6.63 Pipeline Hazid Envid Report

KCP-GNS-SHE-HZI-0001 Revision: 02

Project Title: Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project Page 1 of 17

Document Title: Pipeline HAZID/ENVID Report

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good fai th. E.ON UK plc, i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Cl imate Chan ge (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, rel iabi l i ty or completenes s of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers or DECC shal l have any l iabil i ty whatsoever for any direct or i ndirect loss howsoever arising from the use of the Information by any p arty.

Pipeline HAZID/ENVID Report

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2

1.1. Document Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................ 2

1.2. Objective .................................................................................................................................. 2

1.3. Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 3

1.4. Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... 3

2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 4

2.1. Overview .................................................................................................................................. 4

2.2. HAZID/ENVID Nodes ............................................................................................................... 4

2.3. HAZID/ENVID Process ............................................................................................................ 4

2.4. Reference Materials ................................................................................................................. 5

2.5. Meeting Attendees ................................................................................................................... 5

3. Main Findings and Actions Arising ..................................................................................................... 7

4. Supporting References ...................................................................................................................... 8

Appendix List of Appendices ................................................................................................................... 9

Appendix A: HAZID/ENVID Guidewords ............................................................................................... 10

Appendix B: Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets ............................................................................ 14

Table of Tables Table 2.1 List of HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials ............................................................................. 5 Table 2.2 List of HAZID/ENVID Attendees ............................................................................................. 6 Table 3.1 HAZID/ENVID Actions ............................................................................................................ 7

Table of Figures Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic ................................................................................................... 2





1. Introduction

1.1. Document Purpose and Scope E.ON UK has commissioned Genesis Oil and Gas Consultants Ltd. (GOGC) to perform the pre Front End Engineering Design (FEED) for the pipeline and offshore facility associated with the E.ON Kingsnorth Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) development project. An outline system schematic of the development is presented in Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic

As required by both E.ON UK and GOGC risk management processes, the potential hazards associated with the system require identification by a hazard and environmental identification (HAZID/ENVID) process.

This document details the output from a HAZID/ENVID meeting that took place on the 20th

October 2010 at GOGC Aberdeen Offices.

1.2. Objective

The purpose of the meeting was to identify key safety, health and environmental (SHE) hazards that have the potential to significantly impact upon or influence the subsequent project design phases. Where such hazards were identified, the proposed measures to prevent, control or mitigate them were reviewed. Where necessary, further or alternative measures were actioned.





The overall objective of the HAZID/ENVID was to, wherever possible; ensure that the inherent safety, health and environmental principles are applied to the project design and to prescribe philosophies or controls to manage residual risks.

1.3. Scope

The HAZID/ENVID meeting covered the Kingsnorth pipeline from the discharge side of the compressors up to and including the Kingsnorth Offshore Platform riser base.

The Kingsnorth Offshore Platform has already been subject to a HAZID/ENVID and reported separately Ref. [S2]; it was therefore not included within the scope of the meeting.

SHE issues not impacting upon or influencing the FEED 1a design were specifically excluded from the scope of the HAZID/ENVID meeting.

1.4. Abbreviations

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage ENVID Environmental Hazard Identification GOGC Genesis Oil and Gas Consultants Ltd HAZID Hazard Identification SHE Safety, Health and Environmental TOR Terms of Reference





2. Methodology

2.1. Overview The HAZID/ENVID Terms of Reference (TOR) Ref. [S2] was used as the basis for the meeting.

2.2. HAZID/ENVID Nodes The study scope was divided into the following two nodes to facilitate appropriate examination:

Node 1: The onshore section of the pipeline from the discharge of the Kingsnorth power station CO2 compressors up to and including the landfall valve.

Node 2: From the landfall valve up to and including the Kingsnorth Offshore Platform riser base.

2.3. HAZID/ENVID Process The HAZID/ENVID guidewords were systematically applied to each of the study nodes to identify hazards that have the potential to give rise to safety, health or environmental consequences of concern.

The proposed prevention, control and associated mitigation measures were explored for each hazard that has the potential to give rise to consequences of concern. Further or alternative measures were proposed where the team were of the opinion that the proposed prevention, control or mitigation measures are not sufficient to reduce the associated risks to as low as is reasonably practicable levels.

Meeting attendees were reminded that the project was in FEED 1a. The focus of the meeting was therefore upon the identification of key safety, health and environmental hazards that had the potential to significantly impact upon or influence the subsequent design phases.

An E.ON UK provided HAZID/ENVID worksheet was used to record the minutes of the meeting. The worksheet was projected on a screen such that all participants could see its development during the meeting. Worksheet entries were made by exception, i.e. only HAZID/ENVID guidewords that gave rise to consequence of concern were recorded.

Several drawings were referenced during the meeting and are listed in Table 2.1.





2.4. Reference Materials The materials referenced during the meeting are summarised in Table 2.1; due to the memory requirements, these documents are not appended to this report.

Document /Drawing Title Document Reference Rev

Landfall Valve Planning Drawing Sheet 1 KCP-GNS-PLD-LAY-0001 02

Landfall Valve Planning Drawing Sheet 2 KCP-GNS-PLD-LAY-0002 02

Shore Approach & Landfall GA Sheet 1 KCP-GNS-PLD-LAY-0003 01

Shore Approach & Landfall GA Sheet 2 KCP-GNS-PLD-LAY-0004 01

Onshore Pipeline Route Map KCP-GNS-PLD-MAP-0001 03

Onshore Pipeline Route, Site Location Plan, Sheet 1 of 4.

KCP-GNS-PLD-MAP-0003 03

Onshore Pipeline Route, Site Location Plan, Sheet 2of 4.






Route Word Document – Uncontrolled document showing the offshore pipeline route.

NA NA

Table 2.1 List of HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials

2.5. Meeting Attendees Table 2.2 details the meeting attendees. The range of personnel ensured that the necessary skills, knowledge and experience were available to perform a thorough and accurate HAZID/ ENVID.





Name Role Company

HAZID/ ENVID Meeting Chairman GOGC

Safety Lead and Meeting Secretary GOGC

Project Manager GOGC

Safety Consultant E.ON UK

Process Lead GOGC

Flow Assurance Lead GOGC

Environmental Lead GOGC

Pipelines GOGC

Pipelines GOGC

Project Management Office Arup

Client Representative E.ON

Project Planning/Deputy Project Manager GOGC

Environment and Modelling E.ON UK

CDMC / Safety Manager E.ON

Table 2.2 List of HAZID/ENVID Attendees





3. Main Findings and Actions Arising The completed HAZID/ENVID worksheets are presented in Appendix B.

The HAZID/ENVID did not raise any issues that were likely to significantly affect the design of the Kingsnorth topsides process or structure. The ten actions that arose during the HAZID/ENVID are detailed in Table 3.1.

Action No.#

Action Actionee Action Due Date

1.1 To confirm reliability of trip system for CO2 dryness

End Oct.

1.3 Determine a means to ensure the compression system is incapable of generating a pressure/temperatures greater than design.

FEED 1B/2.

1.5 Review the potential to overpressurise the land section of the pipeline due to liquid lock-in and warm-up.

End Nov.

1.6 Evaluate the potential for explosive decompression and determine whether associated control measures are suitable and sufficient.

Phase 1B.

1.10 Cross system ESD and blowdown

philosophy to be established.

Mid Nov.

1.12 Ensure that discharge of hydrotest water is included in the consenting process.

FEED 1B/2.

1.15 Review security strategy requirements. End Oct.

2.2 Review the potential to overpressurise the

offshore section of the pipeline due to liquid

lock-in and warm-up.

End Nov.

2.3 Ensure that discharge of hydrotest water is included in the PON 15C by RSK.

End Oct.

2.4 Review pipeline route survey to provide advice on actions to mitigate potential environmental disturbance.

End Oct.

Table 3.1 HAZID/ENVID Actions

#Action numbers refer to the corresponding line within the HAZID ENVID worksheet.

GOGC will track all actions until the end of FEED 1a. Any actions outstanding at the end of FEED 1a will be entered onto an appropriate register for tracking through to completion.





4. Supporting References

[S1] Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project - Offshore Platform HAZID/ENVID Report – KCP-GNS-IFS-HAZ-0001, Rev 01.

[S2] Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project - Kingsnorth Pipeline HAZID/ENVID Meeting Terms of Reference - KCP-GNS-SHE-TOR-0002 Rev01.





Appendix List of Appendices

Appendix A HAZID/ENVID Guidewords.

Appendix B Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets.





Appendix A: HAZID/ENVID Guidewords

1 Process Parameters

Temperature Pressure Flow

Level Inventory Compositions

Flash point Toxicity Corrosivity

Solid deposition Wax / hydrates Chemical reaction

Materials of construction/compatibility

Kinetic Energy Potential Energy

2 Operating methods

Black start Start up Shutdown

Normal operation SIMOPS Sampling

Calibrating Testing Service failure (air, water, etc)

Emergency shutdown Blowdown Isolation

Draining / venting Purging / filling Winterisation

Maintenance

3 Access / egress

Operational access Maintenance access Confined spaces

Means of escape Means of evacuation Life saving appliances

4 Environment

Liquid effluent Solid effluent Venting

Noise level Flaring Air intakes / exhausts

Ventilation Pressurisation Gas / Oxygen enrichment

Extreme weather Humidity Illumination

Discharges to Air Discharges to Water Odour

Environmental Receptors (including Population).

Energy Efficiency Lightening

5 Loss prevention

Fire / head detection Smoke / gas detection Active fire protection

Fire areas Area classification Passive fire protection





Blast overpressure HP / LP interfaces Deluge drains

Ignition sources Leak sources

6 Plant and equipment

Design pressure Design temperature Materials of construction

Vibration Thermal stress Pressure cycling

Hydraulic shock Static electricity Ionising radiation

Mechanical seals Liquid seals Vacuum protection

Galvanic corrosion By-pass valves Hazardous areas

7 Structures

Loads on / strength of Structure / foundations / equipment supports

Type of loads Static / dynamic / environmental

Creep Scour Fire / blast walls

Impact protection Weights limits Platforms

Handrails Bunds / Drains Stairs / Ladders

Walkways Airlocks / doors Floors / Hatches

8 Control systems

ESD, F+G logic Control software DCS failure

Failure modes System reliability Alarms and trips

High integrity systems Overrides and resets Control room ergonomics

9 Electrical systems

Power supplies DC supplies Battery supplies / UPS

Distribution boards Cable routes Inductive effects

Load shedding Overload protection Heat tracing

Motor start frequency Emergency lighting EMC

10 Communication

Radios PA system Signs

Beacons / klaxons Nav Aids

11 Installation





Temporary supports Sequence of events Rigging

Lifting points Scaffolding Hot work

Hot tap / line freeze Specialist welding Tie-in points

12 Personnel / Occupational Hazards

Slips / trips / falls Electrocution Hot / cold environment

Hand tools Manual handling Equipment failure

Hazardous chemicals Machine tools High level working

Rigging lines Ionising radiation Toxic gases / fume

Inert gases Smoke Steam

Asbestos Crew change Roles and responsibilities

Overboard working Human Factors

13 Dropped objects

Containers Gas bottle Swinging loads

Small overhead objects Drill pipe / casing Drill collars

Scaffolding Anchors Special lifts

14 Marine

Shuttle tanker Supply vessel Standby boat

Shipping lanes Drilling rig Diving support vessel

Anchor handling vessel Helicopter Fishing vessel

DP System Anchors Pipelines

Chains / cables Work < 500 m Buoys

15 Emergency Response

Temporary Refuge Command Structure Special procedures

Fire and Explosion H2S Gas TEMPSC

EER Helicopters Vessels

Isolation

16 Drilling

Drilling Workover Wirelining

Mechanical problems Well control problems Drillstring problems





Formation problems Shallow gas Mud weight

17 Diving

Dropped objects Life support DSV

Breaking containment Process operation Maintenance

18 Site operations

Security access Vehicles Drains

Cranes Excavations Earth moving

Temporary facilities Third party contractors




Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good fai th. E.ON UK plc, i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Cl imate Chan ge (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, rel iabil i ty or completenes s of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers or DECC shal l have any liabil i ty whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss how soever arising from the use of the Information by any party.

Appendix B: Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets

HAZID ENVID Worksheets – Node 1

HAZID ENVID Worksheets – Node 2




Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good fai th. E.ON UK plc, i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Cl imate Chan ge (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, rel iabil i ty or completenes s of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of i ts subcontractors, subsidiaries, affi l iates, employees, advisers or DECC shal l have any l iabil i ty whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoever arising from the use of the Information by any party.

HAZARD SCENARIO CAUSES CONSEQUENCES POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND OFFSITE

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT

RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS ACTIONS/ COMMENTS

1 The onshore section of the pipeline from the discharge of the Kingsnorth power station CO2 compressors up to (and including) the landfall valve.

1.1 Toxicity (of CO2) Loss of containment of CO2 from pipeline, caused by corrosion (external

or internal), third party intervention,

flange leak, mechanical failure,

upheaval buckling, geo-

movement,buoyancy.

Loss of containment of CO2. Potential multiple fatalities due to toxic/asphyxiant effects of CO2

release. Cryogenic impact.

Potential for reputational damage to

E.ON from persistent leak.

Potential fatalities to local species and

short term impact on habitat.

Dryness specification for CO2 from site – coupled with monitoring and trip system to protect pipeline against internal corrosion. Use of a technology that

does not give an instant loss of dryness for CO2 should be used. Adequate

margin between trip point and water dropout to be maintained. Internal

corrosion allowance (1.5 mm allowance).

Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) (for internal and external

corrosion monitoring functions and pipeline route inspection).

External corrosion protection measures: impressed current, pipeline coating.

Pipeline burial depth and markers. Security arrangements for landfall valve

location (to be defined).

Leak detection system (to be defined)

Minimisation of flanges and take-off lines (likely to be within site and at landfall

valve location). Application of correct piping/instrument specification.

Hydrotesting and leak testing of pipeline. Quality control of construction and

design activities.

Vehicular protection for above ground sections.

Buoyancy issues to be prevented by application of concrete weight coat.

D P-S to confirm reliability of trip

system for CO2 dryness – end Oct.

1.2 Toxicity (of CO2) Escalation from Kingsnorth site causes

pipeline failure.

Fire and explosion at Kingsnorth site, causing

pipeline failure.

As above. As above. Burial of route within site where possible. Layout of onsite equipment accounts for pipeline route through the site to manage potential escalations eg

orientation of gas turbines.

Kingsnorth site F&E protection. Site boundary isolation, to minimise potential

lost inventory onsite.

None.

1.3 Toxicity (of CO2) Loss of containment due to over

pressurisation from compression, overstressing of pipeline due to high

temperature.

Catastrophic failure of

pipeline.

As above. As above. Compression design to ensure pressure does not exceed MAOP of pipeline.

Adequately SIL rated temperature trip to ensure pipeline does not exceed

design temperature.

Determine a means to ensure the

compression system is incapable of generating a pressure/temperatures

greater than design. – FEED 1B/2

1.4 Toxicity (of CO2) Loss of containment due to fatigue or

material/construction defect

Loss of containment of CO2. As above. As above. Hydrotesting and pipeline manufacturing and welding quality control, as above. None.

1.5 Pressure Liquid lock-in and warm-up of CO2,

causing overpressure and loss of

containment

Loss of containment of CO2 As above. As above. Further evaluation is required to determine if this is a credible hazard. Review the potential to overpressurise

the land section of the pipeline due to

liquid lock-in and warm-up. - end Nov.

1.6 Pressure Explosive decompression of dense

phase at high temperature.

Catastrophic failure of pipeline

with pipeline fragmentation

As above. As above. Further evaluation is required to determine if this is a credible hazard. Evaluate the potential for explosive decompression and determine whether

associated control measures are

suitable and sufficient. Phase 1B.

1.7 Temperature Loss of containment of CO2. Embrittlement of materials

within effect zone.

Potential personal injuries as a result

of failure of load bearing structures.

N/A Route selection (to avoid proximity to vulnerable structures). Physical barriers to protect specific structures. To be considered in subsequent stages of

design.

Thermal imaging along pipeline route. Isolation and blowdown of onshore

pipeline section to minimise duration of effect.

None.

1.8 Startup Low temperature due to pressure drop-down during initial pipeline

pressurisation for commissioning.

No concern. N/A Localised cold temperature along

pipeline route. No significant concern

Not applicable. None.

1.9 Shutdown Rapid closure of valve creates

“hammer” effect within pipeline

Could give rise to loss of

containment at the valve

closure location

No concern. No concern. Large valves – closure times are relatively slow. CO2 is compressible, even in

dense phase, therefore hammer effect not considered significant.

None.








1.10 Isolation and venting Onshore pipeline emergency Requirement to vent down onshore pipeline CO2

inventory.

Prolonged exposure of personnel to

loss of containment.

Increased amounts of CO2 released

into environment.

Isolation and blowdown routes (onsite). Cross system ESD and blowdown

philosophy to be established. mid Nov.

1.11 Access Presence of significant number of heavy construction vehicles during

installation.

Potential to impact on local

roadways and infrastructure.

Personal inconvenience and harm

during construction activities.

N/A. Traffic Management Plan, to manage interactions with local services and

facilities.

None.

1.12 Discharges to Water Requirement to use treated seawater

to undertake hydrotesting.

Requirement to discharge

water after use.

No concern. May lead to environmental impact. Discharge of hydrotest water will require consent. Ensure that discharge of hydrotest water is included in the consenting

process. – FEED 1B/2

1.13 Electrical systems Use of impressed current corrosion protection systems, on CO2 pipeline

and other systems crossed using

similar systems.

Interaction between cathodic protection systems resulting in

ineffective corrosion inhibition

eventually leading to loss of

loss of containment.

Potential multiple fatalities due to toxic/asphyxiant effects of CO2






Pipeline design will be to relevant codes which specify the standard for pipeline

crossings. PIMS to include monitoring of CP systems.

None.

1.14 Electrical systems Potential High Voltage interference

causing induced current during

construction and impact on CP system

during operation.

Potential of failure/reduced

efficiency of CP system.

Potential for introduction of

welding defects during

construction.

Electrical shock. N/A. CP system design and construction welding procedures. None.

1.15 Security Third party intervention at landfall valve giving rise to loss of

containment.

Potential damage/loss of containment with operational

disruption.

Potential multiple fatalities due to toxic/asphyxiant effects of CO2






None presently developed. Review security strategy requirements

end Oct.

All guidewords checked: Y / N

Base case and variation considered: Y / N








2 From the landfall valve along the shore approach up to and including the Kingsnorth Offshore Platform riser base.

2.1 Toxicity (of CO2). Loss of containment of CO2 from pipeline, caused as above, plus ship

anchors, dropped objects, scour,

fishing, free spanning due to sand

waves.

Loss of containment of CO2. Potential multiple fatalities due to toxic/asphyxiant effects of CO2


Vessel instability due to subsea

release.



Minimal impact on local species and


Pipeline first 45km is trenched and backfilled to a depth of 2 m, with localised areas of 3m depth with rock and gravel dumping as additional protection. Pre-

sweeping of sand waves to reduce vulnerability to spanning.

Tie-in spools to be protected by concrete mattresses.

Pipeline surveys to monitor seabed movements and damage to pipeline.

Pipeline route to be clearly identified on Admiralty charts and in discussions

with fishing organisations.

Mass balance reconciliation to identify any gross disparity in pipeline flow to

platform – applicable over relatively long term periods.

None.

2.2 Pressure. Liquid lock-in and warm-up of CO2, causing overpressure and loss of

containment.

Loss of containment of CO2 As above. As above. Further evaluation is required to determine if this is a credible hazard. Review the potential to overpressurise the offshore section of the pipeline due

to liquid lock-in and warm-up. - end

Nov.

2.3 Discharges to

Water.

Requirement to hydrotest pipeline with

treated seawater.

Discharge water to sea. No concern. May lead to environmental impact. Discharge of hydrotest water will require consent. Ensure that discharge of hydrotest water is included in the PON 15C by

RSK - end Oct.

2.4 Environmental

Receptors.

Identification of specific habitats for Saberlalia – disturbance during

pipeline installation.

Would require pipeline route

revision to avoid prosecution.

No concern. Environmental sensitive habitat

disturbed.

Undertake route survey to identify any habitats likely to influence pipeline

route.

Review pipeline route survey to provide advice on actions to mitigate

potential environmental disturbance.

end Oct.

2.5 Installation. Requirement to construct coffer dam

for installation of shore approach.

Flooding of St Mary’s

marshes.

Potential harm to personnel working

in or around coffer dam and to public

in the vicinity.

No consequence of concern. Specialist contractor to undertake coffer dam construction and maintenance in

accordance with good industry practice.

None.

2.6 Marine. Unexploded ordnance. Potential ordnance present

along pipeline route.

Potential injury and significant project delay. Potential damage to

installation vessel.

No concern. Pipeline pre-construction survey. Pipeline installation contractor to engage

ordnance disposal specialists.

None.

All guidewords checked: Y / N

Base case and variation considered: Y / N

Documents

6.63 Pipeline Hazid Envid Report