BALKAN ISLAMA BARRIER OR A BRIDGE

FOR RADICALISATION?

Economics and International Relations Institute

Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungOffice Bulgaria97, Knjaz Boris I St.1000 Sofia, BulgariaTel.: +359 2 980 8747Fax: +359 2 980 2438http://www.fes-bulgaria.orgoffice@fes.bg

© Cover foto: Ivan Stoimenov

ISBN 978-954-2979-38-8

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organisation for which the author works.

Commercial use of all media, published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

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ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG

BULGARIAN DIPLOMATIC SOCIETY

BALKAN ISLAMA BARRIER OR A BRIDGE FOR RADICALISATION?

Prof. Iskra Baeva, PhDBiser Banchev, PhD

Bobi BobevPeter Vodenski

Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhDLyubcho NeshkovLyubcho Troharov

Editor Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhD

Sofia, 2018

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Foreword – Helene Kortländer, PhD;

Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhD; Philip Bokov .....................................3

2. Balkan Islam and Radicalisation: a Barrier

in front of the Bridge – Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhD .....................5

3. Albania: Both a Bridge and a Barrier

for Islamic Radicalism – Bobi Bobev, PhD ...................................20

4. Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Lyubcho Troharov ..............34

5. Islam in Bulgaria: Most Muslims in Bulgaria

Practice Traditional Islam – Prof. Iskra Baeva, PhD ....................48

6. Kosovo: a Collision Between Traditional

Tolerance and Radicalism – Bobi Bobev, PhD .............................61

7. There is No Internal Islamic Threat in

Macedonia, Foreign Forces Import Radical

Islam – Lyubcho Neshkov ............................................................73

8. The Muslim Communities in Serbia: Between

Integration and Radicalisation – Biser Banchev, PhD ................86

9. Islam in Turkey – Peter Vodensky ...............................................99

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FOREWORD

There are sizeable Muslim communities in many of the Balkan countries. As

a whole, the region is characterised by the moderate nature of the Balkan

Islam and tolerant relations among religions. In the last years, however,

wars and political confrontation have drawn new dividing lines within local

societies on ethnic and religious basis. The actions of the “Islamic State”

and the terrorist acts in Europe placed additional strain on the local Islamic

communities. Available evidence confirms the fact that a sizeable number

of Islamic fighters in the Middle East originated from South-eastern Europe.

The purpose of this study is to make a political assessment of the

role of the local Islamic communities in the Balkans in these processes, to

analyse the tendencies among them in the different countries, the risks of

radicalisation and external interference. The outlining of the region-wide

dimensions of the problem would help to stimulate the dialogue among

the religious confessions and regional cooperation with a view of prevent-

ing possible radicalisation of the Islamic communities in the region

The study encompasses seven Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and

Turkey and tries to adhere to a unified approach, reflecting the signifi-

cance of the following issues in each of the countries:

• general outline of the picture of the religious beliefs in the respective

country and the role and place of Islam;

• the Islamic communities – legal status, relations with the institutions

of the state, existence of different Islamic trends, religious organisa-

tions, Islamic schools;

• political parties on a religious or ethnic basis and their relations with

Islam (if any), their influence in the country;

• processes and tendencies among the Islamic community in the coun-

try – risks of radicalisation, possible influence of the ideology of the

“Islamic State”;

• foreign influence on the local Islamic communities (if any) – origin,

objectives, methods, financing;

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• recruitment of jihadist fighters from the respective country, including

returnees from the Middle East – dynamics, problems, manifestations;

• risk assessment related to radical Islamist groups;

• measures against Islamic radicalisation after the year 2000 (if any);

• the local Islamic communities – a barrier or a bridge for radicalisation.

The country reports were prepared by Bulgarian experts with in-depth

professional knowledge about the respective countries – ambassadors, ac-

ademics, journalists. The texts are the authors’ analyses of the complex and

contradictory processes and tendencies in the region and do not necessarily

reflect the positions of the “Friedrich Ebert” Foundation, the Economics and

International Relations Institute and the Bulgarian Diplomatic Society.

Helene Kortländer, PhD, Director of the Office Bulgaria,

of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhD, Director of the Economics and

International Relations Institute

Philip Bokov, Chairman of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Society

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BALKAN ISLAM AND RADICALISATION: A BARRIER IN FRONT OF THE BRIDGE

Lyubomir Kyuchukov, PhD

Religious Beliefs in the Region, Role and Place of Islam

There is a substantial variety of religious beliefs in the Balkan region, but

with a single dominating religion in most of the countries. The countries

whose population is primarily Christian predominate, Eastern Orthodoxy

being much more widespread. Catholicism is present mainly in the west-

ern part of the peninsula. Islam is the dominant religion in Turkey and Bos-

nia and Herzegovina with a growing influence also among the Albanian

population (in Albania proper, Kosovo, and among the Albanian minorities

in the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and the other post-Yugoslav states).

Islam was brought among the Balkan peoples at a relatively later

stage and arrived on the peninsula with its conquest by the Ottoman

Empire after the 14th - 15th centuries. This created a specific historic reli-

gious-state linkage of Islam with the Turkish state, which exists until now

as a public attitude. That is why even at present traditional Balkan Islam

preserves its link with Turkey.

Within the Ottoman Empire Islam was a state, dominating religion, defin-

ing the status of the subjects – the “faithful” and “rayah”. Its expansion was

taking place both voluntarily by virtue of economic and political factors (mainly

in the Albanian ethnic area) and by force – through the Islamisation of the local

population. Subsequently this process stimulated internal division and separa-

tion within the different ethnoses on the basis of religion, creating conditions

for the formation of new ethno-religious groups - Bosniaks1*, Pomaks, etc.

At the same time, albeit with a different, not fully equal status in

the Ottoman Empire, Christianity preserved its serious presence and influ-

ence among the Balkan peoples during all those centuries. This created

certain traditions of common and parallel existence of the two religions,

* Note of the translator: Due to the extremely complicated ethnic and national situation in the Balkans, where ethnicity does not always coincide with citizenship, several conventions for the terms used have been adopted here in order to avoid confusion. E.g. Bosniak, Serb, Croat denote ethnicity; Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian denote citizenship.

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expressed in a fairly high degree of religious tolerance among Balkan soci-

eties after the collapse of the empire in the 19th – 20th century.

The Muslims in the Balkans are mainly Sunni (in Turkey – 80%), while

the rest are Shia (mainly alevis) and representatives of different sects.

Islamic Communities – Legal Status, Relations with the Institutions

of the State, Religious Organisations, Islamic Schools

In all Balkan countries religion is separated from the state constitutionally.

The executive has no legal right to interfere in the organisation and oper-

ation of the existing religious structures and in many countries it is neutral

by definition vis a vis them (in certain cases – Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, etc.

the leading or traditional religion in the country is specified).

A specific example of a more unequivocal commitment of the state to

the affairs of religion is the activity of the Directorate for Religious Affairs

(Diyanet) in Turkey as a state instrument for influencing the organisation

(and indeed the beliefs) of the Muslims – not only of the ongoing Islamis-

ation processes in the country but in the entire Balkan region.

The Islamic communities are clearly distinct (in most cases both

ethnically and geographically) and well organised, with their own

religious structures, elected religious leaderships, as well as the nec-

essary infrastructure and financial capabilities to perform their activ-

ities. With certain exceptions (Bulgaria, Serbia) they are also suffi-

ciently internally consolidated.

In the last two decades mass construction of mosques can be ob-

served in all countries with prevailing Muslim population in the region – in

the ones, where the role of Islam in politics is growing (Turkey, Bosnia and

Herzegovina), as well as in the Albanian area (Albania, Kosovo, Northern

and Western Macedonia, Preševo and also in Sandžak in Serbia). There

is also another tendency – the shortage of sufficient Islamic educational

establishments and a vacuum in the training of local imams and preachers

created the conditions for the infiltration of organisations and ideas for-

eign to the Balkan Islam.

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Processes and Tendencies Among the Islamic

Communities in the Balkans

A sufficiently clearly identified process of expansion of the territory of

religion, including of Islam, is observed in the region as a whole. The main

dynamic here is in Turkey and within the former communist countries:

Albania, Bulgaria and most of all in the countries of the post-Yugoslav

area. On the one hand, this is a result of the effect of lifting the restric-

tions on religion, which, on the other hand, leads to a sharp increase of

the number of citizens declaring their religious affiliation. In a number of

cases this is more a declarative position, defining primarily societal affilia-

tion and identity, rather than genuine religiousness – in particular among

the Orthodox population in these countries. Things are different in the

cases where the matter concerns the definition of a certain minority ethnic

or religious community, where religion (practically everywhere this turns

about to be Islam) becomes a basic delineation and identification factor.

This process is particularly distinctive in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

where it is state-building, insofar as the separation of an independent

state was the result of the ambition to reassert Bosniak identity on the

basis of the historically formed religious divisions. And there exists a suffi-

ciently clear specificity of confrontation: while between Serbs and Croats

the dividing line is ethnic, the one between the Bosniaks and the rest of

the population is religious. The transformation of Islam in a key political

factor in the country creates conditions for domestic fundamentalism in

the country itself, as well as for the penetration of external factors; at that,

with very important specifics – alongside the radical religious aspect they

bring in with them a militarised presence through the jihadist volunteers.

A slide towards Islamisation is observed in Turkey in the last two de-

cades – as an element of strengthening Erdoğan’s power, a reduction of

the influence of the army as a guarantor of the secular state and ero-

sion of the Ataturk’s legacy, exoneration of the Islamic traditions and

symbols, distancing and confrontation with the West. At the same time

this state-controlled Islamisation performs also a certain protective func-

tion with regard to the penetration of foreign religious influences in the

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country and to a large extent restricted the processes of import of Islamic

radicalism from the Middle East, but on the other hand it expanded sub-

stantially the basis and the significance of Islam in society.

As a whole, one might ascertain that local Islam is gaining strength

and is expanding its influence in a number of countries in the Balkans.

From the point of view of scope, Islam gradually encompasses ever wider

strata of the population, narrowing the field of the atheist or religiously

indifferent part of the population in the countries where it dominates (Tur-

key, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo) and engulfing ever tighter

the ethnic minorities practicing this religion in other countries (Bulgarian

Turks, Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, etc.). The pene-

tration of Islam in new territories is also characteristic – mainly among the

Roma population, which due to its social marginalisation in the majority of

countries, is more susceptible to eventual radicalisation.

Political Parties on Religious (or Ethnic) Basis, Connected to Islam

In the majority of the countries in the region (Turkey, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Her-

zegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Republic of Macedonia) there are ethnic parties and

part of them represents the interests of the respective Islamic communities.

In the countries with predominantly Muslim population Islam is in-

corporated to different degrees in the ideological basis of the governing

parties (Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina). In Turkey Islam, alongside

with nationalism, is used as a primary consolidating factor of power. They

both are the very base on which the ruling Party of Justice and Devel-

opment constructed the concept of political Islam. In Bosnia and Herze-

govina practically all political formations are on ethnic basis but only in

the Bosniak parties the religious element is strongly expressed, the lead-

ing Party of Democratic Action having as its ideological base the ideas of

conservative Islamic democracy and Boshiak nationalism, reflected in the

views of the “Islamic Declaration” of Alija Izetbegović, which formulated

the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems and the impossibility

of peace and coexistence between it and non-Islamic social and political

institutions. It is because of this that the ideological foundation of political

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Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on these ideas and intensified by

the bloody ethnic and religious confrontation, is rather more radical than

the one in Turkey. In Albania and Kosovo Islam is not present in the plat-

forms of political parties and the attempts to create Islamic parties there

were halted by the governments.

In the countries where the Islamic communities are in a minority (and

they to a large extent coincide with the respective ethnic minorities) the

existing ethnic parties do not dwell on Islamic ideas in their political plat-

forms either. Islam is exerting a certain influence only on the political rep-

resentation on the Bosniak (but not Albanian) minority in Serbia.

As a whole it may be noted that with the exception of Bosnia and Her-

zegovina and Turkey Islam and politics are separated in the Balkan countries.

Foreign Influence Upon the Local Islamic Communities

In view of the historic roots of Islam in the Balkans it is logical that the main

foreign religious influence in the Balkan countries should originate from

a source that is internal for the region. It is connected with Turkey and its

traditions and ambitions to present itself as protector of the Muslims in

the Balkans and is effected along two, often overlapping lines – ethnic and

religious. For the time being the line of “pan-Turkism” is predominant,

while the one of Islamism plays a supporting role. This approach has been

elevated to the rank of state policy, which has been most thoroughly

motivated in the ideas of neo-Ottomanism, where a wider role of pan-Is-

lamism can be discerned. This policy possesses the necessary administra-

tive and financial set of tools: the state Directorate for Religious Affairs

(Diyanet), which commands very substantial financial (more than USS 2

billion in 2016) and personnel resources, the Cooperation and Coordi-

nation Agency (TIKA), etc. Turkey’s attention is focused primarily on the

Turkish ethnic population in Bulgaria, as well as the Muslim communities

in Albania, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Greece. Special

attention is devoted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Turkey regards as

a brother country, a sort of a foothold for the restoration of its historic

influence in the Balkans. From the point of view of substance, the Turkish

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state tries to influence the leaderships of the Islamic communities in the

respective countries, including through sending Turkish Muslim officials

and supporting (financially and organisationally, through textbooks and

teachers) the education of local imams. Additionally, Turkey tries to affect

the political processes in some countries in the region (Bulgaria primarily)

and in other European countries through stimulating the creation and

supporting parties on a Turkish ethnic basis. It should be noted, however,

that the priority of the Turkish policy in the region remains to serve the

state ambitions of Turkey for its transformation into a regional leader and

a global player, while the exploitation of the religious communities falls

for the time being within the arsenal of tools for the attainment of these

objectives. From this point of view at this stage a claim of a direct influ-

ence of this Turkish policy in the direction of a possible radicalisation of

the Islamic communities in the region would not be sufficiently justified.

Concurrently, the interference of Turkey in the domestic affairs of the

countries creates conditions for additional divisions in the Balkan soci-

eties, stimulating as a counterweight the emergence of rather powerful

nationalistic tendencies in some countries and the generation of domes-

tic confrontational processes, which increase the threat of isolation of the

Islamic communities there.

Alongside the traditional Turkish influence over the Muslim communi-

ties in the peninsula, exercised within the frame of moderate local Islam,

the presence of non-traditional and foreign for the region factors was

intensified in the last decades. They originate primarily from Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, etc. This happens mainly

through dozens of non-governmental organisations – as humanitarian aid

(in the form of food and medicines) and financial support, bound ini-

tially by soft conditions (that men should visit regularly mosque services

and women should go out veiled and properly dressed), which later in-

clude the construction of mosques and schools for the study of Quran,

ensuring scholarships for higher religious education abroad, etc. Such are,

for example, the International Islamic Relief Organisation and the Saudi

High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina (expelled from the

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Republic of Macedonia for the dissemination of radical Islam), the “Al

Haramain” Islamic foundation of Saudi Arabia, etc. At variance with the

traditions of Balkan Islam, historically related to Turkey, dozens of young

people have received religious education in the Arab world in the spirit of

a more conservative canon.

It should be noted that for certain countries the external influence of

radical Islam does not necessarily penetrate directly from the Middle East,

but also through channels that are internal for the region – through Bos-

nia and Herzegovina (for Serbia), through Kosovo and Albania (for Serbia

and the Republic of Macedonia).

A number of circumstances contribute to such a penetration in the re-

gion. First, this is the direct result of the wars and the ethnic confrontation

in former Yugoslavia – primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,

where religious affiliation became an element of national delineation and

the formation of a new state identity and where the risk of intensive for-

eign religious influence and unregulated advance of ideas incompatible

with traditional Islam is the greatest. In Bosnia and Herzegovina this pro-

cess was accompanied both by a degree of radicalisation within the Bos-

niak population, and the advance of outside radical religious elements and

military (jihadist) structures, which probably have preserved their presence

even after the end of the hostilities. Other factors for the penetration of

influence that is alien to the region are: the freeing of the spiritual space

from atheist control by the governments and from ideological taboos (in

Albania, the countries of former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey); the with-

drawal by the state from the training of Islamic clerics (Bulgaria), which

brought about their mass training in the Arab countries specified above

through offering scholarships by local organisations but in alien for Bal-

kan Islam traditions; the social marginalisation of certain ethnic groups

(Roma); the political confrontation and the use of Islam as a tool for polit-

ical (Turkey) or ethno-national identification (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

Republic of Macedonia, etc.).

It could generally be stated that the influence of foreign factors in the

region is more discernible in the states where stronger confrontational

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processes are generated and where a more serious domestic dynamics

of delineation and development of the Muslim communities is observed.

Risks of Radicalisation, Influence of the “Islamic State” Ideology,

Recruitment of Jihadist Fighters

The first information about the intensifying propaganda in the region of

fundamentalist ideas and radical Islam (Wahhabism and Salafism) import-

ed from the outside may be attributed to the early 1990’s. Territorially this

tendency is concentrated in the post-Yugoslav space and substantially it

germinated on the objective processes of expansion of the influence of

religion, Islam respectively, among the Muslim population there.

It should be noted that only in Bosnia and Herzegovina domestic

conditions for the penetration of more radical Islamist ideas were cre-

ated earlier, already in the 1960’s. In all remaining states this result-

ed from the processes after the dismantling of the bipolar world. The

influence of radical Islamist ideas (including Wahhabism – with the

advocacy of Sharia rule and the idea of a “holy jihad”) in the Western

Balkans reached its peak after the start of the armed conflict in Syria. It

is much more limited among the traditional, established and integrated

in the respective societies’ Islamic communities, which are more sus-

tainable and resistant against it.

The main channels for the infiltration of radical Islamist ideas in the

region are related to the training abroad of local Islamic clerics (Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait) as well as to the sending of foreign preachers in

the Balkans. Territorially this activity is directed primarily towards the West-

ern Balkans but in a more limited scope concerns Bulgaria too. Available

information indicates that, for a start, penetration is sought in smaller

localities with more isolated and poorer population through the imams in

local mosques, around whom Islamist nuclei are gradually formed. Veter-

ans from the military conflicts in the respective countries or unemployed

young people are mainly targeted. More substantial groups of radical Is-

lam supporters exist only in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo but even

in these countries they remain small and isolated.

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Information varies but it could be assumed that about one thousand

fighters have been recruited for participation in the fighting in Syria and

Iraq – along ethno-religious lines. Assessments indicate that one half of

them came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the rest – from Kosovo and

Albania, as well as a certain number from the Republic of Macedonia

(from the Albanian population) and Serbia (Bosniaks from Sandžak, but

not Albanians from Preševo).

According to public information it is assumed that camps for recruit-

ment and training of Islamist fighters might exist in Bosnia and Herzegov-

ina and Kosovo, and the official Albanian authorities do not exclude the

possibility that in Albania they might have existed too. Timewise this pro-

cess was most articulated in the 2012-2015 period while after that there is

no information of movement of volunteers from the Balkans to the Middle

East. Originally, they joined “Al Nusra” and at a later stage moved into

the ranks if the “Islamic State”. Available information indicates that these

are people under 35 years of age, often related with one another with

family ties (as a result of the strong clan links in these societies). There are

grounds to conclude that there is a certain specificity in the motivation of

the Islamist fighters from the Balkans. One could speak about indoctrinat-

ed jihadists in relation to citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the

ones from the Albanian area are mostly mercenaries whose motivation is

financial and economic.

As a whole the Balkans provided a relatively sizeable contingent of ji-

hadist fighters, originating from the countries, where wars, military action

and conflicts took place in the last two decades. At the same time there is

no reason to assume that at this stage radical Islamist ideas have penetrat-

ed widely the local Islamic communities,

Risks of Terrorist Acts, Related to Radical Islamist Groups

According to most assessments the degree of risk of terrorist acts on the

territory proper of the majority of the Balkan countries is relatively low

compared to a number of Western countries. Exception to a certain de-

gree are the countries with more serious domestic ethnic tensions. But

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in them too, (Turkey in the first place) terrorist acts are motivated not by

radical Islamist ideas but are a result of domestic ethno-national conflicts.

The main risks of radical Islam are related to the returning fighters of the

“Islamic State” in some countries in the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Her-

zegovina, Kosovo, Albania), to the eventual creation of their networks and

attempts at destabilisation of neighbouring countries (Republic of Mace-

donia, Kosovo, Serbia), as well as to their transit. How the local authorities

will deal with the reintegration of the fighters returning from the Middle

East (including also the tracing of those hiding from the authorities, who

present a potential threat for further terrorist activity) will be of paramount

importance for lowering the risk of radical action in the region. For the

time being, however, there is no information of the existence of a critical

mass for the deployment of a jihadist infrastructure in the region.

Measures Against Islamist Radicalisation

Express legislation against the risks of transnational terrorism was adopted

in the majority of countries in the region in the last years and particularly

after 2014-2015. There are several main factors that lead to this: the ter-

rorist acts in a number of European countries, the spread of radical Islamist

ideas from the Middle East, the participation of Islamist fighters from the

Balkans in the fighting there and their return after the territorial defeat of

the “Islamic State” and, last but not least, in response to the public opin-

ion concerns about an eventual infiltration of Islamist fighters through the

refugee and migrant channels.

Legislative measures were adopted in a number of countries in the re-

gion (Albania, the Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria) incriminating

the advocating of radical ideas. Substantially, this legislation encompasses

two spheres – the fight against terrorism and the prevention of radicalisa-

tion and extremism. The measures include criminal prosecution for actions

like the recruitment of volunteers, financing the propaganda of radical

Islam (Kosovo), ban on the participation in armed conflicts outside the

country, etc. In some countries there are already cases of court convictions

on this basis of persons whose activity had been at variance with these

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laws, as well as prohibition of the operation of religious structures advo-

cating radical Islam.

In most countries serious attention is paid to prevention, focusing on

attacking the causes for this phenomenon. Internal consolidation of so-

cieties, prevention through the education system, improvement of social

and economic conditions and, in particular, social security and the pros-

pects for young people are of significant importance in this respect. It is

the social sphere, however, that will continue to be the most vulnerable in

the future, generating alienation, aggression and radicalism.

The authorities in the counties with a more serious presence of political

Islam (Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina) are also taking adequate measures

against the spread of radical ideas in order to prevent both destabilisation

of the state and a shift of political attitudes beyond government control.

Certain specificity here stems from the fact that state authorities are in-

clined to tolerate the expansion of the influence of religion as a means to

consolidate society, i.e. when they feel domestic or foreign threat, but, at

the same time they take serious measures for the elimination of possible

external influence: because then the risk by radicalisation comes to the

forefront and threatens the local governments themselves – both as a ve-

hicle of the interests of external factors and as a generator of a domestic

political counterweight.

Governments try to maintain good institutional cooperation with the

Muslim communities in all countries of the peninsula, based on the un-

derstanding that the struggle with radical Islam may be successful only

in an alliance with the wider Muslim communities. They rely on the fact,

that public beliefs in their overwhelming majority are linked to traditional

moderate local Islam, but active commitment by the religious leaders and

preachers is also sought for opposing radical Islamist ideas. Governmental

political, organisational and financial support for the religious communi-

ties and for their activities is of major significance in this respect. On the

other hand, the internal divisions in the leaderships of the Muslim religious

communities (Serbia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia) har-

bour a certain degree of risk of disorientation of the very communities. In

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several countries (Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia) a stand-off can be

observed between the older and traditionally inclined leadership and the

young more radical generation.

It might be concluded that governments in the region, although not

always sufficiently effective, realise the risks from the penetration of radi-

cal Islamist ideas from the outside and gradually generate the political de-

termination and public support for more decisive measures against them.

Barrier in Front of the Bridge

The analysis suggests that Islam in the Balkans per se is rather a barrier to

the penetration of radical Islamist ideas from the Middle East towards Eu-

rope. It is moderate by nature and there is a longstanding tradition in the

region of coexistence and tolerance among the different religions. In most

countries there is no accumulation of political or religious confrontation in

society, which might create conditions for radicalisation of wider Muslim

communities.

At the same time, both the internal dynamics (national and regional)

and the influence of forces alien to the region indicate the existence of

certain factors, the development of which has the potential to increase

the risk of such a tendency.

As far as interregional processes are concerned, one should take

into consideration the place of Islam in the individual countries. Here one

could add a third group of countries, alongside the ones with prevailing

Muslim population (Turkey, Albania) and those, where it is in the minority

(Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece) – the specific category of countries, which have

acquired their first modern statehood after the collapse of Yugoslavia

(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, The Republic of Macedonia).

In all countries where Islam is the prevailing religion governments take

serious measures to prevent radical foreign influences – in view of preserv-

ing the stability of the state and their own positions in power. This is valid

both for the countries where religion remains practically outside politics

(Albania) and for the ones where Islam is an important political (Turkey) of

even politico-ideological factor (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

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The processes in Turkey as a kind of a ‘buffer” country between the Mid-

dle East and Europe are of key importance for preventing the penetration

of radical Islam in Europe. This to a large extent depends on the ability of

Erdoğan, relying on the “controlled Islamisation” as his political resource, to

contain the process within this frame and to prevent it from acquiring its own

momentum and getting out of control - in case of internal destabilisation

or an international crisis. One should bear in mind that Erdoğan’s neo-Otto-

manism and radical Islam are not strategic allies but are rather competitors:

neo-Ottomanism is a state doctrine with regional application while radical

Islam is a political ideology which aims globally; neo-Ottomanism endeavours

to impose Turkish influence on the neighbouring countries and domination in

the region, while radical Islam is a sufficiently integral anti-Western ideology

aiming to divide and destroy societies from the inside. From this point of view

the Turkish state presents a barrier before the unobstructed proliferation of

radical Islam towards Europe. On certain occasions, however, there is a co-

incidence between neo-Ottomanism and radical Islam – not so much of the

objectives but rather of the adversaries – Assad, the Kurds, etc.

The countries that have acquired their first modern statehood ( Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia) face the difficult task

of blending into a harmonious unity two conflicting processes: on the one

hand – to separate a long-existing common economic, political and cultural

space, to differentiate themselves, to affirm sovereignty, build institutions

and consolidate society – all this inevitably accompanied by a strong dose of

nationalism (especially after the military conflicts that brought about inde-

pendence); on the other hand – to preserve normal inter-ethnic and interre-

ligious relations within the new states. The internal ethnic conflicts in each

one of them harbour dangerous destabilising potential not only for a strong

aggravation of interreligious confrontation but also create conditions for

internal radicalisation and penetration of fundamentalist ideas among the

Muslim population from the outside. Their unstable statehood makes Bos-

nia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and in case of a possible destabilisation

the Republic of Macedonia too, the countries in the region that are most

threatened by infiltration of radical Islam.

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The territorial concentration and compactness of the Islamic commu-

nities in the countries where Islam is not the leading religion (Bulgaria,

Greece, Serbia) create conditions for their additional seclusion and iso-

lation. The main risk factor here is the growing intensity of nationalist

tendencies in both directions: of the majority against the minority and vice

versa – as a reaction to the need for internal cohesion but also as a result

of external interference along ethnic (mainly among the ethnic Albanians

and Turks) rather than religious lines.

As elsewhere in Europe the refugee crisis caused a sharp increase of

nationalist attitudes. However, the optic in the region is different: while in

Western Europe the debate is focused on the stay (accommodation and

integration), in the Balkans it concentrates on prevention (border protec-

tion) and transit. This determines a different kind of attitude towards the

refugees and migrants: there are concerns about security but they do not

grow into hatred against the foreigner and into xenophobia. The fact,

that in the mass public perception there is a sufficiently clear distinction

between the “own” Muslims (who are not regarded as a security threat)

and the “aliens” (about whom fears exist that among them there might

be jihadists) is of a particular importance in this respect.

Analyses indicate that social insecurity is another and a very significant

risk factor for practically all countries in the region. The social consequences

of the rapid transition to a market economy, the high unemployment, the

deindustrialisation, the lack of stable professional prospects and the enor-

mous emigration, especially among the young population, lead to the disin-

tegration of the social fabric in most of the former socialist countries, which

could open floodgates for the penetration of radical movements, including

Islamist ones. Especially vulnerable here are the Roma communities.

It is important to note that neither of the above mentioned internal

problems in the region leads per se to radicalisation of the Muslim popu-

lation. In its entirety, however, they make it more vulnerable to targeted

external influences in case of eventual destabilisation of the countries.

The main risks for the region are related to the possible import of

radicalism under the influence of external factors.

19

The Muslim communities in the Balkan countries, as elsewhere around

the world, are a logical aim for radical Islamists. The targets for export of

fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism may be traced in several direc-

tions. First, to the Islamic majorities: in the states that have obtained their

first independence as a result of ethnic conflicts (Bosnia and Herzegovina

and Kosovo) and also to the public space freed from atheism in Albania.

Second, to the Muslim minorities in the Christian states. Third, to ethnic

minorities (Roma) and marginalised social strata (mainly young people).

Two levels, on which attempts for penetration among the Muslim com-

munities in the Balkans are being made, could be identified at this stage. The

first one is the interference in the traditional beliefs – through transformation

of the moderate version of Islam, which is characteristic for the region, into

a more conservative, scholastic variety, which on the one hand would lead

to the seclusion of the Islamic communities within themselves, and on the

other – would enhance the public perceptions of differentness. The address

here are the local Islamic communities, and the aim is their seclusion and

consolidation. The second level is the attempt to create, on the basis of such

an artificially imported, more fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, a fertile

soil for transformation of the social frustration and alienation, particularly

of young people, into aggression and radicalisation of wider groups. In this

case the address is narrowed to the potential radical elements but the aim is

widened to destabilisation and confrontation of the entire society. There are

no grounds at present to assert that the necessary accumulation is available

among the Islamic communities of the Balkan countries, that might give an

impetus to the cultivation of local radicalism in the region.

Everything said above allows to conclude that so far Balkan Islam as

a whole has played an important constraining role against the transfer of

radicalism from the Middles East to Europe. This tendency, however is not

necessarily irreversible. The internal destabilisation of the countries, the

flourishing of the region’s nationalisms and the transformation of the Bal-

kans into an arena of geopolitical confrontation are key factors that might

increase the risk of the moderate Balkan Islam barrier being lifted for the

penetration of radicalism in Europe.

20

ALBANIA: BOTH A BRIDGE AND A BARRIER FOR ISLAMIC RADICALISM

Bobi Bobev

Confessional Structure of Society – Background and Current State.

Legal Status of the Islamic Community

The current confessional structure of Albanian society has a long history

and was built under the influence of different factors. In the Middle Ages

the boundary between Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity crossed

these territories and the absence of an integrated state in this period

meant also an absence of targeted and centralised policy in the spiritual

field, which contributed to the permanent consolidation of the division

between northern Catholics and southern Orthodox Christians. As far as

the development of society is concerned, it should be underlined that the

family and clan form is deeply rooted in Albanian tradition and dominates

all other influences, including religious ones.

In the second half of the 14th century and during the 15th century the

situation in the Balkans was changed dramatically and for a long time to

come. The invasion of the Ottoman Turks through the Straits towards the

Balkans and the heart of Europe dealt a blow to the existing status quo

and within several decades wiped out from the political map of the conti-

nent the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgarian Kingdom, the Serbian Kingdom

and other smaller entities in the region, including several Albanian princi-

palities. In this case, however, the issue was not just territorial changes or

the emergence of a new and dominating state and political entity but a

general shift of a civilisational nature. The Ottoman Empire, which settled

permanently in the Balkans, was the carrier of a new confession and,

respectively of a different type of culture with all resulting consequenc-

es. Having in mind the medieval age this inevitably meant a collision, or

at least opposition – one of main identification dividers at the time was

religious confession. The new confession found the best soil for adoption

and establishment in the territories of Albania and Bosnia. Moreover, the

religious conversion was exclusively on voluntary terms, forceful impo-

21

sition of Islam was a rare occurrence in the Albanian lands. It could be

assumed that in the 18th century over 50% of the Albanians were already

Islamised, and in the second half of the 19th century the face of Albanian

society from a religious point of view had the value characteristics which

remain lasting to the present day – approximately two-thirds Muslims,

about 20% Orthodox Christians and about 10% Catholics. Such is the

information from the censuses during the 20th century. One should not

overlook another feature, characteristic of the imposition of Islam in the

Balkans – the strong influence not so much of official Sunnism but rather

of the different trends and sects. In general, they were with more liber-

al postulates, more open and more comprehensible for the subjugated

Christians. Among the Albanians most influential and impactful was the

Bektashi sect. In organisational terms the Albanian Muslims belong to the

Caliphate system imposed throughout the entire Ottoman Empire.

In the 19th century, although slightly later than the other Balkan peo-

ples, the ideas of the Renaissance started to penetrate Albanian society

and religious differences did not obstruct this process. Moreover, it is pre-

cisely at the end of that century that a significant figure like Pashko Vasa

aired the thought that the religion of the Albanian was Albanism. It seems

that this formula is valid to the present day, it explains the relationships

between the different beliefs in society. At the end of the 19th century at

any significant event of a national importance, e.g. at the declaration of

an autonomous and independent state on 28 November 1912, represen-

tatives not only of the territories populated by Albanians but of all confes-

sions are in attendance.

The 1920’s were the time when the foundations were laid of the

autonomous modern Albanian religious structures. In view of the undis-

puted priority of the believers in Islam the developments in this communi-

ty are important. In March 1923 at a special congress in Tirana a decision

was made for the separation from the Turkish caliphate and the existing

and functioning today Albanian Muslim Community was established. It

included in its structure central management headed by a Grand Mufti

and regional mufti districts covering the whole territory of the country.

22

It should be pointed out that Albanian Islam both then and in the subse-

quent decades remained traditionally linked with Turkey.

The totalitarian communist regime, established after 1944, dealt a

heavy blow upon all religious structures and confessions. With a decree of

1949 loyalty to the regime was required from all religions and their prop-

erties were nationalised with the exception of the places of worship them-

selves. In this way irreparable damage was inflicted on the influence of the

individual confessions and they were headed by persons close to the au-

thorities. Much more alarming, of course, was the physical annihilation of a

substantial part of the clergy. The confessional structures were debilitated.

In 1967 the so called “Atheist State Act” was adopted with which Albania

became the only country where religion was formally banned. More than

2 100 places of worship ceased to function, a large portion of the buildings

were demolished, others were turned into warehouses, sports halls, clubs.

It may be concluded categorically that during the period of the com-

munist dictatorship Islam – the traditional religion of the overwhelming

majority of the Albanians, not only had no real presence in public and

political life but was severely persecuted and repressed, together with the

other confessions.

“The wind of change” in the 1990’s inevitably reached the Albanian

mountains and set the start of serious disturbances, of gradual overall

transition from a totalitarian regime to parliamentary democracy. Regard-

less of the leading position at the time of the Albanian Party of Labour

(this was the official name of the Communist Party) with a decision of par-

liament of May 1990 the pernicious atheist state act was annulled. Grad-

ually action was taken in several directions – both towards restoration of

the old confessional structures and the places of worship and towards the

return of religious services in people’s everyday life. So, Albania entered

a new stage in its spiritual development, which, however, could not help

being influenced both by the decades-long prohibition of religion and by

the overall spirit of the time and the vicissitudes of the transition.

First, it is proper to clarify the question about the size of the individual

confessional communities in modern-day Albania – including because of

23

the fact that during the entire period of the totalitarian regime and in the

time prior to 2011 no such studies were made. With exact number of the

population of 2 800 138, adherence to the Muslim confession has been

stated by 1 587 608 persons or 56.70% of the country’s citizens, with

2.09% belonging to the Bektashi sect, which means 58 628 Albanians.

The numbers indicate also 280 921 Catholics – 10.03%, and 188 992

persons who have identified themselves as Christian Orthodox, or 6.75%.

In a certain sense this ratio of two-thirds Muslims and one-third Christians

with an almost two-fold prevalence of the Orthodox over the Catholics

differs from the one traditionally accepted and based on information from

the inter-war period. In 2011, however, one can find other interesting and

thought-provoking data. 153 630 citizens of the country have identified

themselves as “believers” without specifying the confession. There are

69 995, or 2.5% atheists, as well as 386 024 Albanians, or 13.79%, who

have not responded to the question. Assuming that there is the respec-

tive number of convinced atheists, there is a reserve of nearly 20% or

about 600 000 people who do not specify religious denomination. This

undoubtedly changes the situation very much and leads towards a certain

type of distortion. Being aware of the attitudes of the Albanians, I believe,

that the Catholics have voted in the most disciplined way and the data

about them are comparatively accurate, while the presence of more Mus-

lims and Orthodox Christians in the two groups in society that have not

specified beliefs is a more widespread occurrence. In this sense the 2:1

ratio between the believers in Islam and Christianity is not far from the

truth also at present. However, it should be taken into consideration that

the matter concerns first of all the traditional adherence to the respective

confessional group and not the active practice of a specific faith.

The Albanian transition actually had its beginnings at the start of 1990

and the country developed for eight years under the old 1976 Constitution.

The majorities governing the country decided to create a sort of a set of

laws named “constitutional”, which would regulate key issues related to

the proper functioning of the state and society under the new conditions.

This was particularly relevant to the prohibition of religious denominations,

24

the destruction of their structures and the persecution of the clergy. The

parliamentary annulment mentioned above of the law on the atheist state

launched a process of reinstating the structures of the main confessions.

Both individual legal acts and the new Constitution adopted in 1998

provide guarantees both for the complete freedom of worship and for the

equality of the different confessions. This entire matter has been resolved

fully within the tradition of the relations between a state that is of a secu-

lar nature and the existing confessions. A particularly important argument

for such assertions is the radically amended course of Albanian foreign

policy after 1990 oriented in the first place towards strategic relations

with the EU, NATO and the USA.

First Attempts to Disseminate Radical Islam in Albania

There was one case, when in the 1990’s Tirana’s international partners

experienced doubts. In December 1992 Albania became a member of the

Islamic Conference Organisation, later renamed to Organisation for Islam-

ic Cooperation. The then president and future premier Sali Berisha was

subjected to reproaches of a different nature: both internal (due to not

coordinating his actions with parliament) and international (due to the risk

of expansion the field of operation of some irregular Islamic structures).

The membership was motivated primarily with financial and economic

arguments and in this respect, disillusionment set in – the investments

from the Arab world turned out to be relatively limited. Politically Albania

lowered the level of its participation in the periodic meetings of the organ-

isation to the level of ambassador in the respective or the nearest country,

which practically meant freezing the membership. If one adds to this the

active integration policy, the full-fledged membership in NATO and the

close relationships with the European Union, the arguments against such

doubts become really convincing.

There were also other reproaches – that in the 1990’s in Albania, report-

edly, training camps for fundamentalists had been organised, that investment

projects of Al-Qaeda had been realised in the country. It cannot be excluded

that individual terrorists visited the country and maybe even hid there illegally.

25

The reason for such a possibility should be sought not in the policy of the Alba-

nian governments but rather in a simpler fact. It is precisely in the last decade

of the preceding century, in the first years of the Albanian transition, that the

country looked badly from the point of view of legality and practical action to

protect the borders, the security of the state and its citizens. The cooperation

with foreign national and international services was insufficiently regulated

and active. Things were gradually changing – such were the requirements of

the international community. One could give practical examples – about arrests

of suspicious persons and their extradition or bringing to justice, respectively,

about confiscation of buildings constructed with funds of suspicious origin.

This process seems irreversible. As for the large number of mosques being

built – there are two explanations here – on the one hand that the Muslims are

the most numerous confessional community and on the other that the Islamic

world has greater resources. Nobody obstructs the construction of new Ortho-

dox and Catholic churches and this is an undoubted reality.

As a matter of fact, in the 1990’s there was one risk factor. At the

beginning of the transition dozens of young people obtained religious ed-

ucation in the Arab world. This was at variance with tradition – Albanian

Islam had always been related mainly to the Turkish one. A small segment

of Muslim believers came into existence who called themselves “the new

sons of Allah”, who stuck more to the conservative tenets and were more

radically oriented. They worship only in one of the mosques in Tirana and

evidently communicate mainly among themselves. I do not believe that

this group of people has any future in Albanian society – even the external

signs as men with the characteristic beards or veiled women are a very

rare occurrence. Besides, a suitable response was found with the opening

in 2010 of the Bedër Islamic University with the active and benevolent

assistance of the state institutions – it will educate the majority of the

future spiritual leaders. Be that as it may, however, both at present and in

the future account should be taken of the existence of such a segment of

Islamic preachers – and their behaviour in the least years has proven this.

It should be pointed out that already in the last years of the 20th cen-

tury the authorities in Tirana undertook successful actions to counteract

26

the attempts to advocate Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in the

country. Four religious structures spreading radical Islam were implicated

for illegal activities in 1998 and they were banned with the respective

court rulings. Among them was a branch of the notorious “Egyptian Is-

lamic Jihad”, against which an investigation is ongoing for committing an

attack against the American Embassy in Tirana.

Following the attacks of 9/11/2001 in the USA Washington practically

declared war on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism worldwide. There

was, of course, the reverse process – of intensification of the forces of ter-

rorism, which undoubtedly broadened the territory of their operation and

waged a consistent global struggle for the hearts and minds of Muslims

in the name of “holy jihad”. This brought about new risks for those Bal-

kan countries where the Muslim confession is dominating, including for

Albania. The government in Tirana categorically declared its participation

in the global anti-terrorist coalition but this was hardly sufficient under

the new conditions. The dominating European notion that the continent

is far away from the outbreaks of conflicts and the risks of terrorist actions

turned out to be an illusion and in a certain sense the European Union was

about to pay dearly for the naïve short-sightedness displayed.

It may be asserted categorically that the government and the polit-

ical class in Albania in general underestimated the threat of the com-

ing activation of fundamentalism and radicalism. The religious tolerance,

traditionally established in society and the absence of serious problems

undoubtedly had a soothing effect, but the dramatic surge of the degree

of tension globally should have been a warning signal. The role of the EU

and the other political factors is not very active either – in the Association

and Stabilisation Agreement concluded in 2006 there are clauses on the

joint fight against terrorism, but the efforts are obviously directed out-

side the country, while prevention activities should be targeted towards

the existing internal threats. Fundamentalism and extremism have still not

started to gain speed and to seek a suitable form for realisation, but there

already are serious symptoms. Only the unsuccessful attempt in 2007 to

establish an Islamist party would suffice as a serious signal – registration

27

was refused due to a flagrant contradiction to the Constitution, besides

the attempt did not provoke serious public interest, but the fact per se

is worrisome. Insufficient attention is paid also to another fact: that the

official structure of Albanian Muslims – the Muslim Community of Albania

has under its jurisdiction between 450 and 500 cult facilities (according

to some sources over 700), but between seven and ten mosques (some

sources place the number at nine) built by Arab foundations and started

operation in the 1990’s are beyond the scope of its administration. Pre-

cisely they will in the coming years be particularly active and will cause

serious problems both to the Community and to the state institutions.

Recruitment of Jihadist Mercenaries from Albania, Public Attitudes

and Measures of the Authorities

Approximately at the same time one could spot the first instances of the

intensifying propaganda of radical Islam (Wahhabism and Salafism) in

some regions of the country – Pogradec, Librazhd, Elbasan, Bulchiza, and

later precisely from them the main number of volunteers for the Middle

East was recruited. Be that as it may, until the dramatic development of

the civil wars in Syria and Iraq there was no serious information of partic-

ipation of Albanian citizens in these developments, neither of their pres-

ence in this region. If there are such cases, they are isolated and are rather

an exception. The first reports of the special services about departures to

the region of the Middle East were from 2012.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be pointed out that at that time the

Albanian authorities gave an example of an adequate reaction to the emerg-

ing events. At the end of 2011 there were legislative amendments allowing

investigation and criminal prosecution of citizens for participation in armed

conflicts abroad. It soon became clear, however, that such acts were not in

a position to prevent both the intensifying propaganda and the departure of

volunteers to the Middle East. And here once again one is faced by a case of

looking outside, of fighting the consequences and not the causes.

Should one assume that the high point of the problem refers to 2013-

2014, it would be proper to outline the situation in the country and the

28

factors impacting in the direction of risk and destabilisation. Here one

should point first to the overall social and economic situation with low

growth rates and high levels of unemployment. It is indicative that in a

later poll 41.3% of the respondents indicated as the main reason for suc-

cumbing to religious propaganda the existing poverty in the country, an-

other 21.1% believed that the departure of volunteers for the wars in

Syria and Iraq was motivated by “financial reasons”. 12.6% of the poll

participants saw as an important reason ideological influence and 10%

specified the opportunity to obtain religious education. All this demon-

strates unequivocally that social and economic factors are determinative

for the spread of radical ideas and the recruitment of volunteers for the

wars in the Middle East. Another major feature is also symptomatic – the

travellers to Syria and Iraq are predominantly from the rural areas or the

underprivileged outskirts of the bigger towns. An indication for the public

attitudes in Albania in relation to the likelihood of religious confrontation

is the categorical opinion of 84.3% of Albanian citizens that there is har-

mony among the religions in the country while of the opposite opinion

are just 7.8% of the population. And more indicative figures – in 2015

53.6% approved the participation of Albania in the fight against religious

extremism, 20.3% expressed partial agreement, while 18% were against.

It is obvious that the public in general opposes radicalism and vio-

lence and is in favour of measures against their proliferation. Undoubt-

edly this encourages state institutions to act in the same direction – all

the more so, that by 2013-2014, i.e. at the peak of the enlistment of

Balkan volunteers with the jihadists, the participation of Albanian cit-

izens in combat actions was beyond any doubt. And if in the period

before 2013 they were primarily focused on Al-Nusra, subsequently the

overwhelming majority joined the ranks of the “Islamic State”. Around

that time again it became clear that the advocating of fundamentalism

and radicalism was gaining ground and in 2014 brought the foreign

minister Ditmir Bushati to the admission that jihadist training camps may

exist on Albanian territory. This is confirmed by information of the police

that at least in two mosques the religious activity was combined with

29

military training. Particularly notorious was the one in Mezez, close to

Tirana, whose imam Budzhar Hisa had actively campaigned in favour

of the “Islamic State”. He was believed to have ensured personally the

recruitment of over 70 volunteers for the war in Syria.

The fact that precisely the 2013-2014 period was the peak of the

enlistment of mercenaries from the Balkans in the ranks of the “Islamic

State” is beyond doubt. The information about their precise number vary

according to different reports and studies, but it might be said that by

the end of 2014 the “Balkan volunteers” were between 700 and 1000,

and among them the Albanian citizens were between 140 and 150. Of-

ficial Albanian sources specify the number at 114 by June 2015. These

were people predominantly of the 31-35 age group, often with a crimi-

nal record and having family relationships. It may be stated categorically

that their main motivation for joining the basically terrorist structures of

Al-Nusra and “Islamic State” was financial and economic, i.e. they were

mercenaries and not people overwhelmed by religious fervour.

By that time the process of returning volunteers was already well un-

der way and by the end of the year their number reached 40 persons, 15

of them were in hiding from the authorities and represented a potential

threat of further terrorist activity. A poll from this period studied the public

attitudes on the question of the status of the returning jihadists. It is indic-

ative that over half of the Albanians - 51.9% - were of the opinion that

the returnees should be reintegrated in society, while 24.3% thought that

they must obligatorily serve a term of punishment. According to available

information it is from 2015 on, that the stream of Albanian volunteers to

the Middle East practically ceased – this was due both to the developments

there and to the measures undertaken by the authorities. It is believed that

in the same 2015 only one jihadist from Albania departed to Syria and Iraq,

while in 2016 and 2017 there were no records of such movement. A role

was played also by the fact that the judicial system already reacted ade-

quately and was undertaking prosecutions in the spirit of applicable law.

The country was undoubtedly facing new circumstances – the return

of the volunteers from the Middle East and this development was accom-

30

panied by multiple and serious risks for the public and the state. Because

jihadists on their own territory may be particularly dangerous in several

fields - spread of radical Islam, terrorist activity, maintenance of contacts

with the returnees from the neighbouring countries, particularly Kosovo

and Macedonia. In this relation the authorities acted adequately and took

a number of measures.

A regional conference on the problems of countering radical Islam

and the fight against terrorism was held in Tirana in June 2018. The Alba-

nian deputy-minister of the interior outlined the overall approach of the

authorities and the forthcoming actions in this respect. A very repressive

law directed against radical Islamism and terrorist activity was adopted

back in 2014. It envisaged measures like criminal prosecution, withdraw-

ing the possibility to travel, criminalisation of travels to areas of military

activities, criminal prosecution after the return from there. This law actual-

ly deepened and made more detailed the ban on participation in military

activities on foreign territory adopted in 2011. An amendment was made

to article 230 of the Penal Code envisaging imprisonment of 15 years for

involvement in terrorist activity, including through spreading panic among

the population, and the same punishment for financing terrorist struc-

tures. In compliance with Resolutions 1267 and 1373 of the UN Security

Council Albania adopted and implemented a number of measures in the

international field related to the active combat against terrorist activities

and the attempts to advocate radical Islam.

A National Inter-Sectoral Strategy and an Action Plan were adopt-

ed in 2015 which envisage the implementation of a series of measures

preventing violent extremism by identifying the communities which may

fall under radical influence and which use education and employment

as methods to exert influence, including for the recruitment of terrorist

groups. Besides, the strategy identified the cooperation with partners on

local, national and international level through state agencies involved in

this field, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, religious

communities and the media as an important step in the fight against vio-

lent extremism both inside the country and abroad.

31

This strategy takes account also of the general change in the situation in

view of the process of volunteers who had participated in the conflicts in the

Middle East and had started to return, some of them accompanied by their

families. Earlier, a key element was the raising of obstacles to the possibility

of radicalisation and recruitment of individuals by terrorist organisations but

nowadays at the centre is the question of the reintegration of these persons.

As of now a plan has been approved for inter-institutional action for meeting

and dealing with Albanian citizens returning from the conflict zones in Syria

and Iraq and in parallel with it a draft government decision has been drawn

up for their reintegration. In addition, the structures of the Anti-Terror Direc-

torate of the national police perform their duties pursuant to the plan on the

measures for monitoring the returnees from the Middle East conflict zones

and other citizens, for proving and control over the activities of individuals

and groups, which appear to have terrorist and extremist inclinations that

may lead to terrorist actions of Albanian or foreign citizens. Prevention, de-

tection and combatting any criminal activity originating in Albania is a priority

in the fight against terrorism after 2017 through enhancing cooperation and

coordination of the national structures of the police, the serious crimes pros-

ecution authorities and the regional prosecution offices, the Intelligence Ser-

vice, the Republican Guard, the Prison Directorate and all institutions whose

activity has any relation to the fight against terrorism.

One of the main elements in the work of the government structures

and the special services is the enhancement of the cooperation with the

strategic partners from the USA (FBI and CIA), with the respective structures

from the countries in the region, with police missions accredited to the

country’s police as well as the security offices of the embassies accredited in

Albania, in order to ensure the required monitoring of terrorism on the ter-

ritory of Albania of Albanian and foreign citizens suspected of participation

in armed conflicts abroad, as well as of individuals with a potential to pres-

ent a threat to the country. The cooperation of the national police with the

National Centre for combatting violent extremism takes place through the

structures of the Public Security Department and its work is very dynamic.

Aware of the great role of prevention in the field of terrorism among the

32

different communities, the Public Security Department has specified the

duties and responsibilities of the employees and amongst the tasks of the

greatest importance is the detection of individuals with extremist, radical or

terrorist behaviour tendencies and the exchange of information about the

persons of this category with the “Anti-Terror” Directorate. Special train-

ing and events for preventing radicalism and violent extremist phenomena

are organised in cooperation with the leaders of the Security Academy,

the Public Security Department, the Sector for communication with public

media. The organisation of prevention aims at enhancing the capacity of

all police offices primarily in the field of detecting the signs of emerging

violent extremism, of being able to identify them, to link them to the rele-

vant clauses of the law and to be able to cooperate with other institutions

in order to overcome the existing challenges.

It is undoubted that Albania has a clear vision that the risks for the coun-

try and the public are far from exhausted by a single success of the interna-

tional community against the “Islamic State”. And if at the initial phase of the

outside pressure upon the Balkans the Albanian authorities were insufficiently

adequate and acted with substantial delay in relation to the attempts at radi-

cal Islamist propaganda and at recruitment of volunteers for Al-Nusra and the

“Islamic State”, at present Albania acts with resolution and determination

and may serve as an example in this respect. No peace of mind is allowed

by the fact that Albania according to some studies is not directly threatened

by terrorist acts on its own territory and is in the same risk group as Bulgaria,

Romania, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, as opposed to Kosovo and

Bosnia and Herzegovina where the degree of risk is higher.

It should be pointed out that the country’s authorities have the advan-

tage in this respect of working in very favourable conditions from the point

of view of the public attitudes and the possibility to receive actual support.

The polls results, that 83.7% of Albanians disagree with the ideology of

the “Islamic State” and that approximately the same is the percentage of

citizens of the opinion that under no circumstances they should join its

structures, are of the utmost significance for a Balkan country, in which

almost two-thirds of the population is practicing Islam.

33

Of course, there are also other respects in which the state should

invest the necessary efforts. First, the coordination with the work of the

Muslim Community should be improved and its efforts to obtain control

over the mosques beyond the reach of its administration and the teach-

ing of theological disciplines in the country should be supported. For the

sake of justice, it is the state which should do what is needed in order to

restitute all properties claimed by the Muslim Community – in Albania this

issue is not resolved definitively. The media and the academic communi-

ty should also play their preventive role. Credit should be paid and the

fact should be reminded that it was the Muslim Community, particularly

during the peak of the events in 2013-2014, that acted in a sufficiently

determined way against the advocating of radical Islam and appealed cat-

egorically that what was happening in the Middle East and the behaviour

of the “Islamic State” there had nothing to do with true faith and its te-

nets. One should not underestimate also the presence of the Islamic Com-

munity in the so-called Interreligious Council where discussions are held

on extremism and the behaviour of the “Islamic State” and the negative

conclusions are made public knowledge and enjoy government support.

Such approach is fully within the spirit of Albanian religious traditions.

Conclusions

And finally, if one looks for an answer to the main question – whether

the Balkans are a bridge or a barrier to radical Islam, one should take

into consideration all that has been said so far. If taken for granted, it is

the Muslim communities in the Balkans that are the nutrient medium for

advocating fundamentalism and extremism. In this respect there is a risk

that the region may turn out to be a bridge for the penetration of radical

ideology. At the same time, especially in Albania, the government and

religious structures and the public attitudes are sufficiently clearly oriented

in the opposite direction – towards raising a real barrier for such phenom-

ena – alien to religious traditions and the primary political objectives of

the country, and corresponding to the international requirements. Simply

both of them should continue to adhere to the same behaviour.

34

ISLAM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Lyubcho Troharov

History, General Characteristics, Place and Role of Islam in Bosnia

and Herzegovina

In order to determine the place and role of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegov-

ina today, an unprejudiced look is required on the history of the country

and specifically on the relations between the confessional communities

formed on its territory. Numerous historic documents indicate categorical-

ly that on the territory of medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina cohabitated

Slavs – Christians under the influence of three churches – Catholic, Ortho-

dox and the so-called Bosnian Church. It is maintained that the Bosnian

Church was formed due to the specific conditions in which the population

of Central Bosnia lived, as well as on account of its distance from the big

Catholic, respectively Orthodox, centres which suggests lesser influence of

Catholicism and Orthodoxy over this territory. There are studies of serious

scholars from the Balkans (Croats, Bulgarians, Bosnians) and beyond, who

think that this territory offered the necessary favourable conditions to the

Bogomil heresy (known in the West as Patarini) coming from Bulgaria, of

which there are traces even today, mainly in the mountainous part of Cen-

tral Bosnia and Southern Herzegovina. These traces are the big Bogomili

tombstones called by the local population “stechki”. The biggest number

of them, well preserved today, are in the Bjelašnica mountain and in the

region of the town of Stolac. The presence of three confessions persisted

regardless of which bans or kings governed the territory of present-day

Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the incessant aspirations of Cathol-

icism and Orthodoxy to expand their influence.

With the final conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Ottomans

(1463) and its transformation into a border front zone, the Islamic religion

settled in with its sharia canons, strong administration, large army garri-

sons. The widespread view among historians is that in the first decade of

Ottoman occupation of Bosnia mass conversion was carried out of the

Christian population to the Islamic faith. It is believed that the first to be

35

converted were the leaders of the poor mountainous population, which

had remained under the influence of the Bogomil heresy. Mass conversion

to Islam was noted also of the peasants – farmers and livestock breeders,

who were forced to work for the beys coming from the East. Islam found

fertile soil also among the town population, which was looking for a more

favourable status with the adoption of the new religion, ensuring access

to military service or to the administration of the Empire.

The first madrasa in Bosnia and Herzegovina was opened in Sarajevo in

1537 by Gazi Husrev Beg, bearing his name, which in the course of almost

five centuries has trained imams from the local Bosniak residents. With its

settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina Islam acquired a privileged status in

relation to the Christian Churches, which however, preserved their existence

and influence among the local population. The parallel existence of the

three confessions, permitted by the Ottoman authorities, allowed the for-

mation in the course of several centuries an attitude of tolerance among the

representatives of the different confessional communities, their free move-

ment and communication on everyday level and freedom of settlement in

hamlets, villages and towns. For a long time on the territory of Bosnia and

Herzegovina a dominating influence for the status and relationships among

the population had the faith and not the ethnicity. According to certain

academics this fact was taken into consideration by a large contingent of

Sephardic Jews after their expulsion from Spain and they settled in Bosnia

and Herzegovina where they enjoyed good reception.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the withdrawal of its army as

well as the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in

1878 had a profound fateful significance for the Bosniaks and for Islam as

a confession. What was most important was that they lost their privileged

status in relation to the Christian Churches of the Croats and the Serbs.

The new authorities, taking into consideration the complicated political

situation in the occupied territory and the threat of the occurrence of

conflicts on ethnic and confessional basis, and intent to terminate any

influence upon the Islamic community from the outside, took measures to

reform its leadership and functioning.

36

The emergence of the nationalistic forces in the Balkan states and

primarily in Serbia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cen-

turies reflected upon the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serb

national doctrine, including the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within

the boundaries of the Serbian sate, fell on fertile soil among the intellec-

tuals, the Orthodox Church, organisations and associations of the ethnic

Serbs. Croat nationalistic parties and associations, still operating within

the border of Austria-Hungary, also had strategies for annexation of Bos-

nia and Herzegovina to the future Croatian state. At the foundation of the

claims of Serbs and Croats to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina lay

the notion that the Muslim Bosniaks were ethnic Serbs, respectively ethnic

Croats, who had converted to Islam in the past.

After WWI under the conditions of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes and in particular after 1929 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Bosnia

and Herzegovina became a field of ideological and political confrontation

between Serbs and Croats. From the point of view of the King’s regime and

the Serb Academy of Sciences the Bosniaks were ethnic Serbs, who had

become estranged in terms of ethnicity and confession, had become Turki-

sised, and should be evicted from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The programme

of the Serb Cultural Club (1937), drawn up by elite professors and academ-

ics, attests to this, as do the agreements that the Kingdom concluded with

Turkey for the resettlement of the Bosniaks. As a result, hundreds of thou-

sands of Bosniaks from Bosnia and Herzegovina were resettled in Turkey.

Pursuant to this programme colonisation was carried out with Serb ethnic

population in Bosnia, as well as in Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Independent Croa-

tian State (NDH) during WWII created the conditions for mutual annihilation

among Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs, for the establishment of concentration

camps and genocidal acts. Bosniaks were mobilised in support of the Croa-

tian Ustashe forces – the notorious “Handzar” Muslim Division was formed.

The King’s forces joined the inter-ethnic confrontation on the territory of

Bosnia and Herzegovina with the so-called chetnik movement of Draža Mi-

hailović and the partisan resistance led by the Yugoslav Communist Party.

37

After WWII under the conditions of a totalitarian regime and the new

ideology Tito attempted to pacify the Serb and Croat nationalistic forces

and to establish an ethnic balance in the leading bodies of the Union of

Yugoslav Communists, the state administration and the federal entities.

In the course of two decades not a single nationalistic expression was

allowed. At the beginning of the 1960’s the Serb domination in the state

apparatus, the army, the police and in the security services became appar-

ent and this caused displeasure in the republics – Croatia, Slovenia, Bos-

nia and Herzegovina and the autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina.

For the growing political tension in the country Tito accused Aleksandar

Ranković – the leader of the Serbian communists, minister of the interior

and head of the security services after the war, who adhered to the Great

Serb idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Vardar Macedonia,

Kosovo and Vojvodina were part of the exclusive Serb ethnic territory and

as such should be governed by a Serb administration. Under the influence

of his Croat and Slovene circle Tito took a radical step – removed Ranković

from all positions for exceeding his authority and ordered the drafting of

a new constitution of the Federation. It was adopted in 1974 with the

hope that it would cement the “brotherhood and unity” of the Yugoslav

peoples and nationalities. Unfortunately, it was precisely this Constitution

that opened the way for the development of processes in the state and

the individual federal entities, which led to the disintegration of the feder-

ation in the beginning of the 1990’s.

The political system and prevalent ideology established in Yugoslavia

after WWII and the growing atheism in society dealt a heavy blow on the

Islamic confession. In spite of the fact that already in the first Constitution

of the state (1946) there was an article obliging the state to respect re-

ligious freedom, laws were adopted, one after the other, banning sharia

courts, wearing hijab, primary Islamic schools (maktab). The activity of cul-

tural associations (“Gajret” and “People’s Hope”), of the Muslim printing

shop and the publication of Muslim textbooks. Many of the 119 mosques

that had been destroyed during the war were transformed into museums,

warehouses and even stables. Most of the waqf properties were nation-

38

alised and passed under the control of the state. A number of Muslim

graveyards were destroyed or transformed into parks or construction sites.

The Muslim Bosniaks tried to resist this policy of the Union of the Yugo-

slav Communists. Until the 1950’s the organisation “Young Muslims” was

active but its members were persecuted and punished by imprisonment

(among them was the future leader of the Muslims Alija Izetbegović). Is-

lamic texts were distributed secretly and children were taught in mosques

with imported textbooks. Dervish groups also operated in private homes.

While in the ranks of the anti-Fascist resistance the Bosniaks accepted

to be treated by Serbs and Croats just as Muslims, after the war in the Re-

public of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal entity, they, falling under the

pressure of Serb and Croat ideology and propaganda, were compelled to

identify themselves as “unidentified”, “Serbs”, “Croats”, “Yugoslavians”,

depending on political, social, economic or purely domestic interests.

At the end of the 1950’s – early 1960’s, due to Tito’s ambitions to play

a leading role in the Movement of the Nonaligned Countries, an act was

adopted which guaranteed religious freedom to all citizens. It was believed

that this was a propaganda gesture specifically aimed at the Islamic Com-

munity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic world and in particular –

Egypt. It was no coincidence that the education of the theology students

was redirected from NATO’s Tukey to nonaligned Egypt.

In 1968 at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Yugo-

slav Communist Party a decision was made to give Muslims ethnic and

national identity. This decision was legitimised with the Constitution of

1974 and the Muslims became a “state-forming” people on equal footing

with the Serbs and the Croats. Although they received the ethnic identity

“Muslims” as a constitutional definition, in practice the Serbs and Croats

did not recognise this self-identification of theirs as an ethnos, history and

culture. They were not given the right to form their own national institu-

tions, to declare their history and literature.

Divisions emerged among the Bosniaks, in their political elite, the in-

tellectuals and the academics on the views regarding the conceptual ques-

tion about what their true ethnic identity was. For some it was the Slavs,

39

for others – the Muslim confession (on this occasion an anecdote was

spreading in Sarajevo: “born Muslim – atheist by faith”).

Tito’s death (1980) and the appearance of the Memorandum of the

Serbian Academy of Sciences on the Serb national question and the Serb

statehood (1987) exacerbated to the utmost the political, ideological and

inter-nation contradiction on a federal level and within the individual

federal entities. A decisive factor for the formation of the new situation

became the policy of the Serb leader Slobodan Milošević, based on this

Memorandum, at the core of which was the Great Serb claim that Yu-

goslavia was a Serb sate and that Serbia was everywhere where Serbs

lived. The last war, however, showed that the Serb claims included half

of Croatia, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo

and Vojvodina (Milošević avoided publicly to include also Vardar Mace-

donia). In response to this Serb policy the ethno-national programmes of

the Slovenes, Croats, Macedonists, Albanians and Hungarians were acti-

vated. The Croatian ethno-national agenda included the claim that 80%

of the Bosniaks were Croats (Franjo Tuđman, 1996). The top politicians

of the Bosniaks came to the conclusion that the clash between Belgrade

and Zagreb threatened the very existence of the Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, of the Bosniaks themselves and Islam as a religion. This was

the reason why Alija Izetbegović in 1990 officially made public the well-

known “Islamic Declaration” (there is evidence that the declaration had

been drawn up already at the end of the 1960’s). Special attention deserve

the following important positions in the Declaration: Islam is incompatible

with non-Islamic systems, there can be neither peace, no mutual coexis-

tence between the Islamic faith and the non-Islamic social and political

institutions; insisting on its right to organise its own world, Islam excludes

the possibility that any foreign ideology on its territory would have the

right or possibility to operate; the state should be an expression of the

moral principles of the religion and should support it.

In the specific situation of this period the declaration received strong

support from different strata of the Republic’s population, from repre-

sentatives of the administration, senior officers in the army and the po-

40

lice as well as the supreme leadership of the Islamic Community. At the

same time prominent intellectuals, representatives of the academic and

cultural circles opposed the declaration because it denied the Bosniaks

the legitimate right to struggle for preservation of the integrity of Bosnia

and Herzegovina and ensuring equal and uncontested rights for all eth-

noses and confessions.

On their hand, the authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb, with their

intention to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, about which later specific

agreements were negotiated, used the declaration as key evidence of

the Muslim threat in the Balkans and in Europe, of the civilisational in-

compatibility between Islam and Christendom. A propaganda tactic was

adopted to persuade the Bosniaks that Bosnia and Herzegovina had no

right to existence and that they had to resolve their national question

through a national state. At a trilateral meeting of Tuđman, Milošević

and Izetbegović (25 March 1991 in Split) Izetbegović was told that Bos-

nia and Herzegovina cannot survive within its existing borders, that it

must disappear as a colonial creation and that a small Islamic state could

be a buffer zone between Serbs and Croats. According to available evi-

dence Izetbegović expressed agreement in principle to the formation of

“Small Bosnia” around Sarajevo. At the same time some representatives

of the great powers in their endeavours to find a peaceful and quick

solution of the issue at the lowest possible price expressed agreement

with the formation of a “Muslim republic”.

The Islamic Community – Leadership, Legal Status, Operation

After WWII with the first Constitution of socialist Yugoslavia of 1946 the

Islamic Community received rights equal to the ones of the Catholic and

Orthodox Churches. Such rights it received also with the subsequently

adopted constitutions in the 1960’s and 1970’s, as well as with the last

one, adopted in 1974. The Community’s activity encompasses 94% of the

territory of the republic and includes the Muslim Bosniaks, who comprise,

according to official data, 44% in 1991 and 50.11% in 2013 of the pop-

ulation of the country.

41

The hierarchical structure and activities of the Islamic Community are

based on rules established already by the Austria-Hungarian authorities.

Elections are held for the leader – Grand Mufti or Reis (Reis-ul-Ulema),

for the collective governing body – Riyasat, as well as for regional imams.

The aim of the rulers was to make the status of the Muslim denomination

equal to the one of the other two Churches, to sever the influence and

interference of foreign Islamic centres upon the Islamic Community, par-

ticularly from Turkey, and ultimately, to reassert traditional Islam, capable

of coexistence with the Christian population in the Empire.

As an independent state after 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina has

signed an agreement with the Holy See on the functioning of the Catholic

Church and with the Republic of Serbia – on the activity of the Orthodox

Church but still has no agreement with the Islamic Community due to

procedural complications. According to available information a draft has

been drawn up and proposed for approval by the state parliament.

The leadership of the Islamic Community communicates normally

with the authorities on different levels in the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina and rather rarely with the ones in Republika Srpska, mainly

on issues related to the construction and renovation of mosques and the

maintenance of waqf properties. The relations of the Islamic Communi-

ty with the state depend largely on the personality and character of the

Grand Mufti, on the positions he supports publicly in defence of the Mus-

lim’s interests and the relations with the other confessional communities.

A so-called Interreligious Council was created after the war which com-

prises the leaders of all denominations. They meet periodically and discuss

issues of common interest – primarily of property or financial nature.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) became an import-

ant factor for the mobilisation and politisation of the Islamic Community.

Its collective leadership, the Grand Mufti and a large part of the regional

imams supported the ideas of Alija Izetbegović, laid down in the “Is-

lamic Declaration”. The Islamic Community played an important role for

the creation of the Muslim Army. It helped in the recruitment of people

through sermons (khutbah) in local mosques and in ensuring financial

42

resources and weapons from abroad, using its international contacts. It is

undoubtful that it assisted the arrival and participation in the war of the

mujahedeen. Seeing, however, the threat of a military defeat of the Bos-

niaks and its tragic consequences, as well as the hesitant involvement of

the international actors for stopping the war, the leadership of the Islamic

Community accepted the idea of a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina

with the formation of small independent Muslim state – called “Muslim

Fraction”. A small number of imams together with intellectuals, cultural

figures and politicians outside the circle around Izetbegović favoured the

preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the belief that their destiny

was inseparable from the destiny of this state, that its division in ethnic

parts would mean ghettoisation of the Muslim Bosniaks and that the

neighbouring states would continue with new territorial claims (the NGO

“Bosnia International Forum” established in 1993 by leading intellectuals

is known for its activity).

In its contacts with Islamic states during the war (Turkey, Saudi Arabia,

Malaysia, Iran, Jordan) the leadership of the Islamic Community sought

political and financial support for the Bosniaks and, more specifically, as-

sistance for the construction and renovation of Islamic and historic mon-

uments in the country. The greatest support was received from Turkey. It

provided funds for the construction of the Madrasa and the library to it in

Sarajevo, for the renovation of türbes, bridges and hammams, built already

during the time of the Ottoman Empire. This gave the Islamic Community

higher self-confidence, its leadership started to defend openly the Bosniak

political leadership and the Islamic religion and to deplore the aggressive

policy of the neighbouring states. At the same time, it opened itself more

resolutely to the outside, seeking contacts with government institutions

and the public, with Islamic communities in Sandžak and the Republic of

Macedonia, with international organisations. It also opened itself to the

inside – for the solution of its own problems, initiating talks and debates

on the religious and secular principles of education, the need for training

its own personnel, the new curricula of the Madrasa, the question of the

foreign Islamist influence and the preservation of the traditional Islam of

43

the Bosniaks. Among the leadership of the Islamic Community prevails the

view that no foreign influence, which might endanger the “existence of

the tenets of traditional spirituality or the institutional Islamic teaching”

of the Bosniaks, should be allowed (25 August 1997, Reis Mustafa Cerić,

Bosnian Grand Mufti).

Apparently, the closest cooperation with the top Bosniak politicians and

the Islamic Community so far is being sought by Turkey. This is understand-

able from its strategic agenda for relations with the Muslim communities

in the Balkan countries and its position as one of the guarantors for the

implementation of the Dayton agreement and the maintenance of peace in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also from the all-embracing support for the

Sarajevo authorities during the war. Turkey actively supports the member-

ship of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO and the EU, advocates and spon-

sors the participation of the Islamic Community in international Islamic fora.

It declares itself as a strategic partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though

this is not approved by the Authorities in the Republika Srpska.

Political Parties on Ethnic Basis

Almost all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are formed on an ethnic

basis. The ones of the Serbs and Croats are sister parties of and have the

same names as the ones in Serbia, respectively Croatia, but with a stron-

ger nationalistic hue. In their rhetoric and attitude there still exists aversion

to the representatives of the opposite side during the war – persons and

political forces. There are party leaders who had fought at the fronts and

now are in the government of the state at different levels.

The first party of the Bosniaks – Party of Democratic Action, was creat-

ed by Alija Izetbegović immediately before the war. It played the main role

in the formation of the “Muslim Army” and in the negotiating process

for stopping the war and concluding the Dayton agreement of 1995. This

party and its leader had the strongest, almost messianic, influence among

the Muslim Bosniaks during the war and in forming the political status

quo in the country after it. It has dominant positions both in the state bod-

ies and in the cantonal and municipal governments in the Bosniak – Croat

44

Federation. The present leader of the party is the son of Alija Izetbegović

Bakir, currently – member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second significant party of the Bosniaks is the Union for a Better

Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the media mogul Fahrudin Radončić.

The third purely Bosniak party, but comparatively weaker than the two

previous ones, is the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The only party that emerged with claims for multi-ethnic membership

is the Social Democratic Party with leader Zlatko Lagumdžija. Among its

members, besides Bosniaks, is a small number of Serbs and Croats, mainly

former members of the Union of Yugoslav Communists and the pre-war

administration. Its influence among the Bosniaks is negligible and it has

almost no presence in the governing bodies.

All Bosniak parties state as their aims the preservation of the united

and integral state, a new constitution, equality of political, social, eco-

nomic and cultural rights for all ethnoses, membership of the country in

NATO and the EU.

Security, Processes and Threats

The events in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war, as well as the for-

mation and functioning of the state on a federal-confederal principle pur-

suant to the Dayton agreement complicate extremely the internal political

situation. This is exacerbated by the formulated at Dayton and granted

to Belgrade and Zagreb “special relationship” respectively with Republika

Srpska and Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina, which obstructs the nego-

tiation process among the ethnoses for the establishment of stable state

bodies, including army and police, for the demarcation and protection of

the state border and for guaranteeing the security of the citizens. Because

of this Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the state with most serious politi-

cal, social, economic and security problems in the Balkans. Its borders and

territory in general remain vulnerable for penetration of refugees from

conflict areas, as well as persons and groups that might commit terrorist

acts. The risk of internal terrorism, related to radical Islamic groups may

be deemed minimal. This conclusion is justified in particular with the good

45

links and cooperation of the highest political leadership of the Bosniaks

and the Islamic Community with almost all Islamic Countries. The prob-

ability is slight that there might be groups and organisations inside the

country, which wold recruit jihadist fighters returning from the Middle

East or among the local population.

Regardless of the ethnic cleansing during the war in both entities and

the voluntary resettlement and migration the population remains ethnically

mixed on the entire territory of the country and the emergence of such

groups could not remain unnoticed (according to official data of 1991 the

Bosniaks inhabited 94% of the country’s territory, the Serbs – 95%, the

Croats – 70%). Besides, Bosnia and Herzegovina hosts a strong interna-

tional presence, including army and police from NATO and the EU, which

is additional guarantee for the identification and disarming of such groups.

After the year 2000 on the request of the USA and the EU the author-

ities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted jointly with

the EU police mission (EUPM) an inspection for the existence of persons

from the mujahedeen battalion, which had participated in the war on the

side of the Bosniaks against the Serb forces, who had remained in the

country. A small number of persons was identified in several mountainous

villages, who had married local women and were engaged in farming

and stock-breeding. After the inspection monitoring of their behaviour

was started. The Presidency, the government and all political parties and

the leadership of the Islamic Community have made statements that no

presence of any extremist and radical forces will be allowed on the terri-

tory of the country. In compliance with the Stabilisation and Association

Agreement with the EU reforms were carried out in the Bosnia and Herze-

govina army and police for their stabilisation and improving their capacity

to defend on their own the security of the state.

Conclusions

The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its indigenous Bosniak population

and its Islamic confession are a European reality which cannot be over-

looked or eliminated.

46

The Bosniaks and Islam in the centuries-old cohabitation with Serbs,

Croats and other ethnoses, with the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches

have never adopted or followed extremist or xenophobic ideology threat-

ening other ethnoses and religions, different from their own. On the con-

trary, it is they who during long historic periods and in different social and

political environments, have been subjected to discrimination, violence,

hatred and resettlement, and in the last war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(1991-1995) even to genocide.

In its cohabitation with the Christian religions on a common ter-

ritory under the same political regimes and the influence of European

civilisation and culture Bosnian Islam acquired specific characteristics –

peacefulness, openness and tolerance towards other, different religious

communities, which defines it as traditional. It is no coincidence that in

different periods of history Jews, Bulgarians – mainly from the western

borderlands and from Vardar Macedonia, and other ethnoses have been

welcomed in the country.

The appearance of the “Islamic Declaration” (1990) may be consid-

ered a precedent in the history of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an un-

fortunate and short-sighted step of a limited circle of Bosniaks in response

to the aggressive nationalism and the looming threat for the security of

their state emerging in Serbia. In the complex situation immediately pre-

ceding the war it was supported by a substantial portion of the Islamic

community but in the course of the war and after it was rejected. How-

ever, it turned out that the apprehensions were real, since the war which

Serbs and Croats fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina was for the liquida-

tion of this state, for the division of its territory and the formation of a

mini-state of Muslim Bosniaks serving as a buffer zone between the two

ethnoses and between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy.

In the future the place and role of Bosnia and Herzegovina will depend

primarily on the way in which the state will be built, on the preservation

of its integrity and indivisibility, on the possibility for the Bosniaks to have

equal political, social, economic and cultural status with the Serbs and the

Croats, on ensuring the equal participation of the Bosniaks in the forma-

47

tion and functioning of the authorities on all levels, on guaranteeing equal

right to the confessional communities across the country’s territory.

Today the Bosniaks and their parties understand that their rights can be

ensured through amendments in the Dayton Agreement, more specifically

with a new constitution of the state, with authorities on three levels on the

entire territory, elimination of the attempts at separatism and secession-

ism, with the strong guarantee that the Muslim Bosniaks would receive due

rights, which could ensure the admission of the country in the EU.

Ensuring equal status of the three confessions in Bosnia and Herze-

govina is the most important prerequisite for the preservation of the tra-

ditional character of Islam, for its protection from negative development

towards Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

In case of a possible destabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or en-

croachment on its integrity (an attempt at secession by Republika Srpska)

that will affect existential interests of the Muslim Bosniaks, there is no

doubt that Islamic states will respond in its support with forces and re-

sources as they did during the war of 1992-1995, and the danger of pene-

tration in the territory of the country of radical Islamist elements, including

Bosniaks, who have participated in extremist groups in the Middle East

and having returned home, becomes a reality. In an isolated two-million

community, with uncontrolled borders and in serious economic crisis it

would be easy to radicalise persons and groups capable to participate in

terrorist acts in the Balkans and in Europe.

The admission to NATO of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be of key im-

portance for its integrity and stability within its recognised borders, for the

successful functioning of its state institutions because membership per se

may restrict the negative influence of the possibility given to Serbia and

Croatia with the Dayton agreement for special (parallel) relation with Re-

publika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, respective-

ly, which feed separatism and secessionism in all three ethnic communities

and obstruct the dialogue between the political elites and the functioning

of the state institutions.

48

ISLAM IN BULGARIA: MOST MUSLIMS IN BULGARIA PRACTICE TRADITIONAL ISLAM

Prof. Iskra Baeva, PhD

Islam in Bulgaria as a Historic Legacy

The Bulgarian lands, situated in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula, re-

mained the longest under Ottoman rule – for almost five centuries. This

explains the existence in Orthodox Bulgaria of one of the biggest Muslim

communities in the Balkans. According to census data of 1887 the Muslims

were 500-600 thousand or 19% of the population, and in 1926 – 10.57%.

The diminishing share of the Muslims was due to the rapid demograph-

ic growth of the Christian population and the periodic emigration of the

Muslims (130 thousand in the inter-war period). Only the poorest and the

least educated Muslims remained in Bulgaria (illiteracy was 80%) who lived

in the outermost rural areas.

The Muslims in the Bulgarian state preserved their religious autonomy

and the Sharia, they had private schools with education in the Turkish

language with the Arab alphabet, as well as members of parliament from

different parties. An attempt at interfering in their faith was made during

the Balkan wars 1912-1913 when the Bulgarian Muslims2* (the pomaks)

were forced to change their names, but it was short-lived. After the wars

the rights of the Muslims in Bulgaria were protected by the Agreement on

the rights of minorities signed in Paris on 28 July 1919. Another attempt

at integration was made at the end of the 1930’s and the beginning of the

1940’s by the organisation Druzhba “Rodina”.

In the era of socialism, the attitude towards the Muslims in Bulgar-

ia passed different stages. The communist regime was an opponent of

religion and restricted both the Orthodox Church and Islam. Regardless

of this the Orthodox Church and the Muslim confession continued their

activities, which were financed by the state in exchange for strict control.

* Translator’s note. In this text the term “Bulgarian Muslims” denotes Muslims (or Moham-medans, locally called “Pomaks”), who are of Slav ethnicity but have adopted Islam during the Ottoman rule in Bulgaria, as opposed to the term “Muslims in Bulgaria”, which compris-es all Muslims of different ethnic origin – Turks, Bulgarians, Roma, etc.

49

At the beginning of the rule of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)

priority was given to the class approach, according to which special care

had to be taken of Muslims in Bulgaria in the field of education, culture

and social policy. This continued until the destalinisation carried out by

Todor Zhivkov. From the end of the 1950’s he replaced the cultural au-

tonomy of the Muslims in Bulgaria with a policy of integration through

assimilation. This policy was realised with the change of the names of the

Roma-Muslims (about 255 thousand) and of the Bulgarian Muslims (about

200 thousand) in the 1960’s and 1970’s reaching its peak with the forced

renaming of Bulgarian Turks (about 850 thousand) at the end of 1984

and the beginning of 1985, called “revival process”. This drastic violation

of human rights was not accompanied by a change in confession but just

with the restriction of certain rituals – that circumcision had to take place

only under medical supervision, the burial rituals had to be civic, etc. This

policy was terminated after the end of the Cold War. The “revival process”

was annulled on 29 December 1989, the Arab-Turkish names of the Bul-

garian Turks were restored, even without the endings -ov, -ev, -eva, -ova.

Role and Place of Islam in Bulgaria after 1989

Islam in Bulgaria is the traditional religion of the Bulgarian Turks, Bulgarian

Muslims, part of the Roma and some smaller ethnic groups (Karakachans,

Tartars). It is the second confession in the country and its ratio with Ortho-

doxy is 1:7.5 (577 139 or 7.83% Muslims against 4 374 135 or 59.39%

Orthodox in 2011).

The Muslims are free to practice their faith. In the Constitution of the Re-

public of Bulgaria adopted on 12 July 1991 by the Grand National Assembly

freedom of religion is guaranteed. Article 13, paragraph 2 states: “Religious

institutions are separated from the state”, but in article 4 there is a warning

that religion must not be used for political purposes. This was caused by the

disputes in the first years of the transition about the place and role of Islam,

when the consequences of the “revival proves” were being overcome.

The rights and obligations of Muslims are regulated by the Confes-

sions Act of 29 December 2002. It expresses “respect” towards Islam and

50

states the freedom of choice of religious convictions and practices. The

state undertakes to “ensure conditions for free and unimpeded enjoy-

ment of the right of confession” (art. 4, para. 3) and not to allow “dis-

crimination on the basis of faith” (art. 4). The right “to give and receive

religious education in a language of choice” (art. 6, para. 6), while the

restrictions are for activities directed against national security and public

order and for political reasons (art. 7, paras. 1 and 2)

Since 1990 the Muslims in Bulgaria have been rightful participants

in the development of the Republic of Bulgaria but a large section of

the Bulgarian public treats them with suspicion and apprehension. There

are different reasons for this: their active role in political life (during the

first government of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) – 1991-1992);

their domination in several regions of the country; their links with neigh-

bouring Turkey. So, in the new circumstances the confrontation between

Christians and Muslims is being revived, albeit under a democratic political

system and guaranteed rights of Islam in Bulgaria.

The largest Muslim group are the Bulgarian Turks (612 541), the Bulgar-

ian Muslims (131 531), part of the Roma (42 201), the Karakachans (2 556),

the Tartars, the Albanians. A special group are the Arab immigrants from

different periods (between 11 000 and 17 000). They have a different atti-

tude towards Islam therefore should not be regarded as a single mass and

consideration should be given to the judgement who are an obstacle and

who are a vehicle for the penetration of radical Islam in the country

Islamic Communities in Bulgaria

The Islamic communities in Bulgaria have equal rights with the other re-

ligious communities. The Bulgarian state provides material and financial

support to the Muslim organisations. This does not mean that there are no

problems between the Bulgarian state and the Grand Mufti office.

In 2011 the Muslims in Bulgaria were 577 139 or 10% of the believ-

ers. The tendency of the past two decades is the number of Muslims to

drop and this process continues at present. Their numbers diminish abso-

lutely as does the entire population, but also relatively – from 12.2% to

51

10%. The prevalent part of the Muslims in Bulgaria are Sunni (546 004),

while the Shia (27 407) are just 5%. The downward trend for the Muslims

is due to their economic emigration mainly to the European Union and

Turkey. The Muslims emigrate quicker and more successfully than the rest

of the Bulgarians because they have their communities abroad and a suit-

able employment profile (in construction). The drop is biggest (36.5%) for

the Shia, while for the Sunni this figure is just 11%.

The Bulgarian Turks and the Bulgarian Muslims live predominantly

in several regions, while the Muslim Roma are spread evenly across the

country’s territory. The Turks are concentrated in the regions of Kurdzh-

ali (69.6%), Razgrad (53.7%), Shumen, Burgas, Plovdiv. Blagoevgrad,

Targovishte, Smolyan, Silistra, Dobrich and Ruse. Over two-thirds of the

Muslims reside there. They predominate in 43 of a total of 262 munic-

ipalities in Bulgaria, most of all in the seven municipalities of Kurdzhali

region, six of the seven municipalities of Razgrad (excluding Razgrad),

half of the municipalities of Shumen region. The largest share is in Cher-

noochene municipality (Kurdzhali region) – 96.8%, Venets (Shumen re-

gion) – 95.9%, Satovcha municipality – 91.3%, Ruen – 90% and Kaoli-

novo – 90%. The Muslims in Bulgaria traditionally live in the Rhodopes in

the southern part of the country, predominantly in the regions, Smolyan,

Kurdzhalu, Haskovo, Pazardzhik.

Representatives of the Shia Muslims live mainly in North-eastern Bul-

garia: the municipalities Kaynardzha (51.5%), Kotel (16.2%), Dulovo

(11.6%) and Kubrat (11.3%).

The religious leadership of the Muslims is effected by the office of

the Grand Mufti, which takes care of the confession and maintains con-

tacts with the executive, the judiciary, the government institutions and

the public organisations. The office of the Grand Mufti looks after the

training of imams, the free practice of the faith, the religious education

of children and Islamic charity. It has administration which supports the

Grand Mufti and the Supreme Muslim Council. There are regional mufti

offices in 18 cities and towns in the country: Aitos, Veliko Turnovo, Go-

tse Delchev, Dobrich, Krumovgrad, Kurdzhali, Pazardzhik, Pleven, Plo-

52

vdiv, Razgrad, Ruse, Silistra, Sliven, Smolyan, Sofia, Targovishte, Haskovo

and Shumen. There are also 1 450 mosque boards. At the beginning of

the transition the office of the Grand Mufti published the newspaper

“Muslim”, transformed today into a monthly magazine, which has also

a children’s supplement “Hilyal” (Moon).

The Grand Mufti is Mustafa Alif Hadji (from the Bulgarian Muslims),

who has studied Islam in Jordan and Turkey and has occupied senior po-

sitions ever since 1997. The Grand Mufti is elected by a National Muslim

Conference. In 2010 the election of Mustafa Hadji was challenged by the

former Grand Mufti Nedim Gendjev after the Supreme Court of Cassation

declared illegitimate three extraordinary national Muslim conferences. The

dispute was resolved with a ruling by the Sofia Appellate Court, which

recognised the decision of the extraordinary National Muslim Conference

(12 February 2011) and Mustafa Hadji was re-elected also by the subse-

quent conference in January 2016. The disputes demonstrate the prob-

lems within the Muslim confession inherited from the time of the “revival

process”. One of the sides had cooperated with the authorities at the time

as Nedim Gendjev had done, who now accuses the present leadership

that it is supporting the radicals. On the other side are the participants in

the resistance against the “revival process”, who have become members

of the new leadership of the Muslims.

In Bulgarian schools there is an optional subject “Islamic religion”,

which is taught if sufficient number of pupils enrol. In order to support en-

rolment, the Grand Mufti office organises promotion campaigns among

the Muslims during the Ramazan under the slogan “Support Muslim ed-

ucation. Be involved!”

One of the most important activities of the Grand Mufti office is train-

ing religious staff for the mosques and the places of worship which in

Bulgaria are around 1500. This takes place in the three secondary reli-

gious schools in Ruse, Momchilgrad and Shumen, where pupils from the

9th to the 12th grade are taught. There is also a Higher Islamic Institute

in Sofia established after the transformation of the existing college on 9

March 1998 with decision No. P-15 of the Council of Ministers. The site of

53

the Institute describes it as “high school of the Muslim confession (Grand

Mufti office) in Bulgaria with the status of a legal person”, with a term of

education of four years. It awards a bachelor’s degree and qualification

“Islamic theologian” and its alumni may serve as imams, vaizes and muftis

or work as teachers. The problem of the Higher Islamic Institute is the lack

of premises and of accreditation under the Higher Education Act, which

prevents its graduates from finding realisation.

The constant deficit of imams compels the Grand Mufti office to or-

ganise nine-month courses in Sarnitsa, the selection of the boys for it

being conducted by the regional muftis. Imams may qualify and requalify

in courses, held in the villages Lyulyakovo, Bilka and Delchevo.

The Muslim communities in Bulgaria practice freely their religion be-

liefs but their materialisation sometimes brings about organisational prob-

lems and public resistance.

Political Parties on Religious or Ethnic Basis

The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria does not allow the creation of

political parties on religious or ethnic basis. Its article 11. para. 4 stipulates:

“No parties may be formed on ethnic, racial of confessional basis, or par-

ties which pursue forced occupation of state power”. The constitution was

adopted in the summer of 1991 when in the Grand National Assembly sat

the Turkish Muslim party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which

makes clear the context of the prohibition. It aimed at termination of the

existence of the MRF – the first party of the Bulgarian Turks and Muslims in

Bulgarian history. Until then the political practice was that the interests of

the ethnic groups were realised through the existing political parties. And

the creation and establishment of the MRF may be explained with the situa-

tion of 1990 when the political system was being restructured and the need

to overcome the painful consequence of the “revival process” was at the

forefront. The creators of the MRF justified the establishment of the party

with the distrust of the Muslims towards the other parties after the Bulgar-

ian state had violated their rights so drastically. Therefore, they wanted to

have a party of their own, which would defend their specific rights.

54

Already at the beginning the MRF succeeded on two occasions to

prevent the attempts to challenge the existence of the party before the

Constitutional Court (Constitutional case No. 1 of 1991, which ended

with Decision No. 4 of 1992). In subsequent years under the leadership

of Ahmed Dogan, perennial chairman from 1990 to 2013, the MRF re-

asserted itself as the single representative of the Muslims in Bulgaria and

became a constant factor in political life, regardless of the serious negative

attitudes towards it among wide public circles.

According to the documents the MRF is “a liberal-democratic party”, the

aim of which is “to contribute to the unity of all Bulgarian citizens, respecting

the rights and freedoms of the minorities in Bulgaria in compliance with the

Constitution of the country, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities,

the Charter of Fundamental Rights and other international agreements”. Re-

gardless of the stated generally liberal character of the MRF, its political prac-

tice shows that it is a political representative of the Bulgarian Turks and the

Muslims in Bulgaria. This is evidenced by: the membership, the MRF voters,

who are almost entirely from the regions with mixed population, the activity

of the MRF representatives in parliament, in the local authorities and in their

participation in the government of Simeon Saxe Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005),

Sergei Stanishev (2005-2009) and Pamen Oresharski (2013-2014).

Ahmed Dogan managed to attract in the MRF a small group of Orthodox

Bulgarians, who are members of the leadership and of parliament. In this way

he legitimised the party as non-ethnic and non-Islamic, notwithstanding the

fact that the presence of the Bulgarians remains purely formal and does not af-

fect the local structures. The electoral presence of the MRF seemed threatened

after the Bulgarian Turks started to leave Bulgaria in search of livelihood. Then

Dogan oriented the movement towards the Roma (not only towards the Mus-

lim ones but towards all), which helped him preserve the role of the party. MRF

ranks the third political party and until 2009 played the role of a middleman,

on whom the formation of the government depended. This position was lost

under the governments headed by Boiko Borisov (2009-2013, 2014 – present

55

day), but the MRF continues to play an important role in politics as the party

with most stable parliamentary presence due to the secure electoral support by

the Bulgarian Turks and Muslims.

The party is linked with the bodies of the Muslim confession which is ev-

idenced by the constant presence of religious representatives at celebrations,

memorial meetings and other MRF events, as well as of representatives of

the party at important Muslim fora. An example is the National Muslim Con-

ference in January 2016 which approved Mustafa Hadji as Grand Mufti – at

this event members of the MRF leadership were present – Mustafa Karadayi,

Rushen Riza and Yunal Lyutfi.

Attempts at breaking up the monopoly of the MRF over the Muslim

population have been made since the 1990’s but they all have failed so far. In

1997-1999 Guner Tahir established National MRF but it quickly faded away.

In January 2011 the former MRF deputy-chairman Kasim Dal left the party

and on 1 December 2012 established People’s party “Freedom and Dignity”

(PPFD) together with the former leader of the youth MRF Korman Ismailov.

The most successful attempt at splitting the MRF was made by the successor

of Ahmed Dogan in the leadership Lyutfi Mestan (chairman from 2013 to

2015). At the end of 2015 after sharp criticism by the honorary chairman

Ahmed Dogan he was removed from the leadership and on 10 April 2016

created his own party – “Democrats for Responsibility, Freedom and Toler-

ance” (DRFT). Mestan received the support of the Republic of Turkey and

of the Turkish ambassador at the time Süleyman Gökçe, which caused a

negative reaction in Bulgaria and even an unsuccessful attempt was made to

prevent the registration of DRFT. The party created structures and participat-

ed in the 2017 parliamentary elections but with the just over 100 thousand

votes cast for it and 2.86% of the vote failed to enter parliament.

Risks of Radicalisation among the Muslim Community

The risk of radicalisation of the Muslims in Europe and in the Balkans was

outlined after the start of the so-called war on terror in 2001. The process

is global but also a regional one. The consequences of the wars after the

collapse of Yugoslavia, which had also a religious colouring, contributed

56

to the penetration of radical Islam in the Balkans. They nurture a favour-

able environment for Islamisation of the regions populated by Muslims

in the Balkans. The greatest concern is caused by the operation of the

widespread in Saudi Arabia Wahhabi sect.

Bulgaria was neighbouring Yugoslavia, military action was taking

place also on its border, although thankfully did not cross it, therefore the

public environment remained unaffected by the religious conflicts. The so-

called Bulgarian ethnic model also played a role, which in my view should

not be credited to Ahmed Dogan and the MRF, as it is claimed, but to the

historically established inter-ethnic and interreligious relations. But there is

no way that the country may remain aside from the radicalisation of Islam.

The social consequences of the transition to a market economy re-

sulting in deindustrialisation, high unemployment, constant or temporary

labour emigration of a substantial number of Bulgarian citizens, a good

portion of whom are Muslim, open a niche for the penetration of Islam

that is not traditional for the Bulgarian lands. In the difficult situation of

the 1990’s Muslims in Bulgaria began to receive financial aid from Muslim

organisations abroad, which were used to build 150 new mosques. What

is more concerning is that with the absence of strict control from the state

on the Islamic educational institutions such grants were used to establish

also so-called educational centres, through which Wahhabism penetrates.

In 2003 the authorities closed down several Islamic centres because of sus-

picions that Islamic groups financed by Saudis with probable links to radical

Islamic organisations (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) operated in them.

As can be seen, the main threat for the penetration of more con-

servative Islam in Bulgaria are the educational institutions. According to

analysts like Dimiter Avramov, alongside the official Muslim schools, seven

others have been opened, which are not registered and from which about

3 thousand young Muslims have graduated.

An indication for the penetration of radical Islam was the break up

in 2010 of the organisation “Al Waqf-Al Islami”, which operated in the

municipalities Blagoevgrad, Rudozem, Smolyan, Plovdiv, Velingrad and

Pazardzhik and which for eighteen months had received EUR 400 000

57

from Saudi Arabia. The action of the security services brought about the

first in Bulgaria trial against 13 imams, who had studies Islam in Saudi

Arabia. They were charged for distribution of “anti-democratic ideology –

objection to the principles of democracy, separation of powers, liberalism,

statehood and the rule of law, basic human rights, such as gender equal-

ity and religious freedom, through preaching the ideology of the Salafist

trend of Islam and imposing a Sharia state”. The trial began in 2012 and

ended in 2014 but with only one effective sentence for Ahmed Musa

Ahmed, imam of the mosque “Abu Bekir” in the Roma neighbourhood of

Pazardzhik. Two more suspended sentences were issued and the remain-

ing defendants were fined.

The trial in Pazardzik remains an isolated case, which indicates that

there is no immediate threat of radical Islam penetrating among the ma-

jority of Muslims in Bulgaria. The failure of the attempts at their radicalisa-

tion indicates that they were objected by the traditional Muslims and that

they have found fertile soil among the new converts to Islam in the Roma

communities and among the Bulgarian Muslims.

Foreign Influence upon the Local Islamic Communities

Since the main part of Muslims in Bulgaria are of Turkish origin, they feel

related to neighbouring Turkey. This is evidenced by the numerous emi-

gration waves towards Bulgaria’s southern neighbour and, for that matter,

by the words of the MRF leader of late 1991: “Bulgaria’s road to Europe

passes through the Bosphorus”. The historic link of the Muslims in Bulgar-

ia with Turkey becomes a problem for the Bulgarian state lately, when the

secular nature of Kemalist Turkey is questioned by the new leader of the

country Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The influence of Turkey on the Muslims in Bulgaria aims at maintain-

ing a channel of influence on Bulgaria’s policy. This is particularly evident

after the launching of the strategy of neo-Ottomanism, reminiscent of the

common past of the peninsula within the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish

state relies mainly on the MRF – it maintains contacts with the MRF lead-

ership and assists it in the voting of the thousands of Bulgarian citizens

58

living in Turkey, who invariably support the MRF. Gradually, however, the

MRF is emancipating itself from Turkey and is asserting itself as a Bulgarian

party, therefore Bulgaria’s southern neighbour is focusing on the creation

of alternative political formations. In this way the PPFD of Kasim Dal was

born, who in 2013 was present at Erdoğan’s victory rally, and later DRFT

of Lyutfi Mestan, who after his expulsion from the MRF sought protection

in the Turkish Embassy in Sofia. Both political projects do not enjoy great

success although Turkish support for them is ongoing.

The second channel for the influence of Turkey is through the Muslim

religion. With the difficult financial situation of the Grand Mufti office, the

shortage of imams and the lack of state control Turkey started to render fi-

nancial and personnel support through the Turkish Directorate of Religious

affairs (Diyanet). In this way already in the 1990’s with the mediation of

the Grand Mufti office the three Muslim secondary schools, the construc-

tion and maintenance of their buildings as well as the teachers and dep-

uty-directors, sent by the ministry of education of Turkey were financed.

There is Turkish presence also in the Higher Islamic Institute. According

to information by Ahmed Ahmedov, secretary of the Grand Mufti office,

annually 40% or BGN 3 million of the financing of the educational institu-

tions comes from Turkey. In 2016 a list was published of 95 Turkish Islamic

workers who are employed in the mufti offices and the big mosques in

Bulgaria. Because of interference in the life of the Muslims in Bulgaria the

chief coordinator of the Diyanet Adem Jerinde, who was also deputy-dean

of the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia, responsible for appointments and

financing of the Muslim schools, was extradited from Bulgaria.

The Turkish influence over the religious life of the Muslims in Bulgaria

materialises due to the ambiguities in the Confessions Act of 2003. This

caused public debate in particular after the nationalists under the name

“United Patriots” joined the third government of Boiko Borisov in 2017.

Proposals for amending the law were made at that time that would re-

strict the possibilities of foreign influence and raise barriers before the

penetration into Bulgaria of Islamic practices which are alien in Bulgaria.

59

Recruitment of Jihadist Fighters

As opposed to other countries in the Balkans, there is no information

about Bulgarian jihadist fighters in the conflicts in the Middle East. This

does not mean that such a danger does not exist. On 18 July 2012 a bomb

attack was carried out on a bus with Israeli tourists at Burgas airport in

which seven persons died and 35 were injured. It remains the only terrorist

act on Bulgarian territory so far, the perpetrator of which is a foreigner

who had arrived in Bulgaria for this purpose.

Regardless of the fact that the Bulgarian security services have no informa-

tion about Bulgarian jihadists, in 2014 in relation with the trial in Pazardzhik

such suspicions were born. They provoked the Grand Mufti office, which in

the middle of September of the same year condemned the “Islamic State”

and called upon the Muslims in Bulgaria “not to succumb to the provocations

of these people and to dissociate themselves from their actions”.

For the time being the only threat in Bulgaria from jihadist fighters

comes from their transit through the country.

Risk Assessment of Islamist Terrorist Acts

At least for the time being – August 2018 – the risk of terrorist acts

on Bulgarian territory committed by radical Islamist groups is minimal. In

Bulgaria there is no critical mass of people capable of creating a logistic

infrastructure for such actions.

Measures against Islamic Radicalisation after 2000

The developments in the last years in neighbouring countries as well as

the series of terrorist acts in Europe urged the Bulgarian authorities to address

the problem. Preparation began in 2017 of amendments to the Confessions

Act and in early 2018 the main political parties submitted to the National

Assembly a bill (a joint draft of the governing party GERB, the opposition

Bulgarian Socialist Party and the MRF, as well as an alternative one of the

“United Patriots” who are part of the government). Their aim is to raise legal

barriers to the penetration of radical Islam. The amendments envisage gov-

ernment subsidies for the main confessions in order to discontinue financing

60

from abroad; ban on the participation of political figures in the governing

bodies of religious communities; ban on foreign citizens to execute religious

rites in Bulgarian places of worship; control over the curricula and content of

religious educational activities. The Grand Mufti office, however, disagreed

with the restrictions on financing and involving foreigners in the service, with

the attempt to present Muslims as “a threat to national security of the coun-

try”, and in general with the attempts to give a definition of the term “radical

Islam” (on this topic the Supreme Muslim Council sent a letter to the state

institutions, accompanied with the signatures of 46 thousand Muslims).

Conclusions

The general conclusion with which I wish to end, is that the large

Muslim community in Bulgaria cannot be perceived as a direct threat to

the security of the country on account of the radicalisation of some Mus-

lims in the Balkans, in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The main

mass of the Muslims in Bulgaria plays the role of a barrier before the rad-

icalisation of Islam in Bulgaria.

My argument for this conclusion is that most of the Muslims in Bul-

garia practice traditional Islam, which can be defined as moderate. The

coexistence between Orthodox Christians and Muslims has a longstand-

ing tradition, in which there was everything – annihilation, confrontation,

conflicts but also – good neighbourliness and cooperation. The tendency

for cooperation should continue with the efforts of both parties.

There are also worrisome tendencies among the Muslims in Bulgaria

which cannot be overlooked. The issue refers to the penetration of the ideas

of radical Islam primarily among the Roma and most of all the new converts.

The second group susceptible to radicalisation is among part of the Bulgar-

ian Muslims. In both cases this refers to young people (among the Turks

the birth rate is lower than among the Roma and the Bulgarian Muslims),

isolated from society and with serious economic and social problems.

It should not be forgotten that the threat of radicalisation of Muslims

in Bulgaria may come as a result of negative changes in the international

relations and in the environment outside Bulgaria.

61

KOSOVO: A COLLISION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL TOLERANCE AND RADICALISM

Bobi Bobev

On one of the central boulevards in Pristina, immediately opposite the

university campus, rises the imposing building of the newly built Catholic

cathedral “Mother Theresa”. If one visits the town of Peja (Peć) and heads

towards the buildings of the local Serb Orthodox Patriarchate, just before

reaching them one cannot help noticing the renovated Catholic church.

From the hill of the Prizren fortress one can easily count more than 50

mosques and in close proximity to the one in the town centre is the Serb

church “St. George” with the medieval temple “St. Nicholas” opposite it.

Such a picture may be seen almost anywhere in Kosovo and it seems that it

proves the unproblematic coexistence between the different religions – all

the more so that the overwhelming majority of the population are Alba-

nians, traditionally known for their tolerance in this sphere of public life.

To that one could add the peaceful relations between the religions both

during pre-war and socialist Yugoslavia taking into consideration the large

Muslim population in the country.

This inherited tolerance, however, was put to a serious test in modern

times and especially in the last two decades. The bloody disintegration of

Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia awoke old contradictions and brought

to the forefront both ethic and religious confrontation. The consequences

were catastrophic with more than 200 000 dead and the inherited risks of

further similar developments. And the conflict in Kosovo was waiting in the

wings. The threat of a new bloodbath in the Balkans was what urged the

international community to adopt a tougher course and efforts to prevent

it. NATO conducted the operation “Allied Force” against the regime of the

Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and the consequences are well-known –

the Kumanovo Agreement, Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council and

the establishment of an actual protectorate in the erstwhile Serbian auton-

omous region, unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008

and the birth of a new sovereign political actor in the Balkans.

62

The question naturally arises: what was at the root of the clash in 1998-

1999 and to what extent religion was pertinent to it, considering the obvious

fact that the Albanian majority practices Islam and the Serb minority – East-

ern Orthodoxy? Let us give the floor to two people who are not only immedi-

ate witnesses of the events, but also spiritual leaders of the local population.

In May 2013 a conference “Dialogue Between Religions” took place in the

town of Peja under the auspices of the Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga,

which later on was transformed into traditional and is organised with the

support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pristina. Among the keynote

speakers at the first event of this nature were Naim Tërnava, leader of the

Muslim Community of Kosovo, and Bishop Theodosije, spiritual leader of

the Eparchy of Raška-Prizren of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Their opinions

to a large extent coincided and are very indicative. Tërnava pointed out that

the dialogue on all issues, including religious ones, was the only acceptable

way. Even during the peak of the events of 1998-1999, in time of war, the

religious communities were seeking contacts between them in the name of

peace. And Theodosije seemed even more categoric. He underlined that this

conflict was not religious but rather an ethnic one – a clash of two opposing

national agendas. Kosovo is a colourful mosaic in ethnic and religious terms

and because of this dialogue has no alternative, the guiding principle should

be the maxim that religion should unite and not divide.

It is apparent that both opinions of exceptionally respected and highly

placed persons coincide and the question logically arises why, less than two

decades after the military operation, different expert assessments define Koso-

vo as a place of serious religious confrontation and a hotbed for jihadists for

the wars in the Middle East. Enormous significance, undoubtedly, has the fact

that it is religion that is the clear delineator between the Albanian majority in

Kosovo and the unwanted Serbian authorities. And still, one has to look for

the interference of another, imperatively foreign force that would transform

confessional difference into ethnic intolerance. Because only under such influ-

ence the once tolerant society may be converted in a comparatively short time

into a source of extremism and a channel for the export of jihadists – according

to the assessment of the respected New York Times.

63

Current Confessional Picture, Role and Place of Islam in It

The consideration of this issue requires also a glance towards the develop-

ments of the past even without going too deep in retrospect. The territory

of Kosovo in the Middle Ages was consecutively within the borders of Byz-

antium, and of Bulgaria, and of Serbia – all this in the absence of an integral

Albanian state in this period. Later these lands were part of the Ottoman

Empire, where the Albanians enjoyed a privileged status and their elite was

part of the elite of the enormous state. From the point of view of the eth-

nic picture the population was mixed but gradually the Albanian element

became prevalent, particularly after the great Serb resettlement in 1767.

Of course, there is no detailed information about these centuries and often

there are speculations with this fact in order to advocate national agendas.

In 1913 Kosovo became part of Serbia and later Yugoslavia, and the first

census in modern times – in 1921, if one accepts its data as objective and

not manipulated, showed already over 60% Albanian element. In the sub-

sequent decades the overwhelming presence of the Albanians constantly

grew – both due to the high population growth rate among them, and also

to the slow but incessant process of mechanical decrease of the number of

Serbs and to a lesser extent Montenegrins who were living in the area.

The shortest review of the confessional picture demonstrates that the

Albanian population of Kosovo in the Middle Ages belonged to the Catholic

denomination but in the period of the 16th – 18th centuries was voluntarily

Islamised en masse, mainly due to financial and economic considerations.

The picture changed neither during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, nor Social-

ist Yugoslavia. It could be concluded that the Albanian population belongs

almost entirely to the Muslim Suni confession, the Serbs are entirely Eastern

Orthodox, while among the existing Montenegrins there are also Catholics.

The last two decades of the 20th century in a way changed the ethnic

and respectively the religious picture of Kosovo society. The regime of

Milošević practically annulled the autonomous status of the region and

gradually deprived the Albanians of their rights and freedoms enshrined

in the so-called Tito Constitution of 1974. This did not go by without pres-

sure and resistance against the authorities and the serious ethnic domi-

64

nance of the Albanian element over the Serb and Montenegro ones led

to the gradual exodus of the latter. The situation in Kosovo became all the

more complicated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. Towards

its end the straightforward question arose about its status and affiliation

with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as was the name of the residual

format of the former federation.

At present the ethnic and confessional picture in Kosovo may be

drawn only tentatively since the local Serbs boycotted the 2011 census of

the population. It is clear, though, that on the territory of 10 800 square

kilometres the Albanians are the dominant majority with about 1.8 million

people or over 92% of the population. The Serbs living in the northern

part of the country and in some southern enclaves are probably between

50 000 and 100 000 or about 5%. There are, of course, some other small-

er minorities. The size of the existing denominations corresponds to this

ethnic picture. So, the Albanians are almost 100% Muslim and minorities

such as Turks, Roma, Gorani, etc. should be added to them. The Serbs are

entirely Orthodox Christian, while Catholicism is represented by the small

Montenegrin and Croatian population, as well as single cases among the

Albanians. It may be stated that the ratio Muslims – Orthodox – Catholics

varies within the approximate values of 91%-5%-3%. The overwhelming

advantage of Islam as the main confession is more than apparent.

The Islamic Community – Legal Status, Activity, Relations with

State Institutions, Existence of Trends

The Constitution of Kosovo was drafted in 2008 under strict international

control with the help of qualified legal experts and ultimate approval by the

Venice Commission. Its main objective was to form a multi-ethnic, multi-re-

ligious and multicultural society – the numeric prevalence of the Muslim

confession does not lead to a privileged position in the Constitution and

the legislation and the confessional groups are officially equal. The freedom

of religion is categorically guaranteed. The definition of the state is secular.

The Kosovo Constitution is a modern basic law, which clearly out-

lines the separation of the state from the existing confessions. The central

65

government authorities do not interfere in any form whatsoever in the

existence of the religious structures, their organisation and operation – by

definition the state is neutral vis a vis them.

The main and officially adopted structural unit of the Muslims in the

country is the so-called Islamic Community of Kosovo. It has a central of-

fice which is identical to a Grand Mufti office, and district entities, which

correspond almost entirely to the administrative division. The president of

the Islamic Community is the Grand Mufti and for a number of years this

function has been performed by Naim Tërnava. The supreme body of the

community is the Meeting elected for a term of five years, chaired by a

Chairman and Deputy-Chairmen. The members of the Meeting may be

recalled in case of dissatisfaction with their activity.

The leadership of the Islamic Community of Kosovo is responsible also for

religious education in the country. Under its control are the madrasa, of which

most prominent and significant are the ones in Pristina and Prisren. On 15 Au-

gust 1992 a Faculty of Islamic Studies was established as an educational and

scientific centre with a decision of the Islamic Community Meeting. Under the

conditions existing then its activity was semi-legal and subjected to serious

difficulties but later, and in particular after the declaration of independence, it

grew and on 6 July 2012 received accreditation as a higher educational estab-

lishment. The control by the Islamic Community over medium and higher re-

ligious education is of substantial importance especially in view of the foreign

pressure exerted on the Kosovo Muslims in the last two decades.

This main structural unit of the Islamic confession in the country main-

tains correct relations with the central government institutions and the local

authorities. The relations are active, well-intentioned and unity of action is

a common occurrence, in particular under the complex situation of the last

years, when the threat of radicalisation and respectively – destabilisation, be-

came apparent and presented a real challenge to the country and to society.

There are no official trends among the Kosovo Muslims and the Is-

lamic Community with its structures is their only legal representative. It is

absolutely clear, however, that undercurrents exist based on foreign influ-

ence coming from the Arab world.

66

Objectively, political Islam has no roots in the country. An attempt was

made to create a party on this basis but it was blatantly unsuccessful and

did not bring about any presence in the realities of the country and in soci-

ety. It is difficult also to speak of parties on an ethnic basis since the political

actors are by definition purely ethnic – Albanian, Serb or of other minori-

ties. However, one should probably mention the existence of an openly

nationalistic formation – Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) which has a

growing presence in the realities of Kosovo and wins positions at elections.

Processes and Tendencies among the Islamic Community.

Foreign Influences Upon It

What is characteristic of the confessional situation in Kosovo after the actu-

al separation from Serbia in 1999, is undoubtedly the growing foreign reli-

gious influence and the unregulated advance of ideas that are incompatible

with traditionally espoused Islam. This is a serious risk since the country’s

population is not only about and over 90% Muslim, but also because it

is positioning itself as religious to a far greater degree than, for example,

the Albanians in Albania. A Gallup poll in 2015 indicated that Kosovo was

among the most religious countries in the world: 83% identified themselves

as believers, 7% as non-believers, 1% as atheists and the remaining 9%

could not answer. Such results, however distorted they may be, are influ-

enced by two factors: the deep-seated religious dividing line with the Serbs,

but also the already existing influence of more radical feelings. Another

example: in 2016 32% of the Kosovo population identified themselves first

as Muslim and after that as Albanian. I am convinced that the same poll 15

years earlier would have produced different results. This shows not only that

the foreign radical influences have impacted to one or another degree soci-

ety, but also that the Islamic Community of Kosovo and the state institutions

and the international factors have underestimated the threat of fundamen-

talism and extremism and have failed to take the due countermeasures.

The advance of different religious structures and foundations, primarily

from Saudi Arabia, began immediately after the war of 1999 in the condi-

tions of a genuine humanitarian crisis. Because of this the start was with

67

humanitarian aid in the form of food and medicines and later a move was

made also towards financial support under the condition that men should

visit regularly the services in the mosques, and women should wear veils

and the appropriate dress. The activity of literally dozens of such structures

was constantly growing in scale and it is difficult to embrace it as a whole –

they built mosques and schools for the study of the Quran at variance with

regulations, secured scholarships for higher religious education abroad. The

influence of Wahhabism in Kosovo – with the advocating of the sharia rule

and the idea of “holy jihad”, reached its peak after the start of the armed

conflict in Syria. Just a few examples will be given of this permanent and

incessant advance. At present in Kosovo there are over 800 functioning

mosques and approximately 240 of them were built after the war of 1999.

According to available data more that 100 of these Islamic places of wor-

ship have been constructed at variance with the regulations, i.e. beyond the

control of the official structure of the Islamic Community. All this activity re-

quired serious financing and apparently it was forthcoming. About EUR 10

million have passed only through the “Al Waqf - Al Islami” foundation oper-

ating on Kosovo territory. Another active structure is the “Saudi Joint Relief

Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya”. According to probably incomplete

information it has built several mosques as well as 98 schools for the study

of the Quran and the pupils who excel are provided with scholarships to

receive higher religious education in the Arab world, primarily in Saudi Ara-

bia. A total of 200 citizens of Kosovo have graduated from such education

in the years after the war and most of them have returned to the country.

All this creates risky conditions for preaching Wahhabism and radical Is-

lam in general. The consequences are starting to be felt in the Islamic Com-

munity itself, where under the pressure of the generous Arab resources, rep-

resentatives of this segment of preachers are also allowed. This inevitably

has an impact on the tenets of traditional Islam – after 2004 there are already

mullahs who have graduated abroad, who officially preach in Besiana (Podu-

jevo) and (Gjilan) Gniljane, and later also in the capital Pristina. And another

risky element in the ranks of the Muslim mullahs – there is already clearly de-

fined confrontation between the older and traditionally leaning mullahs and

68

the young radically inclined generation. There are many examples of threats

and even physical violence. The clash on the religious front has become more

than obvious and, in this sense, it could be asserted that after 2010 among

the Muslims in Kosovo and in the ranks of the religious leaders there is, an

albeit small, but already formed wing of adherents to radical Islam. According

to some expert assessments their number is up to 50 000 persons – under

3% of the Albanian population, but it is sufficient for the creation of serious

problems. Developments during that time corroborate this assessment.

Participants from Kosovo in the Battles in the Middles East

When the battle against terrorism and the ideologically justifying it Islamic

fundamentalism and radicalism started in 2001, Kosovo was a UN pro-

tectorate, it did not pursue independent policy and remained aside from

these developments. However, when in the second decade of the 21st

century the Middle East was shaken by events and out of the chaos and

the noise the silhouette of the “Islamic State” emerged, the country had

declared its independence and had clearly defined foreign policy priorities.

It is at that time that it became clear that Kosovo was threatened not only

by the propaganda of radical Islam but also found its name interwoven in

the recruitment of volunteers for the war in Syria and Iraq.

According to the official government institutions the first volunteers

from Kosovo to the Middle East departed in 2012, but the probability

should not be excluded that there were such cases before, albeit isolated.

Initially they became mercenaries of Al-Nusra but subsequently the major-

ity joined the “Islamic State”. The greatest number of Kosovo volunteers

participated in the fighting in the period 2012-1014, after that there are

probably isolated cases, and officially it is believed that as of 2016 the flow

of Kosovo citizens to the “Islamic State” has stopped permanently.

The data about the number of the Kosovo mercenaries in this radical Is-

lam army does not come from a single source and often diverge. So, accord-

ing to the Ministry of Interior in Pristina, in August 2014 about 70 Kosovo

citizens were fighting in the Middles East, while a report of the State De-

partment two months earlier mentioned between 150 and 200 Kosovars.

69

One should approach information, which is unspecified and is coming from

different sources very carefully – without any specification in the informa-

tion sometimes reference is made to actual number of mercenaries, in other

cases – to a total number since the beginning of the conflict. In this sense

more important are the end data, indicating total numbers.

So, I think, credit should be given to a report drawn up by the an-

ti-terror group of the Kosovo police with the support of the UNDP and the

partner services. As of May 2017, it mentions the figure 316 citizens of

Kosovo, who have taken part in the war in Syria and Iraq. Among them

there were two kamikazes, 44 women and 28 children. Again, according

to data from the Kosovo police as of November 2017, there is information

about 113 citizens of Kosovo, who have returned to the country and 74

who have been killed in battle.

Many news agencies and expert studies have accepted the number

316 as credible and have quoted it. If this is true, the country must rank

first in Europe according to the number of jihadists per capita – 16 merce-

naries per 100 thousand people, which is eight-fold more than France and

even by 60% more than Libya.

If one should outline the reasons for this stream, which is serious for

the country’s scale, one should, first of all, mention two main ones. The

first is the overall economic condition of society – low GDP levels and

growth rates, which are combined with exceptionally high unemployment

rates, in particular among the youngest age groups. To put it otherwise,

part of these Kosovo jihadists are mercenaries seeking high pay. The sec-

ond main reason should not be overlooked either – that the propaganda

of radical Islam in Kosovo is gaining ground and succeeds in attracting to

its side a number of young people. And the majority of volunteers from

Kosovo are in the 21-25 age group.

And something very important in relation to the degree of risk of impos-

ing radical ideas and carrying out terrorist activity. Already at the end of 2015

an expert study in the UK placed Kosovo in the second group of countries

threatened by terrorist attacks, in line with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,

Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. The return of a number of jihadists will

70

heighten the degree of risk and this will require additional efforts both by the

government institutions and the Islamic Community. The fact that so far there

have been no serious incidents should not be comforting.

Actions, Directed Against Radicalisation in All its Forms

The active work against the penetration of radical Islamic ideas and the

consequences from them actually started in 2012 – this has been stated

officially by the Kosovo authorities. It should be stressed expressly that this

fact indicates a serious delay and lack of prevention before that. For the

sake of objectivity, it should be noted that ideas in this direction existed

before. So, in 2004 Prime Minister Bayram Recepi stated that a bill was

under preparation then for the prohibition of sects operation on the coun-

try’s territory but that is was abandoned due to recommendations “from

Europe” that such an act would be interpreted as restriction of religious

freedom. This is further proof of the short-sightedness and underestima-

tion of the risks from the advent of radical Islam on a global scale, and

more specifically in the Balkans and in Kosovo.

The government and its institutions develop their activities in several

directions and it should be pointed out that the synergy, albeit very late, is

beyond doubt. So, in the sphere of the legislation the government proposed

and in 2015 parliament voted an act prohibiting the participation of citizens

of Kosovo in armed conflicts abroad. Amendments were introduced also in

the Penal Code allowing criminal prosecution for acts such as recruitment

of volunteers, financing propaganda of radical Islam, creation of disruption

and panic in society, etc. The law-enforcement and judicial authorities are

actively engaged. It is reported that between 2013 and the beginning of

2017 over 217 persons have been arrested and investigated on charges of

participation in the conflict in the Middle East, of terrorist activity, including

recruitment of volunteers, of financing such activity, of threats to public

order. Among the detained, investigated and convicted there were religious

leaders. Dozens were convicted to different prison terms. The special ser-

vices operate closely with the partner services of the Western countries,

Turkey and Albania – according to government sources in this way over 50

71

attempts at departure to the Middle East were thwarted. A very important

point is the fact that at least 19 Muslim foundations and organisations were

prohibited from operating on the territory of Kosovo. All these are elements

of the implementation of two national strategies: for combatting terrorism

and for combatting radicalism and extremism.

The attitude of the Islamic Community – the official structure of the

Kosovo Muslims is of particular importance. In the period before 2013-

2014 its leadership made a number of mistakes, which allowed radical

imams to infiltrate its ranks and practically to officialise their activity. This

attitude has changed abruptly as of 2014 – the tenets of traditional Islam

are preached actively, the tone against radicalism in general and specifi-

cally against the “Islamic State” has become harder, frequent appeals are

addressed to the Kosovo citizens, fighting in the Middle East, to return

home. In many respects the Islamic Community acts in parallel with the

government structures and even jointly with them. Under an agreement

with the Ministry of Justice, for example, a group of lecturers is prepared,

who would engage in work in prisons advocating the canon norms of tra-

ditional Islam. It may be stated that all this activity makes sense and is use-

ful but this does not alter the fact that it is late in time and the threat that

is looming large over the faith and the country has been underestimated.

It is right to point out that the non-governmental sector and the me-

dia also delayed for years their response but later started to work in syner-

gy and in a focused way against the threat from radicalisation.

As whole, it may be concluded that public attitudes in favour of tra-

ditional Islam and against radicalisation are apparent. However, this does

not alter the fact that Kosovo is one of the main target points in the

Balkans for outside pressure in a negative direction and a risk zone for

dissemination of fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism.

Conclusions

This short expose allows to reach some conclusions.

If one departs from the main topic – whether the country and society

are a bridge for infusion of radicalism or a barrier before it, two stages

72

could be outlined. The fist was from 1989 to 2012 when radical ideas

penetrated Kosovo freely and gradually found fertile soil for development

and permeated even the system of the Islamic Community. Of course, the

political upheavals and the lack of really operating power structures before

1999 also had their significance. What was dangerous was that after that

both the UN administration and the representatives of the international

factors and the existing Kosovo institutions in a certain sense were sitting

on their hands and in such a way facilitated the process of radicalisation.

The situation changed after 2012 in the face of already real threats.

Then both the government institutions of the already independent Kosovo

and the structures of the Islamic Community and a number of public actors

became active and began gradually to catch up with the delay with the

support of the international factors which had become aware of the risk.

What is necessary from now on is to continue and deepen this line of be-

haviour. The government with its law-enforcement and judicial bodies should

bring to the end its two strategies and focus on prevention – both through

the system of education and through the necessary support for traditional

Islam and its organisational structures. The improvement of the social and

economic situation would be of particular importance and the creation of

good prospects for young people, who are the overwhelming majority in the

country. And again, it is the government institutions that are required to coor-

dinate the cooperation with the international actors in this field.

The Islamic Community should be a genuine protector of the traditional

Islamic denomination; it should obtain full control over religious education

and the places of worship. It is necessary to discontinue any contacts with

dubious religious organisations and foundations, particularly from the Arab

world, regardless of how generous they might be. Active contacts with the

entire public will be of particular importance, among which meaningful pro-

paganda work should be carried out – in the best meaning of the word.

With such long-term attitude it could be expected that in the future

Kosovo will cease to represent a preferred field for radicalisation in the region

and will be transformed into a barrier before the negative foreign influence.

73

THERE IS NO INTERNAL ISLAMIC THREAT IN MACEDONIA, FOREIGN FORCES IMPORT RADICAL ISLAM

Lyubcho Neshkov

The wars in Syria and Iraq revealed the existence of a well-built Islamic

terrorist network in the Balkans. Hundreds of citizens of Bosnia and Herze-

govina, Kosovo, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia fought (are fight-

ing) on the side of the “Islamic State” and in the different paramilitary

formations in Syria and Iraq. Nobody knows the exact number of the par-

ticipants in the fighting from the Balkan states controlled by the “Islamic

State” but it is certainly known that the number of the dead is already

several hundred. Only from the Republic of Macedonia their number is 33.

Religious Beliefs and the Place of Islam in the Republic of Macedonia

Islam was brought to the Balkans by the Ottomans who ruled the re-

gion for five centuries. The subjugated or the “protected subjects” of

non-Muslim origin were obliged to pay taxes to the Ottoman authorities.

Many of them, in order to avoid paying taxes converted to Islam and were

assimilated by the Ottoman system.

In the Republic of Macedonia, which has a population of 2.1 mil-

lion people, there are two main religious groups: Orthodox Christians and

Muslims. The majority of the Orthodox believers are Macedonians and the

majority of the Muslims are Albanians. About 65% of the population are

Orthodox Macedonians, 32% are Muslims, 1% are Roman Catholics and

2% practice other religions – different Protestant denominations. There is

also a small Jewish community which resides in the capital Skopje.

The Islamic Religious Community is mentioned in Constitution of the

country alongside with the Macedonian Orthodox Church – the Archbish-

opric of Ohrid, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church

and the Jewish community as separate from the state and equal before

the law. Until 1997 the Religious Communities Act was applicable. It was

amended by the act of 2007 on the “legal status of the church, the reli-

gious communities and religious groups”.

74

The Islamic Religious Community is the only institution recognised by the

Macedonian government, which represent the Muslims in the country by law.

After the establishment of an independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991

the Islamic Religious Community was recognised by the state in 1994.

Islamic Communities – Legal Status, Relations with the State

Institutions, Existence of Different Islamic Trends, Religious

Organisations, Islamic Schools and Tendencies in the Islamic

Community of the Country

In Macedonia the denominations and the religions, together with their

followers, typically are represented by specific government agencies. So,

Islam has always been represented by a government body ever since the

establishment of Ottoman rule in the region until the collapse of the total-

itarian Yugoslav communist dictatorship of Josip Broz Tito in the 1990’s.

The Islamic Religious Community deals mainly with education and culti-

vation of Islamic values, construction and maintenance of mosques, Islamic

centres, tekke (Muslim ritual complexes of buildings) and mektebi (prima-

ry schools for Islamic studies), establishment and functioning of educational

institutions, of social and cultural institutions, creation and maintenance of

libraries, archives, museums, creation and maintenance of graveyards as well

as establishment and functioning of charity institutions – establishment of

waqf (charity grants) and protection of their rights. The official documents of

the Islamic Religious Community state that it “advocates peace and wages

war against evil and terrorism” and cooperates with “all institutions, associa-

tions and different organisations, which popularise Islamic Values”.

Organisation of the Muslims During the Ottoman Empire. The lands

under the Ottoman rule in the Balkans were divided into administra-

tive-territorial entities, the largest of which was the eyalet. The eyalets

were divided into sanjaks. The ruler of the sanjak was the bey, who had

military and administrative authority and the ruler of the kaza was the

kadi, who had the judicial authority. Both were appointed by the central

government, i.e. the so-called Porte. Although the sanjak bey was higher

75

in the hierarchy than the kadi, the latter was the most important figure in

the region and enjoyed the greatest influence. The kadi had full authority

in his region, both religious and secular.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. From 1918 to 1992 the

functions and activities of the religious communities in the Balkans may be

divided into two periods:

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, which in 1929 was re-

named Yugoslavia. In the period between 1918 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

included the present-day territories of Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia,

Croatia, Bosna and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo.

The second period includes the years between 1945 and 1992 – the time

of the communist totalitarian system created by the dictator Josip Broz Tito.

During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the relations between the state and

the different religious communities were based on the principle of recognition

and acceptance of the practiced religion. In 1930 a new law was adopted in

the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which gave also the official name of the Islamic

Religious Community. After the adoption of the new law the Muslim religious

officials were under the jurisdiction of the state and the seat of Reis-ul-Ulema

moved from Sarajevo to Belgrade. At the same time the members of the two

Ulema Councils (Majlis) went to two places – to Sarajevo and to Skopje. The

muftis were reduced to nine and were appointed with a decree by the King.

Practically the Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia appointed

their own people to leadership positions in the Islamic Religious Community.

During the communist dictatorship between 1945 and 1002. The Is-

lamic Religious Community in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was

established in 1947 during the Grand Sabor (meeting) of the waqfs in Sarajevo.

It consisted of four councils: 1) Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Croatia and Slovenia with a seat in Sarajevo; 2) Islamic Community of Serbia in

Pristina; 3) Islamic Community of Macedonia in Skopje; 4) Islamic Community

of Montenegro in its capital at the time – Titograd (present-day Podgorica).

A number of delegates for each council were elected in the Supreme

Council of the Islamic Religious Community of the Socialist Federal Repub-

lic of Yugoslavia, which on its part, elected the Reis-ul-Ulema. Interesting-

76

ly, all titleholders of Reis-ul-Ulema were from Bosnia with the exception of

the Macedonian Jakub Selimoski, elected in 1989.

The Republic of Macedonia is the only former Yugoslav republic in

which Muslim extremism has no local roots and its own radical leaders.

If in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia (Sandžak, the Preševo

Valley) there are many examples of the existence of local Muslim extrem-

ist organisations already at the beginning of the 20th century and during

WWII in particular, in Macedonia, even among the Albanian population,

the radical elements come predominantly from neighbouring Kosovo and

Albania. In the Republic of Macedonia there are neither transnational, nor

domestic terrorist organisations. However, taking stock of this, one should

not overlook the causes and the consequences between the Islamist ex-

tremist ideologies and the Islamic terrorism.

The Albanians are the main Muslim minority in the Republic of Mace-

donia. According to the last census of 2002 the ethnic Albanians comprise

about 23% of the total population. It should be underlined that in the

last two decades a permanent exodus from the country is observed not

only by the Macedonian but also by the Albanian population. A growing

number of Macedonian citizens (of all ethnoses) leave permanently their

birthplaces, sell their property and have no intention to return. This is es-

pecially valid for the rural areas.

As opposed to the Albanians in Albania and Kosovo, where there are

Christians among them – Orthodox and Catholic, the ethnic Albanians in

Macedonia are almost all Muslims. The Albanians in Macedonia are Ghegs,

which includes the largest of the two sub-groups (the other consists of To-

sks). The Ghegs are more conservative compared to the Albanians from Al-

bania and Kosovo. The Albanians in Macedonia live predominantly in the

north-western part of the republic, bordering on Albania, Kosovo and Serbia.

The Turks in the Republic of Macedonia are the third largest ethnic

group in the country. According to the last census in 2002 the Turks com-

prise about 4% of the total population and about 12% of the Muslims

living in Macedonia. For the Turks in Macedonia the relationship between

Islam and national identity derives historically from the political and reli-

77

gious developments in Turkey. The majority of the Macedonian Turks are

members of the Democratic Party of the Turks, which advocates the values

of the secular state. In the last years the so-called “Gülen movement” is

particularly active. A Turkish newspaper “Zaman” was launched in the

1990’s and later it started publishing also in the Albanian language. In

addition, the Gülenists support the private schools “Yahya Kemal” in Sko-

pje, Gostivar and Struga. These schools are accessible also for children of

Muslim elites from other nationalities. The largest number of Turks reside

in the western part of Macedonia.

The ”Torbeši” are a Macedonian Muslim minority living predominantly

in the western part of the country. It is difficult to identify their exact num-

ber because in the past many of them identified themselves as Turks and

some have been assimilated by the Albanians. In this way the ”Torbeši”

have always tried to avoid problems with their neighbours. In the last

decades a large number of Macedonian Muslims - ”Torbeši” emigrate to

West Europe and North America. The ”Torbeši” lead a conservative life.

Even today they oppose the consumption of liquor, nightlife and photo-

graphs. In the last years, however, there is an increase of the “bearded

Wahhabis” in their villages, who receive financial support mainly from

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

After the census of 2002 the Roma are about 2.6% of the total pop-

ulation of the Republic of Macedonia. Most of them are Muslims and a

small number are Christians. The relations between these two religious

groups are often hostile and distrustful. Most of the Roma in Macedonia

speak their mother tongue, in the western part of the country they com-

municate in the Albanian and Turkish languages. In the eastern part of the

country the Roma identify themselves as Turks.

Foreign Influence on the Local Islamic Communities, Jihadist

Fighters and Measures Against Islamic Radicalisation after 2002

According to information of the Macedonian special services and in par-

ticular of the agency combatting terrorist acts and paramilitary formations

as of now it is known that a total of 150 Macedonian citizens have partic-

78

ipated in the wars of Syria and Iraq. They have fought on the side of para-

military formations in the territories controlled by the so-called “Islamic

State”. 80 of them have already returned and at present (August 2018)

are in the Republic of Macedonia.

The first public reports about the participation of Macedonian citizens

appeared in 2010. A local newspaper reported in November 2010 that

about 50 volunteers, who had been training to participate in the war in

Afghanistan, had been followed by the security agencies of Macedonia.

According to information of the Macedonian security agencies by

mid-2018 33 Macedonian citizens had been killed on the battlefields in

the territories, controlled by the “Islamic State”. The documents do not

specify their ethnicity but, judging from the information on their iden-

tity, there is no doubt that they were ethnic Albanians. Judging from

interrogations of Islamic extremists, who had returned home or had been

arrested, all fighters from the Republic of Macedonia went to Syria and

Iraq through the territory of Turkey. In most cases they travelled by land

but some flew by air.

From the interrogations of the terrorists it becomes clear that before

departing to the battlefield the persons attended religious sermons of radi-

cal imams. Part of them “became radicalised” through the social networks,

others through personal contacts, from which they received logistical sup-

port for their travel and for joining the ranks of the paramilitary formations.

Seventeen Macedonian citizens, who had fought with the “Islamic

State” and had returned home have already been convicted on charges of

terrorism. From their testimony it becomes clear that foreign persons had

participated in their organisation and training – part of them had been

from the region – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Albania, but there

had been also citizens of Arab states.

A National Committee for dealing with extremism and combatting

terrorism was established recently in the Republic of Macedonia. At pres-

ent strategies for the re-socialisation of such persons are being drawn up.

The use of charity organisations for financing and establish-

ment of terrorist groups. The Islamic charity organisations dramatically

79

increased their activity in the Balkans during the wars in Bosnia and Herze-

govina and in Kosovo. They were received comparatively well by the local

population due to their “officially charitable causes”. Very soon, though,

it became clear that these charitable organisations financed and spread

Wahhabist ideology and terrorism. The very same charity organisations

use the Balkans as a logistic base and territory for recruiting members.

Because of this activity of theirs they fell under the surveillance of the

special services, which discovered that they are linked to Islamic extremism

and money laundering. Enormous cash flows have been traced from Saudi

Arabia to Macedonia for the construction of innumerable mosques. At

these mosques volunteers are being recruited for jihad and for spreading

Wahhabist ideology, resentment to the West, the European values and

hatred of Christianity.

The authorities in the Republic of Macedonia started to investigate the

Islamic charity organisations already in the 1990’s at the very beginning of

the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The special services in Skopje discovered

that many Islamic charity organisations from the Albanian capital Tirana

were seeking permission in 1996 to open shops in Macedonia. However,

the charity organisations International Islamic Relief Organization and the

Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not ad-

mitted by the security and intelligence officers. These charity organisations

were denied registration. After this denial they began to finance from Ti-

rana the leaders of the Islamic Religious Community in Tetovo and the ma-

drasa in the village of Kondovo. The Wahhabist International Islamic Relief

Organization from Saudi Arabia, which was established in 1978 as a relief

subsidiary of the Muslim Global League, already in 1979 started opening

offices abroad and especially in the Balkans. In the period 1992-1995 the

International Islamic Relief Organization and other Islamic NGO’s provided

USS 350 million for weapons and mercenaries. At the beginning of 1995

the authorities in the Republic of Macedonia closed the office and banned

the activity in Skopje of the International Islamic Relief Organization. All

members of the International Islamic Relief Organization were deported

from the country. In 2003 it became clear that the International Islamic

80

Relief Organization actively supported the global activities of Al-Qaeda,

but this did not prevent it to open its office in the town of Tetovo in the

western part of the Republic of Macedonia. The Islamic foundation “Al

Haramain”, of which the US Department of the Treasury discovered that

it, together with its international branches supported the terrorist network

of Osama bin Laden and different extremist organisations, in the Republic

of Macedonia raised funds through drug trafficking and prostitution. An-

other charity – “Bamiresia”, which was headed by the imam Bekir Halimi,

an ethnic Albanian, had operated in Skopje since 1997. Later it opened

offices in all major towns of the country. On multiple occasions “Bami-

resia” was investigated for relations with the terrorist organisations and

money laundering. In one of his interviews Halimi officially stated that his

organisation was entitled to receive funds from Saudi Arabia. The main

source of finances for “Bamiresia” is a Saudi NGO and the Society of the

Revival of Islamic Heritage with a seat in Kuwait.

Local experts warn that “the number of the new non-governmental

organisations dealing with religious activities under the cover of humani-

tarian aid has grown in the last several years”.

The Active Islamic Youth, which was created after the war in Bosnia and

Herzegovina by local Muslims who had fought together with the foreign Isla-

mist fighters from the mujahedin units and which popularises fundamentalist

Islamic teachings, has its affiliates in Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga and Ku-

manovo. The security services have detected that the members of the Active

Islamic Youth in Macedonia coordinated the transfer of a substantial sum of

money for Kosovo and that they have close links with the members of the Is-

lamic Jihad Union. Other Islamic radical movements, groups and non-govern-

mental organisations include The “Student Club”, the president of which is

Kurtishi Fatmir from the village of Aračinovo and “El-Mujahedeen”, founded

in 2002 by Šamilj Demirović in the village of Batinci.

It becomes clear from the revelations in 2017 of a participant in “Is-

lamic events” on the territory of the town of Debar and the vicinity that

“persons born in the town and living in the USA are financing religious

schools, which preach radical Islam”. The same persons finance different

81

associations supporting education of children, religious literature libraries,

book shops, perfume and food shops specifically intended for Muslims.

The source uncovered the “whole supply network for these facilities in the

country”. They all are part of the “Selefi” group which had participated in

support actions during the refugee (2001) and Kumanovo (2015) crises.

The members of this group are divided into two groups – more radical and

moderate. Among them there are members of the former National Liber-

ation Army and different Islamic groups, which had fought in Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Kosovo. They operate in Gostivar, Tetovo, Debar, Ohrid,

Kumanovo and Struga but have registration only in Skopje. The financing

comes from different foreign countries – the USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,

Austria or Italy, the source reveals. They use mosques for propaganda and

recruitment of persons for “departure for Syria in the name of Allah, to

die for Allah and going to paradise and to the angels”, the source said.

At the gatherings there are persons from abroad, including from Saudi

Arabia. The source revealed the distinctiveness of the clothes of the ex-

tremists and their behaviour in the mosques – different hand gestures and

touching in a particular way with the feet and the arms during prayer. He

described in detail the type of dress, the length of the trousers and the

form of the beard of the group’s members.

The Islamic extremists in Macedonia use the internet for dissemination

of jihad and radical Islamist ideology. Already 15 years ago DVDs of Chech-

en jihadists were discovered in many mosques in the country, which showed

how mujahedeen killed Americans. A musical video clip in Albanian was

also distributed in 2010 dedicated to the leader of the terrorist organisation

Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden. There is a great number of supporters of the

Gülen movement in the Republic of Macedonia. It is known that in the

Gülenist schools in Struga and Gostivar there are lessons outside the curric-

ulum about radical Islam, during which fundamentalism is praised.

The problems with radical Islam in the Republic of Macedonia date

back to the mid 1990’s when Saudi Arabia and other states used the

domestic contradictions in the Islamic Religious Community. The radical

elements availed themselves of this situation as well as of the weakness of

82

the young independent Macedonian state. In 2002 a group of local and

Arab Wahhabis invaded with arms “Arabati Tekke” – the most renowned

religious site in the town of Tetovo in the western part of the country.

After taking over the building they quickly converted it to a mosque. The

Centre for Islamic Pluralism in the Republic of Macedonia characterised

their actions as “aggression of Wahhabist Islamists and a serious terror-

ist threat to the whole region and a violent act of cultural and religious

vandalism”. The Centre sent a letter to the American Embassy in Skopje

and to the President of the Republic of Macedonia. “We strongly protest

against the Wahhabist invasion of “Arabati Tekke” in the town of Tetovo

and appeal to the diplomatic bodies in the USA and the authorities in Sko-

pje, which monitor terrorist threats in the Balkans, to exert pressure on the

Macedonian Government for the immediate eviction of the Wahhabists

from “Arabati Tekke” pursuant to the law and, if necessary, for the pro-

tection of the Tekke from further encroachments”, the letter of the Centre

for Islamic Pluralism in the Republic of Macedonia stated.

During the conflict in 2001 in Macedonia the security services regis-

tered several groups of mujahedeen in different regions of the country.

According to the Ministry of Interior in the period 2001-2012 about 500

mujahedeen, individually or within the terrorist group Albanian National

Army, have taken part in different armed clashes. In the region of Ku-

manovo members of a mujahedeen unit of about 100 fighters acted on

the territory of the villages Slupčane, Matejče, Vaksince, Otlja and Lipko-

vo. In the region of the capital Skopje mujahedeen participated in armed

conflicts in the villages Tanuševci, Brest, Malino maalo and Aračinovo. In

August 2001 there was also a group of mujahedeen in the Gazi Baba

municipality in Skopje, where five members of the terrorist group were

killed together with their leader “Teli”, who was not a Macedonian citi-

zen. Other five persons were arrested by the Macedonian police forces. In

the region of Tetovo groups of mujahedeen were deployed in the villages

Bozovce. Vejce, Gajre and Poroj.

From the reports of the special services dealing with combatting ter-

rorist acts on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia it is clear that in

83

February 2001 two wings of the mujahedeen organisation were formed

in the country. The military wing was under the command of Muhamed

Hadafan Gamili and the political wing was led by sheikh Ahmed Ali Sedan.

Islamic extremists continue to operate on the territory of the Republic

of Macedonia even after the end of the crisis of 13 August 2001, when

the Ohrid peace agreement was signed. So, in 2004 French terrorist ex-

perts discovered that “up to 100 fundamentalists, related to terrorist or-

ganisations, operate on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia”.

In 2006 street protests and demonstrations were organised in Tetovo

and Skopje because of the cartoons of the prophet Mohamed. This was the

first public appearance of the Wahhabis and the Wahhabi movement. The

protest in Skopje started after the Friday prayer in front of the “Yahya Pa-

sha” mosque. About 1000 persons took part in the protest. The crowd in the

streets of the capital chanted “Allah is great”. Many of the participants wore

black scarfs and black and green flags with Arab inscriptions. At the same

time in the town of Tetovo about 800 persons gathered in front of the Šarena

Mosque. Most of the protesters were young people and students. The two

main Albanian political parties – the Democratic Party of the Albanians and

the Democratic Union for Integration distanced themselves from the protests

but addressed mutual accusations for participation in the protests. Represen-

tatives of the Islamic Religious Community also denounced the publication of

the cartoons but appealed to the Muslims not to succumb to provocations.

In 2007 the special police forces discovered in the area of Brodec in the

north-western part of the country an armed group of local Albanians. Accord-

ing to the police report the group prepared for prolonged armed struggle. An

enormous cache of ammunition and arms was apprehended – mortars, ma-

chine guns, rifles and sniper rifles, but the law-enforcement forces discovered

also brochures, documents and other mujahedeen propaganda materials.

Less than a year later in January 2008 a policeman was killed and two others

were wounded in an armed attack from a car driving next to the police car.

The attack was carried out by three persons, who had been members of the

National Liberation Army in 2001. A similar incident occurred in November

2008, when another policeman was killed and two were wounded.

84

Islam in Macedonia – A Bridge or A Barrier for Radicalisation

As in most Balkan countries also on the territory of present-day Repub-

lic of Macedonia Islam was brought by the Ottomans who ruled the re-

gion for five centuries. Macedonia is the only country, which in spite of

the enormous threats during the Serb aggression in Croatia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Kosovo managed to neutralise any serious incidents of

religious and ethnic extremism in the country. The young state did not

allow on its territory the operation of different Islamic organisations which

were deeply rooted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania. If

one were to compare Macedonia with another Balkan country in terms of

peaceful coexistence and high degree of religious tolerance, one would be

fully justified to claim that it is closest to Bulgaria. These are the two coun-

tries, which were bordering a country at war (Serbia) in the 1990’s, but

allowed no bursts of extremism, including religious. The small Balkan state

managed to overcome and control the brutal aggression of Slobodan Mi-

lošević, who in the course of just a few weeks deported 300 000 Koso-

vo Albanians in the spring of 1999. Besides common citizens, including

children and old people, among the deportees were a number of former

members of the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as fighters of most diverse

armed groups. Among them there were Kosovo Albanian activists of rad-

ical Islamic organisations, linked to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or coming from

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonia, which was flooded by hundreds of

thousands of deported Albanians, had to deal also with the threat of in-

filtration of these radical elements in the territory of the republic with

resident Muslim population.

The absence of “intensive hatred” between the Macedonian and Al-

banian population (Christian and Muslim) was best demonstrated during

the three-year deep political crisis that beset the Republic of Macedonia in

the 2015-2017 period. The then governing party of Premier Nikola Grue-

vski, in order to cling to power, used aggressive nationalistic and anti-Al-

banian propaganda. Gruevski, who governed for ten years thanks to the

party Democratic Union for Integration, created by the former leader of the

National Liberation Army Ali Ahmeti, organised for several months mass

85

protests in the central streets of the capital against the so-called “Tirana

Platform”. The participants and primarily the leaders of the protests used

rude and vulgar language against the Albanian minority. The rhetoric re-

minded very much the one of the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević from

the end of his political career. The 2015-2017 political crisis which ended

with the pogrom on the Macedonian Parliament on 27 April 2017 proved

two things. In the Republic of Macedonia the “Albanian threat” was used

by the erstwhile rulers to preserve the links with the authorities in Belgrade

with the ultimate objective that Macedonia would not be a fully indepen-

dent and sovereign state. At the same time, it became apparent that in the

Republic of Macedonia the local Albanians, including the political leaders,

do not have the necessary support and strength to trigger ethnic collisions

if they do not receive support from the neighbouring Kosovo and Albania.

Perhaps, it should be noted here, that during the great migrant wave in

2015-2016 the territory of the Republic of Macedonia was crossed, mainly

from Greece, by over 600 000 migrants. Among them were fighters of the

“Islamic State”. The country managed to deal quite successfully with this

challenge. The greatest risk for the stability of the Republic of Macedonia,

including the emergence of radical Islamic organisations, comes from the

outside. The Skopje authorities are facing a single threat – to prevent the

infiltration of their territory by jihadist elements from neighbouring Alba-

nia, Kosovo and the slightly further away Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this

respect the Republic of Macedonia should receive also international sup-

port in the fight against terrorism. The last official information shows that

at least 4 800 former jihadists have found refuge on the territory of pres-

ent-day Albania. All of them are a potential threat not only for the Republic

of Macedonia but also for the other countries in the region.

86

THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN SERBIA: BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND RADICALISATION

Biser Banchev, PhD

Role and Place of Islam in SerbiaThe Republic of Serbia is a predominantly Christian country, but it has inher-

ited also a part of the religious diversity of the former Yugoslav federation.

According to the census of 2011 almost 85% of the population belongs to

the Eastern Orthodox Church, 5% to the Catholic Church, and the Muslims

slightly exceed 3% (222 828 persons). Both the official statistical documents

and the prominent researcher of the Muslim communities on the territory

of former Yugoslavia Ahmet Alibašić point out the persistent boycott of the

censuses by Southern Serbia communities populated by Albanians, which

justifies the claims that the actual number of Muslims in Serbia should be

increased by about 60 thousand people and their actual percentage should

be assessed at approximately 4% of the total population.

An important characteristic of the Serbian citizens of Muslim faith is

their ethnic and territorial religious concentration. The historic region of

Sandžak with its main town of Novi Pazar is usually defined as multi-ethnic,

but almost two-thirds of the Muslims in the country live there. Tradition-

ally they feel attached to their fellow Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina

and until the breakup of the religious unity in the former Yugoslav space

in the 1990’s they were subjects of the supreme head (Reis-ul-Ulema)

of the Yugoslav Muslims residing in Sarajevo. The residents of Sandžak

are no strangers to the identity transformation processes that are taking

place in Bosnia. The change of the nationality identification from Muslims

with a capital letter to Bosnians after 1993 was adopted also in Sandžak

(Boshnak/Boshnjak is regarded a national category as opposed to Bosnian

which denotes geographical and state affiliation). The last census in Serbia

in 2011 recorded 145 278 Bosniaks and 98% of them were registered in

Sandžak. Another 22 301 residents of the six Sandžak municipalities in

Serbia identify themselves as Muslims by confession. The Albanians in the

municipalities Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac are also Muslims. Outside

these regions the religion is represented in all major cities in Serbia, where

87

part of the Roma community and other smaller groups may be added to

the Bosniaks and Albanians.

Legal Status of the Islamic Community, Relations with the Institutions of the State, Existence of Different Islamic Trends, Religious Organisations, Islamic SchoolsIn the 1990’s the “Islamic Community in Serbia” was taking care of the

Muslims’ spiritual salvation, which regarded itself as part/subsidiary of the

larger Muslim family in former Yugoslavia and was subjected religion-wise

to the Grand Mufti (Reis-ul-Ulema) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At local level

the spiritual leader is the mufti of Novi Pazar Muamer Zukorlić, who since

1993 has been controlling waqf properties, publishing houses, media and

educational establishments and also aspires to be the main mediator for the

grants coming from Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. The first

democratic government in Belgrade after the fall of Milošević tolerated the

mufti and in 2002 allowed him to open the so-called International Universi-

ty in Novi Pazar, which is registered as a religious foundation (waqf) and to

conduct education in Islamic theology without having obtained the required

accreditation. Zukorlić monopolised also the issuing of “halal” certificates

which are required for the export of foods to the Muslim countries.

The intensifying international contacts of the mufti and his association with

influential factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina are regarded with suspicion by

the authorities. An alternative religious structure was established in 2007 - the

“Islamic Community of Serbia”. It is headed by an old hand from the times

of Tito – the Belgrade mufti Hamdija Jusufspahić and his family. Formally the

management of the structure is granted to the mufti of the Sandžak Tutin mu-

nicipality Adem Zilkić and the position of his deputy is occupied by Mohamed

Jusufspahić – son of Hamdija. The local imams respectively, depending on their

views and often by virtue of family commitment, divide their loyalty between

the groups of Zukorlić and Jusufspahić. Adem Zilkić was proclaimed Reis-ul-

Ulema, which underlines the complete independence of Serbian Muslims.

Hamdija Jusufspahić received the title of an honorary Grand Mufti.

The existence of two Islamic communities prevented the believers

from availing themselves of the restitution legislation. The social functions

88

of the religious charity, respectively, were made more difficult. The muf-

ti Zukorlić resolved the problem through enforced occupation of former

waqf properties and their management without ownership documents.

Muamer Zukorlić remained at the head of the “Islamic Community

in Serbia” for 22 years – until January 2014, when he resigned and Prof.

Mevlud Dudić – a former associate of his and dean of the Internation-

al University in Novi Pazar - was elected mufti to replace him. Zukorlić.

remained mufti of Sandžak. The Reis-ul-Ulema of Sarajevo – Husein Ka-

vazović, was in personal attendance at Dudić’s inauguration.

In 2016 the leadership of the “Islamic Community of Serbia” was

replaced. It was headed by Sead Jusufović of Bijelo Pole in Sandžak – up

until then the president of the community’s religious court.

Both competing organisations have their supporters among the Alba-

nians in the Preševo valley, where more than 60 mosques are in operation

but the larger part of them are managed by a third institution – the local

structure of the Islamic community of Kosovo.

The “Islamic Community in Serbia” is more active in the field of education.

It controls several primary Muslim schools in different towns and in Novi Pazar –

one high school and a faculty for Islamic studies. The latter trains also teachers

for the Serbian state schools on the subject “Confessions – Islamic Religion”.

There are also students from other countries – mainly from Bosnia and Herze-

govina. The faculty is part of the International University of Novi Pazar.

Political Parties Connected with the Muslim CommunityTwo parties dominate the political life of the Serbian Muslims. They group

around themselves a plethora of smaller parties, the majority of which exist

only on paper. The strongest political figure is the dentist Sulejman Ugljanin,

who in 1991 organised an unrecognised by the authorities referendum on

the autonomy of Sandžak. In this period he established the Party of Demo-

cratic Action. It emerged as an affiliate of the great Bosnian party with the

same name but already in the 1990’s the links between the two parties were

discontinued under pressure from Belgrade. The authorities raised additional

obstructions to the local political leaders by dividing the six municipalities of

the historic Sandžak region among two different administrative regions. Ugl-

89

janin’s biography features a short political exile in Turkey, following which he

returned to Serbia where he was elected on multiple occasions as Member of

Parliament and from 2004 to 2008 he was mayor of Novi Pazar. Sometimes

Ugljanin is nicknamed “the Milošević of Sandžak” and foreign diplomats de-

fine the region as his “feudal fief”. Ugljanin is a member of the government

where he is responsible for the underdeveloped regions.

Ugljanin’s political role is contested only by his former deputy in the

party Rasim Ljajić, who established an autonomous party as far back as in

the 1990’s. He pursues a softer policy towards the authorities in official Bel-

grade and for this reason he is subscribed for a ministerial position in every

government since the democratic changes after the year 2000. Ljajić is a

doctor and was born in Novi Pazar. This allows him to counterbalance Uglja-

nin’s influence, who lacks strong family base in the town and the municipal-

ity. The two leaders are vigorously contesting control over the region and in

certain cases this has provoked physical clashed between their supporters.

The competition is reaching particular heights during elections for the

National Council of the Bosniak Minority. The powers of the National Coun-

cil lie in the fields of education, culture, language and the media. A charac-

teristic of the Bosniaks is that they are almost entirely concentrated in the

Sandžak municipalities which practically transforms their National Council

into a regional parliament. During the 2010 elections Zukorlić opposed the

traditional parties and registered a ballot list of his own supporters. The

matter resulted in a prolonged deadlock. The government did not condone

the mufti’s attempts to unite religion and politics. The Ministry of Human

Rights and Minorities extended ex-officio the mandate of the old National

Council headed by the Member of Parliament from Ugljanin’s party Esad

Džudžević. In response Zukorlić initiated the establishment of a new party –

the Boshiak Democratic Community, led by his brother-in-law Emir Elfić. The

party was registered as a minority party. In this way the mufti walked the

full path to the inclusion of religion in politics. In the 1990’s he was close to

Ugljanin, in the next decade he enjoyed the support of Ljajić and in the end

rejected everyone and became an independent political factor.

The actual balance of forces was tested in 2012 when elections were

held on all possible levels – presidential, parliamentary and local. Zukorlić

90

ostentatiously distanced himself from direct participation in politics stating

that he only supported the Bosniak Democratic Community but in the end

succumbed to the temptation and ran for president. At the first round of

the presidential elections he ranked last-but-one of a total of twelve can-

didates. It should be taken into account that the mufti managed to attract

to his side the votes of the Albanians of the Preševo valley who usually

boycott the election of Serbia’s head of state.

The parliamentary race preserved the balance among the regional par-

ties. Ljajić was elected on the ballot of the Democratic Party which had

governed until then while Ugljanin won two seats independently. The co-

alition of small minority parties organised by Zukorlić won one seat, which

to no one’s surprise was occupied by the mufti’s brother-in-law.

The big political change after the elections reflected on Ugljanin and

Ljajić who were included in the new government. In this way the practical

message of the government on continuity of the policy of ethnic peace

overwhelmed the populist statements that are mandatory for modern

politics and in particular in the Balkans. One of the responsibilities that

Ugljanin obtained in the government was co-chair of the mixed intergov-

ernmental committee with Turkey for bilateral economic cooperation, and

also with Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, etc.

In March 2013 Zukorlić managed to quarrel with his brother-in-law

Emir Elfić. The mufti was forced to establish a new party under the name

of Bosniak Democratic Community of Sandžak. For the early elections in

2014 the mufti’s party joined a coalition led by the Liberal-Democratic Par-

ty of Čedomir Jovanović. The liberal-democrats undertook this step after

their coalition negotiations with Ugljanin failed. The joint ballot failed to

cross the election threshold and remained outside parliament. Ugljanin

won the usual two seats while Ljajić this time was part of the victorious

election coalition of the Progressive Party, led by Aleksandar Vučić.

In the autumn of 2014 the mandate of the minority national councils

also ran out. This time Ugljanin won and he was elected chairman of the

Bosniak Council.

The frequent parliamentary elections played a certain role for the

shifting of the political layers among the Serbian Muslims. Nationwide this

91

diminished Ugljanin’s role, and after the early elections of 2016 Zukorlić

was elected Member of Parliament. At the presidential elections in 2017

both Zukorlić and Ljajić supported the victorious ballot of the incumbent

premier Aleksandar Vučić.

During the entire period after 2000 the political formations of the Al-

banian minority managed to send one or two Members of Parliament to

the different compositions of the Serbian Parliament and to hold control

over local power in the Preševo valley.

Foreign Influence Over the Local Muslim CommunitiesThe Serbian Muslims often seek the support of their fellow believers abroad.

Quite often their sights are set on Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

inter-confessional conflict among the Muslims in Sandžak creates difficulties for

the Turkish government, which at present demonstrates a growing ambition

to play a leading and uniting role for the Balkan Muslims. The Turkish foreign

minister Ahmet Davutoglu appealed officially for the unification of the two

Islamic communities during his visit to Serbia on 25 October 2011. The visit was

preceded by shuttles of the Turkish ambassador and a dispatch of senior Islamic

imams from Turkey to Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in an attempt to

prepare an agreement. The mediation failed. The mufti Jusufspahić, who was

backed continuously by the Serbian government, played a prominent role for

the failure. To the Belgrade authorities the envisaged mechanism, whereby the

Grand Mufti from Sarajevo would approve the head of the Serbian Muslims.

was unacceptable. There was also a problem with Zukorlić who did not agree

to leave the stage and to accept a voluntary exile in Turkey that was offered.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) organised new

attempts at uniting the two Serbian Islamic communities, which envis-

aged that Zukorlić and Zilkić would rescind their leading positions, while

continuing to work as imams in the new structure at a lower level. The

involvement of the Diyanet was interpreted by Zukorlić as a threat and in

August 2013 he accused Turkey that it was financing his opponents. Such

reactions restrict Turkish activity among Serbian Muslims.

The “Islamic Community in Serbia” looked for support in Bosnia and

Herzegovina and initially found it with the member of the collective pres-

92

idency Bakir Izetbegović but the latter withdrew it under the influence of

Ugljanin. Allies are being sought in Bosnia and Herzegovina also through

joining in the hot topics of public debates as the one about the genocide

in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in 1995. The mufti Zukorlić obtained

address registration in the town and later even voted at the municipal

elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Zukorlić continues to count on the Reis-ul-Ulem in Sarajevo. In June

2012 Zukorlić and the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mustafa

Cerić participated in Mecca in the meeting of the Organisation of Islamic

Cooperation (the former Islamic Conference). A paragraph was included

in the official declaration urging Serbia to stop the isolation of the Bos-

nians from Sandžak and of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to undermine the

unity of the Muslim community, not to imperil the waqf properties and

to start supporting the educational and training institutions. Cerić and

Zukorlić were included in the organisation’s Supreme Council.

Mustafa Cerić at the end of his mandate pronounced a religious sen-

tence “fatwa” against the rival Serbian mufti Adem Zilkić. This position

was continued also by the new Grand Mufti of the Islamic community in

Bosnia and Herzegovina Husein Kavazović, who visited Novi Pazar and

participated in various events, organised by Zukorlić.

Processes and Tendencies Among the Islamic Community in the Country – Risks of Radicalisation and Influence of the Islamic State IdeologyThe predisposition to use forceful arguments for the resolution of political dis-

putes among the Serbian Muslims does not allow to consider in pure form the

topic of the risks of the Islamic community’s radicalisation. For example, the

mufti Zukorlić declared 4 September as a day of the martyrs for the freedom

of Sandžak. On this day in 1944 the execution took place of the leaders of the

local Muslim self-defence forces during WWII, who were accused of collabo-

ration with the German occupiers. Subsequently, the initiative was taken over

by Ugljanin. He led the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the execu-

tion of the Sandžak political and military leaders by the communist partisans.

In the great commemoration march the young people wore uniforms of the

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Muslim self- defence forces during the war. The incident caused serious con-

cern throughout the entire country. In the following years the young people

were taking part in the demonstration without uniforms.

After Ugljanin was not included in the new government following

the 2014 elections, he for the first time for many years reminded of the

demand for autonomy of Sandžak. Literally some months earlier Ugljanin

had criticised Zukorlić for a similar demand with the argument that econ-

omy was more important than autonomy.

The topic of the study of the mother tongue is also a sensitive one.

The division of the Yugoslav federation was followed also by the division

of the uniform until then Serbo-Croat language. The Bosniak nation and

its minorities in the former Yugoslav republics defended their right to their

own language. An official start took place in February 2013 in Sandžak

of the teaching of Bosniak language and classes were opened on Bosnian

history and culture. At various instances before that rival Muslim leaders

had accused the government of obstructing the process.

In the course of the 2014 election campaign for national councils

new claims were addressed to the authorities that the rights of Muslims

were not observed. The president of the official Bosniak National Council

Esad Džudžević, who was a leading activist of Ugljanin’s party, organised a

campaign to remove the Serb endings “ić” and “vić” from the names of

Bosniaks and he himself changed his name to Džudžo.

Recruitment of Jihadi FightersMuch more serious alarm is causing the accumulation of information about

Muslims from the region of the former Yugoslav space who die as volunteer

jihadists in Syria. Observers and officials express concern with the spread of

Wahhabism in the region during the entire first decade of the 21st century and

in 2011 an extremist originating from Sandžak fired at the American embas-

sy in Sarajevo. Other Sandžak-born persons. investigated as his accomplices.

were discovered in the following years in Syria. At the beginning of 2014 the

names of the first victims from Sjenica and Novi Pazar were made public. One

more resident of Novi Pazar was added to the list by the end of the year. The

following spring the Ministry of Interior in Belgrade made public information

94

on more than 30 Serbian citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq. In 2015 the chair-

man of the parliamentary committee for oversight of the security services Mo-

mir Stojanović, who is a former director of military intelligence, announced

that 37 persons had gone to fight in Syria and seven of them had died.

A nineteen-year-old woman, who had returned from the battlefields in the

Middle East, was arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over to the

Serbian authorities. She was born in the town of Smederevo on the river Dan-

ube but her patronym was Albanian and her husband was a citizen of Bosnia

and Herzegovina. The borders in the Western Balkans are dangerously perme-

able for the activists of radical Islam. In 2015 the Serbian security services found

out that a theologian from the Kosovo town of Prizren, who had the symbolic

nickname “the Sheikh”, with the help of a Bosniak – citizen of Serbia, used the

mosque in Novi Pazar to urge the worshippers to join the “jihad” in Syria. The

mosque is not a recruitment centre for volunteers but there a connection may

be established with people fighting on behalf of the “Islamic State”.

In 2017 the Serbian Minister of Interior Nebojša Stefanović announced

that 49 persons from Serbia had left to fight on behalf of the “Islamic State”

and that some of them had died while others were still there. Before that Mo-

mir Stojanović spoke of 70 Serbian citizens in the “Islamic State”. An expla-

nation of the differing numbers gave the mufti Zukorlić in March 2018 when

he raised the alarm that eleven Serbian citizens – women and children - had

been detained in a Kurdish camp near the borders of Syria, Iraq and Turkey

and called for their release and return home. There is no doubt that part of

the Serbian jihadists had been accompanied by their families.

Risk of Terrorist Acts, Related to Radical Islamist GroupsAccording to the researcher of Islamic radicalism in the Balkans Christo-

pher Delizo at the early stages of his establishment as a leader Zukorlić

had received financial and moral support from Wahhabi circles both directly

from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran and through the mediation of structures

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Controlled by Zukorlić young Muslim Activists

in Sandžak are being radicalised. They provoked several incidents in 2006-

2007, during which they attacked and threatened moderate local imams,

women in fashionable attire and participants in music concerts. A secret

95

weapons cache was uncovered in 2007 in the vicinity of Novi Pazar con-

taining explosives, uniforms and propaganda literature. The equipment was

received through the existing Wahhabi connections. The participants in the

shooting incident at the American embassy in Sarajevo in 2011 and the

Serbian jihadists in the Middle East originate precisely from these circles.

In the subsequent years the most radical elements were located outside

Serbian territory but with the shift in the course of the military activities in the

Middle East the attention was focused on their homeland again. On 10 July

2015 a threatening video of the “Islamic State” was published on YouTube in

which, against the background of a religious song, a threat is pronounced that

Serbia would be the first target of the jihadists, who after that planned “to bring

back sharia law“ also in the other countries of the Western Balkans. The mes-

sage was published on the day before the Serbian prime-minister Aleksandar

Vučić visited Srebrenica to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the slaughter

of Bosnian Muslims during the war for the Yugoslav succession. During the visit

Vučić was the victim of organised stone-throwing attack. The situation was

exacerbated significantly by the manifold increase of the refugee streams from

the Middle East to Western Europe. It turned out that some of the participants

in the Paris incidents in November 2015 had crossed Serbian territory. Experts

warn that terrorism may escalate into armed clashes in the Balkans.

In March 2016 three “Islamic State” loyalists, who had returned, were

arrested in Kosovo for planning attacks in Serbia. In the summer of the

same year a clip was published in the social media in which armed men

were burning the Serbian flag dressed in uniforms of the Bosnian Muslim

army from the time of the wars in the 1990’s.

In 2016 the mufti Zukorlić was awarded special attention by the “Is-

lamic State” in the form of a video, calling for his assassination and iden-

tifying him as a traitor who had brought disgrace to his position of imam

for having been elected a member of parliament in a Christian state.

A special poll was conducted at the same time which showed that in

Sandžak almost one fifth of young Muslims between the age of 16 and

27 justified violence in the name of faith. Almost a quarter refused to reply

to the question whether they knew what the “Islamic State” was. About

10% replied positively to the question whether it was justifiable to go to

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another country to fight if in this way the faith was defended. According

to sociologists young Muslims in Sandžak are socially isolated and “atom-

ised”. They do not believe the imams, political parties, non-governmental

organisations, neighbours but believe only in their families and partners.

This is loneliness which, coupled with danger on a collective level, easily

generates opening towards radical political opinions.

Such people are susceptible to radical propaganda disseminated through

the social networks. Yet another threatening message from the “Islamic

State” was issued in the summer of 2017 in the specialised on-line maga-

zine “Rumiyah” (Rumelia). In it threats of terrorist attacks were addressed

against the Serbs for the “killings of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo”.

Measures Against the Threat of RadicalisationThe Serbian government pays special attention and undertakes a series of

measures against Islamic radicalisation in the field of legislation, judicial

prosecution and the operation of the special services. This is coupled with

a sustained policy of integrating the Muslim community and its leaders.

It is an indicative example that none other than minister Rasim Ljajić

is raising the alarm and members of parliament from his party are propos-

ing legislative amendments directed against participants in armed conflicts

abroad. At the start of its 2014 autumn session the parliament adopted a law,

providing for imprisonment of Serbian citizens who participate, support or re-

cruit participants in armed conflicts abroad. Implementing exactly these texts

in April 2018 the Specialised Court in Belgrade convicted to a total of 67 years

imprisonment seven persons, accused of terrorism and cooperation with the

“Islamic State”. Three of them were tried in absentia. There are assessments

that the group had sent at least 24 people to the battlefield in Syria.

This case is an example of successful international cooperation. One

of the defendants was deported to Serbia from Turkey. Because of the

links of the Serbian Muslims with their fellow countrymen in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (as far as Bosniaks are concerned) and in Albania, Kosovo

and Western Macedonia (in cases when Albanians are concerned) the Ser-

bian special bodies are collecting targeted information about the process-

es in the respective countries and the possible sources of threats.

97

The policy of integrating the Muslim community is of equal impor-

tance. When forming the local authorities, the big national parties always

try to conclude the necessary coalitions with the local political leaders and

the prominent representatives of the Muslim confession in the respective

municipality. The latter, on their hand, successfully incorporate themselves

in the local and national power structures. The central authorities also

seek a balance and try to have more than one ally in Sandžak. Rasim Ljajić

passed flawlessly from government to government where he was com-

plemented by Sulejman Ugljanin. After 2014 only Ljajić remained minister

but the departure of Ugljanin from the capital enhanced the possibilities

of the mufti Zukorlić for cooperation with the government to such an ex-

tent that after the 2016 elections he received the chairmanship of the Par-

liamentary Committee for education, science, technological development

and information society. Neither were other prominent representatives of

the Muslim community forgotten. Vučić’s government sent Mohamed Ju-

sufspahić as ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Emir Elfić – to the Lebanon.

The efforts were worthwhile. When on June 11, 2015 the Serbian

prime-minister Vučić was attacked with stones in an assault, prepared in

advance during his visit to pay respect to the victims of Srebrenica, which

in itself was a serious challenge for the security of the region, the mufti

Zukorlić made a statement to the news agencies that he supported the

policy of reconciliation pursued by Vučić and wished the prime-minister to

remain committed to the selected course. His statement was followed by

a statement of the Bosniak National Council in the same vein. The appeals

for peace came at the right moment.

A similar coincidental position can be observed with regard to reli-

gious extremism. It is denounced both by Ljajić, who was the sponsor of

the bill, criminalising the participation in foreign military structures, and by

the Boshiak National Council, presided by Ugljanin.

ConclusionsThe observation of the processes within the Muslim community in Serbia cre-

ates the impression of a seemingly paradoxical situation. On the face of it

stand out periodic sharp extreme statements of the leaders about violations

98

of the Muslim’s rights, which often are accepted quite seriously by their sup-

porters. In comparison with the leading figures of the big national parties, as

a matter of fact, this looks like an expression of a “macho” style in the politi-

cians’ rhetoric, who in this way legitimise their leadership presence. A similar

behaviour is part of the Serbian political tradition but is does not always take

account of the voters’ emotions, which are additionally heightened by unem-

ployment, economic backwardness and the growing number of young peo-

ple seeking their realisation in life. The nepotism and political patronage are

an integral part of local politics in a backwater region such as Sandžak. A daily

fight is being waged for control and distribution of the local resources, which

are an extremely important source of influence, livelihood and in certain cases

– even of survival. Local leaders are often inclined to legitimise their public role

with the threat of “external enemies” and by their own declared readiness

to respond in force. This is not always comprehended by their followers, who

often resort even to physical clashes. The party bosses have difficulties in con-

trolling their supporters among the region’s growing unemployment and are

inclined to resort to the dangerous mix of religion and politics and of social

and ethnic problems. Not all members of the community succeed in finding

their own place in this complicated balance. Their feelings are exploited ruth-

lessly and they stand on the verge of emotional stress, which is seeking a vent

to go out. Some find this vent in the temptation of Islamic radicalisation.

Such preconditions may put the relations between Orthodox Chris-

tians and Muslims in Serbia and, for that matter, in the entire former Yu-

goslav space, to the test. In addition, the Albanian problem should also be

taken into consideration, which undoubtedly is a national one, but which

under certain circumstances and the right conditions for radicalisation

may acquire religious dimensions.

Compared to its neighbours, Serbia sends fewer jihadists to the Middle

East. This may be due both to the relatively smaller share of Bosniaks and

Albanians as compared to the rest of the population and to the Yugoslav

legacy, which tolerated secular Islam. In this sense the Serbian Muslims may

become an effective barrier against radicalisation. On the other hand, un-

derestimating the problem may bring about a development of hazardous

tendencies, of which there are hints in the developments of the past years.

99

ISLAM IN TURKEY

Peter Vodenski

Religious Beliefs – Role and Place of IslamThe predominant religion in Turkey is Islam; about 99.8% of the popu-

lation identify themselves as Muslims. According to generally accepted

studies about 80% of modern Turkey’s population are Sunni, and 20%

Shia-Alevis. Islam spread in the lands of present-day Turkey in about

the second half of the 11th century when the Seljuk Turks expanded in

Eastern Anatolia. Since 1517 the Sultan became the only Caliph (from

Arabic – “successor”, “steward”) of the prophet Mohammad, supreme

head of the Islamic Community, performing spiritual and secular leader-

ship of the Islamic world.

After WWI a group of patriotic nationalistic officers and intellectuals,

headed by Mustafa Kemal, refused to accept the peace treaty of Sevre and

started armed action that grew into a war of national liberation. The Republic

of Turkey was established in 1923 (the peace treaty of Lausanne). The republic

was built by Mustafa Kemal, who was named Atatürk (father of the Turks), on

an ideology, resting on six principles: populism, republicanism, nationalism,

laicism, statism (state control of the economy) all this requiring reformism.

Atatürk’s reforms encompassed practically all spheres of Turkish so-

ciety, including the role of religion. The Sultanate was annulled on 1 No-

vember 1922, and the Caliphate on 3 March 1924 (the position of Sheikh-

ul-Islam was also annulled and all religious questions were handed over to

a Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). In subsequent

years women were granted equal rights with men (1926-34), wearing the

fez and hijab was banned (25 November 1925), a Civil Code was adopted

(in March 1925 the sharia courts were disbanded and civil judicial pro-

cedures were introduced), and on 30 November 1925 the religious sects

and orders were closed down. These reforms, in particular in the religious

sphere, were met by strong resistance by the clergy and on certain occa-

sions caused revolts which Atatürk suppressed radically.

Atatürk and his followers regarded organised religion as anachronism,

opposing “civilisation”, which according to them was rational secular cul-

100

ture. When in the 1920’s (and later for that matter) reforms were carried

out in the direction of a secular society, the reformists strived to exclude

religion from the sphere of public policy and to restrict it to personal moral-

ity, behaviour and faith. The aim of these changes was to place Islam under

the control of the state.

Political Parties and their Relations with IslamIn any event, during Atatürk’s time Islam incessantly played inalienable

role in citizens private life. This role grew after the relaxation of political

control in 1946. The newly-established Democratic Party (DP) lead by Ad-

nan Menderes included in its programme some policies aimed at satisfying

the aspirations of the religious circles, which brought it votes at elections.

After the DP came to office, it started gradually to meet the need

for restoring religious education in state schools. In the 1950’s religious

education became obligatory in schools unless parents expressly object-

ed. In 1949 a Faculty for Religious Education at the University of Ankara

was established for training teachers in Islam and imams. In 1951 the

DP government opened a special secondary school (Imam Hatip) for the

education of imams and preachers. In 1982 religious education became

obligatory for the pupils in primary and secondary schools.

In the 1960’s the successor party to the DP was the Justice Party (JP)

headed by Süleyman Demirel, which gradually withdrew from the rural

areas, and the space freed by it was occupied by newly created small

parties with religious orientation. The deep changes in society brought

to the forefront the respective politicians who had the skills to exploit

voters’ religious feelings. Such a politician was Necmettin Erbakan. On

the basis of the” National Outlook” (Millî Görüş) ideology he created

one after the other several pro-religious parties (at the first congress in

1970 of the National Salvation Party, created by Erbakan, it embraced an

Islamist political philosophy and for the first time the chant “Allah-u-Ak-

bar” was heard at a party forum).

Speaking about such politicians, one should point out also the role of

the current President Tayyip Recep Erdoğan. He was a member of Erbakan’s

Welfare Party, in 1994 he was elected mayor of Istanbul; after the party

101

relinquished power (under the pressure of the military) and its ban he was

sentenced to four months imprisonment. In 2001 he established the Jus-

tice and Development Party (JDP) which won the parliamentary elections in

November 2002. The court record of Erdoğan, burdened by imprisonment,

prevented him initially from becoming prime-minister but later the law was

amended. In 2014 he was elected President and after the win at the 2017

referendum on amending the Constitution and the transformation of the

republic’s form of government from parliamentary to presidential, in 2018

he was elected President and headed the executive. In parallel, Erdoğan

preserved his position of party leader.

One of the reasons that in the 1970’s and 1980’s Islam underwent

political renaissance was that the leaders right of centre regarded religion

as a lever in the fight against left and leftist ides, which were becoming

socially popular. A very powerful and influential group of intellectuals, or-

ganised in the so-called “Intellectual Hearth” (Aydınlar Ocağı), emerged,

which preaches that the true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turkish

traditions before the adoption of Islam and the tenets of Islam itself.

Attitude of the State Institutions Towards the Islamic Communities, Existence of Islamic Trends and Religious OrganisationsThe tolerant attitude of the state towards Islam leads to the development

of private initiatives, including construction of new mosques and religious

educational establishments in the cities, establishment of Islamic centres

for research and holding conferences dedicated to Islam, development of

Islamic newspapers and magazines, opening of Islamic health centres and

orphanages, as well as financial institutions and cooperatives. In 1994 the

first Islamic TV channel (Channel 7) began broadcasting first in Istanbul

and later also in Ankara.

Turkey was the first Muslim country which in 1925 officially banned

women from wearing hijab. For the first time in 1984 the then prime-minister

Turgut Özal, following the policy of “synthesis with Islam”, rescinded this ban,

but under public pressure from secular circles in society he restored the ban

in 1987. In 2008 Erdoğan’s government made a new attempt to remove this

ban in the universities, but the Constitutional Court left it in place. In 2010 the

102

ban was lifted and in 2013 the wearing of hijab was allowed in government

offices. In 2014 the ban to wear hijab was lifted for the upper classes in the

state schools. In 2015 the Supreme Military Court of Turkey annulled the ban

on wearing hijab by relatives of servicemen when visiting barracks.

Islamic sects, movements and organisations like Nakşibendi, Bektashi,

Nurcu, etc. developed too. They also have their own media. It is believed

that their membership includes a substantial part of the Turkish politi-

cal, economic and cultural elite (it is a well-known fact that the former

prime-minister Turgut Özal was a member of Nakşibendi and it is thought

of Erdoğan as being “very close” to Nakşibendi). The members of Sü-

leymancılar (Sūlaymanites) – more than 100 000 persons – do not con-

sider themselves an Islamic order but “followers”. In their ranks there

are ministers, members of parliament, founders of political parties (after

the formation of the JDP the Sūlaymanites divided politically between the

Motherland Party and the JDP). They carry out humanitarian, educational

work in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Sweden and

Switzerland – a total of 1 700 associations. Before the June 2018 elections

support for Erdoğan and JDP was expressed also by 14 organisations of

the Salafites (there are claims that Turkish Salafites have taken part in the

fighting in Syria on the side of the radical groups).

The religious charity foundation Maarif (there are rumours that it is

under the control of President Erdoğan) not without help from Diyanet

and TIKA (Development agency), as well as from other humanitarian or-

ganisations serving as cover for the intelligence service MIT (Milli istihbarat

teşkilati), is currently implanting itself in the place of FETO (Gülen move-

ment), and not only in Tukey itself but also in the Balkan countries and

among the Turkish communities in Western Europe, which FETO had pen-

etrated through educational establishments, libraries and foundations.

In the last years the influence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Di-

yanet), established by Ataturk, is growing. The budget of this Directorate,

subordinated directly to the President, amounts to billions of dollars. In 2002

its budget was USD 325 million and in 2016 – in excess of USD 2 billion,

which is by 40% more than the budget of the ministry of interior and equals

the budgets of the ministries of foreign affairs, energy and culture together.

103

The Directorate takes care of the construction and maintenance of

mosques (almost 100 thousand in Turkey), of the wages of the imams,

etc. It allocates resources also to the Islamic communities abroad – in the

Balkans, in the Western countries with Turkish communities, etc., where

it tries to send its imams and preachers, and to carry out work among

them, including intelligence work. After the coup attempt in 2016 the

Diyanet ordered its employees abroad to monitor and report on activities

of Gülenists and hundreds of intelligence reports from dozens of countries

were sent to Ankara. The Diyanet has 150 thousand employees which

practically means an entire army of Islamism. The Diyanet has licence to

create its own media – TV and radio stations, newspapers, magazines.

After 2011 the Diyanet started to issue fatwas on request and their

number is growing steadily. At the end of 2015, for example, the fatwas

explained that “one should not keep dogs at home, should not celebrate

the Christian New Year, should not play lottery, neither have tattoos”. The

establishment newspaper “Yeni Şafak” (advocates the policy of the JDP)

publishes these fatwas periodically. However, although the Diyanet is a gov-

ernment body the fatwas issued by it do not have (at least so far) the oblig-

atory character of a law in Turkey.

During the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, the

opposition defined as a sort of interference in the election struggle in

Turkey the support for the JDP by the Muslim clergy and in particular their

active campaign in favour of Erdoğan. For this purpose religious evenings

(iftar) and the Muslim places of worship were used (during the prayers ap-

peals were made for support of the JDP and Erdoğan’s portrait was placed

in every mosque or in front of its entrance).

It should be pointed out that the Diyant takes care only of the Sunnis

and the Alevis are deprived of such care. This creates a certain inequali-

ty since all Turkish citizens pay taxes (from which the budget is formed)

regardless of the practiced religion (the Alevis visit their own places of

worship – cemevi and their preachers are called “dede”).

It should be taken into account that a main pillar of secularism in the

Republic of Turkey were the military, they were considered the staunch-

est supporters of Atatürk’s legacy. After WWII the Turkish military made

104

four coup-d’etats, one attempt at a coup and were charged once of an

attempted coup (the charge was dropped later) – all this to prevent (in

their judgment) the deviation of certain politicians from the principles of

Atatürkism, the Islamisation of society and the threats to national security.

It should be definitely underlined that the gradual erosion of the role of

the military in Turkish politics, their expulsion to the sidelines led – in addi-

tion to other consequences – to the undermining of the secular tenets of

Atatürk’s legacy. This expulsion happened not without help from Europe.

Islam and the Foreign Policy of TurkeyDuring the different periods of its development the Republic of Turkey has

used Turkish/Turkic nationalism and the Muslim religion for the purpos-

es of its foreign policy in the countries where the Ottoman Empire once

ruled. Depending on the circumstances and the historic period this was

based on the ideology of “pan-Turkism”, and later “pan-Islamism”, “Tur-

kic-Islamic synthesis”, “strategic depth” but the purpose had always been

the same – strengthening the position of Turkey among these countries.

Presently Turkey is a regional factor with ambitions to become a global

one. In order to gain advantages for its policy, in the course of its conduct

Turkey uses all available hybrid means – political, military, “soft power” for

establishing influence over Turkic and Muslim groups in the neighbouring

countries. This is done through various tools: intelligence service (MIT), the

Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the Cooperation and Coordina-

tion Agency (TIKA), the “Yunus Emre” Institute, the Agency of the Turks

Abroad, NGO’s, political and party engineering in the countries where

conditions allow, etc. The modus operandi is “what is possible is enough”.

Erdoğan’s first visits after he was elected President in 2018 were in Azer-

baijan and in the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. At both places

Erdoğan used the phrase “… we are the same people divided in two states”.

Relations with the states of the Western Balkans traditionally have pri-

ority significance for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey often regards them

through the prism of the Ottoman historic legacy, which at times brings

about contradictory results and leads to exacerbating the existing historic

burdens and prejudices. The Western Balkans are for Turkey the territory

105

on which it has to exert influence through the Turkic-Muslim element,

starting from Albania, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, Koso-

vo and Macedonia, through Thrace (Bulgaria and Greece). But Turkey’s

aspirations do not end here. What follows is the Black Sea (Crimea – the

cause of the Crimean Tartars and the Gagauz in Bessarabia, particularly in

Moldova where in less than 30 years the local Gagauz population – Ortho-

dox but speaking a Turkic language – were subjected to intensive “soft”

cultivation that they are Turks), and further East – the Caucasus (with the

Turkic-Muslim element among the local population), Central Asia up to

the Uygur region in China.

The basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy vis a vis the Republic of

Macedonia are to build an image of “protector” and closest ally of Skopje,

always underlining the role of the Muslims in the Republic of Macedonia.

Turkey officially defines the Bosnian Muslims as a “brother nation” and Sa-

rajevo, together with Skopje, is one of the Balkan capitals mentioned most

often in President Erdoğan’s speeches in the context of the promoted vision

of the existence of a group of states upon which Turkish power is projected

in the form of influence, protection and solidarity. For many years now the

JDP has supported the Bosnian leader Bakir Izetbegović through nurturing

among the Muslims the cult of his father – Alija Izetbegović. According to

the TV series “Alija” of the Turkish state TV (filmed in Sarajevo and Mostar)

on his deathbed Alija “had bequeathed Bosnia to Erdoğan and had asked

him to take care of the country”. The Turkish state leadership prioritises rela-

tions with Kosovo, which is justified with argument that the residents there

are Turkish citizens of Albanian origin. Albania is perceived as “friendly and

brotherly” (as opposed to the other countries in the region – with Serbia

the Turkish side develops relations and increases its influence mainly on the

basis of economic cooperation using TIKA).

Also interesting is the question of the so-called FETO (Gülen move-

ment – some characterise it also as a Muslim sect), accused as the or-

ganiser of the unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016. Alongside the hun-

dreds of thousands of supporters of the preacher, subjected to subse-

quent persecution, the Turkish side undertook the persecution of such

persons abroad too through a different set of tools. For example, in

106

Kosovo. Azerbaijan and the Ukraine MIT conducted operations for the

“extraction” to Turkey of so-called Gülenists (as a matter of fact Kosovo

politicians expressed public disagreement with the operation, which was

carried out without their knowledge). There was an attempt of such an

operation also in Mongolia.

The existence of Turkish and Muslim communities in West European

countries is used by Ankara in the election struggle – there were such

cases both before the referendum for the amendment of the Constitution

(April 2017) and before the elections for President and Majlis in 2018.

Apparently, this was characterised as a problem for some of the countries

like the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, which

did not permit such election propaganda on their territory (this caused

deterioration of their relations with Turkey).

The activity of the preachers sent by the Diyanet to other countries

also causes problems in some countries. An indication of this is the case of

Austria, where in the period of the election campaign for President and Ma-

jlis in Turkey among the Turkish citizens abroad the government decided to

close down seven mosques (six related to the Arab community and one to

the Turkish) and extradited six imams (all related to the Turkish community).

This decision was the result of established violations of the Law on Islam and

the Law on the Non-Profit Legal Persons related to the licencing regime, the

form of financing and the advocating of extreme Islam. A similar incident

happened also before the Bulgarian parliamentary election in 2017 – the

caretaker government applied a so-called “compulsory administrative mea-

sure” in relation of six Turkish citizens (two of them were imams sent by the

Diyanet with diplomatic passports), who were obliged to leave the country.

As a matter of fact, a similar measure was applied by the Bulgarian Gov-

ernment also in 2006 in relation to a diplomat (attaché) from the Turkish

Consulate General in Burgas (he had also been sent by the Diyanet).

At present there are eleven political parties in the European countries

founded by “Muslims or with predominantly Muslim membership”. In

France there are three such parties, in Spain – two, in Bulgaria – three, in

Austria, the Netherlands and Greece – one. According to publications in the

Turkish media, these parties are financed by official Ankara through different

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instruments. It is interesting that with the exception of Bulgaria in all other

countries these are marginal organisations with “insignificant influence” on

the policies of the respective country. In the period of the caretaker govern-

ment in Bulgaria prior to the early parliamentary elections in the spring of

2017 the Turkish ambassador in Sofia was invited to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and his attention was drawn to the inadmissibility of interference in

the country’s internal affairs in the form of party-political engineering.

An interesting aspect of Turkish foreign policy is also its policy toward

Islamic countries. As opposed to the times of Atatürk, at present Turkey em-

phasises by all possible means the common Muslim base for the relations with

these countries. Ankara proclaimed itself as the most ardent defender of the

Palestinian cause, which on the other hand caused problems with Israel.

Ankara used to maintain discreet relations with military and political groups

opposing Bashar Assad in Syria, traded with energy resources with the “Islamic

State” (when a journalist published a story that the lorries, transporting the

fuel, were with registration plates of Turkish intelligence, he, together with the

newspaper’s editor, was confined to prison for “disseminating classified infor-

mation”). With its military operations in Afrin and Manbidj, as well as in Iraq,

Turkey demonstrated that it is an unsurmountable factor in the region.

In spite of the confrontation along the Sunni-Shia line, there are many del-

icate links between Turkey and Iran, related mainly to the sects Nakşibendi and

Süleymancılar (Sūlaymanites). There are “reasonable assumptions” that these

links are supervised and maintained by MIT. The intelligence service is using the

Islamic banks in Iran in which there are assets of present-day Turkish leaders.

Processes and Tendencies in the Islamic Community – Risks of Radicalisation, Influence of the “Islamic State” Ideology, Recruitment of Jihadist FightersThe existence in Turkey of jihadists (including Turkish citizens) – fighters of

ISIL cannot be excluded, but what is more important is that Turkey tries to

monitor and neutralise such fighters and strives to be recognised as “the

staunchest opponent of jihadism, a barrier before the jihadists trying to go

to Europe, protector of the European countries from terrorism”. Officially

Erdoğan denies any involvement with ISIL.

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At the same time, persons in opposition to Erdoğan who have found

refuge in Western Europe claim that there were links between Erdoğan

and members of Al-Qaeda, especially during the “Arab Spring” and subse-

quently, when he tried to take part in the installation of proxy regimes from

Tunisia and Libya to Egypt and Syria. According to these persons Erdoğan

interfered in the judiciary in the Van vilayet, preventing the conviction of a

local resident (Osman Nuri Gülaçar – an imam on the payroll of the Diyanet)

for links with Al Qaeda, and in his capacity of prime-minister refused to an-

swer a parliamentary enquiry in relation to this incident. Moreover, the same

Gülaçar appeared on top of the ballot papers for the June 2018 elections.

The question “Does Turkey look like a secular state today?” is being

asked not infrequently and moreover not just in philosophic terms. Under

the Constitution the country observes secular laws and not the Sharia. But

if one compares present-day Turkey with what the country used to be, for

example, 40 years ago or to the situation prior to 2002 (Erdoğan’s coming

to office), one would notice inevitably exceptional changes in the religious

field. Tens of thousands of new mosques have been built on the country’s

territory (just in the period 2002-2013 17 000 new mosques were built, and

a significant part of the ones, remaining from Ottoman times, were renovat-

ed). The existing ban on wearing hijab by the public employees – teachers,

lawyers, parliamentarians, etc. was lifted by the JDP. In November 2015 a

female judge became the first judge to preside in court wearing a hijab. And

in August of the same year Ms Ayşen Gürcan became the first Turkish gov-

ernment minister wearing a hijab. The Imam Hatip schools train students

to become imams. In 2002 there were 65 000 students in such schools, in

2013 their number was already 658 000, and in 2016 they reached one

million. Compulsory religious courses were introduced in schools. Initially,

when organising courses on the Quran, the children who had expressed a

wish, had to be at least twelve years of age. This was abolished by the JDP

government, and in 2013 such pilot courses were introduced also for chil-

dren of pre-school age. In 2013 the JDP adopted a law, prohibiting adver-

tising and sale of alcohol drinks within a radius of 100 metres of mosques

and schools. The TV broadcasters were obliged to dim or cut out from their

broadcasts scenes, showing alcohol drinks.

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Opinion polls indicate that 56.3% of the Turkish population consider

Turkey not a secular but an Islamic country (in 2015 this figure was 5%, in

2016 – 37.5%, and in 2017 – 39.9%). Almost 50:50 were the responses

to the question whether the country was with “western” or “eastern”

orientation, and on the assessment whether Turkey had the characteristics

of a European or Middle Eastern country the latter prevailed by 54.4%.

In modern Turkish society voices are also heard that lately among the

youngest part of the population a withdrawal from Islam and a sort of turn

to deism (belief in God but without a religion) and even atheism can be ob-

served. This was recognised even in a report, discussed in April 2018 in Kon-

ya (a conservative town in Anatolia). Right-wing pundits attribute this fact

to the penetrating from the West “hedonist, materialistic and decadent”

influence, while others attribute it to the raging corruption, arrogance, nar-

row-mindedness and spitefulness, which can be observed among the elite

otherwise loyal to Islam. As a reason the latter point to the excessive referral

to Islam by JDP activists (e.g. a party functionary declared at a rally in an

Istanbul district that “if we lose the elections, we shall lose Jerusalem and

Mecca”, as if Islam could not exist if JDP was not in office). Turkish students

studying in Western European universities often think that Erdoğan is not a

true Muslim, believing unreservedly in Islam, but rather is exploiting religion

to attain his political objectives.

Conclusions Obviously, Islam has very deep roots in Turkey. During the Ottoman Empire the country observed Sharia law and the Sultan was Caliph (representative of Mohamad on Earth). The reforms of Atatürk in this field displaced Islam from the centre of public life but it continued to govern people’s personal morality, behaviour and faith. After Atatürk’s death and particularly in the period of the emergence of a real multi-party system (1946-1950) Islam gradually started to play a more prominent role, and not just as a private faith but also in the political system where it is “creeping” to occupy an ever more serious place. For Turkey this is, obviously, a constant process, although the country is still secular in terms of political system.

At present Erdoğan is inclined to use Islam in politics for his own pur-poses but the process of strengthening the religious Islamic factor in do-

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mestic and in foreign policy is acquiring natural momentum, it cannot be stopped by force of will and it is unforeseeable when it will cross the limit, set for it by Erdoğan

In its foreign policy under Atatürk Turkey used actively the Turkic fac-tor in neighbouring and more distant countries (pan-Turkism), while the Islamic factor was placed on the back-burner in view of the principle of the secular state in the ideology of reformism. After the beginning of the return of Islam to the domestic policy, pan-Turkism is complemented by pan-Islamism (influence through the Islamic factor in neighbouring and more distant countries) additionally developed into “Turkic-Islamic syn-thesis” and “strategic depth” – neo-Ottomanism. Turkey establishes links with different Islamist groups in the Balkans, the Middle East, as far away as the Uygur region, provides refuge to compromised members of these groups. The instruments of this policy are the intelligence service (MIT), the Development Agency (TIKA) and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). MIT, for example, carries out secret/dark operations for kidnap-ing Gülenists from other countries, for the time being just from Kosovo, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Mongolia.

There are grounds to expect that this policy will continue even after the actual transformation of Turkey from a parliamentary into a presi-dential republic with an extreme concentration of power in the hands of President Erdoğan.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Prof. Iskra Baeva, PhD teaches modern history at the Faculty of History of the Sofia University “Kliment Ohridski”. She has specialised in Poland and the USA, participated in national and international projects on the Cold War, the transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21th century. She has authored many books and studies on Cold War history, Central Europe, the Soviet Union/Russia, Bulgarian history at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, history of the Jews in this region, etc.

Biser Banchev, PhD has graduated from the Sofia University “Kliment Ohridski” in modern Balkan history and has obtained a PhD degree there. He works at the Institute for Balkan studies with a Centre on Thracian Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in the “Modern Balkans” section. His scholarly interests are related to modern history of Serbia and Montenegro, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, nationalism, geopolitics and international relations in the Western Balkans. He is a member of the editorial boards of the magazines ‘Geopolitika” (Sofia) and “Međunarodna politika” (Belgrade).

Bobi Bobev is a longtime associate at the Institute for Balkan studies with a Centre on Thracian Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He teaches lecture courses for bachelors and masters at the Sofia University “Kliment Ohridski” and the New Bulgarian University. He has authored dozens of studies and articles of teaching and reference literature, popular science publications. In the period 1997-1998 he was a member of the Public Council on Ethnic and Religious Issues with the President of the Republic, and as of 2017 of a similar structure at the same institution on the issues of Bulgarians abroad. Ambassador of Bulgaria in Albania (1998-2006) and in Kosovo (2010-2014).

Peter Vodenski is a former ambassador of Bulgaria in the Republic of Tur-key (1991-1992), the Republic of Moldova (1995-2001) and the Republic of Cyprus (2005-2009), consul-general in Istanbul (1990). He has worked in different departments and directorates of the Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs. He was Director for European countries and for foreign policy anal-yses and coordination (political planning), on two occasions he was head of the political cabinet of the Minister. At present he is a consultant at the Diplomatic Institute with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Speaks English, Russian, French and Turkish.

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Lyubomir Kyuchukov is a career diplomat. Doctor in politology. Member of the Council on European Integration at the Council of Ministers and of the Council on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration with the President of Bulgaria (2001-2005). Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005-2009), Ambassador of Bulgaria in the UK (2009-2012). Currently he is Director of the Economics and International Relations Institute.

Lyubcho Neshkov, journalist and owner of the BGNES Information Agen-cy. He has worked for the “Standart” newspaper and for the Bulgarian National Television. He was war correspondent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. He has graduated from history studies.

Lyubcho Troharov is a career diplomat. Head of Balkan Countries De-partment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991-1994). He has worked in the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade and as Ambassador in Croatia (1994-1997) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002-2007). At present he is a mem-ber of the Board of the Macedonian Scientific Institute in Sofia.

BALKAN ISLAMA BARRIER OR A BRIDGE

FOR RADICALISATION?

Economics and International Relations Institute