51-1 Judicial Defendants' Answering Brief

7/21/2019 51-1 Judicial Defendants' Answering Brief

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Appeal No. 14-56140

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, PBC

a Delaware public benefit corporation, COLBERN C. STUART, III,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et. al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of California

Case No. 13-CV-1944-CAB-BLM

The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo

JOINT ANSWERING BRIEF OF JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS-

APPELLEES

James B. Gilpin, Bar No. 151466Matthew L. Green, Bar No. 227904

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP655 West Broadway, 15th Floor

San Diego, California 92101Telephone: (619) 525-1300

Facsimile: (619) 233-6118

Attorneys for Judicial Defendants-

Appellees SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANDIEGO, et. al.

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 1 of 76


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES..........................................................................4

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................5

A. The Stuart Dissolution .......................................................................5

B. Stuarts Criminal Proceeding People v. Stuart................................6

C. The April 15, 2010 Bar Association Event.........................................8

D. The Filing Of This Action And The Inclusion Of JudicialOfficers Home Addresses In the Complaint......................................9

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................11

A. The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint ............................................11

B. The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To

Dismiss............................................................................................14

C. The Dismissal of the Action.............................................................16

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................16VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................17

VII. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................20

A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS

DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FORFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVILPROCEDURE 8 ..............................................................................20

1. Appellants Failure To Comply With Rule 8 Was One Of

Several Enumerated Grounds In Support Of TheOmnibus Motion To Dismiss .................................................22

2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The FAC

Failed To Satisfy Rule 8.........................................................22

3. The District Court Did Consider And Properly ApplyThe Relevant Factors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b) ..........25



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TABLE OF CONTENTS(continued)

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4. The Involuntary Dismissal Was Supported With Or

Without The District Courts Prior Order On The

Original Complaint ................................................................28

B. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY BARS ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT

OF STUARTS DISSOLUTION AND CRIMINAL

PROCEEDINGS..............................................................................29

1. Ashelmanand SparkmanAre Binding Precedent In This

Circuit....................................................................................312. The District Court Correctly Applied Circuit Precedent.........34

3. The Recycled Claims In The FAC Concerning StuartsDissolution Proceeding, As Well As The New Claims

Relating ToPeople v. Stuart, Are Also Barred By

Judicial Immunity ..................................................................35

4. No Historical Analysis Of Judicial Immunity WasNecessary...............................................................................36

5. Family Law Judges Are Also Afforded JudicialImmunity ...............................................................................37

C. THE DISTRICT COURTS JUDGMENT MAY BEAFFIRMED ON NUMEROUS OTHER GROUNDS......................38

1. The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants In Counts 1

And 2, Which Arise From The So-Called Stuart

Assault, Are Time-Barred ....................................................39

2. Counts 1 And 2 Also Fail To State Facts Sufficient To

State A Claim Against Any Judicial Defendants....................40

3. The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 3,Which Relate ToPeople v. Stuart, Also Fail To State

Sufficient Facts......................................................................41

4. The Claims In Count 3 Against Judge Groch Are Also

Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................41



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TABLE OF CONTENTS(continued)

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5. Count 4, Which Arises From Appellants Inclusion Of

Judicial Officers Home Addresses In Their Original

Complaint, Fails To State Sufficient Facts.............................42

6. The Claims For Supervisory Liability In Count 6 Are

Devoid Of Sufficient Facts.....................................................44

7. The Claims Against The Superior Court, Judicial

Council, and AOC In Count 7 Are Barred By Eleventh

Amendment Immunity...........................................................468. Counts 9 And 10 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

A Claim For Violation Of Sections 1985 and 1986 ................47

9. The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 11 Are

Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................50

10. Counts 12 and 13 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

A Claim Against Any Judicial Defendant ..............................51

11. Count 15 Does Not And Cannot State Facts Sufficient To

State A Claim Against The Judicial Defendants For FalseAdvertising Under The Lanham Act ......................................51

12. The FAC Does Not Allege Facts Sufficient To State ACivil RICO Claim Against The Judicial Defendants..............53

13. The Claims For Prospective Relief Are Barred For Lack

Of Standing And Under Principles Of Abstention..................56

D. NONE OF THE DISTRICT COURTS COMMENTSSUPPORT APPELLANTS PARTIALITY CHALLENGE.............57

E. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED ITSDISCRETION IN DENYING STUARTS MOTION FORCOUNTER-SANCTIONS............................................................58

VIII. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................61



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Federal Cases

Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright,

862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55

Arnold v. Bostick,

339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964)............................................................... 37

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009).............................................................................25

Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................................... passim

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,

368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 41

B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,

192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 56

Barrus v. Sylvania,

55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995).................................................................52

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007).............................................................................25

Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam,

334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 42

Blake v. Dierdorff,856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55

Bradley v. Fisher,

80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872).......................................................passim

Bretz v. Kelman,

773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985)............................................................. 48



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- v -

Estate of Brooks v. U.S.,

197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 40

Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

698 F.3d 58 (2nd Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 59

Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,

637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011)................................................. 17, 23, 25

Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,

404 U.S. 508 (1972).............................................................................43

Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriffs Posse Comitatus,641 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1981)......................................................... 48, 49

In re Century 21-Re/Max,

882 F. Supp. 915 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ......................................................53

Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994).................................................................48

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95 (1983)...............................................................................56

Delew v. Wagner,

143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 43

Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983).............................................................................41

Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano,

252 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 42

Duvall v. County of Kitsap,

260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 37

E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye,

682 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ...................................................... 46, 57

Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,

762 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1985) .............................................................. 59



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- vi -

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005).............................................................................41

Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,

339 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 25

Forrett v. Richardson,

112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................... 45

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................. 42

Franceschi v. Schwartz,57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995).................................................................46

Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin,

812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987)....................................................... 46, 47

Griffin v. Breckenridge,

403 U.S. 88 (1971)......................................................................... 49, 50

Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill,

353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 39

Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 44

Hart v. Massanari,

266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 32

Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept.,

530 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 21, 28

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994).............................................................................41

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................... 48

Kush v. Rutledge,

460 U.S. 719 (1983).............................................................................48



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Lacey v. Maricopa County,

693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 28, 42

Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.,

940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)............................................................... 55

Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp.,

464 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2006)......................................................... 26, 28

Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540 (1994)....................................................................... 57, 58

Long v. County of Los Angeles,442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)............................................................. 40

Margolis v. Ryan,

140 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................... 40

McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 16, 22

Meek v. County of Riverside,

183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17

Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.,

540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 16, 17

Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9 (1991) .................................................................... 29, 30, 36

Moore v. Brewster,

96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996)............................................................... 29

Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc.,

885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 55

Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,

651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981)................................................... 21, 22, 28

Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,

378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 52



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OShea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488 (1974)............................................................. 4, 19, 39, 57

Occupational-Urgent Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co.,

711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ....................................................54

Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,

486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................... 54

Orin v. Barclay,

272 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 50

Parke v. Raley,506 U.S. 20 (1992)...............................................................................16

Parker v. Google, Inc.,

422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006)...................................................53

Pesnell v. Arsenault,

543 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)............................................................. 58

Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547 (1967)....................................................................... 33, 36

PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc.,

376 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 34

Portman v. County of Santa Clara,

995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993)............................................................... 49

Reves v. Ernst & Young,

507 U.S. 170 (1993).............................................................................54

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,

307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002)............................................................. 49

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923).............................................................................41

San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,

145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 57



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- ix -

Schmidt v. Herrmann,

614 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1980)....................................................... 22, 26

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court,

318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)....................................................... 46, 47

Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi,

673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012)............................................................. 52

Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349 (1978).....................................................................passim

Tan v. Univ. of S. Cal.,252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 38

U.S. v. Bosch,

951 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1991)....................................................... 17, 58

U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,

328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 21, 25

U.S. v. Odachyan,

749 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2014)............................................................... 58

Usher v. City of Los Angeles,

828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987)............................................................... 39

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,

491 U.S. 58 (1989)...............................................................................47

Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co.,

556 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17

Wolfe v. Strankman,

392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 47

Woodrum v. Woodward County,

866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................. 40

Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971).......................................................................passim



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Yourish v. California Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 26

State Cases

Olsen v. Harbison,

119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................ 43

Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court,

238 P. 687 (Cal. 1925) .........................................................................46

Federal Statutes

15 U.S.C. 1125 ..................................................................................... 52

18 U.S.C. 1961 ...................................................................................... 54

18 U.S.C. 1962 ................................................................................ 53, 54

28 U.S.C. 1391 ...................................................................................... 44

42 U.S.C. 1983 ..............................................................................passim

42 U.S.C. 1985 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50

42 U.S.C. 1986 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50

State Statutes

Cal. Civ. Code 47 ..................................................................................43

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 335.1 ....................................................................39

Cal. Fam. Code 200...............................................................................38

Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21................................................................... 10, 43

Cal. Gov. Code 70301-70404...............................................................47

Cal. Gov. Code 77003............................................................................46

Cal. Gov. Code 77200.............................................................................46

Cal. Penal Code 646.9.............................................................................6



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Cal. Penal Code 653m......................................................................... 6, 7

Rules

Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.81 ....................................................................46

Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.810 ..................................................................47

Fed. R. App. P. 28.................................................................................... 25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8...............................................................................passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 ....................................................................................... 55

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.............................................................................passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................... 24, 28

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.............................................................................passim

Constitutional Provisions

Eleventh Amendment .....................................................................passim

Cal. Const. Article VI, 1.................................................................. 46, 53

Cal. Const. Article VI, 5........................................................................46



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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is an appeal from the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a

disgruntled family court litigant, Colbern C. Stuart (Stuart), against nearly 60

defendants identified as San Diegos family law community. Stuart generally

claims that anyone involved with his divorce proceeding, which includes the

family court judges that presided over the matter and their supervisors, state

judicial branch entities, family law attorneys and firms, and forensic psychologists,

conspired together to deprive Stuart of his federal family rights.1

Stuart also alleges San Diegos family law community retaliated against

him as a result of complaints regarding the family law system that he lodged

with various governmental agencies, elected officials, and media outlets. Namely,

1 The judicial defendants named in this action consist of the (1) SuperiorCourt of California, County of San Diego (Superior Court), (2) Hon. Robert J.

Trentacosta, Judge of the Superior Court, (3) Michael M. Roddy, Executive Officer

of the Superior Court, (4) Judicial Council of California (Judicial Council), (5)Hon. Steven Jahr, Administrative Director of the Courts, (6) Administrative Office

of the Courts (AOC), (7) Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of

California, (8) Hon. Lisa Schall, Judge of the Superior Court, (9) Hon. Lorna A.Alksne, Judge of the Superior Court, (10) Hon. Christine K. Goldsmith, Judge ofthe Superior Court (Ret.), (11) Hon. Jeannie Lowe, Commissioner of the SuperiorCourt (Ret.), (12) Hon. William H. McAdam, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court

(Ret.), (13) Hon. Edlene C. McKenzie, Commissioner of the Superior Court, (14)Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge of the Superior Court, (15) Hon. Michael S. Groch,

Judge of the Superior Court, and (16) Kristine P. Nesthus, the Director of Legal

Services and General Counsel for the Superior Court (collectively, JudicialDefendants).



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Stuart asserts that the family law community conspired together to bring about

the filing of criminal harassment and stalking charges against him by the San

Diego City Attorneys Office for conduct directed at his ex-spouse, for which he

was convicted, and Stuarts purported assault in April 2010 at a San Diego

County Bar Association (Bar Association) family law seminar.

As implausible as Stuarts conspiracy theory is, Stuart filed the instant action

pro se in August 2013. The original complaint purported to assert approximately

36 claims in a complaint roughly 175 pages in length, and more than 1,300 pages

with exhibits. Aside from the sparse factual averments buried in pages of

generalized grievances about the family courts, as the district court found, the

complaint was confusing, redundant, [and] conclusory, fail[ed] to clearly

identify each separate claim for relief, and fail[ed] to connect [the] factual

allegations to the numerous causes of action identified, among other deficiencies.

(ER 46-47.)

The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failure to

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires pleadings to

contain a short and plain statement of the claim and that each allegation be

simple, concise, and direct[.] Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). The district court

also dismissed with prejudice Stuarts damages claims against the defendant judges

under the doctrine of judicial immunity, which bars claims arising out of judicial



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acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356

(1978);Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

Rather than attempt to correct the pleading deficiencies identified by the

district court, Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which asserted

more than 100 claims and grew in size to 251 pages, and nearly 1,550 pages with

exhibits. Given the amended pleading was even longer than the original and

remain[ed] unmanageable, argumentative, confusing, and frequently

incomprehensible, (ER 10), the district court again found that Stuart failed to

comply with Rule 8 and the district courts prior order.

Based on the substantial harm to the defendants, the district court, and

litigants in other matters pending before the district court, coupled with Stuarts

inability, or unwillingness, to file a Rule 8-compliant pleading, the district court

properly dismissed the action with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b), which permits dismissals for failure to comply with Rule 8 or a court order.

For the reasons explained in this brief, the Court should affirm the district courts

dismissal of the action for failure to comply with Rule 8. While Rule 8 alone is

sufficient to affirm the dismissal of the action, ample other grounds also support

the district courts judgment.



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II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The issues presented in this appeal are:

(1) whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action

for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8;

(2) whether the district court properly dismissed the claims against the

judicial officers who presided over Stuarts dissolution and criminal proceedings

under the doctrine of judicial immunity;

(3) whether the district courts dismissal is supported by other grounds

beyond Rule 8 and judicial immunity, including the statute of limitations, failure to

state facts sufficient to state a claim, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh

Amendment immunity, lack of standing, and abstention underYounger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971) andOShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974);

(4) whether any remarks of the district judge, which merely reflected her

general frustration with Stuart, amounted to deprivation of an impartial tribunal;

and

(5) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Stuart

counter-sanctions against certain Judicial Defendants based on their successful

motion to dismiss the original complaint.



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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As outlined by the district court, the allegations in this action generally relate

to four incidents: (1) Stuarts dissolution proceeding; (2) Stuarts criminal

prosecution and conviction; (3) Stuarts so-called assault at the Bar Association

event; and (4) Stuarts inclusion of judicial officers home addresses in the original

complaint. (ER 7:13-16.)

A. The Stuart Dissolution

The genesis of this action, particularly Stuarts grievances with the family

law system, appears to begin with Stuarts dissolution proceeding with his former

spouse, Lynn Stuart (Stuart Dissolution). According to Stuart, who was an

attorney admitted to practice in California, Arizona, and Nevada at the time, the

Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge of the Superior Court, recommended that Dr.

Stephen Doyne mediate custody issues in the Stuart Dissolution in April 2008.

(ER 111, 3; ER 265, 809.) Stuart thereafter hired Dr. Doyne in September

2008, and Judge Wohlfeil is alleged to have had oversight responsibilities in

connection with the mediation. (ER 265, 812; ER 270-71, 833, 835, 836-37.)

In December 2008, the Stuart Dissolution was reassigned to another Superior

Court judge, the Honorable Lisa Schall, who allegedly maintained the same

oversight responsibilities until November 2009. (ER 271, 837; ER 276, 876.)



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Stuart avers that Dr. Doyne caused Stuart to lose shared custody of his son

and for sole custody to be awarded to Ms. Stuart. (ER 265, 817(F).) Stuart

makes numerous other accusations against Dr. Doyne and alleges that Judges

Wohlfeil and Schall did not properly discharge their oversight responsibilities.

(ER 266-71, 816-17, 821, 822-30, 838.) Based on the same purported conduct,

Stuart also alleges supervisory failures by the Honorable Lorna A. Alksne, the

Supervising Family Court judge at the time, the Honorable Robert J. Trentacosta,

the former Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, Michael Roddy, the Executive

Officer of the Superior Court, and the Superior Court itself. (ER 111-12, 9-10;

ER 113, 19; ER 276, 873.)

B. Stuarts Criminal Proceeding People v. Stuar t

This action also stems from the criminal prosecution of Stuart in the matter

ofPeople of the State of California v. Stuart, Superior Court of California, County

of San Diego, Case No. M104094DV (People v. Stuart). In March 2010, Stuart

was charged with multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m(a) and

(b),2 as well as one count of stalking under California Penal Code section 646.9(a),

based on conduct directed at Ms. Stuart. (ER 181, 373.) Citing to Stuarts

2 Subdivision (a) generally prohibits the harassment of others by telephone or

e-mail with obscene language or threats to inflict injury, while subdivision (b)

generally prohibits a person from harassing others with repeated telephone calls ore-mails.



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ongoing obscene and threatening messages, an arrest warrant was requested by

the San Diego City Attorneys Office, which was granted on April 14, 2010. (SER

68, 70.)

According to Stuart, the Assistant City Attorney prosecuting the case, Emily

Garson, conspired with her boss, San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith, and

his spouse, the Honorable Christine K. Goldsmith, Judge of the Superior Court

(Ret.), in initiating criminal proceedings and obtaining the arrest warrant against

Stuart. (ER 181, 373; ER 183, 381; ER 204, 486-89.) Stuart also claims

that Judge Goldsmiths purported involvement with People v. Stuart, by virtue of

her marriage to Jan Goldsmith, was with the knowledge and support of Judges

Schall and Wohlfeil. (ER 183, 382.)

The Honorable Michael S. Groch, also a Superior Court judge, was assigned

as the trial judge in People v. Stuart. (ER 187, 402.) Stuart was ultimately

convicted of multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m and

sentenced by Judge Groch in March 2011. (ER 190, 416-17.) After serving

approximately 90 days in jail, Stuart was conditionally released from custody in

May 2011. (ER 191, 421-22.) As a result of violating the terms of his

suspended sentence, however, Stuart was arrested in April 2012, and returned to

jail until May 2013. (ER 194-95, 433, 439.) Stuart also alleges that Judge

Groch issued multiple domestic violence restraining orders prohibiting any contact



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with Ms. Stuart. (SeeER 191, 422-23; ER 196, 444; ER 199, 462.) Stuarts

conviction inPeople v. Stuartalso led to his disbarment in California, Arizona, and

Nevada. (ER 192-93, 426-32; SER 74-75, 77-82, 84, 86, 88-91.)

C. The April 15, 2010 Bar Association Event

This matter also arises out of a family law seminar hosted by the San Diego

County Bar Association on April 15, 2010, which Stuart identifies as the central

subject of this litigation. (Compl. 114-15; ER 135-36, 109.) Stuart alleges

that Judges Goldsmith, Wohlfeil and William H. McAdam, Jr. (Ret.), and

Commissioners Jeannie Lowe (Ret.) and Edlene C. McKenzie were organizers

and panel members in connection with the seminar. (ER 113-14, 21-25.)

Stuart also avers that Judge Alksne served as a panel member at the seminar. (ER

136, 110; ER 139, 125.)

Stuart attended the seminar for the purpose of gaining knowledge in order

to advance [his] PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY. (ER 138, 121.) According to

Stuart, during her introductory remarks, Judge Alksne announced an abrupt break,

apologizing that she needed a break so we can straighten something out. (ER

139, 125.) Judge Alksne is alleged to have conferred with Sheriffs deputies,

security guards, and other individuals regarding Stuart. (ER 139, 126-27.)

Sheriffs deputies and private security officers thereafter asked Stuart multiple

times to accompany them in leaving the seminar. (ER 139, 128.) Stuart refused



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to leave and was ultimately handcuffed and removed from the seminar. (ER 140,

132.) Stuart was released once outside of the seminar and told not to return. (ER

140, 133.)

D. The Filing Of This Action And The Inclusion Of Judicial Officers

Home Addresses In the Complaint

On August 20, 2013, Stuart and the California Coalition for Families and

Children, PBC (California Coalition) (collectively, Appellants), a Delaware

corporation formed by Stuart the day before he filed this action, and whose

membership allegedly consists of other aggrieved family court participants, filed

this action against dozens of defendants generally referred to as the Family Law

Community.3 (Compl.; ER 111, 3-4; ER 121, 63; SER 72.) Appellants

complaint totaled roughly 175 pages, plus 1,156 pages of exhibits, and contained

numerous acronyms of [Appellants] invention. (Compl.; ER 42:14-15.) The

complaint purported to assert approximately 36 claims arising under 42 U.S.C.

1983, 1985, and 1986, the Lanham Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), the Declaratory Judgment Act, and California state

law. (Compl.)

3 Stuarts former law corporation, Lexevia, P.C., was also a plaintiff in the

original complaint, but was omitted from the First Amended Complaint and is nota party to this appeal. (SeeCompl. 3, 107-08; ER 1:22-35; ER 7 n.1.)



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For no ostensible purpose other than intimidation, the complaint also

included the residential addresses of Judges Trentacosta, Schall, Alksne, and

Wohlfeil, and the Chief Justice of California, the Honorable Tani G. Cantil-

Sakauye.4 (Compl. 11, 17, 22, 23, 29.) After viewing the complaint on the

Internet, Kristine Nesthus, the Superior Courts Director of Legal Services and

General Counsel, delivered a letter to Appellants on August 25, 2013, demanding

that the residential addresses be removed from the Internet and that steps be taken

to remove the information from PACER under California Government Code

section 6254.21.5 (SeeER 208-10, 510-26.) Ms. Nesthus, who allegedly acted

in collaboration with and under the direction of Mr. Roddy and Judge

Trentacosta, also attempted to contact Stuart directly by e-mail and through his

attorney service by telephone to demand that the home addresses be removed from

the Internet. (ER 209, 518; ER 210, 524; ER 214, 538.)

Rather than comply with Ms. Nesthuss requests, Appellants applied ex

parte to the district court on August 26, 2013, for an order excusing their

4 The home address of Lawrence J. Simi, Chairperson for the Commission onJudicial Performance, was also included in the complaint. (Compl. 19.)

5 California Government Code section 6254.21 prohibits any person fromdisplaying on the Internet the home address of any elected or appointed official,

which includes judges and court commissioners, if that official has demanded in

writing that the person remove his or her home address. Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21(c)(1), (f)(3).



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compliance with the requests. (SER 5:24-6:1; SER 15:9-26.) Plaintiffs ex parte

application acknowledged that as of the prior day, the VERIFIED COMPLAINT

containing the residential addresses of several Defendants ha[d] been viewed over

119,296 times [on an Internet blog], and this number is progressing at a rate of

about 20,000 views per day. (SER 6:18-7:5.)

Recognizing that the complaint contains confidential information,

particularly the home addresses of judicial officers, the district court issued a

minute order on August 26, 2013, directing that the complaint be sealed. (SER 25,

26.) Appellants nevertheless allege that Ms. Nesthus, along with Mr. Roddy,

Judges Trentacosta, Alksne, Wohlfeil, Schall, Goldsmith, McAdam, and Groch,

and Commissioners Lowe and McKenzie, obstructed justice. (ER 208, 509;

ER 214-16, 540, 542, 544, 546, 548.)

IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint

On September 30, 2013, the Judicial Defendants who had been served at the

time, which were collectively identified as the Superior Court Defendants,6

moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds, including, but not limited

6 The Superior Court Defendants consisted of the Superior Court, Judges

Trentacosta, Schall, Alksne, Goldsmith, McAdam, and Wohlfeil, CommissionersLowe and McKenzie, and Mr. Roddy. (SER 28:5-15.)



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to, the California Coalitions failure to obtain counsel, non-compliance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, judicial immunity, and the statute of limitations.

(SER 28:1-19; SER 2:20; SER 41:5-42:4.) Several other defendants also filed

motions to dismiss the complaint on similar or related grounds, which included the

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) and its officials, Brad Battson and

Lawrence J. Simi. (SER 95.)

The Superior Court also moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 based on the frivolous nature of the claims and the inclusion of

judicial officers home addresses in the complaint. (SER 97.) In response, Stuart

filed his own motion for Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the Superior Court

Defendants motion to dismiss the complaint was frivolous. (SER 104; ER 37:11-

15.)

The district court heard the Superior Court Defendants and the CJP parties

motions to dismiss on December 19, 2013, and thereafter issued its order on

December 23, 2013. (ER 41:17-21.) The district court dismissed the California

Coalitions claims without prejudice due to its failure to obtain counsel. (ER 45:8-

27.)

As to Stuarts claims, the district court dismissed them without prejudice for

failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). (ER 46:2-4.) The district court found that

Stuarts individual claims could not be distinguished from those of the California



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Coalition, that each claim for relief was not clearly and separately identified, and

that the complaint was confusing, redundant, conclusory, and buries its factual

allegations in pages of generalized grievances about the family courts. (ER 46:6-

47:25.) The district court also dismissed with prejudice Stuarts claims against

the defendant judges for damages arising out of judicial acts within the jurisdiction

of their courts. (ER 48:2-4.)

Although Stuart requested that the dismissal of the complaint on Rule 8

grounds be with prejudice in order to expedite his filing of an appeal, (ER 63:20-

23), the district courts dismissal was nevertheless without prejudice, (ER 48:24-

26). In amending the complaint, the district court cautioned Stuart to be wary of

the immunity and statute-of-limitation issues . (ER 48:28.)

The district court denied the Superior Courts sanctions motion, but warned

that sanctions against Appellants would be considered if the amended complaint

does not provide justifiable reasons as to why each defendant is named in the

action, does not take judicial immunity into account, and names judicial defendants

just to harass them. (ER 59:21-60:1.) The district court also advised Stuart that

[he was] lucky [he wasnt] sanctioned for filing a complaint representing a

corporation where [he] knew, as a disbarred lawyer, [he] had no right to do that.

(ER 38:4-7.) Given the Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss was



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granted, the district court found that the motion was not frivolous and denied

Stuarts sanctions motion. (ER 16:16-17:9.)

B. The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To Dismiss

On January 9, 2014, the California Coalition, after retaining counsel, and

Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). (ER 109.) Rather than set forth

a short plain statement as directed by the district court, the FAC increased the

length of the original complaint to 251 pages, plus 1,297 pages of exhibits, added

roughly eleven new defendants to the case,7 and continued to utilize countless,

lengthy, concocted acronyms. (ER 7:12-13; ER 8:6-9:7.)

The FAC included over 1,200 numbered paragraphs and was divided into 28

counts. (ER 143-356, 149-1203.) The first 15 counts were subdivided into 75

claims generally arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Lanham

Act, and California state law. (ER 143-292, 149-914; ER 25-27.) The FAC

also contained an additional eleven RICO counts and two counts for prospective

relief. (ER 316-49, 1001-1180; ER 351-54, 1192-1203.)

In order to promote efficiency, the district court scheduled a case

management conference for February 26, 2014. (SER 155.) At the case

management conference, the district court expressed its preference to have the

7 The new defendants named in the FAC included the Honorable Steven Jahr,

Administrative Director of the Courts, Judge Groch, and Ms. Nesthus. (ER 112, 12; ER 115-16, 26, 31.)



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defendants file one joint motion, rather than receive separate motions from the

multitude of defendants. (ER 25:3-15.) The district court added that it would like

to see one motion that addresses the issues the Court previously raised regarding

Rule 8, regarding the statute of limitations, and regarding the immunity issues on

the broad perspective that most of the defendants may have immunity . (ER

27:13-17.) Following the case management conference, the district court set a

briefing schedule, which was to commence with the filing of an omnibus motion

to dismiss by the Bar Association and be followed by the filing of joinders and

supplemental motions to dismiss by other defendants. (SER 157.)

Pursuant to the district courts briefing schedule, the Bar Association filed

the omnibus motion to dismiss the FAC on March 28, 2014. (SER 159.) Among

other grounds, the omnibus motion sought dismissal based on Appellants failure

to comply with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (SER 159.)

On April 10, 2014, the Judicial Defendants filed their notice of joinder in the

omnibus motion to dismiss, as well as their supplemental memorandum of points

and authorities, the stated purpose of which was to advance those additional

grounds supporting dismissal of the action as against the Judicial Defendants.

(SER 222:8-10, SER 232-34.) On May 13, 2014, the Superior Court and the AOC

also filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions based on the continuing frivolous nature

of Appellants lawsuit and failure to comply with the district courts directives.



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(SER 236-39.) After all briefing concluded, the district court took the matter under

submission. (SER 265.)

C. The Dismissal of the Action

On July 8, 2014, the district court issued an order dismissing the case with

prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8. (ER 6-12.) The district court

appropriately reasoned that that the FAC remains unmanageable, argumentative,

confusing, and frequently incomprehensible. (ER 10:22-26.) The district court

further observed that Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8 prejudiced the

defendants and harmed litigants in other pending matters. (ER 10:27-11:10.)

Although recognizing that the amended submission is even more unmanageable

than the original , the district court nevertheless declined to impose sanctions.

(ER 11:21-12:3.) Judgment in favor of the defendants was entered on July 9, 2014,

and the instant appeal ensued. (ER 1-5.)

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision of a district court is generally presumed to be correct. Parke v.

Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). A dismissal for failure to satisfy the pleading

standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003). The denial of leave to

amend a complaint is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Metzler Inv.



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GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008). [T]he

district courts discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Id.; see also Cafasso v. Gen.

Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011).

The district courts dismissal based on judicial immunity is a question of law

reviewed de novo. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.

1999). The district courts denial of Rule 11 sanctions is also reviewed for abuse

of discretion. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 819 (9th

Cir. 1999). Finally, any claim for reversal based on judicial bias is reviewed for

plain error when raised for the first time on appeal. U.S. v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546,

1548 (9th Cir. 1991).

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As properly determined by the district court, the pleading at issue in this

action is argumentative, prolix, confusing, redundant, almost entirely conclusory,

nearly impossible to determine what claims are being asserted and against whom,

and contains incomprehensible rambling, all of which are grounds on which this

Court has consistently affirmed dismissals for failure to comply with Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8. There was therefore no abuse of discretion by the district

court in its dismissal of the action with prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.



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Although Rule 8 alone supports affirmance of the district courts dismissal

of the action, the judgment against Appellants is warranted on numerous other

grounds. With regard to those claims against the judicial officers that presided

over Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding and People v. Stuart, the district court

correctly recognized that judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from claims for

damages arising out of judicial acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. The

claims relating to the dissolution and criminal proceedings are also barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal courts from hearing de facto

appeals of state court judgments. Stuarts criminal conviction also bars any

malicious prosecution claim in connection withPeople v. Stuart.

As to those claims relating to the Bar Association incident, which occurred

more than three years before this action was filed, they are barred by the two-year

statute of limitations for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and they do

not otherwise state facts sufficient to state a claim.

Appellants nonsensical obstruction of justice claim based on the demands

that the judges home addresses be removed from the original complaint also fails

as a matter of law, as the inclusion of such information violates a general order of

the district court and California state law and is entirely immaterial to the outcome

of this action.



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Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars the claims against the Superior

Court, Judicial Council, and AOC, as it is well-established that such State agencies

are immune from suit. The state court judicial officers and employees named as

defendants in this action are also protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity as

to those claims against them in their official capacities.

The dismissal of Appellants conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985

and 1986 was also proper due to the absence of any factual allegations establishing

a conspiracy, that Stuart is a federal officer, or that any Judicial Defendant acted

with a discriminatory animus. Appellants false advertising claim under the

Lanham Act also does not and cannot state facts sufficient to state a claim, as the

Judicial Defendants do not advertise or sell services, or compete commercially

with anyone.

The FAC also does not and cannot satisfy the elements needed to assert a

viable civil RICO claim. There are no factual allegations regarding any Judicial

Defendants participation in a purported enterprise, or conduct that constitutes a

criminal act, let alone a pattern of crime. Appellants also lack standing to obtain

prospective relief because there are no allegations establishing a real or immediate

threat of being harmed again in the future. The granting of such relief would also

run afoul of principles of abstention underYoungerand OShea, which generally



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preclude federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings, as well as

the administration of Californias judicial system.

Appellants remaining grounds for appeal relate to the alleged partiality of

the district court and the denial of counter-sanctions in connection with the

Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss the original complaint. As to the

former, the comments made by the district judge about which Appellants complain

reflect nothing more than the district judges frustration with Appellants, which is

insufficient to establish judicial bias as a matter of law, let alone that the district

court was incapable of making a fair judgment. With regard to the latter, the

district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for counter-

sanctions relating to a motion to dismiss that was granted. For these reasons, and

as set forth more fully below, the Court should affirm the district courts judgment.

VII.

ARGUMENT

A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS

DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR FAILURE

TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 8

In order to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must

contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in a complaint also

must be simple, concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 requires



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parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties

need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud. U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin

Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).

A complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed with

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Hearns v. San Bernardino

Police Dept., 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins.

Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 41(b), a defendant may move

for dismissal of an action where the plaintiff fails to comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure or a court order.

On appeal, Appellants argue the district courts dismissal of the FAC for

failure to comply with Rule 8 was error on the grounds that (1) the district court

sua sponteconsidered Rule 8 without notice and an opportunity for Appellants to

be heard on the issue; (2) the district court misapplied Rule 8; (3) the district court

did not consider the pertinent factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule

41(b), and (4) the district courts order dismissing the original complaint with leave

to amend was improvident and thus the violation thereof cannot support a Rule

41(b) dismissal. (AOB 21-30.) Each argument is without merit.



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1. Appellants Failure To Comply With Rule 8 Was One Of Several

Enumerated Grounds In Support Of The Omnibus Motion To

Dismiss.

Appellants first assert that the district court sua sponte dismissed the action

under Rule 8 without providing Appellants notice and opportunity to be heard.

(AOB 21-22.) Contrary to Appellants assertion, the district courts consideration

of Rule 8 was not sua sponte. Not only did the Bar Associations notice expressly

state that the motion was being made under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with

Rule 8, but its memorandum of points and authorities devoted six pages to

Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8. (SER 160:2-4; SER 168-74.) The

allegedlysua spontenature of the district courts Rule 8 dismissal, and Appellants

purported lack of notice and opportunity be heard, is also belied by Appellants

joint opposition to the omnibus motion to dismiss, which devoted approximately

18 pages to discussing Rule 8. (SER 244-62.)

2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The FAC Failed To

Satisfy Rule 8.

As noted by the district court, [this Court] has affirmed dismissal on Rule 8

grounds where the complaint is argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy,

and largely irrelevant, McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996),

verbose, confusing and [almost entirely] conclusory, Nevijel v. North Coast Life

Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981), or where it is impossible to designate

the cause or causes of action attempted to be alleged in the complaint, Schmidt v.



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Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980). (ER 5:8-14); see also Cafasso,

637 F.3d at 1059 (Rule 8(a) has been held to be violated by a pleading that was

needlessly long, or a complaint that was highly repetitious, or confused, or

consisted of incomprehensible rambling.).

The rationale for such dismissals has been explained by this Court as

follows:

Prolix, confusing complaints impose unfair burdenson litigants and judges. As a practical matter, the judgeand opposing counsel, in order to perform their

responsibilities, cannot use [the] complaint and must

prepare outlines to determine who is being sued for what.

Defendants are then put at risk that their outline differs

from the judges, that plaintiffs will surprise them withsomething new at trial which they reasonably did not

understand to be in the case at all, and that res judicata

effects of settlement or judgment will be different fromwhat they reasonably expected.

The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the

short and plain statement which Rule 8 obligated

plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the litigation

without knowing what claims are made against whom.This leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials,

prejudicing litigants in other case who follow the rules,

as well as defendants in the case in which the prolix

pleading is filed. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80.

Moreover, [t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8

does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit. Rule

8[(d)(1)], requiring each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct,



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applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of

Rule 12(b)(6). [Citations]. Id.at 1179.

The operative pleading in this action contains anything but a short and plain

statement of each claim, or simple, concise, and direct allegations. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). The FAC totals 251 pages in length, and roughly1,550

pages with all of its voluminous exhibits, and sets forth in excess of 1,200

numbered allegations. While verbosity alone is ordinarily not a basis for

dismissing an action under Rule 8, like the pleadings at issue in the authorities

referenced above, the FAC is unquestionably argumentative, confusing, and almost

entirely conclusory.

The general charge in the FAC is that nearly 60 defendants, consisting of

judicial officers and state judicial branch entities, the Bar Association, the San

Diego County Sheriff, the County, the City, the District Attorney, health care

professionals, and family law attorneys and firms, all conspired against Stuart to

deprive him of his fundamental rights. Yet, it is impossible to determine from the

FAC what each defendants role was in this alleged conspiracy, the manner in

which each defendant participated in the conspiracy, and what claims Appellants

assert arise from each defendants conduct.

Because the FAC requires the defendants and the district court to penetrate

a tome approaching the magnitude ofWar and Peace to discern [the] plaintiffs



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claims and allegations[,] Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058, and to try to fish a gold

coin from a bucket of mud[,] Lockheed-Martin, 328 F.3d at 378, the district court

properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the action on Rule 8 grounds.8

3. The District Court Did Consider And Properly Apply The RelevantFactors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b).

Appellants also argue that the district court erred by failing to consider the

requisite factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 20-21.)

Appellants reason that because the district court did not specifically reference Rule

41(b), the district court therefore did not analyze the relevant factors for its

application. (AOB 20.) Not only did the district court address such factors, but the

findings relating thereto are correct.

A district courts dismissal under Rule 41(b) should not be disturbed unless

there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error

of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.

8 Appellants also assert that Rule 8 was satisfied because the FAC contains

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

(AOB 21-30); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Simplyput, a conspiracy by and between the entire Family Law Community to depriveStuart of his fundamental rights is implausible. Indeed, the district court foundcertain of Appellants allegations to be so implausible as to be offensive. (ER

8:1.) Moreover, the assertion of legal conclusions cast in the form of factualallegations, as is the case here, is insufficient to establish a plausible claim.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,

339 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2003); (see also Doc. 45 at 14-17, adopted byreference under Fed. R. App. P. 28(i).)



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Schmidt, 614 F.2d at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leon v. IDX

Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006). Such factors consist of (1) the

publics interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the courts need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

alternatives. (Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).

A dismissal should be affirmed where at least four factors support

dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is preferred, it is not required that

the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has considered

these factors and [this Court] may review the record independently to determine if

the district court abused its discretion. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly found that at least four of the foregoing factors

favors dismissal of the action with prejudice. (ER 10-11.) The district courts

order first addressed the risk of prejudice to the defendants, noting that the

defendants face the onerous task of combing through [plaintiffs lengthy

complaint] just to prepare an answer that admits or denies such allegations and to

determine what claims and allegations must be defended or otherwise litigated.

(ER 10:27-11:3 (quoting Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1059).)



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The district court next found that plaintiffs noncompliance [with Rule 8]

harms litigants in other matters pending before the court[,] which corresponds to

the public interest and docket management factors. (ER 11:3-4.) The district court

aptly noted that [f]ederal judges have better things to do [than try to fish a gold

coin from a bucket of mud], and the substantial subsidy of litigation (court costs do

not begin to cover the expense of the judiciary) should be targeted on those

litigants who take the preliminary steps to assemble a comprehensible claim.

(ER 11:4-10 (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d at 378).) The district

court also appropriately observed that [d]istrict judges are busy, and therefore

have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it imposes an undue burden

on the judge to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the judges attention. (ER

11 n.6 (quotingKadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013)).)

Lastly, the district court addressed the issue of whether further leave to

amend should be granted, which relates to the availability of less drastic

alternatives. (ER 11:12-20.) Because Appellants were previously granted leave to

amend, and their amended submission [was] even more unmanageable than the

original, the district court found that Appellants demonstrated an inability or

unwillingness to file a Rule 8-compliant pleading and thus denied leave to amend.

(ER 11.) Based on the foregoing, four of the five factors weigh in favor of



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dismissal of the action with prejudice.9 The Court therefore should affirm the

district courts dismissal of the action with prejudice under Rule 41(b).

4. The Involuntary Dismissal Was Supported With Or Without The

District Courts Prior Order On The Original Complaint.

Appellants also take aim at the district courts order dismissing the original

complaint and contend the violation thereof cannot support an involuntary

dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 19-20.) According to Appellants, instead of

moving to dismiss the original complaint, the Superior Court Defendants should

have moved for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). (AOB 29.) While

such a motion may have been available, a motion to dismiss for failure to comply

with Rule 8 was also appropriate. Hearns, 530 F.3d a 1129; Nevijel, 651 F.2d at

673.

Although Appellants may disagree with the district courts conclusion that

the original complaint did not comply with Rule 8, the district court specifically

identified the pleadings deficiencies and provided Appellants leave to amend.

(ER 41-49.) Given Appellants elected to amend their complaint and included

every claim from their original complaint in the FAC, Appellants cannot now be

heard to complain about the district courts order on the original complaint. Lacey

9 The lone factor arguably weighing against dismissal is the general policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits. This factor, by itself, however, is

not sufficient to outweigh the other four factors. Leon, 464 F.3d at 961-62(internal quotation marks omitted).



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v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (recognizing the

general rule that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint and

renders it without legal effect).

Appellants argument concerning the propriety of an involuntary dismissal

based on the district courts December 23, 2013 order also ignores the express

language of Rule 41(b). Under Rule 41(b), dismissal is warranted for failure to

comply with a court order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,

notwithstanding their failure to adhere to the district courts original dismissal

order, Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8 alone warranted the involuntary

dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b).

B. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY BARS ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT

OF STUARTS DISSOLUTION AND CRIMINALPROCEEDINGS

A long line of [the Supreme Courts] precedents acknowledge that,

generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.10 Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). Judicial immunity applies even where a judge

is accused of acting in bad faith, maliciously, corruptly, or erroneously. Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court

recognized that it was a general principle of the highest importance to the proper

10 Ninth Circuit jurisprudence has also recognized that judicial immunity

extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. Moore v.Brewster,96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996).



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administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in

him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of

personal consequences to himself.11 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bradley v.

Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 351 (1872)).

The only two instances in which immunity is overcome is where the judge

acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, [citation], or performs an act that is not

judicial in nature. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. The factors relevant in

determining whether an act is judicial relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,

whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of

the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362); see also Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11.

In connection with the original complaint, the district court dismissed with

prejudice Stuarts claims against the defendant judges for damages arising out of

judicial acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4 (citingAshelman,

11 The Supreme Court further recognized: Liability to answer to every one

who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistentwith the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without

which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. As observed by a

distinguished English judge, it would establish the weakness of judicial authorityin a degrading responsibility. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.



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793 F.2d at 1075).) Although Appellants effectively ignored the district courts

ruling and asserted the same claims in their FAC, as well as additional claims

against judicial officers arising out of allegedly non-immune acts, (see ER 177-

78, 350; ER 270-71, 831-838), Appellants criticize the district courts

dismissal of claims based on judicial immunity. (AOB 34-48.)

Appellants argue that (1) Ashelman, which was cited by the district court,

and Sparkman were both wrongly decided, (AOB 46-51, 53-58, 62-63); (2) the

district court improperly expanded the immunity recognized in Ashelman, (AOB

52-53); (3) the district court failed to perform a historical analysis to determine

whether there is any federal common law immunity for judges, (AOB 43-46); and

(4) that family law judges, in particular, have no common law immunity, (AOB

58-62). Each of Appellants assertions is without merit.

1. Ashelmanand SparkmanAre Binding Precedent In This Circuit.

In Ashelman, the issue before an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit was

whether a judge and prosecutor are immune from damages in a civil rights action

charging them with conspiracy to predetermine the outcome of the judicial

proceedings. 793 F.2d at 1074. In light of policy considerations favor[ing] a

liberal application of immunity[,] the en banc panel held that [a]s long as the

judges ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the courts subject matter

jurisdiction, immunity applies. Id.at 1078. While clearly improper, the Court



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concluded that a conspiracy between a judge and prosecutor to predetermine the

outcome of a judicial proceeding does not pierce the immunity extended to

judges and prosecutors. Id.

Appellants accuse the en banc panel in Ashelman of misapplying and

expanding Sparkman, (AOB 36-40, 41-45), and go so far as to claim that the

Supreme Court overstepped the limits of Article III jurisdiction in Sparkman by

finding the doctrine of judicial immunity applicable to section 1983 actions, (AOB

39-40). In other words, Appellants ask that this Court reconsider the wisdom of

the en banc panels decision in Ashelman and the Supreme Courts ruling in

Sparkman.

While Appellants may disagree with the holdings in Ashelman and

Sparkman, it is well-settled that published Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court

decisions are binding precedent in this circuit. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,

1171 (9th Cir. 2001). Once a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion,

the matter is deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc,

or by the Supreme Court. Id. Given Ashelman is the law in this circuit, and

Sparkman the law of the land, Appellants request that this Court ignore such

precedent, revive earlier case law expressly abrogated in Ashelman, and invoke

case law from other circuits, is misplaced.



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Notwithstanding the precedential value of Ashelman and Sparkman, the

grounds for Appellants attack on these decisions are equally devoid of merit.

According to Appellants, Ashelmans consideration of the precise act to

determine whether judicial immunity applies was rejected by Sparkman. (AOB

45-46.) Nothing in Sparkman rejected consideration of the precise act or

ultimate act for purposes of applying judicial immunity. To the contrary, the

first factor identified by the Supreme Court relate[s] to the nature ofthe actitself,

i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge[.] Sparkman, 435

U.S. at 362 (emphasis added) (applying judicial immunity to judges ex parte

approval of a minors sterilization).

Appellants criticism ofSparkman and Ashelman on Article III grounds is

also unavailing. (SeeAOB 40, 49.) Appellants effectively assert that the scope of

judicial immunity recognized in Sparkman and Ashelman did not exist in federal

common law and was therefore abolished by Congress with the adoption of section

1983.

In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Supreme Court expressly held

that the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable to section 1983 actions. 386

U.S. at 555, overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800

(1982); Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Indeed, in

1872, the Supreme Court held that judicial immunity applies however erroneous



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the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have

proved to the plaintiff. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347. The only requirements for

judicial immunity reflected inBradley, and repeated in Sparkmanand Ashelman, is

that the character of the act be judicial, and that the act was within the jurisdiction

of the judicial officer. 80 U.S. at 347, 351. Appellants attack on well-settled

Supreme Court authorities is therefore not well taken and should be rejected.

2. The District Court Correctly Applied Circuit Precedent.

In its December 23, 2013 order, the district court dismissed with prejudice

those claims for damages against the defendant judges arising out of judicial acts

within the jurisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4.) While Appellants may

disagree with the law, this is a correct recitation of the doctrine of judicial

immunity under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.

Appellants seem to fault the district court for not identifying any particular

claims that are barred by judicial immunity.12 (AOB 34.) Although the district

courts order does not cite to the specific claims to which judicial immunity

12 Appellants also attack the scope of judicial immunity outlined by the districtcourt at the hearing on the Superior Court Defendants original motion to dismiss.

(AOB 34-35.) Where the record includes both oral and written rulings on thesame matter, [the Court] review[s] the written opinion and not the oral statements.

PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2004). Appellants

apparent request for review of the district courts oral remarks is thereforemisplaced.



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applies,13 the district courts order identifies the two events on which the original

complaint was based the so-called assault at the Bar Association seminar and

Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding. (ER 42:18-44:25.) The Superior Court

Defendants motion papers also show that judicial immunity was being raised as to

any claims challenging allegedly unlawful rulings and decisions in the

Dissolution Proceeding. (SER 50:25-51:5; SER 144, n.4.) Because the defendant

judges are clearly immune from such claims, the Court should affirm the district

courts dismissal of such claims with prejudice.

3. The Recycled Claims In The FAC Concerning Stuarts Dissolution

Proceeding, As Well As The New Claims Relating To People v.

Stuart, Are Also Barred By Judicial Immunity.

Despite the district courts dismissal of the claims arising out of the judicial

decisions in Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding, Count 11 of the FAC continues to

assert claims against Judges Wohlfeil and Schall relating to their conduct in that

matter. (ER 270-71, 831-838.) Count 3 of the FAC also adds new claims

arising out of allegedly non-immune acts against Judge Groch, who presided

over the trial inPeople v. Stuart. (ER 177-78, 350; ER 205-06, 491-97.)

In both cases, the FAC fails to identify any acts outside the scope of judicial

immunity. The allegations that these judicial officers acted in bad faith,

13 Given Appellants utter failure to comply with Rule 8, particularly their

failure to connect their scant factual allegations to causes of action, it isunderstandable why the district court did not do so.



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maliciously, corruptly, or erroneously, or the legal conclusion that their acts were

not judicial, has no impact on the application of judicial immunity. Mireles, 502

U.S. at 11; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Given the acts about which Appellants

complain occurred during Stuarts encounter with Judges Wohlfeil, Schall, and

Groch solely in their judicial capacities, judicial immunity supports the dismissal

of the claims relating to Stuarts divorce and criminal proceedings.

4. No Historical Analysis Of Judicial Immunity Was Necessary.

Appellants next suggest that the district court erred because the Superior

Court Defendants proffered, and the district court undertook, no historical analysis

of whether judicial defendants asserting immunities were performing functions

immune at common law in 1871 both merely citing toAshelman. (AOB 35-36.)

Once again, Appellants ignore the precedential effect of prior decisions of this

circuit and the Supreme Court. After performing a historical analysis, the Supreme

Court, as recognized in Ashelman, has already held that judicial immunity existed

under federal common law and was not abolished in 1871 by 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347;

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Appellants historical analysis argument is therefore

without merit.



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5. Family Law Judges Are Also Afforded Judicial Immunity.

Finally, Appellants contend that family court judges are not entitled to

judicial immunity on the ground that courts did not have jurisdiction over divorces

and child custody matters in 1871. (AOB 46-48.) Appellants also assert any

immunity granted to such judgments does not apply to judicial acts performed

maliciously or corruptly because of the inferior status of family courts. (AOB

48.) Neither assertion has any merit.

It is well-established that judicial immunity applies to judges in divorce

proceedings. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, (9th Cir. 2001) (finding

superior court judge absolutely immune in action under the American with

Disabilities Act arising out of judges failure to accommodate plaintiffs hearing

impairment during dissolution proceeding); Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879, 880-

81 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming dismissal of section 1983 action against superior

court judge based on court order excluding plaintiff from the family home); see

also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1158-59

(9th Cir. 1986) (applying quasi-judicial immunity to family court employees that

mediate custody and visitation disputes).

In Bradley, the Supreme Court held that judges of courts of superior or

general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when

such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done



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maliciously or corruptly. 80 U.S. at 351. Bradley did not recognize any

exception for malicious or corrupt acts of judges of limited and inferior

authority. (See AOB 48.) To the contrary, the Supreme Court held that any such

limitation was not a a correct statement of the law. 80 U.S. at 351. Indeed, [i]t

is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law

should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently

and freely, without favor and without fear. Id. at 349 n.16 (internal quotation

marks omitted). An exception to judicial immunity for malicious or corrupt

motives would subject judges to the same vexatious litigation that the doctrine

was designed to prevent. Id.at 354. Judges presiding over family law matters are

therefore entitled to the same protections granted under the doctrine of judicial

immunity.14

C. THE DISTRICT COURTS JUDGMENT MAY BE AFFIRMED

ON NUMEROUS OTHER GROUNDS

In addition to Rule 8 and judicial immunity, the Judicial Defendants moved

to dismiss the

Documents

51-1 Judicial Defendants' Answering Brief