M.Ü. ilAHiYAT FAKÜLTESi VAKFI YAYlNLARI Nu: 271

900. VEFAT YILINDA • A A A

IMAM GAZZALI

Milletlerarası Tartışmalı ilmi Toplantı

07 - 09 Ekim 20 ı ı İstanbul

İstanbul 2012

YAHYA en-NAHVİ VE GAZZALI: YARATILIŞIN DELİLLERİ ÜZERİNE

Doç. Dr. Said el-BOUSKLAOUl

Mohamed I Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, Oujda, Morocco (Fas)

Başta Tehôfiitü '1-felôsife olmak üzere Ebıi Hômid el-Gazzôli'nin eserlerin­

de altıncı asrın İskenderiye 'li filozofiı Yahya en-Nahvf'nin (Philoponus) izlerini

araştırmak ve iddia edilen etkinin ne derecede olduğunu ele almak bu makalenin

başlıca hedefleri dil: Beyhaki 'nin Telimme/ii Sivôni '1-hikme. adlı eserinde naklet­

tiği "Huccetii '1-İs/ôm Gazzôlf"nin -rahmetullahi al ey/ı- Tehöfiitü '1-fe/ôsife eserin­

den en fazla çıkarılabilecek şey Yahya en-Nahvf'nin bazı sözleridir", şeklindeki

ifadeleriyle başlayıp, yaratılışla alôka/ı argumanlarma ve filozofların alemin

ezeliyeti konusundaki argiimanlarım çiiriitmesi iizerine yoğunlaşacağız. Gerçek­

ten Yahya en-Nahvi'nin yaratılış konusunda/d argilman/arı miisliiman kelômcılar

ve Meşşôt felsefeci/er tarafindan iyi bilinmekteydi ve miitekellimim tarafindan

kabul edilip yeniden formülleştirilirken, felôsife tarafindan çiiriitiilmekteydile1:

Gazzôlf de felsefecilerin o/emin ezeliyeti konusundaki görüşlerini çiiriitiirken bu

argiimanlarm bazılarm ı, ancak sıklıkla farklı şekillerde, kullanmaktadu: Bununla

birlikte Philopomıs 'un zamanda sonsuz sayıda hale.fiyetin imkansızlığı konusım­

da Gazzôli Yahya en-Nahvi tarafindan sımu/an örneklerin neredeyse aymlanm

tekrar etmektedil: Biz de bu argiimam Philoponus tarafindan ilk defa formüle

edildiği üç şekli ile detaylı olarak ele alacağız: Sonsuz olan

1) Bir uçtan bir uca aşılamaz,

2) Arttırılamaz,

3) Çoğalhlamaz. Dolayısıyla bizim tartışmamız pasaj/ann, ibôrelerin ve iki

felsefecin in örneklerinin mukayesesi üzerine odaklanacaktu:

***·

360 900. VEFATYILINDA IMAM GAZZALİ

YAf.{Y A AL-NAI;IWİ AND AL-GHAZALİ ON THE PROOFS OF

CREATION

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to follow the traces of the sixth~century Ale­

} xandrian Christian philosopher Ya(ıya al-Nabwf (John Philoponus) in the text of

Abii Ham id ai-Ghazalf (d. lll 1 ), chiefly in his Talıafut al-faliisifah (lncoherence

of the Philosophers) and to illustrate the extent to which Pbiloponus' main proofs

of creation were reproduced by al-GhazaU. It is wortb s tating that Philoponus was

known among the ancients with his arguments and counter arguments against the

philosophers mainly Proclus andAristotle on the issue ofthe etemity of the world

to which he devoted three works1• We know that these works were translated,

partially or totally, into Arabic2• SimiJarly, al-Ghazali was known in the Islamic

world for the same refutations of the argumeots provided by the philosophers who

taught that the world is etemaL lt is perhaps for this reason that it is often taken

for granted that aJ-GhazaiT reproduced Philoponus's proofs in his Tahiifut (wit­

hout providing any serious evidence that Abü Ham id had indeed in his hand one

or more ofYaJ:ıya al-NaJ:ıwl's books). It is alsa wortb reminding that al-Baybaql

' stated in his Ta timmat Siwan al-lfikma that "the most of w hat is adduced by hıyjat

al-Islöm (the proof ofis lam) al-Ghazali, m ay Allah have mercy on him, in Tahafut

al-falösifah is a report of Yabyii al-Na/:ıwi's words"[my translation].3 Many sub­

sequeot allusions have been made to this supposed influence ofYalJya al-NaJ:ıw1.4

An autbor may think that "it can be inferred that al-Ghazall read Philoponus in

Against Proclııs oıı the Eternity of the World; Agaiııst Aristotle. on the Eternity of the World;

De Contengencia Mıındi. .

2 1 havestudied this topic in an articleentitled "Mu'allaf!t Yatıyll ai-NaJ:ıwT li al'arabiyyit"(YaJ:ıyli ai-Natıwi's works in Arabic], Journal of Facıılty of Letters, Rabat (forthcoming). Cf. Also H.

Davidson, "John Pbiloponus asa Source ofMedievaJ lslamic and Jewisb Proofs ofCreation".

Journal oftlıeAmerican Orieııtal Society, VoL 89, N. 2 ( 1969), pp. 357-391; Proofsfor Eternity.

Creation and tlıe E.Tistence of Gad in Medieval /slomic and J~vislı Plıilosoplry, Ox.ford

University Press, 1987;. S. Pines, 'An Arabic Summary of a Lost Work of John Philopoous,'

lsrael Oriemal Shtdies, Vol n, 1972, pp. 320-352; Gerard Troupeau. 'Un Epitome Arabe du

"De Contingentia Mundi" de Jean Pbilopon' in : Amiqııite Paiemıe et Clıretiemıe, Memorial

Andte-Jean Fesrugiere, ed. par E. Luccbesi et R. D. Saffrey, Gen~ve 1984, pp. n-88.

3 ai-BayhaqT, Tatimmat Siıviin al-lfikma, ed. Rafiq al'ajam, Baynıt: Dar al-fılcr al-lubnliıü,

1994, p. 47.

4 Most ofthem restate al-Bayhaqi.

IV. OTURtiM 361

Arabic translation from the fact that Maimonides, in the I 2th century, said that

John the Grammarian, meaning Philoponus, had been translated into Arabic'"';

for another: "since Proclus and Philoponus' books were widely known in the Isla­

mic world, it is very natural that al-Ghazaii knew Proclus' proofs and Philoponus'

refutations",6 and yet for anotber there is no doubt that al-Ghazaii was "familiar

with Philoponus' works about creation of the world from nothing".7

The main question then is: to wbat extent was ai-Gbazali intluenced by

Yal:ıya ai-Nai:ıwi? And tberefore did he have direct access to Philoponus' work?

As far as I know, there is no single work exclusively devoted to this question.

Al-Gbazali's arguments for the eternity of the world as discussed in Talıöfut al­

falösifah are well studied by many scholars. Michael Marmura, for example,

discusses the metapbysics underlying ai-Ghazall's arguments, but not in re la tion

with Philoponus' arguments. Only the work of H. Wolfson8 andA. H. David­

son9 may be said to provide an outstanding study of the influence of John Phi­

loponus' proofs of creation on Medieval Muslim and Jewish thinkers, among

wbom there is al-Ghazali. l will demonstrate, in my talk, that there is no evideoce

that ai-Ghazali drew directly from YaJ:ıya ai-Na}Jwi, but he certainly made use of

some of Philoponus' arguments as they were widely used by the Mutak.alJimün

and Falasifa within the lslamic tradition, in a slight different way. I will begin

by a glimpse at Philoponus' main arguments of creation in lslamic theology;

then I will move to some first evidence concerning Philoponus' flfst and second

arguments in ai-GhaziHi's text, and briefly focus on the contrast between Against

Proclus and Tahöfut; and finally I will discuss the striking similarities between

the two pbilosophers with respect to Philoponus' third argument and some other

issues actually reproduced not only by al-Ghazali but also by al-Mutakallimün

before him and those who came after.

S Richard P. Aulie, "aJ-Gha.zzaJrs Contra Aristolle: An Unforeseen Ovemıre to Science in Eleventh-Cennıry Bagbdad", PSCF 45 (March 1994): 26-46.

6 A. Badawi, "ai-Ghazzaii and his Greek sources" (in Arabic) in: Abii Hiimid ai-Giıazziifi fi al­

dilcrö ol-mi 'awiyy6t al-tiisi'a, Damascius, 1971 , p. 224.

7 Katie J. Nolan, "Aristotle and the Abrahamic Faiths on the Eıemity of the World", UCLA

JOURNAL ıooı FaJI 2009, http://www.sscneı.ucla.edulhistory/undergrad/paıljoumal2002/

oolan.pdf.

8 H. Wolfson, Tlıe Plıilosoplry oftlıe Ka/om, Harvard University Press, 1976.

9 Cf. H. Davidson, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval lslamic and Jewish Proofs of

Creation", Journal oftlıe American Oriemal Society, Vol. 89, N. 2 ( 1969), pp. 357-391; Proofs

for Etcrnity, Creation and tlıe Existence of God in Medievallslamic and Jeıvislı Plıilosoplıy,

Oxford University Press, 1987.

362 900. VEFAT YILINDA tMAM GAZZALİ

ı. Pblloponus' arguments of creation in Islamic theology

There is a very extensive literature of refutations of the arguments of the

eternity of the world in the period that separates Yal)ya al-Nal)wT in the sixth

century and al-Ghazali in the eleventh century. Many works in Arabic were

i devoted to this topic, yet the most known philosophical book is ai-GhazalT's

· Tahafitt al-falösifah. It goes without saying that Philoponus' proofs of ere­

} ation were well known to the theologians and philosophers in the Islami c ; , world, widely accepted by the Mutakallimün and the platooic philosophers

and refuted by the peripatetic pbilosophers. As it was stated above, Wolfson

and Davidson have already demonstrated the extensive use of Philoponus'

proofs by Muslim and Jewish theologians. I will focus on three main proofs of

creation provided by Philoponus and known to Muslims: the argument from

the fınitude of the power of the body, the argument from composition, and the

argument from time.

The argument from the finitude of the power of the body appears in his

De Contengencia Mundi10 in the following passage: "If the world is a fınite

body (an Aristotelian premise)[ ... ]and every power of every fınite body is finite

(another Aristotelian premise) [ ... ] it follows necessarily that the world(. .. ] is

,generated, it comes to be after it does not exist" (a non-Aristotelian conclusion)

.(my translation].11

The Christian peripatetic philosopher Ibn Siwar12 reformu­

' lated it in the following syllogism(s): "every body is fınite, and the world is a

body, then the world is finite; and every finite body has a finite power, then its

power is finite; and the powers of eternal things are fınites, then the world is not

etemal"(my translation).13

1 O lt appears in the first pages of the fırst argument in Agalnst Proclus, repeated in Agaiııst

A.rlstatle and reproduced in De Conliııgentla Mımdi.

ll Philoponus, fi o/-da/ölat 'a/ö lıodaılı al'ö/onı (De Collfe11gencia Mımdi), in O. Troupeau, 'Un

Epitome Arabe du u De Contingentia Mımdt' de Jean Philopon,'op. cit., p. 79. He states:

,J\S \:.ı..... ( ... ]ıJWI .:ı fo_,:,\~ .J [ ... ]t.J$ .,_.ı::.. .ı_,.c; .ı::.. r-"=' js ,J\S.J ( ... ]1.,.>1::.. ~ ıJWI,J\S üJ"

·"~ıJ.:.ıl~ 12 Disciple ofYahyalbn 'Adi disciple of al-Farabi.

13 Ibn Siwar, inA. Badawi, ol-ajlaüniyyôt a/-Mulıdatlıat 'indo al- 'orab, Kuwaiı: 1977, p. 246.

According to Ibn Siwar, this argument is more accepted than the kalarn argument because

it is based on essential things and the Mutakallimün's 'false' argument "is derived from ac­

cidents". But Ibn Siwar was not aware that this arguınent too, ascribed to ai-Mutakallimün,

was presuınably derived from anoıher argument of Philoponus himself, i. e. the argument of

composition as Herben Davidson has well illustrated.

IV.OTIJRUM 363

The argument from composition appears in two forms "composition of matter

and form" 14 and "composition offinite parts". In the fust one, Philoponus confirms

that "the nature of matter is such tb at matter cannot retain any form indefinitely.

TI1erefore nothing composed of matter and form can be indestructible".15 Philopo­

ous' second type of the argument from "composition offinite parts" was repeated in

rnany and different statements: 16 "that which consists of finite [parts] is finite".17

Philopoous' third argument which is much known in the kalarn tradition in­

depeodently, or as part, of tbe argument from accidents, is the argument of the

impossibility of an infinite succession of time. Philoponus provided three inter­

conoected forms of this argument: 18

A) The argument that the infinite cannot be traversed19; It is not possible to

14 The argument of composition of matter and form appears in Plıilponus 'AgoitısT Arislot/e and in De Contengencio Mundi in at least n.vo fonnulations: in the fırst he confınns that "the nanıre of matter is such that matter cannot retain any form indefinitely. Therefore, nothing composed of matter and form can be indestructible", and while demonsırıuing that the power of the uni­verse is finite, Ya_tıyii aJ-Na.tıwi argues in the second: "The heavens are composite. Wbatever is composlte contains the grounds of its dissolution and therefore does not contain infinite power"; Simplicius, Commellloıy on tlıe Physics, p. 1331, Cf. H. Davidson, "John 'Philoponus asa Source ofMedievaJ lslamic and Jewish Proofs ofCreation", p. 362.

15 !dem. 16 lt appears in Agahıst Proclus as foUows: "tbe number of men or plan ts or of individuals of any

other kind that have come to be is finite, since each of them has had its existence in a finite time, it would al so be necessary for the whole of time i o be fınite; for w hat that w hi ch consists of fınite (parts) is finite", Agoinst Proc/us on the Eternity of tlıe World, 1-5, ıranslated by Michael Sh are, Duckworth: 2004, p. 24. In the second chapter 'maqiila' of De Comengencia

Mundi (fi lıadot al- 'ii/am) an argumenı from finite parts, and thus from generated parts, is provided as follows: all things that are composed from fınite parts are finite and thus they are generated. Philoponus presents it in the following syllogism: the world is composed from individuals that are generated and corrupıed and the duration of each ofthem is finite; then the

world is composed from durations of this finite individuals; and what is composed from things wlıicb each of lbem is finite in itself it is necessary fınite too; lben the world is not etemaL

17 Agoinst Proclus, 1-5, p. 24. 18 Which are repeated in many places of his aforementioned three trearises devoted to the que­

tion. 11ıree supporting arguments that are very closer to each other could be discemed and at least two oftbem appears in al-IGncWs demonsıration on the crearion of the world.

19 lı reproduces an Aristotelian aıgumeot and reorients it against its original conclusion: everything that is infinite cannot be traversed. Aristotle, PITysics, VUJ, 8,263a, 7: "it is impossible to ıraver­se distances intinite in number," meaning th.at an infi.nite number cannot be counted. And, in De

Coelo, I, 5, 272a, 3: 'ibe infinite cannot be traversed." In his Agoftıst Proclııs, Ya.tıyii ai-Na}.ıwi' affinns that the traversing of the infi.nite is impossible; i. e. to "counting it olfunit by unit [ ... ] even

364 900. VEFAT YIUNDA İMAM GAZZAIJ

traverse the i.nfin.ite "for the infinite is by its nature uotraverseable; otherwise it wo­

uld not b~ infin.ite". He gave an example, wh.ich became weU laıown to Mustims, of "successive generations of [human] race, advancing individual by individual, have

desc~nded through an i.nfin.ite number of individuals to those that ex.ist oo\1/';20 tben,

. if it were infini te, the in:finite would become lraverseable, whicb is impossible. For the 1

. generations of the race have reached down to each of us, thenit is finite in number.21

} . b) The argument that an infinite cannot be increased22: the infinite is one

' and undivided; otherwise "many infini te things would be the same thing, which is

impossible. He gave many examples Like Socrates, the infini te number of species,

and the mavement of the spheres: "if the world had no beginning and the number

of men living before, say, Socrates was infinite; and those living from Socrates

until the present time have been added to it, there will be something greater than

the infınite, which is impossible".23

c) The third form of this argument, that an infınite cannot be multiplied, is

explained by the example of the unequal periods of the spheres' revolution. This

argument is very connected with the form er one. "If the motion of the heavens is

without a beginning" and the spheres "do not move with equal periods of revo­

lution", then "it is necessary that the sphere of Satum" (which revolves once in

thirty years) "has rotated with an infinite number of revolutions, and the sphere

of Jupiter (which revolves once in twelve years) with nearly three times more

revolutions than that. The revolutions of the sun (which revolves once ina year)

will be thirty times greater in number than the ones of Satum, the revolutions of

the moon (which revolves ooce ina month) 360 times, and the revolutioos of the

sphere of the fixed stars (whicb revolves once in one day) more than ten thousand

times greater".24

The result is that the infinite will be multiplied, which is impos-

if the cowıter were everlasting" . "I mean the ttav~ing of the infini te by, as it were, cowıting it off unit by unit-is impossible, even if the cowıter were everlasting"; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 24.

20 ldem.

21 "for the infini te is by i ts narure untraverseable ; otherwise it would not be infinite. So if the infinite is wıttaverseable, but successive generations of(buman] race, advancing individual by individual, have descended through an infinite number of individuals to those that ex.ist now, then the infini te has become traverseable, which is impossible. Therefore the number of earlier individuals is not infinite. for [if it were] the generations of the race would not have reacbed down to each of us, for it is impossible to traverse the infinite"; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 24.

22 It reproduces also an Aristotelian principle: the infini te is undivided. 23 Agahıst Proclus, 1-5, pp. 24-25.

24 Pbiloponus, Agalnst Aristotle, translated by Christia.n Wildberg, Duckworth, 1987, p. I 46.

IV. OTURUM 365

sible. Philoponus concludes that "It is not possible that the world is ungenerated

and without a beginning. For in that case the infini te will be traverseable and wiU

exist in actuality, and the infinite will necessarily always be growing and never

stop getting bigger than itself and roany times, not to say an infini te number of

times, infinity".25

There is no doubt that many of these arguments appear in ai-Mutakallimün

and al-Falasifa, accepted by the MutakaJlilun and al-K.indi (c. 800-870) and refu­

ted by the peripatetic philosopbers. Al-.Kindi reproduces partially the fırst argu­

ment but totally the second and the third ones.26 The argument from accidents,

as demonstrated by Davidson, is a reformulation of philoponus' argument from

composition of matter and form. Plıiloponus argument from the impossibility of

an infinite succession in time is largely reproduced as an independent proof or

as part of the argument from accidents. It is reproduced large Iy and in many for­

mulatioos by the early and Iate Mutakallimün alike. AI-Nap,.am (d. 845) uses all

the three forms of this argument and it is this argument that al-khayy~t (d. 939)

deseribes as the best argument provided by al-Mutakallimün against etemaüsm.

The argument that an infinite cannot be increased is well known since al-Farabi

and fbn Sina as the method of app1ication. The argument from the impossibiliry

of an infini te number appears in lbn I:Iazm (d. 1 064) and al-JuwaynT (1 028-85) who was the fust to ineJude the third argument as fourt11.principle of the argument

from accidents.

Having said this, it is not wrong to expect that al-Ghazali as well will rep­

roduce some of these arguments in his Tahöfut exclusively devoted to refute the

arguments provided by the philosophers.

2. Pbiloponus' arguments in al-Gbazali's text

That ai-GbazaiT never mentioned Yal;lya al-Nal)wi, nor any of his work, is

explicitly clear. He is not an exception in this matter; Philoponus is rarely cited in Arabic sources, in general, and when his name is cited, it is often confused witb

other Christians Ilke Yahya Ibo Adi. AI-Ghazlill's dealing with Philoponus' proofs

of creation is no exception, too.

25 Philoponus, Agailıst Proclus, 1-5, p. 25.

26 l have srudied this topic in an unpublished paper entitled "Y~ya ai·Nııl)wi and ai·Kindi on the

Proofs of Creation", presented at the 8th Intem~tional Colloquiwn of the SIHSPAI, London:

December 3-5,2010.

366 900. VEFATYTLINDAtMAM GAZZALi

Indeed, Tbere is no textual ev idence that can support the cia im that Abü

Hamid ~as been directly influenced by Pbiloponus' work. In fact, the evidence provided by those who claim that al-Ghazii!T drew directly from Pbiloponus, al-~ayhaqi among the ancients, and recently Abderrahman Badawi and others, remains undefeoded. Although it is one of the strongest proofs, Philoponus' fırst argument does not defınitely appear among al-GhaziUi's arguments for­mulated against the philosophers. It seems that it was generally not known to al-Mutakllirnün whereas it is formulated by Ibn Siwar and known to the most ofperipatetic philosophers who refute it I ike lbn Rushd.27 The argument from composition is provided by al-GhazalT, like every Mutakallim, as part of the

kalarn argurnent from accidents, and it can be said that it is the same for the argurnent from the impossibility of an infini te time as we shall see later. Thus, from the two facts that the first argument is neitber adduced by al-Ghazali nor by any of the Muslim Mutakallimün, and that the second is present as a mere kalarn proof, we can deduce that the sources of ai-Ghazali's material, in his arguments formulated against the pbilosophers, are indeed the previous books

ofKalam.

Al-bayhaqi's view seems, as Shlomo Pines had already well noted, to be very exaggerated.28 In the same way, Badawi considers that all proofs provided

. by ai-Gbazali are a reformulation ofphiloponus' argument from Against Proc/us

. witb no substantial addition; "the difference consists just of formulations, con­, cepts and the way of argumentation".29 Hence, ai-Gbazali's first argument, ac-

cording to him, reproduced Philoponus' third argument; the second is the same as Philoponus' fifth; and the third argument is equivalent to the second proof in Against Proclus. Tben Badawi adds that it goes for all al-Gbazali's arguments on the etemity of the world, time and mavement that have the ir equivalents in Against Proclus mainly the seventb, the eighth and the ninth proofs.30 However,

27 However, al- GhazzlilT, !ike al-K.indi and al-Mutakallimlin, argues from the finitude of the

body of the universe.

28 He states that "al-Bayhaqi perhaps overstates the case ... ". S. Pines, 'An Arabic Suınınary of a

Los ı Worlc of John Philoponus,' Israe/ Orient al Studies, Vol. ll, 1972, p. 339; not e 266.

29 Badawi, op. ciL, p. 224.

30 BadawT, p. 224 .

.:,)ıl<lt J_,i </'J (\ HV <:.- -=..J.,r- ·~..y. ;_,:.; (T TT ..,..) .)t_jAlt \..~J-1! .;Jt .)}Jt ~~~ W<Ş~ J~

~ ;J .liJ •..,.Ü r. ~ <T <!!\!ll ..;.,...ıı or ..;.,...ıt .ı...~ ~.ıi <r ..:..~~ J.JJJ> J:--:-t .;1 ıJWt r~ ..,-)~\!ll ~IJ .d.I)':IIJ -=..W.I_r':ll.}r- •P )IJ .;L.I)I.J .,;L.;.I_r~ .)ljAli•~J.JI \.. ~ .ş~l u:"'!

~ (f ~b.JI ~~ ~ ._r -.Jl,. )~ r.ic:JI <!6.:,...~ ~b.JI._rr ;6.1)1 (~ .:,)ılCJI ~ (T (OT-O\

<.:1\!11 ~1 )ö~ (W-n..,-) Jl_jAll ~ ..!.J\!11 J='.ıliJ .~1 .)t_jAll.l.ıi:- ~ c,Ş~I4:J.&. ;J .ıiJ •..,.Ü /.

rv.OTIJRUM 367

Badawi does not provide any seri o us comparison of passages, formulations and

exampl~s of the two philosophers.

In opposition to what is suggested by BadawT, it seems that al-Ghazali's ar­

gumeots of creatioo have oothing to do, in general, with Philoponus' book Against

P1·oclus-except for some general similarities due, on the one hand, to the fact that

Philoponus' argumeots were widely usedin lslamic theology as stated above, and

on the other, to their similar religious and philosophical background (i. e. Monot­

heism and Neo-Platonism).

In the third argument, Proclus asserts that if a cause (the creator) is actual,

"that which is caused willlikewise be actual"; Philoponus, armed with the Aris­

totelian canception ofactuality and potentiality, observes how Proclus "does not

specify with refereoce to which sense of actuality he is hypothesising that the

creator is an actual creator"/1 However, al-Ghazali's critique of the proof of the

philosophers, especially based on the ash'arite canception of the etemal will,

defends, thus, the idea that "the world was an object of the etemal will at the

time when it actualized".32 In this context abü bamid reproduces the third form

of Philoponus' argument from the impossibility of an infini te sucession in time.

Nevertheless, neither the problem of the etemal will nor the third form of Phi­

loponus' third argurnent, as presented by al-Ghazali, are present in Philoponus

J~IJ Jl!..ll ;,r 'i~ ..:.o~:'JI ._} j>X '-;-'>."I}IJ ~lifo ..:.ol~~~ i;\,AII..:....&J.:.:.I .Jl.J •..,...Ü .r. ~ ;,r <S _,...JIJ ,JL. ;JIJ rlWI ~~i.._#~ ;.r ~)l..i.IJ .)IJ..II ·~;JI w J~ J!.-.)~J . ._,sı-..JI ~J i;_,...o.ll Jl

1114,ls- ~P; ;.r .şy-.:.!1 ~ •>;JI L.J ,...._.I:JIJ 4:.-I:JIJ ~UI L... _,.....:. •..,.-li .r. ~ .j 1..> J\l2; 4JS 4li Badawi, "ai-Ohazz,m and his Greek Sources"(in Ara bi c), in Abii Ham id oi-Giıazzö/ifi ol-dikrö

al-Mi 'awiyyo a/-tösi'a li nıilödilıi, the proceeding of a colloquium organised by Hi gb Council

for Protection ofarts and Social Sciences, Damascius, l961, p. 224.

31 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 46. Yal;ıyi!. ai-Nal;ıwi argues that "when the house does not actually

exjst notlıing prevents the buiider from acrually existing in capacity. For a man who has the

capacity isa buiider even when he is not building, and likewise a doctor even when he is not

practicing"; lbid, p. 4 7.

32 "the world came into being because of the etemal will wbich demanded its exisıence

at the time at which it acrually came into existence, and wbich demanded the non exis­

teoce (of the world) to 1ast as long as it lasted, and (demanded) the existeoce to be­

gio where it acrually began"; al-Ghazzali, Ta/ıöfıu al-ja/ösifolı, fa/ösifalı (Jncolıerence

of the Plıilosoplıers), translated inıo English by Sabih Ahınad Kamali, Labore: Pakistan

Philosophical Congress, 1963, p. 16; the original version in Arabic of the same book

is always taken into account to compare the two versions. Cf. Tolıafut al-falösifalı, ed.

Maurice Bouyges, Bibliotbeca Arabica Scholasticorum, Serie Arabe, Tome U, Beyrouth:

lmprimerie Catholique, p. 26.

368 900. VEFAT YILTNDA İMAM GAZZA.Li

third argument nor in any other argument provided in Against Proclus. lnste­

ad, the influence of Against Aristat/e on al-Ghazali's fust argumeot is indirectly

observed?3

fJ-Gbaziili's second argument that "God is prior to the world in essence not

1 in time", in fact, does not reproduce Philoponus' proof as it is provided in his

·. refutation of the Proclus fıfth proof from time in spite of the appareot similarity

J betwe~n the two arguments. the argument refuted is likely the same, and !ike

~ Philoponus, ai-Ghazall.uses the same method but not the same arguments nor the

same concepts. In addition, al-Gbazall's argumentation seems to be more general;

it discusses this argument as the argument of the philosophers in generaiJ.4 where­

as Philoponus dea ls exclusively with Proclus argument, sometimes word by word,··

referring to Plato's Timaeus and its interpretations.

Finally, while Proclus' second argument deals wiıh forms as etemal world

patterns w hi cb necessitate that a copyas well should also be etemal,3s al-Ghaziilr's

third argument from the possibility suggests that if the world "is supposed to have

existed for ever, it will not be an originated thing. Accordingly, the actuality will

not be commeosurate with the possiblity, but incongruent with it''.36 Despite the

broad similarity with Proclus second argument (pattemlcopy and actuallity/possi­

biliy), al-Ghaziiii's objection is very different from Yahya al-NahwT's, not only in

'"formulations, concepts and way of argumentation" as suggested by BadawT but

; aıso in the body of the argument itself.

33 ai-Ohaz.zalr refutes Aristotle and the Muslim Aristotelians, but not directly Proclus. Maııy

themes and arguments caıı be located in the fragıneniS preserved from Agahıst Arlstotle: the

arguınent from the revolution of the spberes; that the celesıial movement isa natural move­ment; the issue of the void; ... ete .. In addition, ai-Ghazzalrs argument, that the number of

people who suppon the idea that the world was generared is greater than the number of those

who support i ts etemity, reminds us of as imilar statement in Philoponus Agamst Arostotle's.

34 lt should be noted that ai-Ghazzaır does not mention Proclus among the philosophers conce -ned directely by his refutation.

35 For Proclus, if the pattem of the world were etemal, the world would necessary be etemal. Proclus'

argument is based on aııalogy, the pattem aııd the copy presupposes each other, aııd if one of them

is etemal the other would necessaıy be etemal too. Philoponus aıgues that "even though the Forms

are eıemal, it is not at all necessary that the ir copies (I mean the perceptible substaııces) should also

always exist[ ... ] ifthere isa copy, a pattem must exist; but even ifa pattem exits, though not [me­

rely] asa pattem but because it is also a substaııce, it is not necessary for a copy to exist as well"

He gives the ex.amples of thekingand the ponraitand father and son; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 38.

36 ai-GhazzalJ, Talıiifut al-falasifah (lncolıerence oftlıe Plıilosophers), translated into English by

SabihAhmad Kamali,op. cit, p. 46; Maurice Bouyges' editioo, op. cit, p. 67.

lV. OTURUM 369

However, in wbat concems the argument of the impossibility of an infinite

number, besides some other issues as we shaU see, the similarities seem to be

striking between the two philosophers.

3. al-Ghazali's argumeot from the impossibility of ao infini te by succession

The most known argument to al-Mutakalimun and al-Ghazali is the ar­

gument from the impossibility of an infinite succession of time. Al-Ghazali

reproduces the second and the third form of this argument and provides two

of philoponus' examples: the spheres' revolutions and the infınite number

of souls.

ln the flfst objecrion to the first argument, al-Ghazali formulated Philoponus

third argument in the foUowing passage:

"How will you disprove your opponents if they say: "The etemity of the

world is impossible. For it leads to the affinnation of spherical revolurions which

are infinite in number, and consist of innumerable un.its. The fact is that these

revolutions can be divided into one-sixth, or one-fourth, or a half. For instance,

the sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one year, w bile that of Satum

makes one in thirty years. Therefore, the revolurions of Saturo are one-tbirtietb

of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of Jupiter are ooe-twelfth of those of the

Sun, for Jupiter completes one revolution in twelve years"? You maintain that, in spite of the fact that the revolutions ofSatum are one-thirtieth of the Sun, they are

equally infınite. Nay, you would assert that the revolutioos of the S tellar Sphere,

each ofwbich takes thirty-six thousand years, are as infinite as the East-West mo­

vement of the Sun, w hi ch takes only a day and ni gbt. If someone says that this is

an impossible thing, and that its impossibility is self-evideot, how will you silence

his criticism?".37

1n fact, al-Ghazali reproduced the same example provided by Philopoous in his third form of the argumeot from time and movemeot, ina slight different way.

Since the spheres do not revolve at equal speed and iftheir mavement has no be­

ginning, it necessarily follows that an infini te wiU be multiplied, i.e, for instance,

the revolution of the spbere of the fixed stars (which revolves once in one day) has

rotated more than ten thousaod times greater than Saturo (wbicb revolves once in

thirty years), as have shown above.

37 lbid, p. 20; Bouyges' edition p. 31-32.

370 900. VEFAT YILINDA IMAM GAZZALf

Indeed, similarities are striking betweea the two formulatioos of the same

argumeot of the impossibility of ao infınite by successioa based upoo the exaınple

of the revorution of the celestial spheres. Both Philopoaus and al-Ghazali were on

the position of refuting the idea of the eternity of the world. Many elemeats and

premises ofPbilopoous argument are present in al-Ghazali's argument. They used

the same Aristotelian premisses and arrived at the same non-Aristotelian conclusi­

~n. Except the moon, al-Ghazali mentions all the other four spheres (Satum, Sun, (

Jupiter iınd the fix.ed stars) but with a different order. Moreover, both of them,

independently of each other, argue that an infini te movement is impossible, for it

leads "to the affinnation of spbericaJ revolutions which are infini te io number, and

consist of innumerable units", and, therefore, to an impossible consequen·ce that

an infinite is greater than another.

The second form of the argument is from addition, the infınite cannot be

increased; al-Gbazali provides the exaınple of an iofinite number of souls; be

demonstrates:

"if you assert that the past eveats are existing neither at preseat nor in any

:>ther state, and that the non-existeat cannot be deseribed as limited or unlimited,

then you will have to take a similar view of the human souJs which have departed

from bodies. For, according to you, they do not perish. And the number of souls

~xisting after their separation from the body is ir~finite. A sperm is continually ge­

ıerated from a man, and a man from a sperm, and so on iadefınitely. And this soul

:s by number different from the soul of those who died before, or after, or togetber

.vith, this man. If all the souls were by species one, then, according to you, there

Nould exist at any time an unlimited number of souls".38

And further, he adds:

" if we suppose that every day such an imper~shable thing cam e in to existence

o last forever, obviously, by this time, there should have accumulated ao i.nfinite

ıs ai-Ghazzali, Ta/ıöfut al-falösifah (lncclıerence of rlıe Plıilosoplıers), English translation, op.

ciı., p. 91; Maurice Bouyges' edition, pp. 136-137. He states:

._...~.:.:~~ ....A.....,y. ~ rı.ı......lıı Jı.,..~ı ~.}~ı Jı...ıı.; Lu •~J>:"Y ..:--,~ ~wı..:.~ı_,...ıı ~~ r=--"'.J .Jii"

._,.. _,.i:JI ve .J.ı.,.IJ J.ıl.WI ~ J":" _,..!lı r5".J.:.&. ._;.iı; ~ ~l,t .JI.I.ı)U ü) .. C..JI ~_r.,.ll ..r _,.i:JI ~_H ifl.:.:ll r.J.p J

Y'J .....c;~ ..w ..:..t.. .JL..;j js 2 ~4' .r-J-.)! w.; V" .JL..;l..ı .JL..;j V" w.; J; ı-.1 ~ıı...~ı.J.p~ ~"" ~ ~"" ~ ..,.. _;:, Jb- js.} ~$_,ll.} ı-S..ı:,.j !..b-lı tr~ js:Jı .J\S" .:ıı.., o.LuJ ~ J ~ ..:..t.. V" ~.r-J- ~..w~

.• wı.J.p~

CV. OTURUM 371

number of such beings. For even if a circular were transitory, stili the appearance

in it of an everlasting being should not be impossible. So by this supposition the

diffıculty is reinforced. It is irrelevant here whether this everlasting thing is the

soul of aman, or ajin, or a devi!, or an angel, oranother being you may suppose.

For the difficulty will arise, wbatever point of view they may have taken. And it

will arise because they have posited spherical revolutions which are infınite in number".39

•

There is no doubt that this example is ultimately derived from Pbiloponus.

Nevertheles, the presence ofthese two examples in al-Gbazali does not mean that

he quotes directly from Against Aristotle. Four remarks are worthy of considera­

tion here: First, al-Ghazau reforrnuJated an argument which was widely used and

reproduced in rnany formuJations by the Muslim theologians and philosophers.

It was already stated that it was reformulated by many Muslim theologians like

al-Na.ı?am, Ibn ijazın, and reproduced by ·aı-Juwayni as a fourth principle of the

kalarn prooffrom accidents. Second, al-Ghazali does not produce the full third ar­

gurnent as in Philoponus: the first form of this argument that the iniinite cannot be

traversed does not appear in Tahiifut al-falasifah n or elsewhere in the work of al­

Ghazali. Unlike al-Na.ııam for example, al-Ghazali produces only the second and

the third form. Furthermore, he does not clearly and totally reproduce these two

forrns, but only some Philoponus' examples explaining this argument. And the

two same examples are provided by al-GhazaiT, as we have shown, in a different

formulation. Third, al-Ghazali cl early reproduced the example of the unequal re­

volution of the sp bere and the example of infini te souls in order to demonstrate the

impossibility of an infinite by succession in time. However, while it is clear that

the fırst is derived ultimately from Philoponus, the second is not. The argument

from the number of souls seems to be a Muslim variation of Philoponus' argu­

ment. Instead of the infınite number ofraces (men, fathers, horses and dogs), the

Muslims preferred to use the infini te number of souls just as they preferred the use

of the prophet's bej ra (migration from Mekka to Medina) instead of the example

of Socrates. The second example is derived from a very laıown argument used by

39 Talıöfut al-falasifalı (Jncolıerence af tlıe Plıilosoplıers), English translation, p. 95; Bouyges' edition, p. 142. He states:

~.;.;ts- .J!.J OJJ..ı.Jli 4J ~~~..:..b~_,. <lb...o ~ .J"YI.)I ~ı •• u.J •..,:. ..!.J.!>- rY- js l,;y.i 1~\.i" ..)l:JI..!ll~c)~.Jl.j~/ ~.J J~~IJ:Ar...u:I11-4!J ~ .;:f-~ ~J ._h 4-:i .)y.-_,.J~ ~ ..:.ıJ.J.) ı_,:;ı ~ı ~ '-:-"'~ js- .)s- rJ~ .r .J .;..ı.,~ _,..ı ı <r ..:...:.; t. .Jı ..!.ll. Jı .:ı~ .Jı ~ .Jı ..,..)i ..,..-;

. ·•41 ~4'

372 900. VEFATYILINDA lMAM GAZZAIJ

al-FarabT, Ibo s-ına and by ai-Mutakallimiin; it is called the method ofapplication.40

Fourth, ai-JuwaynT is strongly thougbt to be the source of ai-Gha.zali's two argu­

meots. It seems that these arguments are based on ai-Juwa~'s proof from the

impos~ibility of infı.nite revolutions (among other supposed kalarn sources) but

rot directly on Philoponus' text. The formulation ofthese two argumeots (examp­

les), chiefly the second one, reminds us ofai-JuwanT's statement41 and even ofbis

~ay of ıırgumentation (from the spbere revolution); ai-GhazaiT's formulation and

words are closer to al-Juwayni's statement than to Philoponus's.~2

However, ai-Gbazalı-·s formulation of the argument is stili clearer and more

complete compared with al-Juwayni's. It is worth noting bere that the second

and the third fonn of the argumeot from the impossibility of an infini te successi­

on, unlike ai-GhazaiT, appear clearly, with the same examples, in fbn H.azm who

"contends that over an eternity the number of men, the number of horses and

the total of the two would be infini te, leading once again to the absurdity of one

infınite's being larger than another".~3 However, Like al-Na..?+am, al-Kindi, fbn

H.azm, al-Juwayni and al-Shabrastaıü, al-Ghazali argues from the finitude ofbody

(not the power ofbody) to the finitude oftimejust as in ai-KindT. He states: "what

bad happened to tbese pbilosophers who deny, on the one hand, the possibility of

bodies arraoged above one another in space ad infinitum: but admit, on the other

band, the possibility ofbeing existing before one another in time ad infinitum ı is

~ot this an arbitrary, groundless and unconvincing position?" . .ı.ı What Pbiloponus

deseribes as "the most scientific explanation of these things" remains the follo­

wing: s ince the infınite (in magnitude or in number) cannot exist in actuality as

40 Philoponus gave the exampıe of the number of souıs but ina differenı way: God knows prev­ousıy the number of so u ıs that will paıticipate in bodiıy life in the furure as well as the number ofheavens' revoıutions.

4 ı aı-Juwayni states:

r}-v ..!li~J ~_p.-_,ıı ı.i ...,_iı...:ıı,p ı....,ı.,..'i <t~ 'i.J ~~ı.u.\1 ~4' 'i ..:..~ı.r J_,.:.~ ~ ~1 ~r,.

.;JI i .J.J..ıll J:i ._,...;..c; ı J i..b.WI J.--i t.r J J.z J .4J ıJN .;JI i ..ı..ı..ıll .j J _,.<ll ,/ _,.&; ~li •J _,.c,JI JliJ\ı .;~ 11 ••• .b-1)1 ;ı,p ..~>-t}tı r ~ .J1 ~ ~4:-~ı ~ ..:..;:;ıt.. .J 41 ~4' 'i ..:..l..ı.J~ 4:> ıJN

Kira b oi-Jrslıöd, Beyrüth: J?ar al-Kütüb al-'ilıniyaı, ı 995, p. 16. 42 al-Gbaz:ziiJ uses the same sıatement of al-Juwayni: "~~~ ~ <t~ 'jJ u...ıı.u.\1 ~4' 'i"as follows :

"La~\.:..~ J""'>' 'jJ ~~ı.u-)1 ~ı,.; 'i11.1t is worth noting thatthe word "gbiiya" [~~] me:lllS aıso in Arabic "basr" [.,.-].

n Davidson, op. ciL, p. 377-378.

W Tolıöflll ol.jolösifolı, Eng. Transl, p. 92; Bouyges' ed., p. ı 38. aı-Gbazz.ali states:

,Jl.. ..;ltı ~ı J:i ~..:..b .Po" yi.Jjy .J ~4' .d- ...ıı.:ııs:...ı~ı ~ı..;;~ l..411Jj~ ri ~4l.. J ..

. "..ı J-.>1 'j ~.~~.ı~ 'iji.L. JAJ 4.t4' .d- .)1

N. OTURUM 373

proved by Aristotle and "agreed to be so by all witbout exception", "it is absolu­

tely necessary that the number ofthings be fınite. And this being so, it is ridicuJo­

us to ask why more things do not exist".4s

On the other band, there are other similarities that can be illustrated. Accor­

ding to Philoponus as well as to al-Ghazalr, God "brings all things ioto existence

by pure thought al one whenever He wills it. And since God passesses the concepts

ofthings neither more nor less in consequence oftheir being or not being, it would

follow that in God's case capacity and activity in no way differ.''46 For al-Ghazili

too "activity and capacity are the same and one".47 However while Philoponus

argues from God's knowledge, al-Gbazali demonstrates from God's etemal will.

Both ai-Ghazali and Ya.l).ya al-Na.l).wi point out clearly that God "brings all tbings

into being just by willing them" and they both agree that "no alteration will be

apprehended in God as a result of his producing at one time and not producing a

thing or does not produce it[ ... ]The will of God is therefore one and simple and

is always the same and unchanging."48 Stili, there aresome differences bet:ween

the two philosophers. It is true that they both assert that "there is no necessity that

a thing should exist the moment God thinks of it'',49

yet in what concems Phi­

loponus, the world was present in God's foreknowledge, not really in the etemal

will of God because "Will brings all things into existence at the instant He wills

them".$0 It is worth noting bere that philoponus' view is closer to the view of the

Mu'atazilites than to the ach'arites like al-Ghazali who is not just refuting the

view of the philosophers without iovolving his ach'arism, as he claims, but he

indeed defends his acb'arite canception of creation that the world was created at

a time it was created by God's eternal will.

Conc.lusion

Finally, the similarities between the two philosopbers do not stand as eviden­

ce that al-Ghazali had read Pbiloponus' work. Al-GhazaJI was indeed influenced

by Yal)ya al-Nal)wi, but indirectly. He does not seem at all to have bad direct

access to Philoponus' text. It is obvious that we cannot infer from the fact that

45 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 23.

46 lbid, p. 63.

47 "..~>IJ •cr w J-'IIJ ö~" 48 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 65.

49 Ibid, p. 64.

50 Ibid, p. 65.

374 900. VEFAT YILINDAİMAM GAZ.ZA.Li

Philoponus was translated into Arabic that al-Ghazaii formulated his arguments against the philosophers on the issue of the eteruty of the world as derived from YaJ:ıya al-NaJ:ıwi. In fact, Philoponus' third argument was widely reproduced in many_foı:mulations by the Mutakallimün, among whom we find al-Ghazali him-1self, and there is no indication that al-GhazalT drew directly from Against Proclus

.. or from any other work ofPhilponus.51

l i (

5 1 A mo re detailed comparison will be provided in a forthcoming Ara b i c version of this pa per.