35 YEARS AFTER THE ‘GRØXIT’-REFERENDUM: … · 35 years after the ‘grØxit’-referendum: why the eu still plays an important role for greenlandic diplomacy 5 and south america,

35 YEARS AFTER THE ‘GRØXIT’-REFERENDUM:

Why the EU still plays an important role for Greenlandic diplomacy

Rasmus Leander Nielsen†

Paper prepared for presentation at ECPR, Oslo, Norway, 8 September, 2017*

*Early, unabridged draft – please do not quote/circulate before inquiring about an updated version

† Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland

E-mail: [email protected]

Keywords: Greenland, EU, GRØXIT, referendums, para-diplomacy, Arctic, OCT(A)

mailto:[email protected]

35 YEARS AFTER THE ‘GRØXIT’-REFERENDUM: WHY THE EU STILL PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR GREENLANDIC DIPLOMACY

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Abstract

In 1982, Greenland convened a referendum that paved the way to eventually leaving the European

Communities three years later. ‘Grøxit’ – a portmanteau of Grønland, the Danish translation of

Greenland, and exit – gained some scholarly, comparative interest in the aftermath of the British exit-

referendum from the EU in June 2016, commonly known as ‘Brexit’. However, while many has either

stressed the minor resemblances or, more commonly, the big differences in the two ‘exit-cases’, the analyses

of the Greenlandic case generally rest on very rudimentary archive studies or by revisiting the few mainly

descriptive sources from the 1970-80s. In other words, elucidating the very first ‘exit-case’ from the EU

via referendum calls for elaborations. Furthermore, process tracing the period since Grøxit shows a

paradoxical development of para-diplomacy. While events leading up the 1982-vote spurred a

‘Greenlandic Spring’ in terms of political awakening on the world’s largest island, the EU continually

plays a vital role in Greenland’s diplomatic conducts and economic affairs. The purpose of this paper is,

thus, twofold to explicate this puzzle: First and foremost, to scratch beyond the surface of the exit-

referendum and provide a more comprehensive analysis of both ballots, as well as crucial political

developments in-between. Second, to briefly analyse the developments in Greenland-EU relations since

the mid-1980s, in order to gain a more elaborated, coherent analytical narrative of the case 35 years

after ‘Grøxit’.

Introduction

Long before Brexit there was Grøxit. 35 years ago, on 23 February 1982, a small majority of less than

1.500 voters [sic!] voted in favour of leaving the European Communities, which Greenland had joined as

part of the Danish accession in 1973 after referendums in both Denmark and Greenland on 2 October

1972. Isolated, Greenland rejected accession by a vast majority of more than 70%, but at the time of

voting, the constitutional status as a Danish county meant the less than 10.000 Greenlandic ‘no’-votes

were lumped together with the positive referendum-outcome of 63% in Denmark proper.

Having gained Home Rule in the meantime in 1979, Greenland voted for the second time in just ten

years in 1982 about the membership many Greenlanders felt they had been forced into in 1973, as an

appendage to Denmark proper’s accession. Three years later, in February 1985, the Greenland Treaty

came into force, stipulating the negotiated terms of Greenland’s exit and the OCT-status the leaving

micro-polity opted to exchange membership to as an overseas territory.1 In addition, the treaty coined

Greenland as a ‘special case’ in regards to its supranational European affiliation.

1 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are not part of the European Union, but many former European colonies have been associated with the EU and the earlier abbreviations since the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957. For the 1985-agreement, see Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1985:029:FULL&from=EN. While Greenland was a first-mover and proto-case in regards to EU-exit via referendums, a subject nowadays of immense scrutiny because of the recent British exit-vote, Algeria had left the early, evolving European cooperation in the early 1960s without consulting its voters.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1985:029:FULL&from=EN

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1985:029:FULL&from=EN


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‘Grøxit’ – i.e. a portmanteau of exit and Grønland, the Danish name for Greenland, applied here since

‘Grexit’ in EU-jargon is already preoccupied by Greece’s looming exit from the Euro – ended merely 12

years of membership from 1 January 1973 to 1 February 1985. However, the chronicle of Greenland’s

EU-relations by no means ends here.

Historically, the 1972-referendum was one of the most important events in triggering a ‘Greenlandic

Spring’, i.e. a political awakening and the birth of more durable political parties (Lyberth et al. 2013; see

also Lynge 2013; Rebhan 2016).2 While a new membership is not on the table in the foreseeable future,

the EU, including the association of OCTs in OCTA, continues to play an important role in Greenlandic

political economy with iterative Fisheries-agreements and, since the Partnership Agreement in 2007,

substantial funding to the educational sector, etc. Moreover, the EU is still imperative in order to

understand the evolution of Greenlandic para-diplomacy, i.e. the case of a sub-national unit in

international affairs e.g. spreading diplomatic ties to a broader set of international actors and learning the

often times cumbersome trade of international negotiations (Gad 2016; cf. Adler-Nissen & Gad 2013;

Ackrén 2014; Kobza 2016; Gad & Jacobsen 2018).

Only slightly simplifying, the process of Grøxit paved the way for the introduction of a domestic political

arena in Greenland, on the one hand, whereas the EU since then is one of the foremost important arenas

of learning the craft of international diplomacy, on the other hand. This is the paradox this paper

elucidates by offering a longitudinal case-study of Grøxit and the process that follows in the next more

than three decades. The ‘before and after’ case study (George & Bennett 2004) of Grøxit in a single

analytical narrative (Bates et al. 1998) is not offered to make any comparative inquiry or policy

recommendations in regards to Brexit, but is analysed in its own right as a ‘special case’ of para-diplomacy,

using leaving and then utilising the EU as the institutional focal point for analysis in the asymmetric

federal configuration in the Kingdom of Denmark.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, some methodological and theoretical aspects are introduced in order

to calibre the analysis and discussions, albeit the research design is primarily empirically historical. Next,

the utilised data are briefly discussed. Third, the analysis follows in two parts (before and after the specific

event); first and foremost, the two referendums in 1972 and 1982 followed by, second, the European-

integration afterlife of Grøxit. Lastly, some [tentative] conclusions are offered.

2 The analogy of a Greenlandic Spring is arguably not unproblematic as it compare this to the Arabic Spring with diminishing constructive connotations. Lyberth et al. (2013) has presented the analogy, but it was the author of this article who is solely responsible for the emphasis in the title of their article, as I was the (journalistic) editor of the piece and decided on the headline-angle.


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Theory, Methodological Issues, and Research Design

The purpose of this paper is not to test a particular dependent variable per se, but to offer a longitudinal

case study of the Greenlandic case vis-à-vis the European Union to capture the abovementioned

paradoxical puzzle of Greenland both leaving (Grøxit) and continuously utilising the European

integration-arena in a para-diplomatic evolution endeavour. This point of departure corresponds to

somewhat disparate research agendas in-between Comparative Politics, International Relations in the

Arctic, and Area Studies; that is, inter alia, EU-studies, referendum-studies, the role of political parties and

movements in nation-building, para-diplomacy, postcolonialism, and the niche-field of OCTs, etc. In the

subsections below, mainly discussions of referendums and para-diplomacy constitute the theoretical

point of departure, but conceptual arguments from other subfields are included when relevant.

Afore, a notable caveat about the State of the Art must briefly be accentuated: Greenland-studies often

suffer from some of the same pitfalls as Area Studies in other parts of the world, namely being overtly

descriptive; i.e. inapplicable to disentangle country-specific idiosyncrasies from more general patterns,

neglect of the recommendations for comparative inquiry beyond the case under scrutiny, and, thus,

restricted to descriptive inference (Przeworski & Teune 1970; King et al. 1994; Elman 2005; Nielsen

2009; see e.g. Peeters 1982 in regards to a descriptive investigation of the pre-Grøxit).

Recently, however, an overdue, welcomed trend is emerging in new books and edited volumes situating

the Greenlandic case within EU-studies (e.g. Gad 2016; Rebhan 2016) and International Relations (e.g.

Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, eds., 2018), which has typically ignored sub-state actors and/or non-

sovereign polities. Apart from Rebhan, who applies Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal version of

intergovernmentalism (but see below for a critical remark), the bulk of this theoretical turn is rooted in

identity narratives via discourse analyses, whereas this paper in contrast is more influenced by the

‘analytical narratives’ approach (Bates et al. 1998). This framework applies rational and historical

institutionalism and political economy to historical case studies in order to combine theoretical derived

arguments while also process tracing historical developments and causal mechanisms.

Referendums

Since the centre stage of the analytical narrative of Grøxit (ex ante and ex post) emanates from two

referendums (1972 and 1982) in Greenland, the first piece of a viable puzzle-solution is to consult the

referendum-literature. Referendums in relation to devolution, secession, and ethno-national issues have

been convened for centuries and has received some comparative, scholarly attention (see e.g. Qvortrup

2014, 2016), but this line of research does mostly address cases from Europe, the former USSR, Africa,


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and South America, etc., with Quebec in Canada as the main outlier of actual focus in the Arctic. In other

words, Greenland is outlandishly absent in the canonical referendum literature. Having said that, the

comparative knowledge of different shades of direct democracy has progressed considerable in the last

couple of decades, let alone more theoretically guided analyses, which can direct possible avenues for

future research on the essentially untouched territory of Greenland in regards to referendums; some of

them discussed in this paper, most others not (cf. also Gad & Nielsen forthcoming/work-in-progress).

For example and also pertaining to this paper, EU-referendums have especially since the Danish ‘No’ to

the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s been given considerable attention, both on the voter and, albeit

less frequently, elite/politician level of analysis (see e.g. Nielsen & Beach 2008 for the voter level and

Nielsen 2009 for the elite level); but, again, Greenland is typically missing from the sample of cases.

In regards to voting behaviour, unfortunately, the data available of both Greenlandic EEC-ballots are

confined to the official outcomes as reported on print in the respective statistical yearbooks (see table 1-

2 below), making it only possible to detect some regional variances per municipalities in yes/no-votes

and in turnout. To the best of the author’s knowledge no data of socio-economic indicators, background

variables, or motivation for voting ‘aap’/’naamik’ (yes/no) exist to e.g. test competing schools of voting

behaviour (see e.g. Nielsen & Beach 2008 for a discussion of the main schools in the EU-referendum

literature).

Wendel-Hansen (2016) argues in a Brexit-induced comparison of Grøxit that the yes-votes in the 1982-

referendum primarily came from voters aligning with the bourgeois party Atassut’s recommendation.

Although this a fair assessment based on party-endorsements in the campaign, this can only be a hunch

because of the scarcity of data at the voter-level. It does concur with what we know from early

comparative works on EU-referendums that party-alignments are important in predicting referendum-

outcomes; an argument that has travelled to, and been elaborated in, the more recent literature on party-

cues in referendums and to some extent the ‘second order-election’-school, which posits that the

outcomes of EU-referendums are determined mainly by domestic politics, rather than the EU-level.3

However, the main anti-thesis to the ‘second-order’ postulate, namely the ‘issue-voting-school’ arguing

voters are actually answering the question on the bill or voting in accordance with their general

3 Furthermore, domestic and international politics are to a high degree intertwined in Greenland because of the status of not being (as of yet) a sovereign state with Denmark proper constantly in the near background (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen 2018), but also having geostrategic importance in the Arctic and in inuit NGO’s like the ICC, as well as being a fish exporter of some pedigree and a potential mining and oil country attracting interest from the EU, China, and Australia, etc.


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preferences in regards to the EU (Nielsen & Beach 2008), primarily analytically advocated by scholars

from the University of Aarhus, Denmark, might fare better in a more vigorous test had the applicable

data been available. All this just to stress that it is cumbersome to make any strong conclusions based on

the voter-level in regards to the two referendums analysed in this paper.

Other key findings from the EU-referendum literature include variables such as economic gains from

European integration, membership-accession, or the treaty/policy amendment on the bill (either

individually or for the country, with some ecological fallacies in relation to isolate the level of analysis-

effects in statistical analyses). In regards to Greenland this primarily involves fishing quotas, but also

funding from the EEC and later the EU.

Also the fluffy concept of sovereignty has played a key factor in a number of EU-referendums and in

relation to euro-scepticism across Europe, but to different extent and with quite different connotations

in different memberstates. In regards to Greenland, as a former Danish colony, this can be expected to

have an even bigger role than pooling or delegating sovereignty generally do in EU-referendums. The

triangle of Nuuk, Copenhagen, and Brussels was initially seen as an obstacle on the road to (greater)

independence by adding another decision-making power in Greenlandic affairs in the shape of

supranational institutions and regulations, but can also be seen as an asset as Greenland move along on

the continuum from colony to a fully independent state (Gad 2016; cf. the subsection on para-diplomacy

below and the empirical analysis in a later section). Recently, Hooghe & Marks (200x) has introduced

identity as another key variable in the list of usual suspects of what to control for when analysing

referendums about European integration.

Again, an actual test of the briefly discussed variables is not doable at the voter level in neither of the

1972 or 1982 ballots, but they can still guide us towards a better understanding of Grøxit by looking at

the elite level and the issues discussed in the referendum-campaigns.

In regards to elite-strategies in EU-referendums the findings in earlier work (Nielsen 2009) offer some

explanatory variables worth assessing in this paper, but the notion of Greenland as a ‘special case’ as

stipulated in the abovementioned Greenland Treaty from 1985 is evident, it must be stressed.

Some seminal, descriptive typologies concerning why elites call referendums in parliamentary

democracies are offered by Bjørklund (1982) and Morel (2001), including domestic aspects such as

electoral motivation and soothing intra-party division using referendums as a lightning rod. Nielsen

(2009) provides a more coherent analytical framework and comparative tests, arguing that the vast

majority of the more than 50 EU-referendums can be analysed by applying standard rational choice


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axioms of Downsian vote-seeking politicians (Downs 1957) and intra-party fractions. Unfortunately, the

Greenlandic case was only briefly mentioned and not analytically tested, as ‘regional votes’ (also e.g.

Aaland) were excluded by definition in the case-selection (Nielsen 2009).

Extrapolating the findings, some of the same dynamics are expected to be present in the Grøxit-case, but

as an art ‘proto-case’. Not necessarily in the standard typology of proto-typical cases (Hague et al. 1998),

in where the case is expected to become the norm of future typical cases, like the French revolution or

Tocqueville's study of democracy in America. Rather, in the sense that the political system and parties

were founded and matured in furtherance of the 1972-referendum, rather than parties calling EU-

referendums to decouple sensitive EU-policies and European integration in general from the domestic

parliamentary and electoral arenas. Thus, the analytical tools come into play at an earlier state in the

lifecycle of the political system; hence, to proto-notion.

The most straightforward reason for convening an EU-referendum, stating the obvious, is if it is

obligatory to hold the ballot. This can be from constitutional decree (Ireland is the most noticeable

example) or if they are politically mandatory, as e.g. the Danish opt-out votes in 1993, 2000, and 2015

because of the path dependency of a political pact after the Maastricht-ordeal in 1992 when voters in

Denmark proper rejected the treaty. Although the constitutionally required-variable holds less

explanatory power comparatively than often suggested, even in Ireland and Denmark (Nielsen 2009), the

1972-referendum in Greenland was mandatory, whereas the 1982-vote was not.

Para-diplomacy

The concept of para-diplomacy has slowly become an important conceptual tool in e.g. postcolonial

frameworks, as well as a rectification to mainstream theories of International Relations’ traditional focus

on statism or sovereign states in international organisations. Realists and neo-realist alike typically hold

that sovereignty is fixed and undividable, and while neo-liberalist in the 1970s argued that transnational

actors beyond the state were crucial to understand international relations, they by and large regressed to

black boxing the state during the so-called neo-neo-debate of the 1980s. Hence, para-diplomacy of sub-

national unit in international affairs makes it possible to analyse regional actors - like Greenland - in

International Relations (Ackrén 2014).

In addition, using the case of Greenland, interrelations with Denmark proper within the Realm also

highlights the blurred lines between de jure and de facto dynamics of possibilities and constraint in becoming

an international actor (Eliasen 2004). De jure foreign affairs is a Danish prerogative, but all the while

Greenland is spreading its diplomatic ties to a broader set of international actors and learning the often


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times cumbersome trade of international negotiations (Gad 2016; cf. Adler-Nissen & Gad 2013; Ackrén

2014; Kobza 2016; Gad & Jacobsen 2018).

As argued by Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen (2018), comparatively speaking, Greenland’s

connection to Denmark has since the introduction of Home Rule (1979) and especially Self Rule (2009)

been looser than in most other para-diplomatic configurations, providing Nuuk with significant room

for manoeuvre in several diplomatic settings.4

The ‘learning para-diplomacy’ notion in relation to Greenland is mostly forwarded and analytically

developed by social constructivist approaches (Gad 2016),5 but the argument can arguably also be

analysed by positivist frameworks like, say, liberal institutionalism, as long as states are not black boxed

and sovereignty is not assumed to be fixed.6 In addition, the argument in regards to the EU to a certain

degree emanates from Greenlandic diplomats themselves (author’s interviews with two former head of

the Greenlandic Representation in Brussels, January and August 2017).

EU-negotiations can be immensely protracted and can shift quickly from integrative to much more

conflictual dynamics. In many ways, Greenland started from a diplomatic ‘tabula rasa’ in the Grøxit-

process.7 For example, in 1979, Greenland’s first and only MEP in Finn Lynge arrived in

Brussels/Strasbourg without much prior diplomatic familiarity. In his memoirs, he describes his first

period of time as “making his swim-training debut in very windy conditions at Vesterhavet [West-coast

of Jutland in Denmark]” (Lynge 2013: 15). Network building and understanding the game and the logic

of written and unwritten workings of the European Parliament took time, wasted hours, and lots of hard

work. Greenland has had its own representation in Brussels since 1992 (Vesterbirk 2006), and although

a representation in Washington was recently opened and another is probably opening in Reykjavik in the

4 As Agnes (2009) argues, the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality is undergoing constant change. Ironically, the international literature frequently presents Greenland's current status as an example of the dissolving importance of classic conceptions of statehood. 5 Social constructivist arguments are also, as of yet, in the driving seat in offering theoretically guided analyses of OCT and OCTA in recent years (cf. footnote 1 above), as a recent study of EU, Greenland, and OCT-relations argues: “While the OCTA concept has been analysed so far mainly from a legal point of view, some recent “postcolonial” narratives seem particularly useful as they shed more light on the OCTs as sui generis remnants of the colonial era, with all the consequences for their political, economic and cultural development on one side, and for an interesting interplay between the European Union institutions and the metropole EU member state on the other” (Kobza 2016). 6 Keohane and Nye were seminal in the 1970’s in introducing transnational and transgovernmental relations in IR that has been further developed in the field of e.g. para-diplomacy in the study of different subunits, also including non-governmental and socio-economic actors (see e.g. Cohn and Smith 1996 for further discussions of the IR-liberal influence on para-diplomacy; see e.g. Axelrod 1984 for the evolutionary aspect of international cooperation, as often times applied by neo-liberalism; see Coase 1960 for the economic baseline theory of institutional cooperation via bargaining; see e.g. Keohane & Martins 1995 for an introduction to neo-liberal institutionalism). 7 Heinrich (2018) trace from a historical perspective the evolution of Greenland becoming an international actor ca. 1900-1979, but it is arguably ado about very little until the EEC-ordeal enters the frame in the early 1970s.


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near future, “the gains from this takes lots of time for a small country like Greenland”, as a Special

Advisor in Greenland’s Foreign Affairs Department puts it in an interview with the author (interview in

Nuuk, March 2017).

In sum, formally, foreign policy matters was in the 1970-80s, and to a large extent still is, controlled from

Copenhagen, according to article 19 in the Danish 1953-constitution (Grundloven). On face-value the

international role of a country with no de jure foreign policy prerogative might then be bordering on

trivialities? Not unless you are an old-school neo-Realist, as a growing literature are arguing:

“Because governments and other political actors at all levels are increasingly capable - both in law and in fact -

of exercising internal jurisdiction and engaging in foreign policy, territorial entities must be located on a spectrum

of independence rather than accorded a status within an oversimplified binary opposition between independence

and dependence” (Grydehøj, 2016: 106).

Data and Methods

The data utilised in this study are primarily qualitative. Several interviews with former and current

diplomats from mostly Greenland have been conducted, but also from Denmark and the EU [and this

will be expanded considerable in the fall of this year]. In addition, Ilisimatusarfik (Greenland University)

provides access to the private archive of the abovementioned late Finn Lynge [which also will be

consulted in Fall 2017 thoroughly] and access to the Greenlandic Representation in Brussels’ archive is

currently processed, also parts of it that is fairly new and not closed according to the usual 25 years clause

[same note as the last brackets].

Third in the triangulation of qualitative data collection, although the case specific literature is not exactly

mushrooming, the secondary literature is also a valuable source included in this study. In relation to the

historical period in the 1970-80s especially Rebhan (2016) provides valuable insights from solid archive-

studies, although the theoretical contribution and application of Moravcisk (1998) is less convincing. Gad

(2016) provides seminal insight to the ‘learning (para)-diplomacy’ aspect in the triangle between Nuuk,

Copenhagen, and Brussels, although he arguably puts too much explanatory power into identity-

discourses.

Descriptive data of the voting results and turn-out across Greenland for both EEC-referendums are

available in the specific statistical yearbooks (see table 1 and 2 below), but no data are available in order

to make more rigorous analysis of voting behaviour, as mentioned above. Still, most sources of the two

referendums only present the overall outcome, whereas the tables below makes some efforts in updating


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the geographical differences and a better comparative overview, in order to make a small contribution in

our understanding of the votes, in lieu of better quantitative data.

In sum, the research design is a longditutional case-study, which spans almost four decades over time.

As e.g. Gerring argues: “… in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than fleeting

knowledge about a large number of examples… We gain a better understanding of the whole by focussing

on a key part” (Gerring, 2007: 1). However, the somewhat longish time-span comes at the price of details-

density. The with-in case observations and dynamics ‘before’ and ‘after’ Grøxit, however, is essential in

elucidating the paradox stipulated in the introduction (see George & Bennet 2004 in relation to

before/after event research designs).

Analysis

The 1972 referendum and the Greenlandic Spring

Denmark applied for membership of the European Communities in 1961 and 1967, but French President

de Gauelle vetoed enlargement and especially British accession on both occasions. Denmark was instead

a founding part of EFTA for the most part of the 1960s and although Greenland was not initially part of

EFTA this changed after a few years (Rebhan 2016). However, not a lot of practical knowledge about

European integration was at this stage present in Greenland.

Landsrådet (Greenland’s Assembly, back then) drafted a few remarks in 1967 when the second application

was imminent, stating they, admittedly, did not knew a whole lot about the EEC, but in principle were

in favour of membership. As long as a couple of opt-outs were provided in regards to: 1) Inshore fishing

restrictions of 12 miles (ca. 22 km); 2) Establishment-right for new business meant living in Greenland

for 6 months before starting a business was required; 3) The block-grants from Denmark was not to be

altered.8

In Denmark there was not a lot of EEC-debate before the spring of 1971 when the accession referendum

was announced (Nielsen 2009), and this was even more so the case in Greenland until late 1971.

Hereafter, the topic quickly gained a lot more salience. Discussion about greater autonomy had grown

by the late 1960s in Greenland and amongst Greenlandic students in Denmark, many of them playing a

pivotal role in the Siumut party for years to come, but according Finn Lynge the novel independence-

8 Similar opt-outs were included five years later when accession was not vetoed anymore. Exemptions are not uncommon in the EU. For example, Denmark also obtained an opt-out on summer-cottages before 1973 (sommerhus-reglen) before the more 4 more well-known opt-out were negotiated after the Maastricht-treaty ordeal in 1992-93. Sweden has a de facto, rather than de jure Euro-opt and in regards to ‘snus’, etc.


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ideas needed something to trigger tenable actions. The 1972-referendum became that trigger-event

(Lyberth et al. 2013). Or as Rebhan puts it: A turning point in Greenland’s political history (Rebhan,

2016: 109).

A pamphlet, published by Demos (197x) and the EEC-skeptical Greenland Committee, listed in 1970s-

Marxist jargon a number of issues for Greenland; for example:

“After a transitional period, it will be the EEC's Supranational bodies that will be the hegemon

(“enerådende” in Danish) in terms of Greenland's further destiny… The political possibilities for

independence will be further impaired when the Greenlanders in addition to the Danish state administration

now also get bureaucratic technocrats in Brussels to drag us down” (author’s translation).

There was suggestions by amongst others Moses Olsen, a Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament

at the time, that Greenland should vote at a later stage than the Danish vote set for 2 October 1972, but

this was deemed unconstitutional by Copenhagen. With the constitutional amendment in 1953,

Greenland ceased being a colony and had instead received constitutional status as a Danish county.

Consequently, on 2 October 1972 both Greenland and Denmark proper went to the ballot, but with

quite different outcomes, as mentioned above.9 The less than 10,000 no-votes in Greenland were lumped

into the pot with the Danish vote in the referendum, and Greenland had to join the EEC a couple of

months later, against the ‘will of the people’. Table 1 contours the consensus across all municipalities,

except for the small, now abandoned, cryolite-mining town of Ivittuut and the few other settlements in

this former municipality (e.g. Kangilinnguit/ Grønnedal).

9 The third entity within the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands had Home Rule at the time and was not bound to join the EEC. The Faroese was contemplating convening a referendum after a wait-and-see period of, say, five years, but this never manifested itself (see e.g. Rebhan 2016 for further discussion of the Faroese case).


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Table 1: Greenland’s accession-referendum in 1972

Yes (Aap) No (Naamik) Blanks/invalid Turn-out1

Greenland

3.990 (29.2%)

9.658 (70.8%)

57/304

57.5%

Region/Municipality2 Kujalleq (South)

Nanortalik 261 768 6/13 67,3%

Qaqortoq (Julianehåb3) 359 837 4/25 72,3%

Narsaq (Narssaq) 197 526 6/20 60,5%

Regional sum 817 (27.7%) 2.131 (72.3%)

Sermersooq-West (Capital and South-West )

Ivittuut (Ivigtut) 59 34 0/0 54.7%

Paamiut (Frederikshåb) 239 493 5/19 52.1%

Regional sum, excl. Nuuk 298 (36.1%) 527 (63.9%)

Nuuk (Godthåb) 1.070 (37.4%) 1.793 (62.6%) 10/58 60.9%

Qeqqata (Mid-West)

Maniitsoq (Sukkertoppen) 209 806 5/14 49.7%

Sisimiut (Holsteinsborg) 187 698 4/18 49.0%

Regional sum 396 (20.8%) 1.504 (79.2%)

Qaasuitsup (North-West)

Kangaatsiaq (Kangatsiaq) 49 195 0/2 56.4%

Aasiaat (Egedesminde) 291 624 8/10 56.7%

Qasigiannguit (Christianshåb) 149 376 1/14 60.5%

Ilulissat (Jakobshavn) 197 742 1/44 47.4%

Qeqertarsuaq (Godhavn) 88 274 0/13 70.2%

Uummannaq (Umanak) 215 616 0/12 63.2%

Upernavik 137 427 0/15 63.6%

Qaanaaq (Thule) 81 106 5/7 62.3%

Regional sum 1.207 (26.4%) 3.360 (73.6%)

Sermersooq-East

Tasiilaq (Angmagsalik) 151 262 0/15 38.4%

Ittoqqortoormiit (Scoresbysund) 51 81 2/5 54.1%

Regional sum 202 (37.1%) 343 (62.9%)

Source: Compiled by author using data from Statistical Yearbook 1973 citing Meddelt af landhøvdingen over Grønland.

Notes:

1: Including non-valid and blanks

2: In 1972 and 1982 Greenland had 18 municipalities, but this was reduced to only four in 2009 (the northern Qaasuitsup

Kommunia, however, is going to be split in two somewhat soon). These are used to divide the regions in the table - except,

Sermersooq is divided in East and West

3: The names of the relevant settlements, towns, and cities are presented in the table by their Greenlandic name. The

brackets include the names (typically the Danish name or earlier spelling) in the original source


13

The voter-turn-out was a somewhat meager 58% compared to over 90% in Denmark proper on the same

date (and compared to the Grøxit-vote ten years later; see table 2 below). But, as already oft-mentioned,

politically the referendum had ramifications leading to a political awaking, parties, and system that

commenced the process of Home Rule obtained by the end of the decade. Essentially, EEC-skepticism

and independence-aspiration became each other’s companions and catalysts between the two

referendums.

The 1982-referendum and Grøxit

After the transition to Home Rule in 1979 and the first parliamentary election, a new EEC-referendum

was quickly discussed and eventually set for early 1982. With merely ten years apart Greenland voted

twice against the EEC, but the second time around with an important constitutional difference; where

the votes of the southernmost part of the Danish Kingdom would not be decisive and overrule the

Greenlandic voters’ verdict.

In 1981, the EEC-critical ANISA – which can be loosely translated to “let’s go” – was formed. The

movement was initiated by the two relatively new left-wing parties Siumut and IA (Inuit Ataqatigiit), as

well as, inter alia, the labour union SIK and the fisheries-organization KNAPK (Association of Fishermen

and Hunters). ANISA was assembled with the inspiration of, and a bit of help from, the Danish

counterpart, People's Movement against the EC, and played a key role in the No-campaign.

The referendum campaign was foremost about what was - and still is - the most important industry in

Greenland: Fishiries: ”What’s the purpose of Home Rule if we can’t even be involved in developing the

fishing industry and decide our own quota”, as one of the leading actors in ANISA, Kaj Kleist, puts it

(Christiansen 2015: 88, author’s translation). The argument was that the Home Rule, finally achieved in

1979, was not worth much if Greenland was in a straitjacket from the Community's Common Fisheries

Policy and an unfair quota competition from European industrial fishermen. Even if a significant amount

of support kroner from Brussels would probably fall away after Grøxit.

Finn Lynge, the aforementioned former MEP, had changed his mind about EEC-membership from pro

to against between to two ballots. In a book-chapter, he listed three reasons as to why Grøxit should

remain, even though he himself was rooting for Grøxit. First, economic reason in general; second,

keeping more funding than other European regions; thirdly; political reasons, including pleasing

Copenhagen (Lynge in Peeters 1982). A more whole-heartedly pro-campaign was led by Atassut (liberal

party, pro-Realm, and for many years the main opposition party), backed by most (but not all) in the

business and the newspaper Sermitsiaq (whereas the other main newspaper AG was against).


14

The first incoming results on 23 February 1982 from smaller towns and even smaller settlements and

villages pointed to a ‘No’ to the question: “Do you want Greenland to remains in the EC?” However, the

expectation was that of a much closer result when cities were counted than had been the case in the first

ballot on 2 October 2 1972.

Table 2: The 1982 Grøxit-referendum

Yes (Aap) No (Naamik) Blanks/invalid Turn-out1

Greenland

11.174 (47%)

12.624 (53%)

470

74.9%

Region/Municipality2 Kujalleq (South)

Nanortalik 477 912 36 76.7%

Qaqortoq (Julianehåb3) 595 950 34 76,5%

Narsaq (Narssaq) 604 562 34 80,8%

Regional sum 1.676 (40.9%) 2.424 (59.1%)

Sermersooq-West (Capital and South-West )

Ivittuut (Ivigtut) 56 7 5 26.7%

Paamiut (Frederikshåb) 531 736 50 74.3%

Regional sum, excl. Nuuk 587 (44.1%) 743 (55.9%)

Nuuk (Godthåb) 2.876 (52.2%) 2.633 (47.8%) 126 78.1%

Qeqqata (Mid-West)

Maniitsoq (Sukkertoppen) 913 862 30 73.0%

Sisimiut (Holsteinsborg) 851 1.186 35 73.0%

Regional sum 1.764 (46.4%) 2.037 (53.6%)

Qaasuitsup (North-West)

Kangaatsiaq (Kangatsiaq) 320 219 7 82.1%

Aasiaat (Egedesminde) 850 811 30 75.2%

Qasigiannguit (Christianshåb) 414 437 10 76.8%

Ilulissat (Jakobshavn) 845 973 17 72.4%

Qeqertarsuaq (Godhavn) 226 263 11 75.1%

Uummannaq (Umanak) 516 732 13 75.0%

Upernavik 356 486 11 70.5%

Qaanaaq (Thule) 119 176 4 63.3%

Regional sum 3.646 (47.1%) 4.097 (52.9%)

Sermersooq-East

Tasiilaq (Angmagssalik) 509 590 14 72.2%

Ittoqqortoormiit (Scoresbysund) 116 89 1 68.0%

Regional sum 625 (47.9%) 679 (52.1%)

Source: Compiled by author using data from Statistical Yearbook 1983 citing Meddelt af Grønlands Hjemmestyre.

Notes: See table 1 above

Although a small majority in the capital Nuuk voted yes to remain in the EEC, the total number of 12,624

no-votes against 11,174 votes in favour was enough to trigger the withdrawal process (see table 2). In


15

contrast to 1972, several municipalities voted to remain, but especially southern Greenland paved the

way for, three years later on 1 February 1985, Grøxit (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Compiled by author (data derived from table 1 and 2)

The legal basis of Greenland's withdrawal from the Community is the former Article 236 of the Treaty

of Rome (now Article 48 of the Lisbon Treaty), which provides for amendments to the EC Treaty and

enters into force after ratification by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional

requirements (Harhoff, 1983).10

There are several reasons why it took three years to negotiate a Grøxit-agreement. Firstly, the relatively

close result “had an enormous influence on the atmosphere. We were told again and again that the

minority was just as big as the majority and we couldn’t do it,” as Lars Vesterbirk, Greenland’s main

diplomatic negotiator at the time, have recently noted (www.slow-journalism.com, 23 June 2016). In addition,

there was probably a hope in Copenhagen and Brussels that the liberal Atassut party would meanwhile

win a parliamentary election and hold a third Greenlandic referendum; a sort of re-vote, as we know from

Denmark in 1993 and Ireland in both 2002 and 2009. Atassut campaigned with this message in the early

10 Article 50 was not ‘invented’ until ten years ago in the Lisbon Treaty.

27,7

36,1 37,4

20,8

26,4

37,140,9

44,1

52,2

46,4 47,1 47,9

SOUTH SOUTH-WEST NUUK MID-WEST NORTH-WEST EAST

1972 & 1982 referendums compared by region

1972 1982


16

1990s in a couple of parliamentary elections, but without much luck (Rebhan 2016). Especially one

German negotiator was delaying negotiations by constantly talking gibberish (interview with Greenland’s

main negotiator at the time, August 2017). It got to a deadlock-point where Greenland threatened to

leave unilaterally without an agreement, which seemed to kick-start the willingness to negotiate more

sincerely in the European Commission – and led to the abovementioned German negotiator being

replaced.

Secondly, in the mid-1980s - as was the case with the Scottish independence vote a few years ago and in

continuation of the debate in, for example, Catalonia - a fear of regional independence votes would spread

through a domino effect. Especially Italia was obstructing the bargaining solution in the Grøxit-process

because of fears of Sicily wanting similar concessions or even independence. Again, it took some hard

negotiation skills from Greenland’s delegation when visiting Rome to smooth the bargaining process

back on track. Another deadlock was altered when the Greenlandic Prime Minister at the time, Jonathan

Motzfeldt, was meeting the Italian Minister of European Affairs, but to little avail until having to cut the

meeting short to meet the Pope, which apparently impressed to Italians. A few days later Italy was ready

to ratify the treaty in the European Council (ibid.).

Apart from these and other sometimes anecdotal examples, however, it was often times Danish diplomats

and minsters, especially Minister of Foreign, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, and part of the delegation

representing the Council, Poul Skytte Christoffersen, who played a crucial part in brokering a deal.

However, it started a vital para-diplomatic process and the few Greenlanders who was in the inner circle

of the Grøxit-process was in almost daily contact between Nuuk, Brussels, Copenhagen, and short visits

to other Member States.

Thirdly, there were lengthy negotiations on what agreement would replace the Community membership:

“The legal contours of the OCT formula have been reshaped in the Commission's Draft in order to fit

Greenland's request for withdrawal from and reassociation with the European Community. Both of these

events may be considered precedential by some observers. The Commission's focus on the problems of adapting

the OCT status to Greenland's conditions demonstrates the pragmatic approach it is taking, but unfortunately

draws attention away from the theoretical but important problem of how a political entity such as Greenland,

which entered the Community as something less than a Member State but as something more than a colony,

goes about leaving the Community” (Mason 1983: 876).

Relatively late in the process, it was agreed to convert Greenland to an OCT, an arrangement dating back

to the Treaty of Rome 60 years ago, i.e. dependencies or semi-autonomous territories in post-colonial

connection to, currently, one of the following member states: France, the Netherlands, Britain, and


17

Denmark. For Greenland it mainly solve the problem of trade tariffs upon leaving the EEC. Finally, on

1 February 1985, delayed by another month because of a Christmas-party made Ireland miss the

ratification-deadline, Grøxit was a reality. Financially, Greenland continued to receive almost equally the

funding it has obtained before Grøxit (interview with former head of the Brussels representation, August

2017).

For the next decades, however, fish was still the most vital part of the cooperation between Greenland

and the EU, and the main means of continued considerable funding: “Fishing vessels flying the flag of a

Member State of the Community and registered in that Member State shall be authorized to operate in

Greenland waters subject to the conditions laid down by the Parties to this Agreement in the

implementation Protocols” (Greenland Treaty, 1985).

Learning para-diplomacy (note: this section constitute a very, very early draft)

Lessons from the Grøxit-negotiation led to opening a Greenlandic Representation in Brussels in 1992

(Vesterbirk 2006). Being present on a day-to-day basis was seen as vital to improve Greenland’s hand in

the iterative re-negotiations of the Fisheries-agreement, and later also in relation to other issues. Today,

the representation has three employees and an intern. The tasks include keeping the government in Nuuk

updated in regards to EU-affairs of interest, to make and develop networks, and essentially put Greenland

on the map among Eurocrats and politicians in the different institutions in Brussels. In regards to

fisheries, it is often the Greenlandic diplomat who is negotiating directly with the European Commission

(interview with former head of the Brussels representation, August 2017).

This was also often the case when a notable change in funding was negotiated in 2007 to divide the

funding from primarily the Fisheries-agreement up until then to also include the educational sector in

Greenland through a Partnership-agreement, but roughly within the same budget as before. In the first

phase of the Greenland Education Programme (2007-2013), emphasis was put on vocational training,

the acquisition of real qualifications for jobs requiring skilled persons and real competence courses for

unskilled persons. In the second phase (2014-2020) emphasis is primarily the pre-school and elementary

school system (European Commission, 2014/137/EU).11

It was Greenland that wanted education to the forefront of the Partnership-agreement, but on the

suggestion of the EU to focus on a single issue (interview with former head of the Brussels representation,

11 See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/signed_programming_document_for_sustainable_development_of_greenland_2014-2020_colour.pdf


18

August 2017). This, however, has led some critical remarks that other issues are neglected in the

cooperation (see e.g. the Mid-Term Review of the European Union’s 2014-2020 External Financing Instruments,

2017). The ‘Letter of Intent’ from 2012 concerning mining is a good example since this has not evolved

to being much more than a dead-letter. Several Greenlandic diplomats has to the author indicated that

Greenland could probably gain even more from cooperating more with the EU, but the limited

manpower and resources makes this exceedingly difficult to manage strategically and in practise.

Agenda-setting is generally difficult for a small polity on the outskirt of European integration like

Greenland, but the newfound interests in the Arctic region provides Greenland with a comparative

leverage. In some instances agenda-setting has been highly prioritised; for example in relation to the

European Parliaments latest Arctic Resolution from Spring 2017, where Greenland actively tried to

correct some perceived mistakes in earlier drafts and include Greenlandic interests more in the process

(interview with current head of the Brussels representation, April 2017). Another example is the seals-

ordeal that dates back to Bardot-gate in the 1970s (ibid.; interview with former head of the Brussels

representation, August 2017). Bigger awareness of the inuit-exemption and working towards some sort

of certificate to indicate to consumers it is ‘OK’ to buy Greenlandic seal-fabrics is a recurrent task for

the representation in Brussels. Often in tandem with Danish diplomats and politicians, like former Prime

Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Danish MEPs.

Gad (2016) provides an interesting (as well as catchy) analogy of Greenland using Brussels to ‘photo-

shopping’ Denmark out of the diplomatic picture in ideational post-sovereignty games. Denmark being

‘out of the picture’ can be detected in e.g. fisheries negotiations where the Greenlandic diplomat often

sits at the table without much involvement or inference from Copenhagen. But several former diplomats

have stressed the importance of a well-coordinated strategy and division of labour with Denmark proper

if e.g. agenda-setting is most likely to succeed; in other words getting into the family photo without too

much internal drama, which Gad also notices elsewhere (cf. Gad & Jacobsen 2018)

Learning para-diplomacy is also important on an individual level. In the 1970-80’s, e.g. Finn Lynge and

Lars Vesterbirk, mentioned in earlier sections, did not have much prior knowledge of the tasks facing

them beforehand. Nowadays, most Greenlandic diplomats have been in Brussels at some point as an art

breeding ground for diplomats, so even though the general knowledge in Greenland about EU/OCT is

low, this is crucial to understand the evolution of para-diplomacy (cf. Gad 2016; Gad & Jacobsen 2018).


19

The EU-insights and lessons-learned, however, does not always travel easily across the north-atlantic to

Nuuk as many voters, politicians, and the media does not pay much attention to the travails in Brussels,

even though economic funding from the EU constitute up to 5% of its annual budget.

The Coalition-agreement from the new left-wing government from last fall states: “The Coalition believes

that it is important for Greenland to protect its interests abroad by means of engagement and with a clear

voice”. The voice could arguably often still be clearer and a little sounder, but Greenland has in many

ways come a long way in learning the craft of para-diplomacy since Grøxit 35 years ago.

Conclusions

The process of Grøxit started ten years before the 1982-referendum. The 1972-referendum initiated a

‘Greenlandic Spring’ and the independence-discussions among a young generation of Greenlandic

politicians found a common trigger. Essentially, EEC-skepticism and independence-aspiration became

each other’s companions and catalysts between the two referendums. Politically, the referendum had

ramifications leading to a political awaking, parties, and system that commenced the process of Home

Rule obtained by the end of the decade.

Compared to the on-going Brexit-ordeal, the post-referendum exit-negotiations ‘only’ took three years,

but it iteratively tested the patience of the diplomats and politicians of the leaving polity. Since Grøxit,

the economic funding from the EU has continued via Fisheries agreements and later the Partnership-

agreement, but the perhaps more interesting development is the diplomatic relations that continues to

evolve. These dynamics are at the little documented in the field of EU-studies and International relations,

but recent work has started to pay closer attention to the Greenlandic case, and the tentative finding

presented above concur with argument emanating from different theoretical points of departures.

This paper constitutes initial work in a broader research agenda of mapping EU-Greenland relations

from the early 1970s to present time. More data from archives-studies and interviews will be added in

future drafts to explicate the puzzle of Greenland – as a ‘special case’ of para-diplomacy - leaving and

then later still utilising the EU as the institutional focal point of learning para-diplomacy.


20

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