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5Unofficial Actors and their Role in the Policy Process

Avinash Samal

The policy studies scholars have divided the players in the policy process into two main categories such as official and unofficial actors XE "actors" . Official actors are those involved in public policy by virtue of their statutory or constitutional responsibilities and have the power to make and enforce policies. This does not preclude the possibility of these people being influenced by others, like political XE "political" party bosses or other interest/pressure groups XE "groups" . The actors belonging to legislature XE "legislature" , executive XE "executive" (including bureaucracy), judiciary XE ", judiciary" and regulatory XE "regulatory" agencies are clearly the official actors.

Besides the official actors XE "actors" , there are many other groups XE "groups" and organizations which do participate in the policy-making process. These actors are called unofficial because their participation in the policy process is not a function of their duties under the Constitution or the law. This is not to say that these actors have no rights or standing to participate in the process. Rather, it means that their mode of participation in policy formulation is not specified in law. On the other hand, it has evolved and grown as the nation has evolved and grown. So the unofficial actors refer to those who play a role in the policy process without any explicit legal authority to participate, aside from the usual rights of participation in a democracy. These groups include the interest/pressure groups of various types, political XE "political" parties, individual XE "individual" citizens, research organizations and think tanks, and the mass media. They considerably influence policy formulation without possessing legal authority to make binding policy decisions. While the previous chapter focused on the role of official actors (legislature XE "legislature" , executive XE "executive" and judiciary XE "judiciary" ) in policy formulation, the present chapter discusses in detail the role of unofficial actors in the policy process.

Interest Groups

At the societal level XE "level" , interest or pressure groups XE "groups" play a significant role in the policy-making in many countries. While policy-making is a preserve of the government, and particularly of the executive XE "executive" and bureaucracy, the realities of modern politics enable groups formed specifically to promote the interests or positions of specialized social groups to play a significant role in the policy process. One of the most important resources that differentiates such actors XE "actors" from others is the specific knowledge they have at their disposal. The possession of specific information that may be unavailable or less available to others constitutes a very important advantage for them. The members of specialized groups often know a great deal about their area of concern. Since policy-making is a highly information-intensive process, those with information may normally expect to play an important role than the other. Politicians and bureaucrats XE "bureaucrats" often find the information provided by interest groups indispensable for performing their tasks. Government and opposition parties at times curry favour with such groups to secure the information required for effective policy-making or for attacking their opponents. Bureaucrats similarly often need these groups help in developing and implementing many policies (Baumgartner XE "Baumgartner" and Leech XE "Leech" 1998).

The other resources possessed by interest or pressure groups XE "groups" are organizational and political XE "political" . The primary concern of a pressure group is to influence policy in a particular manner. They may also supply the official lawmakers with much technical information for and against a specific issue and possible consequences XE "consequences" of a policy proposal. Special interest groups often make financial contributions to the campaign chests of sympathetic political parties and politicians. They also campaign for and deliver votes to sympathetic candidates who they think would support their cause in the government. The main function of these groups is to express demands and present alternatives for policy action. Often there are several groups with conflicting desires on a particular policy issue, and policy makers are faced with the problem of having to choose between conflicting demands.

However, interest groups XE "groups" political XE "political" impacts on the formulation and implementation of public policies vary considerably according to their access to differing levels of organizational resources.

First, interest groups XE "groups" differ tremendously in terms of size of membership. All other things being equal, larger groups can be expected to be taken more seriously by the government. Well-organized and active groups naturally have more influence than groups whose potential membership is poorly organized and inarticulate.

Second, their propensity to associate with other similar groups XE "groups" also works as a powerful influential factor. Some groups often form a peak association XE "peak association" consisting of representatives from other groups with similar interests. A coherent peak association may be expected to be more influential than those interest groups operating individually.

Third, some groups XE "groups" are well funded which enables them to hire permanent specialized staff and influence parties and candidates during elections.

Fourth, their influence and effectiveness also depends on other resources like cohesiveness, leadership skills, social status and attitudes of the policy makers on specific policy issues. The strength and legitimacy of groups XE "groups" also differs from country to country, depending upon whether they are democratic or dictatorial, developed or developing.

While the exact impact of interest group campaign expenditures on government policy is contentious, there is no doubt that differences in financial resources matter and that in democratic political XE "political" systems the information and power resources of interest groups XE "groups" make them key members of policy subsystems XE "policy subsystems" . While this does not guarantee that their interests will be accommodated, they are unlikely to be entirely ignored except in rare circumstances when executive XE "executive" makes a high-level XE "level" and deliberate decision to go ahead with a policy despite opposition from concerned groups.

Interest groups XE "groups" are found to be more numerous in the USA, UK and India than they are in the Soviet Union or China. Given the plural character of USA or Indian society, it is not surprising that pressure groups are many and varied in number, interests, size, organization and style of operation. In fact, the number of interest groups has rapidly expanded since the 1960s. Today, while many groups are local and deal with local issues, many interest groups and popular movements cannot be confined to small states or communities. Rapid socio-economic XE "socio-economic" and technological changes, coupled with transportation XE "transportation" and communications capabilities unimagined in the past, has made it possible for large many groups to mobilize quickly on a regional or national scale. With freedom of association and speech guaranteed by the Constitution, neither US nor India place any legal burden in the path of those who wish to mobilize and form an interest group. Grassroots organizations form nearly daily to pursue myriad goals, such as halting the construction of multipurpose dams across rivers to banning the screening of some of the movies in the theatre halls. While mobilization and group development XE "development" are not greatly constrained in our political XE "political" system, the mere existence of a group does not necessary suggest that it will have any voice in policy making. While some groups, particularly those representing concentrated economic and business interests, have considerably more power, other groups simply do not have it. Groups that represent powerful or privileged interests are partly responsible for Americans suspicion of interest groups or, as they are often called, special interest groups. In fact, some groups call themselves public interest groups to signal that they view their mission as a counterweight to these special interests.

Types of Interests Groups

There are many ways to categorize interest groups XE "groups" . One can distinguish between an institutional interest group, whose members belong to a particular institution, and a membership group, whose members have chosen to join. If one happens to be a student at a university, he or she is a member of an institutional interest group university students union because he or she shares some interests with the fellow students, such as affordable tuition fee and quality education XE "education" . If one joins the NCC or a Public Interest Research Group XE "Public Interest Research Group" (PIRG), he or she becomes part of a membership group because he or has chosen to join the same deliberately.

One can also categorize interest groups XE "groups" as economic or private interest groups versus public interest groups. While the difference between the two is sometimes rhetorical almost every group believes it is acting, directly or indirectly, in the broader public interest there is also a more technical way to distinguish between the two. Public interest groups, such as environmental groups, Common Cause, and the like, seek to create broad benefits for the entire society, not simply their members. Indeed, it is difficult to allow only public interest group members to reap the benefits of, say, a cleaner environment without providing such benefits to others. While public interest groups would like more people to join their causes, they also know that non-members constitute a potential force of supporters, and, as mentioned earlier, when many such people are mobilized, a social movement may result.

In economic terms, we can say that non-members of public interest groups XE "groups" are free riders who benefit from the work of the group without contributing resources such as labour or money. Economic groups, on the other hand, seek to overcome the free-rider problem by creating benefits only for the members of their groups. For example, labour unions, particularly in closed shop states where all workers must pay dues to the union, work to provide wage and benefit agreements that benefit only the members of the union. By restricting benefits in this way, the union seeks to promote cohesion and to encourage others to join the union. Industry groups, such as FICCI XE "FICCI" , the National Association of Manufacturers XE "National Association of Manufacturers" , and the National Automobile Dealers Association XE "National Automobile Dealers Association" , are clearly economic groups. These tend to be small groups in terms of the actual numbers of members, but are powerful because of what these groups are: collections of powerful economic interests that often enjoy considerable local, regional, or national political XE "political" support. Finally, one can consider professional XE "professional" and trade associations to be economic associations. Groups such as the Indian Medical Association XE "Indian Medical Association" and the Bar Council of India XE "Bar Council of India" seek to promote and protect the professional and economic interests of doctors and lawyers. While they provide important benefits and services to their members, such as journals and continuing education XE "education" , they also seek to protect the economic interests of their members. They play an active role in the education and licensing of doctors and lawyers, thereby seeking to keep the size of the profession relatively fixed. When their interests are threatened, they lobby elected and appointed officials for its redress.

In both public interest and economic groups XE "groups" , people join because they gain some benefit. The challenge for public interest groups is to make clear what those benefits are in order to attract and keep members. As a rule, it is easier for economic groups to do so because their members have their economic security at stake, and the benefits are then more tangible. Public interest groups, on the other hand, must appeal to other motivations than economics. Most public interest groups make an appeal to peoples desire to do good, augmenting it by material benefits like discounted nature tours, glossy magazines, calendars, etc. These benefits seem trivial, but they help to attract new members and promote group cohesion. Still, they are not as powerful as economic inducements in promoting group unity.

Finally, it is important to note that some groups XE "groups" do not fit neatly into the public interest-economic dichotomy XE "dichotomy" . In particular, the United States contains many religious and ideological groups that come together without being based on economics or a broader public interest mission. Rather, their mission is to promote their religious, moral, and ideological values among their members and, sometimes, in the broader society. These groups range from the mainstream churches to the more fundamentalist churches, and from the politically moderate to the politically extreme on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Such groups can become important players in the policy process, at least briefly, during times of social upheaval and crisis or when issues of morality and values are paramount.

As pointed out by both neo-pluralist XE "pluralist" and corporatist theorists, the organization of business and labour is often seen as the most significant factor in determining a states policy capabilities. This is because of the vital role each plays in the production process, which is, in every society, a fundamental activity that has effects far beyond the economy.

Business Associations

Among the various types of interest groups XE "groups" , business is generally the most powerful, with an unmatched capacity to affect public policy. The increasing globalization of production and financial activities, due to improvements in modem means of communication and transportation XE "transportation" and the gradual removal of controls on international economic transactions, has contributed tremendously to the power of capital in recent decades. It is possible for investors and managers to respond, if they so wish, to any unwanted government action XE "government action" by moving capital to another location. Although this theoretical mobility is limited by a variety of factors including the availability of suitable investment opportunities in other countries the potential loss of employment and revenues is a threat with which the state must contend in making decisions. Because of their potential to affect state revenues negatively, capitalists both domestic as well as foreign have the ability to punish the state for any action it might take of which they disapprove (Hayes XE "Hayes" 1978).

The financial contributions that businesses make to political XE "political" parties also afford them an important resource for influencing policy-makers. Elections can sometimes turn on relatively short-term issues and personalities, which necessitate large budgets to influence voters through extensive media advertising campaigns. In such situations, political parties supported by contributions from business are in a better position to run such campaigns and thus influence voting behaviour. This can lead political parties and candidates running for office to accommodate business interests more than they would for those of the other groups XE "groups" . Similarly, the financial contributions that businesses often make to public policy research institutions XE "institutions" and individual XE "individual" researchers serve to further entrench their power. The organizations and individuals XE "individuals" receiving funds tend to be sympathetic towards business interests and can provide business with the intellectual wherewithal often required to prevail in policy debates (McGann XE "McGann" and Weaver 1999 XE "Weaver 1999" , Abelson XE "Abelson" 1999 XE "Abelson 1999" ).

A strong business organization is able to adopt a bold position if necessary and convey it to the government, without incurring serious opposition from its rank and file. It usually takes the form of a peak association XE "peak association" (a sort of federation of associations) with the authority to impose sanctions and discipline among its members. Moreover, if the state is confident of the strength of the business association, then it can delegate some business-related responsibilities to the business association itself. Generally speaking, the US is regarded as having the weakest business organizations in the industrialized world and Japan the strongest, with countries like Britain or Canada falling closer to the US model. Other European countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Sweden, fall closer to the Japanese model (Katzenstein 1977 XE "Katzenstein 1977" ).

The strength or weakness of business and the varying patterns of government-industry XE "industry" relations found in a country are usually shaped by a range of historical factors. Although the example of Japan cited above is somewhat typical, business is often strongly organized if it has been confronted with strong, persistent challenges from trade unions or socialist parties. The stronger the unions, the stronger will be the business influence. Second, countries with strong states often have strong business organizations because in order to pressure strong governments business itself must be well organized. A strong state may also nurture a strong business association in order to avoid the problems arising from too many groups XE "groups" making conflicting demands on the same issue. The existence of strong business associations simplifies the governments job by aggregating their demands within the organization. Third, the organizational strength of business is affected by the structure of the economy. In national economies characterized by low industrial concentration or high levels of foreign ownership, it is difficult for the disparate elements to organize and devise a common position. Fourth, political XE "political" culture, too, has an important bearing on the extent and nature of business involvement in politics. In countries such as the US and Canada with cultures highly supportive of business, corporations have seen few reasons to organize.

LabourGroups

Labour, too, occupies a powerful position among social groups XE "groups" , though not so powerful as business. Unlike business, which enjoys considerable weight with policy-makers even at the individual XE "individual" level XE "level" of the firm, labour needs a collective XE "collective" organization, i.e. a trade union, to have its voice heard in the policy subsystem XE "policy subsystem" . In addition to bargaining with employers on behalf of their members wages and working conditions, which is their primary function, trade unions engage in political XE "political" activities to shape government policies affecting them (Taylor XE "Taylor" 1989 XE "Taylor 1989" ). The origin of the role of the trade unions in the public policy process is rooted in late nineteenth-century democratization, which enabled workers, who form a majority in every industrialized society, to have a say in the functioning of the government. Given the voting clout afforded to them in a democracy, it was sometimes easier for them to pressure the government to meet their needs than to bargain with their employers. The creation of labour or social democratic parties, which eventually formed governments in many countries, further reinforced labours political power (Qualter 1985 XE "Qualter 1985" ).

The nature and effectiveness of trade unions participation in the policy process depend on a variety of institutional and contextual factors. The structure of the state itself is an important determinant of trade union participation in the policy process. A weak and fragmented state will not be able to secure effective participation by unions because the latter would see little certainty that the government would be able to keep its side in any bargain. Weak businesses can also inhibit the emergence of a powerful trade union organization because the need for it is less immediate.

However, the most important determinant of labours capacity to influence the policy process and its outcomes is its own internal organization. The level XE "level" of union membership affects the extent to which states seek or even accept union participation in the policy process. The same is true for the structure of bargaining units: decentralized collective XE "collective" bargaining promotes a fragmented system of articulation of labour demands. Britain, Canada, and the United States, for example, have decentralized bargaining structures, whereas in Australia, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries bargaining takes place at the industry XE "industry" or even countrywide level (Esping-Andersen XE "Esping-Andersen" and Korpi 1984 XE "Korpi 1984" , Hibbs 1987 XE "Hibbs 1987" ). A union movement fragmented along any or all of possible regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or industrial versus craft, foreign versus domestic, or import-competing versus export-oriented lines will also experience difficulties in influencing the policy process. Fragmentation among labour ranks tends to promote local and sporadic industrial strife and incoherent articulation of labours interest in the policy process (Lacroix XE "Lacroix" 1986).

Finally, to realize its policy potential labour needs a central organization, such as the Australian or British Trade Union Congress XE "British Trade Union Congress" (TUC), All India Trade Union Congress XE "All India Trade Union Congress" (AITUC), the Canadian Labour Congress XE "Canadian Labour Congress" (CLC), and the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations XE "American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations" (AFL-CIO), even more than does business. Since collective XE "collective" action is the only tool through which labour can influence the employers or the governments behaviour, the more united a front it is able to put up, the more successful it is likely to be. To be effective, the trade union needs to enjoy comprehensive membership and have the organizational capacity to deal with conflicts among its members and maintain unity. Trade Unions role in the policy process tends to be the highest in corporatist political XE "political" systems such as the ones in Scandinavian countries, in Austria and the Netherlands, where the state encourages the formation and maintenance of strong trade unions, and the lowest in pluralist XE "pluralist" political systems such as the United States and Canada, where it does not.

Political Parties

Political parties are an intermediating actor existing on the margins or border between state and societal actors XE "actors" . They have a significant impact on public policy, though in the modern era this usually has been only indirectly. Though they are not directly represented in the policy subsystem XE "policy subsystem" , the party to which they are affiliated may influence many of the actors in the subsystem. Political parties tend to influence public policy indirectly, primarily through their role in staffing the executive XE "executive" and, to a lesser degree, the legislature XE "legislature" . Indeed, once in office, it is not uncommon for party members in government to ignore their official party platform while designing policies (Thomson XE "Thomson" 2001).

In modem societies, political XE "political" parties generally perform the function of interest aggregation, i.e. they seek to convert the particular demands of interest groups XE "groups" into general policy alternatives. The way in which parties aggregate interests is affected by the number of parties. In predominantly biparty systems such as the United States and Great Britain, the desire of the parties to gain widespread electoral support will force both parties to include in their policy proposals popular demands and avoid alienating the most important social groups. In multiparty systems, on the other hand, parties may do less aggregating and act as the representatives of fairly narrow sets of interests as appears to be the case in France.

In India, there is a multiparty system, with half a dozen national parties and regional parties of twice the number. Most of the national parties have manifestos, which only differ in stress rather than in content since their common desire is to extend their electoral base as wide as possible. The regional parties, however, are more sectarian in their approach since they desire mainly to woo a particular regional segment of the population. In one-party systems like the Soviet Union and China, they are the chief official framers of public policy. Generally, political XE "political" parties have a broader range of policy concerns than interest groups XE "groups" . Hence, they act more as brokers than as advocates of particular interests in policy formation.

In parliamentary democracies, the political XE "political" party that has a majority of votes in parliament forms the government, which is the chief official policy maker. Needless to say, most of the governments make policies according to the policy manifestos on which they have been elected to office. In presidential XE "presidential" systems XE "presidential systems" like the United States, the fact that members of Legislatures XE "Legislatures" often vote in accordance with their party policy, the party that controls the Congress exercises significant influence on policy matters.

The idea that political XE "political" parties play a major role in the public policy process, of course, stems from their undeniable influence on elections and electoral outcomes in democratic states. While vote-seeking political parties and candidates attempt to offer packages of policies they hope will appeal to voters, the electoral system is not structured to allow voters a choice on specific policies. The representational system also limits the publics ability to ensure that electorally salient policy issues actually move onto official government agendas. The official agenda of governments is, in fact, dominated by routine or institutionalized agenda-setting opportunities rather than by partisan political activity (Kingdon XE "Kingdon" 1984, Howlett XE "Howlett" 1997).

Even when parties do manage to raise an issue and see it move from the public to the official agenda, they cannot control its evolution past that point. As Richard Rose XE "Richard Rose" (1980: 153) puts it:

A party can create a movement on a given issue, but it cannot ensure the direction it will lead. Just as defenders of the status quo may find it difficult to defend their position without adapting it, so too proponents of change face the need to modify their demands. Modifications are necessary to secure the agreement of diverse interests within a party. They will also be important in securing support, or at least grudging acceptance, by affected pressure groups XE "groups" . Finally, a governing party will also need to make changes to meet the weaknesses spotted by civil service advisors and parliamentary draftsmen responsible for turning a statement of intent into a bill to present to Parliament.

While their direct influence may be muted, however, their indirect influence is not. The role played by political XE "political" parties in staffing political executives and legislatures, of course, allows them considerable influence on the content of policy decisions taken by those individuals XE "individuals" , including those related to the staffing of the senior public service. However, this power should not be overestimated. In modem governments, as we have seen, the degree of freedom enjoyed by each decision-maker is circumscribed by a host of factors that limit the conduct of each office and constrain the actions of each office-holder. These range from limitations imposed by the countrys constitution to the specific mandate conferred on individual XE "individual" decision-makers by various laws and regulations XE "regulations" (Pal 1988 XE "Pal 1988" , Axworthy 1988 XE "Axworthy 1988" ). Various rules set out not only the decisions that can be made by government agencies or officials, but also the procedures they must follow in doing so.

Political parties tend to have only an indirect effect on policy making through their role in determining who actually staffs legislative, executive XE "executive" , and judicial institutions XE "institutions" . Their role in agenda setting is very weak, as they play a stronger but still indirect role in policy formulation and decision-making due to the strong role played in these two stages of the policy cycle by members of the political XE "political" executive. Their role in policy implementation is virtually nil, while they can have a more direct effect on policy evaluation undertaken by legislators and legislative committees XE "legislative committees" (Minkenberg 2001 XE "Minkenberg 2001" ).

The fact that the influence of parties on particular stages of the policy process may be muted, or that any such influence may be waning, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that parties do not matter. That is, as Richard Rose XE "Richard Rose" argued almost a quarter century ago in the case of Britain:

Parties do make a difference in the way [a country] is governed, but the differences are not as expected. The differences in office between one party and another are less likely to arise from contrasting intentions than from the exigencies of government. Much of a partys record in office will be stamped upon it from forces outside its control...parties are not the primary forces shaping the destiny of society; it is shaped by something stronger than parties. (Rose 1980 XE "Rose 1980" : 141).

The Public (Individual XE "Individual" Citizens)

Since democratic governments are representative governments, it is often said that citizens arc therefore indirectly represented in the policy-making process. In an abstract sense, this is true. But concretely, this aphorism means very little. Surprising as it may appear, the public plays a rather small direct role in the public policy process. Citizen participation in policy-making, even in democratic countries, is very negligible. Many people do not exercise their franchise or engage in party politics. Neither they join pressure groups XE "groups" nor do they display any active interest in public affairs. This is not to say that its role is inconsequential, as it provides the backdrop of norms, attitudes, and values against which the policy process is displayed. However, in most liberal democratic states, policy decisions are taken by representative institutions XE "institutions" that empower specialized actors XE "actors" to determine the scope and content of public policies, rather than the public per se determining policy.

One important role played by members of the public in democratic polities, of course, is voting. On the one hand, in democratic states voting is the most basic means of participating in the political XE "political" and, by implication, policy process. It not only affords citizens the opportunity to express their choice of government, but also empowers them to pressure political parties and candidates seeking their votes to offer them attractive policy packages. On the other hand, the voters policy capacity usually cannot be actualized, at least not directly, for various reasons. In modern democracies policies are made by representatives of voters who, once elected, are not required to heed the preferences of their constituents in their day-to-day functioning. Moreover, as was discussed above, most legislators participate very little in the policy process, which tends to be dominated by experts in specific sectoral areas rather than by legislative generalists. More significantly, candidates and political parties often do not run in elections on the basis of their policy platforms. Even when they do, voters usually do not vote on the basis of proposed policies alone. However, despite such political attitudes of a great majority of citizens, some still participate directly in decision-making. In some of the American states (like California) and some countries (like Switzerland) citizens can and still vote directly on a legislation or on constitutional amendments which are submitted to the voters for approval.

Elections are the major instruments in democratic countries to gauge public opinion or popular wishes. The most conspicuous difference between authoritarianism and democratic regimes is that democracies choose their top policy makers in genuine elections. Voting in genuine elections may be an important method XE "method" of citizen influence on policy; not so much because it actually permits citizens to choose their officials and to some degree instructs these officials on policy, but because the existence of genuine elections puts a stamp of approval on citizen participation. Indirectly, therefore, elections enforce on proximate policy makers a rule that citizens wishes count in policy making.

However, it is a truism that no government, howsoever dictatorial, can afford to go against the desires, wishes, customs or traditions of the people. Even dictators undertake many popular measures to keep down unrest or discontent against the regime. One-party systems like the Soviet Union also seem concerned to meet many citizen wants even as they exclude citizens from more direct participation in policy formation.Research Organizations and Public Policy Think Tanks

Another significant set of unofficial actors XE "actors" in the policy process is composed of the researchers working at universities, research institutes, and think-tanks on particular policy issues. University researchers often have theoretical and philosophical interests in public problems that may not lead to research results that can be translated directly into usable knowledge for policy purposes. To the extent that they do conduct research for the purpose of participating in policy debates, they often function in a manner similar to their counterparts in think tanks. Indeed, in many instances, academics undertaking directly relevant policy research are sponsored by think-tanks (Ricci 1993 XE "Ricci 1993" ).

In fact, the development XE "development" of more complex government problems and the need for greater analytic capacity than that possessed by the governments have led to the growth of independent research organizations, or what are often called think tanks. A think-tank can be defined as an independent organization engaged in multidisciplinary research intended to influence public policy (James 1993 XE "James 1993" ). Such organizations maintain an interest in a broad range of policy problems and employ, either full-time or on a contract basis, experts on various issue areas in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on the issues facing governments. Their research tends to be directed at proposing practical solutions to public problems or, in the case of some think-tanks, finding evidence to support the ideological or interest-driven positions they advocate. This sets them apart somewhat from academic researchers at universities, whose interests are more specialized and who do not necessarily seek practical solutions to policy problems.

While think-tanks are generally more partisan than their purely academic counterparts, they too maintain an image of intellectual autonomy from the government or any political XE "political" party in order to be taken seriously by policy-makers. Some of the prominent think-tanks in the United States are the Brookings XE "Brookings" Institution XE "Brookings Institution" , the American Enterprise Institute XE "American Enterprise Institute" , the Cato XE "Cato" Institute XE "Cato Institute" , the Urban Institute XE "Urban Institute" , and the RAND XE "RAND" . Similar organizations in Canada include the C.D. Howe Institute XE "C.D. Howe Institute" , the Fraser Institute, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives XE "Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives" , and the Institute for Research on Public Policy XE "Institute for Research on Public Policy" . Major think-tanks in Britain include the Policy Studies Institute and the National Institute for Economic and Social Research. In India too, there are a few policy think tanks like Centre for Policy Research XE "Centre for Policy Research" , Observer Research Foundation XE "Observer Research Foundation" , etc. which have come up in recent years. Literally hundreds of such institutes are active in the Western, developed, and developing countries, some with broad policy mandates, and others that are more limited in their purview such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association (Lindquist XE "Lindquist" , 1993; Abelson XE "Abelson" , 1996). Many think tanks are associated with a particular ideological position. While Brookings and Urban Institute are center-left, the American Enterprise Institute is somewhat more to the right, and Cato is libertarian. Others, like RAND, are more closely associated with their methodological style. RAND uses very sophisticated techniques in its analyses of a range of public issues.

Think-tanks target their research and recommendations to those politicians who may be expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas being espoused. They also seek originality in their ideas and, unlike the researchers working in universities or the government, spend a great deal of effort publicizing their findings. The need for a quick response to policy issues and problems has forced many think-tanks to develop new product lines. Short reports, journal articles, and policy briefs that can be quickly read and digested have replaced book-length studies as the primary output of many think-tanks. In addition, a premium has been placed on writing articles and pieces for newspapers and making appearances on radio and television programmes. This new brand of research and analysis is dependent on the public policy food chain, which includes a range of knowledge and policy-oriented institutions XE "institutions" . Over the last few decades, much of the work of think-tanks has been devoted to promoting economic efficiency, since this has been an important preoccupation of the governments in the industrialized world.

Mass Media

Last but not the least, media constitutes one of the important intermediating actors XE "actors" active in the policy-making process. While some regard the role of the mass media in the policy process as pivotal (Herman XE "Herman" and Chomsky XE "Chomsky" 1988, Parenti XE "Parenti" 1986), others describe it as marginal (Kingdon XE "Kingdon" 1984). There is no denying that the mass media are crucial links between the state and society, a position that allows for significant influence on the preferences of government and society in regard to the identification of public problems and their solutions. Yet, at the same time, like political XE "political" parties, their direct role in the various stages of the policy process is often sporadic and most often quite marginal.

The role of the media in the policy process originates in the fact that in reporting problems they function both as passive reporters and as active analysts, as well as advocates of particular policy solutions. That is, news programmes do not just report on a problem but often go to great lengths in locating a problem not otherwise obvious, defining its nature and scope and suggesting or implying the availability of potential solutions. The medias role in agenda-setting is thus particularly significant. Media portrayal of public problems and proposed solutions often conditions how they are understood by the public and many members of government, thereby shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of others more likely. However, the mass media has the tendency to be a one-sided source for setting the policy agenda, as it has an inclination toward the sensational news and also a tendency to exaggerate some aspects of an issue, while playing down others.

This is particularly significant considering that news reporting is not an objective mirror of reality, undistorted by bias or inaccuracy. Reporters and editors are newsmakers, in the sense that they define what is worthy of reporting and the aspects of a situation that should be highlighted. Thus, policy issues that can be translated into an interesting story tend to be viewed by the public as more important than those that do not lend themselves so easily to narrative structures and first-person accounts and sound bites. This partially explains why, for example, crime stories receive so much prominence in television news and, as a corollary the public puts pressure on governments to appear to act tough on crime.

We must not, however, exaggerate the mass medias role in the policy process. Other policy actors XE "actors" have resources enabling them to counteract media influence, and policy-makers are for the most part intelligent and resourceful individuals XE "individuals" who understand their own interests and have their own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy options. As a rule, they are not easily swayed by media portrayals of issues and preferred policy solutions or by the mere fact of media attention. Indeed, they often use the media to their own advantage. It is not uncommon for public officials and successful interest groups XE "groups" to provide selective information to the media to bolster their case. Indeed, very often the media are led by state opinion rather than vice versa (Howlett XE "Howlett" 1997).

Conclusion

To conclude, it can be said that while the official actors XE "actors" like the minister(s) and bureaucrats XE "bureaucrats" by virtue of their central position in the policy subsystem XE "policy subsystem" and access to abundant organizational resources critically affect and influence the policy process, their societal counterparts like interest groups XE "groups" (business and labour), political XE "political" parties, research organizations/think tanks and the media often play a significant role in many policy areas. All these actors have their own objectives, which they seek to achieve through subsystem membership and participation in the policy process. But what objectives they pursue, how they do so, and the extent to which they succeed in their efforts depend to a large extent on the institutional context in which they operate. At the domestic level XE "level" , the structure of political institutions XE "institutions" affects the autonomy and capacity XE "autonomy and capacity" of the executive XE "executive" and bureaucracy, a situation paralleled at the international level by the structure of international regimes XE "international regimes" and the role played by state resources within them. These structures have a decisive effect on actors interest and behaviour, and on the outcomes of the policy process.

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