53672142 Case Doctrines Rem2

8/13/2019 53672142 Case Doctrines Rem2

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Provisional Remedies

Preliminary Attachment(Mangila vs CA)Preliminary attachment has 3 stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, thewrit of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. Forthe initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be firstobtained. owever, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have ac!uired

jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authori ty to act inany manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the "ourt will not bind the defendant.

(Chuidian vs Sandiganbayan)#upervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview ofthis particular rule.

$hen the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant%s cause ofaction, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with#ection &' of the same rule

(Du vs Stronghold Insurance)A levy on e(ecution duly registered ta)es preference over a prior unregistered sale; and that even if theprior sale is subse!uently registered before the sale in e(ecution but after the levy was duly made, thevalidity of the e(ecution sale should be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise,the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory.

(Wenceslao vs Readycon Trading)*f the applicant for a preliminary attachment is found by the court to be entitled as such, then no damagesmay be recovered by adverse party resulting from such attachment.

+he attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachmentwrit by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other.

oreover, the filing of a counter-bond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciouslysought out by the attaching party creditor instead of the other way, which in most instances li)e in thepresent case, would re!uire presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easilybe settled in a pending incident of the case.

Preliminary *njunction(Idolor vs CA)*njunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. efore aninjunction can be issued, it is essential that the following re!uisites be present: &/ there must be a right inesse or the e(istence of a right to be protected; '/ the act against which the injunction is to be directed isa violation of such right. ence the e(istence of a right violated, is a prere!uisite to the granting of aninjunction. *njunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either thee(istence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction orthat the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends toendanger the e(istence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. +he controllingreason for the e(istence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent athreatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughlyinvestigated and advisedly adjudicated. *t is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity toavoid injurious conse!uences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. *t is alwaysa ground for denying injunction that the party see)ing it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, andno claim to the ultimate relief sought 0filed beyond redemption period/. +he possibility of irreparabledamage without proof of actual e(isting right is not aground for an injunction.

( ustilo vs Real)$e do not see how the complainant%s e(ercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violatethe right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order 1to maintainthe status !uo.1 $e see no reason to disagree with the finding of the 2"A that the evident purpose of thesecond + 2 was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the 4iga ng mga arangay.

(!WWA vs Chave")+he status !uo should be that e(isting at the time of the filing of the case. +he status !uo usuallypreserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which precededthe actual controversy. +he status !uo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is e(isting atthe time of the filing of the case. *ndubitably, the trial court must not ma)e use of its injunctive power toalter such status. $hat is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ can not be effectuatedto establish new relations between the parties.

(#imitless Potential vs CA)

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alice or lac) of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. +his must be so, because tore!uire malice as a prere!uisite would ma)e the filing of a bond a useless formality. +he dissolution of theinjunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that theinjunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues.+hus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because ofpetitioner5s main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon thebond.

+he injunction bond is answerable for all damages suffered by reason only of the issuance of the writ

eceivership(Sy $ong %u vs CA)

eceivership, which is admittedly a harsh remedy, should be granted with e(treme caution. #ound basestherefor must appear on record, and there should be a clear showing of its necessity. +he need for areceivership in the case under consideration can be gleaned from the aforecited dis!uisition by the "ourtof Appeals finding that the properties of the partnership were in danger of being damaged or lost onaccount of certain acts of the appointed manager in li!uidation.

(#arrobis vs Phil &eterans 'an )$hen a ban) is prohibited from continuing to do business by the "entral an) and a receiver is appointedfor such ban), that ban) would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept newdeposits. owever, the receiver of the ban) is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the ban), whichdebts form part of the assets of the ban). +he receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligationof the ban) under receivership, and ta)e steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, thereceiver of the ban) is obliged to collect pre-e(isting debts due to the ban), and in connection therewith,

to foreclose mortgages securing such debts. ence, Prescription will still run against the ban) underreceivership.

A ban) is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. owever, the ban) may go after the receiverwho is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the assets of such ban) and to safeguardits assets.

(Aguilar vs Manila 'an ing)esides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners5 position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their

obligation when respondent was placed under receivership. $hen a ban) is placed under receivership, itwould only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new loans or to accept new deposits.

owever, the receiver of the ban) is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the ban), which debts formpart of the assets of the ban). +hus, petitioners5 obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondentwas placed under receivership. +he respondents5 receivership is an e(traneous circumstance and has noeffect on petitioners5 obligation.

eplevin(!rosa vs CA)*f recovery of personal property is not possible, the applicant may recover its e!uivalent in money.

($ang vs &alde")+he provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who see)simmediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. *tsuffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of #ection ', ule 67, 1entitledto the possession thereof.1

ence, after defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception of the service ofsummons and a copy of the order of replevin on 8anuary 9, & ed to represent +homas =ang. From then on defendantshould have been on guard as to the provision of #ection 6, ule 67 of the ules of "ourt: the five 0ed in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches andsei>ures or its accepted e(ceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis.As the "ourt said in +amisin v. 2dejar, 1A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and issubjected to the official custody of a judicial e(ecutive officer in pursuance of his e(ecution of a legal writ.12nly when property is lawfully ta)en by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law,and not otherwise.

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#upport(De Asis vs CA)+he right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Future supportcannot be the subject of a compromise. +he agreement entered into between the petitioner andrespondent%s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon thedismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. *t violatesthe prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

(Peo le vs Manahan)2n the matter of ac)nowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a !uo isin order. Article 3?< of +he evised Penal "ode provides that persons guilty of rape shall also besentenced to 1ac)nowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so,1 and 1in everycase to support the offspring.1 *n the case before us, compulsory ac)nowledgment of the child elanie+ibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is amarried man. As pronounced by this "ourt in People v. @uerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a marriedman, he cannot be compelled to recogni>e the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child,whether legitimate or illegitimate.1 "onse!uently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordinglydeleted. *n any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordancewith law.

(#o e" vs CA)n passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not without remedy. For as what he

see)s to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he can file a motion with the trialcourt for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes final.

S ecial Civil Action

*nterpleader(+ternal ardens vs IAC)Bnder the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner%s objections to the depositof the amounts in litigation after having as)ed for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaintfor interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only re!uired by the nature of the actionbut is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the 4and Cevelopment Program. As correctlyobserved by the "ourt of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest inthe property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds incontroversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and e!uity: Dthat the plaintiff may not continueto benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the e(pense ofwhoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.E

(Wac ,-ac ol. / Country vs #ee Won)+he remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and ha>ard of two ormore actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with )nowledge of all the facts,neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to ta)e the chances for success in the actions at law, oughtto submit to the conse!uences of defeat. +o permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successfulplaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shouldersof others the burden which he as)s may be ta)en from his own.

(Mesina vs IAC)"onsidering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent ban) merely too) the necessaryprecaution not to ma)e a mista)e as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. *thas been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by respondent ban) because petitioner and 8ose @owere both laying their claims on the chec), petitioner as)ing payment thereon and 8ose @o as thepurchaser or owner. an) filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because petitioneris laying claim to the same chec) that @o is claiming. 2n the very day that the ban) instituted the case ininterpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by thefact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated an) vs. 8ose @o and 8ohn Coe, but later onchanged to arcelo A. esina for 8ohn Coe when his name became )nown to respondent ban).

Ceclaratory elief (&elarde vs S0S)+he essential re!uisites: 0&/ there is a justiciable controversy; 0'/ the controversy is between personswhose interests are adverse; 03/ the party see)ing the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and0?/ the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

*n special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actionsdoes not strictly apply. +he reason for this e(ception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposesthat there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.

evertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

(Tambunting vs Sumabat)

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$here the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratoryrelief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. *n other words, a court has no more

jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., hasalready been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Bnder such circumstances,inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothingmore for the court to e(plain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. ence prescription would stillrun

(Almeda vs 'athala M tg)e!uisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: &/ the subject matter of the controversy must be

a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, e(ecutive order or regulation, or ordinance; '/the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and re!uire judicial construction; 3/there must have been no breach of the documents in !uestion; ?/ there must be an actual justiciablecontroversy or the Dripening seedsE of one between persons whose interests are adverse;


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rroneous inferences of fact or conclusions of law are correctable by certiorari only if they are of such adegree as to amount to a clear case of abuse of discretion of the grave and malevolent )ind.

(Tua"on vs Register o. Deeds o. Caloocan)+hese acts may thus be properly struc) down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in theperformance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or ine(cess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. #ince r. arcos was never vested with judicialpower, such power, as everyone )nows, being vested in the #upreme "ourt and such inferior courts asmay be established by law, the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputablyperpetrated without jurisdiction. +he acts were completely alien to his office as chief e(ecutive, and utterlybeyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial lawregime.

(Torres vs Aguinaldo)y grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical e(ercise of judgment as is e!uivalent

to lac) of jurisdiction. +he abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is e(ercised in anarbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and grossas to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or toact at all in contemplation of law.

andamus(#icaros vs Sandiganbayan)

andamus is a proper recourse for citi>ens who see) to enforce a public right and to compel theperformance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the "onstitution. +o reiterate, the rightof the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law.

"orrelatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the "onstitution, to speedily dispose ofthe case before it. +hus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the "onstitution,e(peditious action from all officials who are tas)ed with the administration of justice.

*deally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a discretionaryduty. ore specifically, persons or public officials may be directed to act with or to e(ercise discretion, butnot as to how that discretion should be e(ercised. owever, our jurisprudence is replete with e(ceptions inthis matter. +hus, it has been held that in a case where there is 1gross abuse of discretion, manifestinjustice or palpable e(cess of authority,1 the writ may be issued to control precisely the e(ercise of suchdiscretion.

(2P 'oard o. Regents vs #igot,Telan)andamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the

petitioner being re!uired. *t is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty re!uiresthe e(ercise of discretion or judgment.

(#acson vs Pere")$hen there are surfeit of other remedies which can be availed of, prohibition and mandamus areimproper.

*t is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to theperformance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. andamuswill not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award

Juo $arranto(Calle3a vs Panday)#ection &0a/ of ule 66 of the present ules no longer contains the phrase 1or an office in a corporationcreated by authority of law1 which was found in the old ules. "learly, the present ule 66 only applies toactions of !uo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officerswho forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporateddespite the passage of .A. o. 9 . *t is, therefore, +he *nterim ules of Procedure @overning *ntra-"orporate "ontroversies Bnder .A. o. 9 0hereinafter the *nterim ules/ which applies to the petitionfor !uo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being !uestioned is the authorityof herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of #t. 8ohn

ospital, *ncorporated.

(Mendo"a vs Allas)2rdinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. +hisrule, however, is not applicable in !uo warranto cases. A judgment in !uo warranto does not bind therespondent%s successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. +hisfollows from the nature of the writ of !uo warranto itself. *t is never directed to an officer as such, butalways against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authori>ed to performany act in, or e(ercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. *n the case at bar, the petition for!uo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. $hat was threshed out before thetrial court was the !ualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent ay

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Allas, not against @odofredo 2lores. +he "ourt of Appeals did not err in denying e(ecution of the trialcourt%s decision.

(propriation(City o. Manila vs Serrano)+hus, a writ of possession may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint fore(propriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amounte!uivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to e(propriation. Bpon compliance with thesere!uirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. *n this case, these re!uirementswere satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession.

(*AP!C!R vs CA)2rdinarily, the dismissal of the e(propriation case restores possession of the e(propriated land to thelandowner. owever, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it isneither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner isto demand payment of just compensation. +he Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to

P". Pobre has completely lost the Property as if P" had physically ta)en over the entire 6 , 6 s!uare-meter Property.

+his case ceased to be an action for e(propriation when P" dismissed its complaint for e(propriation.#ince this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the ules of"ourt on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial beforecommissioners, for instance, was dispensable. $e have held that the usual procedure in the determinationof just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural re!uirements.

P"%s ta)ing of Pobre%s property without filing the appropriate e(propriation proceedings and paying him

just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process.

(Re ublic vs Phil,&ille Dev4)+o stress, payment of just compensation is not a condition sine !ua non to the issuance of an order ofe(propriation. *n e(propriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land e(propriated that mustwait until the indemnity is actually paid.

(Re ublic vs Andaya)1+a)ing,1 in the e(ercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actuallydeprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is apractical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.

Foreclosure of eal state ortgage(Dayot vs Shell Chemical)+he obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an e(tra-judicialforeclosure sale of a mortgaged property ceases to be ministerial once it is shown that there is a thirdparty in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor and that suchthird party is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the e(-parte writ of possession wasapplied for.

(Service-ide S ecialist vs CA)+he mortgagor must be impleaded in a replevin suit for recovery of mortgaged property and not just thepossessor. ortgagee must establish a clear right first before he may be entitled to possession ofproperty and this is only possible when mortgagor is impleaded. ence, the mortgagor is an indispensableparty.

(2nion'an vs CA)*t is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased ifit is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. "onsolidation too) placeas a matter of right since there was no redemption of the foreclosed property. otice to the mortgagors,and with more reason, to private respondents who are not even parties to the mortgage contract nor tothe e(tra judicial sale, is not necessary.

(Ardiente vs Provincial Sheri..)*t is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in e(tra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is notnecessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.

('PI vs &eloso)ona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price,

otherwise the rule on the redemption period fi(ed by law can easily be circumvented. *n order to effect aredemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of thefollowing: 0&/ the price which the purchaser paid for the property; 0'/ interest of &K per month on thepurchase price; 03/ the amount of any assessments or ta(es which the purchaser may have paid on theproperty after the purchase; and 0?/ interest of &K per month on such assessments and ta(es.

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edemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a !uestion of payment or validtender of the full redemption price within said period.

Partition(%eirs o. Teves vs CA)

very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemedto be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an e(change, a compromise, or any othertransaction.

Forcible ntry and Bnlawful Cetainer(C R Cor vs Treyes)An independent action may be filed for actions for damages arising from incidents occurring afterdispossession

(#arano vs Calendacion)*n unlawful detainer, ' re!uisites must be present: 0a/ there must be failure to pay the installment due orcomply with the conditions of the "ontract to #ell; and 0b/ there must be demand both to pay or tocomply and vacate within the periods specified in #ection ' of ule 97.

(Raymundo vs 'andong)2nly possession is the issue in an ejectment suit

(Re.ugia vs CA)An ejectment suit is limited only to the issue of possession, even when appealed to the +"

(0avelosa vs CA)+he issue of ownership is different from the issue of possession, hence, the filing of a case before the +"!uestioning ownership does not preclude the filing before the +" of an ejectment suit !uestioningpossession.

"ontempt(0udge +s anol vs 5ormoso)A person accused of indirect contempt may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, andan opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel

(Montenegro vs Montenegro)$hen the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeitbelatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time, the penalty of imprisonment may nolonger be imposed despite the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioner5s absence.

(Sison vs Caoibes 0r4)"ontempt is improper if issued against a person that has no interest or relation to a case, especially ifsuch person is not a party to the case.

($asay vs Recto)"ontempt parta)es of the nature of a criminal offense. +he e(oneration of the contemner from the chargeamounts to an ac!uittal from which an appeal would not lie.

S ecial Proceedings

#ettlement of states(De #eon vs CA)A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon !uestions of titleprovisionally. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they shouldor should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. *fthere is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort toan ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate courtcannot do so.

(&alarao vs Pascual)$hether the probate court e(ercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is amatter left entirely to its sound discretion as to how to appoint an administrator. As to possession, the lawe(plicitly authori>es him to ta)e possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he doesso to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. "learly, the special administratorenjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but theprimary and independent discretion of )eeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.Partisan possession e(ercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutralpossession of a special administrator under the ules of "ourt.

(2nion 'an vs Santibane")

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+hus, in e(ecuting any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an e(tra-judicial partition, asin the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdictionover that part of the estate. +he money claim must be filed against the decedent5s estate in the probatecourt. +he rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of theproperty to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. +he law strictly re!uires the prompt presentation anddisposition of the claims against the decedent%s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon aspossible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim withthe probate court, at most, it may only go after dmund as co-ma)er of the decedent under the saidpromissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses dmund may have asagainst the petitioner.

(0amero vs *elicor)+he appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the +" and non-appealable. owever, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the +" committed graveabuse of discretion or lac) of or in e(cess of jurisdiction.

(#ee vs RTC o. 6C)+he sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probateor intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.

(+state o. Rui" vs CA)@randchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent%s estate. +he lawclearly limits the allowance to 1widow and children1 and does not e(tend it to the deceased%sgrandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

(San #uis vs San #uis)+he word 1resides1 should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual orphysical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. *t signifies physical presence in a placeand actual stay thereat. *n this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personalresidence, not legal residence or domicile. esidence simply re!uires bodily presence as an inhabitant in agiven place, while domicile re!uires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to ma)e it one5sdomicile. o particular length of time of residence is re!uired though; however, the residence must bemore than temporary. , there is a distinction between 1residence1 for purposes of election laws and1residence1 for purposes of fi(ing the venue of actions.

(Pila il vs %eirs o. Ma7imino 'riones)*t should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding inrem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for thehearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the e(istence ofthe proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.

scheats(Alvarico vs Sola)

ven assuming that respondent Amelita #ola ac!uired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the#tate can institute reversion proceedings under #ec. &7& of the Public 4and Act. *n other words, a privateindividual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling afree patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the landcovered thereby will again form part of the public domain.

(Caro vs Sucaldito)eversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land bac) to

the government under the egalian doctrine. "onsidering that the land subject of the action originatedfrom a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. *n thiscase, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

@uardianship(Cani"a vs CA)$hile it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminatedby the death of the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the stradas. +hat action, notbeing a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have ta)en her place and now represent herinterests in the appeal at bar.

( oyena vs #edesma, ustilo)*n the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with theparties.

Adoption(Cang vs CA)

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*t would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount considerationin deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. +here should be a holisticapproach to the matter, ta)ing into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social andspiritual needs of the child. +hat a husband is not e(actly an upright man is not, strictly spea)ing, asufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.+he discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the childbut li)ewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

(In the matter o. ado tion o. Ste hanie *athy Astorga arcia)*t is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed tocarry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. +he interests and welfare of the adopted child are ofprimary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained topromote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. ence, since there is no lawprohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, li)e #tephanie, to use, as middle name hermother5s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

(Re ublic vs CA / Caranto)As to the correction of name, the trial court erred in upholding the same for failure to abide the procedureprovided under ule &7 , ules of "ourt. $hile there was notice given by publication in this case, it wasnotice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with ule , sec. ?. *n that notice only the prayerfor adoption of the minor was stated. othing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name inthe civil registry was also being sought. +he local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,conse!uently, of the opportunity to be heard. 0+his rule has now been abandoned/

(Re ublic vs %ernande")

+he creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change theadoptee%s registered "hristian or first name. +he automatic change thereof, premised solely upon theadoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. either is it a mere incident in noran adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition foradoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. 0+his rule has now been abandoned/

(&da de 0acob vs CA)+he burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. +his

espondent Pilapil failed to do. oreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the allegedadoption is a sham.

abeas "orpus0*llusorio vs ildner/

abeas "orpus is not available to the wife to secure the custody of her husband, who voluntary chose notto cohabit with her.

0#erapio vs #andiganbayan/A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one%s right to bail. *t cannot beavailed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court andthe latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even e(ercised saiddiscretion. +he proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case ispending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. +he issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not onlybe unjustified but would also preempt the #andiganbayan%s resolution of the pending application for bail ofpetitioner. +he recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

04acson vs Pere>/+he issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is torelieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

0Pulido vs Abu/owever, for filing a Petition for abeas "orpus despite the pendency of the Petition for "ertiorari that

!uestioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition forabeas "orpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. As lucidly e(plained by the "ourt of Appeals, the

ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of@on>ales and esa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for abeas "orpus because the relief he issee)ing therein is the same relief he is as)ing for in the certiorari case. oreover, the main issue in bothcases boils down to whether @on>ales and esa should be released on bail. ecause of the presence ofthe elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the sameLsimilar in the twocases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case 1petitioner is thusguilty of forum shopping.

0#angca vs "ity Prosecutor of "ebu "ity/$hen the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a $rit of abeas "orpus was filed iseffected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.

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$rit if Amparo and abeas Cata0"anlas vs AP*"2 omeowners/+heir claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and e(ecutory judgmentadverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. +here is, therefore, no legal basisfor the issuance of the writ of amparo. esides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners5 claim to the landin !uestion is not alleged in the petition at all. +he "ourt can only surmise that these rights and interesthad already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. o writ of amparo may be issuedunless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to beprotected.

0+apu> vs del osario/+he writ is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as ane(traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing ules, or as a remedysupplemental to these ules. $hat it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property orcommercial. either is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

"hange of ame0 leosida vs 4ocal "ivil egistrar of J"/*f the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted issummary. *f the rectification affects the civil status, citi>enship or nationality of a party, it is deemedsubstantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. ven substantial errors in a civil registry maybe corrected and the true facts established under ule &7 provided the parties aggrieved by the erroravail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding isone where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properlydeveloped, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party%s case,

and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

0 epublic vs Gho/$hile the jurisdictional re!uirements of ule &73 0which governs petitions for change of name/ were notcomplied with, observance of the provisions of ule &7 suffices to effect the correction sought for. +hemista)e is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to theunderstanding.

0Gilosbayan Foundation vs rmita/o substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order,

and, under the law, a change in citi>enship status is a substantial change. #ubstantial corrections to thenationality or citi>enship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through apetition filed in court under ule &7 of the ules of "ourt, not under A 7? .

0 epublic vs "apote/A proceeding is adversarial where the party see)ing relief has given legal warning to the other party andafforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. +he fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprivethe court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it ma)e the proceeding less adversarial in nature.

(Petition .or change o. name o. 0ulian lim Carulason Wang)*n the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name isconvenience. owever, how such change of name would ma)e his integration into #ingaporean societyeasier and convenient is not clearly established. +hat the continued use of his middle name would causeconfusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registeredcomplete name. *n addition, petitioner is only a minor. "onsidering the nebulous foundation on which hispetition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his

judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.

(Ceruilla vs Delantar)All matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date ofbirth, fall under ule &7 of the ules of "ourt which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the"ivil egistry. +hus, the petition filed by the "eruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as havingbeen falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to #ection 30c/, ule & and ule&7 of the ules of "ourt. #ummons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with

jurisdiction, but to comply with the re!uirements of fair play and due process.

+vidence

Preliminary "onsiderations(Peo le vs 5etalino)+he evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to thestatements made in open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements ofthe witnesses, and other supporting evidence. *n every case, the court should review, assess and weighthe totality of the evidence presented by the parties.

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(!ng Chia vs Re ublic)+he rule on formal offer of evidence 0 ule &3', sec. 3?/ now being invo)ed by petitioner is clearly notapplicable to the present case involving a petition for naturali>ation. +he only instance when said rulesmay be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is 1practicable and convenient.1 encethe acceptance of additional evidence by the appellate court does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

(Peo le vs &alde")*t is a matter of judicial e(perience that an affidavit, being ta)en e(-parte, is almost always incompleteand often inaccurate. +o be sure, a sworn statement ta)en e( parte is generally considered to be inferiorto a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross e(amination.

(8ulueta vs CA)+he constitutional injunction declaring 1the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable1is no less applicable simply because it is the wife 0who thin)s herself aggrieved by her husband%s infidelity/who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. +he only e(ception to theprohibition in the "onstitution is if there is a 1lawful order Hfrom aI court or when public safety or orderre!uires otherwise, as prescribed by law.1 2ne thing is freedom of communication; !uite another is acompulsion for each one to share what one )nows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the dutyof fidelity that each owes to the other.

(Peo le vs $atar)Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant andreliable. Bnder Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to inducebelief in its e(istence or non-e(istence. Applying the above test to the case at bar, the C A evidenceobtained through P" testing and utili>ing #+ analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a !uo is

relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics andmolecular biology.

(Peo le vs Sartagoda)

$hat need not be proved(Re ublic vs CA)A court will ta)e judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in priorproceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the sameparties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. *naddition judicial notice will be ta)en of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another courtbetween the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another casebetween different parties in the same court. 8udicial notice will also be ta)en of court personnel.

(Peo le vs 1ulais)+rue, as a general rule, courts should not ta)e judicial notice of the evidence presented in otherproceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and areactually pending before the same judge. +his is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused hasthe constitutional right to confront and cross-e(amine the witnesses against him.

(#aureano vs CA)As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine "ourts do not ta)e judicial notice ofthe laws of #ingapore. +he defendant that claims the applicability of the #ingapore 4aws to this case hasthe burden of proof. +he defendant has failed to do so. +herefore, the Philippine law should be applied.(Processual Presumption)

(#'P vs 'anal)$ell-settled is the rule that courts are not authori>ed to ta)e judicial notice of the contents of the recordsof other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same

judge. +hey may only do so 1in the absence of objection1 and 1with the )nowledge of the opposing party,1which are not obtaining here.

(Re ublic lass Cor vs 6ua)A party may ma)e judicial admissions in 0a/ the pleadings filed by the parties, 0b/ during the trial eitherby verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or 0c/ in other stages of the judicial proceeding. +oconstitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. *f madein another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any otherfact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.

(%abagat rill vs DMC,2rban Pro erty)*ndeed, municipal courts may ta)e judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipalityin which they sit. #uch notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. +he location of

abagat @rill cannot be resolved by merely ta)ing judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation o. '7; suchlocation is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case.

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(Clarion Printing vs *#RC)A court will ta)e judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in priorproceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the sameparties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. *naddition judicial notice will be ta)en of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another courtbetween the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another casebetween different parties in the same court. 8udicial notice will also be ta)en of court personnel.

Rules o. Admissibility

2bject vidence(Peo le vs Rulle a)A person%s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to thesenses of the court, as provided in #ection &, ule &37.

(Peo le vs 2l"oron)#uch pieces of object evidence indeed are more elo!uent than a hundred witnesses. +he fact of carnal)nowledge is not disputed. *t was positively established through the offended party%s own testimony andcorroborated by that of her e(amining physician

(Macarrubo vs Macarrubo)+he saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted in evidence bycomplainant, which show a typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a husband tocomplainant and a father to their two )ids.

Cocumentary vidence(De &era vs Aguilar)All originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. +his, petitionersfailed to do. ecords show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.

(Citi'an Mastercard vs Teodoro)efore a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales

invoices, the offeror must prove the following: 0&/ the e(istence or due e(ecution of the original; 0'/ theloss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and 03/ on the part of theofferor, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. +he correctorder of proof is as follows: e(istence, e(ecution, loss, and contents.

(Sison vs Peo le)+he rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by thephotographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.+he value of this )ind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original,and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. +hephotographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has ta)en. +hecorrectness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved primafacie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which thecourt can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. +his court notes that when the prosecutionoffered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants objected to their admissibility for lac) of properidentification. owever, when the accused presented their evidence, the same photographs werepresented to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not haveparticipated in the mauling of the victim. +he photographs were adopted by appellants as part of thedefense e(hibits.

( arvida vs Sales)Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the "2 4 " ules of Procedure, muchless by the ules of "ourt. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. *t is, at best, an e(act copypreserving all the mar)s of an original. $ithout the original, there is no way of determining on its facewhether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and hiscounsel. *t may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

(Cuevas vs Muno")+hus, it is an accepted practice for the re!uesting state to rush its re!uest in the form of a tele( ordiplomatic cable, the practically of the use of which in conceded. ven our own (tradition 4aw 0P.C. o.&76 / allows the transmission of a re!uest for provisional arrest via telegraph. +here is no re!uirement forthe authentication of a re!uest for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. +he process ofpreparing a formal re!uest for e(tradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting themthrough diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also lea)age-prone.

(%eirs o. Saban an vs Comor osa)+he facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in @arvida. +he one mentioned hererefers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but

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recogni>ed as valid in ban)ing, financial, and business transactions. *f the "ertification were a sham aspetitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his 2rder.

(!rtanes vs CA)when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all theterms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof."onsidering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found insaid instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.

(#a u,la u 5oundation vs CA)$hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all theterms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence ofsuch terms other than the contents of the written agreement. vidence of a prior or contemporaneousverbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a validcontract. $hile parol evidence is admissible to e(plain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot servethe purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are notmentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mista)e.

('orillo vs CA)

(Cru" vs CA)

(Peo le vs olimlim)*t is now universally accepted that intellectual wea)ness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a validobjection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and

reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

(Peo le vs Castaneda)$hen an offense directly attac)s, or directly and vitally impairs the "onjugal elation, it comes within thee(ception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other e(cept in a criminal prosecutionfor a crime committed by one against the other. $ith more reason must the e(ception apply to the instantcase where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsificationis not a third person but the wife herself. +a)en collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscorethe fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become sostrained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tran!uility which may bedisturbed.

('ordalba vs CA)+he dead man5s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact comingto his )nowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, orcommunication made by the deceased to the witness.

(Ra"on vs CA)+he case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late 8uan "huidian to recover shares of stoc)in . a>on, *nc. allegedly owned by the late 8uan +. "huidian. *t is clear, therefore, that the testimony ofthe petitioner is not within the prohibition of the dead man statute. +he case was not filed against theadministrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records showthat the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature ofhis transaction with the late elder "huidian.

(Sunga,Chan vs Chua)ut before this rule can be successfully invo)ed to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is

necessary that: &. +he witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a casein prosecuted; '. +he action is against an e(ecutor or administrator or other representative of a deceasedperson or a person of unsound mind; 3. +he subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against theestate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; ?. is testimony refers to any matterof fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became ofunsound mind.1 +wo reasons forestall the application of the 1Cead an%s #tatute1 to this case. First,petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court, andwith the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambitof the 1Cead an%s #tatute1. #econd, the testimony of 8osephine is not covered by the 1Cead an%s#tatute1 for the simple reason that she is not 1a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whosebehalf a case is prosecuted.1

(Peo le vs Sandiganbayan)*f the client see)s his lawyer%s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed,he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannotbe bro)en by the attorney without the client%s consent. +he same privileged confidentiality, however, doesnot attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and forpurposes of which he see)s the lawyer%s advice. . *t is well settled that in order that a communication

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between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of alawful end.

(#im vs CA)

(Almonte vs &as9ue")$here the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or othernational security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courtshave declined to find in the "onstitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoenaconsidered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

Admissions(Ching vs CA)Bnder the ules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status aspleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. $hile they may nonetheless be utili>ed against the pleaderas e(trajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. *f notoffered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered.

(Peo le vs audia)A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal )nowledge or perception. +he offer ofcompromise allegedly made by the appellant5s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimonyof Amalia. owever, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of hisparents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was itshown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim.

(Doldol vs Peo le)#uch partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriationof the missing funds. #aid payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought ac!uittal for theappellant. 2n the contrary, as guided by #ection '9, ule &37 of the ules on vidence, $e hold that saidpayment, particularly when ta)en in conjunction with appellant5s commitment to gradually pay theremainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an impliedadmission of appellant5s guilt that he embe>>led or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

(Peo le vs Cui)For this admission of a co-conspirator to be appreciated, the following re!uisites must be satisfied: a. thatthe conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; b. that the admission relates tothe common objects; and c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out theconspiracy. +he general rule is that e(tra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before theformation of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence asagainst the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutionalright to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-e(amine them.

(Peo le vs arcia)eing ta)en e(-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from

partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and in!uiries. *t has thus been held thataffidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former areoften e(ecuted when an affiant%s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford her a fair opportunityof narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions ofwhat the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and theaffiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her.

"onfessions(#adiana vs Peo le)

vidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot beconsidered as being under custodial investigation. +here is no !uestion that even in the absence ofcounsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his "ounter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutionalrights. *t is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not e(acted by the police while he was undercustody or interrogation.

(Peo le vs 5lores)$here several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by oneduring the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. +he e(trajudicial admissionor confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given by a co-accused duringtrial. +he first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against hisco-accused who had the right and opportunity to cross-e(amine the declarant.

(Peo le vs Sayaboc)8urisprudence provides that e(trajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. +he condition for thispresumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional re!uirementssafeguarding an accused5s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially

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when the e(trajudicial confession has been denounced. +he rationale for this re!uirement is to allay anyfear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidatingenvironment that is inherent in custodial investigations. +herefore, even if the confession may appear tohave been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators formaltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation rendersthe confession valueless and inadmissible.

(Peo le vs 2lit)Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangaychairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was notunder arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. +he e(clusionary rule ispremised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs throughmenacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical andpsychological, is forcefully apparent.

"onduct and "haracter(Peo le vs Santos)$e consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the @uerrero affidavit for thelimited purpose for proving )nowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant )new thatthe particular corner of two 0'/ particular streets in anila was a good place to ambush a vehicle and itspassengers.

(Peo le vs *ardo)vidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor

did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or

)nowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the li)e. $hile lying mayconstitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by 4orielyn, assuming them for the momentto be true, are petty and inconse!uential. +hey are not as serious as charging one%s own father of thesordid crime of rape, with a ll of its serious repercussions.

(Re ublic vs %eirs o. Ale3aga)A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latter5s )nowledge, belief, or goodor bad faith -- and the former5s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant withoutviolating the hearsay rule.

earsay vidence ule(Peo le vs Montane")+he statement is highly reliable, having been made in e(tremity when the declarant is at the point ofdeath and when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when themind is induced by the most powerful considerations to spea) the truth.

(Peo le vs 'ernal)A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following re!uisites, to wit: 10&/ that thedeclarant is dead or unable to testify; 0'/ that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 03/that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to hisaforesaid interest; and 0?/ that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to betrue.1

(Tison vs CA)+he general rule is that where the party claiming see)s recovery against a relative common to bothclaimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant%s estate, the relationship of thedeclarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. +here must be someindependent proof of this fact. As an e(ception, the re!uirement that there be other proof than thedeclarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estateof the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property ofsome other member of the family.

(0ison vs CA)$e hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of therule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly )nown as 1family possessions,1 or thosearticles which represent, in effect, a family%s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.+hese have been described as objects 1openly e(hibited and well )nown to the family,1 or those 1which, ifpreserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.1

(Peo le vs Mendo"a)+he test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with congency by justice icardo8. Francisco thus: whether the act, declaration or e(clamation is so intimately interwoven or connectedwith the principal fact or event which it characteri>es as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. +ested by

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this standard, the e(tra-judicial admission of accused-appellant was clearly part of the res gestae andtherefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-appellant.

(Peo le vs &illarama)+o be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startlingoccurrence or immediately prior or subse!uent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of suchoccurrence.

(Peo le vs Palmones)*n order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.+he following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered inevidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: 0&/ the time that lapsed between theoccurrence of the act or transaction and the ma)ing of the statement; 0'/ the place where the statementwas made; 03/ the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; 0?/ the presence or absenceof intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and 0


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(Peo le vs Deo ita)

urden of Proofs and Presumptions(Ibaan Rural 'an vs CA)

stoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence whenhe ought to spea) out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certainfacts to e(ist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if theformer is permitted to deny the e(istence of such facts.

(Alcara" vs Tangga,an)$henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led anotherto believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out ofsuch declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; After recogni>ing the validity of the leasecontract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of thecontract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Nirgilio ac!uired title overthe lot.

(Peo le vs Padrigone)Bnder ule &3&, #ection 30e/ of the ules of "ourt, the rule that 1evidence willfully suppressed would beadverse if produced1 does not apply if 0a/ the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; 0b/ thesuppression was not willful; 0c/ it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and 0d/ the suppression is ane(ercise of a privilege.

(Metro 'an vs CA)*t is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a

party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the casemade against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumptionarises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of hisadversary. o rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if ite(ists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be ta)en as conclusive that the factdoes not e(ist.

(Peo le vs !ng)+o determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were underta)en ineffecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to ma)e sure that the details of theoperation are clearly and ade!uately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, thecourts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in theperformance of official duty by law enforcement agents. +his presumption should not by itself prevail overthe presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.

(Peo le vs allego)

(Peo le vs +dualino)+he "ourt cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt toconceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage.

Presentation of vidence(Peo le vs 5abre)*n any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that hewas somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate li)ewise that he couldnot have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of itscommission.

(Peo le vs uamos)+he right of every party to cross-e(amine a witness 1with sufficient fullness and freedom to test hisaccuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all importantfacts bearing upon the issue.1 *t is also the duty of the witness to answer !uestions put to him or her,subject to certain e(ceptions.

(Peo le vs Pere")As a rule, leading !uestions are not allowed. owever, the rules provide for e(ceptions when the witnessis a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting orsuggestion. 4eading !uestions are necessary to coa( the truth out of their reluctant lips.

(Peo le vs Castillano)efore the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence

consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-e(aminermust lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witnessbeing cross-e(amined. +he witness must be given a chance to recollect and to e(plain the apparentinconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.

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0People vs Plasencia/+he use of memory aids during an e(amination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Allowing awitness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. *n this case, the e(ercise ofthat discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has e(plained that she merely wanted to beaccurate on dates and li)e details.

(Can9ue vs CA)e that as it may, considered as a memorandum, (h. G does not itself constitute evidence. Bnder ule

&3', sec. &7, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence,and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify onthe basis of refreshed memory.

(Dy vs CA)*n proving their due e(ecution and genuineness, it is not sufficient that the witness state in a generalmanner that the person whose signature appears thereon was the one who e(ecuted the document. +hetestimony of an eye witness authenticating a private document must be positive, categorically stating thatthe document was actually witnessed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto.

(%eirs o. #acsa vs CA)For a private ancient document to be e(empt from proof of due e(ecution and authenticity, it is notenough that it be more than 37 years old; it is also necessary that the following re!uirements are fulfilled;0&/ that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 0'/ that it isunblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

(Peo le vs Canonigo)

+he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. evertheless, despite the factthat the baptismal certificate which reflected accused-appellant5s date of birth has not been formallyoffered in evidence, the court may ta)e note of the said date of birth as reflected in the baptismalcertificate. ot only was it the subject of the testimony of accused-appellant5s own witness, s. acaria

stacio, but during the course of the trial, repeated references have been made by the counsel foraccused-appellant to the latter5s date of birth as appearing in the said baptismal certificate. +he absenceof any formal presentation of certain e(hibits does not render their consideration thereof a reversibleerror, if repeated references thereto in the course of trial by counsel for accused and of the courtconvincingly show that the documents were part of prosecution5s evidence.

(!ng vs CA)+he mere fact that a particular document is identified and mar)ed as an e(hibit does not mean it will be orhas been offered as part of the evidence of the party. +he party may decide to offer it if it believes this willadvance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. A document or an article is valuelessunless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an opportunity to object to itand to cross-e(amine any witness called to present or identify it. vidence not formally offered before thetrial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other partiestheir right to rebut them.

$eight and #ufficiency of vidence(Peo le vs Suare")*t is doctrinal that the re!uirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such adegree of proof as to e(clude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. 2nly moral certaintyis re!uired or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

(Peo le vs 'ulan)*ndeed, the testimony of a lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient tosupport a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmar)s of truth and sincerity. $hile thenumber of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonabledoubt is not necessarily with the greatest number. "onviction of the accused may still be had on the basisof the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. *t must be stressed that evidence to be believedmust not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself, such thatcommon e(perience and observation of man)ind lead to the inference its probability under thecircumstances.

(D+CS vs del Rosario)*n civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance ofevidence. 1Preponderance of evidence1 means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side issuperior to that of the other. *n other words, preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of theevidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party.

(Cervantes vs Cardeno)ere substantial evidence suffices in administrative cases.

(Reyes vs Mangino)

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*nasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent 8udge connotes misconduct so grave that, if proven,it would entail dismissal from the bench, the !uantum of proof re!uired should be more than substantial.+he ules of "ourt re!uires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graveroffense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct )nowledge. +he judiciaryto which the respondent belongs demands no less. efore any of its members could be faulted, competentevidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. +hus, the ground for the removal ofa judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. +he general rules in regard toadmissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

('enares vs Pancho)*t is well to note at this point that in !uasi-judicial proceedings, the !uantum of evidence re!uired tosupport the findings of the 4 " is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which areasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to justify a conclusion.

(PA# vs CA)*t is well entrenched that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by !uasi-judicialand administrative bodies are generally accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. #ubstantialevidence, which is the !uantum of evidence re!uired to establish a fact in cases before administrative or!uasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uateto justify a conclusion.

(#agon vs CA)#ettled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notari>ed documentcontinues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its e(ecution and delivery.

(Domingo vs Domingo)eing a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein e(pressed. *t has the presumptionof regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more thanmerely preponderant.

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53672142 Case Doctrines Rem2