A-4 Kirschenbaum - Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster ...Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster Management Organizations Alan Kirschenbaum Faculty of Industrial Engineering and

International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

March 2004, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 75–102

Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster ManagementOrganizations

Alan KirschenbaumFaculty of Industrial Engineering and Management

Technion – Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifa 32000, Israel

[email protected]

This study proposes introducing the ‘client-stakeholder’asa partner in measuring public sector disaster managementeffectiveness. Combining multiple constituency and goal attain-ment theories, an analysis was made of Israel’s Home FrontCommand. Combining responses of key managers in this dis-aster agency along with those of a representative nationalsample of Israel’s urban population, effectiveness was measuredby matching stated organizational goals against the perceptionof their provision by client-stakeholders. Goal perceptions werefound to substantially differ from and focus on only a small num-ber of officially stated goals. The results suggest that a disasterorganization’s stated goals, upon which most measures of orga-nizational effectiveness are based, are not necessarily thoseperceived or even used by its client-stakeholders to gauge effec-tiveness. In addition, factors contributing to these perceptionsare not necessarily related to the organization or the servicesit provides. This stands in sharp contrast to traditional measuresof organizational effectiveness based on internal performancemeasures and highlights the need to reevaluate the role of theclient-stakeholder in measuring disaster management organi-zational effectiveness.

Disaster management organizations are a relatively new form of pub-lic sector human organization. For centuries, preparing for, mitigatingand helping recover from disasters were an established and embeddedpart of the local community’s social structure (Kirschenbaum 2002). Thischanged with the industrial revolution and introduction of bureaucraticforms of public administration. However, only after World War II didthese organizations take hold in the public sector. Today, the vast major-

75

ity are incorporated into government and municipal public administra-tion agencies and mandated to provide disaster related services for thegeneral public. These services range from dispensing information aboutpossible natural or technological hazards to operations involving evac-uation or recovery after disasters (Drabek & Hoetmer 1991). In mostcases the disaster managers work with other public sector agencies tocoordinate their efforts. Yet, disaster management agencies have rarelybeen subject to the kind of scrutiny about their effectiveness asked ofother public service organizations that provide citizens with health, wel-fare and security services (GAO 1999; CAG 2001). As pressure fromconsumers for better public services, fiscal concerns, and the threat ofterror increase, there is likely to be greater demand on disaster manage-ment agencies to improve their effectiveness (Heinrich 2002). In lightof these demands, this paper will explore a distinct approach to evaluatethe effectiveness of public sector disaster management agencies. Unlikethe criteria that have been the focus of attention in most public sectorservice organizations, dominated by internal management performancemeasures (Carter et al 1995) the emphasis here will be on the disasteragencies’ clients, the potential disaster victims; those constituents whoare also its major stakeholders.

This approach, which stresses measuring effectiveness by employ-ing constituents’ perceptions of the disaster organizations ability todeliver on its promises, has evolved over time. Such an approach dif-fers from general organizational evaluation studies that emphasize“client satisfaction”1 or “internal performance auditing” (Bohte & Meier2001). The focus on delivery is primarily based on an organization’s ful-fillment of its stated goals, goals that provide a framework andjustification for organizational survival. These goals are actuated interms of real services provided to its constituents. As Daft (1998)astutely put it, “An organization goal is a desired state of affairs that theorganization attempts to reach. A goal represents a result or end pointtoward which organizational efforts are directed.” Therefore, the provi-sion of actual services represents not only the fulfillment of theorganization’s goal but is also a direct proxy of that goal.

As human service organizations have multiple goals, some directedtoward internal administrative operations and others toward providingits constituents with specific types of services, I will argue that mea-suring the degree to which client oriented goals are actually providedmay be a powerful means of determining the degree to which the orga-nization is effective. This approach admittedly marginalizes internalorganizational goals but such goals are primarily utilized as a means to

76 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

gain organizational efficiency. If we relied only on measuring internalperformance, we might conclude that the disaster organization had ahigh efficiency rating and by implication be effective. The assumptionwould be that a disaster organization is investing considerable resourcesin making its internal bureaucratic apparatus more efficient so as to ful-fill one or more of its stated external oriented service goals. Yet, in termsof making good on these client-oriented goals through its actual deliv-ery, a completely different picture may emerge. Specifically, itsconstituents—in contrast to its managers—may perceive that suchstated goals are not being provided or worse, may not be aware of them.The adage that “the proof of the pudding is in its eating” is well placedhere. It is this reason that the gap between what the organization claimsto be its client oriented service-goals and its constituents’perception ofactual delivery of these goals, form the basis for a measure of organi-zational effectiveness.

This approach is partly ideological—increasing utility of a publicgood—but mainly the outcome of serious research. In fact, organiza-tional theorists have struggled for many decades over the thorny issueof how to gauge organizational effectiveness (Campbell 1977; Bedeian1994; Hall 1996). The measures have varied in name, focus and ideo-logical underpinnings (Scott 1995). Most have been associated withprofit-based organizations thereby excluding a considerable portion ofpublic sector human service agencies that provide public goods and ser-vices. However, the growth of the human service sector after World WarII has created an ongoing interest among researchers to develop a moreappropriate effectiveness measure. (DeAraujo 2001; Boyne 2001). Onetrend has been to view all types of human service organizations—bothpublic and private—singularly due to their commonality as a providerto consumers (Hasenfeld 1992). Despite this similarity, however, onesignificant difference remains; namely, “profits” in the public sector arepolitically derived and dispensed while for-profit organizations arebased on market bottom-line profits. Several attempts have been madeto overcome this constraint in measuring effectiveness, including sug-gesting measures based on alternative organizational forms (McHughet al 2001), internal management strategies (Johnson & Cords 2000;Shoichet 1998), variable performance criteria (Bohte & Meier 2001)and most recently a new public management approach (Vigoda 2002).The issues can be extremely complex due to the nature of public sectororganizations. Yet, for the most part, what distinguishes theseapproaches is that the majority focuses primarily on internal organiza-tional criteria of effectiveness, utilizing ‘objective’ and/or ‘subjective’

Kirschenbaum: Measuring Effectiveness 77

performance measures endorsed and evaluated by the organization’sown members. Only rarely are clients asked to systematically assessorganizations’ effectiveness. When done so, primarily through the useof opinion polls (Vigoda 2000), the criteria are based on measures of‘satisfaction’, a methodologically tenuous and problematic way toassess effectiveness.2

Over time, unease with the standard measurements of effectivenessin traditional forms of public sector human services generated a grow-ing concern in the field of disaster management. With increasingawareness that the ability of disaster agencies to provide adequate ser-vices did not match public expectations (Platt & McMullen 1979), alongwith case studies criticizing the output of public administrative inter-vention into local disasters (McLuckie 1975; Hirose 1979; Heathcote1980; Sylves 1991; Olson et al 2000), evolved efforts to reexamine howto make disaster management agencies more effective. The primaryresult, however, was to refocus on internal organization performanceissues concerned with management strategies and inter-organizationalcoordination (Quarantelli 1997; Gillespie 1991). Little concern, how-ever, was paid to potential victims as a critical component in the measureof organizational effectiveness (Julnes & Holzer 2001), particularly asit related to the provision of actual disaster related services. The victim-clients were seen mainly in terms of their being an “output” of disasters,leading researchers to focus on the trauma they suffered rather than theirrole in providing an “input” in making disaster organizations more sen-sitive to what potential victims need. A major exception to this generaltrend has been the emergence of studies primarily outside the disasterfield based on both theoretical and empirical developments in the mul-tiple constituency approach (Tsui 1990; Connolly et al 1980).

Multiple Constituencies

The development of the multiple constituency approach to organi-zational effectiveness has taken place over the last twenty-five years(Zammanto 1984) but can claim only a limited number of empiricalcase studies testing its advantages (Martin 1980; Jobson & Schneck1982; Tsui 1990; Fried & Worthington 1995). It focuses primarily onthe multiplicity of stakeholders in (and outside) an organization whodetermine the success of attaining an organization’s goal(s). These stake-holders can include the organization’s shareholders, employees atdifferent levels in the organization’s structure and consumers who pur-chase or receive the organization’s product/service. As each


constituency or stakeholder has a different set of perception-based mea-sures to gauge their organization’s effectiveness (Alvarez & Brehm1998), specific constituencies may have widely different evaluations ofthe same organizational goals (Kanter & Summers 1987). For exam-ple, top managers may judge the effectiveness of their serviceorganization in terms of ‘budget utilization’, department heads by‘meeting quotas’, administrative staff on maximizing ‘processing peo-ple’and the recipients of the service on its ‘timely delivery’. On the onehand, this diversity of perceived effectiveness measures is a major con-straint on its utilization. For example, different effectiveness scoresappear when comparing managers and clients (Gowdy et al 1993), prac-titioner-experts with other stakeholders (Herman & Drenz 1997) oremployees and customers (Schneider et al 1980). In addition, relyingsolely on stakeholders may confound the ability of ‘neutral’ third partyobservers from generating less politically or interest-laden criteria ofgoal effectiveness. But, on the other, such an approach broadens thebase upon which an effectiveness measure can be built as it considersthe multiple goals inherent in organizations. Most importantly, it takesinto account the perceptions of the stakeholders and what constitutestheir appraisal of a successful and effective organization.

For public sector human service organizations such as disaster agen-cies, external stakeholder evaluations by potential victims of a disasterare particularly relevant. First and foremost, such client-stakeholdersare the basis for and justify the establishment of disaster managementagencies. The fact that such organizations depend upon their clients (andare subject to their criticism) also means that they have a complex rela-tionship with them (Hasenfeld 1983). As a human service organization,disaster management agencies justify their funding and ongoing oper-ation for those “in need”, by creating a symbiotic relationship with theirclients, and making client-stakeholders, along with other types of stake-holders, an integral component in the measure of their effectiveness.

Extending this idea, researchers have introduced measuring howclient-stakeholders view the quality of the service or product, raisingsuch issues as “satisfaction” and “inter-personnel” relationships(Johnson & Holdaway 1990). As the organization’s service goals areprimarily directed at its external client-stakeholders, such an approachmade sense. However, by doing so they have diluted the direct link tothe organization’s delivery of its service goals by diverting attention tothe individuals’own particular sets of psychological predispositions andvalues which can affect how satisfaction is viewed. In addition, theproxy measure of an organization’s effectiveness based on ‘satisfaction’


or ‘performance’ rests on very shaky ground as it assumes that every-one has unlimited knowledge of what the (disaster) agency’s specificservice goals are as well as their ability to compare such service goalsacross diverse organizations.

In contrast to this problematic approach is one where effectiveness ofa disaster management organization depends on the client’s perceptionsof service goals that were actually delivered; those same stakeholderswhose very lives and safety depend on the effectiveness of this organiza-tion (Skopek 2001). By exploring how the client-stakeholders of disastermanagement organizations assess the delivery of organizationally statedexternal service goals that are relevant to them, it may be possible to pro-vide a model of independent externally derived measures of effectivenessthat are not biased by the organization’s own members.

Goal-Constituency Approach

To understand how disaster agency client-stakeholders, as a con-stituency, can utilize an organization’s stated goals to measureeffectiveness, requires first examining its basis in organizational the-ory. Historically, a key component that has attracted researchersseeking measures of organizational success has been performance,which in many ways has been equated with effectiveness (Hall 1996;Etzioni 1964).3 For human service organizations, effectiveness has tra-ditionally meant focusing on internal processes affecting output(production) of services and to some degree their quality (Julnes andHolzer 2001). This has meant looking inward at structural interrela-tionships and particularly at higher level managerial positions. Very rarecases are found where emphasis has been put on external measures suchas client evaluations (Njoh 1994). The basis for the performance-effec-tiveness measure has, for the most part, been framed by a combinationof three major theoretical approaches: The Goal, Resource, and InternalProcess Approaches (Daft 1998). The Goal Approach stresses actualperformance against goals; the Resource Approach on how well theorganization has used its resources to provide services; and the InternalProcess Approach focuses on internal (managerial) performance crite-ria. Singly or in combination, these approaches have dominated howwe look at organizational effectiveness. However, these approacheshave, for the most part, looked at organizational effectiveness throughthe eyes of for-profit organizations. Public sector service organizations,such as disaster agencies, simply did not have a place in these measuresas ‘profits’ did not play a major role in their operation. In addition,


these approaches assumed that organizations are dominated by oneoverriding goal.

As greater understanding of organizational processes developed,there arose a growing sensitivity to the fact that organizations are com-posed of multifaceted workgroups, multiple goals and external clients.This convinced researchers to view effectiveness measures within abroader framework that included client-stakeholders’perceptions of theorganization’s service goals. The innovation of this approach is that itassumes that differing constituencies within and outside the organiza-tion may have different standards and perceptions for measuringeffectiveness. These perceptions are directly associated with the spe-cific services which these individuals or groups expect to attain. Thisintermeshing of the goal and constituency model approach thereforecan be viewed as a viable alternative measure of organizational effec-tiveness, which, as I will now argue, is appropriate for disastermanagement agencies.

Transparency Link

The meshing of the goal and constituency approach is fairly straight-forward. In the case of the Goal Model Approach, the emphasis isstrictly on internal organizational processes. Such an approach initiallyexcludes external client-stakeholders. Moreover, it specifies that effec-tiveness depends on whether or not the organization attains its statedgoals (Etzioni 1964). These goals can be either ideological or materialand represent standards by which members of the organization canjudge their performance (Daft 1998). In general, an organization’s per-formance, its internal decision-making processes, leadership qualitiesand external social networks, when applied to these goal-standards, havean impact on its level of effectiveness (Hall 1996). Yet, for this to hap-pen these goals must be clear, final, consensual, measurable andconsistent (Robbins 1983). For public sector disaster management agen-cies, such service goals need to be transparent to both the providers andrecipients of these services. Due to adaptation of goals to the demandsof the market environment, however, consistent measures of effective-ness over time are difficult to attain (Harvey 1996), particularly withchanging of goal expectations (Schneider et al 1980). This is excep-tionally acute in human service organizations such as disastermanagement agencies whose goals may be affected by the vagaries ofpolitical rather than market conditions (Glampson et al 1977; Gilbertand Parhizgari 2000). The recent concern with the ‘threat of terror’ is


a good example of how political priorities can impact on disaster man-agement. Yet, at any given time, the stated service goals are in the maintransparent, both to its members and its clients. This is because suchservices are highly visible in the public realm and regulated in the polit-ical arena (Grandjean & Vaughn 1981). It means that disaster agencyclient-stakeholders, along with the organization’s managers, are awareof service goals that are stated to be delivered to them. Such awarenessmakes client-stakeholders sensitive to what service-goals are availableand what service goals should be delivered.

This transparency of goals in public sector disaster managementagencies is the link between the agency’s service-goals and its con-stituency. The core idea of this approach in measuring organizationaleffectiveness is that an organization must satisfactorily fulfill the min-imum requirements of its stakeholders by providing deliverableservices. Transparency of relevant service goals is crucial for thisprocess. In affect, the major stakeholders in a disaster managementorganization are likely to be those who are the major consumers of itsservices, those who wield the greatest power over the survival of theorganization (D’Aunno 1992). It is client-stakeholders who can pur-chase this public service, ignore it or possibly find alternative privatemarket sources. Therefore, first and foremost, knowledge of and aware-ness of the service-goals publicly acknowledged by the disastermanagement agency becomes a first step in the measure of organiza-tional effectiveness. By confronting the disaster managementorganization’s relevant service-goals against a client’s awareness ofthem, and the client’s perception of actual delivery, a clearer picture ofthe effectiveness of the organization should emerge.

Theoretical Model

Transcribing the goal-constituency approach to measure organiza-tional effectiveness into a workable model requires certain basicassumptions. First, it must be recognized that such organizations areembedded with multiple goals. In broad terms, these consist of internalorganizational goals (primarily aimed at its managers) and those rele-vant to external client-stakeholders who receive its services. Themultiplicity of internal and external organizational goals highlights thecomplex choices that its major stakeholders will have when they con-front and measure the provision of each that are relevant for them. Themultiplicity of goals also allows for the possibility that there may be agap between what the organization states are its external service goals


and what its clients recognize them to be. This leads to a second issueinvolving understanding what influences the evaluation of the relevantservice-goals. The assumption is that the perceived effectiveness willbe affected by client awareness of an organization’s goal(s) which isdrawn from varied situations these same clients have experienced.Having experienced an “anthrax” terror attack, for example, mayincrease an individual’s awareness of specific service-goals offered byan organization (e.g., biochemical preparedness) to the detriment ofother goals (e.g., fire prevention); and draw attention to the relevanceand delivery. Indeed, a broad range of variables, some related to disas-ter behavior, others not, can be brought to bear in affecting awarenesslevels of the stated service-goals and their actual delivery, includingpolitical, environmental and even economic situations.

The issue of being aware of the disaster management organization’sgoals is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, goals that the publicis not aware of are usually those embedded in the organization that relateto its own development and survival. These internal and usually admin-istrative goals are dedicated toward gaining efficiency or adapting toenvironmental constraints. Such prescribed goals are the basic survivalplatform affecting the logistics of organizational continuation and devel-opment. They are often only indirectly related to the externally directedhuman services that the public obtains. Not being aware of these ser-vice-goals does not mean that they do not exist or are not important,especially when not met, as they affect the ability to provide the deliv-ery of services for client-stakeholders It is for this reason that theeffectiveness measure that I am proposing will focus on only those rel-evant stated organizational service-goals that directly affect theclient-stakeholder.

To ascertain the relevance of these arguments, a theoretical modelwas generated to guide the research. This model (See Figure 1) arguesthat in order to evaluate a disaster management organization’s effec-tiveness, it is crucial to focus on how client-stakeholders perceive theorganization’s stated service-goals that are directly relevant to them.These perceptions are in part dependent on how well the organizationgets its goal “message” across but even more crucial are those personaland environmental factors that impinge upon the formation of service-goal perceptions among the clients. What this model suggests is thatclient-stakeholders’ goal perceptions are influenced by a multitude ofvariables. The model sets a framework to explore what variables aremost significant in the development of such goal perceptions. Themodel also provides a mechanism to match these perceptions with trans-


parent stated service-goals of the disaster organization, a preamble formeasuring the disaster agency’s effectiveness.

Strategy

On the basis of my arguments, a strategy was devised to ascertainIsrael’s Home Front Command’s (HFC) organizational goals as a first stepin measuring its effectiveness.5 To determine its goals, both the explicitstated goals of the HFC as well as those expressed by high-ranking officeholders were employed. These goals were then separated into those whichwere for internal administrative purposes and those relevant in providingservices to potential disaster victims. The fact that the HFC is obliged bylaw to provide emergency services to the entire Israeli population makesthese clients its major stakeholders and essential in evaluating its effec-tiveness. For this reason a national survey was constructed which includedalternative client-stakeholders’perceptions of the delivery of HFC service-goals, along with other disaster related information. These perceptionsunderwent a factor analysis to generate independent perceived goal cate-gories reflecting how clients actually viewed the HFC goals. They included


DemographicVariables

Fears and Beliefs

Preparedness

Past Experiences

OrganizationalProvider

Stakeholder’sPerceptionOf Service

Goals

StatedOrganizational

Goals

OrganizationalEffectiveness

Figure 1: Schematic Model of Stakeholder’s Perception of a

Disaster Management Organization’s Stated Goals and

Its Impact on Effectiveness

only service related goals relevant to the respondents. Once accomplished,a regression model was introduced to ascertain those factors best predict-ing differences in HFC goal perceptions.

Methodology

Data Source

The data utilized in this paper was based on a recent national rep-resentative household survey of the Israeli adult urban populationresiding in areas of 10,000 and over. Over 800 interviews in 150 urbanareas were conducted over a two-week period before hostilities withIraq commenced in 1990 in the Persian Gulf. One of the aims was toassess the effectiveness of the national disaster management agency,Israel’s Home Front Command, in terms of its ability to provide ade-quate levels of ‘preparedness’ for potential future disasters—natural,technological or war related. The survey employed a random-digital-dial, computer-assisted telephone survey of 814 household heads thatincluded a telephone interview that lasted about 20-25 minutes. Samplesize was based on proportional area size. The only constraint imposedon the sampling design was that the gender of the adult household headbe equally distributed (rotated) regardless of marital status. The actualtelephone interview relied primarily on a closed-ended structured ques-tionnaire. Given the subject matter and sponsor of the survey (HomeFront Command), refusals were extremely rare (98% response rate) withrandom alternative households making up the deficit. Included in thissurvey were questions covering a broad range of areas and variablestheoretically linked to disaster related behavior (Quarantelli 1998;Lindell & Perry 1992). The sample generated by the telephone surveywas evenly split by gender (as originally requested) and matched thebasic characteristics of the Israel population living in urban areas. Mostof the household sample are married (80%), have 2-3 children (52%),are highly educated with a college or more education (44%), live in dualearning households (60%), are in good health (72%), are between 40-60 years of age (47%), native born (51%), are in the labor force (54%),Jews (87%) and evenly distributed for above/below average income.

Goal Measures

Organizational goals were measured in two complementary ways:stated goals of the Home Front Command (HFC) and perceived goals as


expressed by the organization’s senior managers. Stated goals were obtainedfrom public documents published by the Home Front Command whichincluded statements from official public records as well as various publicinformation publications. These stated goals are based on both law and mil-itary regulations that officially mandates the Home Front Command assolely responsible “to prepare the civilian population for emergency situa-tions.” “Emergency situations” originally related to wartime activities butwas expanded to also include natural, technological and non-war relateddisasters. Under this rubric were 15 specific goals; of which ten dealt withproviding direct/indirect services to the civilian population and five wereinternally directed toward making its own organization more efficient.Those stated goals relevant for internal organizational purposes include:(1) providing organizational protocols, guidelines and (2) plans for intra-organizational coordination. (3) Rules for coordination with other relevantpublic emergency agencies. (4) Creating regional and urban preparednessguidelines and (5) clarifying issues of population behavior during emer-gencies to assist internal policy decisions.

Those goals directed outward directly relevant to the civilian pop-ulation include: (1) informing the civilian population of potentialemergencies; (2) providing instructions to emergency organizations howto deal with civilian populations; (3) control and management ofHazmat materials and coordinating organizations to maximize civiliansafety; (4) providing, maintaining and informing the population aboutwarning systems; (5) preparation for, and response to, biochemical andatomic threats through the distribution of gas mask kits, shelters andtheir maintenance; (6) authority over the civilian population, includingevacuations and post disaster rehabilitation; (7) the recruitment of civil-ian manpower during emergencies; (8) coordinating civilian logistic andsupply organizations; (9) preparing civilian emergency health and med-ical facilities; and (10) having the authority over the requisition of allcivilian emergency types of equipment.

In reviewing the organization’s stated goals, it was clear that fivespecific goals were for internal organizational purposes aimed atincreasing efficiency rather than directed toward the clientele. To someextent, these internal goals (e.g., coordinating and providing instruc-tions to various emergency organizations, or technical control ofemergency equipment) had consequences for its clientele, the civilianpopulation. However, the end result could only be judged in terms ofthe final service provided to the population. For this reason, only thoseservice-goals that were externally and directly relevant to its majorclient-stakeholders were incorporated into the effectiveness measure.


In addition, an open-ended questionnaire was distributed to 40senior-ranking officials (equivalent to departmental vice presidents) inthe Home Front Command to ascertain if the stated goals match thoseperceived by its senior managerial members. The responses were col-lated and underwent a content analysis, including an independent panelof judges. Asking to delineate their organization’s goals and rank theirpriority, it was found that the basic stated goals of the organization andthe perceived goals of its managers were very similar. This was not sur-prising due to the bureaucratic nature and strong sense ofidentity-commitment of the staff. In some cases, the goals of coordina-tion with other specific disaster agencies were not explicitly stated butcould be inferred from their responses. Differences were found, how-ever, in how they ranked what they felt should be the operational priorityof the goals. For example, some officers felt it more important to putadditional effort into distributing gas masks than into technical educa-tional training of the population.

Effectiveness Measure

As previously noted, the gap between what the organization claimsto be its client oriented stated goals and its constituents’ perception ofactual delivery of these relevant service-goals form the basis for a mea-sure of organizational effectiveness. However, to compose a measure ofeffectiveness required being sensitive to the link between the organiza-tion’s multiple service-goals relevant to its client-stakeholders and theirperception of the delivery of these goals. The guiding principle was inseeking a clear-cut measure that acknowledged the actuality and deliv-ery of those stated goals relevant to the client-stakeholders. For example,an organization can declare that it provides specific services to its clientsin line with its stated goals but these services may or may not have beensupplied nor reach the intended clients. There is also the possibility thatalong the way, the intended end-users may not be aware of these services.In addition, the client may misinterpret the meaning of the goal-objec-tives (Grandjean and Vaughn 1981). To take this into account, alternativemeasures of the perceived service-based organizational goals were intro-duced into the field survey. Focusing on the ten client-relevant serviceoriented goals, questions were formulated to measure if each of theserelevant service goals was perceived as being/not being provided by theHFC. We refrained from measuring perceived satisfaction with the ser-vices, as this measure is highly suspect and inter-correlated with a hostof intervening variables. Emphasis was put on client-stakeholder per-


ception of the actual supply of the service, an unequivocal measure ofthe organization’s ability to attain its stated service-goals. Again, the gapbetween what the HFC says are its relevant service-goals and how indi-viduals perceive the degree of actual (or potential) delivery became themeasure of organizational effectiveness. The rationale for this approachassumes that the first crucial step in an assessment of organization’seffectiveness is if the organization delivers what it promises. It is the cog-nitive recognition that relevant services are actually supplied, that setsthe stage to evaluate organizational effectiveness. This means that orga-nizational effectiveness differs from measures of quality of services,placing them on two different sides of the organizational coin.Organizational effectiveness is based on the client (stakeholder) per-ception that stated goals are being delivered while quality of the servicedepends on relative (usually peer related) value judgments of a servicealready provided. Simply put, stated service-goals exist if client-stake-holders perceived them to be so (even though they may not be delivered)and form the basis for a measure of organizational effectiveness. Qualityof service, on the other hand, can only be evaluated if stated goals canbe transcribed into actual delivery of services.

Perceptions of Goals

To compare the HFC stated goals with its clients’ perceptions ofthem led to a series of possible measures asking the client populationif they received or knew a specific relevant service goal was supposedto be provided by the HFC. For example, respondents were asked if,“during emergency situations, the HFC coordinates fire and rescue ser-vices.” The response ostensibly measured the client-stakeholders’perception of the HFC role in directing and coordinating these servicesbut more importantly provided evidence of the degree to which a pri-mary stated service-goal is perceived as linked directly to the HFC. Ifit was not, this could be interpreted as either a ‘failure’ of the HFC toinform its clients of this service-goal or a ‘failure’ to fulfill it. It mayalso have meant that another organization, and not the HFC, providesthis. In all cases, a negative response indicated that the HFC stated ser-vice-goals were, as far as its client-stakeholders were concerned, notbeing met. This same type of measure was employed for other statedrelevant service-goals such as providing the technical, financial andlogistic accessibility to the civilian population of bomb shelters, guide-lines and instructions for sealed rooms, an ample supply of basicsurvival goods (food, electricity), identifying and coordinating the neu-


tralizing of hazardous materials and distributing protective gear againstnon-conventional attacks.6

Given the constraints of the telephone survey, most of the measuresof perceived effectiveness were based on a 3-4 point Likert type scale.These ranged from a simple “yes, no, don’t know” response, to one thatincorporated intensity of positive/negative responses. As each of the ninestated goals included at least 3 separate measures of their effectiveness,the average of the responses was employed as the score of perceivedeffectiveness. To further refine this average score, each set of responseswas categorized in terms of the proportion of positive (yes, very much)or negative (no, not much, does not provide or do not know) reaction toeach of the service-goal questions. Positive responses reflect an evalua-tion by the client-stakeholder that the organization is indeed effective,for its goals are recognized as such, and its product/services are eitherprovided or can be obtained. Negative responses reflect their absence.This scale ranged from extremely positive to completely negative.

Table 1: Summary of Factor Analysis Based on Client-Stakeholders’ Perception of Service-Goals*


* Extraction method: Principle component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser

normalization.

Stated Service-Goals Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

Hazmat Gas Masks Service

Hazmat in Factory 0.72

Truck Accident Hazmat 0.74

Missile Related Hazmat 0.60

Mask Renewal Center 0.49

Supply of Gas Masks 0.89

Mask Maintenance 0.87

Rescue Services 0.86

Mask Distribution Center 0.77

Health Services 0.90

% Variance 16.36 20.27 24.36

% Cumulative 61 44.6 24.4

Alpha Chronbach 0.46 0.65 0.80

Goals Versus Perceptions

With this measure of perceived effectiveness, the stated service-goals that were directly relevant for client-stakeholders were once moreexamined. Conceptually, these goals publicly stated by the Home FrontCommand fell into three basic categories: (1) those which aimed at adirect product/service delivery; (2) those related to preparation throughinformation, training, guidelines and advice and (3) goals directedtoward prevention and response. To substantiate this categorizationempirically, a factor analysis was generated. Of the questions that wereemployed to measure the perceptions of the ten service-goals relevantto client-stakeholders among the HFC stated goals, three factorsemerged. The results (See Table 1) reflect this differentiation in goaldirection. For example, prevention-response goals focus on handlinghazardous materials (Factor 1, Hazmat), the service-oriented goalsdescribes the distribution and maintenance of gas masks (Factor 2, GasMasks) while goals related to preparation and mitigation focus on thebasic emergency providers (Factor 3, Service).

Table 2: Degree of Organizational Effectiveness Based on Client-Stakeholders


Perception Effectiveness of Service-Goals Organizational Effectiveness*

Gas Masks 88%

Mask Renewal Center 84%

Supply of Gas Masks 87%

Gas Mask Maintenance 83%

Service 85%Rescue services 76%

Mask Distribution Center 91%

Health services 81%

Hazmat 31%

Hazmat in Factory 24%

Truck Accident Hazmat 26%

Missile Related Hazmat 59%

*Organization effectiveness is based on the proportion of sample that responded positively toquestions that recognized that the stated service-goals of the HFC are provided and deliveredto its clients.

Comparing the proportion of positive responses that client-stake-holders make in their perceived judgment of the effectiveness of theHFC shows that differences appear between the major service-goal fac-tors as well as within each factor (See Table 3). For example, perceivedeffectiveness was highest for those goal factors related to Gasmasks(88%) and Service (85%) and extremely low for those service-goal fac-tors dealing with Hazmat items (31%). These wide differences appearedwithin factors, especially for measures grouped in the Hazmat (24-59%)and Service (76-91%) categories. These variations in the degree of per-ceived effectiveness that client-stakeholders assigned to the multiplestated service-goals are a clear indication that there is no one ubiqui-tous overall perceived goal of the disaster management organization buta series of distinct and specific sub-goals to which they relate in scor-ing effectiveness.

Developing Effectiveness Perceptions

This distinction made by client-stakeholders in their perceptions ofthe organization’s relevant service-goal effectiveness begs a furtherquestion as to how and under what conditions such effectiveness scoresdevelop. It seemed reasonable to assume that sensitivity on the part ofthe client-stakeholders to these stated service-goals would reflect thesocial and political situation from which they emerged, namely, the after-math of the first Gulf War. Taking this as a starting point, we soughtexplanatory variables that would reflect these situations as well as coredisaster behaviors already found in the literature (Schneider 1995).Thus, basic socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education,gender, marital status and religion are included. Along with these arepreparation variables (e.g., have equipment, plans, knowledge, doneactivities); “belief ” (e.g., that defense forces can eliminate or cope withthreat); “fear” items (i.e., fear of a disaster, hearing the warning); sat-isfaction with disaster related services, understanding/compliance withdisaster instructions; and Gulf War experience and concerns. Takentogether, these situational variables reflected what could best bedescribed as the framework within which clients develop their aware-ness of relevant service-goals provided by the Home Front Command.

Regressing these variables against each separate service-goal fac-tor provided a picture of what best explained the formation of each. Theresults show that awareness of each organizational service-goal is devel-oped through different sets of variables. The perception of the HomeFront Command Hazmat goal, as Table 3 reveals, is primarily depen-


dent on the level of preparedness of the client. Thus, the degree ofknowledge of the danger of hazardous materials and activities the indi-vidual has made to avoid them are significant variables in affecting thesensitivity of individuals to this service-goal. An additional bio-demo-graphic component, religious affiliation (Jew/Arab), also affects itsperception. In the case of the Gas Mask factor—a major concern of theHFC—a combination of variables appears to significantly sensitizeclient-stakeholders to this service-goal. Here, statistically significantvariables reflect the degree to which the client is satisfied with the gen-eral services provided by the HFC: a strong belief that the Israel DefenseForces can cope with the threat of a non-conventional war; having avail-able (gas mask kit) equipment; as well as ethnic background. Theperception of the Service goal, reflecting the HFC disaster preparationand mitigation service-goal, appears to coalesce as the result of wellfounded fears, past war related experiences and religious affiliation.The regression model indicates that fear of another war related disas-


Table 3: Regression Coefficients and Significance Levels of Socio-Demographic and Situational Variables

Variables Hazmat Gas Masks Service

Demographic B Signif B Signif B SignifAge 0.10 0.70 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.37Education 0.01 0.75 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.36Income -0.60 0.09 -0.03 0.46 0.04 0.28Marital Status 0.00 0.94 -0.02 0.25 -0.05 0.1Gender 0.03 0.48 -0.02 0.59 0.01 0.75Religion -0.18 0.00 -0.07 0.13 -0.13 0.00Ethnic Status 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.96PreparednessEquipment -0.13 0.34 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.06Plans 0.00 0.84 0.02 0.52 -0.04 0.32Knowledge 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.59Activities 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.00 0.98FearsFuture Disaster 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.32 0.08 0.03Warning Sirens 0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.67 0.14 0.00BeliefsEliminate Threat 0.01 0.72 -0.03 0.34 -0.02 0.64Can Cope -0.40 0.23 0.13 0.00 -0.40 0.30Organization ProviderSatisfaction Level 0.04 0.23 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.72Clear Instructions 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.22Past ExperienceGulf War Experience 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.32Army -0.20 0.64 0.05 0.21 -0.02 0.55Post GW Concern -0.02 0.62 0.01 0.67 -0.09 0.03

Explained R2 12.6% 20.1% 6.3%

ter; hearing the warning sirens indicating imminent incoming ballisticmissiles; concerns after the Gulf War of another conflagration; and reli-gious affiliation (beliefs) are all significant variables predicting thisrelevant service-goal perception.

Conclusions

Along with the growth of public sector disaster management orga-nizations has come a need to measure their effectiveness. The traditionalorganization effectiveness measures, which were developed for the pri-vate market, have attempted to fill this vacuum but are clearlyconstrained in their scope and methodology. What has been exploredhere is an alternative approach to measure these organizations’ effec-tiveness by taking advantage of the qualities inherent in multipleconstituency and goal model measures. The basic advantage of such anapproach is that it looks outward toward perceptions of client-stake-holders as the key players in determining effectiveness while relatingeffectiveness to the organization’s relevant client oriented service-goals.As such, it provides the researcher with two great advantages: a meansto carefully examine the organization’s structure through its goals aswell as obtain a comprehensive understanding of the development ofend-users’ perceptions of these service-goals. This perspective wasexamined in a study of a public sector disaster management organiza-tion, Israel’s Home Front Command.

In exploring the interaction of the constituency and goal modelapproaches, it was necessary to put forward several assumptions andcriteria that laid the ground work for the ensuing analysis. Firstly, it wasargued that client-stakeholders were key determinants in measuringorganizational effectiveness. As the primary client-stakeholder (andrecipient) of the organization’s services, effectiveness was dependentfirst and foremost on their awareness of the organization’s goals. Statedgoals understood by the organization’s members did not necessarilymean that they were so perceived by the client-stakeholders. This dual-ity of goals distinguished between internal administrative goals aimedat bureaucratic efficiency and service-goals relevant for the client-stake-holder. Secondly, it was further argued that the perception of theorganization’s stated goals evolved from criteria embedded in, as wellas outside, the organization. Client-stakeholders, under this assump-tion, would be particularly vulnerable to be influenced by their widersocial and political environment that would possibly set standards anddemands beyond the scope of the providing organization.


On the basis of these arguments, a strategy was devised to evaluate theefficacy of these approaches in formulating an organizational effectivenessmeasure. Focusing on Israel’s Home Front Command (HFC), which fits thecriteria of a public sector human service provider, an analysis of its statedgoals was made. Fifteen stated goals were discovered of which ten weredirected at and relevant for its client-stakeholders and five for internal orga-nizational administrative utilization. The ten service-goals directly relevantto client-stakeholders were transcribed into effectiveness measures by ask-ing a representative sample of urban Israeli household heads if theseservice-goals were perceived to be delivered. If so, then the organization ful-filled its goal ambitions toward its client-stakeholders and could be declaredeffective. In addition, an interview schedule was developed which includeda set of background and disaster related questions of the respondents.

The perception that the stated disaster management service-goalswere being/not being provided does not mean that a particular individ-ual client-stakeholder personally receives the service or product of theorganization. It only means that it was perceived to be provided by theorganization. This definition has its foundation in the performance(rather than attitudinal) criteria commonly found in organizational effec-tiveness measures. Thus, individuals are being asked their perceptionsof an actual performance, i.e., the delivery of what is claimed. As theindividuals being asked are the client-stakeholders, the very targets forthe organization’s services, their perceptions of delivery become a cru-cial behavioral measure of organizational effectiveness.

The first step in the analysis revealed that the HFC’s own clients rec-ognized only three of the ten-targeted organization service-goals. Inaddition, effectiveness varied both between the three service-goals fac-tors (Hazmat, Gas Masks, Service) as well as among its specificcomponents. The implications strongly suggest that an organization’sstated goals (as expressed by its managers) are not necessarily recog-nized as such by its client-stakeholders. In an effort to discover how thesegoal perceptions developed, a further analysis was performed whichencompassed broad situational and disaster related factors. The resultsshowed that each of the perceived organization service-goals relevant toits client-stakeholders was explained by a different set of variables, manyof which originate not from the service-goals themselves but from otherextraneous but relevant situational considerations. This confirmed theindependence of these goal-factors as well as put a focus on how a dis-aster management agency is perceived by client-stakeholders.

What these results strongly suggest is that measuring disaster man-agement organizational effectiveness is a complex task, especially when


taking into account the role that client-stakeholders have in this process.For one, effectiveness is dependent on the perception of relevant ser-vice-goals. This means that stated goals made by disaster managers orappearing in the public record, as a benchmark for measuring effec-tiveness, may be misleading, as they may not be recognized as such byrecipients. Secondly, a good deal of the factors which impinge on howservice-goal perceptions develop derive from situational, environmen-tal and perhaps idiosyncratic factors having little to do with the disastermanagement organizational goals themselves.

Implications

The implications of these results should act as a catalyst in how wethink about public sector disaster agency effectiveness measures. Forone, there is an underlying recognition that the potential victims of dis-asters form a critical source from which disaster managers can deriveorganizational goals. The client-stakeholders apparently know what isneeded for their survival and can distinguish the absence of these imper-atives in public sector bureaucratic organizations. This has beenconsistently confirmed in research that seriously challenges the notionthat experts know better and are more capable (in their organizationalcapacity) to provide needed disaster services (Rowe & Wright 2001;Wright et al 2002; Beierle 2002; Elliott 1999). The analysis of the HFC,a public sector disaster management organization, shows that we nolonger have to rely on speculation in spearheading the place of the client-stakeholders in measuring the effectiveness of disaster agencies. Norcan we ignore that disaster management agencies, as bureaucratic for-mal structures, set their goals in accordance with the rules of publicsector administrations. What can be done, however, is seek a compro-mise. A large part of the organizational ‘rules’could be used to develophuman service goals that are client based. This would not mean totallyabandoning internal organizational performance criteria, but refocus-ing them on criteria that are important to the potential victim.

The goal-constituency approach to assess the effectiveness of dis-aster management organizations provides a viable alternative to the alltoo familiar organizational focus in disaster management. Rather thanexpending energy and time on increasing an organization’s internal effi-ciency and goal missions, it might be better for disaster managers tocheck if these agencies provide the ‘right stuff’ to their client-stake-holders. By following this path they may quickly learn that differentsegments of population have different perceptions of effectiveness. This


being the case, disaster organizations should provide or make availableappropriate services to these market segments. This was indirectly con-firmed in a byproduct analysis of the data employed in this study wheresuch basic socio-demographic variables as age, ethnic status and reli-gion proved to significantly affect evaluating effectiveness measures.

In addition, focusing on client-stakeholders could provide invalu-able information on what types of service-goals, beyond those alreadyprovided, are perceived as crucial for disaster survival. Presently, dis-aster organization experts come to a decision about their clients’needs.However, the client-stakeholder, as the prime recipient of disaster relatedservices should likewise be considered in this decision process. Theircontribution may be invaluable in helping recognize the ‘missing goals’,or services that were felt needed. This contribution was clearly impliedwhen the sample was asked about purchasing related services in the pri-vate market. Not surprisingly, the emphasis was on family relatedservices, a clarion call to go beyond being a distributor of materials orinformation and begin providing comprehensive personal services.Overall, these implications should provide a wake up call to disastermanagers that organizational effectiveness as it is now being justifiedmay not be the panacea they assume it is.

Acknowledgments

This project was supported by a research grant from the IDF HomeFront Command and the Technion Foundation. I would like to thankTali Gants and especially Hadas Arzi for their assistance as well as theofficers of Israel’s Home Front for their participation. Also, my appre-ciation for the astute comments of the anonymous reviewers andespecially Maureen Fordham.

Notes

1. In general, ‘satisfaction’ measures do not differentiate betweenspecific services provided by a particular public sector agency. Suchmeasures tend to be biased toward an evaluation of a limited numberof highly visible services in an agency while ignoring others.

2. The use of ‘satisfaction’ as a means of measuring organiza-tional effectiveness or performance is not new in the area of PublicAdministration (Vigoda, 2000). However, from a methodological per-spective, it is a conceptually unstable variable (it is conditional uponchanging situations and collateral contingencies) and has very little


predictive value of actual behaviors, such as job performance. Thus,evaluation research which focus on particular programs, or publicopinion polls which use ‘satisfaction’ measures are fraught with seri-ous methodological problems.

3. There is an ample and sometimes confusing literature arguingthe advantages and disadvantages among each of three, sometimesinterchangeable, concepts of organizational success, performance,and effectiveness. For a more detailed exposition see Hall 1996.

4. Such stated goals should be distinguished from internal admin-istrative objectives. For example, a disaster management agency’sservice goal may be to distribute gas masks to everyone but theadministrative apparatus to do so would require, for example, shiftingmanpower to relevant units, revamping logistical processes for acqui-sition and distribution of the masks and/or putting into place qualitycontrol checks. The disaster management organization’s service-goalremains but the internal organizational mechanism for its actualimplementation differs.

5. The national disaster management agency in Israel, the HomeFront Command, was created along with the establishment of Israeland organized along the lines of the Israel Defense Forces. It is anational organization staffed by military personnel whose specificgoals are designed to protect the civilian population from natural,technological and non/conventional war related acts. Its stated goalsare clearly defined in law. Since its inception it has undergone severalstages of reorganization with the latest (early 1990’s) making it theprime supplier of plans, products, equipment and social-psychologicalservices to the civilian population in case of disasters and emergen-cies. It is a highly visible and transparent organization, as it has had todeal with a constant flow of emergencies and war/terrorist related actsover the last 50 years. This visibility has intensified since the first GulfWar, opening up the Home Front Command to public scrutiny andcriticism (Kirschenbaum 2001). Its core members are obligatory armyrecruits as well as short-term reservists. In accordance with its militarycommand approach, training and real-time simulations include theparticipation of the civilian population and coordination with a broadrange of other emergency organizations. Unlike local municipal disas-ter management agencies, the Home Front Command is mandated bylaw as the overall national command organization in cases of nationalemergencies. As such, it is responsible for preparation and mitigationas well as actual recovery after disasters. These responsibilities are car-ried out on a daily basis, especially in terms of preparing for a


non-conventional attack. Examples of questions included: “In youropinion, to what degree is the HFC responsible for providing you andyour family with a sealed room, bomb shelter?” “Do you know wherethe gas mask maintenance center is located near your home?” “Are theemergency services (such as firefighting, ambulance, police, etc) con-trolled, coordinated and/or operated by the HFC or are theyindependent organizations?” “Is your local municipal emergency man-ager in command of local emergencies?”

References

Alvarez, R. M., Brehm, J. 1998. Speaking in two voices: Americanequivocation about the internal revenue. American Journal ofPolitical Science 42, 418-452.

Bedeian, A. J. 199). Organization theory: current controversies, issuesand directions, in C. L Cooper and I. T. Robertson (eds) Key Reviewsin Managerial Psychology: Concepts and Research for Practice.New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Beierle, T.C. 2002. The quality of stakeholder-based decisions. RiskAnalysis 22: 739-749.

Baier, A. C. 1994. Moral Prejudices. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.

Boyne. G. 2001. Planning, performance and public service. PublicAdministration 79, 73-88.

Bohte, J., Meier, K. 2001. Structure and performance of public orga-nizations: task difficulty and span control. Public OrganizationReview 1, 341-354.

CAG, Comptroller and Auditor General 2001. Measuring thePerformance of Government Departments. London, National AuditOffice.

Campbell, J. P. 1977. On the nature of organizational effectiveness, inP. S. Goodman, J. M. Pennings (eds.) New Perspectives inOrganizational Effectiveness. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

Carter N., Klein, R and Day, P. 1995. How Organizations MeasureSuccess—The Use of Performance Indicators in Government. N.Y.Routledge Press.

Connolly, T., Conlon, E. J., Deutsch, S. J. 1980. Organizational effec-tiveness: a multiple-constituency approach. Academy ofManagement Review 5, 211-217.

Daft, R. L. 1998. Organization Theory and Design (6th ed) Ohio: South-Western College Publishing.


D’Aunno, T. 1992. The effectiveness of human service organizations:a comparison of models, in H. Hasenfeld, (ed.) Human Services AsComplex Organizations. Newbury Park California, Sage Publications.

DeAraujo, J.F. 2001. Improving public service delivery: the crossroadsbetween NPM and traditional bureaucracy. Public Administration79, 915-932.

Drabek, T.E., Hoetmer, G.J. 1991. Emergency Management: Principlesand Practices for Local Government. Washington D.C.,International City Management Association

Elliott, S. J. 1999. The power of perception: health risk attributed to airpollution in an urban industrial neighbourhood. Risk Analysis19: 621-634.

Etzioni, A. 1964. Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

Fried, B. J., Worthington, C. 1995. The multiconstituency approach toorganizational performance assessment: A Canadian mental healthsystem application. Community Mental Health Journal 31,11-24.

GAO, General Accounting Office. 1999 Managing for Results—Opportunities for Continued Improvements in Agencies’Performance Plans. Washington D.C., General Accounting Office.

Gilbert, G. R., Parhizgari. A.M. 2000. Organizational effectiveness indi-cators to support quality. Managing Quality 10, 46.

Gillespie, D.F. 1991. Coordinating community resources. In T.E. Drabek& G.J. Hoetmer (eds.) Emergency Management: Principles andPractice for Local Government Wash D.C. International CityManagement Association. pp55-78.

Glampson A., Glastonbury, B., Fruin, D. 1977. Knowledge and per-ceptions of the social services. Journal of Social Policy 6, 1-16.

Gowdy, E.A., Rap, C.A., Poertner, J. 1993. Management is perfor-mance: strategies for client-centered practices in socialorganizations. Administrative Social Work 17, 3-22.

Grandjean, B. D., Vaughn, E.S. 1981. Client perceptions of school effec-tiveness: a reciprocal causation model for students and their parents.Sociology of Education. 54, 275-290.

Hall, R. H. 1996. Organizations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes.New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Company.

Harvey J. 1996. Productivity In professional services: to measure or notto measure. In A. Halachmi, G. Bouckaert (eds.). OrganizationalPerformance and Measurement in The Public Sector: Toward, EffortAnd Accomplishment Reporting. New York: Quorum Books.


Herman, R., Drenz, D. O. 1997. Multiple constituencies and the socialconstruction of nonprofit organization effectiveness. Nonprofit andVoluntary Sector Quarterly 26, 185-206.

Hasenfeld, H. 1983. Human Organization. Englewood Cliffs, NewJersey: Prentice-Hall.

Hasenfeld, H. (ed.) 1992. Human Services As Complex Organizations.Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Heathcote, RL. 1980. An administrative trap? Natural hazards inAustralia: A personal view. Australian Geographical Studies18:194-200.

Heinrich,C.J. 2002. Outcomes-based performance management in thepublic sector: implications for government accountability and effec-tiveness. Public Administration Review 62 :712-725

Hirose, H. 1979. Volcanic eruption and local politics in Japan: A casestudy. Mass Emergencies 4:53-56.

Jobson, J.D. and R. Schneck, 1982. Constituent view of organizations:evidence from police organizations. Academy of ManagementJournal 25,25-46.

Johnson , D. E., Cords, D.A. 2000. A strategic approach to enhancemanagement and marketing effectiveness utilizing the SOAR lead-ership model to improve communications for public-sector andnot-for-profit organizations. Human Resources Abstracts 35, no.2.

Johnson, N. A., Holdaway, E. A. 1990. School effectiveness and prin-cipals’ effectiveness and job satisfaction: a comparison of threeschool levels. The Alberta Journal of Educational Research 36, 265-295.

Julnes, P. D. L., Holzer, M. 2001. Promoting the utilization of perfor-mance measures in public organizations: An empirical study offactors affecting adoption and implementation. PublicAdministration Review 61, 693-708

Kanter, R.M., Summers, D. V. 1987. Doing well while doing good”dilemmas of performance measurement in nonprofit organizationsand the need for a multiple-constituency approach, in W. W. Powell(ed.) The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. New Haven CT:Yale University Press.

Kirschenbaum, A. 2001. Mass terrorism and the distribution of gasmasks in Israel: a longitudinal cohort analysis. International Journalof Mass Emergencies and Disasters 19:245-267.

Kirschenbaum, A. 2002. The organization of chaos: the structure of dis-aster management, in E. Vigoda, (ed.). Public Administration: AnInterdisciplinary Critical Analysis. New York: Marcel Decker.


Lindell, M. K., Perry, R.W. 1992. Behavioral Foundations OfCommunity Emergency Planning. New York: HemispherePublishing Corp.

Martin, P.Y. 1980. Multiple constituencies, differential power and thequestion of effectiveness in human service organizations. Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare 7, 801-816.

McHugh, M., O’Brian, G. Ramondt, J. 2001. Finding and alternativeto bureaucratic models of organizations in the public sector. PublicMoney and Management 21, 350-42.

McLuckie, B.F. 1975. Centralization and natural disaster response: a pre-liminary hypothesis and interpretation. Mass Emergencies 1(1): 1-9.

Njoh, A.J. 1994. A client satisfaction based model of urban public ser-vice delivery organizational effectiveness. Social IndicatorsResearch 32, 263-296.

Olson, R.S., Prieto, J.P.S., Olson, R.A., Gawronski, V.T., Estrada, A.2000. The marginalization of disaster response institutions: the1997-1998 EL Nino experience in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,Special Publication 36, Boulder, University of Colorado,.

Platt R.H., McMullen, G.M. 1979. Fragmentation of public authorityover floodplains: the Charles River response. Water ResourcesResearch Center no.101. University of Massachusetts.

Quarantelli, E.L. 1997. Ten criteria for evaluating the management ofcommunity disasters. Disasters 21: 39-56.

Quarantelli, E. L. (ed.) 1998. What Is A Disaster? London: Routledge.Robbins, S. P. 1983. Organization Theory: The Structure And Design

Of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.Rowe, G., Wright, G. 2001. Differences in expert and lay judgments of

risk: myth or reality. Risk Analysis 21: 341-356.Schneider, S.K. 1995. Flirting With Disaster: Public Management In

Crisis. Armonk. N.Y.: Situations.Schneider, B. J. J. Parkington and V. M. Buxton 1980. Employee and

customer perceptions of service in banks. Administrative ScienceQuarterly 25: 252-267.

Scott, R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

Shoichet, R. 1998. An organization design for non-profits. NonprofitManagement and Leadership 9: 71-88.

Skopek, T. A. 2001. Perceptions of risk in siting nuclear waste facili-ties: a localized perspective. The Humanities And Social Sciences.61: 2946-A.


Documents

A-4 Kirschenbaum - Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster ...Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster Management Organizations Alan Kirschenbaum Faculty of Industrial Engineering and