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5-22-2016

Международные отношения: Россия, ЛатинскаяАмерика и конфликт в Украине = [InternationalRelations: Russia, Latin America, and the Conflictin Ukraine]Simon Gaetano CiccarilloDickinson College

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Recommended CitationCiccarillo, Simon Gaetano, "Международные отношения: Россия, Латинская Америка и конфликт в Украине = [InternationalRelations: Russia, Latin America, and the Conflict in Ukraine]" (2016). Dickinson College Honors Theses. Paper 247.

Международные отношения:

Россия, Латинская Америка и конфликт в Украине

Семён Чиккарилло

Дипломная работа

Русский факультет

16 мая 2016

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Introduction

Within the past eight years, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly more

aggressive around the world since its near-failed state status during the “Lost Decade” of the

1990s, when the country was in economic and political free-fall. In August of 2008, Russia

flexed its military muscle by responding to an attack by the Georgian military in the form of an

invasion to protect Russians and their allies in the breakaway Georgian republics of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia. Again in 2014, the outbreak of civil conflict in Ukraine over its national

interests drew Russia in to support the separatist Donbass region in the East. This ultimately led

to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation to protect Russian

speakers and minorities; the port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet; and traditional Russian

influence, which had been setback once more Ukrainians demanded a Eurocentric alignment.

Finally, in 2015, the Russian Air Force and Special Forces defended Russian ally Bashar al-

Assad, president of Syria, against militant rebels and terrorist organizations (namely ISIS and the

al-Nusra Front) in an attempt to stabilize a country where there is a Russian naval base operating.

Russia has increased its foreign policy activities with (former) membership in the G-8 economic

summit, leadership of the Eurasian Economic Union, and by brokering deals with the Iranian and

Syrian governments to end the use or production of harmful weapons of mass destruction.

Current Russian involvement in the Ukraine Conflict demonstrates how its foreign policy

in one region of the world – Eastern Europe – has a profound impact on Russian foreign policy

in another part of the world – Latin America. In March 2014, the United Nations General

Assembly voted on whether to accept a Russian-backed referendum held earlier that month in

Crimea determining if it would remain part of Ukraine or enter the Russian Federation. The

referendum showed that, “96.77 percent of the Crimean population has voted ‘for’ integration of

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the region into the Russian Federation” of the 83.1% of voter turnout – the result of which was

vehemently criticized and debated by the West and the UN ("Crimea Declares Independence,

Seeks UN Recognition").

Interestingly, the UN vote exposed a very divided Latin America – one that did not

uniformly vote to invalidate the Crimea Referendum regarding its annexation, as would be

expected for a region of the world under US hegemony for decades. Rather, major regional

powers and core allies of Russia voted to recognize or abstain (not taking a decisive stance

against Russia) from validating the annexation of Crimea. This, when viewed together with the

past 10 years of increased trade, political support, and cultural exchanges between Russia and

Latin American countries confirms that Russia is entering a new age of renewed and expanded

collaboration with Latin America, while exposing the decline of US hegemony in the region. In

this paper, I will argue that while Russia has been involved economically, politically, or

culturally over the past 200 years with various Latin American countries, there has never been a

point like today, where the tools of power Russia have been used so effectively to influence

Latin America across multiple spheres (trade agreements, military exercises, political dialogue

on mutually-beneficial issues, etc.). Indeed, the Russian approach to Latin America has moved

into a new phase of regional development due to the implications of the history of the Ukrainian

Conflict, the UN vote, the decisions made by Latin American countries in that vote, and how all

of these factors might influence the future of Russian-Latin American relations in a way that

could significantly (and from an American perspective, negatively) undermine existing

international norms – namely US hegemonic power across Latin America.

To understand the possible future of Russian-Latin American relations in the

international system, one must understand the historical ties that serve as a foundation upon

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which Russia is building its policies. Below I will now summarize that relationship in Russian,

based off of research conducted at the Dickinson-in-Moscow program during the 2014-2015

academic years.

Дипломатическая история России и Латинской Америки до 2008

Международные отношения между Россией и Латинской Америкой уже

существуют 200 лет. Даже когда этот регион был колонией Испанской империи,

Российское правительство торговало с этими территориями в Латинской Америке.

Конечно потому что эти колонии не были независимые, встречи между ними были не

очень серьёзные в дипломатической или культурной сферах (с 1525 по 1828). Когда

страны в этом регионе выиграли войны независимости, отношения стали сильнее. Эти

первые шаги между Россией и Латинской Америки имеют последствия сегодня, когда кто-

то отмечает интернациональные тенденции между ними.

Первая страна, которая открыла отношения с Русской империей была Бразилия.

Это очень интересно, потому что теперь Бразилия одна из самых важных стран, с

которыми Россия хочет создать сильное партнёрство в международном сообществом. 200

лет истории между ними были очень важными, чтобы создать доверие, хорошие

отношение и сильные связи. «В 1828 Бразилия стала первой из них, с кем Россия

установила дипломатические отношения» и это важно, потому что отношения с другими

странами и развитии между регионами могли расширить (Давыдов 138, Латинская

Америка – Россия: история и современный этап отношений). После 1825 г. Россия тоже

начала дипломатические и экономические дискуссии с другими странами. Например,

Колумбия, Венесуэла, Аргентина и т.д. Бразилия не была единственной страной, с

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которой Россия развивала отношения, и это было не только в успех экономического

развития.

В XIX веке идей, люди и информации обчинивались между Россией и Латинской

Америкой. Кинематографы, писатели, дипломаты, геологи, ботаники и художники

разделяли научные и культурные традиции. Поэты и писатели, как Хосе Марти из Кубы

читал русскую литературу, которая имела сильное его работу. Х.П. Капабланка (тоже из

Кубы) получил навыки для игр шахматы от шахматистов из России. Другие обмены

включали экологические экспедиция в Латинскую Америку (страны дали разрешение

делать экспедиции, которые требуют хорошие отношение между ними).

Без сомнения, одним из самых важных обменов была эмиграция. «В поисках

лучшей жизни, свободных земель, избавления от нищеты за океан…» русские люди

эмигрировали в Бразилию и Аргентину, когда «в начале ХХ в. выходцы из России

занимали в Аргентине по численному составу четвертое место» (Ларин 389, История

Латинской Америки). Эти движения между людьми в этих регионах показывают, на

сколько они были близки. Эмиграция хороший стандарт, который показывать силу

отношении, потому что это значит, что у людей (и стран) есть подлинные традиции и

интересы. Этот связь не существует между Латинской Америкой и другими странами, как

США или Китай. Поэтому они не будут близки к России, даже несмотря на то, что они

используют экономическую политику, похожую на русскую.

В то время также была доктрина «Драго,». Эта доктрина значил что ни

американская ни европейская власть может быть использована против Латинской

Америки для сбора задолженности. Эта политика и экономические договоры «показали,

что у России и латиноамериканских государств имелись не только общие или близкие

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позиции по некоторым вопросам, но и определенные возможности для развития

взаимовыгодных двусторонних отношений в целом» (Ларин 386).

В начале Первой мировой войны в 1914 году много стран в Латинской Америке

присоединились к России в Антанте. Когда правительства в Латинской Америке

поддержали Русскую империю, организации работников (тоже в этих странах) были

сформированы, как в России. Они (очень сильное) поддержали революцию в России

против Царя. Когда большевики укрепили контроль над Россией, страны в регионе

постепенно нормализировали отношения. Здесь Россия начала поддерживаю Аргентину

по вопросу Фолькланда (остров близь Аргентины находящийся под контролем Англии).

На самом деле, контакт с Латинскими странами был легче, благодаря Лиге Наций. «В

этой международной организации СССР не только имел контакты с участие в разрешении

ряда вопросов, касавшихся этого региона, особенно боливийского-парагвайского

конфликта» (Калмыков 436, История Латинской Америки). Интеллигенция в Латинской

Америке стала ближе и ближе к интеллигенции СССР, потому что обе протестовали

против агрессию Италии в Абиссинии и тоже поддерживали республиканскую Испанию,

во время гражданской войны (с 1936 до 1939).

СССР и Латинская Америка создали вместе общество «Южамторг» -

торговую организацию, через которую они могли заниматься торговлей (экспортировать

нефть, лесоматериалы, шерсть, кожсырье и т.д.). В это время в отношениях между

Россией и Латинской Америкой «были сделаны важные шаги в области дипломатии,

торговли, культуры; на пути к утверждению и становлению этих отношений была

доказана не только возможность и реальность существования, но и дальнейшего развития

в интересах обеих сторон» (Калмыков 487-488).

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Когда научилась Вторая мировая война, люди и правительства в Латинской

Америке поддержали СССР против фашизма –в этом регионе, сильное политическое

движение – очень популярное, потому что латиноамериканцы думали, что они были

жертвами империализма (от Америки). Благодаря этому СССР начинал отношения с

большинством стран в регионе, что привело к «развития торговано-экономического,

культурного, и научного сотрудничества…для упрочения дружбы между их народами» в

40-х (Калмыков 489). Но после войны, отношения между ними ещё раз были прекращены

из-за влияния США, которые начали «Холодную Войну» против коммунизма и

Советского союза. Только Куба после революции в 1959 поддерживала отношения с

СССР (Никарагуа и Чили также поддерживали отношение с Союзом но кроткое время,

когда у них были социалистические правительства). Этот «разрыв» отношений

продолжали до 70-х, потому что «они были связаны с крайне небольшим объемом и

эпизодическим характером их взаимной торговли, многолетней нестабильностью

внутренней обстановки в латиноамериканских республиках, что оказывало, в свою

очередь негативное воздействие на их международные связи» (Ларин 382). Только к

концу Холодной войны ситуация стала другим и новые отношения между этими

регионами были установлены.

Но уникальным развитием между СССР и Латинской Америкой стало открытие

новых школ и университет, как РУДН в Москве или Санкт-Петербурге. В этих местах,

студенты из стран в Латинской Америки могли учить и применить навыки, которые они

изучали в своих странах, чтобы способствовать развитию и хороших отношений с СССР в

то же время. Эта эпоха конечно закончилась, когда был распад СССР, «в результате

значительно сократился объем политических контактов, торговли, култь. и науч. связей»

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до начала нового этапа отношений, который будет сильнее, чем раньше (Давыдов 139).

Кроме этого, можно сказать, что до 1991, отношения между Россией и Латинской

Америкой сильное влияли на будущие отношения и создали атмосферу партнерства,

благодаря активной истории движения людей, торговли и политических-идеологических

связей.

Новая эра отношении между Россией и Латинской Америкой была начата в 90-х,

после распада Советского Союза. «Отказ от конфронтации с Западом в конце 80-х и в

начале 1990-х гг. ещё больше сократил интерес России к странам Латинской Америки»

(Мартынов 387, История международных отношений стран Латинской Америки).

Российская Федерация начала торговлю и договоры со странами в Латинской Америке,

потому что экономика РФ нужна была поддержка из-за катастрофа переход от

коммунизма до капитализма. На самом деле, русские экономисты знали потенциал на

рынке Латинской Америки, « Ее товарооборот в 1992 году составил 208 миллиардов

долларов (экспорт - 99 миллиардов долларов, импорт - 109 миллиардов), а объем валового

внутреннего продукта почти достиг триллиона долларов». Они рекомендовали

бизнесменам и государствам сотрудничать с этими странами (Внешняя торговля РФ со

странами южной Америки).

Когда Владимир Путин стал президентом России в 1999 году, и когда нефть и газ

создал огромные богатства в русской экономике, правительство РФ могло серьёзно

начинать программы в социальных и политических сферах в Латинской Америке. Когда

Путин путешествовал много раз по Латинской Америке и встречался с разными

руководителями, он демонстрировал обязательство в улучшении с отношений Латинской

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Америкой. Эта политика называется «геополитика» и эта очень важная часть политики

России в регионе, которая сейчас характеризует новые отношения.

History of the Ukraine Conflict and the Crimea Referendum

The context and current situation of the Ukraine Conflict is pertinent to better understand

the UN vote to accept or reject the Russian-backed Crimea Referendum in 2014,. The divide

between Eastern and Western Ukraine goes back to the mid 1600s up until the final conquest of

the Crimean Khanate by the Russian Empire in 1783. Until that point, Russia, the Ottoman

Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Cossacks fought each other for control of the

strategic and arable land of Ukraine (including Crimea) (Conant, "How History, Geography Help

Explain Ukraine's Political Crisis"). Russia not only saw Ukraine as another addition to its

territorial empire, but also as a vast farmland to feed the growing Russian population, as well as

a buffer state between Russia proper and any European invasions from the West. By the

conclusion of hostilities, Ukraine was divided first between Poland and Russia, and then between

Russia and Austria – where each empire would split the country in two – between east and west.

In that environment, Eastern Ukraine developed with Russian immigrants, hierarchical Russian

laws and customs, a strong Orthodox Church, and the Russian language, whereas Catholic

empires developed Western Ukraine using Enlightenment-based government and a decidedly

European orientation. Crimea was a separate territory from the rest of Ukraine (since Muslim

Turkic peoples – the Tatars, inhabited it). During the reign of Catherine, “the decision was taken

in November, 1776, that Russia should begin the invasion of the Crimea” which was conquered

to gain access to the Black Sea, outlining its strategic importance for centuries (Fisher, The

Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783, pg. 75).

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Centuries later, the ramifications of the split history of Ukraine was pushed further when

in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev allowed the Crimean territory to be ceded to the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic as a “a gift of the ‘elder brother [Russian Communist Party]’ to the ‘younger

brother [Ukrainian Communist Party]’ on the occasion of the tricentennial of the unification of

Russia and Ukraine” ("Transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine"). Khrushchev took the action

without popular consent of Russians, Crimeans, or Ukrainians. Khrushchev’s actions had long-

lasting consequences; as the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Duma) passed a

bill “declaring Crimea’s transfer…in 1954…to be illegal,” covertly support the pro-Russian

separatists in the region in 2014 – leading to the annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014

("Federation Council to Pass Bill Proclaiming Crimea's Transfer to Ukraine in 1954 Illegal").

Before this occurred, tension had been building over the course of Ukrainian history. Each

region, given its unique history, developed with differing views on political orientation,

language, religion, and ethnicity – setting the stage for a buildup of tension leading to the

Ukraine Conflict in 2014. Indeed, before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine as it

exists today had never successfully gained independence as a self-governing country. The

buildup of tension between Eastern and Western Ukraine was thus exacerbated over the two

decades in which Ukraine was independent, coming to a head in 2014.

By November of 2013, Viktor Yanukovich had served as president of Ukraine for three

years since being elected in 2010 in a hotly contested election between himself and his Party of

Regions against Yulia Tymoshenko and her Fatherland Party ("Election Resources on the

Internet: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine - Results Lookup"). Charges of

voting fraud were raised as well as Russian intervention during the election, with then-President,

Dmitri Medvedev, raised public concern with the drifting of Ukraine towards pro-European and

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Western policies – namely the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, which would

have facilitated economic and political discourse between the EU and Ukraine (EU-Ukraine

Association Agreement – the Complete Texts). Yanukovich’s refusal to sign the treaty widened

the divide between the European-oriented Western Ukraine, and the Russian-oriented Eastern

Ukraine.

By the end of the year in 2013, the historic “Maidan protests” began in the capital of

Kiev, with thousands of pro-Western Ukrainians demanding the signing of the treaty with the EU

and an end to “decades of poor governance characterized by systematic corruption” as well as

Russian influence over diplomatic decisions (Düvell and Lapshyna. "The EuroMaidan Protests,

Corruption, and War in Ukraine: Migration Trends and Ambitions"). Once protests became

violent between President Yanukovich’s police force and the protestors, the process of a general

conflict began in earnest. Eventually protestors overcame security forces in Kiev and forced

Yanukovich to flee to Russia, effectively toppling the democratically elected, pro-Russian

elements of the Ukrainian government, and installing a Western Ukrainian-backed government

that was pro-EU under current president Petro Poroshenko. In the eastern regions of the country,

particularly in Crimea where Russian-speakers and those who identified as Russian live, there

were counter-protest movements declaring the post-Maidan government illegitimate (Cartalucci,

"Ukraine: The Anti-Maidan Begins"). In February and March of 2014, separatist movements

began taking action against the post-Maidan government by setting up “People’s Republics”

centered on the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine. Seizing the opportunity of a

nationalist-driven mandate, President Vladimir Putin of Russia began sending military and

economic support to the separatists, as well as “little green men” (Russian soldiers with

unmarked uniforms not designating a country of origin) to wrest control of the Crimean

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peninsula from the Ukrainian government forces in a relatively bloodless transfer of power

(Shevchenko, “"Little Green Men" or "Russian Invaders"?"). The use of Russian troops to assist

separatist elements in Eastern Ukraine was an aggressive gesture by Russia to assert its influence

over events in the country, and violated a 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

where Russia (along with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, the US and the UK) signed an

agreement not to use hostile threats or force against the territorial integrity of the other

signatories (Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the

Treaty on the NPT). However, the bold actions taken by the Russian military following the

outbreak of serious internal strife in Ukraine remained militarily unanswered by the signatories.

Following the successful annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, far-reaching

consequences continued to press Russia – namely Western-imposed economic sanctions and

political isolation. Beginning soon after the UN vote, the United States and European allies

condemned Russian action as a violation of international law, and began seeking support in the

freezing of Russian financial assets. Key members of the Putin Administration and Russian

oligarchy were targeted, as well as sectors of the Russian economy. For example, the natural gas

and oil Russia sold to Europe was reduced as part of sanctions, along with other imports and

exports between the EU and Russia, including foodstuffs ("EU Sanctions against Russia over

Ukraine Crisis - Newsroom - European Commission"). The West removed Russia from the G-8

summit in a symbolic gesture of disapproval. In retaliation, Russia stopped importing products

from the West and even began destroying products already inside Russia rather than sell them to

its own population. At one point, “some 9 million tons of European cheeses steamrolled and

bulldozed before being buried at a landfill.” (Chappell, "We Will Bury You: Russia Bulldozes

Tons Of European Cheese, Other Banned Food").

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Even military measures were taken by NATO forces that began exercises and an increase

in patrols and number of troops in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, to signal “to Russia that

there are no divisions within NATO that it can exploit” and where the fear of Russian-backed

uprisings might start (McNamara, "Securing the Nordic-Baltic Region"). These combative

economic, military, and political actions taken by the West, while focused on the deterrence of

further Russian aggression, did nothing to ease the diplomatic crisis between the West and

Russia – and only created a higher resolve for the Putin Administration with which to push

Russians further into supporting policies abroad. The West mirrored the fear of encirclement

and invasion by Russia in the fear of unmet, geopolitical aggression. While Russia looked at a

history of nearly 800 years of European invasion and destruction, most recently at the hands of

Nazi Germany in World War II, the West looked towards the Cold War and current Russian

foreign policy since 2008 – when the Putin Administration demonstrated its willingness to use

force against Western allies in pursuit of its own regional interests, such as Georgia during the

Russian-Georgian War of 2008. The heightened tension not seen since during the Cold War

existed because of the annexation of Crimea and the general conflict in Ukraine.

The implications of Russian support for the breakaway Donbass region of eastern

Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have brought very detrimental economic consequences to

Russia. Coupled with oil prices of $44.37 per barrel, economic sanctions from Western

countries have caused Russia to suffer a “GDP growth of -2.2% in the first quarter of 2015”

("Commodities: Latest Crude Oil Price & Chart"), (Christie, "Sanctions after Crimea: Have They

Worked?"). Because Western nations have stopped exporting certain products to the Russian

market, such as cheese from the Netherlands, Russia has seen increased shortages of food, along

with the symbolic gestures of destroying Western food products rather than selling them in

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Russia (Chappell). While Western sanctions have forced Russia to become more self-sufficient

and has forced Russian citizens to create a Russian-product only cuisine, the country is unable to

meet the full needs of its people. By 2015, the ruble had dipped to the new lows since the crisis

of the late 1990s (around 70-80 rubles per US dollar) within the past decade (“XE Currency

Charts”). Instead, compensation for economic losses had to be explored; such as a new oil

pipeline stretching from Eastern Russia to China, where the demand for energy is high to meet

the needs of its large population.

However, the Asian market did not resolve the loss of food imports and general trade

(China is still an export-driven economy), which is when the UN vote on Crimea became

particularly significant. In an effort to benefit from sanctions, Latin American countries, many

of which are still heavily agricultural economically (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, etc.) “have

indicated their desire to increase exports to Russia in order to boost their own economies” so that

both Russia and Latin America gain mutually from the trade vacuum in the Russian economy

(Meacham, "What Does the Russian Food Import Ban Mean for Latin America?").

The United Nations and the Vote

The UN General Assembly was one of six major organs formed in 1945 as the “principal

organ” of the United Nations – the main legislative body. In this body, each member state has an

equal voice and equal vote to determine questions of global importance, related mostly to

security, budget, recommendations on international issues, etc. Resolutions, or official decisions

reached by the Assembly must be decided by a 2/3-majority vote of present countries to pass

("Chapter IV | United Nations").

On March 27, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly had come to a conclusion on

the “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” in response to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian

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Federation, and inspired by the fear of further incursions. The non-binding resolution enacted by

the international body showed that the General Assembly was in support of the pre-2014

Referendum borders of Ukraine, and encouraged members “not to recognize any change in the

status of Crimea…and refrain from actions or dealings that might be interpreted as such” (UN

News Center, "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize

Changes in Status of Crimea Region"). This all occurred after the Security Council of the UN

was unable to reach a conclusion on its own due to continued Russian vetoes. Of the present

voting nations, 100 votes asserted the territorial integrity of Ukraine, 58 abstained from a

decision, and 11 were opposed to condemning the Russian annexation (UN News Center).

The anti-Russian votes, spearheaded by Western countries such as the US and the UK,

maintained that Russia had violated international norms and treaties (the 1994 Budapest

Agreement), by taking military action in Eastern Ukraine, while disregarding the security and

integrity of Ukrainian civilians and the Ukrainian government. Latin American countries closely

tied politically or economically to the US – such as Mexico (which is a member of NAFTA), or

Colombia, Chile, and Peru – the strongest liberal democratic allies of the US in Latin America,

fell into line with the US position offered by Samantha Powers, the US representative to the UN.

While it was clear that the 11 countries that voted in favor of Russia would do so (core

allies – Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, etc.), the uniqueness of the vote was found in the 58

countries that had abstained. Several of these votes were made by prominent Latin American

countries such as Argentina and Brazil, which illustrated a unique shift in the Latin American

trend of backing Russian initiatives where only two decades ago Latin America was almost

entirely within the American sphere of influence during the Cold War. In part this shift may

have been related to the growing Latin American autonomy found in its governments – Luis

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Ignacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff were Marxist guerrillas in the 1980s in Brazil – guided

by Soviet doctrine; and the Kirchners had become more skeptical of the US sphere in Argentina.

But because several Latin American countries did not explicitly vote against Russian efforts of

annexation, and seen in the very diplomatic language used later on, one can see how an

abstention is simply an passive method of approving an action – in this case, territorial

annexation. In a way, the abstention vote is related to the international relations theory of

appeasement – or placating a country or government when it takes assertive actions. While the

Munich Conference of 1938 is usually cited as an illustration of appeasement, the case of Russia

and Ukraine should not be looked at with the same negative connotations. Appeasement in this

case, through abstention, is simply a support by lack of rejection of Russian action and the

possible reasons as to why countries such as Brazil and Argentina did so (even with large

ancestrally Ukrainian populations).

The reason for abstentions may be the successful Russian diplomatic maneuvers of the

past decade in regard to the composition of the UN Security Council (the decision-making entity

made up permanently of Russia, China, France, the UK, and the US). For example, Russia is one

of the leading Security Council countries in favor of changing the makeup of the Council.

Russian officials have specifically Brazil as a potential new, permanent member, as Brazil is the

most populous, economically potent, and regionally powerful country in a region of the world

where diplomatic and economic power will shift within the next 50 years ("Russia to Support

Brazilian Bid for Permanent Membership in UNSC"). The implications of changing the current

Security Council can be easily imagined as the decisions of the body would change dramatically

to match the interests of the new members. What is interesting about this potential shift is the

politics behind it. Brazil of course finds membership mutually beneficial, and can use the fact

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that a P-5 member supporting its own membership is a significant step towards the change of the

make-up of the Council. It has also created a working foundation that allows Russia and Brazil

to come together on other issues and improve relations in general.

Russia and Latin America Today

The current Russian policy towards Latin America is perhaps the most significant aspect

of foreign policy analysis now as it explains the UN vote, the current diplomatic situation, and

the future of Russian involvement in Latin America. Indeed, the interactions the Russian

government employs with most states within the pro-Russia camp and the abstention camp are

core elements of Russia policy in the region. These core elements can be broken into economic,

military, and political sectors, all of which overlap in certain cases. Since 2008, political

overtures have been the centerpiece of the new policy initiative for Russia – beginning with

diplomatic visits by high-level officials of the Russian government. From 2000-2015, President

Putin, President Medvedev, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and Defense Minister Shoigu have all

traveled on tours throughout Latin America to gather support for new economic and political

relationships between Russia and the region from arms and energy trade to joint military

exercises. According to Jan Burlyai, a Deputy Director of the Latin American Department of the

Russian Foreign Ministry, “Russian-Latin American ties have become much more active lately”

with visits made by President Putin to Cuba in 2000, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile in 2004; and by

foreign ministers to Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 2003, Cuba in 2004, and Mexico

in 2005 (Burlyai, “Russia’s Latin American Tango” pg. 51). Several visits have been made in

2010, and 2015 focused on military and political relations regarding Crimea, mustering support

for visa-travel, which most Latin American countries have with Russia, and trade.

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This travel by the highest officials of government has not been restricted to only

diplomats, however. In fact, recently Russia and Latin American states have come to travel

agreements allowing the easier flow of people between both regions based on visa-free travel

zones, which is not only in effect in core allies of Russia such as Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua,

but also in countries like Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil – countries not as aligned historically

or politically in the past (MercoPress, "Latam Divided on UN Crimea Vote; Mercosur, except

for Venezuela Abstains"). As of 2016, only Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico (with

electronic visas), did not permit visa-free travel with Russia. A lack of travel restrictions

between countries is generally a good indicator of the level of trust and positive relations one

government has with another, suggesting that even right-wing, pro-American governments have

come to see Russia not as an ideological enemy, but as a political partner in many regards.

Another way this cooperative spirit has manifested itself is in Russian membership in

Latin American transnational organizations such as MERCOSUR and ALBA – the two largest

trade blocs in Latin America. “We intend to pursue our line for further contacts with other sub-

regional integration alliances: the Andean Community (AC), the Central American Integration

System, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), and the Caribbean Community

(CARICOM),” Deputy Director Burlyai listed a few more organizations along with the major

trade blocs where Russia has increased its presence (Burlyai, 52). In these and many other

organizations, Russia has obtained membership as an “observer state” which allows it to give

input and participate as an almost-equal member. These often economic institutions not only

provide Russia with more outlets to expand trade opportunities – something it must do now more

than ever due to Western sanctions, but over time it has created trust and as a foundation for

political, cultural, and military exchanges on which to create stronger policies today. Therefore,

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one could observe that economic relations are the basis for deeper and broader relations in the

future, which Russia has proven. By participating in Latin American institutions and

demonstrating a care for the region that countries like the US or China have not offered, Russia

has made economic inroads in arms deals and in trade in general. “In the past decade, according

to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there has been a surge of Latin

American countries purchasing military equipment and arms from state-owned Russian

Technologies (Rostec) or receiving Russian military aid.” Even discussions about new military

installations and activity, possibly in response to NATO, have begun between Russian and Latin

American officials (Americas Quarterly, "Russo-Latin American Arms Sales").

A report given by the Russian government suggests, “In 2004-2012 mutual trade turnover

increased almost three-fold – from $5.8 billion to $16.4 billion” across all sectors – creating a

stronger dependency on one another (Yakovlev, "Россия и Латинская Америка на траектории

взаимного сближения"). The reason countries like China, which also use economic policy to

develop future general policy in developing regions of the world, do not work is because there is

not a historical basis on which to build, and not a cooperative sense of mutual benefit in trade.

Recently, in 2015, “Argentina’s coast guard says it sank a Chinese fishing vessel that was fishing

in a restricted area off the South American country’s coast” after having repeatedly asking for

identification and demands to leave Argentine territory in Spanish and English (Laje, "Argentina

Sinks Chinese Vessel, Cites Illegal Fishing").

The sign of the deepest trust and partnership however, is the military agreements between

Russia and Latin American countries. Other than increased arms deals, Defense Minister Shoigu

began discussions regarding the expansion of Russian naval and military bases in various parts of

the world – at the very least “for the use of Nicaraguan military bases, ports, and airports to

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refuel Russian planes” (Americas Quarterly). Like the US, which maintains military

installations across the globe, Russia has been seeking to expand its military capacities, generally

as a response to increased NATO drills and activities close to the Russian border in Eastern

Europe. Joint military exercises with Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and Costa Rica demonstrated

Russia’s military prowess, reach, and capability in the “backyard of the US” – one with multiple,

nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers flying to Venezuela, and another with a naval flotilla

dispatched to the Caribbean for naval exercises in 2014 (Ellis, "Russian Engagement in Latin

America and the Caribbean: Return to the "Strategic Game" in a Complex-Interdependent Post-

Cold War World?" pg. 16). Military exercises are both expensive and require a certain degree of

coordination and cooperation between two countries. The fact that Russia has successfully done

this twice in the Caribbean, which has not gained much attention from the US, exposes the lack

of attention or care of US policy in the region. That lack of attention has not gone unnoticed by

Latin American countries.

Over the course of the near 300-year history of Latin American-US relations, an anti-

American sentiment has been building due to perceived (often real) injustices seen by Latin

America. Unilateral interventions in places like Mexico, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,

and more from the early 1900s to the installation and backing of right-wing dictators like

Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican

Republic, the Somoza family in Nicaragua and more have made the US seem like an imperialist

power determined to extract as much benefit – political or economic from Latin America since

the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Latin Americans have generally felt themselves treated as a lesser

partner in a hegemonic relationship with the US, which in the 1990s and 2000s caused

revisionist, populist leaders like Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, and Daniel Ortega

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to come to power across Latin America, often on platforms of anti-Americanism. Interestingly, a

Pew Research Center poll conducted in 2014 across Latin America saw Argentina as the country

most opposed to current US foreign policy, with a 36% favorability rating in 2014, down from

41% in 2013 ("Chapter 1: The American Brand"). This is noteworthy because the country was

Argentina rather than a “usual enemy” of the US like Cuba or Venezuela.

The vote demonstrated that there was a rising potential in another area of the world where

Russia had had an historical relationship – Latin America. In that region, core allies of Russia –

Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua voted against invalidating the Crimea Referendum.

Even more interesting were the abstentions – made by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, El

Salvador, Ecuador, Guyana, and Suriname. Many of these countries, which had been during the

Cold War opposed to Soviet policy and expansion, indirectly voiced support for Russian actions

taken in Eastern Europe, seemingly validating them due to the lack of rancor against the

aggressive actions which traditional Western allies in the region took (Mexico, Colombia, Chile,

Peru, etc.).

The Pro-Russian Vote

There was no surprise when the core allies of Russia voted in favor of the annexation of

Crimea by Russia, and who offered their positions on the situation. It did however reaffirm the

strongest allies of Russia in the region and the successful work Russia had already completed –

the models to which the Russian government was attempting to move more Latin American

countries. Their views are nonetheless an important aspect to put into perspective the extent

Russia has already solidified inroads made in the region based off of the aforementioned

historical and ideological ties that united Russia with these core allies.

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Relations between the governments in Havana and Moscow have been strong ever since

the Cuban Revolution in 1959. This is due to the ideological alliance in the Marxist-inspired

revolutions in both countries, as well as the development of educational exchanges in Latin

American schools in Moscow (РУДН), support during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and economic

funding throughout the Cold War. For approximately 50 years (save for the “Lost Decade” of

the 90s in Russia), a relationship was built between the two countries, “providing not only

billions of dollars in arms, loans, and aid…but also hosting tens of thousands of Cubans to tavel

to Russia for education in universities (Ellis, 38). As perhaps Russia’s oldest and staunchest ally

in Latin America, Cuba has been the ideal model for what Russia seeks to accomplish across the

entire region – an alliance founded on trust with ties across all facets of life: economic, cultural,

political, etc. Therefore, during the statements and explanations process in the UN, the

representative from Cuba, Rodolfo Reyes Rodríguez voiced the Cuba’s support of the annexation

of Crimea. In his statement, Rodríguez cited the “hypocrisy, the double standards, and the

aggression” shown by Washington and NATO in matters of self-determination, territorial

integrity, and international law (UN News Center). He went on to state that the expansion of

NATO further east would destabilize a previously peaceful region and that the current Ukrainian

government did not reflect the rights of Crimea given the fact it violently overthrew the

democratically elected Yanukovich government.

Bolivia

The second and newer ally of Russia in the region is Bolivia – where the populist,

socialist-inspired rhetoric of Evo Morales has won him the presidency in that country, with a

great deal of support from and for the Russian government. That mutual support was evident

when Representative Sacha Sergio Llorentty Solíz offered a similar statement to his Cuban

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counterpart, mentioning that Bolivia was a pacifist country not intent on picking a side regarding

the referendum, but voting against it to voice its discontent with the hypocrisy and double

standards of the West and the Security Council, which he believed needs to be reformed to

reflect the current international environment (UN News Center). The Morales Administration

embodies the anti-American sentiment and revolutionary change in leaders in Latin America that

see an alliance with Russia as the alternative to traditional US hegemony. He has solidified this

alliance through increased arms deals and energy-based economic negotiations between the two

countries (Ellis, 64-67).

Nicaragua

One of the more active allies of Russia in Latin America – Nicaragua, led by Daniel

Ortega (a former left-wing revolutionary), offered its support for Russian policy in Crimea on

March 22, 2014, and later that week on March 27, believing the annexation was just and valid

(UN News Center). Interestingly, Russian assistance brought Ortega to power during the Cold

War, and aided the government in combating the contra rebellion. To solidify the alliance,

“Ortega’s government became the first in Latin America to recognize diplomatically the pro-

Russian breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Ellis, 25). Like Bolivia,

Nicaragua has become a strong ally of Russia by increasing joint military exercises, hosting

Russian officials, and increasing arms deals to revitalize the Nicaraguan Armed Forces while

also constructing a new counternarcotic training center in Managua (Ellis 27). With such

significant military and strategic actions initiated by both governments, it is clear that the

alliance between the two is a strong one.

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Venezuela

Finally, and also unsurprisingly, the Venezuelan government under Nicolás Maduro

voiced its strong support for the referendum held in Crimea. Represented by Samuel Moncada

during the deliberation in the General Assembly, the Venezuelan statement was opposed to the

undemocratic changes to the Ukrainian government preceding the conflict in Eastern Ukraine

(UN News Center). Reflecting popular Russian sentiment propagated by state media, President

Maduro and his officials stated that they believed terrorist organizations and extremist groups

backed by Western powers had, since World War II been disrupting a stable world order and

replacing popular governments with “Nazi-fascist” elements – something representative of how

many Latin Americans might view US foreign policy after a history where such a statement

could be validated. He not only cited these beliefs, but also events in Kosovo during the 90s

where the situation was virtually flipped. At the time, the Russian government, with its

traditional ally Serbia was fighting against what the West called a democratic self-determination

movement by ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo province of Serbia after ethnic tensions caused

violence. In the end, the West, backed by NATO quickly supported the Kosovars and the

legitimacy of their movement and government for the same reasons the Russian government was

supporting Crimean and Eastern Ukrainian separatist tendencies. Venezuela has long been an

ally of Russia since Hugo Chavez –arguably the first revisionist leader of Latin America, came to

power and immediately fostered positive relations with Russia against the United States. Even

past his death, his efforts have continued, as the Venezuelan embassy in Moscow operates a

cultural education program with other Latin American embassies to educated and disseminate

Latin American news, culture, information, and more to establish strong ties with Russian

citizens – an effective use of soft power ("Objetivos Específicos y Actividades").

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As mentioned before, the support for Russia and the Crimea Referendum from these core

allies was not an issue Russia had to deal with in finding international support for its assertive

policies in Eastern Europe. What was truly significant was the less expected support from major

players in Latin America, demonstrating the effectiveness of Russian relation building in the

region to this point.

The Abstention Vote

The sign of success for new Russian regional policy can be based on the fact that during

the 2014 UN vote on Crimea, countries that were traditionally aligned with the US government

during American hegemonic period (1823-2008), and particularly during the Cold War against

communist revolutions, had broken from this order by abstaining rather than outright rejection of

Russian actions in Ukraine. Recently, Russia has made serious attempts to work closer with

right-wing governments – namely Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru – which are generally

considered to be the closest allies of the US in Latin America. Russia has started its economic-

based interactions with these countries, hoping to build relationships it has or is currently

building now in places like Argentina and Brazil. These two countries, “which have suffered

massive protests, some of them spontaneous” may have seen a vote supporting the Western-

backed Ukrainian government, as a validation of anti-government movements back home,

causing cautious voting in the form of abstentions (MercoPress). As mentioned before, the

action not to reject Russia’s claims outright – a form of appeasement, signifies recognition and

possibly even support for Russian foreign policy. The consequences of ending a thus far

beneficial relationship with Russia does not seem to be the goal of developing Latin American

countries. And while not direct support, rhetoric between countries like Argentina and Russia,

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and increasing economic dependency between Russia and Brazil (for food and military products)

has nearly solidified a larger pro-Russian camp in Latin America.

Paraguay and Uruguay

Paraguay and Uruguay have both experienced increased and improved relations with

Russia, being included in the vise-free travel, as well as increased trade. Due to both having

access to agricultural and livestock resources such as beef, imports from these countries to

Russia after Western sanctions has increased. In statements from both the Uruguayan and

Paraguayan governments (made by Christina Carrion and Marcelo Eliseo Scappini Ricciardi

respectively) voiced their belief in open and direct dialogue as the only appropriate way to end

the conflict in question (UN News Center). Carrion went further citing the Uruguayan

government’s commitment to international law and democratic principles. She reminded her

colleagues that Uruguay for the same reason was opposed to the unilateral referendums in

Kosovo or the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), which undermined UN Charter principles, and which

Uruguay would remain consistently opposed to. However, the fact that the governments did not

immediately condemn the Russian government strongly implies that they do appreciate the

position of the Crimeans and Russia on some level causing the lack of confidence to vote in

favor of invalidating the referendum.

Argentina

One of the newest and most significant allies for Russia in Latin America is Argentina.

After having made the connection that Crimea was the same as the Malvinas – where Argentine

claims to the land caused a war between that country and England in the 1980s, resonated

strongly with Argentines in how they viewed Russia’s position in relation to Crimea. “Many of

the major powers, which have secured the Falklands’ people right to self-determination, do not

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want to do the same in relation to Crimea now…There is zero logic in that.” (Sudarev, "Russia

and Latin America in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis"). Past that, the left-leaning, populist

Peronist Party of the Kirchner family created common ground on which Russia could build an

economic relationship with Argentina. For arms and energy products to develop the country,

Argentina could send back food needed to maintain the Russian economy. These relations have

continued to develop over history – with Argentina having the largest Russian community in the

Western Hemisphere outside of Brazil and the United States. María Cristina Perceval, the

Argentine representative to the UN stated that the government would not support a resolution

with a “lack of coherence” and with room for interpretation of the UN Charter regarding

territorial integrity on which the UN vote was being based (UN News Center). In separate

statements, the President at the time Cristina Kirchner and the Argentine embassy stated that

they could not support a resolution where double standards would exist due to the international

community recognizing the right of Britain to maintain its claims on the Malvinas, while Russia

was not allowed to do the same with Crimea. Here, the success of Russian policy in the region is

demonstrated by the Foreign Ministry’s ability to find and latch onto a popular image or

sentiment and to build an anti-Western relationship off of that sentiment for future, consolidated

positions.

Brazil

However the investment in Argentina for its claims on the Malvinas was not the only

policy success of Russia. Perhaps even greater was its success in keeping Brazil outside of

support for the Western condemnation of the Crimea vote; in part due to the support Russia had

given Brazil in becoming a permanent member of the UN, amongst other mutually beneficial

developments. As the preeminent regional power in Latin America, Brazil has historically been

Ciccarillo 27

the country courted by foreign powers. Brazil is so significant due to its membership in BRICS,

and because it posses the largest population in South America (and the second largest Russian

population), the largest economy and geographic area (which requires an up-to-date military and

a strong, export-based economy – both of which Russia provides outlets for). In October of

2005, both countries signed the Strategic Alliance Agreement outlining cooperation and the

desire to improve relations further – which joint membership in BRICS has accomplished (Ellis,

60). Outlining the significance of Brazil to Russian strategy in the region, trips by Medvedev

and Putin have stopped in Brazil – with a focus on military and general economic agreements.

Brazil not only provides Russia with the largest buyer of arms, but also makes up $5.9 billion in

bilateral trade as of 2013 – 94% of Brazilian exports are agricultural products (Ellis, 62). That

Russia has been successful in creating a place for itself as a partner among Latin American

countries is clear and since the 2014 vote, has begun to pay off.

The Future of Russian in Latin America

In Moscow, the relationship between Russia and Latin America seems to reflect the trend

in which both regions of the world are moving – that increased cultural exposure and exchanges

between people show a mutual appreciation and interest between the two peoples. The relatively

large Latin American community there encounters an open Russian population with a genuine

interest to travel, learn dance or language, and understand the culture of Latin American

countries (based on interviews). When one goes abroad, representing the general principles of a

host country becomes more evident, and in this case, Latin Americans in Russia often reflected

the views of Russia that their governments had. From February to May of 2015, I successfully

conducted 20-30 formal interviews of a diverse group of Latin Americans (mainly students and

embassy employees from the ages of 20-60), with questions regarding their perceptions of Russia

Ciccarillo 28

and Russians, vice-versa, and the state of relations between their countries of origin and Russia,

the reason why they lived there, the position the Latino community occupied in Russian society,

and the possible implications.

Based off of these interviews in Spanish, Russian, and English, I found that many Latin

Americans currently traveling to Russia do so for work opportunities, higher education, and the

relative ease at which Latin Americans may travel to Russia. “I came because in Colombia and

other countries, receiving an education in Moscow is prestigious and a good opportunity” said

Mary Rivera, a Colombian graduate student studying at РУДН. The older interviewees, such as

Jesús Oliva or Gilberto Marquez from Honduras and El Salvador respectively, agreed that Latin

Americans they knew, as well as in their home countries, generally supported the Russian claim

to Crimea. While these residents of Russia may be more prone to support the government

position, their conversations with other members of the community and their connections home

suggest a real recognition and approval of Russian action, possibly borne out of a feeling of

increased autonomy from US influence.

The conclusion of the research suggested that increased numbers of Russians (since early

1990s) also traveled to Latin America, with an increased level of national interest in the region –

brought on by heightened levels of exposure from diplomatic programs such as the integration

and educational centers in the Venezuelan embassy and vice-versa in Buenos Aires, Argentina,

where there is a “Russia House” ("Casa De Rusia En Buenos Aires"). Based on the individual

and cultural exchanges brought by increased travel and education, the research demonstrated

what is occurring at the international level – that Russia’s influence in Latin America has grown

over the past several years, that Latin Americans themselves find common ground on issues such

as the Crimea referendum, and that the future of relations between these regions – be they

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economic, political, or social, all point towards a new path of cooperation and the drawing in of

Latin American countries to a revisionist, Russian-oriented sphere of influence.

One of the more unique shifts in 21st century Russian-Latin American relations, which

differs from historical interactions, is the extent and activism of Russian involvement across the

whole region of Latin America, regardless of ideological tendencies. At no other point has

Russian soft power (defined as persuasive tools of power used to achieve national policy goals –

such as trade, cultural exchanges, media-sharing, etc.), or hard power (coercive military force)

been present in such a territorially broad section of Latin America. What is potentially more

surprising is the reciprocation and willingness to cooperate that Latin American countries in

general show towards Russia. As mentioned before, the Crimea Referendum vote held by the

UN signaled a change in attitude across Latin America – particularly in countries that have

generally been apathetic to previous Russian attempts to advance foreign policy interests during

the Soviet era or before. The significance only increased when one observes that Brazil and

Argentina – the two economic and political powerhouses of Latin America, are amongst those

countries that, rather than follow aggressive, anti-Russian, Western policies, have instead opened

themselves up to take advantage of a mutually beneficial period of prosperity by increasing the

rate of trade between Latin America and Russia, military access, and cultural development and

understanding. This increased exchange is reflected in the movement of peoples between Russia

and Latin America over the past decade as indicated by the Moscow Research Project. For

example, I found that the younger Latin Americans (mainly from Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia)

saw education in Russia as cost-effective and prestigious in their home countries; while elder

Latin Americans remarked on their personal (and their home governments) support for the

annexation of Crimea as a natural and understandable response (See Appendix D).

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As for Russia, the time is opportune to fill the power-vacuum left by the lack of

significant American presence in the region, which the Russian government is all too prepared to

take advantage of. As has already been demonstrated, Russia has made economic, political, and

military overtures to all Latin American countries – even those within the “American camp” with

traditionally conservative, pro-American governments. This lack of media coverage or academic

work in the United States following these trends exposes the lack of interest or activity of

American policymakers in the region, which can only be explained by a perceived notion that the

“backyard of the United States” is still safe from foreign intervention. This, however, is not the

case. The foreign policy implications for the US depend upon future action taken to meet

Russian inroads into Latin America. Assuming relations with the US remain stagnant or worsen,

Russia has no incentive to either reduce activism in Latin America, or use that activism and

relationship to create stability and a positive relationship between Latin America and its northern

neighbor. Instead, Latin America will continue to act as a diplomatic and economic battleground

where NATO activity in Eastern Europe causes Russian-Latin American joint military exercises

in the Caribbean, and where Western-imposed sanctions result in Russian-led arms deals and

increased trade programs. The anti-American sentiment that has been building in Latin America

over the past history of 200 years will continue the trend seen today.

While the success of Russian policy in different Latin American countries varies

depending on the level of trade, political identity, and cultural exchange, the overall perception

of Latin American states towards Russia following the UN Crimea Referendum vote moved the

region closer to the top of Russian diplomatic priorities. Latin America is now seen as a new and

viable partner entering a period in the international system where interdependent and

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interconnected regions of the world can create a cohesive movement of change and power –

something both Russia and Latin America seem to be striving for at the present moment.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

Table 1. Trade turnover between Russia and Latin American countries, mn USD.

A country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Latin America

including:

15702

10381

12164

17169

16351

Brazil 6711

4593

5874

6504

5659

Venezuela 958 113 131 1706

1945

Mexico 1231

623 769 1415

1587

Argentina 1976

1360

1125

1873

1571

Ecuador 936 834 952 1299

1304

Paraguay 356 359 451 483 863

Uruguay 404 473 374 398 629

Chile 365 270 357 455 525

Colombia 213 174 253 313 463

Peru 328 181 326 726 462

Cuba 265 354 276 221 220

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia for various years.

Table 2. Structure of the Russian exports to the Latin American countries (the share of individual commodity groups,%)

Trading group 2010 2011 2012

Total

including:

100 100 100

fertilizers 37.6 48.1 36.5

Mineral fuels 22.7 22.9 10.3

Black metals 12.2 4.7 8.0

Rubber and articles thereof 3.1 3.2 2.8

VEHICLES 0.7 1.1 2.5

Aluminium and articles thereof 1.3 2.1 2.4

Reactors, boilers, parts thereof 1.0 0.9 2.1

Electrical machinery and 2.6 1.0 2.0

Ciccarillo 34

equipment

Copper and articles thereof 1.3 2.5 2.0

Aircraft and parts thereof 2.4 0.7 1.1

Tools and machines 0.3 0.2 0.9

Paper and paperboard 1.2 0.7 0.7

Inorganic Chemistry 1.2 0.9 0.7

Plastics and articles thereof 0.3 0.3 0.5

Organic Chemistry Products 0.7 0.6 0.5

Metals and metal products 0.8 0.3 0.3

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia for various years.

Table 3. Structure of Russian imports from Latin American countries (the share of individual commodity groups,%)

Trading group 2010 2011 2012

Total

including:

100 100 100

Meat and meat by-products 39.2 33.1 37.2

Fruits, nuts 12.6 13.1 12.9

Sugar products from sugar 25.0 25.7 10.4

VEHICLES 2.7 3.7 4.6

Trees and plants 2.8 2.0 3.6

Tobacco and tobacco substitutes 1.9 2.8 3.5

Oil seeds and fruits 3.0 2.8 3.0

pharmaceutical products 0.2 0.2 2.5

Reactors, boilers and parts 0.5 1.4 2.1

Fish, shellfish, etc. 1.6 1.8 2.1

Waste of food industry, animal feed

0.5 1.0 2.1

Food products are different 1.6 1.8 2.1

Coffee, tea, mate, spices 1.3 2.2 1.8

Inorganic Chemistry 0.7 0.3 1.7

Cereals 0.1 0.2 1.6

Milk products 1.1 1.2 1.6

Alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages

0.9 1.0 1.5

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia for various years.

Ciccarillo 35

Appendix C

Blue – visa-free travel

Green – e-visas or electronic registration

Light Blue – visa granted on arrival

Grey – visa required

Ciccarillo 36

Appendix D

Вопросы

1. Почему вы здесь в России? Какие причины?

2. Что вы делаете в Москве?

3. Есть ли большое русское сообщество в вашей стране? Где оно находится и почему

существует?

4. Что вы думаете о жизни здесь в сравнении с жизнью в вашей стране?

5. Как Вы думаете, существует ли между Россией и Латинской Америкой больше

культурных (или общих) сходств или различий?

6. Вы сохраняете ваши латиноамериканские традиции и обычаи (еда, религия, язык и т.д.)

или воспринимаете обычаи России?

7. У Москвы есть большое или активное латиноамериканское общество (он приключен?)?

8. Что думают русские о латиноамериканцах и их культуре?

9. Каков образ русских и русской культуры в вашей стране?

10. Как Вы думаете, насколько тесные связи между Россией и вашей страной? Почему?

11. Что Вы думаете (или люди в вашей стране думают) о кризисе в Украине, и

отношениях между Россией и Западом сейчас?

12. Как эта ситуация влияет на отношения между Россией и Латинской Америкой?

13. Думаете ли Вы, что сходства в культуре/экономике/истории и т.д. естественным

образом связывают Россию и Латинскую Америку?

Интервью (не всё)

Гилберто Маркез

Хесус Олива

Франко Пачес

Хесус Парисе

Лейди Рада

Кеувин Рамирес

Елиса Рейес

Мери Ривера

Индира Хернандес

Ciccarillo 37

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