7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES · 2018-12-01 · CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL

CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL

NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 240

7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES

7.1 Public Consultation

The site is located in Notified Industrial Estate set up prior to EIA Notification dated 14th September 2006, hence

Public consultation will not be required. Gazettee notification is attached as Annexure 17.

7.2 Consequance Analysis & Risk Assessment

7.2.1 Background

Key issues in Risk Assessment (RA) of the Petro chemical based processing unit (M/s Chemplast Sanmar) i.e.

Category 5 (e) of the Schedule to the EIA Notification dated Sept. 14, 2006 (amended till date), for proposed

increased capacity ( 6,00,000 TPA) are discussed in this chapter. The risk assessment process is intended to

identify existing and probable hazards in the work environment and all operations, to quantify the hazards and to

assess the risk levels of those hazards in order to prioritize those that need an immediate attention.

In the unlikely event that an abnormal consequence has occurred, the disaster management kicks in. This includes

prescribing the procedures pertaining to a number of issues such as communication, encounter, rescue,

rehabilitation and further steps to prevent recurrence of such consequence in future. These issues are addressed in

the disaster management plan.

Both, the RA and DMP are living documents and need to be updated whenever there are changes in operations,

equipment or procedures.

7.2.2 Key Definitions

The terminologies used in this Risk Assessment (RA) study are defined below.

Consequence: Magnitude or size of the damage or loss. In terms of health and safety, it is the degree of harm

that could be caused to the people exposed to hazard, the potential severity of injuries or ill health, and/or the

number of people who could be potentially affected. Consequence of hazard need not only be in terms of human

safety criteria, but could also be in terms of a financial loss due to production and incurred costs due to

repairs/replacement, environmental impacts as well as public outrage.

Disaster: A catastrophic consequence of a major emergency/accident that leads to not only extensive damage to

life and property, but also disrupts all normal human activity for a significant period of time and requires a major

national and/or international effort for rescue and rehabilitation of those affected.

Emergency: A situation of process deviation that, if uncontrolled, may lead to a major accident/disaster with

potential short term and/or long term risk damage consequence to life and property in and/or around the

workplace.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines1 (EPRG1): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is

believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour (without a respirator) without experiencing

other than mild transient adverse health effects or without perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines2 (ERPG2): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is

believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible

or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines3 (ERPG3): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is

believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening

health effects.




Hazard: Source of potential harm, injury or loss to man and machines.

Immediately Dangerous to life and health (IDLH): It represents the maximum concentration of a chemical

from which, in the event of respiratory failure, one could escape within 30 minutes without a respirator and without

experiencing any escape/impairing (e.g. severe irritation) or irreversible health effects.

Lethal Concentration Low (LCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, other than LC50, which has

been reported to cause death in human or animals.

Risk: Combination of the likelihood of a specific unwanted event and the potential consequences, if it occurs.

Risk Assessment: A process that involves estimation and measurement of risk to determine priorities and to

enable identification of appropriate level of risk treatment (used also to describe the overall process of risk

management).

Risk Control: Implementation of strategies to prevent, control and minimize hazards.

Risk Management: Overall description of the steps taken to manage risk, by identifying hazards and

implementing controls in the workplace.

Risk Rating: The category, level, or risk assigned following risk assessment (e.g. High, Medium, or Low).

Threshold Limit Value (TLV): It is the permitted level of exposure for a given period on a weighted average

basis (usually 8 hrs for 5 days in a week)

Short Time Exposure Limit (STEL): It is the permitted short-term exposure limit usually for a 15 minutes

exposure.

Toxic Concentration Low (TCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, to which humans or animals

have been exposed for any given period of time that has produced a toxic effects in humans or produced

carcinogenic, neoplastigenic or tetratogenic effect in humans or animals.

7.2.3 Methodology for Risk Assessment

The scope of work includes site inspection, hazard identification, selection of potential loss scenarios, and

simulation of release source model on DNV’s PHAST Professional 7.1, consequence analysis and plotting of Damage

contour on site map in order to take strategic decision to mitigate/minimize the level of risk to the facility and to the

community. The steps undertaken to carry out Risk Assessment for the proposed increased capacity are described

in subsequent sections.

7.2.4 Hazard Identification

The Hazop for this plant for the production capacity of 3,00,000 TPA was carried out by “Kadam Environmenal

Consultants” September 2011. And all recommendations were closed. Consequence analysis for 6,00,000 TPA

capacity has been done and detailed Hazop will be carried out during engineering phase.

7.2.5 MCLS Development Techniques

As a first step towards risk assessment is to identify the possible release scenarios based on available information

about scenario development for Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS).

Basis for Selecting the Material to be studied for Consequence Assessment

Following points are considered while selecting the release scenarios:

Flammability and the flash point of the material

Phase of the material i.e. liquid or gas

Threshold quantity of the chemical as prescribed in MSIHC Rules

Operating Temperature and Pressure of the material




Total inventory of the material

M/s. Chemplast Sanmar is using Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) as a major raw material which is a highly

flammable liquid having flash point in the range of -75°C to -78°C in production of Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC). The

flow of VCM in the facility is shown below:

Table 7-1: Flow of VCM in the Chemplast Sanmar PVC manufacturing facility at Cuddalore

The other flammable liquid being used in the facility is High Speed Diesel (HSD). The physical condition of the

containment carrying VCM as shown above is given below;

Table 7-2: Containment Operating Condition

S. No. Containment (Vessel) Temperature

(°C)

Pressure

(bar)

Height

(m)

Diameter

(m)

Volume

(m3)

Existing

1 VCM Storage Tank -13.6 ambient 21 24.8 7500

2 VCM Day Tank 30 5 - - 190

3 Reactor 56 8.5 - - 100

4 HSD Tank Amb. Amb. 3.6 2.4 20

Proposed

1 VCM Storage Tank -13.6 ambient 21 24.8 10000

2 HSD Tank Amb. Amb. 3.6 2.4 30

PVC to packing and to Supply

Sections of the facility where

containment / equipment failure

will lead to release of VCM into

the environment and can lead to

disastrous situation

VCM transfer from Jetty through

a pipe-in-pipe out pipeline

facility

VCM storage in high integrity

double walled Storage Tank at

Atmospheric Pressure and at

–13.60 C Temp

VCM from tank farm to Heat

Exchanger 1003

VCM from HE 1003 to

Intermediate Storage VCM Day

Tank

VCM from Day Tank to Reactor

Slurry from the reactor to Blow

down Vessel, then to Stripper

feed vessel, and then to FBD




Table 7-3: Pipeline Operating Conditions

S. No.

Containment (Pipe) Temp.

(°C)

Pressure

(bar)

~Pipe Length (m)

Pipeline Size

(Inch)

~Volume (m3)

1 Pipeline transferring VCM from Jetty to Tank Farm in pipe-in-

pipe out pipeline -13.6 5 - 6 3500

OD of inner pipeline

12.75

- OD of outer

pipeline 16.00

2 Pre Cooling Line -13.6 10 - 11 3500

OD of inner pipeline

4.00

- OD of outer

pipeline 8.63

3 Pipeline connecting VCM Tank

Farm to HE 1003 -13.6 16 40 8 1.25

4 Pipeline connecting HE 1003

to VCM Day Tank 30 5 20 4 0.157

5 Pipeline connecting VCM Day

Tank to Reactor 30 14 50 8 1.6

Hazard and Damage Assessment

Toxic, flammable and explosive substances released from sources of storage as a result of failures or catastrophes,

can cause losses in the surrounding area in the form of:

Toxic gas dispersion, resulting in toxic levels in ambient air,

Fires, fireballs, and flash back fires, resulting in a heat wave (radiation), or

Explosions (Vapours Cloud Explosions) resulting in blast waves (overpressure).

Consequences of Fire/ Heat Wave

The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation and exposure time. The effect

is expressed in term of the probability of death and different degree of burn. The consequence effects studied to

assess the impact of the events on the receptors are provided in Table 7-4.

Table 7-4 : Damage due to Radiation Intensity

Radiation (kW/m2) Damage to Equipment Damage to People

4.0 - Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec. But

blistering is unlikely.

12.5 Minimum energy to ignite wood with a

flame; melts plastic tubing. 1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in 10

sec.

37.5 Severe damage to plant

100% lethality in 1 min.

50% lethality in 20 sec.

1% lethality in 10 sec.

Consequences of Overpressure

The effects of the shock wave vary depending on the characteristics of the material, the quantity involved and the

degree of confinement of the vapor cloud. The peak pressures in an explosion therefore vary between a slight over-

pressure and a few hundred kilopascals (kPa). Whereas dwelling are demolished and windows and doors broken at

overpressures as low as 0.03- 0.1 bar. Direct injury to people occurs at greater pressures. The pressure of the

shock wave decreases rapidly with the increase in distance from the source of the explosion. The overpressure

damage is shown in Table 7-5.

Table 7-5: Overpressure Damage

Overpressure bar Damage

1 Fatality

0.41 Ear Drum Rupture to humans




Overpressure bar Damage

0.2 Structural Damage to buildings

0.02 Glass Damage

Source: CCPS Consequence Analysis of Chemical Release

Consequences of Toxic Release

The effect of exposure to toxic substance depends upon the duration of exposure and the concentration of the toxic

substance.

Short-term exposures to high concentration give Acute Effects while long term exposures to low concentrations

result in Chronic Effects.

Only acute effects are considered under hazard analysis, since they are likely credible scenarios. These effects are:

Irritation (respiratory system, skin, eyes)

Narcosis (nervous system)

Asphyxiation (oxygen deficiency)

System damage (blood organs)

7.2.6 Selection of Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLs’)

Following important points should be considered for the selection of release scenarios.

Flammability and the flash point of the material

Phase of material i.e. liquid or gas

Threshold quantity of the chemicals as prescribed in MSIHC Rules

Operating temperature and pressure of the material

Total inventory of the material

On the basis of study of chemical properties (MSDS) of the chemicals those are selected for simulation are

presented Table 7-2 & Table 7-3.

On the basis of the information provided in Table 7-2 & Table 7-3, and as discussed over failures sceneries given

in publications like World Bank Technical Paper 55 and TNO Purple Book and the experience of the consultant,

MCLs’ which may take place are presented in Table 7-6 & Table 7-7.

Table 7-6: Scenario Selected for Simulation from vessel Source

S. No.

Containment (Vessel)

Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied

1 VCM Storage Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and

Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire,

Explosion

2 VCM Day Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and


Explosion

3 VCM Reactor 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and


Explosion

4 HSD Storage Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and


Explosion

Table 7-7: Scenario Selected for Simulation from Pipe Source

S. No.

Containment (Vessel) Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied

1 Pipeline transferring VCM

from Jetty to Tank Farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline

Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Fireball, Explosion

2 Pre Cooling Line Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Fireball, Explosion




S. No.

Containment (Vessel) Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied

3 Pipeline connecting VCM Tank Farm to HE 1003

10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak in tank and Catastrophic Rupture

Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion

4 Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day Tank

10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak in tank and Catastrophic Rupture

Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion

5 Pipeline connecting VCM

Day Tank to Reactor 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak

in tank and Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion

Failure Rates

A leak or rupture of a tank, release some or all of its content, can be caused by brittle failure of the tank wall, welds

or connected pipework due to use of inadequate materials, combined with loading such as wind, earthquake or

impact. Failure rates for selected MCLS’ are provided in Table 7-8.

Table 7-8: Failure Frequency for Storage Tanks

Categories Catastrophic Rupture

Frequency (per tank per year) Leak Frequency (per year)

Refrigerated Storage Tank (Single Wall) 2.3 × 10-5 1.0 × 10-5

Refrigerated Storage Tank

(Double Walled) 2.5 × 10-8

1.0 × 10-5

(for primary containment)

Atmospheric Storage Tank 3.0 × 10-6 2.8× 10-3

Pressure Vessels 4.7 × 10-7 1.2 × 10-5 (for Hole Size 3 to 10 mm)

7.1 × 10-6 (for Hole Size 10 to 50 mm)

Reference: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP); Report No. 434-3, March 2010

Also, the risk assessment is considered using certain internationally recognized yardsticks for measuring risk. These

first need to be explained, and this is done as Table 7-9.

Table 7-9: Broadly Accepted Frequency

Annual Fatality risk level per year

Conclusion

10-3 Unacceptable to everyone. Immediate action shall be taken to reduce the hazards

10-4 Willing to spend public money to control hazards, such as traffic signs, fire departments etc.

10-5 People still recognize. Safety slogans have precautionary rings. Such as never swim alone,

never point a gun

10-6 Not of great concern to everyone. People are aware of these hazards but feel that they

cannot happen to them. Such as Lightning Never Strikes twice an Act of God.

7.2.7 Simulation of Release and Development of Contours

As the MCLS’ were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the consequence

analysis. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the following sections.

VCM Storage Tank (Existing)

Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-10, whereas the Overpressure Effect distance are

presented in Table 7-11.

Table 7-10: Radiation Level and Effect Distance

Chemical (Storage Tank)

Failure Scenario

Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

VCM Tank (7500 m3 Existing)

10 mm leak Jet Fire

1.5/B 23.6 19.2 NR

2.0/E 22.8 18.4 NR

4/D 20.6 16.4 NR





Failure Scenario


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 26.5 16.6 9.5

2.0/E 27.0 17.5 9.4

4/D 26.9 17.0 9.4

50 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 88.6 71.5 58.7

2.0/E 85.7 68.6 56.4

4/D 78.6 61.8 51.0

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 155.2 95.9 49.5

2.0/E 155.8 98.5 51.5

4/D 150.0 99.4 54.3

Catastrophic Rupture

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 1844.0 1175.1 733.5

2.0/E 1855.2 1190.6 752.0

4/D 1845.6 1208.7 794.9

Table 7-11: Overpressure Effect Distance


Failure Scenario

Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters

0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar


10 mm leak Overpressure

1.5/B 55 35 32

2.0/E 39 24 22

4/D 25 13 11


1.5/B 311 166 144

2.0/E 322 160 136

4/D 208 105 90


Overpressure

1.5/B 4966 3125 2916

2.0/E 4957 3034 2810

4/D 2518 1435 1401

The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-1 to Figure 7-3.

Figure 7-1: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B




Figure 7-2: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E

Figure 7-3: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E

VCM Storage Tank (Proposed)

Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-12, whereas the overpressure effect distance are

presented Table 7-13.



Failure Scenario

Consequence Met Data

Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

VCM Tank (10000 m3 Proposed)

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 23.6 19.2 NR

2.0/E 22.8 18.4 NR

4/D 20.6 16.4 13.4

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 26.5 16.6 9.5

2.0/E 27.0 17.5 9.4

4/D 26.9 19.0 9.4

50 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 88.6 71.5 58.7

2.0/E 85.7 68.6 56.4

4/D 78.6 61.8 51.0

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 155.2 95.9 49.5

2.0/E 155.8 98.5 51.5

4/D 150.1 99.4 54.3





Failure Scenario



4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2


Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 2058.2 1316.0 827.9

2.0/E 2070.3 1332.5 847.6

4/D 2058.2 1350.9 892.5



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar



1.5/B 55 35 32

2.0/E 39 24 22

4/D 25 13 11


1.5/B 311 166 144

2.0/E 322 160 136

4/D 208 105 90


Overpressure

1.5/B 5547 3544 3301

2.0/E 5544 3448 3189

4/D 2798 1596 1521







Figure 7-6: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E

VCM Day Tank


given in Table 7-15.



Failure Scenario


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

VCM day Tank

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 27.9 22.9 19.7

2.0/E 26.9 21.9 18.7

4/D 24.6 19.4 16.2

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 24.1 18.0 15.1

2.0/E 23.9 18.1 14.9

4/D 23.6 18.8 15.6

50 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 118.9 96.6 82.7

2.0/E 115.3 92.7 78.6

4/D 106.4 82.9 68.7

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 125.0 85.0 52.7

2.0/E 123.3 85.7 52.9

4/D 119.8 87.3 54.7


Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 450.3 169.7 NR

2.0/E 450.3 169.7 NR

4/D 450.3 169.7 NR



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

VCM Day Tank


1.5/B 25 13 11

2.0/E 25 13 11

4/D 24 13 11


1.5/B 197 127 117

2.0/E 202 128 117

4/D 209 138 127


Overpressure 1.5/B 1350 311 197

2.0/E 1368 323 252





Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

4/D 1373 342 297



Figure 7-8: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B

Figure 7-9: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50mm Leak at Weather Condition 4.0/D




VCM Reactor





Failure Scenario


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

VCM reactor

10 mm leak Jet Fire

1.5/B 29.1 24.0 20.7

2.0/E 28.1 22.9 19.6

4/D 25.7 20.3 17.0

50 mm leak Jet Fire

1.5/B 124.8 101.6 87.4

2.0/E 120.9 97.4 83.1

4/D 111.4 87.2 72.5


Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 451.7 186.4 NR

2.0/E 451.7 186.4 NR

4/D 451.7 186.4 NR



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

VCM Reactor


1.5/B 24 13 11

2.0/E 24 13 11

4/D 24 13 11


1.5/B 182.9 116.4 106.6

2.0/E 186.2 117.1 106.8

4/D 192.6 126.4 116.5


Overpressure

1.5/B 1065.5 243.9 131.3

2.0/E 1080.2 249.9 140.5

4/D 1086.4 257.1 157.6

The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-10 & Figure 7-11.





Figure 7-11: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 4.0/D

HSD Tank (Existing)

Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-18, whereas the Flash Fire effect distance are given in

Table 7-19.



Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

HSD Tank (20 KL - Existing)

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 1.4 NR NR

2.0/E 1.3 NR NR

4/D 1.3 NR NR

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7

50 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 8.0 6.1 5.8

2.0/E 7.7 5.8 4.5

4/D 7.3 5.4 3.9

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7


Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7

Table 7-19: Flash Fire Effect Distance


Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter

0.5 LFL LFL


10 mm leak Flash Fire

1.5/B 3.01 2.98

2.0/E 3.00 2.98

4/D 2.97 2.97


1.5/B 3.8 3.8

2.0/E 3.8 3.8

4/D 3.8 3.8

Flash Fire 1.5/B 5.5 5.5






0.5 LFL LFL


2.0/E 5.5 5.5

4/D 5.3 5.3

HSD Tank (Proposed)

Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-20, whereas the Flash Fire effect distance is given in

Table 7-21.



Failure Scenario



4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

HSD Tank (30 KL - Proposed)

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 1.5 NR NR

2.0/E 1.4 NR NR

4/D 1.3 NR NR

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7

50 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 8.0 6.1 5.8

2.0/E 7.7 5.8 4.5

4/D 7.3 5.4 3.9

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7


Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0

2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3

4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7

Table 7-21: Flash Fire Effect Distance



0.5 LFL LFL



1.5/B 3.01 2.98

2.0/E 3.00 2.98

4/D 2.97 2.97


1.5/B 3.8 3.8

2.0/E 3.8 3.8

4/D 3.8 3.8


Flash Fire

1.5/B 6.1 6.1

2.0/E 6.1 6.1

4/D 5.9 5.9

The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-12.




Figure 7-12: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D

Pipeline transferring VCM from jetty to Tank farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline





Failure Scenario



4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2



Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 488.3 301.9 170.0

2.0/E 497.8 314.1 183.1

4/D 504.5 329.9 208.4

Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 80.2 20.2 NR

2.0/E 80.2 20.2 NR

4/D 80.2 20.2 NR



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar



Overpressure

1.5/B 1130.2 661.4 616.9

2.0/E 1143.0 643.7 591.8

4/D 971.9 453.6 399.0





Figure 7-13: Fireball Ellipse Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 2.0/E

Figure 7-14: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 10mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E

Pre cooling Line





Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Pre cooling Line Catastrophic

Rupture

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 181.2 109.7 54.8

2.0/E 185.1 115.4 59.7

4/D 190.4 124.8 70.2

Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 12.8 NR NR

2.0/E 12.8 NR NR

4/D 12.8 NR NR



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

Pre cooling Line Catastrophic

Rupture Overpressure

1.5/B 487.8 254.9 229.8

2.0/E 494.7 251.2 222.3





Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

4/D 450.2 194.6 168.3


Figure 7-15: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D

Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to HE 1003





Failure Scenario



4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to HE

1003

10 mm leak Jet Fire

1.5/B 39.7 32.4 27.5

2.0/E 38.4 31.1 26.1

4/D 35.1 27.5 22.7

25 mm leak Jet Fire

1.5/B 90.1 73.2 62.1

2.0/E 87.3 70.2 59.1

4/D 80.2 62.5 51.5


Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 46.6 27.2 10.9

2.0/E 47.7 29.0 11.5

4/D 50.2 33.1 13.3



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to

HE 1003


1.5/B 58 35 32

2.0/E 59 36 32

4/D 44 25 22


1.5/B 191.6 126.1 116.5

2.0/E 208.9 137.6 127.1

4/D 169.3 105.7 96.3


Overpressure 1.5/B 174.4 81.6 68.6

2.0/E 176.1 80.6 68.2





Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

4/D 162.7 68.7 57.5



Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day tank





Failure Scenario



4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day

tank

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 27.9 22.9 19.7

2.0/E 26.9 21.9 18.7

4/D 24.6 19.4 16.2

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 20.1 15.7 14.5

2.0/E 20.1 15.7 14.3

4/D 20.6 16.7 15.2

25 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 63.8 52.2 44.8

2.0/E 61.8 50.0 42.5

4/D 56.8 44.6 37.1

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 29.1 23.9 22.0

2.0/E 29.0 24.0 21.8

4/D 30.1 25.5 22.6

Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 34.6 NR NR

2.0/E 34.6 NR NR

4/D 34.6 NR NR


Fireball Ellipse

1.5/B 34.6 NR NR

2.0/E 34.6 NR NR

4/D 34.6 NR NR






Failure Scenario


0.02 0.21 1.00

Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM

Day tank


1.5/B 25 13 11

2.0/E 25 13 11

4/D 24 13 11


1.5/B 69.6 37.8 33.2

2.0/E 70.9 38.1 33.3

4/D 68.4 37.6 33.1


Overpressure

1.5/B 79.6 23.8 15.5

2.0/E 84.4 24.7 15.9

4/D 107.6 29.4 23.5







Figure 7-19: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D

Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to Reactor





Failure Scenario


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to

Reactor

10 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 34.8 28.6 24.6

2.0/E 33.6 27.4 23.3

4/D 30.8 24.3 20.3

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 27.5 21.2 18.1

2.0/E 27.1 21.1 17.8

4/D 26.3 21.7 18.7

25 mm leak

Jet Fire

1.5/B 79.6 64.9 55.7

2.0/E 77.1 62.2 53.0

4/D 70.9 55.6 46.2

Late Pool Fire

1.5/B 45.9 35.9 28.6

2.0/E 45.4 36.2 28.3

4/D 46.3 38.6 29.3


Fireball Elipse

1.5/B 97.8 36.9 NR

2.0/E 97.8 36.9 NR

4/D 97.8 36.9 NR



Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar

Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to

Reactor


1.5/B 28 14 11

2.0/E 29 14 12

4/D 27 13 11


1.5/B 100.5 60.0 54.0

2.0/E 112.6 70.4 64.2

4/D 110.5 70.0 64.0

Overpressure 1.5/B 275.3 62.5 40.5





Failure Scenario


0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar


2.0/E 277.9 63.2 44.3

4/D 279.2 66.2 55.8




Conclusion

Table 7-32: Conclusion from Consequance Analysis

Chemical Scenario

Effect Distance in Meters Consequence

Zone At Radiation level 4 Kw/m2

At Flash Fire 0.5 LFL

At Overpressure 0.02 bar


Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)

155.8 at 2.0/E 133.4 at 1.5/B 322 at 2.0/E Within the site

Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)

1855.2 at 2.0/E 2808.9 at 1.5/B 4966 at 1.5/B Outside Plant

boundry*

VCM Tank (10000 m3 Proposed)


155.8 at 2.0/E 133.4 at 1.5/B 322 at 2.0/E Within the site


2070.3 at 2.0/E 3187.7 at 1.5/B 5547 at 1.5/B Outside Plant

boundry*




Chemical Scenario

Effect Distance in Meters Consequence

Zone At Radiation level 4 Kw/m2

At Flash Fire 0.5 LFL

At Overpressure 0.02 bar

VCM day Tank


125 at 1.5/B 129.3 at 4.0/D 209 at 4.0/D Within the site


450.3 at 1.5/B 477.9 at 4.0/D 1373 at 4.0/D Within the site

VCM reactor


124.8 at 1.5/B 113.1 at 4.0/D 192.6 at 4.0/D Within the site


451.7 at 1.5/B 176.8 at 4.0/D 1086.4 at 4.0/D Within the site



26.8 at 4.0/D 3.8 at 4.0/D - Within the site


26.8 at 4.0/D 5.5 at 1.5/B - Within the site



26.8 at 4.0/D 3.8 at 4.0/D - Within the site


26.8 at 4.0/D 6.1 at 1.5/B - Within the site

Pipeline transferring

VCM from jetty to Tank farm in

pipe-in-pipe out pipeline


504.5 at 4.0/D 602.7 at 1.5/B 1143 at 2.0/E Within the site

Pre cooling Line


190.4 at 4.0/D 223.1 at 1.5/B 497.4 at 2.0/E Within the site

Pipeline connecting

VCM Tank farm to HE 1003


90.1 at 1.5/B 125.7 at 2.0/E 208.9 at 2.0/E Within the site


50.2 at 4.0/D 69.2 at 1.5/B 176.1 at 2.0/E Within the site

Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM

Day tank


63.8 at 1.5/B 37.7 at 4.0/D 70.9 at 2.0/E Within the site


34.6 at 2.0/E 37.1 at 4.0/D 107.6 at 4.0/D Within the site

Pipeline connecting

VCM Day Tank to Reactor


79.6 at 1.5/B 61.9 at 2.0/E 112.6 at 2.0/E Within the site


97.8 at 2.0/E 84.8 at 4.0/D 279.2 at 4.0/D Within the site

*Worst case scenario i.e. catastrophic rupture of existing and proposed VCM tanks are considered to comply ToR

point. However catastrophic rupture is not possible due to;

Double walled VCM storage tanks

VCM boil-off recovery system

Multi level pressure and vacuum protection devices are provided to avoid tank failure due to excess pressure or

vacuum

Dedicated power supply and standby compressor & utility system

Pressure and vacuum relieving devices for VCM storage tanks

Apart from standard monitors and hydrant points the tanks are provided with an automatic medium velocity

water deluge system for fire protection

In case of emergency material from one tank can be pumped to other at any time

With all the above safety system, any catastrophic release of VCM is remote

All the above safety system will ensure that any major release of VCM is avoided at any point of time




7.2.8 Treatment and Control

After examining the high priority risks, a prime consideration is given to the potential to reduce or eliminate the risk

by using the hierarchy of controls. This assists in establishing methods to reduce risk. The desirability of control

plans (with reducing effectiveness) is as follows;

Elimination: Take step to eliminate the hazard completely,

Substitution: Replace with less hazardous material, substance or process,

Separation: Isolate hazard from person by guarding, space,

Administrative: Adjusting the time or conditions of risk exposures

Engineering Control: includes designs or modifications to plants, equipment, ventilation systems, and processes

that reduce the source of exposure.

Training: Increasing awareness, improving skills and making tasks less hazardous to persons involved,

Personal protective equipment: Use appropriately designed and properly fitted PPE.

Control measures can reduce either the likelihood or consequence of the event or both. Depending on the level of

reduction of the hazard, there could still be a residual risk that needs to be monitored so that a secondary

prevention process can be initiated when trigger points are reached.

The control measures and action will be adopted by M/s Chemplast to minimize the risk present in the facility for

the hazardous event are summarized in Table 7-33.

Table 7-33: Event Consequences, Treatment and Control

Hazardous Event Possible Consequences Treatment and Control

Loss of containment

Rupture / leak in storage tanks

Fire, explosion and toxic hazards

Gas detectors, Dyke wall provision, Level indicator, Earthing, flame arrestor &

visual observation, Ready availability of fire extinguishers and fire hydrant system

7.2.9 Precautions to be taken during Transportation

Following are some precautions will be taken during the loading and unloading of material in plant premises.

Before the tanker enters the industry premises, the tanker is to be inspected for authorized entry and safe &

sound condition of the tanker, its contents and that of the prime mover. Flammable material carrying tankers

entering plant are to be fitted with spark arresters on their exhaust.

Static charge neutralizing

The quality of the chemical in the tanker should be ascertained before unloading to avoid contamination of

chemical already at storage.

Coupling used for connecting hose to tanker must be leak proof.

For flammable chemicals, the tanker and the hose are to be properly earthed before starting unloading

operation.

Unloading should be done under personal supervision of responsible staff authorized by the management.

Provision of sample quantity of water / neutralizing medium to take care of leakage / spillage must be made.

Also steam and inert gas hose stations must be available at unloading point.

Fire alarm and firefighting facility commensurate with the chemical should be provided at the unloading point.

7.3 Disaster Management Plan

7.3.1 Objectives of Onsite Emergency Plan

The objective of “On-Site Emergency Plan” is to prepare well in advance to contain effectively any emergency in the

shortest time possible with minimum loss. The plan aims to make the maximum use of the combined resources of

the plant and the outside services to take fast and effective actions in any emergency in order to:




Protect the personnel, plant and the environment

Effect rescue and treatment of casualties, if any

Safeguard other personnel and sections in the premises

Minimize damage to property and environment

Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control

Provide authoritative information to the media

Preserve the relevant records and equipment for subsequent enquiry

7.3.2 Definition of Terms

Table 7-34: Definition of Terms

Hazard The size and nature of the event unforeseen.

Risk The probability that the event could occur.

Consequences The effect on people, plant and environment, both on-site and off-site due to emergency.

Major Emergency

An industrial emergency could be defined as an “occurrence of such magnitude so as to create a situation in which normal pattern of life within an industry/plant is suddenly

disrupted, adversely affecting not only the personnel and property within such an industrial area, but also in the vicinity”. It will require the assistance from outside agencies and use of

outside resources to handle it effectively.

Key Personnel

The essential actions during an emergency depend upon the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the required actions are promptly and effectively organised

by nominated people, each having specified responsibilities as part of coordinated plan. Such nominated personnel are known as KEY PERSONNEL.

Site Controller Site Controller is the person who assumes absolute control of the works and determines the

actions necessary to control the emergency.

Incident Controller Incident Controller is the person who goes to the scene of emergency and directs the actions

at the location of incident to overcome the emergency.

Teams A number of special actions may have to be carried out by specified works personnel to

control as well as minimise the damage and loss. For this purpose, designated teams should be available. Each Team will be headed by a Leader.

Emergency Control Centre The Emergency Control Centre is the place from where the operations to handle the

emergency are directed and co-ordinated.

Incident Control Centre Incident Controller (IC) means Incident Control Centre during emergency. It should be

located at minimum risk area.

Safe Assembly Points

In an emergency, it will almost certainly be necessary to evacuate personnel from affected areas and, as a precautionary measure, to further evacuate non-essential workers from

areas likely to be affected, should the emergency escalate. The evacuation will be effected on getting necessary message from Site Controller (SC). On evacuation, employees should be directed to pre determined safe places called safe Assembly Points. The safe Assembly

Points are to be located well away from plant and equipment and near exits from plants and conspicuously identified.

Escape Routes The roads leading to the safe Assembly Points are the designated escape routes. The

escape routes would be clearly marked with arrow marks for easy identification and escape.

Essential Personnel Essential Personnel are those to whom specific responsibilities are assigned in the

management of the On-site Emergency.

Non-Essential Personnel Non-Essential Personnel are those to whom specific responsibility is not assigned in the

management of emergency.

Recovery It means that all those short term and long term activities undertaken by the management

to normalize the operations after an emergency.

7.3.3 Declaration of Emergency

Declaring Fire Emergency

Any one discovering a fire shall attempt to put out the fire by using the first aid fire fighting appliances

Simultaneously, he would shout FIRE, FIRE, FIRE/ THEE, THEE, THEE (in local language) till the assistance

arrives




Any one or his colleagues who hears, shall immediately inform the Shift In-charge and Control Room over

phone or in person giving the exact location of the emergency

The Incident Controller on hearing the incident of emergency would proceed to the scene of emergency and

assess the situation and decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to escalate into major one

If a major one, he would activate the on-site emergency plan by sounding the siren to code and informs the

Site Controller

The key personnel would report to the emergency control centre and take respective charge

Declaring VCM Leakage Emergency

Any person discovering VCM leakage would immediately inform the control room giving the exact location of

the leakage

He shall not approach the leakage without suitable personal protective equipment. Approach would be from

upward wind direction

The Incident Controller would proceed to the site with protective equipment from upward wind direction and

assess the situation

He will take a decision whether it would be possible to attend the leakage safely. If it is YES, he would call the

maintenance and operational personnel and get it attended taking all safety precautions

If he feels the leakage could not be attended so, if required, he would take a decision to close down the

system concerned and also inform the Site Controller about the same

He shall not allow people to crowd in that area but directs them to safe areas and if warranted to assembly

points

If gas is escaping into the atmosphere and surrounding, Incident controller would activate the on-site

emergency plan by hooting the siren to code

Declaring HSD Leakage and Fire Emergency

Any person discovering HSD leakage or fire would immediately inform the control room giving the exact

location of leakage or fire

The Incident Controller would proceed to the site to assess the situation. Meanwhile, the person discovering

HSD fire shall try to extinguish it, if it is safe to do so, using suitable fire extinguishers

If the leakage could be attended safely, he would call the maintenance and get it attended

HSD leakage shall be collected and not allowed to spread

If the leakage is very heavy and warrants plant shutdown, the Site Controller shall be informed and on his

confirmation, he would take suitable action

If the leakage has caught fire, the Incident Controller would initiate the On-site Emergency Plan by operating

the siren to emergency code. The Site Controller would be informed.

Declaring Hydrochloric Acid Emergency

Any person discovering Hydrochloric acid leakage would immediately inform the Shift-in –charge/control room

giving the exact location of the leak

He shall not approach the leakage without suitable personal protective equipment

The incident controller would proceed to the site to assess the situation

He will take a decision whether it would be possible to attend the leakage safely. If it is YES, he would call the

maintenance and operational personnel and get it attended taking all safety precautions

If he feels the leakage could not be attended so, and warrants storage tank isolation he would make suitable

arrangements. If required he make arrangements for neutralizing the leaked acid lime or soda ash

He would inform the Site Controller about the same

He shall not allow people to crowd in that area but directs them to safe areas and if warranted to assembly

points

If required he shall initiate the On-Site Emergency Plan by sounding the siren to code




Figure 7-22: Onsite Emergency Plan

Legend: Admn – Administration; CSR – Corporate Social Responsibilities; PR: Public Relations

7.3.4 Key Personnel and Responsibilities

Table 7-35: Key Personnel and Responsibilities

S. No Designation Designation during Emergency

1 Location - Head Site Controller

2 Manufacturing head Alternate site controller

3 Head – Instrumentation Alternate site controller

4 Head- Production Incident Controller

5 Head - Mechanical Leader Emergency task Force

6 Mechanical Alternate Emergency task Force

7 Head - Security Logistic Controller

8 Support services Alternate logistic controller

9 Head- Electrical AlternateCommunication Coordinator

10 Head - HR Head count Team

11 Head- Safety Safety & fire Fighting Coordinator

12 Head- Safety & Environment Alternate Safety & fire Fighting Coordinator

7.3.5 Emergency Team

There will be 7 Emergency Teams. Each Team will be headed by a Leader assisted by number of personnel,

Allotment of Personnel for Each Team

The personnel for each team are allotted based on the minimum strength, which would be available on any day and

beyond the general shift hours.

The extra personnel available in the plant at the time of accident will be commissioned for augmenting the teams

engaged in control of the emergency.

Site Controller

Location: Head

Alternate: Head (Production)

Incident Controller Location: Head (Production) Alternate: Shift In charge.

Emergency Task Force Team Leader: Head (Mechanical) Altertnate: Senior Manager (Mechanical)

Logistic controller

Leader: Head - Security

Alternate: Support Services

Communication Team Leader: Head (Instrument) Alternate: Head: (Electrical)

Safety & Fire Fighting Team Leader: Head (safety) Alternate: Joint Manager (Safety & Environment)

Incident control Team Respective shift-in-charge. Area officer

Security Team Leader: AGM -Security Alternate: Shift Security Officer

Medical Team Leader: Medical Officer - OHC Alternate: Shift First aider

Manpower Accounting Team Leader: Head (HR) Alternate: Officer (HR)




The minimum allotment is done so that there are no extra persons overcrowding at the location and also to avoid

confusion.

The responsibilities of each Team and its Leader are specifically delineated, so that the responsibilities do not over

lap and confusion does not develop in executing the duties.

Incident Control Team-Production Team

Emergency Task Force

Communication Team

Security and Transport Team

Manpower Accounting Team

Medical Team

Safety and Fire fighting Team

7.3.6 Emergency Action Procedure

Responsibilities of Any Person Noticing Emergency

Raise alarm by shouting, "FIRE OR GAS/LIQUID LEAK, HELP" as the case may be.

Break the nearest Manual call Point.

Inform other employees in the vicinity by shouting.

If possible, attempt to extinguish the fire or take suitable action to contain the incident

Immediately inform the Shift in Charge/ Control Room. Pass on the following information to them :

Location and brief description of the incident

Approximate severity of the situation.

Wind direction

Action immediately taken

Continue control of the emergency at location.

Shift-in-Charge of the affected plant

Rush to the spot of emergency

Assess the severity

If required inform Main Control Room to declare emergency

Mobilise men and material for control of emergency

Responsibilities of Main Control Room during Emergency

On getting information regarding any emergency from the Shift-in-Charge of the concerned plant the Main Control

Room In-Charge/supervisor should do the following:

Immediately start the "wailing siren"

Announce the emergency on "Public Address System" (PAS) (In English and Tamil).

Handle all communication till take over by the communication team.

Immediately arrange to inform Shift in-Charge of the Main Plant.

Inform Security at Main Gate.

If the incident comes under control activate "all clear siren" on the advice of the Site controller.

7.3.7 Roles and Actions of Key Personnel, Teams and Other Essential Personnel of the Company on

Hearing Wailing Siren or on Coming to Know of Emergency

Site Controller

On hearing the Emergency Siren, rush to Emergency Control Centre 1 or 2 and take charge of the incident.




Take overall responsibility for directing emergency operations and asking outside help.

Assess the situation quickly and find out the level of emergency from Incident Controller and decide and

declare major emergency, if needed inform occupier.

Ensure that other key personnel are called-in.

Direct emergency control and rescue operations with the following priorities

Personnel safety (Arrange to provide necessary safety equipment to all the personnel in the plant, if

required.)

Plant, property and environment safety.

Minimum loss of production.

Continuously review and assess possible developments to determine most probable course of events.

Direct safe shut down of plants in consultation with Incident Controller and key personnel, if necessary.

Call Emergency Task Force for arranging immediate repairs and maintenance of equipment, if necessary.

Arrange to check that all non-essential workers, visitors, contract labor are evacuated to Assembly Points

and later on to safe places, if required.

If necessary, arrange for evacuation of neighboring population

Ensure that search for affected personnel within the affected area have been carried out.

Arrange for hospitalization of victims and additional help, if required, and ensure that relatives are apprised

of.

Ensure liaison with outside agencies such as District Emergency Authorities, District Magistrate, Police

Services and Chief Inspector of Factories, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories and Inspector of Factories.

Provide advice on possible effects on areas outside the factory.

Ensure that a chronological record of the emergency is being maintained.

Direct sounding of all clear sirens, when the situation comes under control.

Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of the emergency.

Arrange to flash information to public on radio and TV.

Issue authorized statement to the news media.

Ensure that evidence is preserved for enquiries to be conducted by statutory authorities.

Incident Controller

The Shift In-charge of the affected plant would act as Site Controller till the Site Controller arrives. Thereafter he

would be “Incident Controller”. He would execute the following responsibilities:

Take action to control the incident either by isolating the equipment or by stopping the plant and

simultaneously inform the Site Controller.

He would assess the emergency situation and if a major emergency exists or is likely to develop, he would

activate the On-Site Emergency Plan.

He would depute an operator to remain near the telephone to give and receive messages.

Ensure through the Site Controller that the required key personnel and outside help are called-in.

Direct all emergency operations, within the affected area, with the help of operation staff available at site,

with the following priorities.

Secure the safety of personnel

Minimise damage to plant, property and environment

He would ensure that all non essential staff and contract workmen are evacuated to the safe assembly points

He would ensure that the affected area is searched for causalities or trapped personnel

Brief the Site Controller and keep him informed of the developments. Provide guidance to the fire and security

teams

Preserve evidence so as to facilitate any enquiry into the causes and the circumstances or escalation of

emergency




Logistic Controller

Take charge of all logistic activities at site

Arrange to render first-aid and medical-aid to casualties.

Arrange for additional ambulance.

Arrange for head counting of all employees like regular workers, contract workmen and truck drivers at the

assembly point and in plant, by the time keeper and get it counter checked with the entry records.

Help Site controller by mobilising men, material and other services.

Co-ordinate with Site Controller in all activities as per his directions.

Arrange to record the names of casualties, head count of persons in assembly points and for rescue of those

trapped inside.

In case persons are missing, send persons equipped with PPE for search in co-ordination with Incident

Controller.

Ensure that the relatives of the casualties are informed.

If emergency is prolonged, arrange for relievers, catering facility etc.

Shift-in-Charge of the Affected Plant

Rush to the spot and assume the role of Incident Controller. Act as Site Controller also if the designated Site

Controller is not immediately available at the site.

Initiate appropriate actions to contain the situation.

Arrange for the "Wailing Siren", if not already given, through the Main Control Room.

On the Site Controller reaching site the Shift in Charge will function only as Incident Controller.

The Main Control Room Personnel will communicate the following information to the Site Controller:

Brief description of incident

Status and seriousness of the situation

Action immediately taken

Team Leaders

Mobilise the team members and required equipment.

He should activate and direct his team to take up activities assigned to the team by the Incident Controller.

Incident Control Team

The team should rush and report to the Incident Controller.

Take all prompt actions to contain and control the situation at the earliest, with minimum loss/damage.

Help coordinate with other emergency team members.

Emergency Task Force

Rush to the incident spot.

Report to Incident Controller and carry out emergency maintenance activities as required/instructed by Incident

Controller.

Co-operate and coordinate with the Incident Control Team.

Arrange to isolate electrical lines as required/advised by Incident Controller.

Attend to urgent repairs, if any, which are needed from emergency point of view.

Arrange required temporary connections.

Bring to the spot the required additional equipment and materials.




Security and Transport Team

Manning of gates. Arrange for closing of all gates and stop movement of traffic.

In case of fire arrange to post sufficient guards to incident site for augmenting firefighting force.

Inform guards at the gate to allow movement of emergency vehicles.

Depute adequate security personnel to cordon off the incident area.

Maintain law and order in the plant and Assembly Points.

Allow the emergency services like ambulance, fire tender etc to go through the gates without normal checks.

Direct external emergency services to the site of emergency.

Communication Team

On hearing the emergency alarm /or coming to know of the emergency he would proceed to Emergency

Control Center and report to the Incident Controller, Site Controller and maintain the communication system.

From the information received, brief the Site Controller of the situation, recommending, if necessary,

evacuation of staff from assembly points, to outside the plant in co-ordination with Transport and Welfare

Teams.

Deploy suitable staff to act as runners or messengers who are listed in the essential workers list between him

and the incident controller if the telephone and other system of communication fail due to any reason.

Maintain inventory of items in the emergency control center.

Maintain a log of incidents.

Keep in constant touch with happenings at the emergency site and offer suggestions to the incident

controller. He shall ensure that the board is kept free to the extent possible for incoming calls.

He shall ensure that the telephone system is in good working condition.

Medical Team

Keep the ambulance and Occupational Health Center ready to receive the injured.

Direct the first-aiders and arrange for immediate first-aid and medical attention to casualties.

Arrange additional emergency equipment and medicines.

Liaise with local hospitals and give detailed treatments required.

Liaise with Security and Transport Team for transportation of casualties to local hospitals.

Be in constant touch with Incident Controller.

Look after the welfare of the affected persons.

Arrange to keep record of casualties.

Fire Fighting Team

On hearing the emergency siren/ coming to know of the emergency he would rush to the spot of incident.

He would make sure that all required safety equipment are made available. If required he would arrange from

other sources.

Advising on safety to Incident Controller, if required be in continuous touch with Incident Controller and carry

out his instructions.

He would arrange for issue of Safety Work Permits for jobs to be taken up arising out of the emergency in co-

ordination with the task force.

Ensure that safety of personnel, plant and environment are properly taken care of.

Arrange for the prompt replacement/replenishment of used fire and safety equipment.

Take guidance of the Incident Controller for assessing the requirement of mutual aid.

Based on the instructions from the Incident Controller, he would guide the fire group to control the emergency

and rescue operations.

Arrange to position the fire tender at the proper place depending on wind direction and availability of fire

hydrant.




Decide his line of action in consultation with the Incident Controller and take appropriate measures to

extinguish the fire / control gas leak.

Ensure the crewmembers are provided with proper safety equipment.

Man Power Accounting Team

Conduct "headcount" of all employees like regular workers, contract workmen and truck drivers at the

assembly point and in plant, and get it counter checked with the entry records.

Keep control of the persons assembled in assembly point/s.

Do not permit non-essential personnel and visitors to move out of assembly point/s till the termination of

emergency or on instructions from Site Controller.

Report the list of missing person/s to Logistic Controller.

Search and find out missing person/s, if any under instructions of Site Controller.

Record all happenings and report to Logistic Controller, and Incident Controller.

Report to Logistic Controller and carry out his instructions

Key Personnel beyond General Shift Hours and for Holidays

The executives and officers will not be available during non- general shift hours and factory holidays. So shift

Personnel available in the respective team has to shoulder the emergency responsibilities till the above mentioned

key personnel arrive at the site and relieve them.

Table 7-36: Details of Team Leaders

S. No. Team Team Leader Designation

1 Incident Control Team Shift in Charge of the plant where

emergency occurred Shift in Charge

2 Emergency Task Force Maintenance Engineer - Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

3 Communication Team Foreman- Electrical Foreman

4 Security &Transport Shift Security in charge D.S.O

5 Manpower Accounting Team Shift Security In charge D.S.O

6 Medical Team Compounder, (Health Center) Medical attendant

7 Safety &Fire Fighting Fireman Fireman

Each team leader may select and train 2 to 3 members working under him to act as its team members during an

emergency.

7.3.8 Role of Key Personnel and Key in Brief

Table 7-37: Role of Key Personnel

S. No. Key Personnel/Team Brief Description of the Role

1 Site Controller Overall in-charge

2 Incident Controller In-charge of all site actions

3 Logistics Controller Head of Support team. Mobilization of Finance, Material, Security, Medical

Transport and rendering all non technical/logistics support to Site Controller.

4 Other Senior Personnel of the

company As required, depending upon the situation.

5 Incident Control Team, To bring the incident under control.

6 Emergency Task Force Team To carry out emergency maintenance activities.

7 Security and Transport Team To look after security and transport requirements.

8 Communication Team To maintain communication facilities during emergency.

9 Medical Team To look after medical requirements including first aid, transport of injured

to hospitals and procurement of medicines on emergency basis.




S. No. Key Personnel/Team Brief Description of the Role

10 Fire Fighting To fight the fires; to control toxic release by spraying water; issue of PPE; to mobilize PPE and fire fighting equipment; to direct external fire fighting

agencies .

11 Man Power Accounting To head count the personnel assembled at Safe Assembly Points and plant

areas including contract labour.

If an emergency occurs beyond general shift hours or during holidays, the Shift in-Charge of the plant in which it

occurs would act as the Incident Controller. The Shift – In – Charge of one of the other plants, would assume the

responsibilities of the site Controller. They will continue to shoulder this responsibility till the regular site Controller /

Incident Controller or their alternatives arrive at the site.

Table 7-38: Emergency in PVC Plant

Emergency in Incident Controller Site Controller

PVC Plant Field officer of respective section Shift-in Charge PVC Plant

Table 7-39: Emergency Control Centre

Main Intercom: 3384 Admin Block

Alternate Intercom : 3372 Material Gate

7.3.9 Safe Assembly Points

Safe assembly points are listed below;

Main Gate/ Security Office

Adjacent to fire water storage tank

Material Gate

7.3.10 Escape Routes

Route no. 1: From VCM Tank Storage to Material Gate (Road N 7 to N 8 via Road E 7)

Route no 2: From Reactor area to Admin Building (Road E3 to N 3 and/or E3 to E 1 via N 6)

Route no 3: Road to Ware House via open area (Road E6 to N 8)

Route no. 4: From Dryer Area to Main Gate via Work shop (from E3 to E1 via N6 and/or E3 to N 3)

Route no. 5: From Nitrogen Plant / Compressor to fire water pump house. ( N 3 to E 9 and/or N2 to E 8)

7.3.11 Help from External Agencies during Emergencies

Types of Accident

Fire in VCM, or HSD storage tanks or lines conveying these materials due to leakage

Toxic release of hydrochloric acid vapours due to leakage from joints or from tank

Bomb threat, terrorism, act of war, earth quake

Responsibilities Assigned

Table 7-40: Responsibilities Assigned

Incident External Agency Assistance

Fire / explosion spillage, natural disasters.

State fire brigade. Fire fighting and rescue augmentation.

Injury/illness Hospitals and ambulance services. Medical help augmentation.

Theft / sabotage /bomb threat /terrorism /war.

Police department Law and order, safety and security augmentation.

All incidents Neighbourhood organization Consumables, manpower, technical help

augmentation.




Other Organizations in the Locality

Following are the factories in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, in which Chemplast Sanmar factory is situated:

SPIC Pharmaceuticals

Shasun Chemicals

Tamil Nadu Fluorides and Allied Chemicals (TANFAC)

AsianPaints – Penta division

Pandian chemicals

Clariant Chemicals

Bayer Material Science India Ltd

Tagros chemicals India Limited

Arkema Peroxides India Private Limited

Contact No. of External Organizations

Table 7-41: Contact Information of External Organizations

S. No. Name Telephone No.

OFFICE* RESIDENCE*

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

a. The District Collector, Cuddalore 04142-230999 04142-230777

b. Special Deputy Collector, Cuddalore 04142-226600 9444452166

c. The District Revenue Officer 04142-230651 04142-230185

d. The Tahsildar 04142-295189

e. Panchayat Officer 04142-320286 9443335831

POLICE

a. Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore 04142-230060 04142-295161

9443879888

b. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore 04142-284355

c. Inspector of Police (OT) 04142-297681

d. Inspector of Police (Port) 04142-297680

e Inspector of Police Kullanchavady 04142-279233

f. Inspector of police - Kurinjipadi 04142-258350

FACTORIES INSPECTORATE

a. Director Industrial safety and Health 044-28112144

b. Senior Additional Director of Industrial safety and

Health, Chennai 044-28291534 044-26152244

c. Additional Director of Industrial safety and health, Trichy 044-242122

d. Joint Director of Industrial safety and Heath Cuddalore 04142 - 222826

DEPARTMENT OF EXPLOSIVES

a. Joint Chief Controller Of Explosives, Chennai 044-28419529

b. Chief Controller Of Explosives, Nagpur 0712-2510248

FIRE DEPARTMENT

a. Divisional Fire Officer, Cuddalore 04142 - 294603

b. Asst. Divisional Fire Officer 04142 - 295733

c. Fire Station, SIPCOT 04142 - 239242

d. Fire Station ,Kurinjipadi 04142 - 258370

POLLUTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT

a. Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, Chennai 044-22353134 to

22353141

b. Chairperson, TNPCB, Chennai 044-22353076 044-26261144




S. No. Name Telephone No.

OFFICE* RESIDENCE*

c. Member Secretary, TNPCB, Chennai 044-22355145 044-23662870

d Additional Chief Environmental Engineer 044-22353146 044-24615007

e. The District Environment Engineer, Cuddalore 04142-221867

HEALTH AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OFFICE RESIDENCE

a. District Medical Officer, Cuddalore 04142-230052

b. District Health Officer, Cuddalore 04142-295134

c. General Hospital, Casualty, Cuddalore 04142-231590

d. ESI Dispensary – Medical Officer Cuddalore - OT 04142-297148

TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT

a. The Manager, TSTC, Cuddalore 04142-224795

b. Regional Transport Officer, Cuddalore 04142-290035

ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENT

a. Chief Engineer 04142-222035/

04142-222036

b. Superintending Engineer 04142-223793

04142-230969 9443330664

WATER SUPPLY

a. SIPCOT 04142-239236

SANITARY

a. Sanitary Inspectors, Cuddalore (Municipality) 04142-230021

SERVICE CLUBS

a. Cosmopoliton Club 04142-221723

NEWS MEDIA

a. Dinathanthi, Cuddalore 04142-293289

b. Dina Malar, Cuddalore 04142-295830

* Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing

Key Personnel of Neighboring Industries

Table 7-42: Name of Contact Person in Neighboring Industries

S. No NAME OF THE INDUSTRY CONTACT PERSON* Phone*

1 The Covestro (India) Pvt. Ltd. Senthil Kumar 04142-239913

2 Pioneer Jellice India Pvt.Ltd Mr.T.Arumugam 04142-239355

98946 39386

3 Arkema Peroxides Private Ltd Mr.M.Ananda jothi 04142-239901

90032 12868

* Contact Person & Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing

7.3.12 Safety Related Components

Chemplast Sanmar, after assessing the available technologies have selected the technology of INOVYN U. K. Ltd.,

was formerly known as INEOS Vinyls Ltd., for this project. INOVYN is the largest producer of PVC in Europe.

The technology used is a clean and closed reactor technology, which minimizes reactor opening thereby

reducing the potential exposure to the operator and release of VCM to the environment.

The expected opening frequency is once in 500 batches.

The VCM recovery system does not use a gas holder thereby reducing the fugitive emissions of VCM.

Ex –situ (outside the reactor) preparation of catalyst using commonly available chemicals.




Water contaminated with VCM is stripped and treated to levels < 0. 5 ppm before discharge. Plant design

meets applicable standards of safety and environmental performance.

The reactor protection systems against major hazard releases are of very high integrity and include a reaction

short stop system of extremely high reliability and effectiveness.

The technology used is a clean one and the plant is well designed with utmost care on safety (ie, protection of

personnel, plant and surrounding environment). Adequate built-in safety devices, preventive/mitigation

measures are incorporated in the plants.

The pipeline is buried in a concrete trench

The line runs through the land exclusively owned by Chemplast Sanmar

The corridor is under strict surveillance by security staff 24 hrs x 7 days.

7.3.13 Safety Features in VCM Unloading Line

Chemplast Sanmar imports VCM (liquid) through tankers at Cuddalore Port. VCM liquid from tankers will be pumped

through VCM pipeline. The system for unloading VCM from the tanker to the storage tank at plant site consists of

the following elements:

Island jetty including unloading arm

Offshore pipeline including pipeline end manifold (PLEM)

Onshore pipeline (corridor line) including crossing of the Uppanar River and PLEM at the plant end

An important safety feature of VCM unloading is that the line will be in service only during Ship unloading time

and during all other times it will be depressurized and kept at a positive pressure of 0.5 KG/CM2 through

complete recovery of VCM. This ensures that during this period, no fire, explosion or toxic vapor release can

take place. It is expected that to a maximum extent of 3 times in a month (each time three days) the line will

be under pressure

The offshore portion of the unloading line is coated with concrete for anti buoyancy and buried 1.5 meters

below the sea bed

VCM pipe line is made of special low carbon steel to withstand low temperature

Polypropylene coating is given to prevent corrosion

To avoid Electro Chemical Corrosion, cathodic protection is provided

VCM pipeline is of pipe in pipe configuration-i.e.; inner pipe and outer pipe with annular space between them

Both the inner and outer pipes are independently capable of withstanding 7 times the operating pressure

envisaged

Pipeline from jetty to plant is a single welded string with flanges only at valve locations to minimize the risk of

leak

All pipe weld joints are 100% radiographed

Pipeline designed by Impac Germany, design proof checked by OGE Singapore and finally certified for design

performance by DNV

Emergency Shut down Valves (ESD) are provided at three strategic locations

Pressure sensors are provided in the annular space of the VCM pipeline at 6 locations for immediate detection

of VCM

Any leakage detected will immediately activate and close all the three ESDs

7.3.14 Risk due to Natural Calamities

Earthquake

Cuddalore is situated in Seismic Zone II which means Low Risk Damage Zone. Also, there are no high rise

buildings or structures or trees that can cause damage to the VCM pipe line.




However high intensity earthquake or explosion of high explosive bomb may cause twisting of the pipeline leading

to leak of VCM. However, since the pipeline is buried underground with sand filling, free flow of the escaping liquid

will get hampered.

Emergency Action During Earthquake

In case of an earthquake being felt all concerned to stop the operations in consultation with site controller or

incident controller considered if it is safe to do so and evacuate the plant and assemble at the assembly point.

Shift Engineer to inform the site controller and main gate security.

Electrical in charge along with shift engineer to isolate the power supplies and shut down the whole plant.

Ensure that non-essential loads are cut - off from the UPS power supply so that it is available for lighting and

emergency systems.

In case of any eventuality arising due to earthquake like fire execute related emergency actions.

Try to avoid staying below structures, be in open place.

Sections can be restarted after getting clearance from the plant.

Action After Earth Quake

Immediately take head count to ensure that all are safe.

Ensure that all available communication facilities are in good condition.

Inspect the VCM storage facility and Boiler area and other critical areas of the plant.

Check the gas cylinders for any leak.

Look for and extinguish fire, if any, to eliminate fire hazard.

Watch out for fallen power lines, broken gas lines and stay away from danger zone.

Emergency team shall carry out leak arresting, fire fighting and rescue operations as per onsite plan.

If leakage could not be controlled isolate the valves with due safety precautions

Medical and first aid team shall render medical help to the injured.

Inform District crisis group and local fire brigade for assistance.

Ensure availability of food, water and medicine in adequate quantity

Tsunami

After the occurrence of Tsunami that hit the Indian coast in 2004, it has also been identified as a potential hazard.

Tsunami results from Earthquake in the seabed. This creates high waves. The lashing of these waves on the

structures would cause damage. Also there will be inundation of huge areas inland.

Tsunami effects on the pipeline and the plant are due to wave propagation and inundation. However the VCM

pipeline from the marine terminal to the PLEM at the plant is buried underground and so protected from mechanical

damage.

The plant is constructed 3km from the sea and 7-8 km along the Uppanar river from Bay of Bengal. The wave

propagation from Tsunami will subside to a large extent and there may not be any significant rise in Uppanar River

level above the normal high tide level. In addition the bund wall and the green belt will serve to dissipate the force

of Tsunami waves, if any.

Review of the Preliminary Impact assessment of Tsunami that occurred in 2006 compiled by ICMAM (Integrated

Coastal and Marin Area Management, a body under Department of Ocean Development), especially for the

Cuddalore Coast, indicated that no wave propagation and subsequent inundation was observed in the Uppanar

Backwaters. Also there were no damages observed to any industrial structures located in SIPCOT Phase.

Response Action

On receipt of tsunami warning from district authorities indicating a threat to the area.




1. Any vessel discharging or loading at the jetty shall immediately suspend all cargo operations and be removed

to the anchorage or sea.

2. The non-critical operations in the plant shall be stopped in consultation with site controller and be ready for

safe shut down of whole plant if required.

3. Protecting the life will be the highest priority.

4. Restrict the access to the Marine Terminal site and Uppanar river.

5. Instruct all to move to high-rise structures and buildings at least 10 meters above sea level and stay there until

advised that it is safe to return.

Flood

Emergency Action Procedure During Flood

The person first noticing the incidence should shout the nature of emergency.

Inform to the shift engineer through phone.

Inform the site controller and main gate. The main gate guard shall inform all key personnel.

Security at Uppanar river end should keep watch on the river high tide condition and inform the situation time

to time to main gate.

Crossing of the river should be avoided during high flood situation in Uppanar river.

Security shall make frequent walk around of the Uppanar periphery to assess the situation.

Life saving appliances like, life buoy with life line and life jackets shall be kept ready.

Main gate guard shall immediately close the gate to prevent any person or vehicle entry.

Incase section is going to be affected by flood; /Shift in charge in consultation with site controller immediately

stop all the operations.

Inform Electrical people to isolate the power.

Try to remove all the voluble materials to safe area.

The Electrical Incharge Emergency Action Procedure During Flood

Go round the plant and check whether water has entered in any of the cable trenches/MCC panel room in the

ground floor inside the factory and if any cables are short – circuited.

Immediately arrange to isolate the power supply in that particular line.

Arrange to pump out the water from cable trenches.

Incase of any abnormal smell/sound isolate the power

Stp/Civil Department

Ensure that no sewage water is allowed to mix with the floodwater.

Ensure that all the storm water drains are free from choking and other debris particles periodically.

General steps during emergency

If incidence is in control, normalcy is restored after getting clearance from the site controller.

If the incidence is not in control, site controller will declare emergency.

Based on the situation stopping of the plant and evacuation will be carried out by the team.

The rescue team along with security will go with PPE to rescue any people in danger.

Ensure that no valuable material taken away by the flood.(Eg.pallets,barrels,bags etc.)

Keep in ready all-medical and transport facilities for tackling the emergency.




Inundation

As the corridor line is buried underground enclosed in a concrete trench impervious to water, the water inundation

due to cyclone or storm or Tsunami would at the most affect the topsoil only and not the pipeline along the pipeline

corridor.

Since the damage to the corridor pipeline can take place only during Ship unloading, immediate action will be taken

to shut down the system and to control the release of VCM.

Cyclone

The plant along with the MTF is designed to handle Cyclone of Gale up to 200 Km/hr.

The Plant is situated about 2.5 Km from the seafront and the risk of Tsunami impacting the plant is very low.

The plant has an established system of communication even during cyclones / Tsunami that helps in aids in

implementation of the management plan for the disaster.

Even during the recent “THANE” cyclone that had gale in excess of 160 km/hr at the plant and the Marine terminal

facility, the loading arm, instrumentation and all the safety systems that were installed in the MTF was intact.

The main plant had no damage because of the cyclone, but had some peripheral damage to the roof top in the

utility area.

The plant after a detailed safety integrity check and on availability of power was started immediately.

The plant was among the first to start operations post Cyclone and this is a testimony of the robust design of the

plant.

In Marine Terminal

1. The first priority shall be of a vessel on the jetty and its timely removal to a place of safety away from the port

area.

2. The terminal support craft shall be similarly considered and arrangements made for placing them offshore in a

position to safely ride out the storm.

3. The jetty facilities shall be made ready for the winds and VCM arm locked securely in position.

In PVC Plant

1. No class A permit shall be issued for height work such as scaffolding erection, removal etc during cyclone.

2. No temporary power connection shall be given if it rains and Electrical Engineer to ensure that all temporary

power connections already given is isolated and removed.

3. Ensure that all the storm water drains are free from choking and other debris particles periodically.

4. Ensure valuable materials, which are kept out side like chemical barrels, bags etc, are covered and secured

properly.

5. Ensure all the glass windows and doors are securely closed.

6. Where personnel are required to stay onsite, adequate stocks of food and other essential items should be made

available during the period.

7. Ensure the availability adequate first aid and emergency medicines.

Post Cyclone monitoring

1. Inspect plant area for damage: being aware of dangerous situations power lines, weakened structures, debris,

submerged hazards etc, identify situations requiring high priority attention, initiate action as required.

2. Reset electrical connections so long as power outlets/cabling appears undamaged; otherwise have system

checked by qualified electrician.

3. Record and photograph any damage.




7.3.15 Emergency Procedure

The care taken in design and standard spreading procedure operation of the PVC plant are intended to make a

major release highly improbable. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that such an incident, or a lesser incident,

which involves people outside the works, will not occur.

Full instructions are provided for prompt recognition of escapes, which can affect those outside the works, prompt

action to stop the escapes and mitigate their effects, make safe other plants, and protect works personnel within

the affected area.

The local emergency services (Ambulance Service, Fire Service, Hospital Service and Police) are informed of the

potential hazards in the factory and given all information necessary for them to deal with any situation which may

arise.

The emergency services will warn the local population in case of emergency.

Emergency equipment has been provided at suitable points in areas, where significant escapes could occur. There

is an adequate training and practice in use.

Personal Protective Equipment

Safety Helmets, Safety Shoes and appropriate Hand Gloves are issued to all plant personnel. Other need-based PPE

are also are available for use where and when needed basis.

Emergency Safety Equipment

Emergency equipments are available at vulnerable points. In case of emergency, the emergency equipment can be

used.

It is ensured that the emergency equipments are readily available for any emergency.

Safety Showers

Adequate safety showers are provided, wherever required. They are also well maintained.

Communication Facilities

For internal communications, "Intercom" phones are provided in all sections. For external communications, P & T

Telephones are provided. "Public Address System" (PAS) is installed in the main control room. In case of failure of

phones, runners/messengers will be used.

First Aid

No. of first-aid boxes in the factory premises: 10

No. of personnel trained in first aid by St. John's Ambulance Association, Cuddalore: 29

The first aid boxes are distributed in all sections. It is ensured that the boxes are fully equipped at all times.

Occupational Health Centre

Occupational Health Centre is in place in the factory premises. A visiting Doctor with diploma in industrial health has

been arranged to visit the plant thrice a week. For emergencies, he is available on call. Medical records of workmen

and contract workmen have been made available to the doctor. Medicines are also made available in the OHC.

An ambulance with stretcher and first aid medicines is made available in the plant round the clock.

Facilities available in OHC:

Bed , Pillow & Bed spread




Table of required size

Toilet with wash arrangement

Oxygen cylinder with required arrangements

One Blood pressure apparatus

Stethoscope

Stretcher

One suction equipment

Lung function measurement instrument

All prescribed/required medicines

Other equipments like Drip stand, tray etc

Anti venom and required medicines

Information of Other Hospitals

Table 7-43: Contact Telephone No. of Hospitals

S. No Place Phone No*

1 Government Hospital 04142230052

2 Mahatma Gandhi Medical college and research Institute 0413-2615449 to 458

3 Surendra Hospital, Cuddalore O.T 04142237333

4 Hindu Mission Hospital, SIPCOT Through a messenger

5 Krishna Hospital, Manjakuppam 04142-231711

6 Kannan Hospital O4142230370

* Contact Person & Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing

Provision of Emergency Power Supply

Emergency power supply is available from the diesel generator (DG sets). There are three DG sets with a capacity

of 2000 KVA each for supply of emergency power. Apart from critical equipments, some of the important lights are

connected with emergency power supply.

Portable Meters

Oxygen meter and explosion meter are available.

Detectors

VCM detectors are provided at following places:

Near Fire Water Tank

Near VCM Storage tank

VCM Recovery – North Side

VCM Recovery near grid

Reactor pipe rack

Reactor area

Additive area

Dryer area

VCM Tank emergency vent

Vent Gas absorption

Alarm and Warning System

Electrically operated siren, with 5 Km range and UPS arrangement is provided to give warning during an

emergency.




Siren Code

Table 7-44: Siren Code

Type of Siren Duration Sign

Wailing Siren 30 seconds each Total 2 minutes Emergency (fire/release of toxic gas/liquid)

Continuous Siren 90 seconds Termination of emergency

Locations of Sirens

Table 7-45: Location of Sirens

S. No. Locations of Sirens Location of ON/OFF Switch of the Sirens

1 Silo Building Control Room

"No break power" is supplied to the On/Off switches of the sirens

Speakers of the "Public Address Systems" (PAS) are distributed in almost all areas/sections to have full coverage

throughout the factory. The mike and amplifier of the system is installed in the main control room. Back up power

is supplied to the system.

Windsocks

24 no. of windsocks are provided. Regular trainings are conducted to all employees so that all are well acquainted

with the locations of the windsocks.

Periodic maintenance and changing of windsock clothes is being followed to have them always in working condition.

Safety Promotional Activities

All appropriate and effective safety promotional activities as detailed below are adopted in the company to arouse

and maintain the safety awareness amongst all employees.

Safety Organisation

CHEMPLAST SANMAR has set up a separate Safety, Health & Environment Department to take care of all aspects of

safety including the environment. The safety department comprises of a Manager (Safety) and a Executive Manager

(Safety & Environment). All matters connected with safety and environment is effectively handled by the Safety

Department.

Safety and Health Policy

CHEMPLAST SANMAR has declared their well-defined "Safety and Health Policy" which is distributed to all

employees. The same has been displayed in prominent locations in the company premises.

Safety Committee

A properly constituted safety committee is functioning as per statutes.




Figure 7-23: Environment, Health, Safety and Responsible Care Policy of Chemplast Sanmar




Safety Slogans and Posters

Catchy safety slogans and posters are displayed wherever required in the company. The safety slogans and posters

are circulated/ displayed in appropriate locations in the company.

Safety /Fire Fighting Training

Regular training on safety and fire fighting is given to all employees in the company, including the Security

Personnel. Refresher courses will also be conducted.

National Safety Day and Safety Week Celebration

"National Safety Day" and "Safety Week" are celebrated every year in the month of March. Competitions are held

on such items as safety essays, speeches, slogans and posters during the safety day celebration. Attractive prizes

are given to the winners of the competitions. External faculties are also invited to give effective speeches on safety

during such occasions.

7.3.16 Reporting and Investigations of Accidents and Fire

All fires and accidents are reported through the prescribed formats and investigated. Remedial steps are evolved

and implemented. Reportable accidents are reported to the Factories Inspectorate through the prescribed forms.

Records are also maintained. Accident statistics are maintained and circulated to all concerned.

7.3.17 Statutory Obligations

All statutory obligations as applicable are always complied with.

7.3.18 Work Permit System

Work permit system is strictly followed for any maintenance job in the plant.

7.3.19 Material Safety Data Sheet

MSDS of all hazardous chemicals stored and handled in the company are available. It is circulated to all concerned.

7.3.20 Smoking

Smoking is strictly prohibited inside the company premises. "No Smoking" caution boards are displayed wherever

required. A very strict vigil is kept in this regard.

7.3.21 Housekeeping

Efforts are made by all concerned to maintain good housekeeping in the entire company. Waste disposal is

regularly done.

7.3.22 Earthing and Lightening Arresters

Tanks and equipment, all electrical equipment and pneumatic conveying systems etc are properly earthed.

Adequate lightening arresters are provided in the plant

7.3.23 External Technical Support

CHEMPLAST SANMAR maintains a list of consultants to obtain technical consultancy in case of need such as:

National Safety Council (NSC) India

Indian Chemical Manufacturers Association (ICMA)

SIPCOT Employers' Association




7.4 Social Impact Assessment. R&R Action Plans

R& R is not applicable as project is expansion within existing premises.

Documents

7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES · 2018-12-01 · CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL