March 12, 2004#605-606

NUCLEAR MONITORA Publication of World Information Service on Energy (WISE) and the Nuclear Information

& Resource Service (NIRS), incorporating the former WISE News Communique

What did we learn from Three Mile Island? 1

What happened at TMI-2? 3

A question of dose... they cheated, they lied, people died 4

Bush's nuclear family 5

Bias on health effects from TMI refuted 6

A personal remembrance 7

"Critical Hour" is critical reading 9

NRC's TMI fact sheet disputed 10

Events Calendar 12

Unrealistic emergency planning 14

Mobile meltdown - TMI train troubles 16

TMI's international impact 19

In brief 22

World Information Service on Energyfounded in 1978

SPECIAL ISSUE: 25 YEARSSINCE THE TMI DISASTER

WHAT DID WE LEARN FROMTHREE MILE ISLAND?We learned the obvious – that a combination of bad design, mechanical failure and operator errorcan lead to a nuclear meltdown, widespread panic, and scared and dying people. If we did not learnthat then, we certainly did seven years later at Chernobyl.(605-606.5583) NIRS - We learned thatnuclear power, if it is to be evenremotely safe, is not cheap; nuclearutilities spent tens of millions ofdollars refitting existing reactors tomeet post-TMI safety guidelines.Utilities building reactors at the timewere forced to spend more to meetstricter safety standards. Of course,none of that made the reactors safe,nothing can.

We learned that electric utilities, onceconsidered a safe stock option forwidowers and retirement funds, liewhen threatened, and thatgovernments lie to protect them.

A significant number of peoplelearned that their homes and theirlives really were not very important toinstitutions many had thought littleabout—the federal Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, the US Congress, theJudiciary, the utilities, state govern-ments, nuclear trade associations, theNational Cancer Institute, just aboutevery big-time player in the businessof providing electricity and reassu-rance to the United States. Instead,they learned that their homes and liveswere pretty much expendable to themyth of safe nuclear power.

In the end, that may have been the

biggest, longest-lasting lesson: peopleare expendable when the nuclearindustry is in trouble.

That is, admittedly, a sad commentary.Many of those who have caused thatlesson to sink in would vigorouslydeny it. They would say, no, TMI didnot kill anyone, the accident wascontained and no, we do not want toadmit anything.

Of course, they may well believethemselves, but the facts proveotherwise, as does real life. The facts,and real life, show that cancer rateshave risen since the TMI accident, inprecisely those areas most impacted bythe radiation releases. The facts, andreal life, demonstrate that TMI did kill- people, animals, plants - and causedmutations that still provoke acombination of wonder and disgust.

The facts, and real life, admit thatsome 2,000 cases of harm were settledout of court for millions of dollars andrecords sealed because the utility didnot want to admit the fact, and thereality of the TMI accident. Potentiallythousands more cases were thrown outof court, because the court did notwant to admit into evidence the facts,and reality, that more radiation wasreleased from TMI than the utility andgovernment want to admit.

The court can hide behind its judicialpowers, but the facts and reality standout nonetheless. People died becauseof Three Mile Island, and anyone who

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 20042

WISE Amsterdam/NIRSISSN: 1570-4629

Reproduction of this material isencouraged. Please give credit whenreprinting.

Editorial team: Tinu Otoki (WISEAmsterdam), Michael Mariotte (NIRS).With contributions from HermanDamveld, Mary Osborn Ouassiai, TMIAlert, Judith H. Johnsrud, Ph.D. andKay Drey.

The next issue (607) will be mailedout 2 April 2004.

tries to tell you differently does notknow the facts, nor the reality.

Just as some people and institutionswould try to make you believe thatonly a few dozen people died as aresult of Chernobyl - all firefightersand reactor operators - when, in fact,thousands, probably tens of thousandswill die prematurely because of thataccident, some people and institutionstry to proclaim TMI as some sort of“success,” some sort of proof that thenuclear age does not kill.

It is difficult, of course, to prove that acancer is a direct result of any singlething – even cigarette smoking is forsome a debatable cause of cancer. So itis for nuclear utilities also. Who, afterall, would want to be blamed for deathand destruction? Much better to blameit on unknown, unseen, or alreadyimproper influences. When Dr. SteveWing finds stark evidence of increasedcancer rates directly attributable toradiation released from TMI, of coursethose who caused it want to deny it.Especially since it might affect theirability to continue that industry.

And, 25 years later, is that not wherewe have arrived? Whether or not thenuclear industry will continue? ThreeMile Island was not a local mishap, itwas an international awakening andacknowledgement that nuclear poweris a technology without fail-safeguarantees, it was the live demon-stration that there is no such thing asinherently-safe nuclear power.

Back in 1979, a lot of people thoughtwe would have learned our lesson by

now. Nuclear power would be dead, orat least clearly on its way out. Evenformer US President Jimmy Carter,who toured TMI clad in little plasticbooties to reassure an anxious nation,sought to create a renewable energy-powered future. And if TMI, and thenChernobyl, failed to kill the industry,then the waste problem will…

Give nuclear industry some credit, it isa resilient industry, one that takespunches and bounces back as ifnothing had ever happened. It is anindustry that can cause utilitiespurchasing its products to drown intobankruptcy, and then, without eventaking a breath, espouse its economicbenefits.

It is an industry that has no hesitationin arguing that creating the world’smost tempting terrorist target –thousands of high-level nuclear wastecasks sitting unguarded in an open-airparking lot in Nevada – is somehowpreferable to dispersed, protectedstorage at 70 or so nuclear reactorsites. In short, it is an industry that hasno shame.

Even worse, it is a shameless industrythat has many high-level backers.Senate Energy Committee ChairmanPete Domenici, for one wants to create,in his own words, a “nuclear corridor”running from the Texas border to theoutskirts of Albuquerque. SenatorLarry Craig of Idaho wants to moveIdaho’s high-level waste to YuccaMountain, but nonetheless hassteadfastly promoted construction of anew reactor in his state to producehydrogen for a non-existent hydrogenfuel cell program for automobiles.New House Energy CommitteeChairman Joe Barton is another whohas yet to meet a nuclear-relatedprogram, initiative or relaxation ofregulations to benefit the nuclearindustry that he doesn’t like.

And that is just in the U.S.! Across theworld, the nuclear power industry isfighting back. You can read it in theirinternal communications; thisindustry feels like it has been trodupon and stomped down and we, thepeople, are interfering with their right

to pollute, irradiate and kill as manyof us as they choose, and by God,they’re tired of that opposition!

Now Finland has ordered a newreactor. The temporary moratoriumon new reactors in France is injeopardy because of French nuclearpressure. In Asia, they still buildreactors, don’t they? And in the U.S.,hiding behind the smokescreen of alicensing process that allows utilitiesto obtain essential site permitswithout ever admitting they want tobuild a reactor, there are three utilitiesseeking permits to build reactors. No,we are not fooled, we know what anEarly Site Permit means – it is not justthe first chance to participate inreactor licensing decisions, it is thelast chance. After this, it is too late, theutility can do what it wants.

This is why NIRS and Public Citizen,together with BREDL and other localand regional groups, have joinedforces to challenge every single EarlySite Permit applications beingconsidered by the NRC: at Grand Gulf,Mississippi; North Anna, Virginia; andClinton, Illinois.

Everywhere the nuclear industry goes,we must be there too, workingtirelessly to remind people thatnuclear power is not what its backersclaim: it is not emission-free –reactors routinely emit radiation; it isnot safe, people have died andcontinue to die from reactor accidents;the waste is not manageable, in fact,there is no place to put it; nuclearpower is not economic, when its fullcosts are counted, it cannot competewith any energy source.

So, 25 years after we learned first-handthat the nuclear industry waseverything its opponents feared, andnot much of what its backers touted –and how it kept backers after losingUS$1 billion dollar investment in a fewhours is still startling – where do westand? It would be comforting to arguethat we are on the verge of a newenergy age, one in which everyone hasaccess to all the energy they need,clean, affordable and sustainable, butwe are not there yet. It would be

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Between 3 and 4 a.m. on 28 March 1979, maintenance work was conducted at the secondary cooling system in the turbinebuilding of Three Mile Island reactor 2. TMI-2, located near Harrisburg in the state of Pennsylvania, was an 880 MW reactor,built by Babcock & Wilcox. Metropolitan Edison Company (MetEd), a subsidiary of TMI owner General Public Utilities (GPU)operated both TMI reactors. TMI-2 was connected to the grid in April 1978 and was running for almost a year when theaccident happened.

At around 4 a.m., a valve in the condensor closed causing circulation in the secondary coolant circuit to stop. The two mainfeedwater pumps stopped due to a lack of water and the turbine also scrammed and as a consequence heat was no longerremoved from the steam generators. With non-functioning steam generators, the temperature and pressure in the primarycooling circuit started to rise. As increasing pressure could lead to pipes rupturing, a valve (Pilot Operated Relief Valve)opened automatically to release steam/water. The reactor itself also shut down automatically as its control rods werereleased. So far, everything was working as expected in emergency shutdowns.

The problems escalated when the pressure in the primary circuit began to drop. At that moment, the relief valve should haveclosed in order to prevent too much water being released from the cooling circuit but the valve remained opened, althoughan indicator in the control room wrongly showed that it had closed. This was caused by a design fault: the indicator onlyshowed electricity supply to the valve but not whether it had really closed or not. With the valve open, more and more waterescaped from the reactor.

Another problem occurred when emergency coolant pumps of the secondary circuit were started. Two valves in the feedwaterpipes were blocked and no water could be transported to the steam generators, which ran dry. After eight minutes, the valveswere opened manually.

As coolant continued to escape from the relief valve, the instruments available to reactor operators provided confusinginformation. None of the instruments showed the actual level of water in the reactor. The operators judged it by the level inthe pressurizer (connected to the relief valve), which was still high so they were unaware of the decreasing level of water inthe reactor core.

Because of the residual heat in the uranium fuel and the lack of sufficient cooling, the fuel cladding started to burst and thefuel began to melt. Within eight hours the core was (partly or completely) dry and melted fuel dropped to the bottom of thereactor vessel. It was later found that about one-half of the core had melted.

On 28 and 30 March radioactive gases were released from the plant. For the public, there was much uncertainty about thesituation in the plant. The governor of Pennsylvania decided on 30 March to evacuate all pregnant women and youngchildren within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the reactor. Another 200,000 people left voluntarily, because of a lack of trust in theinformation provided by MetEd.

In 1980, decontamination work in the reactor buildings started. The reactor vessel lid was lifted in 1984 and removal workcould begin inside the reactor. It was discovered that core damage and temperature levels had been much higher and waterlevels much lower than previously assumed. The molten fuel was removed between 1985 and 1990 and transported to theIdaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Decontamination work was completed in 1993. Final dismantling of thereactor will be conducted when TMI-1 (still in operation) is to be dismantled.

Sources: Herman Damveld, 25 February 2004; www.nrc.gov fact sheet on TMI

WHAT HAPPENED AT TMI-2?

upsetting to think our future is solelynuclear, with a national security stateensuring that radiation leaks are neverreported. In reality, we are somewherebetween the two. There are more casesto be made, certainly better economiccases, that the first hypothesis is closerthan the second, but that is by nomeans guaranteed. To create a betterenergy future, a better environmentalfuture, a better economic future, is notan easy task. It requires incessant

work, argument, education,organization and mobilization.

Three Mile Island dealt a blow to thenuclear power industry. Some hoped itwould be a fatal blow, but it was not.Others hoped it would be a glancingblow; but it was not that either. 25years later, arguments remain overwhat happened, who suffered and whatwas learned. If you look at the facts,the reality, there is really no doubt. If

you talk to people who were there youwill not doubt them. If you look at thescience, you will not doubt it.

The next time you think about nuclearpower, think not about an abstractcooling tower or reactor buildingbehind a grove of trees. Think insteadabout the metallic taste people nearTMI still feel in their mouths whenthey think about the accident. Thinkabout the fear of pregnant women,

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told to evacuate more than 52 hoursafter the accident – then think abouthow the world criticized Ukraine forwaiting 48 hours to issue an evacuationwarning. Think about what the pain ofcancer really feels like, and why somepeople in power feel compelled todeny it exists, when it is so clearlyproven. Think about the dollars lostthat day, and then think about thedollars the nuclear power industrystill hopes to gain.

And that, in the end, is the lesson ofTMI. Reactor accidents will happen, as

long as there are reactors. The oddsare it will not happen tomorrow, theodds just as conclusively are that itwill happen again, in our lifetimes,perhaps even worse than ever.Stopping that reality means acquiringpolitical power, because it will notstop by itself. If it did, if mereargument or persuasion or self-evidentreality were sufficient, we would havewon a long time ago. But it is notenough, political power is requiredand too often we surrender to thestrength of our own arguments and sayif “they” do not understand that, what

can we do? The problem is that “they”understand power, and what we needto do is very clear: educate, do notexpect TV to do it for us; organize, anddon’t stop; mobilize, and bring peopleout; and then do the same all overagain… And if we all do that, then, inthe history books, we can say: well, ittook a while but in the end, the TMIaccident really was the beginning ofthe end of nuclear power.

Contact: Michael Mariotte atnirsnet@nirs.org

A QUESTION OF DOSE...THEYCHEATED, THEY LIED, PEOPLE DIED….Some years ago, the father of the U.S. nuclear navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover, stated that if the fulltruth were known about the accident at Three Mile Island, it would have destroyed the civilian nuclearpower industry because the accident was infinitely more dangerous than was ever made public. At TMI,the utility falsified reactor coolant water leak rate data, cheated on NRC control room operator testsbefore and after the accident, and lied about the severity of the accident.(605-606.5584) Mary Osborn Ouassiai- For three days, children waited forschool buses and played outdoors inthe plumes and clouds of fallout, untilPennsylvania Governor RichardThornburgh reluctantly advised thosemost vulnerable to leave the area. Thecheating, lying, falsification of reactordata and the failure of governments toconsider safety above finances,resulted in illness and death forfriends, neighbors, loved ones andmany TMI workers.

Confusion, scientific fraud andmiscarriage of justice are the legaciesof the TMI accident. Confusion by thenuclear apologists claiming thatinsufficient radiation escaped duringthe accident to cause any of the effectspeople experienced. Scientific fraudpertains to the fallout dose reportsthat have never been honestly peerreviewed or legally challenged.

Miscarriage of justice at the hands ofthe judge who ordered a finding of “nohigh doses” by the TMI Public HealthFund. The same judge prohibited thehealth fund’s advisors fromparticipating as experts in the personalinjury class action lawsuits, and alsothrew out most of the scientific

experts, making it near impossible togo to trial. This judge, in essence,became the jury deciding the casewithout trial. Attorneys for plaintiffsrecently quit the case, heaping moreinjustice on over 2,000 victims and noend to the legacy of the TMI accident.

Unless you lived through the terrifyingdays and weeks of the accident youwill never be able to understand orrelate to how we felt then or how wefeel now. Sounds, smells, voices andwords are etched within us. The voiceof commentator Walter Cronkite onthe evening news announcing theaccident to Harrisburg and the world.The sound of sirens or church bellsringing, instantly flash us back to 30March, 1979 - known as Black Friday,the day of uncontrolled radiationreleases and evacuation.

The incredible metallic taste* orsmell, the saltiness, the thiosulfate-peroxide smells, and the “dead-fishy”smell, remind us of something evilthat destroyed our previously happyway of life. We remember the voices ofour children and our inability asparents to protect them from theinvisible, unforgiving poisons in ourair. We remember our neighbors down

river exposed to the radioactive waterdumped from TMI into theSusquehanna River from which theirdrinking and bathing water wasobtained.

Other voices introduced us to thesecond disaster at TMI, exposingdishonesty and betrayal by thoseentrusted with protecting our healthand safety: the utility’s Jack Herbein,telling us that everything was undercontrol and later discovering from Lt.Governor William Scranton, Jr., that itwasn’t under control. The voice ofGovernor Thornburgh reluctantly“advising” those most vulnerable toleave; while ignoring those of us livingbeyond the five-mile zone receivingdoses, as though there was a magicwall that would stop the radiation.(Each person living within 50 miles ofthe reactor was assessed a radiationdose, which on paper, resulted in lowexposures.)

Even voices we didn’t hear had animpact: for example, the mountains oftranscripts and the audio-taped voicesof the NRC Commissioners, who neverwanted responsibility for ordering anevacuation then and who still refusetake claim responsibility now. Voices

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silenced at the NRC, knowing leak ratetests were falsified for half a year priorto the accident at TMI; those voicesnever ordered the utility to shut downthe reactor as required by their ownregulations.

During the first days of the accident wedid not know the solid reactor fuel wasmelting into liquid, flowing like “hotolive oil,” nor that TMI was burping,venting and dumping radioactivityinto our communities, our river andour bodies. But our bodies knew, andthe animals knew. Our bodies reactedby displaying symptoms and effects:the metallic taste or smell, burning orreddening of skin, burning in nose orthroat, itching or tearing of eyes, thenausea, vomiting, the subsequentdiarrhea and hair loss. Birds died.Many of our pets and farm animalsdied and others were born deformed.Flowers and leaves grew deformed andmutated; many trees died and stillcontinue to do so.

What caused all this? To this day, wewere never told the cause but werereassured by Met-Ed, the utility thatowned TMI and by our governmentthat TMI was not responsible becausenot enough radiation had escaped.Improbability ruled as official scienceeagerly exonerated TMI as the sourceof these maladies; but whateverradiation escaped TMI, these effectsdid occur . Either low dose caused theeffects or the doses were indeed muchhigher than admitted. If Three MileIsland didn’t do it, what did?

The late Dr. Carl J. Johnson stated that,“... people can give us a medicalhistory, associating symptoms andphysical signs with relevant events,”and furthermore, “These simpleobservations are equally important inthe study of the effects or nuclearradiation on populations.” Humans,unlike animals and plants, have theability to communicate and discusstheir symptoms and ailments. Manypeople reported symptoms to ThreeMile Island Alert and to the Governor’s“Hotline” during and following theaccident. Harrisburg’s Mayor, StephenR. Reed, then a state representative,wrote a letter to the NRC asking them

why they refused to look intoallegations of radiation effects. TheNRC’s Harold Denton, then the topofficial in charge of the TMI accidentsaid – and to this day the response atthe NRC is the same – doses were toolow, so TMI could not be the cause.

The tragedy at Chernobyl, wherevictims also experienced the metallictaste and far- greater effects, has sinceverified our allegations and vindicatedout actions and beliefs.

The question of dose remains a majorissue because of the unique symptomsexperienced during the accident and in

subsequent years. The symptoms werecritical evidence, if they had notexisted, the issue of health effectswould have never arisen.

It takes just one affected cell to initiatecancer; radiation damage on the bodyis cumulative. An accident does notneed to occur at your local atomicpower plant for you to be harmedbecause radiation releases occurduring routine operations on a dailybasis venting approximately 30 curiesdaily or 1000 curies monthly. (1)

In over fifty years of atomic fallout,there is still no definition of “low

It is fair to question why the currentBush administration, includingGeorge W. and Dick Cheney, is sovery pro-nuclear power - not tomention its interest in expanding theU.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. KevinPhillips’ recent book “AmericanDynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, andthe Politics of Deceit in the House ofBush” aims to shed a little light onthe matter.

Prescott Bush (later a U.S. Senator forConnecticut who harbored hopes ofbecoming president), grandfather ofGeorge W. and father of George H.W.,sat on the boards of directors forboth Dresser Industries andVanadium Corporation of America inthe 1940’s and 1950’s. Both companieswere involved in the ManhattanProject and subsequent atomic bombdevelopment. (pg. 129) During andafter World War II, Dresser providedseveral federal agencies with highlyspecialized and highly classifiedproducts: pumps for gaseousdiffusion enrichment of uranium tobomb-grade; spiraxial compressorsfor nuclear submarines; launcherbuildings for BOMARC (Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical ResearchCenter) missiles; radioactivitymonitors for nuclear attack missile-tracking systems. (pg. 153) Vanadiumsupplied the U.S. military withuranium ore during the ManhattanProject. (pg. 197)

Dresser reportedly went on to supply

the faulty valve that initiated theThree Mile Island accident andaccording to Phillips, is now a part ofthe Halliburton corporate empireformerly headed by Dick Cheney.(“The Diane Rehm Show,” NationalPublic Radio, Feb. 10, 2004) Speakingof Iraq, Phillips points out that in1989 and early 1990, a year or sobefore the confrontation that becamethe first Persian Gulf War, the GeorgeH.W. Bush administration knew butappeared unconcerned that U.S.exports were assisting Iraq’s nuclearweapons development. Two nuclearscientists from Saddam Hussein’s Al-Qaqaa nuclear research facility wereeven invited to Portland, Oregon toparticipate in a Department of Energysymposium on nuclear detonationsin September 1989. (pg. 307; see alsoAlan Friedman’s “Spider’s Web: TheSecret History of How the WhiteHouse Illegally Armed Iraq,” NewYork, Bantam Books, 1993, pg. 155).

European companies were notespecially concerned about Iraq’snuclear ambitions either. In 1990,Urenco trained 22 Iraqi scientists inthe highly-specialized art ofcentrifuge welding at its Gronauenrichment plant (The Nonproli-feration Review, Fall 1996, p 128)..

All page references are to: KevinPhillips, “American Dynasty:Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politicsof Deceit in the House of Bush,” NewYork, Viking, 2004.

BUSH’S NUCLEAR FAMILY

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dose” radiation and there is noconsensus among the scientificcommunity as to what constitutes alow dose. Is it five Rems? Not in mybook, not after TMI. The lip-burns andsore throats some experienced whenthe wind blew during the years ofclean up had to be in the milliremsrange. Any dose is an overdose.

Even the nuclear industry’s ownexpert, the late Dr. Jacob Fabrikant,stated, “...we believe that any exposure

to radiation, even at low levels ofdose, carries some risk of suchdeleterious effects” (i.e., referring tocarcinogenesis, teratogenesis andmutagenesis) (p.402) [meaning, cancer,birth defects and mutations]. At ThreeMile Island the nuclear industry andgovernment got away with murder.

*Met-Ed’s report stated that noexisting scientific evidence links the“metallic taste” to radiation, and notenough Iodine-131 escaped to cause the

taste. (A Report on the TMI-2 Accidentand Related Health Studies” by GPUNuclear) [But crewmembers of theEnola Gay reported this taste; AtomicVets, A-bomb survivors and Chernobylvictims reported metallic taste.]

Contact: Mary [Osborn] Ouassiai,Harrisburg, Pennsylvania atdais79y@aol.com.

(1) John Collins, NRC, interview in ThePeople of TMI, DelTredici

BIAS ON HEALTH EFFECTS FROMTMI REFUTEDThe official position that little or no radiation was released, and therefore no health effects could be ascribedto radiation from the accident at Three Mile Island, is carefully and thoughtfully toppled by Dr. Steve Wing inan analysis that spans the basic premise of scientific inquiry to a point by point examination, and rebuttal, ofthe criteria used by a US court to exclude Wing’s own findings on health effects from the 1979 accident. (1)(605-606.5585) NIRS - A landmarkreview of scientific and legal processesimplemented to assess TMI’s radiationhealth impacts written by Dr. StevenWing of the University of North Caro-lina, Chapel Hill in the article titled“Objectivity and Ethics in Environ-mental Science” appeared in theNovember, 2003 issue of the journalEnvironmental Health Perspective. (2)

Key among Wing’s findings is astatistically significant correlationbetween lung cancer incidence andrelative level of radiation exposureduring the accident. This finding wasexcluded from the court case broughtby citizens of the Harrisburg area whofelt they had suffered adverse healtheffects from the TMI disaster. As Wingwrites: “The official position that high-level radiation exposures were impos-sible was questioned by hundreds oflocal residents who reported metallictaste, erythema, nausea, vomiting,diarrhea, hair loss, deaths of pets andfarm and wild animals, and damage toplants. Many of these phenomenacould be caused by radiation; however,the maximum possible dose wasofficially reported to be orders ofmagnitude less than the dose neededto produce acute symptoms. Residentswere told that their symptoms weredue to stress. People who pressed theirconcerns about radiation were treated

as though they had psychologicalproblems.”

That the court would not hear Wing’sfindings on lung cancer is a tragedyemblematic of the degree to which thenuclear industry has been able todictate “justice” in the United States.Indeed, Wing takes care in this articleto show that this situation predates hiswork, which was based on previoushealth impact studies. Wing quotes theactual court order that established theColumbia University studies uponwhich his work is based, stating thatthe order prohibited “worst caseestimates of releases of radioactivityor population doses…[unless] suchestimates would lead to a mathema-tical projection of less than 0.01 healtheffects.” Wing also cites that this orderspecifies that a representative of thenuclear industry’s insurance cor-poration had to “concur on the natureand scope of dosimetry projects.”

Wing points out that the net result ofthe court arbitrarily banning anyconsideration that higher doses ofradiation may in fact have occurred,was to consign the Columbianresearchers to study TMI based on ahypothesis that could not be tested –since any finding, by order anddefinition, could not be associatedwith a radiological cause. Wing

describes the claims that “chance”could be the cause of statisticallysignificant correlation between lungcancer and radiation dose as aconfusion between gambling and reallife. When cards are well shuffled,patterns occurring are due to chancebut when there is nothing randomabout a distribution, the invocation of“chance” is simply a mask to rejectactual possible causes. Wing writes:“Chance may have built an empire inthe world of science, but its emperorhas no clothes.”

On the matter of Wing’s findings onlung cancer, the court simply adoptedthe view of the defendant (the ownerof TMI) that since there is a 10 yearlatency period on lung cancer, and thecases Wing studied occurred within 7years of the accident, his findingscould not be due to the TMI accident.

This assertion accepted by the judge asfact is easily rebutted by Wing: “Therehave been no epidemiological studiesof the exposure of human populationsto radioactive xenon and krypton gases[dominant in the TMI release].Consequently, assumptions about thetypes and timing of cancers that couldresult must be based on inferencefrom studies of other types of ionizingradiation. Defendants argued that thestudy of Japanese A-bomb survivors,

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upon which official estimates ofradiation risks and latency have beenbased, proved that lung cancer has a10-year minimum latency. In response,we noted that ionizing radiation canact as a promoter as well as aninitiator of cancer (3); that high dosescan suppress immune function, whichis associated with the appearance ofsecondary tumors within 2 years ofradiotherapy (4); and that latencies ofless than 5 years have been observedfor miners exposed to radon (5). Arecent study of lung cancer amonguranium miners found the bestestimate of minimum latency to beless than 1 year.” (6)

Wing provides a detailed and elegantappraisal of the inappropriate eleva-tion of the Japanese atomic victims tothe “gold standard” for human radia-tion impact evaluation. He reminds usthat they are a “select group…that hadto resist radiation blast and the

aftermath of war” and that the dose tothose individuals was never measured,but instead extrapolated from modelsand interviews of survivors conductedby US military occupation.

If Wing’s findings on radiation andlung cancer had been admissible, itwould have established a statisticallysignificant correlation betweenradiation exposure and the occurrenceof a major health consequence due tothe TMI accident. The barring of thisfinding from evidence helped tocontribute to the plight of thousandswho have suffered from the Three MileIsland disaster, and never beencompensated or officially recognized.

Contact: Mary Olson atnirs@main.nc.usSources:(1) Wing, S., Richardson, D., Crawford-Brown D. 1997 “A Reevaluation of CancerIncidence near the Three Mile Island

Nuclear Plant: The Collision of Evidenceand Assumptions.” Environmental HealthPerspectives 106:52—57(2) Environmental Health Perspectives,Volume 111, Number 14, pages 1809-1818, includes map illustrating correlationbetween radiation emissions andincidence of lung cancer – see http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2003/6200/6200.pdf(3) Doll R. 1978. An epidemiologicalperspective of the biology of cancer.Cancer Res 38:3573–3583.(4) Appelbaum F. 1993. The influence oftotal dose, fractionation, dose rate, anddistribution of total body irradiation onbone marrow transplantation. SeminOncol 20:3–10.(5) Hornung RW, Meinhardt TJ. 1987.Quantitative risk assessment of lungcancer in U.S. uranium miners. HealthPhysics 52:417–430. 1(6) Langholz B, Thomas D, Xiang A, StramD. 1999. Latency analysis inepidemiologic studies of occupationalexposures: application to the ColoradoPlateau uranium miners cohort. Am J IndMed 35:246–256.

A PERSONAL REMEMBRANCEMillions of words have been written about the worst commercial nuclear power accident in U.S. history.Very few have told much of the history from the perspective of the nuclear energy critics most directlyinvolved in opposing the licensing and operation of the ill-fated Three Mile Island, Unit 2 reactor.(605-606.5586) Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud- With my colleague, Dr. ChaunceyKepford, I represented those opposingthe original licensing of TMI Unit 2,and intervened in both the operatinglicense and restart proceedings for TMIUnit 1.

In 1970, two Babcock and Wilcoxpressurized water reactors were underconstruction on an island in theSusquehanna River, within ten miles ofHarrisburg, Pennsylvania’s statecapital. Harrisburg resident, VirginiaSouthard, who headed a small group,Citizens for a Safe Environment,contacted members of the Environ-mental Coalition on Nuclear Power(ECNP) shortly after we had beeninvolved with preventing both anAtomic Energy Commission (AEC)Plowshare Program proposal toexplode nuclear devices undergroundto create storage chambers for naturalgas and a utility proposal to site aliquid metal fast breeder reactor onthe upper Susquehanna River in

Wyoming County, PA. She asked if wecould help her group oppose theoperating licenses for both TMI Units 1and 2.

When, in the mid-1970’s, the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)announced an opportunity tointervene in the operating licenseproceedings for TMI-2, ECNP’s leadingtechnical members, Drs. Kepford, aradiation chemist, and WilliamLochstet, a professor of nuclearphysics, offered to undertake the case.

Dr. Kepford’s earlier questioning ofthe extent of projected radiationreleases from the reactor hadapparently resulted in the terminationof his university position, a dismissalhe successfully challenged. In 1968, Ihad experienced a similar consequenceof my active opposition to the nuclearindustry, having been warned “thosewho dissent from government policiescannot expect to be supported by theuniversity.” My doctoral fellowship

was suspended, and I was forbidden topublish anything about the Plowshareproject if I wanted to complete thedegree. Despite threat of reprisals, wefelt obligated to try to protect thepeople of the Three Mile Island area tothe best of our ability.

It was a time when many reactorlicenses were being challenged.Reactor safety and environmentalissues addressed in those 1977 licenseproceedings remain significant for allU.S. power reactors.

In the course of cross-examining utilityand NRC staff witnesses, weencountered perhaps the single mostfundamental basis for public concernsabout the safety of nuclear powerreactors. The NRC Atomic Safety andLicensing Board (ASLB) did not permitany questions on the probability orconsequences of any accident moresevere than safety systems weredesigned to withstand – severity wasdetermined by NRC staff engineering

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 20048

analyses. Moreover, we were also ableto establish, on record, that the NRCstaff had based safety conclusions on a“single failure mode” criterion,thereby apparently ignoring thepotential consequences of multiplefailures and “failure modes” andinteractions that might occur in thecourse of an accident. This kind ofanalysis, we were told, was common toall reactor license approvals.

Second, Dr. Kepford was able toestablish that the NRC’s regulationsummarizing the environmentalimpacts of the uranium fuel cycle for a1000-megawatt reference reactoroperating for a single year, hadmiscalculated the amounts of radongas that would continue to emanatefrom uranium mill tailings piles formillions of years into the future.

Moreover, the NRC had under-estimated each year’s radon releaseassociated with a reactor’s operation,and also wrongly omitted the fullhealth effects from those ongoingradon emissions. These issues, laterconfirmed by a member of the NRC’sASLB Panel, formed the basis ofECNP’s 1978 challenge to the legalityof the TMI-2 license before the CircuitCourt of Appeals for the District ofColumbia. Our challenge, which camewithin one vote of obtaining aninjunction, could have prevented thereactor from beginning to operatecommercially at the start of 1979.

In the aftermath of the accident at TMI,the NRC convened a special panel todetermine whether the Price-Andersonliability insurance law would berequired to take effect. That hearingwas to decide if an “ExtraordinaryNuclear Occurrence” had taken placeand would trigger the Price-AndersonAct, to compensate members of thepublic at a mere seven cents on thedollar for the losses they suffered.

Despite the voluntary evacuation ofnearly 150,000 residents in centralPennsylvania, large business andfarming losses, and many reports ofillnesses and birth defects over theensuing years, it could not beestablished within a few months of the

accident that lives had been lostspecifically due to radiation releasesin the course of the TMI accident.However, some 2,000 cases related tothe accident were settled out-of-court,and the records permanently sealed.

During the years of TMI-2 clean up thatfollowed, numerous citizen groups,such as TMI Alert and PANE (PeopleAgainst Nuclear Energy) formed andgrew in the adjoining areas. Theybanded together to oppose the restartof the presumably undamaged TMIUnit 1 reactor.

A major issue for intervening partieswas the adequacy of evacuationprocedures. Before TMI, haphazardEmergency Planning Zones were onlyabout four miles in diameter aroundthe reactor. From a post-accident NRCdocument, we learned that the NRC’sguidance recommendation was“sheltering,” not evacuation, for theclose-in population. State policewitnesses testified that, if evacuationwere to occur, residents who livedbeyond the evacuation zone boundarymight be prevented from evacuatinguntil the close-in population had beenmoved – if they were to be evacuated.In the course of the TMI-1 Restartproceedings, we were able to establish,during cross-examination of an NRCstaff evacuation witness that, duringthe course of a severe accident withoffsite radiation releases, there was nomaximum dose to members of thepublic above which the NRC wouldrequire that they be moved. To myastonishment, the official transcriptfailed to include the staff witness’response – an omission that wascorrected by the Administrative LawJudge in the record at a later hearing.

TMI Unit 1 continues to operate andthe Unit 2 reactor remains on ThreeMile Island. It has not beendecommissioned. Its fuel was

painstakingly removed and shippedacross the continent for storage.Despite the assurances of many expertsthat there have been no serious healthconsequences, the NRC’s and EPA’sexposure standards still fail to accountfully for all health impacts now foundto be associated with low-levelradiation. Many in the affectedpopulation of central Pennsylvaniahave moved away and their health isno longer monitored.

The burden of proof of radiation-related injury remains with the victimsand remains extremely difficult toestablish in the courts. Federalradiation exposure standards remainbased on “Standard Man” – the healthyyoung male nuclear industry workerwho chooses to receive occupationalexposures.

The standards still ignore the greatersensitivities of unborn and/or youngchildren, those with impaired healthand the elderly. The standards remainbased only on lifetime risk of fatalcancer and gross genetic defects in thefirst generations. The standards stilldo not recognize the many other non-fatal, non-cancer impacts of ionizingradiation on human well-being, nor dothey take into account contemporaryresearch findings of impacts of chronicinternal doses received throughinhalation and ingestion pathways.

Twenty-five years after TMI, the manyepidemiological studies that showclusters of cancers and leukemia nearnuclear facilities are still dismissed astoo small to be “statisticallysignificant.”

Contact: Judith H. Johnsrud, Ph.D.through NIRS

The radiation standardsstill do not recognize themany other non-fatal, non-cancer impacts of ionizingradiation on human well-being.

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 9

“CRITICAL HOUR” IS CRITICAL READINGTiming is everything and Albert J. Fritsch, Arthur H. Purcell, and Mary Byrd Davis have done wellto produce a new history of the nuclear power industry in the U.S., focusing on the 25th anniversaryof America’s most-infamous meltdown.(605-606.5587) NIRS - Titled “CriticalHour: Three Mile Island, the NuclearLegacy, and National Security”(Yggdrasil Institute, 2004, 141 pages),the book appropriately begins: “The25th anniversary of the Three MileIsland (TMI) nuclear accident is afitting opportunity to renew the re-commendation that narrowly missedbeing approved by the Carter-appoin-ted TMI Commission a quarter of acentury ago, namely, the request tophase out the nuclear power industryin this country. Having lost a goldenopportunity then, we still haveprecious time left to reconsider therecommendation.”

The authors distill key moments fromthe 60+ year history of the AtomicAge, such as the evasiveness andultimate failure of the 12 memberKemeney Commission investigatingthe TMI accident (of which Purcellserved as senior staff) to “stick itscollective neck out and call for a haltin nuclear power development,making official a condition that theU.S. marketplace was by that timeimposing; not since the year beforehad any new domestic order beenplaced for a nuclear plant.”

Despite eight members leaning infavor of a moratorium at variouspoints during the months followingthe TMI disaster, when a formal votefinally came the motion was defeatedby a 6:6 tie. A non-decision dubbed a“Human Error” by the authors. In theface of the current prospect of anuclear power relapse resulting in newreactor construction, “Critical Hour”argues we must seize this moment andchange course to prevent another TMI,or worse.

The authors recount the “twenty-fiveyears of conflicting data” on TMI’shealth impacts. At one end of thespectrum, they cite NRC’s conclusion(NUREG-0738) that “many of thereported livestock problems were

probably the result of nutritionaldeficiencies.” The U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission (AEC) used that same linein the 1950’s, under oath in federalcourt, to dismiss claims by Utah sheepfarmers that their flocks wereperishing in epidemic numbers fromunrecognizable illnesses due toradioactive fallout from the newlyopened nuclear weapons test siteupwind in Nevada.

25 years later, the same federal judgewho had presided over the case in the‘50’s ruled that the AEC had perpe-trated a fraud upon his court. In thelate 1970’s, the same attorney repre-senting the sheep farmers was able toshow, with newly released documents,that the sheep deaths were entirelyconsistent with radiation damage,based upon AEC studies performedbefore the tests kept hidden during theoriginal trial and for a quarter of acentury afterward. That sordid historyis told in John Fuller’s book “The DayWe Bombed Utah.”

The authors first examine the TMIaccident and its aftermath in detail,applying its relevance to the presentday and then take the history of theAtomic Age one decade at a time, fromthe birth of the industry in the 1940s tothe aging of the industry anddeterioration of reactors in the 1990’s.An entire section is devoted to the“new dimension,” the reality of thepotential for catastrophic terroristattacks upon reactors or other nuclearfacilities made clear by the events of11 September, 2001. “But this historycannot stand alone. It must be coupledwith a way out.” and thus theyconclude with a very hopeful vision for“Conversion from Nuclear Power.”

The historical review in “CriticalHour” – including the Feb. 2000 steamgenerator tube rupture at Indian Pointand the 2002 reactor vessel headcorrosion hole at Davis-Besse, tworecent examples of NRC putting

industry profits before public healthand safety – inspires consideration ofhow the NRC of 1979, and 2004, isbehaving like the AEC of 1953, to ourperil.

Mary Byrd Davis’ chapter “The 1990sand Early 2000s: An Aging Industry”reviews trends in the nuclear powerindustry familiar to regular readers ofthis newsletter, such as: NRCrubberstamping reactor licenseextensions, power uprates, and newreactor designs; regulatory rollbackson radioactive wastes and contami-nation; the shattering of any lingeringillusions that civilian and militarynuclear programs are unconnected;and industry consolidation. Shereports convincingly on the increasingglobalization of the nuclear powerinfrastructure: Canadian firm Camecoowns the only two uranium mines/mills currently active in the U.S.;European Urenco is central to the LESenrichment facility targeted at NewMexico; UK/Japanese/German/Frenchinvolvement is central to nuclear fuelfabrication within the U.S.; Cogema,Belgonucleaire, and Framatome arecentral to the U.S. MOX program.Davis illustrates the key point thatdespite nuclear power industry soundbites to the contrary in this age ofenergy wars, “Nuclear power is be-coming less and less a means to energyindependence for the United States.”

Davis’ chapter “The Impact ofSeptember 11, 2001” leads directly tothe overriding conclusion of the book,that nuclear power must be phasedout, reactors shut down and radio-active waste secured and safeguarded(against accidents and leaks as well asterrorist attacks) as a national securitymeasure before the unthinkableoccurs. But “[d]espite the events ofSeptember 11, the [Bush] administra-tion has not wavered in its announcedintention of supporting the nuclearindustry. Far from considering a phaseout of the nuclear industry, it is

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200410

continuing to press for the industry’sexpansion.” She details this nuclearpower relapse at taxpayer expense,such as the Department of Energy’s(DOE) “Nuclear Infrastructure andEducation” program’s attempt torevive dwindling nuclear engineeringdepartments across the U.S. withmillions of dollars in grants,fellowships, and scholarships to 14universities.

Tellingly, the effort to repeal a 25-year-old state law blocking new reactorconstruction until a waste solution isfound and economic merit establishedis being led by University of Wisconsinnuclear engineering professors; theirdepartment receives US$30 million peryear from DOE, according to a recentarticle (“Up and Atom?”) in Madison’sweekly paper The Isthmus.

Co-author Fritsch’s upbeat nuclearpower phase out plan concludes thebook, laying out short-, medium-, andlong-term steps for individuals andinstitutions, he demonstrates howenergy conservation and efficiency canreadily replace the “need” for nuclearpower, and how renewable sources ofelectricity such as wind and solar canmake large inroads against pollutingfossil fuels. He ends with the hopethat, although “many Americans areaddicted to wasting energy,” it will nottake a nuclear meltdown or terroristattack to motivate the American publicto phase out nuclear power.

Citing Janet Sawin’s “Charting a NewEnergy Future” in the WorldwatchInstitute’s “State of the World 2003,” heconveys that “Including external costssuch as damage to the environment,

the cost of generating electricity bywind on good wind sites is 4-6 centsper kilowatt hour. This contrasts with6.3-19.8 cents for coal/lignite and 10.2-14.7 cents for nuclear energy, alsocounting external costs.”

Fritsch, Purcell, and Byrd Davisdedicated their book “to the thousandsof citizens who during the past halfcentury have sought to publicize thedangers of nuclear power facilities.”This book is a valuable new tool forthis movement to develop and workmore knowledgeably towards its goalof a nuclear-free world.

Contact: Kevin Kamps atkevin@nirs.org

NRC’S TMI FACT SHEET DISPUTEDEarlier this month, the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a new “fact sheet” on the1979 Three Mile Island accident. Three Mile Island Alert has published this critique of the NRC’swork. The quotes in bold are from the NRC’s fact sheet.(605-606.5588) Three Mile IslandAlert - “The main feedwater pumpsstopped running, caused by either amechanical or electrical failure, whichprevented the steam generators fromremoving heat.”The problems did not start with thefeedwater pumps, trouble began in thecondensate polisher system. The NRCreported this in 1979 but states thatthey don’t need to know the exactcause of the condensate polisher valvesfailure. No one knows why theaccident began to this day.

“Signals available to the operatorfailed to show that the valve was stillopen… In addition, there was noclear signal that the pilot-operatedrelief valve was open.”Because TMI had been falsifyingreactor leak rates to the NRC in theweeks leading to the accident,operators had learned to ignore themost obvious sign that the PORV hadstuck open and that coolant was beinglost through this pathway. The hightemperature reading at the PORV drainline was a clear indication that coolantwas escaping. But, operators had

become accustomed to this anomalybecause of the criminal falsificationwhich allowed this condition to existfor several weeks.

It should be noted that if the companyhad operated lawfully, the plant wouldhave been shutdown for repairs andthere would have been no accident onMarch 28 1979.

It is also noteworthy that NRC inspec-tors at TMI during the weeks beforethe accident failed to find or note thereactor coolant leak. Later, thecompany pleaded “no contest” tofederal charges of criminal falsifica-tions On May 22 1979, former controlroom operator Harold W. Hartman, Jr.tells the NRC investigators thatMetropolitan Edison- General PublicUtilities had been falsifying primary-coolant, leak rate data for monthsprior to the accident. At least twomembers of management were awareof the practice. NRC investigators donot follow-up or report the allegationsto the commission.

On February 29, 1984, a plea bargain

between the Department of Justice andMet Ed settled the Unit 2 leak ratefalsification case. Met Ed pleadedguilty to one count, and no contest tosix counts of an 11 count indictment.

“In a worst-case accident, the meltingof nuclear fuel would lead to a breachof the walls of the containmentbuilding and release massivequantities of radiation to theenvironment. But this did not occuras a result of the Three Mile Islandaccident.”It was only by luck that the reactorwalls were not breached. The industryconjectured that voids in the coolantprevented molten fuel from burningthrough the reactor walls. It is notknown if these voids will form toprevent a total meltdown in futureaccidents. Fifteen million curies ofradiation is a “massive quantity.”

“The accident caught federal and stateauthorities off-guard.”State officials had no means tomeasure radiation at the scene. Theyhad to take field samples and return totheir laboratories. This was not an

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 11

effective way to acquire real-time dataor collect data on gaseous releases.Their data collection abilities wereinsufficient to determine release rates.The NRC no longer monitorsradioactive releases at reactor sites.

“They did not know that the core hadmelted, but they immediately tooksteps to try to gain control of thereactor and ensure adequate coolingto the core.”Reactor core measurements takenduring the first morning showed thatfuel might have melted. This data wascast aside because operators believedit was not possible and thereforeerroneous. During the first day, theNRC in fact distanced itself from thecompany by stating it did not tell themhow to run their plant and that theywere overseers of regulatory matters.Initially, the NRC was more interestedin hiding from responsibility thanoffering advice to the company.

“In an atmosphere of growinguncertainty about the condition ofthe plant, the governor ofPennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh,consulted with the NRC aboutevacuating the population near theplant. Eventually, he and NRCChairman Joseph Hendrie agreed thatit would be prudent for thosemembers of society most vulnerableto radiation to evacuate the area.Thornburgh announced that he wasadvising pregnant women and pre-school-age children within a 5-mileradius of the plant to leave the area.”The NRC’s agreed-upon conditions of areactor which would requireevacuation of nearby communities hadalready been met two days earlier onWednesday the 28th. GovernorThornburgh complained often aboutthe conflicting and confusing datacoming from the plant and the NRC.

“….even though it led to no deaths orinjuries to plant workers or membersof the nearby community.”Findings from the re-analysis of cancerincidence around Three Mile Island isconsistent with the theory thatradiation from the accident increasedcancer in areas that were in the path ofradioactive plumes. “This cancer

increase would not be expected tooccur over a short time in the generalpopulation unless doses were farhigher than estimated by industry andgovernment authorities,”. Rather, ourfindings support the allegation thatthe people who reported rashes, hairloss, vomiting and pet deaths after theaccident were exposed to high levelradiation and not only suffering fromemotional stress.” (Dr. Steven Wing,august 1996, University of NorthCarolina – Chapel Hill)

“But new concerns arose by themorning of Friday, March 30. Asignificant release of radiation fromthe plant’s auxiliary building,performed to relieve pressure on theprimary system and avoid curtailingthe flow of coolant to the core, causeda great deal of confusion andconsternation.”This was not by accident or design. Therelease was perpetrated by a loneoperator acting on his own andwithout permission or consultationwith anyone else. There were noregulatory repercussions resultingfrom his actions.

“Today, the TMI-2 reactor ispermanently shut down anddefueled, with the reactor coolantsystem drained, the radioactive waterdecontaminated and evaporated,radioactive waste shipped off-site toan appropriate disposal site, reactorfuel and core debris shipped off-siteto a Department of Energy facility,and the remainder of the site beingmonitored.”The reactor was destroyed. No oneknows how much fuel remains in thereactor core debris. Some estimateshave placed it at 20 tons of uranium.Unit #2 is still releasing smallamounts of radiation to the air andwater.

“The accident was caused by acombination of personnel error,design deficiencies, and componentfailures.”Also add to the list: criminal activity,the NRC’s failure to disseminate safetydata, NRC inspection and enforcementfailures, failure to fix problems notedby control room operators, sloppy

control room housekeeping andeconomic gain placed above safety.

“Upgrading and strengthening ofplant design and equipmentrequirements. This includes fireprotection…”A reactor safety division specificallycreated to spot problem trends in thewake of the TMI accident wasabolished by NRC executives in 1999.For more than a decade, the NRC wasaware that the fire protection materialThermolag was defective and burnedat the same rate as plywood. The NRCwas aware that Thermolag’smanufacturer has falsified test resultsyet did nothing to fix the problem.Finally the NRC asked TMI to removeThermolag. Two years after thatrequest, TMI was again asked toremove Thermolag. The NRC and TMIwere very slow to act.

“Expansion of NRC’s residentinspector program - first authorizedin 1977 - whereby at least twoinspectors live nearby and workexclusively at each plant in the U.S toprovide daily surveillance of licenseeadherence to NRC regulations…”At Davis-Besse, there was no chief in-spector for a year. Inspectors find lessthan 2% of problems identified at theplants. The NRC has decreased totalinspection man-hours in recent years.

“The installing of additionalequipment by licensees to mitigateaccident conditions, and monitorradiation levels and plant status…”The NRC no longer monitors radiationat the plants. On many occasions, thecommunication lines from the controlroom computers to the NRC are foundto be inoperable.

“Employment of major initiatives bylicensees in early identification ofimportant safety-related problems,and in collecting and assessing rele-vant data so lessons of experience canbe shared and quickly acted upon…”Oh, if this were only true. Drasticemployee cutbacks and overburdenedworkers and engineers have little timeand are reluctant to raise safety newissues. TMI Alert has learned of TMI

continued on page 14...

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200412

TMI 25TH ANNIVERSARYANTI-NUCLEAR EVENTS

talk by Kevin Kamps of NIRS, at the Science and Theology Seminarat the Wesley Foundation in West Lafayette, IN. Later that sameevening, World Pot Luck, “Crossroads and Crosswinds: Indiana inthe Crosshairs of Nuclear Danger” by Kevin Kamps, also in W.Lafayette. Contact Loren Olson, loren@dcwi.com, ph.765-743-0278.

Friday, March 26Three Mile Island-Alert Press Luncheon, Capitol Building, EastWing, Room E-60, Harrisburg, PA. Noon. Featuring David Lochbaum,Nuclear engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Dr. SteveWing, epidemiologist, University of North Carolina. Lochbaum,Wing, and Joseph Mangano, National Coordinator of the Radiationand Public Health Project, are also available for media interviewsfrom March 25 to March 27 at the Harrisburg Marriott Hotel, 4650Lindel Road, ph. 717.564.5511. Free potassium iodide pills andemergency preparedness guides available.

6 P.M. TMI-Alert showing of “China Syndrome” at MidtownCinema, 250 Reily St., Harrisburg, PA. Film includes Q&A onnuclear issues, featuring: David Lochbaum, UCS; Scott Portzline,security expert, TMI-Alert; Dr. Steve Wing, UNC. Tickets $15.Reservations on-line at www.acteva.com//booking.cfm?binid=1&bevaID=63764 or call TMI-Alert at717.233.7897 or 717.541.1101. Free potassium iodide pills andemergency preparedness guides available.

Saturday, March 27 and Sunday, March 28Cinemareno presents “The Atomic Film Festival” at the NevadaMuseum of Art (Reno, NV), featuring the films: Plutonium Circus,The Day after Trinity, Atomic Café, On the Beach, Meltdown atThree Mile Island, The China Syndrome, Panic in Year Zero, and Dr.Strangelove. For more info., visit www.highfalutinfilms.com/cinemareno/atominfo.htm

Saturday, March 27TMIA-Alert’s TMI 25th Anniversary Community Banquet atAmerican Legion Post #594, 137 East High Street, Middletown, PA17057, 6 to 9 P.M. A hot buffet dinner, with speakers, open miketime for remembrances, and music. Ticket Price: $20.00. Book yourticket on-line at www.acteva.com//booking.cfm?binid=1&bevaID=60074 or contact TMIA-Alert, ph.717.233.7897 or 717.541.1101.

TMIA-Alert Oral History Taping, 7 to 11 P.M. Taping of personalexperiences for the Dickinson Oral History Project will beconducted at the EFMR office at 213 South Union Street,Middletown, PA. No reservations required. Contact EFMR, ph.717.944.3007.

Sunday, March 28“TMI, Chernobyl, Who is Next?” No Nukes Pennsylvania AnnualVigil at the North Gate of Three Mile Island. Take Route 441 twomiles south of Middletown, PA. Gather at 3 A.M. Sunday, March 28,2004. Rain or snow. Speakers begin at 3:30 A.M. Moments ofsilence at the exact time of the accident at approximately 3:52 A.M.Individuals are encouraged to “Speak Out” until Vigil is over at firstlight.

Annual No Nukes Breakfast at Capitol City Diner off Route 283 atRoute 441 at about 6 A.M. Bring signs, pictures, songs, etc. to the

All events listed are taking place in the U.S.

March, 2004Photo display: “The People of Three Mile Island,” Harrisburg CityHall, 10 N. Market Square, Harrisburg, PA. Contact Angie McClurkin,Angmcclurkin@comcast.net. Free potassium iodide pills andemergency preparedness guides available.

Monday, March 15Sane Virginia and Blue Ridge Environmental Defense Leagueprotest actions against new nuclear reactors at the North Annanuclear power plant near Charlottesville. Public comments will besubmitted at the Louisa County Board of Supervisors mee-tingduring its annual review of the North Anna reactors. Street theaterwith giant puppets is being planned. Contact Abhaya Thiele withSane Virginia at saneva@yahoo.com, and Lou Zeller with BREDL atph. 336.982.2691, BREDL@skybest.com

Tuesday, March 23“Remember TMI.” Massachusetts Citizen Awareness Network(CAN) will show films in Greenfield, MA on March 23 at 7:00 P.M.,including “TMI Revisited.” There will be a discussion afterwardabout how people can become involved in preventing nuclearhazards. There may be a media conference. A “Mobile Chernobyl”full-size replica mock nuclear waste cask on a trailer will bedeployed. Contact Deb Katz, CAN, ph. 413.339.5781,deb@nukebusters.org

Press Debriefing – all day. TMI owner AmerGen will host a pressbriefing and tour of TMI at 10am. Three Mile Island Alert andEFMR Monitoring Group will provide a “debriefing” all day at theEFMR office at 213 South Union Street, Middletown, PA. Noreservations required. Contact EFMR, ph. 717.944.3007.

Wednesday, March 24(tentative: this event could also take place on Thurs., March 25th

or Tues., March 23rd) Congressional and media briefing, providingupdate on health and environmental problems in the TMIcommunity, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s regulatoryrollbacks (including gutting fire protections at reactors), thepending “nuclear power relapse” in the energy bill beforeCongress, and nuclear waste deregulation threats, all in the contextof precautionary actions needed to prevent nuclear hazards. LoisGibbs of the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice will host.Featured speakers include TMI watchdog Dr. Judith Johnsrud,members of the U.S. Congress, and spokespeople from NIRS,Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. Co-sponsored by Children’s Environmental Health Network. ContactDiane D’Arrigo at NIRS, ph. 202.328.0002 ext. 16, dianed@nirs.org

Thursday, March 25Noon rally on the Library Mall at the University of Wisconsin inMadison to confront UW’s role in pushing nuclear power andstalling clean energy, and to mark the 25th anniversary of the TMInuclear power plant disaster. Visit WI’s Nuclear Watch Dog website,www.WNWD.org, or call Clean Wisconsin at 608.251.7020.

Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 25th Anniversary Dinner, 6 to 10P.M., Friends Meeting House, 110 Tulane Terrace, Lancaster, PA.Contact Kip Adams, kipadams@yahoo.com12 noon, “Forever Deadly Radioactive Waste is Not Sustainable,”

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 13

Vigil. Bring your story for the video chronicle. Contact: Gene Stilp,Director, No Nukes Pennsylvania, 717-443-6421,genestilp@aol.com.

Salem Nuke Protest - Sunday March 28th from 2pm till 4pm atSalem Nuke Access Road, Lower Alloways Creek Township, NewJersey. Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of TMI Meltdown.Unplug Salem Now ! No TMI on the Delaware ! Speakers Include:Judith Johnsrud (TMI Alert), Paul Gunter (NIRS), David Lochbaum(UCS), Jane Nogaki (NJ Environmental Federation), Tony Totah(Clean Ocean Action), Joe Mangano (Tooth Fairy Project), NormCohen (UNPLUG Salem), Ray Shadis (New England Coalition onNuclear Pollution), Frieda Berryhill (Delaware’s Original Anti-NukeOrganizer), J. Roy Cannon (Delaware Green Party), Matt Ahearn (NJGreen Party), Maya Von Rossum (Delaware Riverkeeper, invited),Jim Riccio (Greenpeace, invited), PSEG Nuclear Whistleblower(invited), Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, The Eco-Chorale (GreenParty Singers). Solar Power Provided by LBI Solar. Contact NormCohen, ph. 609.601.8583, ncohen12@comcast.net, or visitwww.unplugsalem.org/

Monday, March 29“AVOID ANOTHER THREE MILE ISLAND.” Jersey Shore NuclearWatch afternoon meeting at Ocean County College. public meetingcalling for the immediate shutdown and decommissioning ofOyster Creek in observance of the 25th Anniversary of TMI .Speaker: Ray Shadis, decommissioning expert, helped shut downthe Maine Yankee on “How To Decommission Oyster CreekNuclear Generating Station.” Panel: Sidney Goodman, author of“Asleep At the Geiger Counter” and Edith Gbur, Jersey ShoreNuclear Watch. March 29, 7 to 9 P.M. Dover TownshipAdministration Building, 101 Hooper, Toms River, NJ. Contact EdithGbur, ph. 732.830.6565,. Visit.

March 29, 30, and 31Vermont Citizens Awareness Network, New England Coalition onNuclear Pollution, and Nuclear-Free Vermont will hold a three dayfilm festival, featuring “Three Mile Island Revisited” and vigil at theVermont Yankee nuclear reactor. Contact Deb Katz, CAN, ph.413.339.5781, deb@nukebusters.org

April to JuneArt exhibition at Penn State University-Harrisburg. Call for artists:hyperlink http://www.tmia.com http://www.tmia.com. ContactAngie McClurkin, hyperlink mailto:Angmcclurking@comcast.comAngmcclurking@comcast.com or Maureen Mulligan, hyperlinkmailto:maureenm@pa.net maureenm@pa.net.

Thursday, April 1Illinois State University Student Environmental Action Coalitionfollows up its successful Feb. “NRC: Nuclear Reality Conference” inBloomington-Normal with a celebration of April Fool’s Day,protesting Exelon Corporation’s foolish plans to build a newnuclear reactor in Clinton, IL. Contact Geoff Ower, ph.309.454.1836, hyperlink mailto:geoff@nukereality.orggeoff@nukereality.org or Dan Moriarty, ph. 309.451.1789,hyperlink mailto:dan@nukereality.org dan@nukereality.org. Visithyperlink http://www.nukereality.org www.nukereality.org.

Sunday, April 18A coalition of Long Island groups – Indian Point Safe EnergyCoalition, Mid-Island Radiation Alert, and PeaceSmiths will featurespeakers from near Indian Point and Three Mile Island nuclearpower plants and show the film “Three Mile Island: Accident

Without End.” 7 P.M., Cinema Art Centre, Huntington, Long Island.Contact Miriam Goodman, ph. 631.367.8581; Susan Blake, ph.631.226.1595

Tentative Plans:Contact the following for dates, times, and more details on events:

Connecticut Citizens Awareness Network, along with People’sAction for Clean Energy, CT Greens, and CRC will show films. A“Mobile Chernobyl” full-size replica mock nuclear waste cask on atrailer will be deployed. Contact Deb Katz, CAN, ph. 413.339.5781,hyperlink mailto:deb@nukebusters.org deb@nukebusters.org

Central New York Citizens Action Network will show videos andfeature nuclear whistleblowers. Contact Deb Katz, CAN, ph.413.339.5781, hyperlink mailto:deb@nukebusters.orgdeb@nukebusters.org

Westchester County (New York) Citizen Awareness Network, alongwith Riverkeeper and NYPIRG, are tentatively planning an eventregarding the Indian Point nuclear power plant. Contact Deb Katz,CAN, ph. 413.339.5781, hyperlink mailto:deb@nukebusters.orgdeb@nukebusters.org or Kyle Rabin, Riverkeeper, ph.845.424.4149 ext. 239krabin@riverkeeper.org.

Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League is tentativelyconsidering an event regarding the Catawba and McGuire nuclearpower plants in the western Carolinas. Contact Lou Zeller withBREDL, ph. 336.982.2691, BREDL@skybest.com

NC WARN (North Carolina Waste Awareness and ReductionNetwork) is tentatively planning events regarding the ShearonHarris and Brunswick nuclear power plants. Contact Jim Warren atph. 919.416.5077, jim@ncwarn.org, www.ncwarn.org

Mothers for Peace is pursuing its lawsuit against Pacific Gas andElectric’s Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and is considering aTMI accident anniversary event. Contact Rochelle Becker,beckers@thegrid.net, ph. 805.489.7420.

Citizen Alert in Las Vegas, Nevada has an event in the planningstages. They will deploy a “Mobile Chernobyl” full-size replicamock nuclear waste cask on a trailer. Contact Peggy Maze Johnson,ph. 702.796.5662, pmj1@citizenalert.org, www.citizenalert.org.

Indigenous Environmental Network has tentative plans regardinguranium mining and its member grassroots groups in the NativeAmerican environmental movement. Contact Bob Shimek, ph.218.751.4967, rshimek@ienearth.org.

Tentative (sometime between March 22 and 28) house party/letterwriting party with video showing in Beloit, OH (northeast OH).Contact Lisa Bays-Herold, ph. 330.525.0388, lisah@cannet.com.

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200414

employees who simply “up and quit”due to the excessive work load.

“July 1980 approximately 43,000curies of krypton were vented fromthe reactor building.”For 11 days, in June-July, 1980, Met Edillegally vented 43,000 curies of radio-active Krypton-85 (beta and gamma; 10year half life) and other radioactivegasses into the environ-ment withouthaving scrubbers in place.

In November 1980, the United StatesCourt of Appeals for the District ofColumbia ruled that the kryptonventing was illegal. By 1993, TMI-2evaporated 2.3 million gallons ofaccident generated radioactivegenerated water, including tritium aradioactive form of hydrogen (halflife; 12.5 years), into the atmospheredespite legal objections fromcommunity-based organizations.

Postscript:The NRC fails to point out that it hadignored for more than a year prior tothe accident, a newly discovered safetyproblem which did occur at TMI. Voids

in the coolant created by a poor designof piping caused reactor pumps tocavitate and vibrate violently. Thesevibrations threatened to destroy thepumps. The coolant pumps had to beturned off during the height of theaccident.

The NRC’s role in the accident is oneof tacit permissiveness. The attitude ofthe industry was criticized by thePresident’s Commission above allother factors. Three Mile Island Alerthas observed that safety conditionsand attitudes are returning to the levelevidenced by the industry in 1979.

Many of the so called “permanent”changes have been downgraded sincethe time of their installation. The NRCinspectors have little confidence in thenewly implemented regulatory processaccording to a January 2000 GAOinvestigation. The new regulatoryprocess handcuffs the ability ofinspectors to pursue safety problemsat the plants. Unless a suspiciouscondition is deemed clearlydangerous, the new process doesn’tallow the implementation of otherthan routine inspections.

The Davis-Besse near miss is a primeexample. The NRC did not have aresident inspector there for one year.Although there was clear evidence of aleaking reactor, the NRC initiallydenied possession of the “smokinggun” – a picture of the red crud whichhad formed on the outside of thereactor vessel. The NRC had in factignored the problem to allow the plantto continue operating; determiningthat something is clearly dangerous isapparently still a subjective skill at theNRC.

There are many outstanding safetyissues identified by the NRC followingthe accident which have still not beencorrected. One example is thevulnerability of electrical cablesduring an accident which canelectrically short circuit. Anotherexample is the PORV valve whichreleased the coolant during theaccident – it is still not rated as a“safety item.”

Source and contact: Three Mile IslandAlert - March 2004; The above is anexcerpt of the critique, contacttmia@tmia.com for the full version

UNREALISTIC EMERGENCY PLANNINGThere is no disputing that the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island caught federal andPennsylvania officials without any civilian emergency plan. What NRC and industry had thought wasan “incredible” event, did in fact, occurr. Amid complaints from Pennsylvania Governor RichardThornburg of conflicting, confusing and misleading information from both NRC and MetropolitanEdison, the utility that operated TMI, the governor’s subsequent “advisory” to evacuate wasscrambled together and issued three days after the accident.(605-606.5589) NIRS - Now twenty-five years on, the picture of emergencyplanning for a nuclear power accidentis much different. But are currentplans adequate to protect populationsfrom a catastrophic release of radia-tion, particularly with the newly-understood threat of terrorist attacks?

Plans for a nuclear reactor accidentnow outline evacuation routes andestablish reception centers for thoseseeking radiation monitoring,decontamination and medicalattention. State and local governments,with support from the Federalgovernment and utilities, developplans that include a radiation plume

emergency planning zone (forsheltering and evacuation) within aradius of 10 miles (18 km), and aningestion planning zone (sheltering ofcows and stored feed) within a radiusof 50 miles (80 km) from the reactor.

Residents within the 10-mileemergency-planning zone (EPZ) arerequired to be provided withemergency information materials (viabrochures, the phone book, calendars,utility bills, etc.). These materialscontain information on radiation,instructions for evacuation andsheltering, special arrangements forthe handicapped, contacts foradditional information, etc.

However, current emergency plans forpopulations living and workingaround nuclear power stations remainunrealistic in several importantaspects and are likely to fail. Thefundamental flaw is that plans do nottake into consideration the naturalbehavior of people seek to protectthemselves and their families in theevent of a nuclear accident.

The lessons learned from the ThreeMile Island accident should providevery important experience foremergency planners to seriouslyconsider the viability of successfullyexecuting nuclear accident emergencyplans. A study of human response in

continued from page 11...

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 15

the aftermath of TMI was published in“Evacuation Behavior In Response ToNuclear Power Plant Accidents,” byDonald Zeigler and James Johnson, Jr.in the May, 1984 issue of TheProfessional Geographer.

Here are some of their findings:

1. To plan for only a 10-mileevacuation is to significantly underplan for a nuclear power stationaccident.

The 10-mile emergency-planning zoneis a politically arbitrary distance. It hasno bases in meteorology, radiationreleases mechanisms and humanbehavior. In fact studies of humanbehavior following the TMI accident,where a limited evacuation advisorywas issued by Governor Thornburg,provides evidence that people willspontaneously leave their homes wellbeyond the current 10-mile EPZ. Thishuman behavior phenomenon hasbeen termed the “evacuation shadoweffect.” The evacuation shadow isdetermined by people who believethemselves to be at risk and whoevacuate even though they have notbeen ordered or advised to do so byofficials. The study of human behavioraround the TMI accident showed that ifthe government had advised onlypeople, specifically pregnant mothersand pre-school children, within a 5mile radius, that number would havebeen about 3400 evacuees.

Instead, as many as 200,000 peopleactually evacuated, approximately 39%of the population within 15 miles ofthe reactor. The “shadow” evacuationphenomenon is not expected todiminish until approximately 25 milesout from the reactor. The study foundthat in addition to the high rate ofvoluntary evacuation, those evacueestended to travel distances muchgreater than has been observed inprevious studies on non-nuclearrelated evacuation behavior(hurricanes, floods, etc.). The TMIstudy evidenced that the mediandistanced traveled by evacuees was 85miles. The NRC commissioned a study(Flynn 1979) that evidenced an averagedistance of 100 miles of travel.

2. To locate all of the public sheltersand reception centers immediatelybeyond the 10-mile EPZ is to invitechaos and failure of the plan.

Currently all shelters and receptioncenters for evacuees within the currentplanning zone are located in a 10-20mile range from reactors. Anyonetaking shelter in them will likelywatch the resident population packinto their cars and head farther away.Ionizing radiation is such a dreadedinvisible threat that people will wantto put as much distance as possiblebetween them and the accident site.Because of their close proximity, asignificant percentage of shelter andreception center personnel areunlikely to report for duty.

3. To depend on buses to evacuatepopulations without cars (schoolchildren, the elderly, prison andhospital populations) is to ignore roleconflicts within the emergencypersonnel designated as drivers andsupervisors vital to successfulevacuation.

Those people depended upon to drivebuses are unlikely to be professionalemergency workers. They may delayresponse as a result of role conflictbetween emergency duty and home.They may not respond at all and tendto their families. Social surveys ofpersonnel with assigned emergencyduties indicate the strong potential forrole conflict to interfere with themanagement of a nuclear emergency.Research conducted in the vicinity ofthe now closed Shoreham nuclearpower station on Long Island, NYquestioned bus drivers and volunteerfireman “What do you think youwould do first if an accident requiringa full scale evacuation of thepopulation within 10 miles of thenuclear reactor were to occur?”

The results found that 68% of 291 firefighters, 73% of the 246 bus driversindicated that family obligationswould take precedence over emer-gency duties. The consequence of suchchoice would be a failed response tothe nuclear emergency.

During the TMI accident, role conflictwas documented among many of theemergency workers including theexodus of physicians, nurses, andtechnicians required to staff both theshort term and long term medicalfacilities. At one local hospital, onlysix of 70 physicians scheduled forweekend emergency duty reported forwork. None of the hospitals researchedin the study were in the 5 mile radiusof the evacuation advisory. Otherinstances of role conflict includePennsylvania National Guard and evennuclear power plant workers.

Current emergency planning guide-lines for children in schools locatedwithin the EPZ for every reactor relyexclusively upon their teachers andchild care providers to supervisestudents and children through thesheltering-in-place at a facility or anevacuation to a distant “receptioncenter” for the duration of the emer-gency or until each student or child isreleased to an authorized adult.

Parents of these children are offeredbland assurance that their childrenwill be cared for should a radiologicalemergency at the nuclear powerstation occur. This is false andmisleading assurance. No state has thestatutory authority to require non-civildefense employees to participate in anemergency plan for nuclear powerstations. A mandate for non-civildefense employees to participate inthe event of a nuclear accidentpresents the unconstitutionalconscription of private citizens. Stateauthorities should be challenged onthis unconstitutional practice andrequired to plan for the provision ofappropriate civil defense personnel.

4. To package information for radio-logical accident emergency planningas similar to an emergency responseto other disasters (i.e. hurricanes) isto ignore that there are majordifferences in how people respond tothese very different events.

Nuclear reactor operators andemergency planners characterizenuclear disaster planning as nodifferent than that for a hurricane orsome other disaster, but the public

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200416

clearly perceives a difference of threatand consequences between a nuclearmeltdown and a hurricane. Nuclearutilities, state emergency planningagencies and the NRC refuse toacknowledge these distinct differencesin the actual threat, public perceptionsand fears of the harm that can occur asthe result of an accident on the scale ofChernobyl, and other catastrophes.

The harm derived from a nuclear acci-dent both short term and long termincludes deadly radiation sickness,cancer, birth defects and spontaneousabortions. The magnitude of publicresponse to be greater than an evacua-tion from a natural disaster should beacknowledged and factored intoemergency planning and exercises.Instead, nuclear power regulators,industry officials and state authoritiesdownplay the biological impact ofexposure to a radiological accident.

5. To expect to “manage” anevacuation is unrealistic.

People will manage their ownevacuation response and will attemptto rescue their children and families

first. They will head out in their owncars as quickly as possible and try toget on the few available roads and willslow or halt the entire evacuationprocess, likely trapping the intendedevacuees in traffic closer to the reactorand most immediately under anyescaping radiation plume.

With nuclear power becomingincreasingly uneconomical, emergencyplanning is likely to come underincreased scrutiny and the budgetaryknife of the NRC and the nuclearindustry to further reduce“unnecessary regulatory burden” andthe associated costs to a deregulatedelectric industry.

Regulations governing theestablishment of the 10 mile radiushave already been targeted by industryto be reduced to 5 miles underjustification that revised estimates ofthe “source term,” or the amount ofradiation likely to be released in acatastrophic accident, are much less.One utility figured a 75% saving inreduced emergency siren maintenancecosts and public informationdistribution. There is also the ongoing

industry effort to minimize theappearance of a threat from nuclearpower to the public eye.

The industry and regulatory changesdo little to build public confidence inthe intent and sincerity of efforts tofirst provide for the health and safetyof large populations living in theshadow of an aging and increasinglydangerous nuclear power industry. Infact, profit driven changes or attemptsto minimize the impact of a radio-logical accident further erode publicconfidence in emergency planning aswell as the planning authorities.

Regardless of the federal regulations,local and state authorities have thepower to realistically plan foremergency in case of catastrophicnuclear accidents. The first step in thatprocess is to demand answers to theseoutstanding questions and manyothers. Officials must also opposeunrealistic economically-drivenchanges to already faulted planning.

Contact: Paul Gunter at NIRS

MOBILE MELTDOWN - TMI TRAINTROUBLESTMI-Unit 2 became operable in March 1978 but due to numerous problems and shutdowns, the reactorhad operated effectively for just three months prior to the accident. During the accident, the relativelynew fuel came within half an hour of melting through the reactor vessel, the precursor for the proverbial“China syndrome,” in which the fuel would burn its way down to the underground water table, causingmassive radioactive steam discharges in the environment.

(605-606.5590) NIRS - Five years afterits meltdown, the reactor vessel headfrom TMI-2 was removed and between1985 and 1990, the reactor waspartially “defueled.” A portion of thefuel that had melted then turned into ahardened mass was chopped out of thereactor vessel, to be shipped off toIdaho for “interim” storage. At onepoint, the workers responsible forremoving the fuel had to stop becausethey could not see through the vesselcoolant water. A population explosionof mutant microorganisms (“algae,fungi, bacteria, and aerobic andanaerobic organisms”) was apparently

thriving in the highly radioactivewater, making it opaque and cloggingup the filters. After trying variousunsuccessful and unsafe biocideconcoctions, massive infusions ofhydrogen peroxide finally restoredvisibility. (1)

It should be noted that not all theirradiated nuclear fuel was removedfrom the destroyed TMI core. InAugust 1993, Dr. Michio Kaku,professor of Nuclear Physics, CityUniversity of New York, evaluatedstudies conducted or commissioned byGPU [General Public Utilities, then-

owner of the TMI plant] and the NRCon the amount of fuel left in TMI-2. “Itappears that every few months, since1990, a new estimate is made of coredebris, often with little relationship tothe previous estimate…,” Dr. Kakuconcluded. “…[E]stimates range from608.8 kg to l,322 kg [1,342 pounds to2,915 pounds]... This is ratherunsettling... The still unansweredquestions are therefore: precisely howmuch uranium is left in the core, andhow much uranium can collect in thebottom of the reactor to initiate re-criticality.” (2)

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 17

Eric Epstein of TMI-Alert told theauthors of Critical Hour (see bookreview) that as of 2003, no more wasknown about the quantity of fissiledebris remaining in the core. Theutility says it will keep the facility inlong-term, monitored storage until theoperating license for the TMI-1 reactorexpires, at which time both reactorswill be decommissioned. However, theexpiration date of 2014 could beextended until 2034 if Exelon appliesfor what has become a near automaticlicense extension from the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC). (3)

The removed portion of the severelydamaged nuclear fuel was transportedby train to the Department of Energy’s(DOE) Idaho National EngineeringLab. (INEL) and between 1986 and1990, at least 22 separate shipmentswere conducted through statesbetween Pennsylvania and Idaho. Allpassed through St. Louis, Missouri.The two dozen shipments involved notonly broken fuel rods, but also brokenpromises, speed limits and safetyrequests that bode ill for the nuclearestablishment’s Yucca Mountain dumpscheme.

The DOE was in charge of these TMI-2fuel debris shipments, just as it wouldbe in charge of the Yucca Mountainshipments. DOE and the train compa-nies hired to haul the high-levelradioactive waste (HLRW) casks toIdaho were asked by the City of St.Louis not to exceed 35 miles (56 km)per hour, however, TMI-2 shipmentswere observed traveling at 65 (105 km)mph. A promise was made to St. Louisarea officials that TMI-2 trains wouldnot pass through the metropolitanarea during rush hour, but thisagreement was also violated. (4)

DOE continues to violate agreementswith Missouri to date. In June 2001,three truckloads of irradiated fuelfrom a German research reactor en-route from South Carolina to Idahopassed through Missouri populationcenters during rush hour, and pulledover at an unauthorized locationduring a fierce rainstorm, againcontrary to prior agreements. (5)

The federal Environmental Assessmentfor the TMI-2 shipments had assumedonly one high-level radioactive wastecask per train shipment. The “Findingof No Significant Impact” equaled agreen light for the shipments toproceed and indeed, the very firstshipment, which passed through St.Louis on July 22, 1986 carried only onecask. Though just over two monthslater the second shipment carried twocasks, an unanalyzed condition thatwas repeated numerous times byshipments carrying two and some-times three casks.

The shipping casks themselves alsoposed problems, during both designand fabrication. For example, residualwater was unavoidably entrapped inthe shipping canisters during fuelloading. The release of hydrogen andoxygen gases caused by the exposure ofthe water molecules to radioactiveparticles and rays emitted by the fuel,known as radiolysis meant “recom-biner catalysts” had to be installed ineach fuel canister to combine the gasesback into water, in an effort to reducethe generation of combustible gasmixtures. Some of the canisters werealso found to have defective O-rings –the type of seal blamed for the 1986Challenger space shuttle disaster. (4)

Borated neutron-moderators had to beincluded in the canisters to protectagainst a criticality accident. Suchprecautions against inadvertent chainreactions in the still-fissile HLRW arenecessary in most shipping containers,although the amount of boratedneutron moderators required shouldvary with the quantity, age, enrichmentlevel, history and condition of theirradiated fuel.

Perhaps the most dramatic accidentinvolving TMI-2 meltdown shipments

took place on 24 March, 1987 when thetrain, carrying two HLRW casks,collided with a car that had stalled onthe tracks in St. Louis. (4)

The fourteenth shipment through St.Louis, on Feb. 9, 1988 caused anothertype of anxiety among city officialsand emergency responders. The traincarried three HLRW casks, separatedby “buffer” cars. According to a cityofficial who spoke on condition ofanonymity (4), two buffer cars weremarked with hazardous materialsplacards declaring that they containedcalcium carbide. Calcium carbide is anunstable chemical that reacts violentlywith water, generating a highlyflammable gas. In case of a fireinvolving calcium carbide, water mustnot be used. In addition to beingincompatible with moisture and water,calcium carbide must be kept awayfrom strong oxidizing agents,hydrogen chloride, and magnesium.(6) Needless to say, St. Louis officialsresponsible for public safety were nothappy to see flammable calciumcarbide cars mixed in with melteddown HLRW from TMI!

The officials investigated the buffercars while the train was stopped in arail yard in East St. Louis, Illinois.According to some accounts, thesubstance in the buffer cars turned outto be crushed limestone. Was thebuffer car mistakenly marked?Regardless of whether the buffer carswere empty, contained limestone, oractually contained calcium carbide,their placards would have stoppedfirefighters from using water to douseflames in the event of a fire involvingthe shipment. HLRW casks are onlydesigned to withstand low tempera-ture fire (1,475 degree Fahrenheit, 800degrees Celsius) for 30 minutes. Suchlabeling mistakes could interfere withemergency response, risking harmfulradioactive releases.

More frightening still, U.S. federalregulations allow HLRW to be shippedby trains carrying mixed freight andcould be located between explosivesand flammables on a train. For years,DOE – apparently in a bid to savemoney – has strongly resisted calls by

St. Louis officialsresponsible for publicsafety were not happy tosee flammable calciumcarbide cars mixed in withmelted down HLRW fromTMI!

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200418

the American Association of Railroads,environmental and public safetygroups, and concerned state and localgovernments to only ship HLRW ondedicated trains. The highways andwaterways across the U.S. are alsomixing bowls for hazardous, flam-mable, and explosive shipments thatcould potentially breach HLRW trans-port containers in a severe accident.

Another scare was caused by thesixteenth TMI fuel debris shipment, on24 May, 1988. During a transferbetween the Conrail and the UnionPacific train lines, after the Conraillocomotive had been disconnected, therest of the train – TMI-2 waste casks,buffer cars, and caboose – rolled about600 feet (180 meters) before a railwayworker could run after it, jumpaboard, and hand-crank a wheel on topof the train to engage the brakes. (4)

How much radioactivity was containedin these two dozen shipments throughSt. Louis? The nuclear firm EG&Gestimated the radioactivity content atover three million curies. Comparethat to the total of two curies ofradioactivity used at one time at theworld-class Washington Universitymedical center in its thousand labsthat use radioisotopes for research! (4)

A secret DOE train shipment carriedtwo casks of damaged fuel rods acrossthe U.S. in July 2003. (7) The shipmentoriginated at the shutdown commer-cial irradiated-fuel reprocessingfacility at West Valley, New York. Itvery likely traveled through statesfrom Pennsylvania to Idaho (8) beforethe casks ended up at INEL. There thewaste, originally from the Big RockPoint reactor in Michigan and theGinna reactor in New York, was placedin “interim” outdoor dry-cask storage.

This shipment closely followed theroute traveled by the two dozen TMIfuel debris shipments over a decadeearlier, with an important exception:it apparently bypassed St. Louis to thenorth, entering Missouri at Hannibaland exiting at Kansas City. (8) Both theTMI shipments and the West Valleyshipment avoided traveling throughChicago. In fact, DOE explicitly stated

it had chosen the West Valley shipmentroute based in large part on “popula-tion along the route and potential riskto the public.” (9) DOE’s Yucca Moun-tain transport plan does not mandatethe avoidance of major populationcenters. Originally scheduled to roll inOctober 2001, the shipment wasdelayed almost two years due toconcerns over terrorism (10).

In addition, the DOE and NRC agreedthat the casks, with uncertified seals,were not to travel between 31 Octoberand 1 April in order to avoid extremecold weather conditions. (11) In fact,St. Louis would experience one to twotruck shipments per day, or two tothree train casks per week, on average,for three decades. (12) Rail yards justoff downtown Chicago would besubjected to one train cask out of everythree train casks bound for Yucca. (13)

According to the NRC, the TMI-2irradiated fuel debris shipped acrossthe continent is currently stored in drycasks at DOE’s Idaho National Lab (14).

Given the problems experienced by thetwo dozen TMI-2 shipments passingthrough St. Louis, it is frightening tothink about the broad range ofpotential mishaps that could occur ifthe DOE were to ship many tens ofthousands of HLRW casks across thenation to Yucca Mountain. We all needto work to stop this radioactiveRussian roulette on the roads and railsbefore it begins.

Contact: Kevin Kamps at NIRS andKay Drey on +1 314.725.7676.

References:(1) U.S. NRC, NUREG-0090, Appendix B,“Update of Previously Reported AbnormalOccurrences,” update to Vol. 8, No. 4, asof April 20, 1986, pgs. 41-42.(2) Michio Kaku quoted in “Three MileIsland at Nineteen,” April 3, 1998, EricEpstein, Three Mile Island Alert,Harrisburg, PA. See: www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/PA_Env-Her/tmi/tmiEpstein.htm(3) www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.htmlaccessed March 4, 2004.(4) Interviews with Kay Drey inUniversity City, Missouri March 2004.(5) Bill Bell, Jr., “Holden Says Radioactive

Shipment Was Bungled: GovernorCharges That Federal Agency BrokePromises on Moving Wastes,” St. LouisPost-Dispatch, Nov. 1, 2001.(6) According to the Physical andTheoretical Chemistry Laboratory atOxford University,www.physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/CA/calcium_carbide.html, accessed March 4,2004.(7) “Public Interest Groups CriticizeHandling of Recent Nuclear WasteShipment from Western New York toIdaho: Secret Nuclear ShipmentEndangered Local Communities,” PublicCitizen Critical Mass Energy andEnvironment Program press release, Aug.11, 2003, www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1523(8) “U.S. Department of Energy WestValley Nuclear Fuel Shipment Routes 12A& 12B,” in “West Valley Spent NuclearFuel Shipment: Resource Guide,”published by Westinghouse West ValleyNuclear Services Company and INEELBechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC, for U.S. DOE,undated but mailed to NIRS spring 2001,page 21.(9) “DOE FACT: West Valley SpentNuclear Fuel Shipment Route,” a factsheet, undated but downloaded fromwww.wvnsco.com/Fuel_Ship_Route.htmon Feb. 8, 2001.(10) “U.S. Dept. of Energy SuspendsAtomic Waste Train Due to TerroristThreat,” NIRS press release, Oct. 26,2001.(11) NRC Safety Evaluation Reports forthe two casks (Docket Nos. 71-9202 and –9206, Revision No. 7), March 19, 2001;personal communication with JohnChamberlain, West Valley NuclearServices/Demonstration Project, NewYork, July 9, 2001.(12) DOE Yucca Mt. Final EnvironmentalImpact Statement, Feb. 2002, pgs. J-173and 174.(13) Robert Halstead, Nuclear WasteTransport Consultant to State of NevadaSpent Fuel Project office, on CBS “60Minutes,” Oct. 26, 2003. See additionalHalstead analyses at www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans.htm(14) www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/locations.html, accessed March 4,2004.

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 19

TMI’S INTERNATIONAL IMPACTIn the days, weeks and months following the accident at Three Mile Island, the world witnessedunprecedented protests against nuclear power. Tens of thousands of people demonstrated incountries across western Europe, Japan and Australia as well as in the United States, where up to120,000 people protested in Washington DC – the largest protest in the U.S. since Vietnam. BeforeTMI, a large portion of the public had viewed anti-nuclear protestors as over-anxious extremistsaccording to pro-nuclear propaganda. Afterwards, many joined the movement to oppose what theyhad come to recognize as a clear and present danger.

(605-606.5591) WISE Amsterdam –There were of course accidents, and“incidents”, at nuclear power plantsbefore the Harrisburg meltdown but aconspiracy of silence had alwayssurrounded earlier events.

Information concerning the real risksof nuclear power generation wasrigorously censored – nuclear powerhad been mostly successfully packagedas the savior that would rescue us fromthe clutches of the oil-rich and cash-hunger nations holding the energyresource poor West to ransom. Theambitious nuclear programs would,the industry claimed, breakdependence on imported oil once andfor all.

Nuclear energy had been purported bymany, including U.S. President Carteras the “last resort” to source thegrowing energy demands of theworld’s population. After World WarII, scientists had claimed that nuclearenergy would fuel everything fromaircraft, lorries and ships in additionto being the main source of cheap,readily available domestic fuel.

In the desperate search for energyalternatives, governments rushed tothe nuclear option taking little note ofcautionary voices. Both governmentsand the industry claimed that nuclearfuel was clean, cheap and safe – thatthe public had nothing to worry about;until it did…

The cause and extent of the Harrisburgaccident was and still is hotly debated.Several of the articles earlier in thisnewsletter have detailed the truths andmyths surrounding TMI but 25 yearsafter, there is still no true consensus –except amongst the like-minded.Nuclear proponents argue at every

opportunity that despite the severityof the event, the accident had beensuccessfully contained which provedthat safety measures did work.

Protective systems were said to havefunctioned as they should and had itnot been for those pesky humanoperators… In their cataract-cloudedeyes, and according to their dubiouscalculations, the damage to theenvironment and human beings wasminimal and any reports to thecontrary were plain scare mongering.

Despite the assurances, there was ahuge wave of suspicion anddissatisfaction, people were awakeningto the fact that they had been misledand misinformed and turned to theanti-nuclear movement for answers.Environmental organizations wereable to voice opposition at a muchhigher pitch and with more supportersas people rightly began to question theword of their governments.

Dwindling public confidence wasbecoming a serious threat to nuclear

INESThe International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) was developed by the IAEA andOECD in 1990 to standardize the reporting of nuclear incidents and accidents andcommunicate them to the public. The scale starts at zero for no safetysignificance to goes up to 7 for a “major accident”, like Chernobyl. TMI was ratedat 5, an accident with off-site risks though of no harm to human life – this pointof course is debatable especially given the evidence contained in this newsletter.www.uic.com

Nuclear Safety ConventionThe first international legal instrument on the safety of nuclear power plantsworldwide came into force in 1996. Participating countries are committed tomaintaining a high level of safety by subscribing to and reporting against setinternational benchmarks.www.uic.com

Defense in DepthA concept based on several levels of protection based on the introduction ofsuccessive barriers preventing the dispersal of radioactive material in theenvironment (so-called multi-barriers concept). There are two levels ofprotection: prevention – protection of the barriers by averting damage to thefacilities and barriers themselves; and correction – additional measures toprotect the environment should successive barriers prove ineffective.www.avn.be/uk/4_nucleaire/did_fr.asp

Globalized co-ordination on nuclear safety issuesThis is based on the idea that “an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere”.The importance of global information networks for sharing operationalexpertise; international peer reviews to identify ‘best practice’ to help allcountries raise operational standards; and the candid dissemination of lessonslearnt when problems are discovered.www.iaea.org

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200420

In the WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor (and formerly the WISE News Communique)we reported news about the aftermath of the TMI disaster on several occasions.An introduction to the most important articles can be found in this box. You canread the articles by visiting our website at www.antenna.nl/wise and find therelevant issue through “newsletter” in the menu.

WISE Bulletin 5 (May/June 1979): Harrisburg accident sets off chain reactionaround the worldAn overview of actions in several countries, following the TMI disaster, wheretens of thousands of people gathered to demonstrate.

WISE News Communique 467 (28 February 1997): Study reexamines 1979 TMIaccident cancerA review by NIRS of the 1997 study by Steve Wing, published in theEnvironmental Health Perspective. He conducted a reevaluation of the ColumbiaUniversity Three Mile Island study, often cited as evidence that the accidentcaused no ill effects. Wing discovered that people living closer to the path of theescaping radiation cloud developed all cancer types more frequently, especiallylung cancer and leukemia.

WISE News Communique 488 (13 March 1998): Investigators suspectedsabotage at TMIScott Portzline reports that sabotage might have been a possible cause of theaccident. He draws his conclusions based on 30,000 pages of documents at theNational Archives and NRC. The accident started when valves in a condensorsystem closed - the reason remains unknown. The analysis by Portzlineconcludes that sabotage could never be excluded.

WISE News Communique 507 (26 March 1999): Twenty years of problems atTMIWritten by Three Mile Island Alert, an overview of 20 years of problems at TMI.On the costs of the cleanup and incidents during decommissioning work.

WISE News Communique 538 (10 November 2000): 21 Years later,government denies Three Mile Island accident was extraordinaryTwenty-one years (!) after Public Citizen petitioned the federal government todeclare the accident at TMI an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the agencyfinally responded. According to the NRC, the meltdown was not extraordinary.The NRC denied substantial personal damage, which is the criteria for anextraordinary occurrence.

WISE News Communique 554 (21 September 2001): U.S. attacks: the ThreeMile Island connectionThe World Trade Center was the target of a terrorist bombing in 1993, by a groupthat trained near TMI. According to Three Mile Island Alert, there is evidencethat the terrorists trained only 30 miles (50 km) from TMI, where they practicednight time mock assaults on an electrical power substation. Four days after thebombing, the New York Times received a letter, subsequently authenticated byfederal authorities, in which the terrorists threatened to attack additional targetsincluding “nuclear targets” with “150 suicide soldiers”.

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 567 (8 November 2002): Science for sale: TMI andthe University of PittsburghEric Epstein (TMI Alert and EFMR Monitoring Group) criticizes a University ofPittsburgh study, which suggests no increased cancer rates around TMI. Heconcludes that the Pittsburgh study was based on old and inaccurate healthsurveys in the 1980s, basically funded by the industry.

FURTHER READING AT WISE WEBSITEgrowth and in 1981, the head of theInternational Energy Agency, Dr. UlfLantzke argued that an internationalprogram of action was required torestore the image of the nuclearindustry.

Waning public support was not theonly barrier to growth however.Climbing construction costs and highinterest rates also played a part inincreasing the difficulties faced by theutilities. The false claims ofeconomical nuclear power were slowlybecoming more evident as opponentsgained more access to information andlearnt how to share it with the public.

In the direct aftermath of the accident,nuclear countries – especially thoseusing U.S. style reactors – rushed theirnuclear experts to Pennsylvania tostudy the causes of the accident andplan reviews of their own programs inan attempt to prevent such an event intheir own countries.

There were some minor concessions tothe anti-nuclear movement withGermany leading the way by“postponing” plans for a reprocessingplant at Gorleben. The Dutchgovernment also postponed a wastedisposal scheme while in the U.S.,Babcock & Wilcox (makers of the TMIreactors) plants were closed.

Despite these initial concessions somegovernments were not in the leastdeterred from their chosen nuclearpath. France for one, was not forturning. Its officials assured thecountry that an accident such as that atTMI could not occur in France becauseautomatic controls and coolingsystems were completely different tothose at TMI. Japan also refused tomake any immediate changes in itsenergy policy but promised to increasesafety measures and revise andreinforce systems as required.

Some political resistance againstnuclear in view of TMI did emerge andin Spain, socialist and communistparties called for a nuclearmoratorium while in Belgium themayor of the town Huy, ordered theimmediate shutdown of the Tihange

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 21

www.besafenet.com/nuclear.htm. BESAFE precautionary campaign is acoalition of national, state and localgroups (including NIRS) organizingeducational events from March 22ndto 28th to commemorate the disasterand to call for actions to preventnuclear hazards.

www.tmia.com. The probably mostextensive website in the 1979 disasterby Three Mile Island Alert. Containsdetailed information about the firstdays of the event, the history ofsafety problems at TMI, pictures ofdeformed plants and animals.

www.efmr.org. The EFMR MonitoringNetwork is an independent radiationmonitoring group near TMI and thePeach Bottom NPP. The network iscomprised of citizens whom eachrecord five radiation measurementsper day.

www.tmi-cmn.org. The website ofThree Mile Island Citizen MonitoringNetwork, a local grassrootsorganization. The system uses 30

remote stations to monitor radiationlevels around TMI.

www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/page.cfm?pageID=183. An analysisby the Union of Concerned Scientists(UCS) on the lessons learned from thesafety point of view, but also thatsome of the lessons were ignored orforgotten.

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html. The U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission’s fact sheet on TMI(which was criticized elsewhere in thisMonitor). Includes a diagram of theplant’s systems that were involved inthe events.

www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf36.htm.Information by the World NuclearAssociation.

www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=294. Factsheet by the U.S. Nuclear EnergyInstitute (NEI).

The following list consists of websites with more information and stories on TMI.The list includes both anti-nuclear and governmental/industry websites.

WEBSITES ON TMI

PWR that had experienced twoaccidents in 1978 – the decision waslater overturned by ministerial order.

In Sweden, political opposition led bythe former Prime Minister, Tor BjornFalldin, who had resigned in 1978 in adispute over the country’s nuclearprogram, demanded the governmentclose down Ringhals-2 reactor – thesame reactor type as TMI. The Danishparliament also debated the questionas some 25,000 of its people protestedagainst two Barsebäck reactors inSweden, some 20 km fromCopenhagen.

Investigations following the accidentled to a focus on the human factorsinvolved in the operation of nuclearpower plants. Previous insistence thatnuclear was perfectly safe hadcontributed to lax safety by operatorsand those investigating the accidentconsidered this the most importantfactor in ensuring no repetition ofsuch an event.

Mostly attributed to mechanicalfailure and human error, one of themain outcomes of the meltdown wasthat no major design changes wererequired for western reactors but thatcontrols and implementation ofoperator training were to beoverhauled and improved.

Twenty-five years on from the world’sfirst significant meltdown accident in anuclear power plant, we still liveunder a nuclear cloud. The nuclearindustry is again beating the “revival/renaissance” drum and again, we arewatching as governments continue toencourage the dangerous view thatnuclear is our best option for energygeneration.

Despite all the documented evidenceregarding the enormous andunrecoverable costs of nuclear powernot to mention the risks –proliferation, health and theenvironment – the political will forchange is still not there.

Finland has become the first westernEuropean country in at least a decadeto order a new reactor while France,

the UK and U.S. are also believed to beconsidering new reactor projects. Theill-advised South African governmentis moving towards building theuntried pebble-bed modular reactor(PBMR) and in East Asia, plantconstruction site are growing rapidly.

If the lessons of accidents such as TMIand Chernobyl are ever to be learnt,those who still remember the horrorof those accidents must continue totalk, shout, teach and cajole theunknowing to our point of view.

Anniversaries such as this willundoubtedly bring sorrow to thevictims and survivors but they mustalways be used to remind those withtelevision commercial-lengthmemories of the true horrors ofnuclear in all its forms in the hopethat one day soon, we will be able toconvince governments to stop puttingour lives at peril.

Sources:The Telegraph Journal, 2 & 5 April1979; Financial Times, 19 April 1979;WISE Bulletin May/June 1979;Financial Times, 4 February 1981;Financial Times, 13 June 2001; IEEESpectrum, November 2001;www.nei.org, March 2004; UraniumInformation Center, November 2003;IAEA, 14 October 2003;www.bellona.org, 22 September 2003

Contact: WISE Amsterdam

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606, 12 March 200422

Kyrgyzstan bans German waste.Kyrgyzstan will not allow waste ura-nium imports from Germany, PrimeMinister Nikolay Tanayev said on 26February. The government will notpermit the imports because it does notwant to see the country turned into auranium waste dump. However, localmedia reported the uranium refineryin Kara-Balta had signed a contractwith Germany’s RWE Nukem GmbH toprocess 1,800 tons of uranium scrapwaste from fuel fabrication. Therefinery will result in 40 to 60 tons ofnatural uranium, keep the remainingwaste in the refinery’s tailing storagefacility and will earn a profit of aboutU$600,000.Washington Times (United PressInternational), 26 February 2004;NuclearFuel, 1 March 2004

Nirex says radioactive waste clean upis blocked. The U.K. nuclear industryand the Department of Trade andIndustry have been accused by Nirex oftrying to sabotage government wastepolicy. In July 2003, the Secretary ofthe Environment announced that thenuclear waste body, Nirex, would beindependent of the nuclear industry.Details would be released by theautumn but have failed to appear.Civil servants claimed the problemwas partly caused by a GBP500 million(US$ 940 million) loan Nirex was saidto owe the nuclear industry, along withGBP300 million in unpaid interest.Both sums had been written off but,Nirex blames state-owned BNFL,British Energy and the Department ofTrade and Industry for the delay.Independent, 29 February 2004

UK Cumbria County Council fightsnuclear waste plan. Cumbria CountyCouncil is fighting a proposal by theUnited Kingdom Atomic EnergyAuthority (UKAEA) to transportnuclear waste from Dounreay to bestored in Cumbria. It would mean lowlevel waste would be brought fromDounreay to be stored at Sellafield andDrigg in Cumbria. The council hasissued a formal objection to the plans

which is being supported by allpolitical groups. The council says itbelieves the waste generated atDounreay should be stored there.BBC News, 3 March 2004

Czech Republic halts research at wasterepository candidates. Explorationwork at six candidate sites for highlevel waste disposal has been haltedfor five years due to local resistance. Itis expected that the government willnow develop a new policy, includingnegotiations with the communities forfinancial compensation if they arewilling to host a disposal site. In April2003, the six sites were identified forfurther exploration.NuclearFuel, 1 March 2004

French government accused of lackingnuclear crisis plan. The Frenchgovernment is under pressure to workout a crisis plan for coping with anuclear accident or attack on truckscarrying plutonium after accusationsthat it is unprepared. State-runreprocessing firm Cogema dismissedcriticisms contained in two reportsreleased early March, whichquestioned the safety of convoys thatregularly carry plutonium. The reportswere released by France’s NuclearSafety Authority (ASN) and Green-peace. According to Greenpeace, truckscarrying plutonium pass near France’sbiggest two cities, Paris and Lyon.Reuters, 5 March 2004

Germans try to buy nuclear plant.More than 2,500 people who opposethe planned sale of a mothballed MOXfuel plant at Hanau have raised Euro250,000 (US$315,000) in a campaign tooutbid the estimated price the Chinesegovernment has offered Siemens forthe plant. The campaign, which isbeing organized by the InternationalPhysicians for the Prevention ofNuclear War, is seeking to raise Euro50 million (US$ 63 million) plus oneEuro. The group, which includes anumber of prominent German singersand actors, said it would destroy the

plant if it managed to stop the export.Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5March 2004

Germany: transport of spent fuel toAhaus planned. The Germangovernment is planning to bring 951spent fuel elements from theRossendorf research center (state ofSaxony in former GDR) to the interimstorage of Ahaus in the state of Rhine-Westphalia. The state of Saxonyapplied for a transport license in 1996,but the federal government had takenno action. Facing a legal threat,environment minister Juergen Trittinworked behind the scenes for monthsto prepare the transport. The plan hasraised much resistance. Rhine-Westphalia Greens and Social Demo-crats (governing parties) have pressedTrittin not to license the transport.Anti-nuclear groups argue that underthe 2000 phase out agreement, trans-ports would be halted and on-sitestorage obligated. They fear that onceRossendorf has sent its 18 casks, manyother research reactors will follow.Last transport to Ahaus, in March 1998,raised massive protests (see WISENews Communique 489.4851: “X-Daysin Ahaus”).Nucleonics Week, 4 March 2004; LakaFoundation, 10 March 2004

Libyan uranium transported toRussia. The IAEA assisted Libyanauthorities on 8 March with theremoval of highly enriched uranium(HEU) stored at a research reactorfacility near Tripoli. The HEU, 80%enriched and in the form of fresh fuel,contains about 13 kg of fissileuranium-235. It was airlifted fromLibya to Russia. Russia, the originalsupplier in the 1980s for the 10 MWreactor at the Tajoura Nuclear ResearchCenter, agreed to take back the HEUand intends to blend it down into low-enriched uranium. The U.S.Department of Energy funded the US$700,000 fuel-removal under a co-operative US-Russia-IAEA programcalled the Tripartite Initiative.IAEA press release, 8 March 2004

IN BRIEF

12 March 2004, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor 605-606 23

NIRS/WISE offices and relaysTel: +43 732 774275; +43 664 2416806Fax: +43 732 785602Email: post@temelin.at and post@atomstopp.atWeb: www.temelin.at and www.atomstopp.at

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WISE Austriac/o Plattform gegen AtomgefahrMathilde HallaLandstrasse 314020 LinzAustria

Art exhibition dedicates itself tostopping Chernobyl from happeningagain. The Shchusev ArchitectureMuseum in Moscow is hosting theexhibition 4th Block InternationalTriennale of Ecological Posters andGraphics. The exposition is namedafter the reactor of Chernobyl thatsuffered a disaster in 1986 and wasfirst launched in 1991 by OlegVeklenko. He was sent to the nuclearplant in 1986 for clean up work andwas the only artist among his brigadeof cleanup workers and began totranslate his experiences into visualart. His 4th Block exposition containsart made by over 300 artists from 46different countries. Veklenko, aged 53,still suffers from chronic healthproblems including thyroid cancer.The exhibition can be seen in Moscowuntil 14 April 2004.Moscow Times, 27 February 2004

Chernobyl Heart wins Oscar. TheChernobyl Children’s Projects’,Chernobyl Heart has won the Oscar forBest Short Documentary at the 2004Academy Awards ceremony held inLos Angeles. The documentary shotover two years in the affected regionsdocuments the horrific effects ofradiation, high levels of cancer, birthdefects and heart conditions sufferedby the children of the region. The filmwas made in an effort to raiseawareness of the continuing effects ofthe disaster and the plight of thevictims and survivors and is expectedto be aired shortly on the US cabletelevision network HBO.Chernobyl Children’s Project newsrelease, 1 March 2004; CCPI pressrelease, 3 March 2004

Israel to keep watch on Vanunu.Israeli PM Sharon agreed not to put

Mordechai Vanunu underadministrative arrest when he isreleased in April, but the state will useunspecified “supervisory means” tokeep watch over him. Administrativedetention (house arrest) wouldprobably be rejected in a court case.The Israeli government is afraid thatVanunu will release more detailsabout Israel’s nuclear weaponsprogram once he is freed. To ‘solve’this problem, security services are nowallowed to “employ what are deemedappropriate measures” to superviseVanunu. It is likely that he will beclosely tracked and detained if hecommits any security offenses.Nucleonics Week, 4 March 2004

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WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR MONITOR

The Nuclear Information & Resource Servicewas founded in 1978 and is based inWashington, US. The World InformationService on Energy was set up in the same yearand houses in Amsterdam, Netherlands. NIRSand WISE Amsterdam joined forces in 2000,creating a worldwide network of information andresource centers for citizens and environmentalorganizations concerned about nuclear power,radioactive waste, radiation, and sustainableenergy issues.

The WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor publishesinternational information in English 20 times ayear. A Spanish translation of this newsletteris available on the WISE Amsterdam website(www.antenna.nl/wise/esp). A Russian versionis published by WISE Russia and a Ukrainianversion is published by WISE Ukraine. TheWISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor can be obtainedboth on paper and in an email version (pdfformat). Old issues are (after two months)available through the WISE Amsterdamhomepage: www.antenna.nl/wise.

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