

The Judiciary

Through much of modern French history, the judi-ciary had little autonomy and was considered an armof the executive. In the past two decades, however,this condition has changed dramatically, with thegrowth in the powers of the Constitutional Council, aswell as the creation of independent administrative reg-ulatory authorities with extensive power in such var-ied sectors as broadcasting, stock market trading, andcommercial competition. The increased autonomy ofjudicial authority in the Fifth Republic is a remarkabledevelopment.

The Constitutional Council. The ConstitutionalCouncil might be considered the Cinderella of theFifth Republic. One study of the council observes,“Originally an obscure institution conceived to play amarginal role in the Fifth Republic, the ConstitutionalCouncil has gradually moved toward the center stageof French politics and acquired the status of a majoractor in the policy-making system.”31 The councilgained great independence and prominence after itsuccessfully asserted the right of judicial review andespecially after a constitutional amendment passed in1974 authorized opposition members of parliament torefer bills for review by the council.

The nine members of the council are named forstaggered nine-year nonrenewable terms. The presi-dents of the National Assembly and Senate each ap-point three members. The president of the republicnames the remaining three members and designatesthe council’s president. Ex-presidents of the republicare entitled to sit on the council. Members of the Con-stitutional Council are generally distinguished jurists

or elder statesmen. The first woman was appointed tothe council in 1992.

The Constitutional Council has played an impor-tant role in checking and moderating the executiveand legislature, but it has been the object of intensecriticism after issuing controversial judgments. Al-though the council seeks to maintain a nonpartisanposture, its members’ positions may be influenced bytheir political values. The government sought torestrict the council’s ability to overturn legislation bya constitutional amendment in 1995 stipulating that areferendum can pass legislation that violates the con-stitution. The effect is to bypass the council’s reviewprocedure in such cases.

The French judicial system of Roman law, codi-fied in the Napoleonic Code and other legal codes(for example, those governing industrial relations andlocal government), differs from the pattern prevailingin nations inspired by the common law system, suchas Britain and the United States. French courts accordlittle importance to judicial precedent; what countsare legislative texts and the codification of legislationin particular subfields. French judges also play anactive role in questioning witnesses and recommend-ing verdicts to juries. A judicial authority, the juged’instruction, prepares the prosecution’s case. Crimi-nal defendants enjoy fewer rights than in the U.S. orBritish system of criminal justice, although defen-dants’ rights have been strengthened in recent years.

State Council. France has a system of administra-tive courts whose importance is linked to the greatpower of the bureaucracy and the wide scope of ad-ministrative regulations (many areas regulated bylaws in other democratic systems are the subject ofadministrative regulation in France). There is a hierar-chy of about thirty administrative courts. The mostimportant is the Conseil d’État (State Council), whoserole as a watchdog on the executive is especiallyimportant in the French political system, where theexecutive has such great autonomy. (Members of theState Council belong to one of the most powerful andprestigious grand corps.) The council decides casesbrought by individuals alleging that their rights havebeen violated by administrative regulations and ac-tions, and it can order appropriate remedies. The StateCouncil also provides advice to the government about


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 126

Cengage Learning

the constitutionality, legality, and coherence of pro-posed laws. Although the government can overrule theState Council, it rarely does so because the council’sopinions command enormous respect.

The Economic and Social Council

The constitution designates the Economic and SocialCouncil as a consultative body composed of represen-tatives from business, agriculture, labor unions, socialwelfare organizations, and consumer groups, as wellas distinguished citizens from cultural and scientificfields. The council has issued influential reports onimportant public issues, including job discriminationtoward immigrants and reorganization of the mini-mum wage system. However, it has no legislativepower and occupies a modest role within the regime.

Subnational Government

France has three layers of subnational elected govern-ments: municipal, departmental, and regional. Thereare over 36,000 municipalities, more than in all otherWestern European countries combined! Although thesystem seems unusually cumbersome, citizens aredeeply attached to local government: public opinionpolls consistently demonstrate that local politicianscommand far greater respect than do national office-holders. Until the 1980s, local governments werequite weak; responsibility for regulating local affairswas in the hands of nationally appointed field offi-cers––for example, prefects, supervisors of civil en-gineering, and financial officers––who representedgovernment ministries.

The Socialist government sponsored a fundamentaloverhaul of local government in the 1980s. State super-vision of local governments was reduced, regional gov-ernments were created, and localities were authorizedto levy taxes and sponsor a wide range of economic,social, and cultural activities. The Raffarin governmentsponsored a constitutional amendment in 2003 extend-ing the scope of decentralization. The amendmentenshrines the principle of decentralization in the consti-tution and requires the national government to providelocal governments with adequate tax revenues whenlocal governments are delegated responsibilities.

The decentralization reforms have had mixedeffects. They have enabled regional, departmental,

and city governments to gain significant responsibil-ity for education, transportation, social welfare, andcultural activity. Subnational governments have spon-sored public transportation facilities linking cities inthe provinces, thereby weakening the characteristicwheel-and-spokes pattern by which all French roadsformerly led to Paris! The reforms have brought gov-ernment closer to citizens. They have enabled localgovernments to sponsor joint public-private economicdevelopment projects.

Yet critics of the reforms argue that decentraliza-tion has produced some new problems. Local officialsin many localities have been convicted of taking kick-backs from contractors who seek contracts for publicworks projects, questionable land developmentschemes, and municipal contracts. The reforms havealso increased economic inequalities among localitiesand regions.

The Policy-Making ProcessThe policy-making process differs substantially be-tween periods of unified control and cohabitation.When control is united, the president formulates majorpolicy initiatives, usually after consulting with theprime minister and powerful cabinet ministers. Govern-ment ministers, assisted by top civil servants, developlegislative proposals and administrative regulations totranslate broad policy into concrete action. And the par-liament generally approves the government’s initia-tives. During periods of divided control, the prime min-ister has the dominant voice in most areas ofpolicy-making, and the president retreats to the politi-cal wings. However, even during cohabitation, the pres-ident retains great authority in foreign affairs.

Moving outside the executive, there are fewer op-portunities in France compared with most other de-mocratic regimes for public and private actors outsidegovernment to influence policy-making. The constitu-tion enshrines executive dominance at the expense ofthe legislature and popular participation. The bureau-cracy is large, expert, and often domineering. Thepoints of access for private interests are fewer than inmost democratic regimes.

Yet the fact that a particular policy is adopted doesnot mean that it will be fully and smoothly imple-mented. One cannot predict the details of policy


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 127

Cengage Learning

outcomes merely by knowing the content of policydecisions. The bureaucracy is often internally dividedby competition among different ministries, and bu-reaucrats have expertise and power that can be used toprotect their own and their agency’s interests. More-over, private interests have resources to resist legisla-tive and bureaucratic directives, as evidenced bystrikes and popular protest described in Section 4.And the Constitutional Council has gained an impor-tant role in the policy process.

The position of the executive and the French statemore generally have been deeply affected by France’sparticipation in the global economy. EU commitmentshave limited France’s freedom of action, although EUmembership has also enabled France to leverage itspower by gaining a leading voice in this influentialmultilateral organization. EU membership has also re-distributed power among political institutions of the

French state. For example, judicial authorities, not-ably the Constitutional Council and State Council,have gained an authoritative role in interpreting andapplying EU treaty commitments and directives.Executive agencies have gained power relative to theFrench parliament since the executive representsFrance in EU decision making, and parliament has lit-tle choice but to accept the results.

As France has become more integrated within theEU and the wider global arena, the gulf has widenedbetween political decision makers and ordinary citi-zens. The outcome of the 2005 referendum all-too-accurately reflected this gulf. The result has been toprovide additional stress on the system of politicalrepresentation, which, as described in Section 4, hasbeen shaken in recent years by conflicts involving po-litical participation, identity, and inequality.

A principal feature guiding the construction of theFifth Republic was Charles de Gaulle’s belief that po-litical parties and parliament had overstepped theirproper role in the Third and Fourth Republics andthereby prevented vigorous executive leadership. Tocorrect what he regarded as this dangerous imbalance,the Constitution of the Fifth Republic grants the exec-utive an astonishing array of powers and severelylimits popular participation, representation, and leg-islative autonomy.

Although de Gaulle did succeed in limiting parlia-ment’s role, he completely failed to curb political par-ties. Ironically, however, the development of strong,well-organized, centralized parties early in the FifthRepublic—squarely contrary to de Gaulle’s inten-tions—has proved a principal buttress of decisiveleadership and political stability—de Gaulle’s highestpriorities.

What explains this curious turn of events? DeGaulle’s decision to provide for popular electionof the presidency powerfully contributed to thedevelopment of strong parties. In an attempt to winthe all-important presidential contest, the formerlydecentralized parties of the Fourth Republic were

forced to become centralized, unified organizations.The result was to facilitate strong executive leader-ship, although parties have not been especially use-ful in fostering popular participation and representa-tion. As a result, France’s centuries-old tradition ofpopular protest against state authority persists.

The LegislatureThe French parliament is bicameral and consists ofthe more powerful National Assembly and the Senate.In the Fifth Republic, the operative assumption seemsto be that parliament should be neither seen nor heard.How far parliament has fallen since its glory days inthe Fourth Republic! Parliaments everywhere havebeen described as ceding power to the executive. Butthe French parliament began higher (in the Third andFourth Republics) and has sunk lower (in the Fifth).

In France’s semipresidential system, parliamentlacks the independence that legislatures enjoy in pres-idential systems. However, since the president is notresponsible to parliament, it cannot hold the executivefully accountable. In brief, parliament in the FifthRepublic has lost power to the president, government,


Section e Representation and Participation

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 128

Cengage Learning

bureaucracy, judiciary, television, subnational govern-ments, and the EU!

Article 34 of the constitution, which defines thescope of parliament’s legislative jurisdiction, repre-sented a revolution in French constitutional law.Rather than authorizing parliament to legislate in allareas except those explicitly designated as off-limits—true to the tradition of parliamentary sover-eignty prevailing most of the time since the FrenchRevolution––the constitution enumerates those areasin which parliament is authorized to legislate and pro-hibits legislation on other matters. Outside the consti-tutionally specified areas, the executive can issuelegally binding regulations and decrees without needfor parliamentary approval. Even within the domainof parliamentary competence, Article 38 authorizesparliament to empower the government to issue ordi-nances with the force of law. Governments have re-quested parliament to delegate them the authority toissue ordinances when they wish to save time, avoidextensive parliamentary debate, or limit unwelcomeamendments. The referendum procedure provides yetanother means for the executive to bypass parliament.

Within the limited area of lawmaking, the consti-tution grants the government extensive powers tocontrol legislative activity. The government is mostlyresponsible for establishing the parliamentary agenda.As in other parliamentary regimes, the government,not backbenchers or the opposition, initiates mostbills passed into law: about 90 percent in a typical leg-islative session.

Parliament has especially limited control over thebudgetary process. Members of parliament are pro-hibited from introducing budget amendments that willraise expenditures or lower revenues. Furthermore,parliament must approve the budget within seventydays after it has been submitted by the government, orthe government can enact it by decree (although thishas never occurred in the Fifth Republic).

The executive can choose to dissolve the NationalAssembly before its normal five-year term ends. (Theexecutive cannot dissolve the Senate, but this matterslittle since the Senate lacks two vital powers enjoyedby the National Assembly: the right to pass legislationand the ability to force the government to resignby voting censure.) If the executive dissolves theNational Assembly, it cannot do so again for a year.

The government’s control over parliament’s leg-islative and other activity is bolstered by some addi-tional measures. Under Article 44, the governmentcan call for a single vote—known as the vote bloquée(“blocked vote,” or package vote)—on all or a portionof a bill. The government can select which amend-ments to include with the text. Governments haveused—or, according to the opposition, abused—thepackage vote procedure to restrict debate on many keylegislative texts.

The government can curb parliament further bycalling for a confidence vote on either its overall poli-cies or a specific piece of legislation (Article 49). Thisprovision applies only to the National Assembly.When the government calls for a confidence vote on atext, the measure is considered approved unless theNational Assembly passes a censure motion by an ab-solute majority of all deputies within twenty-fourhours. (Members of the National Assembly are knownas deputies; members of the Senate are known as sen-ators.) Deputies who abstain are, in effect, counted asvoting with the government.

Deputies can also submit motions to censure thegovernment on their own initiative. A motion must besigned by one-tenth of all deputies in the NationalAssembly. The procedure for passing this kind of cen-sure motion is the same as that called by the govern-ment, save that deputies who sign a censure motion ofthis kind cannot do so again during the life of the leg-islature. The result is to limit the number of parlia-ment-initiated censure motions.

Given that the government normally commandsmajority support in the National Assembly, it neednot worry about being forced to resign by a vote ofcensure. In fact, only one censure motion has everpassed in the nearly fifty-year history of the FifthRepublic.

Because of the severe restrictions under whichparliament functions, it is widely perceived as a rub-ber stamp. The result is to limit the opportunity foruseful national debate, prevent opposition partiesfrom airing grievances, and force discontented groupsto take to the streets rather than channel demandsthrough parliament.

Voting in the National Assembly is generally alongparty lines, and there is strong party discipline––that is,deputies from each party vote as a bloc. This means


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 129

Cengage Learning

that the government can generally count on obtainingmajority support for proposed legislation.

In some parliamentary systems, parliamentarycommittees—the French term them commissions—play a vital role. But not in the Fifth Republic. Thereare six permanent commissions: Foreign Policy;Finances and Economy; Defense; ConstitutionalChanges, Legislation, and General Administration;Cultural, Family, and Social Affairs; and Productionand Exchange. Commissions are responsible for re-viewing proposed legislation. Although they may pro-pose amendments, the government can reject those itdislikes. The constitution also authorizes parliament tocreate commissions of inquiry to control the executive,but the few that have been created were ineffective.

In recent years, parliament has modestly increasedits role. For example, whereas in the early years of theFifth Republic, only one period a week was reservedfor members of parliament to pose oral questions tothe government, a constitutional amendment in 1995added two more periods a week. A 1990 reform in-creased the possibility for members of parliament toinitiate legislation. However, critics charge that theimbalance between executive and legislature remainsa fundamental flaw in the constitutional architectureof the Fifth Republic.

The National Assembly is by far the more power-ful chamber of parliament since it alone can censurethe government and it has the decisive role in passinglegislation. Since the Senate’s approval is required forconstitutional amendments to pass, it is coequal inthis domain with the National Assembly.

How a Bill Becomes a Law

We provide here a simplified version of the compli-cated story of how legislation is enacted. Following abill’s introduction in one of the two houses of parlia-ment (usually the National Assembly), the bill isreviewed by a parliamentary commission in thatchamber and then submitted to the full chamber fordebate, possible amendment, and vote. If the text isapproved, it is sent to the second chamber, where thesame procedure is followed.

If a bill is passed in identical form by the twohouses, it becomes law (unless subsequently struckdown by the Constitutional Council). If the twohouses twice vote different versions of a bill (or one

time each, if the government declares the bill a prior-ity matter), a joint commission of the two housesseeks to negotiate a compromise text that is again con-sidered by both houses. If the two chambers do notpass an identical text at this reading, the governmentcan request the National Assembly to have the lastword. If the National Assembly approves the text ofthe bill, the measure is considered to have passed evenif it fails to gain approval by the Senate.

Once a bill passes, the constitution authorizes thepresident of the republic, president of either chamberof the legislature, or sixty deputies or senators to re-quest the Constitutional Council to review the text.The council can strike down the entire text or justthose portions that it judges to be in violation of theconstitution. The council must be asked to rule withinone month after a bill is passed. After this period, thebill becomes law and can never be reviewed by thecouncil.

Why would the National Assembly and Senatehold different positions on a policy issue? One reasonis that the two houses are elected by different proce-dures and represent different interests.

Electing the Legislature

Elections in the 577 single-member districts of theNational Assembly are held according to a two-ballotelection procedure, similar in most respects to the onefor presidential elections. Districts are drawn by non-partisan procedures that quite accurately reflect thedistribution of the population throughout France. Tobe elected at the first ballot, a candidate must receivean absolute majority of the votes cast in the district. Ifno candidate obtains a majority—the situation in mostdistricts (although some popular deputies are re-elected at the first ballot)—a runoff election is heldthe following week. Unlike the presidential election,in which only the two front-runners may compete atthe runoff, all candidates receiving at least 12.5 per-cent of the votes can compete at the second ballot.Most second-ballot elections pit a candidate on theleft against one on the right.

Since party alliances typically reflect the left-rightdivide, the system used to elect the National Assemblycontributes to polarization within French politics. Thus,the system of alliances encouraged by the two-ballotsystem maximizes the chances that a cohesive coalition


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 130

Cengage Learning

will gain a majority in parliament, and it therebybolsters political stability in the entire political system.Political scientist Jean Charlot claims that the two-ballot single-district system “has proved . . . one of themost solid underpinnings of the Fifth Republic.”32

The procedure used to select senators produces achamber especially responsive to conservative, ruralinterests. There are 331 members of the Senate. Mostare elected for nine-year terms by mayors and towncouncilors from France’s 100 départements (theadministrative districts into which mainland andoverseas France is divided) as well as from severaloverseas territories. Since there are a disproportionatenumber of elected officials from rural areas, this pro-cedure ensures that the Senate will be particularlyconservative and zealous in defending the interests ofsmall towns and villages. When the National Assem-bly is controlled by center-right parties, the Senateand National Assembly usually agree on proposedlegislation. When the National Assembly is controlledby the Socialist party, there is much more likelihoodof conflict between the two chambers. At these times,the chances increase that the National Assembly willpass legislation over senatorial opposition.

Political Parties and the Party SystemWe have described how the existence of powerful polit-ical parties—the very factor that de Gaulle feared wouldnurture division, instability, and paralysis—has pro-moted political stability in the Fifth Republic. Partieshave facilitated stable leadership and political alterna-tion in office. In recent years, however, the decline inideological distance between the center-left and center-right has left many French citizens feeling unrepre-sented by the major established parties. The result hasbeen an erosion of support for the governing parties andincreased support for fringe parties at the ideologicalmargins. Candidates from splinter parties of left, right,and center received more than half the first-ballot votesin the 2002 presidential elections. Despite strong sup-port from the government parties, the 2005 referendumon the European constitution was resoundingly de-feated. As a result, one can discern two kinds of logic atwork in the sphere of electoral politics in contemporaryFrance. One logic involves conflict between the twomajor governmental parties (described below) to winthe presidential and parliamentary elections; the other

logic pits the two major governing parties against thefringe parties at the extremes of the political spectrum.

The Major Parties

Two major parties––the Union pour un mouvementpopulaire (UMP) and the Parti socialiste (PS)––cur-rently vie for national dominance. For the past severaldecades, each has dominated a rival coalition; the twocoalitions have alternated control of key political in-stitutions in the Fifth Republic. But the two parties arecontinually challenged by a host of smaller parties ontheir ideological flanks.

Union pour un mouvement populaire. Until Gen-eral de Gaulle reached power in 1958, parties on theright of the French political spectrum were numerousand fragmented. Although de Gaulle claimed that he didnot favor any political party, a new party was created tosupport his leadership. Largely thanks to de Gaulle’spopularity, this party—the forerunner of the Union for aPopular Majority (UMP) led by President Chirac—wasthe keystone of the Fifth Republic in the early years. Al-though the UMP, as it is now known, was eclipsed foryears beginning in the mid-1970s, it reestablished itsdominance when President Chirac was elected in 1995.The party currently controls the presidency, govern-ment, and National Assembly. However, the party is di-vided by a fierce succession struggle. President Chiracis a lame duck—his advanced age and weak politicalstanding ensure that he will not run again for the presi-dency in 2007. There is intense rivalry among severalcenter-right politicians to gain the UMP’s support in the2007 presidential elections. The two front-runners areDominique de Villepin, prime minister and a close as-sociate of President Chirac, and Nicolas Sarkhozy, a dy-namic maverick who is currently leader of the UMP andMinister of the Interior—and who has taken pains todistance himself from President Chirac.

The social base of the UMP generally reflects itsconservative orientation. Its electorate mostly consistsof business executives, shopkeepers, professionals,the elderly, the wealthy, and the highly educated.

Parti socialiste (PS). A perpetual and ineffectiveopposition party in the early years of the FifthRepublic, the PS became a vanguard of newly mod-ernized France in 1981, when it swept the presiden-tial and parliamentary elections that year. Since then,


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 131

Cengage Learning

the PS has rivaled the UMP for dominance. It hasprofoundly shaped present-day France by embracingthe institutions of the Fifth Republic (many on theleft opposed the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic inthe early years), sponsoring sweeping reforms duringthe early 1980s and promoting a moderate reformismsince then.

The PS reached power in 1981 by advocating sub-stantial, even radical, changes. However, the party lostits ideological bearings after the right turn of 1983and was further damaged when Mitterrand’s own rep-utation was tarnished by scandals involving his closepersonal associates and by revelations that, beforebecoming a Resistance leader during World War II, hehad been active in a far-right organization.

The PS draws support from civil servants, low-income groups, and educated professionals. While itssupport base is to some extent the mirror image of theUMP’s, in another respect the two parties are similarin that they tend to represent the more secure strata ofFrench society. Some of the most vulnerable andexcluded groups, including unskilled workers, the un-employed, and early school-leavers, have been espe-cially likely to support fringe parties.

Small Parties

As the two major political parties that dominate theparty system have converged, many voters have de-cided that neither one is responsive to their concerns.Thus, at the same time that the PS has consolidated thecenter-left and the UMP has consolidated the center-right, an array of parties fill niches throughout the po-litical universe. The extreme case was the 2002 presi-dential election, when Jospin and Chirac, the PS andUMP candidates, received only 36 percent of the vote.Fourteen other candidates, including, for example, thecandidate from the Hunters, Fishing Enthusiasts,Nature, and Tradition Party (Parti chasse, pêche,nature et traditions, CNPT), shared the remainingvotes. The existence of splinter or fringe parties meansthat the current French party system exhibits stronglyconflicting tendencies between consolidation andfragmentation.

The four largest splinter parties are the Front na-tional (FN), Les Verts (Greens), the Union des démo-crates pour la France (UDF), and the Parti communistefrançais (PCF). Other parties champion nationalist

opposition to the EU, far-left radical opposition toFrench and global capitalism, and, in the case of theCNPT, the defense of recreational hunting and fishing.Splinter parties contribute to the diversity, vitality—and confusion—of French political life. Given spacelimitations, we focus only on one party here, the far-right FN.

Front national (FN). The FN was among the firstpolitical parties in western Europe since World WarII to promote racist themes. Its principal target hasbeen Muslim immigrants from North Africa, espe-cially Algeria. The FN’s relentless choice of a handyscapegoat––Muslim immigrants––provides a simpleanswer to complicated questions. The party has pro-posed depriving legal immigrants of social benefits.In the 1990s, the party broadened its program and at-tracted increased support by dramatizing France’srising crime rate, the corruption of mainstreamFrench politicians, and the problems caused by Euro-pean integration.

Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party’s demagogic leader,has also consistently targeted Jews and expressedveiled support for the Nazi cause. He has character-ized the Holocaust as “a historical detail,” crackedanti-Semitic jokes about Jewish politicians, and re-marked that the Nazi occupation of France duringWorld War II was not especially inhumane.

There is fierce competition within the FN to suc-ceed the elderly Le Pen when he retires. (His personalchoice is his daughter, Marine.) No matter what theoutcome of the succession struggle, the FN’s provenability to retain a loyal electoral following means thata new cleavage has developed alongside the traditionalleft-right cleavage in France, one that pits mainstreamparties and values of both center-left and center-rightagainst the FN’s racist, xenophobic, and homophobicplatform. Further, on certain issues, such as the 2005EU referendum, the FN is part of a broader coalition ofparties and movements opposing mainstream parties.

ElectionsFrench voters go to the polls nearly every year to votein a referendum or in elections for municipal, depart-mental, or regional councilor, deputy to the EuropeanParliament or National Assembly, and president. The


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 132

Cengage Learning

most important elections are the legislative and presi-dential elections (see Tables 3 and 4).

In the 1980s, scholars identified a trend toward the“normalization” of French politics, following theSocialist Party’s right turn and the PCF’s decline, inwhich political competition pitted the center-left PSagainst the center-right predecessor of the UMP.However, the success of the FN—especially Le Pen’sperformance in the 2002 presidential election––as wellas the increase in vote for other splinter parties, haschallenged this view. Indeed, scholars now speak of acrisis of political representation and the party system.

• Support for fringe parties not part of the select “car-tel” of governmental parties has soared: it reachednearly two-thirds in the first round of the 2002 pres-idential elections. And recall that, although themajor governing parties of center-right and center-left vigorously campaigned for a “yes” vote in the2005 referendum on the European constitution,they persuaded only 45 percent of those who votedto support their position.

• Voting patterns have been increasingly unstable.Political scientist Pascal Perrineau notes, “A newtype of voter is emerging, less docile to social andterritorial allegiances, less faithful to a party orpolitical camp, and less involved in the act of vot-

ing. . . . Voters are likely to change their minds fromone election to another, or even from one ballot toanother in the same election.”33 In every one of thesix legislative elections held between 1981 and2002, the governing majority swung between thecenter-left and center-right parties.

• Voting turnout has steadily dwindled. In 2002, it was at a record low in both presidential and parlia-mentary elections.

• Senior politicians from across the political spec-trum, including cabinet ministers, the president ofthe Constitutional Council, and prominent mayors,have been prosecuted on charges of financial cor-ruption. There is clear evidence that, while mayorof Paris between 1977 and 1994, President Chiracreceived illicit political contributions and cash kick-backs from housing contractors to finance lavishfamily vacations. His trusted assistant, Alain Juppé,who worked closely with Chirac at the Paris cityhall and who Chirac appointed as prime minister in1995, has been convicted of political corruption andprohibited from holding public office for severalyears. Although thus far President Chirac hasescaped prosecution because the ConstitutionalCourt ruled that a sitting president has legal immu-nity, he faces the prospect of answering criminalcharges once he leaves office.


Table 3

Electoral Results, Elections to National Assembly, 1958–2002 (percentage of those voting)

1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002

Far Left 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 0% 2% 2% 3%PCF 19 22 23 20 21 21 16 10 11 9 10 5Socialist Party/Left 23 21 19 17 22 25 38 32 38 21 26 25

RadicalsEcology — — — — — 2 1 1 1 12 8 4Center 15 15 18 10 16 21* 19* 19* 19* 15*Center-Right 14 14 0 4 7 42* 5*UNR-RPR-UMP 18 32 38 44 24 23 21 — 19 20 17 34Far Right 3 1 1 0 3 0 3 10 10 13 15 12Abstentions 23 31 19 20 19 17 30 22 34 31 32 36

*Number represents the percentage of combined votes for Center and Center-Right parties.Sources: Françoise Dreyfus and François D’Arcy, Les Institutions politiques et administratives de la France (Paris: Economica,1985), 54; Le Monde, March 18, 1986; Le Monde, Les élections législatives (Paris: Le Monde, 1988). Ministry of the Interior,1993, 1997. Le Monde, June 11, 2002.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 133

Cengage Learning

Tabl

e 4

Pres

iden

tal E

lect

ions

in th

e Fi

fth R

epub

lic (p

erce

ntag

e of

thos

e vo

ting)

Dec

embe

r 19

65Ju

ne 1

969

May

197

4A

pril–

May

198

1A

pril–

May

198

8A

pril–

May

199

5A

pril–

May

200

2

Can

di-

Ballo

tC

andi

-Ba

llot

Can

di-

Ballo

tC

andi

-Ba

llot

Can

di-

Ballo

tC

andi

-Ba

llot

Can

di-

Ballo

tda

tePe

rcen

tage

date

Perc

enta

geda

tePe

rcen

tage

date

Perc

enta

geda

tePe

rcen

tage

date

Perc

enta

geda

tePe

rcen

tage

Extr

eme

Rig

htLe

Pen

14.4

Le P

en15

.0Le

Pen

17.0

(17.

9)(F

N)

(FN

)(F

N)

Cent

er R

ight

de G

aulle

43.7

(54.

5)Po

mpi

dou

44.0

(57.

6)C

hira

c 18

.0C

hira

c19

.9(4

6.0)

Chi

rac

20.8

(52.

6)C

hira

c19

.9(8

2.1)

(Cen

ter-

(UN

R)(R

PR)

(RPR

)(R

PR)

(RPR

)Ri

ght)

Cent

erLe

canu

et

15.8

Pohe

r23

.4(4

2.4)

Gisc

ard

32.9

(50.

7)G

iscar

d28

.3(4

8.2)

Barre

16.5

Balla

dur

18.9

Bayo

u6.

8(O

ppos

ition

-(C

ente

r)(U

DF)

(UD

F)C

ente

r)Sa

int-

4.3

Joss

e (C

NPT

)

Mad

elin

3.9

(PR)

Cent

er L

eft

Mitt

erra

nd

32.2

(45.

5)D

effe

rre

5.1

Mitt

erra

nd43

.4(4

9.3)

Mitt

erra

nd25

.8(5

1.8)

Mitt

erra

nd34

.1(5

4.0)

Josp

in

23.3

(47.

4)Jo

spin

16.1

(Soc

ialis

t-(P

S)(P

S)(P

S)(P

S)(P

S)(P

S)C

omm

unist

)C

hevè

ne-5

.3m

ent

Mam

ère

5.3

(Gre

ens)

Left

Duc

los

21.5

Mar

chai

s 15

.3La

join

ie6.

8H

ue

8.6

Hue

3.

4(P

CF)

(PC

F)(P

CF)

(PC

F)(P

CF)

3 ca

ndi-

10.6

date

s(E

xtre

me

Left)

Abst

entio

ns15

.0(1

5.5)

21.8

(30.

9)15

.1(1

2.1)

18.9

(14.

1)20

.627

.9(1

9.9)

Not

e: N

umbe

rs in

par

enth

eses

indi

cate

per

cent

age

of v

ote

rece

ived

in s

econ

d ba

llot.

Perc

enta

ges

of v

otes

for

cand

idat

es d

o no

t add

to 1

00 b

ecau

se o

f min

orpa

rty c

andi

date

s an

d ro

undi

ng e

rror

s.So

urce

s:Jo

hn R

. Fre

ars

and

Jean

-Luc

Paro

di, W

ar W

ill N

ot Ta

ke P

lace

: The

Fre

nch

Parli

amen

tary

Ele

ctio

ns o

f Mar

ch 1

978

(Lon

don:

Hur

st, 1

976)

, p. 6

; Le

Mon

de,

L’Éle

ctio

n pr

ésid

entie

lle: 2

6 av

ril–1

0 m

ai 1

981

(Par

is: L

e M

onde

, 198

1), p

p. 9

8, 1

38; L

e M

onde

, Apr

il 28

and

May

12,

199

8; Jo

urna

l offi

ciel

, May

14,

199

5;Le

Mon

de, M

ay 5

–6, 2

002;

Le

Mon

de, M

ay 7

, 200

2.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 134

Cengage Learning

Political Culture, Citizenship, and IdentityFor close to a century, French political culture wasstructured in a quite stable fashion. Since the 1980s,however, two of the major traditional subcultures havedisintegrated, an important reason for the increasedvolatility in electoral behavior described above. Onewas a predominantly working-class subculture struc-tured by the strong grip of the PCF and the PCF’s tradeunion ally, the CGT. The other subculture, attractingreligiously observant, and politically and socially con-servative French, was organized around the CatholicChurch and its affiliated social organizations.

Both subcultures comprised a dense network oforganizations in diverse spheres, including sports,culture, mutual aid, and professional activities;they provided their members with distinctive (andopposed) political orientations, and social identities.The decline of the communist and Catholic subcul-tures has produced a vacuum. We analyze here chang-ing forms of French political and social identity.

Social Class

For centuries, France was among the countries inwhich class cleavages periodically fueled intense po-litical conflict. Under the impact of economicchange and ideological reorientation, however, therewas a rapid decline of class identification in the1970s (see Table 5).

The most extensive decline in class identificationhas occurred in the ranks of manual workers. One rea-son is the massive economic restructuring since the1970s. The downsizing of basic industries, includingsteel, shipbuilding, automobiles, and textiles, has meanta drastic reduction in the size of the industrial workforce. Another reason is the decline and changing char-acter of the trade union movement, a traditionally im-portant source of working-class identity and activity.

Citizenship and National Identity

France has a two-sided approach to citizenship andnational identity that dates back to the Revolution of1789. On the one hand, the inclusionary aspect of therepublican model specifies that any immigrant whoaccepts French political values and culture is entitledto citizenship. There are no ethnic, racial, or otherascriptive (inherited) restrictions on becoming aFrench citizen, and France has traditionally beenhome to millions of immigrants. Political sociologistCharles Tilly observes that France has “served asEurope’s greatest melting pot.”34


Allegations of corruption by President Chirac. Source:Reuters.

Table 5

Proportion of French Citizens IdentifyingThemselves as Members of a Social Class

1976 1983 1987

Total 68% 62% 56%

Occupation of respondents:Higher executives, 68% 67% 60%

professionalsMiddle executives, 57% 66% 63%

school teachersOffice workers 64% 62% 59%Manual workers 74% 71% 50%

Source: L’Expansion, March 20–April 27, 1987, in Louis Dirn,La Société française en tendances (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 63.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 135

Cengage Learning

On the other hand, the French republican model in-sists that people’s distinctive cultural identities and val-ues should remain private and play no role in the publicsphere. Most French regard the American conceptionof multiculturalism as dangerous because, in their view,it encourages ethnic or religious identity to fragmentthe political community and displace common ties ofcitizenship. Yet France’s dominant color-blind and eth-nic-blind model has a powerful (if informal) exclusion-ary thrust. For example, there is virtually no ethnic mi-nority representation in key political institutions likethe Constitutional Council, National Assembly, or gov-ernment. Flaws in the secular, republican model werehighlighted by a recent controversy involving the dis-play of religious symbols in public places.

In 2003, French president Jacques Chiracdelivered a major nationwide television address oneducational reform. Did his proposal involve the cur-riculum, educational standards, or school finance?Guess again. President Chirac proposed banning thedisplay of “conspicuous signs of religious affiliation”in public schools. (The phrase is from the law over-whelmingly passed by parliament in 2004 to imple-ment the proposal.)

Among the prohibited symbols were large Catholiccrosses, Sikh turbans, and yarmulkes (Jewish skull-caps). But the principal main target of the reform—indeed, the reason it was proposed at all—was thehidjab (headscarf) worn by some Muslim girls.

The president explained that the reform aimed topreserve religious neutrality in public schools, consis-tent with France’s secular, republican tradition. Ban-ning headscarves was an attempt to combat Muslimfundamentalism and protect Muslim girls fromintimidation since the headscarf symbolizes their sub-ordinate status.

How many French opposed a measure thatarguably limits students’ civil liberties and religiousfreedom? The answer: very few. About 80 percent ofthe French polled on the question supported the ban.Although only several thousand of the nearly onemillion Muslim schoolgirls wore the headscarf toschool, most French citizens considered wearing thehidjab to school as an insult to France’s secular values.

The ban was quite effective. Researchers re-ported that about a hundred Muslim girls have been

suspended from school and several dozen expelledfor defying the ban. Official statistics are not com-piled on how many girls chose to switch from publicto private schools—the dress code does not apply toprivate schools—or were homeschooled because ofthe ban.

Ethnicity and Immigration

France has traditionally attracted large numbers ofimmigrants. Indeed, in 1930, the proportion of immi-grants in France was higher than in the UnitedStates.35 Today, one French person in four has at leastone grandparent who is foreign-born. Contrary to awidespread belief that conflicts between native-bornFrench and immigrants originated recently, historianDavid Bell observes, “The Belgians and Italians metas much hostility and prejudice in their time as Alge-rians and black Africans have done in contemporaryFrance, and sometimes more.”36 Early in the twentiethcentury, tensions often ran high between the native-born French and immigrants arriving from Poland,Italy, and Portugal.

Most recent immigrants have been Muslims (pre-dominantly Arabs) from North Africa. Tensions run es-pecially high in impoverished urban neighborhoods, asillustrated by violent clashes in Paris suburbs betweenNorth African youth and the police in late 2005. Formore than a week, crowds of young men torched carsand buildings and attacked buses and trains. The up-rising soon spread to Paris and cities throughoutFrance, in part provoked by Minister of Interior Nico-las Sarkozy's inflammatory description of the rioters as“scum.”

The French state has been quite suspicious of im-migrants. For example, in 2003, the Raffarin govern-ment tightened the procedures for gaining politicalasylum (that is, seeking sanctuary in France from abu-sive treatment in one’s home country). Amnesty Inter-national, an internationally respected nongovernmen-tal human rights organization, publicly criticized thenew restrictions.37

Since the 1980s, there has been a broad shiftin public attitudes toward the meaning of citizenship.One historian suggests that “the view that immi-grants represented a threat to ‘national identity,’


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 136

Cengage Learning

originally launched by the far right, [came to be]held by large sectors of the public.”38 Public opinionpolls document that racist attitudes are significantlymore widespread in France than in most EU membercountries.

Gender

France was the home of modernist feminist thought.Philosopher and novelist Simone de Beauvoir’s TheSecond Sex, published after World War II, is a land-mark. In the 1960s and 1970s, French feminist theo-rists played a major role in reshaping literary studiesaround the world. However, there is considerable gen-der inequality in France, and women’s movements,like many other French social movements, have beenrelatively weak.

Women, the largest “minority”—in reality a 51percent majority—have traditionally been highlyunderrepresented in the French political system.Although women are over half the electorate, therehas never been a female president of the republic andonly one prime minister. Women have typically com-prised under 10 percent of the National Assembly,putting France toward the low end of women’s legisla-tive representation among EU countries. However,France took a giant step toward increasing women’srepresentation by amending the constitution in 1999and passing legislation in 2000 that mandates genderparity in political representation.

The parity law requires parties to nominate anequal number of male and female candidates in elec-tions using a list system. Parties failing to do so maybe disqualified. In elections held in single-memberdistricts, parties that fail to nominate an equal numberof men and women receive smaller public campaignsubsidies. The French have generally been highly crit-ical of affirmative action as practiced in the UnitedStates, which is regarded as promoting quotas for mi-norities, and prior to the parity amendment the Con-stitutional Council had struck down legislation requir-ing increased women’s representation on municipalcouncils. Defenders of the reform claimed that theparity reform does not single women out for specialrepresentation but simply ensures that power is sharedequally between the two halves of the population.

(This explanation may strike many readers as a dis-tinction without a difference.)

The results of the parity law have been mixed. The2001 municipal elections produced a dramatic in-crease in women’s representation. The number ofwomen elected to municipal councils skyrocketedfrom 7,000 to 39,000. And in elections to the Senateand regional councils in 2004, women nearly doubledtheir representation.

However, although the glass ceiling in Frenchpolitical institutions has been cracked, it is farfrom shattered. The parity law mandates gender bal-ance for legislative bodies but is silent about theirexecutives, for example, mayors or presidents ofregional councils. Case in point: although women’srepresentation on regional councils soared after the2004 regional elections, only one of the twenty-two regional councils of mainland France elected afemale president.

A second reason that the glass ceiling remains in-tact is the different treatment of elections held in sin-gle-member versus multi-member districts. Becausethe penalty for failing to achieve gender balance innominations for single-member districts is relativelymild, parties have much less incentive to achieve gen-der balance. Far from coincidentally, France’s twomost powerful political institutions, the NationalAssembly and presidency, are chosen from single-member districts!

Although the reform has produced a majorchange in French political discourse and practice, akey question—which cannot yet be answered––iswhat kind of impact women’s increased political rep-resentation will have on policy involving issues ofparticular concern to women? The parity law pro-vides a laboratory test of whether increasingwomen’s political representation promotes genderequality in the wider society.

Interests, Social Movements, and ProtestThe political party system represents one arenafor citizen participation and representation. Citi-zens have organized in other ways to pursue theirinterests.


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 137

Cengage Learning

The pace of change throughout the world has rapidlyaccelerated as space and time are compressed by theincredible technological advances of recent decadesand national borders become more porous. To borrowand slightly alter John Donne’s phrase, one mightsuggest that no country is an island; all are intercon-nected by globalization.

After September 11, 2001, we have becomepainfully aware that globalization may involve notonly increased knowledge, productivity, and effi-ciency, but also terrorism. A country’s relationship to

globalization is refracted through the prism of its po-litical, economic, and cultural institutions. What arethe current political challenges and changing agendasin French politics, and how are they affected byFrance’s relationship to globalization?

Political Challenges and Changing AgendasWhat a distance separates French politics in the firstdecade of the twenty-first century from earlier peri-ods! Until the 1980s, major political parties were

Organized Interests

The overbearing French state has typically tended tolimit possibilities for social movements and private in-terest groups. Although some interest groups, such asthe farm lobby (the FNSEA) and umbrella businessgroup (Medef) participate in consultative commissionsand have easy access to policy makers, most interestgroups have little influence. One important example:French labor unions are quite weak, although they doreap significant benefits from helping manage socialinsurance funds. French unions never organized aslarge a proportion of workers as did unions in otherWestern European countries, and they have steadilydeclined in strength from their postwar high: the pro-portion of the active labor force belonging to a unionhas plummeted from a high of over 30 percent to lessthan 10 percent—the lowest figure of any industrial-ized democracy. The bulk of union members are foundamong public sector workers. Moreover, the tradeunion movement is highly fragmented. There are fiveumbrella trade union confederations claiming to repre-sent workers throughout the economy, as well as inde-pendent unions in specific sectors (such as teachers).Each confederation pursues its own course, often op-posed to that of the others. Yet unions enjoy far widersupport than their small size would suggest, as evi-denced by their ability to mobilize large numbers ofnonunionized workers during strikes and the generalpublic during demonstrations. (See boxed feature:“Citizen Action: French Trade Unions.)

Social Movements and Protest

Although Fifth Republic institutions were designed todiscourage citizens from acting autonomously,France’s centuries-old tradition of direct protestpersists. According to the World Values Survey,France is second only to Italy in the proportion of citi-zens who have participated in demonstrations. (We re-view some examples in Section 5.) Groups that haveengaged in strikes and demonstrations in recent yearsinclude farmers, fishing interests, postal workers,teachers, high school and university students, truck-ers, railway workers, health care workers, the unem-ployed, immigrants and their offspring, researchworkers, and actors—to provide a partial list! For ex-ample, a strike by actors and other cultural workersled to the cancellation of the Avignon summer theaterfestival in 2003. Also in 2003, 2 million peopledemonstrated to protest cutbacks in pension benefits.These protests might be interpreted as citizens’ at-tempts to press their demands in the absence of ade-quate institutional channels of representation.

To sum up the last two sections, the Fifth Repub-lic proved better at strengthening the state than in en-abling citizens effectively to express their demands.Despite changes that have brought the state closer tocitizens, an adequate balance has not yet been struckbetween the French state and civil society. Thissuggests an unsettling question: Does the Frenchpolitical system have the capacity to address currentchallenges?


Section f French Politics in Transition

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 138

Cengage Learning

arrayed quite neatly along a left-right continuumlinked to social class and ideological divisions. In theearly 1980s, the reform initiatives of the Socialist gov-ernment dominated the news. When the center-rightcoalition gained a parliamentary majority in 1986, its

first priority was to roll back many of the Socialistgovernment’s reforms.

Several years later, however, the governing partieson both sides of the ideological divide convergedtoward accepting France’s mixed economy, consisting

SECTION 5 French Politics in Transition 139

The character of the French trade union move-ment and its relationship to politics explainmuch about protest in France. In many industri-

alized democracies, such as Britain, Germany,and Japan, trade unions in specific sectors—forexample, steel, transportation, teaching, the civilservice—are allied in a central trade union con-federation. As a consequence, organized laborspeaks with relatively one voice. In addition, thecentral union confederation is usually allied withthe country’s major left-of-center political party: theLabour Party in Britain, Social Democratic Party inGermany, and Socialist Party in Japan.

The situation is very different in France. Ratherthan one umbrella trade union confederation, thereare four, as well as a number of other independentunions. Each confederation pursues its own eco-nomic and political agenda. The confederationscompete with each other in recruiting membersand in elections to representative bodies (calledworks councils) based in shopfloors and offices.Traditionally, divisions have been heightened be-cause each confederation was loosely allied with acompeting political party. The largest confedera-tion was closely allied with the Communist Party,while other confederations had links to the Socialistand centrist parties. The confederations’ ties to po-litical parties have weakened in recent years, buttheir rivalry with each other continues.

Since French labor often speaks with discor-dant voices, and relatively few workers belong tounions, trade unions have little direct influence inshaping public policy. Although the French tradeunion movement is among the oldest in the world,the rate of union membership has traditionallybeen among the lowest of the industrializeddemocracies. In the 1990s, with the downsizing

of manufacturing, which produced high levels ofunemployment, the union movement suffered a fur-ther loss of members and power. Membership hassagged to under 10 percent of the labor force, ahistoric low in the postwar period.

This description suggests that because of theirsmall numbers, organizational and political divi-sions, and meager clout, unions are a weak forcein French politics and society. And in “normal”times, French unions do indeed play a marginalrole. But the strength of unions needs to be mea-sured in other ways than the members holding aunion card. First, unions play a key role in somepublic and private institutions. For example, unionnominees often dominate elected works councils ofFrench business firms. Unions have participated inmanaging the social security, health, pension, andunemployment insurance funds. Second, unionscan mobilize large numbers of members and non-members alike when they call strikes and demon-strations. And, third, at these crisis points, Frenchunions gain strength because they are the only or-ganized actor with which employers and the statecan negotiate in order to restore order.

During normal periods, French employers andthe state are tempted to ignore unions and workers’interests on the assumption that unions are not asignificant force. But when strikes and demonstra-tions shut down plants, firms, economic sectors,and even large regions or the entire country, em-ployers and the state must court union leaders.Feverish all-night negotiations are held among man-agement, government officials, and union leaders,which often produce settlements providing wagegains and institutional reforms, whereupon thecycle of “normalcy” resumes, and unions retreat toa more marginal position—until the next explosion.

Citizen Action: French Trade Unions

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 139

Cengage Learning

of the coexistence of a strong role for the statecombined with heavy reliance on private marketforces. The major parties agreed that, for the sake ofEuropean integration, it was worth making unpopulareconomic policy choices to reduce governmentdeficits and the public debt. By the mid-1990s, then,it appeared that substantial ideological controversyamong the major political parties had ended. Mightthe result be the end of French exceptionalism?

In retrospect, the calm that prevailed was theprelude to the storm. We review here some politicalchallenges in the past decade that highlight continu-ities and changes in France’s political agenda. Theyraise troubling questions about the adequacy of theexisting system to confront that agenda.

The Strikes of December 1995: May 1968Redux?

In 1995, France was rocked by a series of strikes anddemonstrations that recalled those of May 1968. Theywere the first act of a drama involving the restructur-ing of the French welfare state—a drama that has yetto be concluded.

In the 1995 presidential election, Jacques Chiraclamented the “social fracture” that divided France intothose enjoying economic prosperity and those ex-cluded from its benefits. He promised that he wouldgive first priority to repairing this situation. In his vic-tory speech, he proclaimed, “Our battle has a name:the struggle against unemployment.”

Although Chirac’s strategy was electorally suc-cessful, it soon proved politically costly. Only monthsafter he had promised that things could be different,he abruptly announced an about-face in a televisioninterview in late 1995. The need to comply with thestrict fiscal requirements of the EU that limited bud-get deficits collided with electoral promises, and thepromises lost.

Soon after Chirac’s interview, Prime Minister AlainJuppé proposed reforms that amounted to a declarationof war on labor unions and large sectors of the Frenchpopulation. Without consulting with unions or interestgroups, he announced that payroll taxes would beincreased, civil servants’ pension benefits would beslashed, the unions’ role in governing the social securitysystem would be reduced, a freeze on university hiring

would occur, and the state-owned rail network wouldcut services. Reaction to the proposed reforms was swiftand massive. France was brought to a halt when strikesshut down Air France flights, railroads, buses, the Parismetro, the postal system, and garbage collection.Demonstrations were held to protest the government’splans; the high point was when 2 million peoplethroughout France turned out in solidarity with the strik-ers. The strikes wound down when the governmentabandoned many of the proposed changes.

The 1995 strikes reveal the continuing vitality ofthe French tradition of popular protest. Other impor-tant strikes and demonstrations occurred in the truck-ing industry in 2002, the healthcare sector in 2003 and2004, the cultural sector in 2003, around pension ben-efits in 2003 and 2005, and in the electrical powerindustry in 2004. Yet another important strike may bemaking news while you read this book!

Oui to Roquefort Cheese, Non to GeneticallyEngineered Products

Several years after the 1995 strikes, an antiglobaliza-tion movement developed among far-leftists, intellectu-als, farmers, and environmentalists. The movement’sbest-known leader is José Bové, a sheep farmer sport-ing a prominent mustache who comes from south-western France, where famed Roquefort cheese isproduced. Small farmers like Bové oppose the stan-dardized methods of farming that agribusiness corpora-tions seek to impose (including the use of geneticallymodified seed), as well as farmers’ loss of autonomywhen large corporations centralize food processing anddistribution. He became a media hero for ransacking aMcDonald’s construction site near his home, for whichhe served a six-week prison sentence. Bové receivedwide support from across the political spectrum. Presi-dent Chirac announced that he too dislikes McDonald’sfood and supports Bové’s project of protecting tradi-tional French farming, cuisine, and lifestyles fromdomination by globalization and “jungle capitalism.”

When the World Trade Organization (WTO) metin Seattle in 1999 to develop regulations for promot-ing free trade and investment, it was challenged byprotestors from around the world. The French agricul-ture minister, a delegate to the WTO meeting, invitedBové to attend. Bové managed to smuggle 100


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 140

Cengage Learning

pounds of Roquefort cheese to Seattle and distributedit to the assembled protestors. After the EU bannedAmerican hormone-injected beef from European mar-kets, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on se-lected EU food imports. Is it merely coincidence thatRoquefort cheese was targeted?

The French antiglobalization movement is largeand includes participants from across the politicalspectrum. Opposition to globalization is a majortheme in French political discourse. The Frenchregard globalization as threatening cultural diversityand, in particular, fear that the invasion of Americancompanies, products, and values will threatenFrance’s cherished way of life. (At the same time,France is a major global competitor and the Frenchflock to the latest American movies!) One of themajor organizations leading opposition to globaliza-tion is ATTAC, which stands for the Association inSupport of the Tobin Tax. (Nobel economics prizelaureate James Tobin first proposed the idea of a taxon short-term capital movements in order to deterinternational financial speculation.) ATTAC has beena sponsor of the World Social Forum, an annual

assembly usually meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, ofantiglobalization activists from around the world.

The Challenge of Le Pen and the FN

The antiglobalization movement is one response toFrance’s position in a changing world. The growthof the Le Pen phenomenon and ethnic conflicts are oth-ers. The Front National (FN) has reaped a political har-vest from the presence of Muslims in French society.Political sociologist Pierre Birnbaum observes, “Whatthe National Front proposes to the French people . . . isa magical solution to their distress, to their loss of con-fidence in grand political visions of the nation.”39

The FN’s success may be due less to the substanceof its ideas than to its position as critic of the estab-lished system. Polls show that many of the party’ssupporters do not share its positions but vote for theFN as a way to challenge the established system ofparties and politicians. Le Pen has increasingly foundsupport among the native-born citizens on the marginsof French society. In the 2002 presidential elections,the unemployed made up one-third of Le Pen’s elec-torate, and more workers voted for Le Pen than forany other candidate.40

Muslim-Jewish Tensions

A recent addition to the list of challenges confrontingthe French political system is Muslim-Jewish conflict.France has the largest number of both Muslims (5million) and Jews (500,000) of any country in Europe.Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in 2002 pro-voked hundreds of violent attacks on Jews and thedefacing of dozens of synagogues, Jewish cemeteries,schools, kosher restaurants, and sports clubs. (In somecases, skinheads and neo-nazis were behind theattacks, and they have targeted Muslims as well asJews.) The wave of anti-semitic violence nearlydoubled between 2003 and 2004, creating an atmos-phere of interethnic tension and hostility, especially inthose lower class neighborhoods where there aresignificant numbers of Jews and Muslims. Of course,French Jews are not responsible for Israel’s actions,but they provide a convenient target for Muslimyouth––often themselves victims of unemploymentand racial discrimination.

SECTION 5 French Politics in Transition 141

Globalization. This appeared when José Bové traveled to theSeattle meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999.Source: Plantu, Cartoonists & Writers Syndicate, from Cas-settes, mensonges et vidéo (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000), p. 36.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 141

Cengage Learning

In 2004, President Chirac sought to focus onethnic and social conflicts, unemployment, and crimeby creating a super-ministry of employment, labor,and social cohesion. The ministry sponsored a well-financed plan for promoting social cohesion focusingon the 163 neighborhoods throughout France with thehighest rates of crime, poverty, and social tensions. Itis too soon to judge the success of the plan.

France Falling?

The French have not been unaware of the challengesthey face. Indeed, the country has been wracked byself-doubt in recent years, as illustrated by a cottageindustry of books with titles like France Falling andFrance’s Disarray. For example, France Falling, a re-lentless critique of France’s political and economicsystem that totally ignored anything positive, was onthe best-seller list for months.41 A recent public opin-ion poll found that 63 percent of the French believetheir country is in decline. Indeed, political analystSophie Meunier chides the French for being undulyself-critical.42

A balanced assessment requires taking note ofFrance’s recent achievements. The country has ex-celled in international economic competition and hasenacted important reforms, including the parity law,decentralization, and a reduced presidential term.France’s formerly hierarchical pattern of state-societyrelations, in which most decisions originated inParisian government ministries and were imple-mented by civil servants, has shifted toward a morepluralist pattern. Local governments have greater free-dom to experiment. Citizens have greater freedom ofchoice in areas like television programming and tele-phone service.

In 1999, parliament passed a law that further en-larged citizens’ freedom of choice, the civil solidaritypact (pacte civil de solidarité, or PACs), a civil unionbetween unmarried couples of the same or oppositesex. The PACs provides many of the legal rights for-merly enjoyed only by married couples. These days,about 10 percent of couples choose the PACs overtraditional marriage. The innovation reflects a liberal-ization of French cultural attitudes, as well as a weak-ening of the institution of marriage. (The governmentstatistical agency reported that in 2004 47 percent of

all French children were born out of wedlock; thiscompares with 6 percent in 1965.)43

Have recent economic and social changes pro-duced a welcome pluralism or a disturbing fragmenta-tion of French society? Many French lament thatFrance’s formerly highly stable and distinctive way oflife has been destabilized—an important factor fuel-ling opposition to the 2005 referendum on the Euro-pean constitution. Can the positive features of the pastbe preserved while reforms are introduced to addresspressing problems? What has to be sacrificed for thesake of what benefits?

France’s Relation to Terrorism

France’s relationship to terrorism is quite differentfrom that of the United States. The United States hasbeen the site of two terrorist attacks organized fromoutside the country—1993 and 2001. (Both targetedthe World Trade Center in New York; the 2001 attackwas also directed against the Pentagon.) By contrast,France has been the target of numerous domestic andinternational terrorist attacks for decades, althoughnone produced destruction on the scale of 9/11.

France has been quite successful in containing ter-rorism, at least thus far, but it remains a center ofpotential terrorist activity. France’s 5 million Muslimsdo not share a common political orientation, and onlya tiny number are attracted to the radical variants ofIslam that represent a prime source of potentialrecruits for terrorist activity. However, in 2003 thegovernment’s principal intelligence agency claimedthat there were 1,100 new converts that year to themost radical tendency within Islam.44 In 2004, a radi-cal cleric was deported to his native Algeria for advo-cating wife beating and stoning adulterous women,and three men were sentenced to prison for assistingIslamic terrorists elsewhere in Europe. We havedescribed above a series of arrests of alleged terroristsin France.

During the decades that France has been the targetof terrorism, it developed extensive intelligence andcounterterrorist services in the Defense and InteriorMinistries. There have been frequent police sweeps inwhich terrorist suspects have been arrested; severalplots have reportedly been foiled (including an attackon the U.S. Embassy in Paris). While the threat of


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 142

Cengage Learning

Suggested Readings 143

referendumdecentralizationancien régimerevolutionrepublicsecularismauthoritarianproportional repres-

entationconservativesocialiststatistdirigisme

indicative planningnationalizationneoliberalprivatizationderegulationjudicial reviewcohabitationgrandes écolesgrands corpsprefectsfundamentalismparity law

terrorism is disquieting, the government’s antiterroristactivities have also caused concerns. A shadownetwork of counterintelligence agencies, operating insecret with little accountability, has been accused ofcorruption, religious and ethnic discrimination, andabuses of human rights.

French Politics in Comparative PerspectiveFrance has long provided a fascinating case for com-parative analysis because of the endless attempts toanalyze French exceptionalism. Is French politicsbecoming less exceptional? The case in favor rests onthe fact that dirigisme and ideological conflict, two ofthe central features of the exceptionalist model, havedeclined in recent years. However, we have describedhow dirigisme has been transformed but not aban-doned. Further, if “classic” left-right divisions havedeclined, new cleavages have developed. There ismuch to be learned, therefore, from including Francein cross-national comparisons. One method is to com-pare France on the four core themes of this book.A second kind of comparison involves historical com-parisons within France. For example, the Fourth andFifth Republics provide fine case studies of the impactof institutions on political outcomes. As the first coun-try in the world to mandate equal political representa-tion for men and women, France also provides anexciting opportunity to analyze whether politicalinstitutions can be effective in reducing genderinequality.

On the level of political culture more generally,French school children are taught to revere the Decla-ration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789and to take pride in the fact that France has champi-oned the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity.However, the fact that these values are now the her-itage of people throughout the world means that theyno longer serve as markers to identify what is distinc-tively French. Further, France is not alone in seekingto maintain national cohesion in the face of internaldiversity and close integration in the internationaleconomic and political order. Nor is it the only coun-try seeking to balance political cohesion with the rightof diverse groups to maintain their distinct identity.Confronting these challenges will help shape theFrench political agenda in coming years—and

provide ample opportunities for comparative analysis!In brief, more than thirty years after youthful Frenchprotesters chanted in May 1968, “The struggle contin-ues,” the words have lost none of their relevance.

Key Terms

Suggested ReadingsBell, David A. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing

Nationalism, 1680–1800. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 2001.

Birnbaum, Pierre. The Idea of France. New York: Hill & Wang,2001.

Bleich, Erik. Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas andPolicymaking since the 1960s. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003.

Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France andGermany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Célestin, Eliane DalMolin, and de Courtivron, Isabelle, eds.Beyond French Feminisms: Debates on Women, Politics,and Culture in France, 1981–2001. New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2003.

Chapman, Herrick, Kesselman, Mark, and Schain, Martin A.,eds. A Century of Organized Labor in France: A UnionMovement for the Twenty-First Century? New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1998.

Daley, Anthony, ed. The Mitterrand Era: Policy Alternativesand Political Mobilization in France. New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1996.

Daley, Anthony. Steel, State, and Labor: Mobilization and Ad-justment in France. Pittsburgh: University of PittsburghPress, 1996.

Duyvendak, Jan Willem. The Power of Politics: New SocialMovements in France. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995.

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 143

Cengage Learning

Elgie, Robert. Political Institutions in Contemporary France.New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Gopnik, Adam. Paris to the Moon. New York: Random House,2000.

Gordon, Philip H., and Meunier, Sophie. The French Chal-lenge: Adapting to Globalization. Washington, D.C.: Brook-ings Institution, 2001.

Hall, Peter A. Governing the Economy: The Politics of StateIntervention in Britain and France. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986.

Hall, Peter, Hayward, Jack, and Machin, Howard, eds. Devel-opments in French Politics. vol. 2. New York: Macmillan,1998.

Haus, Leah. Unions, Immigration, and Internationalization:New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the UnitedStates and France. London: Palgrave, 2002.

Hayward, Jack, and Wright, Vincent. Governing from the Cen-tre: Core Executive Coordination in France. New York:Oxford University Press, 2002.

Huber, John D. Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institu-tions and Party Politics in France. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996.

Ireland, Patrick. The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Im-migrant Politics in France and Switzerland. Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1994.

Kastoryano, Riva. Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrantsin France and Germany. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2002.

Keeler, John T. S., and Schain, Martin A., eds. Chirac’s Chal-lenge: Liberalization, Europeanization, and Malaise inFrance. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Lebovics, Herman. Bringing the Empire Back Home: France inthe Global Age. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,2004.

Levy, Jonah. Tocqueville’s Revenge: State, Society, and Econ-omy in Contemporary France. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1999.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., ed. The French Voter: Before and Af-ter the 2002 Elections. London: Palgrave and Macmillan,2004.

Mazur, Amy G. Gender Bias and the State: Symbolic Reform atWork in Fifth Republic France. Pittsburgh: University ofPittsburgh Press, 1996.

Noiriel, Gérard. The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizen-ship, and National Identity. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996.

Pierce, Roy. Choosing the Chief: Presidential Elections inFrance and the United States. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 1995.

Sa’adah, Anne. Contemporary France: A Democratic Educa-tion. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Schmidt, Vivien A. From State to Market? The Transformationof French Business and Government. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1996.

Smith, Timothy B. France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality andGlobalization since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2004.

Smith, W. Rand. The Left’s Dirty Job: The Politics of IndustrialRestructuring in France and Spain. Pittsburgh: Universityof Pittsburgh Press, 1998.

Tiersky, Ronald. François Mitterrand: The Last French Presi-dent. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Tilly, Charles. The Contentious French: Four Centuries ofPopular Struggle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,Belknap Press, 1986.

Treacher, Adrian. French Interventionism: Europe’s LastGlobal Player? Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003.

Suggested WebsitesATTAC Internationalwww.attac.org/indexen/Embassy of France in the United Stateswww.ambafrance-us.orgEmbassy of France in the United States’ FRANCE Magazinewww.ambafrance-us.org/publiFrench Foreign Ministrywww.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/actu.gb.aspFrench Prime Ministerwww.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/en

Endnotes1INSEE, Tableaux de l’Economie Française, 2003–2004 (Paris:INSEE, 2003), pp. 47, 45.2Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution(New York: Knopf, 1989), p. 62.3Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London:New Left Books, 1974), p. 111. See also Theda Skocpol, Statesand Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press,1979).4Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolu-tion (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,1984), pp. 15, 56.5Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age ofthe French Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,1988), pp. 171–172.6William H. Sewell Jr., Work and Revolution in France: TheLanguage of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 199.7Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 16, 15.


329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 144

Cengage Learning

8Suzanne Daley, “As French Campaign Ends, Many Focus onNext Round,” New York Times, April 20, 2002.9 Le Monde, April 23, 2002.10New York Times, September 18, 2003.11John J. Miller and Mark Molesky, Our Oldest Enemy: A His-tory of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France (NewYork: Doubleday, 2004).12New York Times, May 9, 2004.13Richard Kuisel, “What Do the French Think of Us? The Dete-riorating Image of the United States, 2000–2004,” FrenchPolitics, Culture, and Society 22, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 107.14Le Monde, May 30, 2005.15Le Monde, May 30, 2005.16New York Times, April 19, 2005.17Kuisel, Capitalism and the State, op. cit., p. 277.18Henri Mendras with Alistair Cole, Social Change in ModernFrance: Towards a Cultural Anthropology of the Fifth Republic(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 1.19Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of StateIntervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1986), p. 163.20Laurent Ménière, Bilan de la France, 1981–1993 (Paris:Hachette, 1993), p. 18.21Peter A. Hall described the new economic orientation sincethe mid-1980s as a “neo-liberal modernization strategy.” Hall,“From One Modernization Strategy to Another: The Characterand Consequences of Recent Economic Policy in France”(paper presented to the Tenth International Conference of Euro-peanists, Chicago, March 15, 1996).22Vivien A. Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transforma-tion of French Business and Government (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 442.23Roger Cohen, “Paris and Washington Speak Softly,” Interna-tional Herald Tribune, October 20, 1997.24INSEE, Tableaux de l’Economie Française, 2003–2004(Paris: INSEE, 2003), p. 103.25Timothy B. Smith, France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality andGlobalization since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2004), pp. xi, 6.26Le Monde, June 4, 2002.27Commissariat général du plan, Rapport sur les perspectivesde la France, p. 54. (This report contains the statistics on gen-der inequality in wage levels presented in the next paragraphand generational inequality in the following paragraph.) The

age group for 2002 includes women aged 30–49 and is pro-vided in INSEE, Tableaux de l’Economie Française,2003–2004, p. 77.28Sophie Meunier, “Free-Falling France or Free-TradingFrance?” French Politics, Culture and Society 22, no. 1 (Spring2004): 98–107.29Robert Elgie, The Role of the Prime Minister in France,1981–91 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 1.30Ezra Suleiman, “Les élites de l’administration et de lapolitique dans la France de la Ve République: Homogénéité,puissance, permanence,” in Ezra Suleiman and Henri Mendras,eds., Le recrutement des élites en Europe (Paris: La Décou-verte, 1995), p. 33.31John T. S. Keeler and Alec Stone, “Judicial-PoliticalConfrontation in Mitterrand’s France: The Emergence of theConstitutional Council as a Major Actor in the Policy-makingProcess,” in Stanley Hoffmann, George Ross, and SylviaMalzacher, eds., The Mitterrand Experiment: Continuity andChange in Mitterrand’s France (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1987), p. 176.32Jean Charlot, La Politique en France (Paris: Livre de Poche,1994), p. 21.33Pascal Perrineau, “Election Cycles and Changing Patterns ofPolitical Behavior in France,” French Politics and Society 13,no. 1 (Winter 1995): 53.34Charles Tilly, Foreword to Gérard Noiriel, The French Melt-ing Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity (Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. vii.35Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers (Paris: Gallimard,1991), p. 28.36David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: InventingNationalism, 1680–1800 (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 2001), p. 210.37Le Monde, May 28, 2004.38Charles Tilly’s paraphrase of Noiriel’s position, in Noiriel,The French Melting Pot, p. xii.39Pierre Birnbaum, The Idea of France (New York: Hill &Wang, 2001), pp. 278–279.40Le Monde, April 30, 2002.41Nicolas Baverez, La France qui tombe (Paris: Perrin, 2003);Alain Duhamel, Le Désarroi français (Paris: Plon, 2003).42Meunier, “Free-Falling France,” op. cit.43Reported in Le Monde, February 16, 2005.44Le Monde, June 4, 2004.

Endnotes 145

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 145

Cengage Learning

329821_Ch03 pp2 11/9/05 9:43 AM Page 146

Cengage Learning

Documents

329821 Ch01 pp3 - Cengage · Many are also struggling, often under intense pres-sure, to build democratic governments in very difficult economic and social circumstances and after