648 Geetam Tiwari, Planning Safe Roads

8/12/2019 648 Geetam Tiwari, Planning Safe Roads

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28/1/2014 648 Geetam Tiwari, Planning safe roads

http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/648/648_geetam_tiwari.htm

Planning safe roads

G E E T A M T I W A R I

ROAD traffic injuries and deaths have become a major public health

concern in India with the total number of people involved in traffic

crashes as well as fatalities per million persons increasing over the last

three decades. Though at present non-motorized transport (NMT) and

public transport trips constitute a vast majority of trips in Indian urban

areas, the use of personal motorized vehicles (two-wheelers and cars) is

rising along with increased risk to pedestrians and cyclists. This trend is

accompanied with a rise in accidents and deteriorating air quality in

cities.

There is a significant proportion of people who cannot afford personal

motorized vehicles (cars and two-wheelers) for transportation and

subsidized bus systems are also too expensive for them for their daily

commute.1They are dependent on NMT for travelling in cities. Even in

the megacities of India (population more than eight million), more than

30% of the trips are made by NMT, a similar number by public

transport (formal bus systems, informal bus systems and three-wheelers),

and the rest by personal motorized vehicles (PMV), i.e., cars and two-

wheelers.2

The poor quality of transport infrastructure and growing traffic

congestion has been recognized by several expert groups and policy

planners.3 At the city level, efforts to improve transport infrastructure

since the 1980s have often involved road widening, junction

improvement to facilitate movement of motorized vehicles, and

construction of elevated roads. The specific needs of public transport

users, bicycles and pedestrians have, however, not been included in the

transport improvement projects. Any investment in infrastructure toimprove mobility of motorized vehicles benefits only a small affluent class

of people who own PMVs. Without facilities to regulate the interaction

between motorized vehicles and NMT, this new infrastructure limits the

freedom of movement of pedestrians and bicyclists substantially. Also,

any investments made in infrastructure to improve mobility of PMVs

result in increased vehicular speeds in the short term. This is often short

lived, eventually resulting in an increase in congestion levels because of

the increasing number of PMVs. Moreover, this results in increasing

negative environmental impacts like deteriorating air quality, noise,
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http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/648/648_geetam_tiwari.htm 2

habitat loss and fragmentation,4and increasing number of accidents.5

FIGURE 1

Number of People Killed (in thousands) in Road Traffic Crashes in India Per Year

Source: NCRB, 2012.

Injuries are an important public health problem in India, contributing

about 10% of total deaths in urban and rural India. In India, 137,000

deaths due to road traffic injuries (RTI) were recorded in 2011.6This is

among the three leading causes of death for people in the age group of

five and 44 years. Nearly 15% of RTI deaths in the country occurred in

cities with a population of more than a million. The rest of the deaths and

injuries occur in districts and rural areas of the country, predominantly on

state and national highways. The fatality rate has increased from 36 permillion persons in 1980 to 95 fatalities per million persons in 2006.7

FIGURE 2

Fatalities Per Million Persons in Million Plus Cities, 2001 and 2006


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Traffic fatality rate in Indian cities with population greater than one million. Source: NCRB, 2007.

Many cities show a fatality increase of 2-5% in recent years, regardless

of the size of the city or the region. Small cities where newly upgraded

highways have been built show the highest increase in fatality rates. The

issues regarding traffic crashes in urban areas must be understood within

a context that at present less than one in 40 families owns a car in India.

The car ownership level is so low that even with reasonable economic

growth (say 5-7% per year) most families are not likely to own a car by

the year 2020. Consequently, a majority of our population is unlikely to

use cars in the near future.

The data for types of road users killed are not available at thenational or state level in India. Some cities maintain such details locally,

but data are not available for all cities in the country. The proportion of

road users killed in the late 1990s in the cities of Mumbai and Delhi,

Kota, Vadodara and selected highway locations show that caroccupants were a small proportion of the total fatalities (Figure 3).

Pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorized two-wheeler riders accounted for

60-90% of all traffic fatalities. Children aged 14 years and younger

comprise only 7% of the fatalities, though their share in the population is

32%. The proportion of fatalities in the age groups 15-29 and greater

than 60 years is similar to their representation in the population, but the

middle age groups 30-44 and 45-59 are over represented by about

70%.


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Both land use policies and design of infrastructure have a majorimpact on RTI in cities. City planning policies that include the location of

different activities, location of residential areas, and planning of transport

networks influence the choice of transport modes as well as distances

that various people have to travel. Mixed land use patterns reduce the

length of trips and thus exposure to road traffic injuries. Often poor

households are relocated to the outskirts of the city limits where land is

cheaper. This results in long pedestrian and bicycle trips, and increasing

exposure to road traffic crashes. Thus, road traffic risk to different road

users is influenced by the city planning policies which decide where

people can live and where the employment opportunities are located.

FIGURE 3

Road Traffic Crash Fatalities in Mumbai, Delhi,Kota and Vadodara


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At the design level, design of road infrastructure (road cross section,carriageway width, intersection design), facilities for pedestrians, bicycles

and public transport users influence the risk taking behaviour of road

users. This includes observance of speed limits by car and bus drivers,

waiting for sufficient gaps by pedestrians and use of zebra crossings and

pedestrian subways.

This paper presents three case studies to show the impact of urbanplanning and road infrastructure design on the safety of road users. The

first case study discusses the impact of relocating poor households from

the self-planned locations in Delhi to the outskirts of the city for

construction of the metro and other city development plans between

1997-2001. The second case study presents change in risk faced by

pedestrians at a signalized intersection, which has been reconstructed as

a signal free intersection to enable uninterrupted movement of vehicles.

The third case study shows the impact of changing the existing road

design for mixed traffic on a six km long corridor in Delhi to exclusive

bus lanes, bicycle lanes and pedestrian paths on the safety of road users.

The last ten years have witnessed large-scale evictions andresettlement in Delhi. What lies behind the current spate of low income

relocations are development projects like commercial complexes,


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flyovers, recreational parks, and wide roads to improve the landscape of

the city. City planners have identified sites at the periphery of the city

where poor households have been relocated. Peripheral development

and relocation of urban squatters has meant an increase in the spatial

segregation of social groups. This has also resulted in poor access to

income generating activities.

TABLE 1

Number of Households Moved Between 1997-2003

Site

number

No. of households Distance from orig ina l

site

1 8000 8 km

2 4000 7 km

3 5000 18 km

4 3000 10 km

5 2300 12 km

6 50 5 km

7 500 18 km

8 5500 23 km

9 4500 20 km

10 1000 15 km

11 4000 18 km

12 50 8 km

13 65 35 km

14 20 40 km

15 1200 25 km

Source: Anand, 2007.

Table 1 shows number of households who have been shifted to locations

planned by the experts. More than 40,000 households have been shifted

from the central city location to the periphery of the city. This has

resulted in an increase in travel distance to work as well as to the public

transport stop.


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We use indicators of accessibility and mobility to understand thechange in RTI risk based on the change in travel distances as well as the

mode of travel. Arora and Tiwari8and Anand9studied 2,000 households

in Delhi to estimate the impact of relocation due to the metro

construction in Delhi. The study documented accessibility and mobility

conditions of households residing in the city in self-planned slums before

the construction of the metro, and after they were relocated to new

locations planned by the city authorities at the outskirts.

A. Anand estimated the indicators of mobility from the household

surveys of low income settlements in the vicinity of the metro line and

households who were relocated to new locations as per the land use

policies to provide land for metro construction. The results from this

study show that for the relocated households the value of all theindicators have changed. The distance to schools increased for 52% of

the households but decreased for 41% of the households. Similarly, the

distance to health services increased for 63% of households and

decreased for 34% of households. Also, the distance to urban services

increased for 52% of households and decreased for 36% of households.

The highest impact is seen in the indicators measuring access to the bus

system the distance to the bus stop increased for 72% of households

and the time gap between successive buses increased by more than

100% for 98% of households.

Interestingly, even for the households living in settlements which havenot been relocated, there is some change in per capita trip rate (PCTR)

for work (there is no change for 78% of households while it increased

for 13%) and other purposes (there is no change for 82% of households

and it decreased for 14%), but little change was seen in the PCTR for

education (there is no change for 91% of households. The share of non-motorized vehicles (NMVs) in the modes used for travel does not

change for 87% of households, increases for 7% and decreases for 5%.

The distance to work, the time to work and the cost has not changed for

73%, 72% and 91% households respectively, and has increased for

17%, 17% and 5% households. For trips made for other purposes, the

distance, time and cost indicators has not changed for 72%, 72% and

93% households and has decreased for 15%, 16% and 4% households

respectively.


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For a majority of the households relocated to new locations identified by

city planners, the value of all the mobility indicators have changed. For

49% households, the PCTR for work has increased and for 30% it has

decreased. For 71% of households, the PCTR for education does not

change it increases for 19% and decreases for 10%. The PCTR for

other purpose has increased for 35% and decreased for the same

percent of households. The share of NMVs in the mode used has

decreased for 59% of households.

The mobility indicators for travel to work distance, time and cost

have increased for 83%, 82% and 61% of the households respectively.

The distance, time and cost of education did not change for 43%, 43%

and 94% respectively and increased for 34%, 35% and 4% of

households respectively. Regarding travel for other purposes, there is a

decrease of distance and time for 58% and 52% households respectively

but no change in cost for 65%.

The results of the study show that for the poor households which arenot relocated to new areas, there is no significant impact on the

indicators of mobility. The construction of a metro line does not change

their mobility patterns. However, since the bus routes and location of bus

stops were changed, these households face reduced access to transport

services. With regard to the accessibility of households, while the land

use accessibility remains unchanged, the transport accessibility haschanged as distances to the bus stops increased for 19% and bus

services became non-existent for 33% of the households.

On the other hand, poor households relocated to new areas experienced

a significant impact on the indicators of accessibility and mobility. The

land use accessibility has deteriorated as distance to schools, health

services and other urban services have increased for 52%, 63% and

52% of the households respectively. The transport accessibility has

deteriorated even more as distance to the bus stop has increased for

72% and the bus frequency has decreased, on an average, from five to63 minutes (almost 13 times). The mobility of the households has also

increased significantly. The PCTR for work has increased for 49% and

decreased for 30%, implying a change in the number of trips made for

work. The share of NMVs amongst the mode used decreased for 59%

of households. The mobility indicators for travel to work distance, time

and cost have increased for 83%, 82% and 61% respectively.

FIGURE 4


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Per Cent Pedestrian Crossings and Accepted Gap at Signalized Junction(beforeconstruction of grade s eparated junction)

Gap of greater than four seconds denotes negligible risk.

It is well known that an increase in trip length by pedestrians and

bicycles increases the probability of a fatal crash. Since the current

planning policies have increased the distances of travel for households

relocated to new areas, the risk of a fatal crash has increased. The

mobility indicators for travel to work distance, time and cost have

increased for 83%, 82% and 61% respectively. The relocated

households are travelling longer distances than before on arterial or

national highways coming to the city. These roads do not have dedicated

facilities for pedestrian, bicycles or buses. These are highways coming

into the city. Many households have been relocated along these

highways. Therefore, the risk of being involved in road accidents

increases for all families relocated as a result of our urban planning

policies.

In Delhi, the government has made significant investments for theconstruction of grade separated intersections to make signal free

junctions to reduce delays faced by motorized vehicles on arterial roads.

With the construction of grade separators, pedestrian crossing problems

arise. However, to facilitate pedestrian movement, pedestrian subways,

i.e., underpasses and foot overbridges, i.e., overpasses have been

constructed.

A study was undertaken at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences

(AIIMS) flyover interchange in New Delhi.10This intersection has large


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flows of bus, pedestrian, and motor traffic. The Ring Road, which is a

major arterial road, and Aurobindo Marg form the AIIMS grade

separated interchange. Traffic data collection allowed the study of road

user behaviour both earlier, when the AIIMS junction was an at-grade,

signalized intersection, and presently, when the site is a grade separated

interchange with no traffic signal control. Our analysis produced results

pertaining to pedestrian crossing behaviour as a function of observable

pedestrian, environment, and traffic characteristics.

Before the reconstruction into a signal free grade separatedinterchange, the study revealed that 640 pedestrians used the southern

cross-walk. From those, nearly 60% made a safe crossing (400

pedestrians did safe crossings, and 240 did partially safe or totally unsafe

crossing). After reconstruction, 100% of the pedestrians observedcrossed the road in an unsafe manner since there was no signal (344

pedestrians made unsafe crossings). Table 2 shows the approaching

speed characteristics of the conflicting vehicles.

TABLE 2

Speed Characteristics of Conflicting Vehicles

Vehicle group Mean speed, km/h

Before reconstruction After reconstruction

Bus/truck 25 30

Car 27 33

Motorized

three-wheeler 21 25

Motorized

two-wheeler 27 35

Figure 4 shows the data for how people crossed the road; thepercentage of all stage crossings versus accepted gap before


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reconstruction. It includes all unprotected pedestrian crossings for all

stages, whether full or half. When the accepted gap is more than four

seconds, the risk to the pedestrian becomes negligible. Totally, only 15%

of pedestrians accepted high risks, that is, accepted gaps less than or

equal to four seconds. The remaining 85% accepted negligible risk.

Figure 5 shows the percentage of pedestrian crossings versus accepted

gap after reconstruction. It includes all unprotected crossings that

pedestrians completed. Only 38% accepted negligible risk. Figure 5shows that accepted risk increased after reconstruction; more than 35%

of crossings had accepted gaps less than one second as compared to

6% of stage crossings before reconstruction.

Previous research has shown that when the impact speed increases

beyond 30 km/h, pedestrian fatality risk increases sharply.11 Table 2

shows the average speed of all motorized vehicle groups, which

increased after reconstruction. It indicates that risk for pedestrians has

increased. For instance, when the average speed of the car group was

26.5 km/h before reconstruction, the probability of death wasapproximately 6%. After reconstruction, the average speed of the car

group increased to 32.5 km/h, thus increasing the probability of fatal

crashes.

The study showed that a higher percentage of vehicles travelled athigher speeds in all categories after reconstruction. As a result, the riskto pedestrians increased. For pedestrians, the average accepted gap

decreased after reconstruction in each stage of crossing, primarily

because of the higher average speeds of the vehicle groups. The speeds

increased 21.6%, 22.6%, 15%, 31.6 % for heavy vehicle, car,

motorized three wheeler, and motorized two-wheeler groups,

respectively. Twenty two per cent of pedestrians accepted shorter gaps

(increased risk) despite the presence of a nearby pedestrian underpass.

The study concludes that after the construction of the signal free grade

separated junction, the risk to pedestrians increased substantially

because the higher speeds of motorized vehicles forced them to accept

shorter gaps for road crossing.

The Delhi government implemented a dedicated bus corridor in2008. Buses on Delhi-BRT corridor operate in dedicated lanes,

separated by a median in the middle of the road in an open BRT system.


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Because bus routes can join and leave the corridor at any point,

passenger interchange time has not increased. Bus stops are at an

average spacing of 500 m, mostly upstream of intersections setback by

20 m. Wherever intersection spacing is more than 500 m and points of

significant boarding/alighting occur in between intersections, provision

has been made for mid-block bus stops with signalized pedestrian

crossing.

FIGURE 5

Per Cent Pedestrian Crossings and Accepted Gap at Signal Free Junction (after

construction of grade s eparated junction)

Gap of more than five seconds denotes negligible risk.

The intersection design on the corridor aims to minimize conflicts and

provide efficient passenger interchange. All traffic movement at the

intersections is controlled through automatic signals. Traffic is segregated

into bus lanes, motorized vehicle (MV) lanes and NMT lanes, each with

their unique signal aspects, which may have overlapping or staggered

green phases for different lane movements from the same approach.

Cyclists move on 2.5 m wide segregated lanes on the left side on both

sides of the corridor. To reduce vehicular speeds, table top humps have

been constructed at the entrance of cycle paths, and wherever a side

road meets the main road to ensure the safety of cyclists. These lanes

have been segregated from the MV lanes (in addition to 0.12 m wide

and 0.15 m high kerb) by a 0.75 m wide median/unpaved zone on 75%

of the length, more than 0.75 m wide green belt/footpath on 20% of the

length, 0.3 m wide median on 4% of the length of the corridor.


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Continuous footpaths are provided on both sides of the road that arewide enough to support existing pedestrian flows. At intersections,

footpaths adjoin marked crossings for pedestrians this maintains a

continuous path for pedestrians. Pedestrian holding areas are provided at

the kerbside, at each intersection, where pedestrians can wait before

crossing the road. This area is also designed for street vendors. Forpedestrian crossings, a 5 m wide zebra strip is designed across all

intersection arms. This is preceded by a stop line (3 m away) to provide

a safe zone for pedestrians to cross in front of the waiting vehicular

traffic.12

A recent study has evaluated the impact of the new corridor designon traffic safety.13The number of fatalities on the 5.8 km stretch of the

Delhi-BRT corridor has been in the range of 4-17 per year with an

average of nine fatalities/year in the period 2001-2006. November

2006-April 2008 was the construction period during which average

fatalities were 6/year. In the first eight months of operation there were

four fatalities. After further design interventions of controlling speeds by

installing rumble strips in the bus lanes, two fatal crashes in the bus lanes

were reported in 2009 (Figure 6).

FIGURE 6

Number of Road Traffic Fatalities Per Year (2001-2009) on the Delhi BRT Corridor

(operationalized in April 2008)


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As per the accident trends observed from 2001-2007 (Delhi Traffic

Police records), it can be estimated that approximately 8.33 accidents

were expected on this corridor if the BRT corridor was not made

operational in 2008, i.e., the accident trend follows Poisson

distribution.14However, four accidents were observed on this corridor in

2008. This was further reduced to two accidents in 2009 after rumble

strips were installed on the exclusive bus lane to check bus speed. This is

to say that there has been a 43% reduction (standard deviation being24%) in accidents after implementation of BRT and an overall 76.5%

reduction (standard deviation being 17%) after installation of rumble

strips on the corridor. The correction factor is 0.98 which is negligible.

Traffic safety has increased on the corridor after it become operational.

The analysis also shows that of all the modes, safety for cyclists has

improved the most as the bicycle interaction with buses on roads has

reduced since the construction of segregated lanes for bicycles.

Moreover, after the BRT corridor became operational, pedestrians

faced the risk of impact by buses, but the implementation of rumble stripon the bus lanes resulted in reduced bus speeds, thereby reducing the

risk imposed by buses to pedestrians. However, pedestrians continue to

face risk by cars and two-wheelers, which needs further intervention to

provide maximum safety on the corridor.

The three case studies discussed in this paper establish a very strong

link between the safety of road users, policy and design interventions.

Urban planning policies and land use policies decide the location of

different activities and location of residential areas. Most of these policies

have not been effective in addressing the needs of poor households who

locate close to employment opportunities in the city, often squatting on

the land not designated for residential use as per the master plan.

However, this location results in short travel distances for pedestrians

and bicyclists.

The case study from Delhi shows how the land use policiessupporting the official Delhi master plan result in relocating poor

households to the outskirts of the city to accommodate transport

infrastructure like road expansion or the metro. This has increased travel

distances and time for most households. The longer walking and bicycle

trips on roads without any dedicated facilities for these modes increased


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the risk of getting involved in a fatal crash. The current relocation policies

have thus made road users more vulnerable. The land use policies must

ensure that the poor households, who cannot afford any form of

motorized travel, are located close to employment opportunities, thereby

reducing travel distances. This will bring down the risk of fatal crashes

because of reduced distances and travel time, in addition to increasing

accessibility to education, health facilities and employment opportunities.

The other two case studies discuss the impact of road design

interventions on the risk of fatal crashes. Unfortunately, the conventional

understanding of measuring performance of a transport infrastructure is

biased towards car traffic. Thus the level of service of an intersection is

measured in terms of delays faced by motorized traffic. Unsurprisingly,

this has become a major source of concern for planners, traffic policy

and road owning agencies. Road expansion schemes and signal free

junctions have become synonymous with improvement of transport

infrastructure.

Since problems faced by pedestrians and bicyclists, the two most

vulnerable road users, are not viewed as major transport issues, the

improvement strategies do not take into account impacts on pedestrian

movement. The conversion of a signalized junction at AIIMS in Delhi to

a signal free junction, for instance, has resulted in an increase in

motorized traffic and increase in risk faced by pedestrians while crossing

the road. However, when road designs factor in the needs of

pedestrians, bicyclists and public transport vehicles as the Delhi BRT

case study presented, the number of crashes can be reduced.

The case study also shows the impact of design interventions on the

speed of buses. The exclusive bus corridor resulted in high speeds and

involvement of buses in traffic crashes. However, after the installation of

rumble strips in the exclusive bus corridor, the number of bus-pedestrian

crashes reduced. Road designs which explicitly address the needs of

bicyclists and pedestrians, and ensure speed control, have a major

impact on road accidents.

Footnotes:

1. D. Mohan and G. Tiwari, Mobility, Environment and Safety in Megacities:

Dealing with a Complex Future,IATSS Research24(1), 2000, pp. 39-46.

2. RITES, Traffic and Transportation Policies and Strategies in Urban Areas in

India. Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, Government of India, New

Delhi, 1998.

3. MOUD, National Urban Transport Policy. Ministry of Urban Development,

Government India, New Delhi, 2005.


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4. H. Demirel, et al., Exploring Impacts of Road Transportat ion on Environment: A

Spatial Approach,Desalination226(1-3), 2008, pp. 279-288.

5. M. Peden, R. Scurfield, D. Sleet, D. Mohan, A.A. Hyder, E. Jarawan and M.

Colin, World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. World Health

Organization, Geneva, 2004.

6. NCRB, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India 2011. National Crime Records

Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 2012.

7. D. Mohan, O.T. Simhoni, M. Sivak and M.J. Flannagan, Road Safety in India:

Challenges and Opportunities. UMTRI-2009-1. The University of Michigan

Transportation Research Institute, Ann Arbor, MI, 2009.

8. A. Arora and G. Tiwari, A Handbook for Socio-economic Impact Assessment

(SEIA) of Future Urban Transport (FUT). Transportation Research and Injury

Prevention Programme (TRIPP), Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, 2007.

9. A. Anand, Socioeconomic Impact Assessment (SEIA) Methodology for Urban

Transport Projects: Impact of Delhi Metro on the Urban Poor. Ph.D. thes is, Indian

Institute of Technology Delhi, 2007.

10. U. Gupta, N. Chatterjee, G. Tiwari and J. Fazio, Case Study of Pedestrian RiskBehaviour and Survival Analysis, Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for

Transportation Studies8, 2010, pp. 2123-2139.

11. E. Pasanen, Ajonopeudet ja jalankulkijan turvallisuus [Driving speeds and

pedestrian safety]. Teknil-linen korkeakoulu, Liikennetekniikka, Espoo, 1991.

12. RITES and TRIPP, Operating Plan for HCBS Corridor Ambedkar Nagar to

Delhi Gate. Report for DIMTS. Delhi Integrated Multi Modal Transport System

Company, Delhi, 2006; TRIPP, First Delhi BRT Corridor: A Design Summary

Ambedkar Nagar to Delhi Gate. TRIPP, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, 2005.

13. G. Tiwari and D. Jain, Accessibility and Safety Indicators for All Road Users:

Case Study of Delhi BRT,Journal of Transport Geography22, 2012, pp. 87-95.

14. E. Hauer, The Naive Before-After Study, in E. Hauer, Observational Before-

After Studies in Road Safety . Second ed., Pergamon, 2002, pp. 73-93.

Documents

648 Geetam Tiwari, Planning Safe Roads