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A Bridge over Turbulent Waters

An Historical Analysis of the Australia-Indonesia Relationship through the Lens of Irregular Migration

Carly Gordyn

February 2020

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of

The Australian National University

© Copyright by Carly Gordyn 2020

All Rights Reserved

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Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma

in any university. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it contains no material previously published

or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Carly Gordyn

February 2020

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For Dedo, who always encouraged me to be a Doctor (I’m not sure this is the kind he had in mind)

and without his brainings this would not be possible –

and for Baba, of course:

Evoga.

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Acknowledgments

As the years went by, I mentally drafted multiple versions of these acknowledgments as a way to visualise my completion of this PhD, something which, at many times, I wasn’t sure I could actually do. Now the moment has arrived and I am completely overwhelmed and lost for words. This is a good segue, actually, because if there was ever a time I have struggled with words I could always count on the advice from my supervisor and chair of panel, Associate Professor Luke Glanville. Luke has an incredible way of crafting the written word, which is a talent I have no doubt he was born with and something which one can only hope to learn. He has been the only one to walk this journey with me right from Day One. Thank you, Luke, for sticking with me right from the start and seeing this through to the end, for believing in me and in this project, especially at the times when I did not. For always finding kind things to say and for being my biggest fan, thank you!

I was fortunate to have a wonderful panel of advisors. Dr Benjamin Zala, who, as it turns out, was the Frodo in this story and the completion of this thesis was the Mordor. Infinite thanks for getting me to Mordor, Ben! Thank you also for the endless supply of cheer and enthusiasm, its infectious and appreciated! I am immensely grateful for your willingness to not only jump on board but also really invest in this project, thank you for all your help! Professor Bina D’Costa and Associate professor Jacinta O’Hagan, thank you for supporting this project and encouraging me to see it through. Thank you to Dr Benjamin Day, who was like a big brother to me even before I had started my PhD. I was only applying for the PhD program when he was in his first year and already offering me advice. He was a colleague and mentor before officially joining my panel, and all the while a wonderful friend. Ben you have been super perceptive, proactive and attentive to not only my project, but also my physical, mental, and spiritual health, for this, and unlimited borrowing access to your personal library, I cannot thank you enough.

Thank you also to my “cheer squad” – those who met me on this journey when I needed them most, and who graciously volunteered their time and efforts to reading drafts and encouraging me over the finish line: Professor Michael Leach, Professor Peter McCawley, Dr Don Greenlees and Professor Virginia Hooker. Thank you for your time and wisdom, and for being passionate about the next generation of scholars and Indonesianists. Thanks also to Dr Devin Bowles and Professor David Scott FitzGerald for their guidance and encouragement. I am not sure any of you could ever know how much your time and attention meant to me, thank you again.

I would like to thank the supportive members of the IR department, both current and former. Thank you to all those who attended our Women of IR sessions and formed a supportive community. Thank you especially to Professor Emerita Lorraine Elliott, who has been a wonderful role model and mentor to myself and the women of our department. Thank you for your generous time and care, Lorraine, your support was invaluable and will never be forgotten. Thank you to Marylou Hickey, whose presence alone warms our department. Thank you to Assistant Professor Vanessa Newby who has always been supportive intellectually, mentally and emotionally, even at a distance. Thank you to Dr Matt Davies, who has supported me at various stages from HDR convener to the Head of Department. Thanks to Dr Maria Tanyag and Dr Claire Benn for the support, and to Associate Professor Cian O’Driscoll, who, with impeccable timing, helped me survive the final sprint to the finish line. Thank you all for your support!

I would like to extend this thanks to the supportive members of the wider ANU community. Especially to Dr Garth Pratten and Di Storey, who were proactive supporters of all the Bell School’s PhD students. Under their management of the PhD program I felt fully supported by my school and equipped with the resources and facilities to finish. Thank you to Associate Professor Inger Mewburn and Victoria Firth-Smith, Dr Cally Guerin, Alexander Van Der Meer Simo, Danny Kenny and all those who facilitated ANU Thesis Boot Camp, TBC Veteran’s Writing Days and Shut Up and Write sessions. For creating and nurturing that vital sense of community while also encouraging words on a page, thank you. To all the members, current and former, of the Bell School Writers’ Group: David Oakeshott, Dr Meabh Cryan, Dr Anna Samson, Dr Timothea Turnbull, Tereza Kobelkova, Anita Togolo, Shaun Gessler, Dr Gerard McCarthy, and Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi. Thank you for your critical and constructive eyes, and for your friendship, no less.

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Thanks especially to my community on the other side of the world: Maaike Derksen, Sara Respati, Lukas Maximilian Müller, Yasmin Khan, TJ Hughes and Katha Peters. To my own PhD cohort, I am extremely grateful for your company and collegiality throughout the whole process, to name but a few: Dr Gail Ma, Dr Ruji Auethavornpipat, Dr Richard Salmons, Dr Caitlin Mollica, Sophie Saydan, Naomi Atkins, Dr Alana Moore, Dr Claire Cronin, Kerri Ng, Zohra Akhter, Astari Daenuwy, Annebelle Davis, Bhavani Kannan, Susan Hutchinson, Myra Mentari, Ristiyan Supriyanto, Gatra Priyandita, and Nicola Mathieson. Gail and Sophie, thank you for being my much-needed big sisters and amazing office mates! Astari Daenuwy, kakak, thank you for being by my side in the craziest of all times. Your friendship, strength and smiling face has made these last few months not only bearable, but enjoyable. Thank you for sharing the laughter and the tears, and the laughter that became tears. I could not have done this without you, and your role in this will never be forgotten. My story of submission will always be marked fondly with memories of you. Terima kasih, kakak.

I am very grateful to the ANU for the opportunities I have been afforded. I wish to acknowledge the ANU for the Vice Chancellor’s Travel Grant and the Ruth Daroesman Study Grant. None of this would be possible without the Research Training Program Stipend Scholarship, nor without the Australian government’s funding for education and fee offset which makes further education possible for first-in-family students like myself. I am also deeply appreciative of the Australian Government’s Endeavour Research Fellowship and opportunities this brought about.

I wish to extend my immeasurable gratitude to the institutions which hosted me and conferences that inspired me. Thank you to my hosts at the CSIS in Jakarta, Bapak Jusuf Wanandi, Ibu Clara Joewono, Christine Susanna Tjhin and Lina Alexandra; at the CRS at York University in Toronto Professor Jennifer Hyndman, Johanna Reynolds, Michele Millard and all those in the CRS Summer School; all those at the Habibie Centre in Jakarta; Professor David Cantor and all those involved with the RLI at the University of London; the organisers and participants of the PhD Research Colloquium at the University of Essex and the International Conference for Human Rights, Multiculturalism, and Migration at the University of Jember; and those at the 2019 UQ Theory Forum. Thank you also to the friendly, helpful staff at the National Archives of Australia and at the UNHCR archives in Geneva.

There are, of course, plenty outside of academia to whom I am indebted. For all friends and family who generously donated and provided food and caffeine, thank you, and I owe you! Mariana, Ashley, Patty and Tim, I am so grateful for your support. To my family, my mum and my dad, who were patient with me and never stopped me following my dreams, thank you for believing in me and raising me to be capable of this. Thank you to my Nanna and to Baba and Dedo, who offered unconditional love and support and encouragement, and who have only cared for my happiness. Dedo, you had always told me to become a doctor and to put my energy into my studies: evoga. Thanks Jeanie for the wheels which saw me safely home on late nights. Thank you to every one of my housemates over the years for your comfort and support, thank you Jag and Joel for being my family and making Canberra home. And to my rocks, those who sent me meals, care packages, picked up the phone and called, washed my clothes and fixed the house, who allowed me to be weak and pushed me onwards, this is for you and because of you: my cousin Sarah Simic, my Aunty Kris and Uncle Tim Lance. Your support was unwavering. You offered it at times I did not know how to ask. I am lost for words in how to express my gratitude to you. From the bottom of my heart, thank you for being the only rocks I had to stand on when everything around me turned to quicksand. I can never repay you enough, and you mean the world to me. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

To the people who have gone as a result of or during this PhD, you also must be acknowledged, for this thesis is also your absence.

And finally, but most importantly, to all those who participated in this research, who gave their time to be interviewed, thank you – this would not be possible without you. This thesis is for all those people who have had their movement restricted by states and have been denied their rights to seek and enjoy asylum. May you someday find your refuge, and may we do better by you.

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Abstract

The story we are often told about the Australia-Indonesia relationship is that it is a turbulent one – marked by frequent successes and setbacks. And it is no wonder, considering the differences between these two neighbouring countries: they are different historically, culturally, linguistically, religiously, and politically. The issue of irregular migration is another area of difference, as the two countries face the issue from different positions: Australia is a destination country while Indonesia is a transit country, combatting irregular migration is a top priority for Australia but it is not for Indonesia, and while Australia is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), Indonesia is not. Nevertheless, Australia and Indonesia work together in preventing the movement of irregular migrants, exemplified by their co-hosting of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (hereafter: the Bali Process), which was established in 2002. Considering their various differences, this cooperation raises questions about how and why Australia and Indonesia work together in this field and what principles underlie their management of irregular migration.

While much of the scholarly literature focusses on Australia and Indonesia’s most recent management of irregular migration – especially since the establishment of the Bali Process – the two countries have actually been working together on issues around irregular migration since the 1960s, a history thus far overlooked. The purpose of this thesis is to examine this missing history and to ask of it: how have Australia and Indonesia cooperated in managing irregular migration since the 1960s? In answering this question, I examine three instances of ‘cooperation’ between Australia and Indonesia in the management of irregular migration: border crossers in Papua New Guinea (1965-1973), the Indochinese refugee crisis (1975-1979), and the boat arrivals of the late 90s and early 2000s which resulted in the establishment of the Bali Process (1991-2002). For each case, I analyse historical archives and triangulate this data with semi-structured interviews of Australian and Indonesian policymakers. My examination of these cases draws upon the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subfield of International Relations (IR) to consider factors below the ‘unitary state’ level that drive, inhibit and foster cooperation on irregular migration and under what conditions.

This research has uncovered a number of factors that have shaped cooperation, including leaders – especially at the lower levels – and their strategic outlook; domestic public opinion; interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships; the role of the media, and; the international political context in which cooperation occurs. But the ubiquitous and generally overlooked factor underpinning this cooperation was the role that trust played – its presence, absence and attempts at building it at various levels – not just at the leadership level, but also at the bureaucratic level.

This thesis makes new contributions to knowledge in a number of ways. First, this thesis is the first longue durée study of Australia and Indonesia’s management of irregular migration. Second, this thesis speaks to the role and motivations of transit countries in pursuing the border control policies of a destination state. Third, by examining one foreign policy problem between Australia and Indonesia throughout time, this thesis sheds light on how this often-turbulent bilateral relationship operates, despite significant and repeated pressures. Finally, by highlighting the central role of trust in Australia-Indonesia relations, this thesis underscores just how important long-term investments in institutional and personal relationships will be to ensure these neighbours are able to enjoy productive international relations into the future.

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Table of Contents

Declaration ................................................................................................................................... i

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... iii

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... v

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ vi

List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... ix

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ x

List of Characters ........................................................................................................................ xi

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

Australia, Indonesia and Irregular Migration: A New Pebble in the Shoe? ........................................ 3

Research Design ................................................................................................................................ 14

Research Findings ............................................................................................................................. 15

New Guinea ................................................................................................................................... 16

Indochina ...................................................................................................................................... 17

The Bali Process ............................................................................................................................ 18

Research Contribution ...................................................................................................................... 19

Plan of the Thesis .............................................................................................................................. 20

2. Mapping the Field & Research Approach ................................................................................. 21

Understanding Irregular Migration as a Foreign Policy Problem ..................................................... 21

Understanding the Australia-Indonesia Relationship ....................................................................... 27

Understanding Cooperation in International Relations .................................................................... 38

Why do States Cooperate? ........................................................................................................... 39

How do States Cooperate? ........................................................................................................... 43

Research Approach and Methodology ............................................................................................. 46

Research Approach: Foreign Policy Analysis ................................................................................. 46

Research Design ............................................................................................................................ 48

Research Process .......................................................................................................................... 50

Research Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 53

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 57

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3. 1962-1973: New Guinea ......................................................................................................... 58

The Start of a Friendship ................................................................................................................... 61

Hitting the Rocks ............................................................................................................................... 65

Sharing a Border ............................................................................................................................... 69

The Transfer .................................................................................................................................. 69

The Border .................................................................................................................................... 70

Border Crossers ................................................................................................................................. 73

A Lack of Trust ............................................................................................................................... 74

Trust Building ................................................................................................................................ 76

Hot Pursuit and Departmental Differences .................................................................................. 87

Balancing Act ..................................................................................................................................... 93

The International Refugee Regime ............................................................................................... 94

Application of the Refugee Convention in New Guinea ............................................................... 96

The UNHCR’s Involvement .......................................................................................................... 100

West Papuan Asylum Seekers in Recent Decades .......................................................................... 102

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 106

4. 1976-1979: The Indochinese Crisis ........................................................................................ 109

The Indochinese Crisis: the ‘First Wave’ of Boats ........................................................................... 112

Seeking Indonesia’s Cooperation .................................................................................................... 116

Australia makes an offer easily refused: Refugees in Merak ...................................................... 118

Bureaucracies: No Unity, No Assurances .................................................................................... 121

A Looming Federal Election and the Arrival of the Song Be 12 ...................................................... 124

A Test Case for Cooperation: The Hong Kiang ................................................................................ 128

The Run-Around: Boat VNSG-1028 ............................................................................................. 131

Australia obtains Agreement, then gives Indonesia the Run-Around ............................................ 136

A Great and Powerful Friend: Seeking US Help .............................................................................. 139

The Gentlemen’s Agreement .......................................................................................................... 143

Testing the Gentlemen’s Agreement: The Hong Hai .................................................................. 146

Holding the Boats: Indonesia’s Perspective .................................................................................... 150

Diversifying Strategy: Internationalisation ..................................................................................... 156

Galang Island Processing Centre ................................................................................................. 161

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 166

5. The 1990s and Bali Process (1991-2002) ................................................................................ 169

1991-1996: The Keating-Suharto Years .......................................................................................... 172

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The ‘Second Wave’ ...................................................................................................................... 173

Australia’s Response to the ‘Second Wave’ of Boat Arrivals: Growing Tougher ........................ 177

The Australia-Indonesia relationship under Keating and Suharto: Growing Tighter .................. 178

1996-1999: The Election of Howard, the Fall of Suharto and the East Timor Crisis ....................... 182

Howard and Immigration ............................................................................................................ 183

Howard and the Australia-Indonesia Relationship ..................................................................... 185

East Timor ................................................................................................................................... 189

1999-2000: The ‘Third Wave’ of Boat Arrivals ................................................................................ 192

Irregular Migration in Indonesia: Not an Important Issue .......................................................... 193

Irregular Migration in Australia: An Increasingly Important Domestic Issue ............................. 195

Irregular Migration: Australia Seeks Cooperation ...................................................................... 197

2001: Tampa, 9/11 and the Australian Federal Election ................................................................ 202

Australia’s Approach to a Growing Problem. .............................................................................. 202

Rocky Relationships .................................................................................................................... 203

In Three Weeks: Tampa, the Pacific Solution and 9/11 .............................................................. 205

Relations under Strain ................................................................................................................. 207

Getting on the Same Page .......................................................................................................... 210

2001-2002: The Bali Process ........................................................................................................... 212

Conclusion: What Explains the Emergence of the Bali Process? .................................................... 215

6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 219

A Recap ........................................................................................................................................... 220

New Guinea ................................................................................................................................. 220

Indochina .................................................................................................................................... 221

The Bali Process .......................................................................................................................... 222

Key Contributions............................................................................................................................ 223

Understanding Irregular Migration as a Foreign Policy Problem ............................................... 224

Understanding the Australia-Indonesia Relationship ................................................................. 225

Understanding Cooperation in International Relations .............................................................. 226

Trust ............................................................................................................................................ 227

Looking Back, Moving Forward ....................................................................................................... 233

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 234

Reference List .......................................................................................................................... 235

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List of Abbreviations

AFP Australian Federal Police

AIMF Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum

AMS Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

BAKIN State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara)

Bali Process Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related

Transnational Crime

CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

or Punishment DEPLU Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Departemen Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia)

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis

HANKAM Ministry of Defence and Security (Pertahanan dan Keamanan)

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IGG Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia

INTERFET International Forces East Timor

IOM International Organisation for Migration

KOPKAMTIB National Command for the Restoration of Order and Security (Komando Operasi

Pemulihan Keamanan)

MOSC Management of Serious Crime Course

OPM Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka)

PKI Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia)

PUSINTELSTRAT Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusat Intelijen Strategis)

RCC Rescue Coordination Centre

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WWII Second World War

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List of Tables

Table 1. Distribution of Interviewees……………………………………………………………………………. 51

Table 2. A list of trust-related feelings and behaviours, and their opposites, as

identified in the trust literature……………………………………………………………………….

56

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List of Characters

Adenan, General Indonesian Director General for Foreign Relations and Security in

DEPLU.

Alatasi, Ali Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 1988 to 1999.

Allen, Geoff Political Counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna Assistant Minister of State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, 1998-1999.

Ashton, Graham AFP Senior Liaison Officer, Jakarta, 1995-1997.

Aspoor DEPLU official, representative to the Jakarta interdepartmental

committee on Indochinese refugees.

Ball, William McMahon Australia’s representative to the Allied Forces.

Barnes, Charles Minister for External Territories 1963-1972.

Barrie, Admiral Chris Australia’s Chief of Defence Force 1998–02.

Barwick, Garfield Australia’s Minister for External Affairs (foreign minister) 1961-1964.

Beerman, Victor UNHCR representative in Australia.

Bintoro, Colonel Official in Indonesia’s department of defence.

Bolkus, Nick Australian Minister for Immigration 1993-1996.

Burton, John Private secretary to Evatt, then Secretary of the Department of External

Affairs 1947-1950.

Chifley, Ben Australian Prime Minister, 1945-1949.

Critchley, Thomas

Kingston

Diplomat in Department of External Affairs, assisted Australia's

representation of Indonesia against the Dutch and served on the

United Nations Commission for Indonesia between 1947 and 1950,

Australian Ambassador to Indonesia 1978-1981.

Damanik, Colonel Indonesia’s Secretary to the Directorate General of Foreign Relations

and Security in DEPLU.

Dixon, Leigh AFP Senior Liaison Officer, Jakarta.

Downer, Alexander Australian Foreign Minister 1996-2007.

Drabsch, Colonel The Australian Defence Attaché, Australian embassy in Jakarta.

Eastman, A.J. First Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.

Edhie, General Sarwo Indonesian General of the Army Special Forces Commander.

Evans, Gareth Australian Foreign Minister 1988-1996.

Evatt, Herbert Vere Minister for External Affairs, 1941-1949.

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Farmer, Bill Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

1998-2005, Australia's ambassador to Indonesia 2005-2010.

Fraser, Malcolm Australian Prime Minister, 1975-1983.

Freeth, Gordon Australian Foreign Minister 1969-1969.

Furlonger, Robert Department of External Affairs Assistant Secretary.

Habibie, B.J. Third president of Indonesia from 1998 to 1999.

Hamilton, R.N. Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation of the Department of

Defence.

Hanson, Pauline Founder and leader of the One Nation party.

Hasluck, Paul Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1964-1969.

Hastings, Peter Journalist, author and executive officer of the Council on New Guinea

Affairs.

Hawke, Bob Australian Prime Minister, 1983-1991.

Hogue, Cavan Officer in the Trusteeship Section (later called the Papua New Guinea

section) of the Department of External Affairs, Minister at the

Australian embassy in Jakarta

Howard, John Australian Prime Minister, 1996-2007.

Irvine, David First Secretary at the Australian embassy, Jakarta.

Jockel, Gordon First Assistant Secretary, Division I, in the Department of External

Affairs, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia 1969–1972.

Keating, Paul Australian Prime Minister, 1991-1996.

Keelty, Mick Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police from 2001 to 2009.

Kelso Assistant Secretary of the Consular and Immigration Branch in DFAT

Khan, Prince Sadruddin

Aga

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1966-1977

Kiki, Albert Maori Founder and Secretary of the Pangu Party, Papua New Guinea.

Kirby, Justice Richard New South Wales District Court Judge and Australian representative to

the "The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question”.

Loveday, H.M. Australia's ambassador to Indonesia 1966-1969.

Mackellar, Michael Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1975-1979.

Malik, Adam Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 1966 to 1977.

McCarthy, John Australia's ambassador to Indonesia 1997-2001.

McFarlane, John Australian Government official in Papua New Guinea.

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McIver, Alexander UNHCR representative in Australia.

Megawati, Sukarnoputri Fifth president of Indonesia 2001-2004.

Menzies, Robert Australian Prime Minister, 1949-1966.

Mochtar,

Kusumaatmadja

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 1978 to 1988.

Moerdani, Benny Head of the Indonesian Military’s Strategic Intelligence Centre

(Pusintelstrat).

Mondale, Walter Vice president of the United States from 1977-1981.

Mulvihill, Tony Labor Senator for New South Wales.

Murtopo, Ali Indonesian Information Minister 1978-1983.

Natalegawa, Marty Senior Official in Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia’s

Foreign Minister, 2009-2014.

Panggabean, Maraden Minister Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs 1978-1983.

Peacock, Andrew Australian Foreign Minister 1975-1980.

Polden, Steve AFP Liaison, Jakarta.

Putu, Major Official in BAKIN.

Raby, Geoff First Assistant Secretary in the International Legal Division of DFAT.

Reith, Peter Minister for Defence 2001.

Rinane, Arne Captain of the Tampa.

Rørholt, Arnold UNHCR Legal Adviser.

Ruddock, Philip Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

1996-2003.

Sastrohandoyo,

Wiryono Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, 1996-1999.

Shann, Keith ‘Mick’ Australia's ambassador to Indonesia 1962-1966.

Sigit, Colonel Deputy to the Chief of Staff of Indonesia’s Navy.

Smith, Ric Australia's ambassador to Indonesia 2001-2003.

Smith, Warwick Secretary of the Department of External Territories.

Soedarsono,

Commodore

Director of the Indonesian Directorate of Asia and Pacific Affairs within

the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Soenarso, Colonel Liaison Officer with BAKIN.

Spender, Percy Australian Foreign Minister 1949-1951.

Subandrio Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 1957-1966.

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Sudhono, Colonel Officer with BAKIN.

Suharto Second president of Indonesia, 1967-1998.

Sukarno First president of Indonesia, 1945-1967.

Surampatkumar, Rajah UNHCR representative in Malaysia.

Syahrir, Sutan First Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia 1945-1947.

Thayeb, Hamzah Indonesia’s Ambassador to Australia 2005-2008.

Try, Tony Assistant District Officer of Wutung.

Wahid, Abdurrahman

(Gus Dur) Fourth president of Indonesia, 1999-2001.

Wahid, Yenny Award-winning journalist, daughter of Gus Dur.

Wanandi, Jusuf Adviser to president Suharto on political and international affairs

during 1970s and 1980s.

Watson, John Political secretary at the Australian Embassy in Djakarta.

Webb, Royce Senior Administration officer of Australian administration in Papua

New Guinea, and Australia’s liaison in Djajapura.

Weis, Paul Legal Adviser for the UNHCR in Geneva.

White, Mr. Australian immigration officer.

White, Hugh

International Adviser to Hawke, Deputy Secretary for Strategy and

Intelligence in the Department of Defence.

Wirajuda, Hassan Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 2001-2009.

Wiranto, General Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces 1998-1999.

Witoelar, Wimar Spokesman for Gus Dur and media commentator.

Woolcott, Richard ‘Dick’ Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia, 1975-1978.

Soegama, yoga Chief of Staff of the National Command for the Restoration of Order

and Security (KOPKAMTIB).

Yudhoyono, Susilo

Bambang

Sixth president of Indonesia, 2004-2014.

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1. Introduction

On a summer’s afternoon in 2006, a canoe carrying 43 West Papuan asylum seekers slid upon

the shores of Cape York in Queensland. ‘If they are going to make an asylum claim, we'll hear the

asylum claim’, said Australia’s Immigration Minister, Amanda Vanstone.1 The Indonesian president at

the time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, phoned then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, to

request that he return the asylum seekers to Indonesia, guaranteeing their safety upon arrival. Despite

this plea, Australia’s Immigration department granted them refugee status within a matter of months

– an unusually quick decision in comparison to claims made by previous boat arrivals. This decision

greatly upset the Indonesians, who were sensitive to the separatist claims of West Papua and were

suspicious of Australia’s intentions regarding Indonesia’s territorial integrity, especially following

Australia’s role in East Timor’s attainment of independence from Indonesia in 1999. The Indonesian

government retaliated by recalling their ambassador from Canberra. Yudhoyono warned Australia:

‘Don't insult us, don't toy with us and don't deny us justice’.2

The Australian government’s actions in relation to these boat arrivals appears in stark contrast

to its well-known hard-line approach: ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the

circumstances in which they come’, boasted prime minister John Howard in 2001.3 It was the launch

of his Federal Election Campaign, a time when most Australians favoured a policy to turn back all boats

arriving on their shores.4 Howard had taken a tough stance toward these ‘boat people’ and ‘queue

jumpers’: only a month prior to making this speech his government initiated the ‘Pacific Solution’ to

deter future arrivals. This policy involved the excision of certain Australian islands from the Migration

Act5, the transfer of asylum seekers to detention centres in Nauru and Manus Island, and Operation

Relex – the interception and return of boats to Indonesian waters.

1 As quoted in “Papuans Should Be Treated as Refugees, Law Group Says,” Text, ABC News, January 19, 2006, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-01-19/papuans-should-be-treated-as-refugees-law-group/781298. 2 Cynthia Banham and Phillip Coorey, “Jakarta: Say Sorry or No Ambassador,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 19, 2006, sec. World, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/jakarta-say-sorry-or-no-ambassador/2006/04/18/1145344085813.html. 3 John Howard, “Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP: Address at the Federal Liberal Party Campaign Launch, Sydney,” October 28, 2001, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/partypol/1178395%22. 4 56 percent of those interviewed favoured ‘turn back all boats’, compared to 33 percent who chose ‘allow some to enter’, 8 percent ‘allow all boats to enter’ and 3 percent uncommitted. See: Katharine Betts, “Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia,” People and Place 9, no. 4 (2001): 34. 5 This meant that anybody arriving at Ashmore Island, Cartier Islands, Christmas Island, and Cocos Islands would not be able to apply for a protection visa under the Migration Act. In 2012 the Australian government excised the entire Australian mainland from the Migration Act.

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Notwithstanding Australia’s acceptance of the West Papuan asylum seekers in 2006, Australia

maintained its tough stance toward boat arrivals. Three years after the West Papuans arrived, an

Australian vessel, the Oceanic Viking, answered a distress call from a boat of 78 Tamil asylum seekers

within Indonesia’s search and rescue zone, yet the Indonesian government would not permit the boat

to dock at an Indonesian port and neither would the Australian government disembark the passengers

on Australian soil. As a result, the ship spent three days in limbo in international waters until the

Australian Prime Minister at the time, Kevin Rudd, made a personal request to Yudhoyono. Based on

this personal request, Yudhoyono granted the boat permission to dock and allowed the asylum

seekers to be processed in Indonesia. The local Governor of Bintan Island in Indonesia, where the

Oceanic Viking was berthed, complained that Indonesia was not a ‘dumping ground’ for refugees.6

These accounts are only a snapshot of the complicated relations between Australia and

Indonesia in the area of irregular migration,7 and they reveal exactly that: this story is complicated.

The story we are often told about the Australia-Indonesia relationship is that it is a turbulent one –

marked by frequent successes and setbacks. And it is no wonder, considering the differences between

these two neighbouring countries: they are different historically, culturally, linguistically, religiously,

and politically. Irregular migration is another area of difference, as the two countries face the issue

from different positions: Australia is a destination country while Indonesia is a transit country,

combatting irregular migration is a top priority for Australia but it is not for Indonesia, and while

Australia is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee

Convention), Indonesia is not. Nevertheless, Australia and Indonesia have worked together in

preventing the movement of irregular migrants, exemplified by their co-hosting of the Bali Process on

People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (hereafter: the Bali Process),

which was established in 2002. Considering their various differences, this cooperation raises questions

about how and why Australia and Indonesia might work together in this field and what principles

underlie their management of irregular migration.

While much of the scholarly literature focusses on Australia and Indonesia’s most recent

management of irregular migration – especially since the establishment of the Bali Process – the two

countries have actually been working together on issues around irregular migration since the 1960s,

a history thus far overlooked in scholarship on the subject. The purpose of this thesis is to examine

this missing history and use it to gain an understanding of Australia and Indonesia’s broader

relationship. Most studies of the Australia-Indonesia relationship focus on the flashpoints – the

6 “Australia Refuses Tamil Refugees,” October 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/asia-pacific/8329420.stm. 7 This is a contested term and will be discussed in the next section.

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successes and setbacks and the ups and downs – missing the insights to be gained from analysing the

continuities and changes in this relationship over time. This thesis examines the Australia-Indonesia

relationship by focusing on the issue of irregular migration historically, and by doing just that, this

thesis explains how cooperation develops over time, despite their many differences and setbacks.

To do so, I ask the question: how have Australia and Indonesia cooperated in managing

irregular migration since the 1960s?

The answer I advance is that Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation on irregular migration can

be explained by the important role that trust plays in the relationship – its presence, absence and

attempts at building it at various levels – not just at the leadership level, but also at the bureaucratic

level. I define trust as the belief that the trusted party will not damage the trustor’s interest in a given

issue area, and argue that this belief is built by both rational and relational inputs. That is, trust is

multi-faceted with distinct cognitive, emotional, and behavioural dimensions, which I will unpack in

the next chapter.

Throughout the three empirical case studies, we will see some instances where the presence

of trust between leaders is key, while at other times cooperation is made possible despite the absence

of trust between leaders due to trust between medium level bureaucrats and bureaucracies. We will

see that in some instances trust is enhanced by keeping the relationship insular and denying input

from regional and international organisations who might want to shape policies in different directions,

but at other times the absence of trust is overcome by inviting in international parties and

organisations as guarantors or ‘trustees’ of cooperation. While at times trust is present at one level or

between certain people, it may be simultaneously absent at other levels and across different

departments, which is something to be navigated in achieving cooperation. Whether trust is absent

or present, the aim of building trust – and generally in this story, it is Australia’s intention to build

Indonesia’s trust – is an underlying motivator for many of the policy outcomes we will see across these

cases.

Australia, Indonesia and Irregular Migration: A New Pebble in the

Shoe? Before going any further it is important to clarify my use of the term ‘irregular migration’.

While potentially controversial, I use the term ‘irregular migration’ as an umbrella term for people

who have had asylum claims already processed and confirmed offshore as refugees but are entering

via irregular channels; asylum seekers whose claims are yet to be tested and processed; and

spontaneous migrants not accessing regular channels and motivated by flight from violence, personal

hardship and natural disaster or pursuit of greater opportunity, among other reasons.

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By using the term ‘irregular migration’ I focus not so much on the status of the people

migrating, but on the fact that they move across international borders through non-regular channels,

that is, not through an airport, port, or immigration and customs checkpoint, and without the

destination country’s prior legal permission. Irregular migration itself is a condition produced through

processes of (ir)regularisation, securitisation and criminalisation enacted through states’ politics of

control.8 I use this term as a broad label to describe the people-on-the-move that Australia and

Indonesia are engaging with. Rather than outlining the strict definitions of refugees, asylum seekers,

and others, I instead interrogate the shifting definitions deployed by relevant actors and the

contestation and political motivations in play

Irregular migration has been an issue in Australia and Indonesia’s bilateral relationship in

recent decades. The issue has been called the ‘new pebble in the shoe’ of Australia-Indonesia relations

from the late 2000s,9 referencing the phrase former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas used in

reference to East Timor in the early 1990s.10 Indeed the Australia-Indonesia relationship has been

widely considered to be turbulent: periods of friendship followed by periods of strain. Scholarship on

this relationship tends to highlight four periods which define the contours of the tumultuous

relationship generally fall around: Indonesian independence (1945-1949); the Menzies period (1949-

1966), the Suharto period (1966-1998), and post-Suharto (1996-2007).11 Generally, this literature

outlines the flashpoints, turning points, and major ups and downs in the relationship, including

independence, Indonesia’s konfrontasi against Malaysia which put Australia and Indonesia on

opposing sides, Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, the David Jenkins article which revealed

Suharto’s business interests and caused a backlash in Indonesia, the Keating-Suharto period, East

Timor’s independence, Howard’s megaphone diplomacy, the Bali Bombings, the Boxing Day tsunami,

Australia’s acceptance of the West Papuan asylum seekers, the spying scandal where it was revealed

that the Australian Signals Directorate monitored the phone of the Indonesian president and his wife,

and the execution of two Australians in Bali charged with drug smuggling.

8 Vicki Squire, “The Contested Politics of Mobility: Politicizing Mobility, Mobilizing Politics,” in The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity, ed. Vicki Squire (London, UK: Routledge, 2011), 4–5, 7, http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415584616/. 9 Mochamad Tatra Kuncara, “Upaya-Upaya Diplomasi Australia Terhadap Indonesia Dalam Menghadapi Imigrasi Ilegal Dan Penyelundupan Imigran Ke Australia,” Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional 6, no. 2 (2010): 77. 10 Ali Alatas, The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor (Aksara Karunia, 2006), 240–41. 11 Evi Fitriani, “Indonesia Dan Australia: Dekat Tapi Jauh,” in Australia & Negara-Negara Di Kepulauan Pasifik Selatan: Observasi Dan Pandangan Dari Indonesia, ed. Evi Fitriani (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 2012), 25; Jamie Mackie, Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects, 1st ed., Lowy Institute Paper 19 (Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Books, 2007), 44.

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Nevertheless, there have also been events which had the potential to upset the relationship

but did not. For example, in the same year that David Jenkins published a damning article of Suharto’s

business interests12 – resulting in the barring of Australian journalists in Indonesia for years – Richard

Robison published a book on high-level Indonesian corruption in great detail: Indonesia: The Rise of

Capital (1986).13 Diplomats and politicians had reportedly prepared for the worst but the book had

little effect on ‘already improving relations’.14 While Indonesia supposedly banned Australian Aircraft

landings, it was lifted 4 days later.15 Other issues include Australia’s crack down on Indonesian illegal

fishing and the killing of an Australian man by an Indonesian policeman.16 Between June 1985 and

October 1987, West Papuans arrived on Torres Strait Islands in four boatloads.17 Nine were granted

refugee status in 1991, and while commentators predicted a breakdown in relations, there was no

such reaction.18

Irregular migration is perhaps an inevitable and ongoing issue for Australia and Indonesia,

adding to the relationship’s turbulence. Australia is a country of around 24 million and Indonesia, one

of its closest neighbours, is a country of around 264 million people – with 11 percent of its population

living below the poverty line. Irregular migration plays a highly politicised and symbolic role in

domestic politics, especially in Australia. ‘Stopping the boats’ has been the focus of many federal

election campaigns, most noticeably embraced as a campaign slogan by then opposition leader Tony

Abbott ahead of the 2013 Australian Federal Election. Australia’s geopolitical position in the world

with strong affinities to Britain had given rise to a kind of ‘fear’ amongst the Australian population, a

fear of the outside, the unknown, and the ‘others’.19 Despite some old fears in Australia20 that the

country might be flooded with Asian migration from the north, there is very little migration from

Indonesia to Australia.21 Nevertheless, geographically, Indonesia sits at a crossroads. The stretch of its

12 David Jenkins, “After Marcos: Now for the Soeharto Billions,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 19884. 13 Richard Robison, Indonesia, the Rise of Capital, Southeast Asia Publications Series, no. 13 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 14 Don Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990: An Annotated Bibliography (Canberra: D. Limn, 1990), 11. 15 “Indonesia Puts Ban on RAAF Aircraft,” Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995), September 5, 1986; “Indonesia Lifts Ban on RAAF,” Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995), September 9, 1986. 16 Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990, 23. 17 Greg Roberts, “Govt in Bind over ‘Refugees,’” Sydney Morning Herald, May 21, 1990, sec. News and Features. 18 Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990, 29. 19 Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 20 David Walker and Agnieszka Sobocinska, Australia’s Asia: From Yellow Peril to Asian Century, 2012, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10883274. 21 In the top ten countries of birth for Australian Citizens, Indonesia does not feature, while Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia do. See: Joanna Simon-Davies, “Population and Migration Statistics in Australia,” Research Paper, Parliamentary Library, December 7, 2018, 6, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/PopulationStatistics.

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17,508 islands connects Australia to Asia. This region saw more than 3 million refugees flee the

Indochinese crisis beginning in the 1970s; it has hosted one of largest protracted refugee situations of

Afghani refugees in Pakistan; and it is grappling with a near constant flow of refugees from Myanmar,

many of whom remain in precarious conditions in the Cox’s Bazaar region of Bangladesh. Australia is

considered a developed Western nation and is one which has ratified the Refugee Convention, while

Indonesia is typically considered the poorer neighbour – which has not ratified the Convention – and

therefore a ‘stepping stone’ on the journey to Australia.

Due to this geography and national circumstances, irregular migration coming through

Indonesia into Australia has the potential to be an ongoing problem. While there have been some

cases of Indonesians seeking asylum in Australian territory, the majority of irregular migrants have

come to Australia from a third country, using Indonesia as a transit point. Australia has resettled

migrants and refugees since the world wars, and is typically seen as a ‘destination’ country. Yet

migration has been a contentious political issue in Australia. Indonesia, however, sees itself as a

pendopo, which is a traditional Javanese structure consisting of a roof on pillars without walls,

providing shelter from sun and rain while allowing wind and light to pass through. Like a pendopo,

Indonesia is a place of rest for refugees as they continued their journey to Australia.22 Irregular

migration is not a major problem for Indonesia23; the number of people transiting Indonesia has been

relatively small in comparison to its own population and Indonesia has had many more immediate

problems to deal with, such as the transition to democracy, financial crises and economic

development. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing concern among the Indonesians

that irregular migration may be connected to other transnational crimes such as terrorism and drug

trafficking. As a result of its important geographical position, various Australian governments have

perceived the need to work with Indonesia if it wants to prevent irregular migration. And given

controlling irregular migration is a major priority for Australia and barely a concern for Indonesia, the

desire to control irregular migration, and to do so cooperatively, is driven by Australia – a Western,

liberal democracy with obligations to refugees under international law.

There is a large body of literature dealing with the ways in which countries seek cooperation

with countries of origin and transit, which will be discussed in Chapter Two. While this literature

acknowledges the cooperation with, or the use of, other countries in achieving control of a state’s

border, there is a nascent literature dealing with how this cooperation occurs and why other countries

are willing, if they are, to participate in the management or policing of another state’s borders –

22 Hasan Wirajuda, Interview with Author, September 2017. 23 Carly Gordyn, “Pancasila and Pragmatism: Protection or Pencitraan for Refugees in Indonesia?,” Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights 2, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 351, https://doi.org/10.19184/jseahr.v2i2.8414.

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especially when those countries detest being used as, in the words of the former governor of Bintan

Island in Indonesia, a ‘dumping ground’ for refugees.24 These countries are, after all, actors in external

migration policy, ‘not merely passive recipients of policy proposals’.25 The literature offers a number

of answers to the question of why states work in policing another state’s borders – discussed in

Chapter 2 – but it is sufficient to note for now that this literature lacks empirically grounded research.26

Much like the broader literature on interstate cooperation in controlling irregular migration,

studies of Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in this field focuses on Australia and the

externalisation of its policies. In line with the global trend towards extra-territorialisation, and in

pursuit of a ‘secure’ border, Australia has established an interconnected geography of ‘border

externalisations’ in source countries, countries of first asylum and transit countries to immobilise

irregular migrants.27 Australia has described this as ‘building relationships’ to create an ‘interlocking

web of bilateral and multilateral agreements’.28 In so doing, as many authors have noted, Australia

has exported its securitised approach to the region, including Indonesia, through incentivising certain

policies to encourage Indonesia to adopt them,29 and engaging in norm entrepreneurship of a

securitised approach to irregular migration and refugees.30 Scholars have focused on Australia’s

24 “Australia Refuses Tamil Refugees.” 25 Natasja Reslow, “The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The Mobility Partnerships,” European Journal of Migration and Law 14, no. 4 (2012): 393, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12342015. 26 Francesco Bosso, “Cooperation-Based Non-Entrée: What Prospects for Legal Accountability?,” IFHV Working Paper 6, no. 1 (October 2016): 22, http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ifhv/documents/workingpapers/wp6_1.pdf. 27 Josh Watkins, “Bordering Borderscapes: Australia’s Use of Humanitarian Aid and Border Security Support to Immobilise Asylum Seekers,” Geopolitics 22, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 965, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1312350. 28 Watkins, 966. 29 Amy Nethery and Carly Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers: A Case of ‘Incentivised Policy Transfer,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 2 (2014): 177–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.841122. 30 Andrew Carr, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific, 2015; Melissa Curley and Kahlia Vandyk, “The Securitisation of Migrant Smuggling in Australia and Its Consequences for the Bali Process,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 42–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1181149; Emma Larking, “Controlling Irregular Migration in the Asia-Pacific: Is Australia Acting against Its Own Interests?,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 4, no. 1 (2017): 85–103, https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.166.

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externalisation policies,31 such as its funding of detention in Indonesia,32 maritime surveillance and

interception,33 and transnational policing.34 Australia has also used international organisations in

31 Andonea Dickson, “Distancing Asylum Seekers from the State: Australia’s Evolving Political Geography of Immigration and Border Control,” Australian Geographer 46, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 437–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2015.1066240; Michael Grewcock, “Australian Border Policing: Regional ‘Solutions’ and Neocolonialism,” Race & Class 55, no. 3 (January 22, 2014): 71–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396813509197; Michael Grewcock, “Australia’s Ongoing Border Wars,” Race & Class 54, no. 3 (January 2013): 10–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396812464010; Asher Lazarus Hirsch, “The Borders Beyond the Border: Australia’s Extraterritorial Migration Controls,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 36, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 48–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdx008; Susan Kneebone, “The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection’?,” International Journal of Refugee Law 18, no. 3–4 (September 1, 2006): 696–721, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eel022; Anne McNevin, “Border Policing and Sovereign Terrain: The Spatial Framing of Unwanted Migration in Melbourne and Australia,” Globalizations 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 407–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731003669834; Anne McNevin, “Beyond Territoriality: Rethinking Human Mobility, Border Security and Geopolitical Space from the Indonesian Island of Bintan,” Security Dialogue 45, no. 3 (June 1, 2014): 295–310, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614530458; Anne McNevin, Antje Missbach, and Deddy Mulyana, “The Rationalities of Migration Management: Control and Subversion in an Indonesia-Based Counter-Smuggling Campaign,” International Political Sociology 10, no. 3 (September 2016): 223–40, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olw009; Nethery and Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers”; Amy Nethery, Brynna Rafferty-Brown, and Savitri Taylor, “Exporting Detention: Australia-Funded Immigration Detention in Indonesia,” Journal of Refugee Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 88–109, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fes027; Savitri Taylor, “Papua New Guinea: The Impact of Australian-PNG Border Management Co-Operation on Refugee Protection,” Local-Global: Identity, Security, Community 8 (2010): 76; Savitri Taylor, “The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare: The Difference between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing,” Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 6 (2005): 1–43; Savitri Taylor, “Sovereign Power at the Border,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1726242; Savitri Taylor, “Australia’s Pacific Solution Mark II: The Lessons to Be Learned,” 2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1728248; Savitri Taylor, “Australia’s Border Control and Refugee Protection Capacity-Building Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Asylum Seekers: International Perspectives on Interdiction and Deterrence, ed. Alperhan Babacan and Linda Briskman (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2008); Aulden Warbrooke, “Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’: Issues for the Pacific Islands,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 1, no. 2 (2014): 337–48, https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.32; Christopher White, “Australia’s Boatpeople Policy: Regional Cooperation or Passing the Buck?,” Cultural Encounters, Conflicts, and Resolutions 1, no. 1 (June 12, 2014), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cecr/vol1/iss1/8; Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe,” Government and Opposition 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 249–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00251.x. 32 Antje Missbach, “Waiting on the Islands of ‘Stuckedness’. Managing Asylum Seekers in Island Detention Camps in Indonesia: From the Late 1970s to the Early 2000s,” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies / Österreichische Zeitschrift Für Südostasienwissenschaften 6, no. 2 (December 2013): 281–306, https://doi.org/10.4232/10.ASEAS-6.2-4; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, “Exporting Detention,” March 1, 2013; Amy Nethery and Rosa Holman, “Secrecy and Human Rights Abuse in Australia’s Offshore Immigration Detention Centres,” The International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 7 (October 2, 2016): 1018–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2016.1196903; Savitri Taylor, “Australian Funded Care and Maintenance of Asylum Seekers in Indonesia and PNG,” UNSW Law Journal 33, no. 2 (2010): 337–59; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, “Exporting Detention,” March 1, 2013. 33 Jessica Howard, “To Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers,” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, December 1, 2003, 35–50; Peter Chambers, “The Embrace of Border Security: Maritime Jurisdiction, National Sovereignty, and the Geopolitics of Operation Sovereign Borders,” Geopolitics 20, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 404–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2015.1004399; Dickson, “Distancing Asylum Seekers from the State”; Andreas Schloenhardt and Colin Craig, “‘Turning Back the Boats’: Australia’s Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at Sea,” International Journal of Refugee Law, October 1, 2015, eev045, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eev045; Savitri Taylor, “Rethinking Australia’s Practice of ‘Turning around’ Unauthorised Arrivals: The Case for Good Faith Implementation of Australia’s Protection Obligations∗,”

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policing its border from Indonesia, as Asher Hirsch and Cameron Doig show, for example, by funding

and contracting the International Organisation for Migration to work in Indonesia in ways that prevent

onward movements of people.35 Given these studies examine Australia’s externalisation policies, they

are Australia-centric and largely neglect Indonesia’s role.

There is also a focus on Australia’s attempts to engage the wider region in combatting people

smuggling, especially through its cooperation with Indonesia cooperation as co-chairs of the Bali

Process.36 The Bali Process was established in 2002 and is a key multilateral forum in Australia’s web

of relations. The focus of the Bali Process is ‘people smuggling’, ‘human trafficking’, and ‘related

transnational crime’. Essentially, this means that the object of policies has become the prevention of

the irregular ways in which people cross borders, as opposed to the needs and the protection of the

people themselves. As such, the Bali Process has focused on criminal aspects of people smuggling and

human trafficking rather than the practices around the protection and rights of refugees an asylum-

seekers. As Melissa Curly and Kahlia Vandyk argue, the Bali Process has enabled Australia and

Indonesia to ‘contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and

Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 11, no. 1 (February 1999): 43–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781159908412869; Dean Wilson and Leanne Weber, “Surveillance, Risk and Preemption on the Australian Border,” Surveillance & Society 5, no. 2 (2008), https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v5i2.3431; Natalie Klein, “Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boats Policy under International Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 15, no. 2 (2014): 413–42. 34 Grewcock, “Australian Border Policing”; McNevin, “Border Policing and Sovereign Terrain”; Antje Missbach, “Doors and Fences: Controlling Indonesia’s Porous Borders and Policing Asylum Seekers: Border Control in Indonesia,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35, no. 2 (July 2014): 228–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12059; Sharon Pickering, “Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism,” Global Change, Peace & Security 16, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 211–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/0951274042000263753; Sharon Pickering, “The Production of Sovereignty and the Rise of Transversal Policing: People-Smuggling and Federal Policing:,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, September 12, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1375/acri.37.3.362; Leanne Weber, “Policing the Virtual Border: Punitive Preemption in Australian Offshore Migration Control,” Social Justice 34, no. 2 (108) (January 1, 2007): 77–93. 35 Asher Lazarus Hirsch and Cameron Doig, “Outsourcing Control: The International Organization for Migration in Indonesia,” The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 5 (May 28, 2018): 681–708, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1417261. 36 Curley and Vandyk, “The Securitisation of Migrant Smuggling in Australia and Its Consequences for the Bali Process”; Susan Kneebone and Felicity Rawlings-Sanaei, eds., New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead, Studies in Forced Migration, v. 20 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Susan Kneebone, “The Bali Process and Global Refugee Policy in the Asia–Pacific Region,” Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 596–618, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu015; Susan Kneebone, “Australia as a Powerbroker on Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia: The Relationship with Indonesia,” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 33, no. 1 (March 23, 2017), http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/40446; Joseph H Douglas and Andreas Schloenhardt, “Combatting Migrant Smuggling with Regional Diplomacy: An Examination of the Bali Process,” 2012, 25; Larking, “Controlling Irregular Migration in the Asia-Pacific”; Penelope Mathew and Tristan Harley, “Refugee Protection and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: A Fieldwork Report” (The Australian National University, March 2014); Penelope Mathew and Tristan Harley, Refugees, Regionalism and Responsibility (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).

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asylum-seekers’.37 Scholars have argued that this has resulted in a regional securitised response to the

problem of irregular migration.38 Few scholars, however, have considered this framing from the

perspective of countries in the region. Susan Kneebone does in fact, and argues that Australia and ‘the

Bali Process has thus far failed to establish itself as either a leading regional institution or as “norm

entrepreneur” of refugee protection’ in the region, countering the prevailing view that Australia is a

regional leader on refugee and asylum-seeker issues.39 In line with this argument, governments in the

region have expressed their dismay in Australia’s unilateral policies.40 Therefore, while Australia seeks

to be a regional leader, paying closer attention to the perspectives of countries in the region has

revealed that ‘the bilateralism or unilateralism in which Australia is engaged is undermining regional

cooperation’.41 Savitri Taylor remains more optimistic:

Most countries in the Asia–Pacific region are not parties to the Refugee

Convention or Protocol and have made little or no attempt to provide for the

protection of refugees in domestic law [therefore] the mere willingness to talk

about refugee protection cooperation at a regional level was a huge step forward.

Consider how legally and culturally diverse the countries in this region are and how

great their obsession with defending national sovereignty and it becomes

apparent how truly impressive an accomplishment.42

In line with Taylor, as I have argued elsewhere, the Bali Process has been a help in getting refugee

protection on the agenda in a region with limited interest in refugee protection, but needs the right

leadership and political will to capitalise on this momentum.43 And a better understanding of the way

in which the region engages with Australia’s efforts are required, as much of the literature on regional

cooperation is Australia-centric.

There is, however, an emerging body of literature on Indonesia’s contemporary engagement

with migration susses. Studies with an emphasis on Indonesia tend to focus on the impact of Australian

37 Curley and Vandyk, “The Securitisation of Migrant Smuggling in Australia and Its Consequences for the Bali Process.” 38 Curley and Vandyk; Larking, “Controlling Irregular Migration in the Asia-Pacific.” 39 Kneebone, “Australia as a Powerbroker on Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia.” 40 Mathew and Harley, “Refugee Protection and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: A Fieldwork Report,” 22. 41 Mathew and Harley, Refugees, Regionalism and Responsibility, 13. 42 Savitri Taylor, “Regional Cooperation and the Malaysian Solution,” Inside Story (blog), May 9, 2011, https://insidestory.org.au/regional-cooperation-and-the-malaysian-solution/. 43 Carly Gordyn, “The Bali Process and Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia,” Asylum Insight (blog), September 2018, https://www.asyluminsight.com/c-carly-gordyn.

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policies in Indonesia;44 the lives of asylum seekers and refugees living in limbo in Indonesia;45 on

Indonesia’s law enforcement and criminal justice system towards people-smuggling;46 its own

domestic policies towards refugees and irregular migrants,47 and; Indonesia’s engagement with

44 McNevin, Missbach, and Mulyana, “The Rationalities of Migration Management”; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, “Exporting Detention,” March 1, 2013; Missbach, “Doors and Fences”; Taylor, “Australian Funded Care and Maintenance of Asylum Seekers in Indonesia and PNG”; Jessie Taylor, “Behind Australian Doors: Examining the Conditions of Detention of Asylum Seekers in Indonesia,” November 2009, http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/news/behind-australian-doors-report.pdf; Antje Missbach, “Asylum Seekers’ and Refugees’ Decision-Making in Transit in Indonesia,” Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 175, no. 4 (November 8, 2019): 419–45, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17504006. 45 Antje Missbach, Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia (ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015); Robyn C. Sampson, Sandra M. Gifford, and Savitri Taylor, “The Myth of Transit: The Making of a Life by Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia,” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 42, no. 7 (June 2016): 1135–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1130611; Antje Missbach and Danau Tanu, “Unaccompanied Young Asylum-Seekers Stuck in Transit in Indonesia: Intimate Relationships and Resilience,” in Children and Forced Migration (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2016), 295–316, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40691-6_13; Antje Missbach and Tom Brown, “The Boats May Have ‘Stopped’, but More Refugees Are Stuck in Limbo in Indonesia,” The Conversation, March 22, 2016, http://theconversation.com/the-boats-may-have-stopped-but-more-refugees-are-stuck-in-limbo-in-indonesia-56152; Anne McNevin and Antje Missbach, “Luxury Limbo: Temporal Techniques of Border Control and the Humanitarianisation of Waiting,” International Journal of Migration and Border Studies 4, no. 1/2 (2018): 12, https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMBS.2018.091222; Savitri Taylor and Brynna Rafferty-Brown, “Difficult Journeys: Accessing Refugee Protection in Indonesia,” Monash University Law Review 36, no. 138 (2010): 138–61; S. Taylor and B. Rafferty-Brown, “Waiting for Life to Begin: The Plight of Asylum Seekers Caught by Australia’s Indonesian Solution,” International Journal of Refugee Law 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 558–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeq034; Missbach, “Waiting on the Islands of ‘Stuckedness’. Managing Asylum Seekers in Island Detention Camps in Indonesia”; Muzafar Ali, Linda Ruth Briskman, and Lucy Imogen Fiske, “Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia: Problems and Potentials,” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 8, no. 2 (July 26, 2016): 22–42, https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4883. 46 Antje Missbach and Melissa Crouch, “The Criminalisation of People Smuggling: The Dynamics of Judicial Discretion in Indonesia,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 14, no. 2 (2013): 1–19; Missbach and Crouch; Wayne Palmer and Antje Missbach, “Trafficking within Migrant Smuggling Operations: Are Underage Transporters ‘Victims’ or ‘Perpetrators’?,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 26, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 287–307, https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196817726627; Antje Missbach, “People Smuggling in Indonesia: Complexities, (Mis)Conceptions and Their Consequences for Sentencing,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 17, no. 2 (2016); Antje Missbach and Frieda Sinanu, “‘The Scum of the Earth’? Foreign People Smugglers and Their Local Counterparts in Indonesia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 4 (2011): 57–87; McNevin, Missbach, and Mulyana, “The Rationalities of Migration Management”; Charles Martin and Andreas Schloenhardt, “Prosecution and Punishment of People Smugglers in Australia 2008-2011.,” Federal Law Review 40, no. 1 (2012): 111–40; Anugerah Rizki Akbari, “Explaining Crimmigration in Indonesia: A Discourse of the Fight Against People Smuggling, Irregular Migration Control, and Symbolic Criminalization,” Indonesia Law Review 5, no. 3 (2015): 276–290. 47 Atik Krustiyati, Penanganan Pengungsi Di Indonesia: Tinjauan Aspek Hukum Internasional & Nasional, Cet. 1 (Surabaya: Brilian Internasional, 2010); Antje Missbach, “Facets of Hospitality: Rohingya Refugees’ Temporary Stay in Aceh,” Indonesia, no. 104 (2017): 41–64; Nikolas Feith Tan, “The Status of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia,” International Journal of Refugee Law 28, no. 3 (October 2016): 365–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eew045; Gordyn, “Pancasila and Pragmatism”; Antje Missbach, Yunizar Adiputera, and Atin Prabandari, “Is Makassar a ‘Sanctuary City’? Migration Governance in Indonesia After the ‘Local Turn,’” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, Advance Online Publication, October 24, 2018, https://doi.org/10.14764/10.aseas-0003; Nurul Azizah Zayzda, Maiza Hazrina Ash-Shafikh, and Ayusia Sabhita Kusuma, “Securitization and Desecuritization of Migration in Indonesia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights 3, no. 1 (June 26, 2019): 81, https://doi.org/10.19184/jseahr.v3i1.8394; Villian Febri Morradi, “Peran Rumah Detensi Imigrasi dalam Perlindungan Hak Asasi Manusia Pencari Suaka,” Pandecta : Jurnal Penelitian

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international refugee law.48 Other studies reflect on or detest the role that Indonesia plays as a ‘transit’

state.49 Yet very few focus on the Indonesian government’s agency, role, preferences and participation

in Australia’s border policing. Notable exceptions which have recently emerged include Susan

Kneebone’s (2017) article, which shows how, between 2001-2016, Indonesia’s policies were

influenced at various points by ‘pragmatic acquiescence to the demand for increasingly securitized

measures by Australia’, regional interests, and domestic fragmentation in its approach due to various

inputs of regional, private, non-state and interstate actors.50 Furthermore, Antje Missbach and

Gerhard Hoffstaedter have recently published an article on how Indonesia (and Malaysia) balance

foreign policy incursions in the migration space with ‘domestic politics, their own policies of

externalizing their borders, and negotiations with destination countries to fund their domestic

Ilmu Hukum (Research Law Journal) 10, no. 1 (June 30, 2015), https://doi.org/10.15294/pandecta.v10i1.4192; Intan Pelangi, “Perlindungan Terhadap Para Pencari Suaka Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 39 Tahun 1999 Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia,” PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law) 4, no. 1 (August 28, 2017): 143–60, https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v4n1.a8; Kevin Ronaldo Sirait et al., “Usaha Mendapatkan Pengakuan Internasional: Kebijakan Indonesia Mengeluarkan Peraturan Presiden 125/2016 dalam Menangani Isu Pengungsi,” Indonesian Perspective 4, no. 2 (November 24, 2019): 150–74, https://doi.org/10.14710/ip.v4i2.26700. 48 Sigit Riyanto, “Urgensi Legislasi Hukum Pengungsi Dan Kendalanya Di Indonesia,” Indonesian Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (2005 2004): 67–86; Joko Setiyono, “Kontribusi UNHCR Dalam Penanganan Pengungsi Internasional Di Indonesia,” Masalah-Masalah Hukum 46, no. 3 (February 24, 2018): 275, https://doi.org/10.14710/mmh.46.3.2017.275-281; Fitria Fitria, “Perlindungan Pengungsi Di Negara Ketiga: Praktik Indonesia,” Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law) 2, no. 1 (2015): 105–25, https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v2n1.a7; Aryuni Yuliantiningsih, “Perlindungan Pengungsi Dalam Perspektif Hukum Internasional Dan Hukum Islam (Studi Terhadap Kasus Manusia Perahu Rohingya),” Jurnal Dinamika Hukum 13, no. 1 (January 30, 2013): 159–70, https://doi.org/10.20884/1.jdh.2013.13.1.164; Rosmawati Rosmawati, “Perlindungan terhadap Pengungsi/Pencari Suaka di Indonesia (sebagai Negara Transit) menurut Konvensi 1951 dan Protokol 1967,” Kanun : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 17, no. 3 (December 1, 2015): 457–76; Fadli Afriandi and Yusnarida Eka Nizmi, “Kepintingan Terhadap Pengungsi/Pencari Suaka Di Indonesia (Sebagai Negara Transit) Menurut Konvensi 1951 Dan Protokol 1967,” Jurnal Online Mahasiswa (JOM) Bidang Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik 1, no. 1 (2014): 1–13; Reinier Sukarnolus Dimitri Sitanala, “Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Pengungsi Lintas Batas Negara Di Indonesia,” SASI 24, no. 1 (July 8, 2018): 30–39; M. Alvi Syahrin, “The Implementation of Non-Refoulement Principle to the Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia,” Sriwijaya Law Review 1 (July 31, 2017): 168–78; Herman Suryokumoro, Nurdin Nurdin, and Ikaningtyas Ikaningtyas, “Urgensi Penanganan Pengungsi/Migran Ilegal Di Indonesia Sebagai Negara Transit Berdasarkan Konvensi Tentang Status Pengungsi 1951 (Studi Di Kantor Imigrasi Kota Malang),” Arena Hukum 6, no. 3 (December 1, 2013): 408–32, https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.arenahukum.2013.00603.7; Dita Liliansa and Anbar Jayadi, “Should Indonesia Accede to The 1951 Refugee Convention and Its 1967 Protocol?,” Indonesia Law Review 5, no. 3 (December 31, 2015): 324, https://doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v5n3.161; Krustiyati, Penanganan Pengungsi Di Indonesia. 49 Sampson, Gifford, and Taylor, “The Myth of Transit”; Danau Tanu, Antje Missbach, and Dave Lumenta, “Introduction: Forced Migration and Protracted Transit in Indonesia and Southeast Asia,” Antropologi Indonesia, December 13, 2017, http://journal.ui.ac.id/index.php/jai/article/view/8754; Graeme Hugo, George Tan, and Caven Jonathan Napitupulu, “Indonesia as a Transit Country in Irregular Migration to Australia,” in A Long Way to Go, ed. MARIE MCAULIFFE and KHALID KOSER, Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-Making (ANU Press, 2017), 167–96, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt20krxxh.15. 50 Kneebone, “Australia as a Powerbroker on Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia,” 37.

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capacity’.51 Taking into consideration Indonesia’s preferences, it is important to note, as Kneebone

(2017) and I (2018) have, that there is more a ‘fragmented’ than unified Indonesian response to

irregular migration; different Indonesian departments have differing opinions on migration policies.52

Noticeably, the literature on Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation on irregular migration focuses on

the period after 2000 – with a handful of studies considering historical events53 – despite that fact that

the two countries have been cooperating on this issue since the 1960s.

The above review has highlighted a number of major gaps in our understanding. First, the

literature on the wider Australia-Indonesia relationship takes a broad historical overview of the

relationship and emphasises the flashpoints in their political and diplomatic relations, or focuses on

historically discrete episodes in specific areas. I have yet to find an historical overview of the

relationship through one issue, leaving a lacuna in our understanding of the continuities in this

relationship over time. Second, the literature aiding our understanding of bilateral cooperation on

irregular migration largely focuses on the policies of the ‘destination’ states. While there is a relatively

small literature interrogating the reasons other countries participate in these policies, there is – to the

author’s knowledge – no empirically grounded research detailing the process by which another state

comes to participate in such policies, certainly not in the case of Australia and Indonesia. Finally, in

the case of Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in this area, studies are relatively contemporary and

neglect the historical precedents to this cooperation. By focusing on the process of pursuing and

sometimes achieving cooperation across multiple decades, this thesis intends to fill these gaps and

shed light on the ways other countries participate in the policing of another state’s borders, in this

case, how Indonesia and Australia come to cooperate in managing irregular migration, and how this

has varied and evolved over time.

51 Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter, “When Transit States Pursue Their Own Agenda: Malaysian and Indonesian Responses to Australia’s Migration and Border Policies,” Migration and Society 1, no. aop (January 1, 2020): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.3167/arms.2020.111405. 52 Kneebone, “Australia as a Powerbroker on Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia”; Gordyn, “Pancasila and Pragmatism,” 350. 53 Some research has been conducted into the New Guinea case. See: Klaus Neumann and Savitri Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcp012; Klaus Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter: The UNHCR, Australia, and West Papuan Refugees,” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 23, no. 1 (November 1, 2006), http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/view/21345; Klaus Neumann, “Asylum Seekers and ‘non-Political Native Refugees’ in Papua and New Guinea,” Australian Historical Studies 33, no. 120 (2002): 359–72, http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/5153; swin:5153; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10314610208596225; Missbach looks into detention practices since the late 1970s. See: Missbach, “Waiting on the Islands of ‘Stuckedness’. Managing Asylum Seekers in Island Detention Camps in Indonesia”; Hugo looks at forced migration within Indonesia. See: Graeme Hugo, “Forced Migration in Indonesia: Historical Perspectives,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 15, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 53–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/011719680601500104.

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Research Design Essentially, the question that my research addresses is a classic International Relations

question about cooperation, but I found, as explained more fully in the next chapter, that major

International Relations (IR) theories did not offer a sufficient explanation. A rationalist IR perspective

would conclude that Indonesia cooperates because it is in line with its interests, but in this case, such

interests are not immediately apparent: why would the Indonesian government stop boats on its

shores, resulting in a growing undocumented population, rather than let them sail on to Australia, a

large, wealthy country which has commitments under the Refugee Convention? Sociological accounts

of IR might argue that cooperation is guided by norms and each country’s role and identity, but this

also is not immediately apparent – after all, Indonesia does not subscribe to the refugee norms as laid

out in the Refugee Convention and does not see itself as a destination country, while Australia is a

country of migrants and sees itself as a ‘good international citizen’. And while these more abstract

theories of International Relations offer potential answers to the question of why the two countries

cooperate, they do little to shed light on the process of how this cooperation came about, especially

given the unclear mutual interest or shared norms. The assumptions underpinning leading IR

approaches risk presenting states ‘unitary wholes’, neglecting the multifaceted characteristics, actors

and institutions that influence ‘state’ behaviour and decision-making as well as how this changes over

time. They therefore miss what the literature on the Australia-Indonesia relationship (discussed in

more detail in Chapter Two) points to as the major factors influencing this relationship – the role of

leaders, culture and media – which are all substate factors neglected by more abstract theorising.

Furthermore, the existing IR literature on cooperation would lead us to expect cooperation to break

down at every moment of crisis given that these crises are borne of the misalignment of the two states’

interests. Instead, we need to understand how cooperation between the two countries works at an

individual and bureaucratic level – the home ground of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) – in order to

analyse its successes and failures over time.

I therefore conduct a chronological analysis of three instances of cooperation between

Australia and Indonesia: border crossers on New Guinea (1962-1973), the Indochinese refugee crisis

(1975-1979), and the boat arrivals of the 1990s and early 2000s which resulted in the establishment

of the Bali Process (1991-2002). I chose these cases because they stretch from the first form of

cooperation on irregular migration between the two countries to the establishment of the Bali

Process, a regional forum on combatting people smuggling and trafficking, which is co-chaired by

Australia and Indonesia. As discussed above, much of the research on Australia, Indonesia and

irregular migration has focused on the period since the Bali Process was created. By examining these

cases, I explain the historical background in the lead up to the Bali Process.

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As further explained in Chapter Two, my historical analysis of these cases is aided by drawing

on the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subfield of IR, which ‘opens the “black box” of the state and

provides explanations of how and why foreign policy decisions are made’.54 I use FPA as a guide in

considering factors above and below the state level that drive, inhibit and foster cooperation on

irregular migration and under what conditions. In so doing, I deepen the historical account while

shedding light on the role of substate factors, the importance of which is hinted at by the literature

on the broader Australia-Indonesia relationship, as I will show in Chapter Two.

In carrying out this investigation I analysed historical archives in the National Archives of

Australia in Canberra and the UNHCR Archives in Geneva for the first two case studies: New Guinea

and the Indochinese refugee crisis. The Bali Process case was too contemporary and, as a result, the

archives had not yet been made available. I overcame this by consulting Hansard, Trove and Factiva

databases, alongside other publicly available documents and secondary sources. For all case studies,

I triangulated this archival work with semi-structured elite interviews of both Australian and

Indonesian officials, some of which were conducted in the Indonesian language. Interviews were

conducted across Canberra, Sydney, Jakarta, Jogjakarta and Geneva. This produced over 43 hours of

interview recordings from 32 interviewees on the Indonesian side and 15 on the Australian side.

Interviewees included former foreign ministers, ambassadors, chief of police, chief of defence,

advisors, academics, foreign correspondents and media, and civil society.

Research Findings In taking this approach, my research has revealed a number of factors that have influenced,

shaped, enabled and constrained cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on irregular migration.

These are: leaders – especially at the lower levels – and their ideology; domestic public opinion;

interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships; the role of the media, and; the international

political context in which cooperation occurs. The prominence of these factors suggests that both

material and ideational factors play a role in achieving cooperation, and that both individuals and

institutions drive this process.

These factors point to the important role that trust plays in the relationship – its presence,

absence and attempts at building it at various levels not just at the leadership level, but also at the

lower levels and between institutions. In each case outlined below, there is a turbulence or suspicion

which needs to be overcome. Building trust builds that bridge, and each case slightly builds on the

previous, as this research has, for the first time, brought to light. In the Papua New Guinea case it was

54 Karen E Smith, “Missing in Analysis: Women in Foreign Policy–Making,” Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 131, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz019.

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strictly bilateral and interpersonal bridge building, while during the Indochinese crisis trust building

was complicated and chaotic, as Australian diplomats tried to navigate a complicated Indonesian

bureaucracy and find the right leaders with which to build trust. In the 1990s case it was perhaps

surprisingly easier to build the bridge after the storm of the East Timor crisis because of the

foundations laid by Keating and Suharto, including in the form of prior-established inter-institutional

links. Throughout this story, I show that trust is not static, it ebbs and flows with the relationship itself,

but there is a sense in which ‘trust’ is ‘stickier’ than the broader relationships and anchors it.

New Guinea In the New Guinea case (Chapter 3), Australia and Indonesia when the two countries shared a

land border. Unlike the next two case studies, this case is not about refugees coming to Australia by

boat through Indonesia, but about refugees fleeing Indonesia directly into Australian territory across

this border. During this time the Australia-Indonesia relationship experienced tension in relation to

Australia’s initial support of Dutch control over the western half of New Guinea, and Australia’s

support for Malaysia against Indonesia during konfrontasi. For Indonesia, a country which had

experienced hundreds of years of foreign rule, sovereignty and territorial integrity were sensitive

issues. The relationship needed to recover from the suspicions that these events had raised, and one

way to do this was by demonstrating trust over border issues. Australia adopted a number of measures

in an effort to build Indonesia’s trust on the border. These included returning many of the border

crossers, and those who were allowed to stay were granted permissive residence if they signed a

document indicating that they would not engage in anti-Indonesian political activity and would

relocate away from the border. In 1968 the Australian administration sent border crossers to a camp

on Manus Island, to reassure Indonesia that dissidents would be, to quote one Australian official,

‘taken out of the game’.55 Further trust-building measures included Australia’s reiteration of its

support of Indonesia’s sovereignty, engaging in open but confidential dialogue and avoiding

international attention and media by managing their communication and cooperation through strictly

bilateral channels (in contrast to the other two cases). Australia also refused to sign the 1967 Protocol

to the Refugee Convention which removed the restriction on the definition of a refugee as one fleeing

events in Europe prior to January 1951 so as to avoid an obligation to the border crossers under

international law. It only signed the Protocol after it left Papua New Guinea. Australia attempted to

appease Indonesia without provoking domestic and international condemnation ‘by too obviously

55 Stuart Doran, ed., “Notes of Interdepartmental Meeting: TPNG Border Contingency Planning Canberra, 23 August 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 Part 2],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 590.

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breaching international law’,56 which would encourage Australia to accept more border crossers and

thereby damage its relationship with Indonesia.

Yet this was complicated in both countries by the governments’ – and its different

departments’ – perception of its national interest, and those of the public. Australia needed to balance

public opinion and its international reputation with its desire to build Indonesia’s trust, which, at

times, were in tension. While cooperation in managing border crossers was perceived to be in the

national interest of both Australia and Indonesia, the key to this cooperation was friendly, strong

relations and frequent, open communication between diplomats from both sides to exchange

information, demonstrate a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour and build trust. This enabled the

relationship to survive potential threats to its stability, such as armed Indonesian officers crossing into

Australian territory in pursuit of border crossers, and accidentally shooting at an Australian officer. If

there were no attempts or desire to build trust, it is conceivable that, despite mutual interests to keep

a calm border area, there would be tensions and misunderstandings and potential for relationship

breakdown.

Indochina For the first time, the Indochinese case study (Chapter 4) examines the cooperation (or lack

thereof) between Australia and Indonesia from 1976 to 1979. This is the period from the first

Vietnamese boat arrival in Australia until the refugee processing centre was opened on Indonesia’s

Galang Island in 1979. Prior to the opening of Galang Island, Australia and Indonesia engaged

bilaterally as Australia tried to convince Indonesia to ‘stop the boats’. But cooperation was largely

unsuccessful as the Indonesian government did not trust Australia’s intentions, fearing that if it

stopped boats of Indochinese refugees for orderly processing on its shores, Australia may selectively

resettle refugees and leave Indonesia with ‘rejects’. Australia attempted to build Indonesia’s trust by

demonstrating a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour, that is, by making concessions in its policy that

it was previously unwilling to make and providing assurances in writing. Australian officials in Jakarta

not only worked to build Indonesian officials’ trust, but also that of the policy makers in Canberra –

who did not initially want to make the concessions required to build Indonesia’s trust. Achieving

cooperation was hindered by bureaucratic difficulties in both countries, and while Australia had good

relations with some Indonesian officials, they could not reach an overwhelming support within other

parts of the bureaucracy. While some Indonesian officials were willing to cooperate, cooperation may

not occur unless those individuals are unable to convince more of the government. Eventually, a

‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ was signed at a higher level in both governments, but did not improve

56 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 1.

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cooperation due to persistent disagreements elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Indonesia’s ultimate lack

of trust in Australia’s assurances prevented cooperation succeeding. In the end, Australia was unable

to build Indonesia’s trust alone, so it hedged its efforts with other resettlement countries to reassure

Indonesia that it would not be left with the burden of undesirable refugees stuck on its shores.

Through an international effort involving the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR),

Indonesia was sufficiently assured that it would not be left with the ‘burden’ of refugees, thus, the

Galang Island processing centre was opened. Similar to the case of the Bali Process, cooperation is

facilitated once the individuals with relevant authority were convinced that cooperation was

beneficial, and was facilitated once cooperation had moved from the bilateral to multilateral space.

The Bali Process The case study on the creation of the Bali Process (Chapter 5) outlines the ‘wave’ of ‘boat

people’ arriving on Australian shores in the 1990s and early 2000s, which led to the establishment of

the Bali Process in 2002. The creation of the Bali Process itself is puzzling: people-smuggling was not

a crime in Indonesia at that time, it was an issue that the Indonesians did not prioritise, the Indonesian

President, Megawati, had a publicly poor relationship with the Australian Prime Minister, Howard, and

only a few short years prior, Australia and Indonesia had suffered a relationship breakdown due to the

East Timor intervention in 1999. Many people think of the Bali Bombings of October 2002 as the event

that mended the bilateral relationship after East Timor,57 but the Bali Process was created some 10

months prior to the bombings. In this chapter I find that the interpersonal trust between Australia’s

prime minister Paul Keating and Indonesia’s president Suharto in the early 1990s allowed for

investments into the relationship, sowing the seeds for closer inter-institutional relations that enabled

the relationship to bounce back after the East Timor crisis and to maintain cooperation on irregular

migration despite high-level rifts. Such trust was able to be built because the strategic outlook of the

leaders at the time – developing a strong working relationship with Indonesia was one of the main

priorities of the Australian Government under the leadership of the foreign minister, Gareth Evans,

who shared a strong relationship with the Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas. This enabled trust

to develop not only between the leaders, but it created space for a trusting relationship to be built

between their government departments and institutions. And it was these relationships that

withstood a change in state leadership and laid the foundations on which the Bali Process could be

built in 2002. As Indonesia experienced a chaotic end to the millennium with the Asian Financial Crisis

and its transition from 30 years of authoritarian rule – making irregular migration unimportant – low-

57 Samuel M. Makinda, “Bali Nightclub Bombing,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition, ed. Gus Martin (SAGE Publications, 2011), 89; Sara Everingham, “Strong Ties Have Kept Lid on Terrorism: Howard,” ABC News, October 5, 2012, https://www.abc.net.au/news/specials/bali-remembered/2012-10-05/howard-praises-anti-terror-fight/4296942.

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level cooperation bubbled away under the surface as Australia worked to convince Indonesia of its

interest in managing the problem. But key individuals in Indonesia’s government were willing to

cooperate, and were powerful enough to make it a reality. While some of these individuals saw

cooperation within their interest, there were as many reasons for cooperation to be against their

interests (for example, issues of higher priority, potential burden of irregular migrants, poor

perceptions of Australia post-East Timor crisis). What was key in achieving cooperation was the role

of certain individuals and their relationships. The Bali Process was therefore created despite the

turbulence because of long-term investments in bureaucratic bilateral links that established trusting

relationships, because of leadership strategic outlook and personal relationships, as well as important

domestic and international contextual factors that rendered cooperation beneficial to state interests.

Research Contribution This thesis is the first longue durée study of Australia and Indonesia’s management of irregular

migration. This precipitates three key empirical contributions and one key conceptual contribution.

First, it contributes historical knowledge to the literature on Australia and Indonesia’s

cooperation on irregular migration, which largely focuses on the period post-Bali Process. By telling

the story of this neglected history, this thesis contextualises such cooperation, sheds light on the

bilateral intricacies that shape this cooperation, and produces lessons for cooperation going forward.

This historically informed account is important in understanding change and continuity over time,

what aspects of this cooperation are driven by which factors, which aspects are entrenched, as well

as what successes are made possible and what injustices are enabled by such cooperation. Second, by

taking a deep dive into cooperation between typically resettlement and transit countries, this thesis

elucidates the motivations of and the role played by transit countries in participating in the policing of

another state’s borders. Third, this thesis sheds light on how this often-turbulent bilateral relationship

operates, despite significant and repeated pressures. It illuminates the points and extent to which

cooperation is pressured by individual, domestic, political, international and normative factors, as well

as other considerations in the wider bilateral relationship.

Conceptually, this thesis indicates that trust, as a neglected but emerging element of Foreign

Policy Analysis, is an important factor in Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation on irregular migration

and needs to be further explored. While mutual interests are also important in this cooperation, I

argue that the relational aspect of trust is a central and overlooked factor in the relationship and this

story cannot be properly told without notions of trust; it is the missing ingredient in fully explaining

Australia-Indonesia dynamics over time. By examining the underappreciated history of cooperation

between Australia and Indonesia in the area of irregular migration, this thesis has revealed the

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importance of trust and invites further research investigating and interrogating the role and functions

of trust.

This thesis underscores just how important long-term investments in institutional and

personal relationships will be to ensure these neighbours are able to enjoy productive international

relations into the future.

Plan of the Thesis This thesis will proceed with Chapter 2, which establishes the framework for the thesis going

forward. This chapter demonstrates that Foreign Policy Analysis is an appropriate guide to

investigating Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in managing irregular migration.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will each tell a story of cooperation – and the lack thereof – in three case

studies: New Guinea (Chapter 3), Indochina (Chapter 4) and the Bali Process (Chapter 5). Chapter 6

will conclude by recalling the key themes and factors that influenced the three cases and how these

have persisted, evolved and changed over time. It outlines what this study tells us about the

importance of issues like irregular migration as ‘frontiers’ between domestic and international politics

as well as the avenues that this opens for the future development of trust research in the FPA field.

The following chapters tell the untold history of Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in relation to

irregular migration and, by so doing, reveal the stickiness of the bilateral relationship despite the

differences and setbacks.

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2. Mapping the Field & Research Approach

How can we begin to make sense of Australia and Indonesia’s management of irregular

migration? Essentially, this question requires an understanding of irregular migration as a foreign

policy issue in the context of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, as well as an understanding of

theories of cooperation. This chapter will review the literature on these fronts in order to generate an

approach to my research question: ‘how have Australia and Indonesia cooperated in managing

irregular migration since the 1960s?’ As a result of this review, I argue that a Foreign Policy Analysis

(FPA) approach, which ‘opens the “black box” of the state and provides explanations of how and why

foreign policy decisions are made’1, provides the most appropriate tools to build the answer to this

question. This chapter will proceed in two parts. First, it will review the literature on irregular

migration, the Australia-Indonesia relationship and theories of cooperation, and, in so doing, highlight

the need for an empirically grounded historical study, guided by an FPA approach. Second, given this

understanding, this chapter will lay out the approach that I took in response to the above literature

and generate my research path forward by setting out the data collection process and framework for

analysis used in the proceeding chapters.

Understanding Irregular Migration as a Foreign Policy Problem As mentioned in the introduction, I use irregular migration as a broad term referring to the

movement of people, including refugees, asylum seekers and others, across international borders

through non-regular channels and without prior authorisation, though not necessarily illegally. By

using the term ‘problem’, here, I am simply referring to irregular migration as an ‘issue-area of

concern’ to foreign policy. Irregular migration itself is not a ‘problem’ which requires a ‘solution’, but

is a condition produced through processes of (ir)regularisation, securitisation and criminalisation on

behalf of states.2 This thesis adopts Vicki Squire’s use of ‘irregular migration’ as it ‘opens the possibility

for a more nuanced and multi-dimensional perspective on irregularity’ in that irregularity is ‘a

condition that is produced through various processes of (ir)regularization’ enacted through a politics

of control.3

1 Smith, “Missing in Analysis,” 131. 2 Squire, “The Contested Politics of Mobility,” 7. 3 Squire, 4–5.

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As Natasja Reslow (2019) notes, ‘international cooperation on migration management sits at

the nexus of two very different policy fields: foreign policy and migration policy’.4 While sovereignty

and border control are the responsibility of the government and its domestic policies, managing cross-

border movements naturally involves neighbouring, transit and source countries. Therefore, in

relation to migration, the boundary between internal and external policies has become even more

porous. There have been many academic works addressing the relation between domestic and

international politics.5 James N. Rosenau (1997) calls this increasingly porous border between the

internal and the external the ‘Frontier’, that is, a political space where global dynamics clash with

equally powerful localising forces, where issues are contested and the course of events configured.6

Didier Bigo (2001) calls this a ‘Möbius Ribbon’, where ‘the internal and the external are intimately

connected’.7 These boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred due to globalisation, technological

advances and the movement of people, goods, capital and threats across these borders. It is,

therefore, no longer useful to consider a distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, as activities outside

are designed to produce effects inside, and vice versa.8 This is relevant to irregular migration, which

inherently connects the domestic to the external.

The issue of irregular migration does play a highly politicised and symbolic role in domestic

politics, especially in Australia. ‘Stopping the boats’ has been the focus of many federal election

campaigns, most noticeably embraced as a campaign slogan by then opposition leader Tony Abbott

ahead of the 2013 Australian Federal Election. Australia’s geopolitical position in the world with strong

affinities to Britain had given rise to a kind of ‘fear’ amongst the Australian population, a fear of the

outside, the unknown, and the ‘others’.9 This ‘xenophobia’ is best represented by the White Australia

Policy that came into force shortly after Australia was federated. The Immigration Restriction Act of

1901 formed the basis of the White Australia policy which aimed to exclude all non-Europeans from

4 Natasja Reslow, “Human Rights, Domestic Politics, and Informal Agreements: Parliamentary Challenges to International Cooperation on Migration Management,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 6 (November 2, 2019): 547, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1674777. 5 James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969), https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/25171033; James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60; Didier Bigo, “The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies),” in Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, ed. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, vol. Borderlines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 160–84; Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 6 Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, 4–6. 7 Bigo, “The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies),” 113. 8 James N. Rosenau, “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969), 44–66. 9 Burke, Fear of Security.

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migrating to Australia. While this policy was formally dismantled, this kind of thinking lives on in the

Australian psyche. On the other hand, this issue is not a major problem for Indonesia; the number of

people transiting Indonesia has been relatively small in comparison to its own population and

Indonesia has had many more immediate problems to deal with, such as the transition to democracy,

financial crises and economic development. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing

concern among the Indonesians that irregular migration may be connected to other transnational

crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. As a result of its important geographical position,

Australia needs to work with Indonesia if it wants to prevent irregular migration.

Any approach to understanding these practices therefore needs to consider both internal and

international factors. Christian Joppke (1997) argues that conflicts over asylum policy are domestic

conflicts revealing the struggle between liberal states’ dual mandate of protecting human rights and

respecting ‘the integrity of the people from which their sovereignty derives’.10 While popular

sovereignty is being ‘respected’, however, it can also manipulated and ignored. Nevertheless, this

tension has contributed to a kind of ‘schizophrenia’11 in Western liberal democracies, whereby they

have attached great importance to the principle of asylum but make enormous efforts to ensure

asylum seekers and refugees never reach their territory.12 As Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James

C. Hathaway (2015) show, wealthier countries have gone to great lengths to ‘keep refugees away from

their territories but without formally resiling from treaty obligations’.13 These efforts include seeking

cooperation with countries of origin and transit, pushing their border further offshore and ‘stretching

accepted understandings of sovereignty to the limit’.14 Australia, for example, has pushed its border

further offshore by funding detention centres in Indonesia in the hopes to prevent people getting on

boats for Australia.15 There are a number of terms in the literature for these policies and their

implementation methods, including: externalisation, extra-territorialisation, external governance,

10 Christian Joppke, “Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Britain,” Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 3 (June 1, 1997): 259–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414097030003001. 11 Matthew J. Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum : Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees (West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10131739; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C. Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 53, no. 2 (2015): 241. 12 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum, 2; David FitzGerald, Refuge beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019). 13 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” 235; James C. Hathaway, “The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée,” Refugees, December 1992. 14 Weber, “Policing the Virtual Border,” 81. 15 A. Nethery, B. Rafferty-Brown, and S. Taylor, “Exporting Detention: Australia-Funded Immigration Detention in Indonesia,” Journal of Refugee Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 88–109, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fes027.

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remote control, remote protection, external bordering, policing at a distance, government at a

distance and punitive pre-emption. These are, generally, all forms non-entrée policies – an ‘array of

legalized policies adopted by states to stymie access by refugees to their territories’.16 While refugee

law rests on the obligation not to return a person back to danger (non-refoulement), the politics of

non-entrée is based on ‘a commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be allowed to arrive’.17

Unilateral non-entrée practices involve visa regimes, imposing financial penalties on ships and

airlines who transport passengers without relevant permission to enter the country, posting

immigration officials to airports around the world, operating surveillance technologies, intercepting

boats at sea and changing domestic laws – for example Australia has excised its territory from the

Migration Act, effectively preventing anyone arriving by boat from being able to claim asylum.18 But

as states are working with other countries, these non-entrée practices increasingly include bilateral

and multilateral measures, called ‘cooperative deterrence’19 or ‘cooperative non-entrée’,20 effectively

moving internal politics to the external. An example of this is the Bali Process, which Australia and

Indonesia co-chair, in order to combat people-smuggling, human trafficking and the irregular

movement of people.21

One dimension of non-entrée practices involves the ‘externalisation’ of policies.

Externalisation is a concept, originating from economics, which involves ‘the transfer of a business

function to an external entity, requiring a degree of coordination and trust between the outsourcer

and this external entity’.22 It involves ‘governance and policy extension beyond borders, between at

least two countries sharing a specific asymmetrical relationship, not only in terms of power and socio-

economic disparities, but also in their capacities to politically-respond to the same phenomenon: the

movement of people between one country and the other’.23 There are two approaches to

externalisation: the ‘remote control’ approach, based on the rationale that potential migrants can be

controlled before they reach the destination country and that it is more difficult to return them once

16 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 291. 17 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” 241; Hathaway, “The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée.” 18 Hirsch, “The Borders Beyond the Border.” 19 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence.” 20 Nikolas Feith Tan, “State Responsibility and Migration Control: Australia’s International Deterrence Model,” Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation, December 8, 2016, 216, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315408262-19. 21 Curley and Vandyk, “The Securitisation of Migrant Smuggling in Australia and Its Consequences for the Bali Process.” 22 Jorrit J. Rijpma and Marise Cremona, “The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of Law,” Working Paper (European University Institute, 2007), 12, http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/6690. 23 Gemma Aubarell, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, and Xavier Aragall, “New Directions of National Immigration Policies: The Development of the External Dimension and Its Relationship with the Euro-Mediterranean Process” (EuroMesco, February 2009), 12.

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they have arrived, and the ‘root cause’ approach, which, rather than aiming to restrain people, uses

political innovation to address the causes of migration.24 Externalisation can be seen in: diplomatic

practices, involving bilateral meetings, multilateral meetings and readmission agreements; external

institutions, involving camps and processing centres, immigration offices and border control, and; in

policies like involving visas, return, repatriation and extradition policies.25 These are all practices of

non-entrée practices and will appear in varying degrees across the case studies in this thesis.

Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway establish a seven-part typology of non-entrée practices

based on the degree of involvement or collaboration with the sponsoring state(s): the sponsoring state

or states. These are: the reliance on diplomatic relations; the offering of financial incentives; the

provision of equipment, machinery, or training; deployment of officials of the sponsoring state; joint

or shared enforcement; assumption of a direct migration control role; and the establishment or

assignment of international agencies to effect interception.26 As the authors note, ‘the truly pernicious

nature’ of these practices ‘is especially clear when the cooperation is with countries not themselves

legally bound to protect refugees’, such as the cooperation between Australia, a signatory to the

Refuge Convention, and Indonesia, which has not signed the Convention.27

While this literature acknowledges the cooperation with, or the use of, other countries in

achieving control of a state’s border, there is much less discussion of how this cooperation occurs and

why other countries are willing, if they are, to participate in the management or policing of another

state’s borders – especially when those countries may become ‘countr[ies] of sedimentation’,

‘accumulation places’28, ‘dustbins’29, or, in the words of the former governor of Bintan Island in

Indonesia, a ‘dumping ground’30 for refugees.31 These countries are, after all, actors in external

migration policy, ‘not merely passive recipients of policy proposals’.32 The literature offers a number

of answers. The first is that there are incentives – financial or otherwise – for another state to

24 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “The External Dimension of Migration Policy In The Mediterranean Region: Premises For Normative Debate,” Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, no. 2 (2013): 10–11, http://revista.ieee.es/article/view/343. 25 Zapata-Barrero, 13. 26 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” 243. 27 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 256. 28 Lyubov Zhyznomirska, “The European Union’s Migration Co-Operation with Its Eastern Neighbours: The Art of EU Governance beyond Its Borders” (Doctor of Philosophy, Edmonton, Alberta, University of Alberta, 2013), 170, 269, https://migrationonline.cz/en/e-library/dissertation-the-european-union-s-migration-co-operation-with-its-eastern-neighbours-the-art-of-eu-governance-beyond-its. 29 Florian Trauner and Stephanie Deimel, “The Impact of EU Migration Policies on African Countries: The Case of Mali,” International Migration 51, no. 4 (2013): 27, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12081. 30 “Australia Refuses Tamil Refugees.” 31 Bosso, “Cooperation-Based Non-Entrée: What Prospects for Legal Accountability?,” 29. 32 Reslow, “The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy,” 393.

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participate in migration control.33 Another is that the decision-making process and domestic

preferences of these states play a crucial role.34 Finally, strengthening migration controls may align

with the priorities of these states.35 All of which suggests that domestic factors also play a role in this

foreign policy decision-making.

This literature tends to focus on policy discourse and, as Francesco Bosso requests: ‘more

empirically grounded research on cooperation with third States in the field of migration control is

needed’.36 The literature reviewed above appreciates that migration control sits at the nexus of

domestic and international policies, but focuses largely on the policies of the ‘destination’ states in

externalising their policies. While there is a relatively small literature interrogating the reasons other

countries participate in these policies, there is no – to the author’s knowledge – empirically grounded

research detailing the process by which another state comes to participate in such policies.

Furthermore, as Reslow (2019) notes, ‘migration is a highly politicised policy area’, and while national

unity is required in the pursuit of national security, migration issues are ‘subject to national legislation

and intensive public and parliamentary debate’.37 Therefore, an approach that takes into account the

various factors – such as domestic and parliamentary politics – is required to fully understand bilateral

dynamics in the pursuit of migration control.

This review of immigration as a foreign policy issue has revealed that there are gaps in our

knowledge by way of empirically grounded research which understands the role of and process by

which a state cooperates with another state in the pursuit of their border policies, as well as the

33 Nethery and Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers”; Reslow, “The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy”; Nora El Qadim, “The Funding Instruments of the EU’s Negotiation on External Migration Policy. Incentives for Cooperation?,” in The EU External Migration Policies in an Era of Global Mobilities: Intersecting Policy Universes, 2018, 341–63, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004354234/BP000018.xml; Florian Trauner, “From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality: EU External Governance in South Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 5 (August 1, 2009): 774–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983564. 34 Gordyn, “Pancasila and Pragmatism”; Melissa Mouthaan, “Unpacking Domestic Preferences in the Policy-‘Receiving’ State: The EU’s Migration Cooperation with Senegal and Ghana,” Comparative Migration Studies 7, no. 1 (August 26, 2019): 35, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7; Reslow, “The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy”; Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B. Aksel, “Two-to-Tango in Migration Diplomacy: Negotiating Readmission Agreement between the Eu and Turkey,” European Journal of Migration and Law 16, no. 3 (October 16, 2014): 337–63, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12342060; Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter, “When Transit States Pursue Their Own Agenda: Malaysian and Indonesian Responses to Australia’s Migration and Border Policies,” Migration and Society 1, no. aop (January 1, 2020): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.3167/arms.2020.111405. 35 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Channelled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters,” European Journal of Migration and Law 16, no. 1 (February 24, 2014): 105–7, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-00002050; Katarzyna Czerniecka and John Heathershaw, “Security Assistance and Border Management,” in The European Union and Central Asia, ed. Alexander Warkotsch, 2010, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203864418-16. 36 Bosso, “Cooperation-Based Non-Entrée: What Prospects for Legal Accountability?,” 22. 37 Reslow, “Human Rights, Domestic Politics, and Informal Agreements,” 547–48.

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multifaceted domestic and international factors that produce such a policy outcome. What is missing

is a fine-grained investigation of cooperation on irregular migration, documenting the impact of the

relevant interacting factors arising from different levels of analysis, over time. This gap in our analysis

is something that lends itself to an FPA approach, where one of the hallmarks of FPA includes

integrative, multifactorial and multilevel analysis, which will be discussed later.38 This review will now

turn to the literature on the Australia-Indonesia relationship in order to understand how the extant

literature on the relationship shapes our understanding of, and approach, to my research question.

Understanding the Australia-Indonesia Relationship The nature of the Australia-Indonesia relationship has been written about by academics and

practitioners alike. Scholarship tends to agree that the periods defining the contours of the

tumultuous relationship generally fall around: independence (1945-1949); the Menzies period (1949-

1966), the Suharto period (1966-1998), and post-Suharto (1996-2007).39 Authors present a number of

reasons for the ups and downs of the relationship: the differences between the two countries, the

role of the media, culture, leaders and mutual interests. This section will review the literature on the

relationship and argue that any study of the Australia-Indonesia relationship needs to go beyond a

focus on crises at particular moments. It further argues that greater attention needs to be given to the

role of substate factors, such as media, culture, and leadership, as is suggested by the literature

reviewed below.

As I mentioned in the introduction, Australia and Indonesia are two different neighbours, and

they face the issue of irregular migration from two different perspectives. Highlighting these

differences has become a ‘long-established discursive tradition of constructing Australia-Indonesia

relations’40, and is considered one of the causes of the ‘flashpoints’ in the relationship.41 For example,

Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant write (1995):

No two neighbours anywhere in the world are as comprehensively unalike as

Australia and Indonesia. We differ in language, culture, religion, history, ethnicity,

population size, and in political, legal and social systems. Usually neighbours share

at least some characteristics brought about by proximity over time, but the

38 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.00001.x. 39 Fitriani, “Indonesia Dan Australia: Dekat Tapi Jauh,” 25; Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 44. 40 Simon Philpott, “Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3 (November 2001): 380, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710120095225. 41 Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae, eds., “Strangers Next Door?,” in Strangers Next Door? : Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century (Hart Publishing, 2018), 4, https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509918195.

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Indonesian archipelago and the continental land mass of Australia might well have

been half a world apart.42

Indonesian scholars also highlight this point, though rather than pointing out how different we are,

some have highlighted the similarities we lack: ‘we have no common ideology, no feeling of solidarity,

and no religious, socio-cultural or racial affinity, which often provides the strong foundation for a

lasting relationships [sic] between countries’43, and ‘there are no similarities in history, culture, social

values, political systems or levels of development’.44 Simon Philpott (2001), however, detests this

illustration, stressing that ‘the same could conceivably be said of India and China’.45 He argues that

‘the unrelenting production of difference as the defining characteristic of Australia-Indonesia relations

not only promotes the idea that this is somehow unique, but also negates the assumption that states

behave in fundamentally similar ways’.46 Mackie agrees that ‘…cultures are not immutable, nor the

differences between them insurmountable. A brief glance at Japan’s great differences from the West

two hundred years ago, and even today, is sufficient to illustrate that’.47 I agree that while such

differences poses certain challenges, this does not preclude the idea that differences can be

productively mediated. My approach of taking a long-term view on a potentially difficult issue allows

me to examine how these states and their constituting parts mitigated their differences.

A notable debate in the literature is the asymmetry between Australia and Indonesia. While a

popular perception of Indonesia in Australia is that Indonesia is a poorer, developing country, there is

wide acknowledgement in the literature of Indonesia’s importance to Australia. Indeed, Indonesia was

once considered a ‘blip on Australia’s strategic radar’48, but today there is increasing recognition that

‘Australia needs Indonesia more than it needs us’.49 This has resulted in great pressure on Australia to

42 Gareth J. Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, 2nd ed (Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1995), 198. 43 Harry Tjan, “Australia-Indonesia Relationship: The View of an Indonesian” (Seminar on Aspects of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship, Lakeside International Hotel, Canberra, 1979), 14–20, https://library.anu.edu.au/record=b1258126. 44 August Marpaung, “Australia and Indonesia: The State of the Relationship. Address by H.E. Ambassador August Marpaung on the Occasion of the Queen Elizabeth II Silver Jubilee, Trust for Youth,” September 6, 1984, 9, Australian National University, https://library.anu.edu.au/record=b1286810. 45 Philpott, “Fear of the Dark,” 378. 46 Philpott, 378. 47 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 9. 48 Hugh White, “Rethinking Indonesia,” Text, The Monthly, June 3, 2013, https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2013/june/1370181600/hugh-white/rethinking-indonesia. 49 Lindsey and McRae, “Strangers Next Door?,” 1; Philip J. Eldridge, Indonesia and Australia: The Politics of Aid and Development since 1966, Development Studies Centre Monograph ; No. 18 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1979), 16; Fitriani, “Indonesia Dan Australia: Dekat Tapi Jauh,” 56; Bilveer Singh, Defense Relations Between Australia and Indonesia in the Post-Cold War Era (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 58; Endy Bayuni and Sabam Siagian, “Australia Needs to Figure out Its Own Place in Asia,” The Jakarta Post, August 10, 2015, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/10/australia-needs-figure-out-its-own-place-asia.html; White, “Rethinking Indonesia”; Ross Tapsell, “Australia Needs Indonesia More than It Needs Us,” The

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be adaptable to Indonesia.50 While many Australian leaders have cited the importance of Indonesia to

Australia – Tony Abbott called for ‘less Geneva, more Jakarta’51 – Indonesian commentators note that

the feeling will never be reciprocated.52 And this can be shown by the number of Indonesianists in

Australia, compared to the handful of Indonesian academics of Australia.53 Nevertheless, some

authors disagree with this sentiment. Mackie argues that this is an oversimplification and that

Indonesia does in fact need Australia and Australia’s expertise.54 In fact, as many of my interviewees

pointed out, Australia’s technical expertise is a motivating factor to maintain a good relationship.

Besides the obvious differences mentioned above, there are a number of factors that authors

point to as causing the turbulence in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Their diagnoses include the

role of the media, culture, leaders and mutual interests. First, the media is often blamed for

relationship setbacks, with media events now considered a ‘feature of the relationship’.55 During the

Suharto years, Indonesia did not have a free press, and found it difficult to understand that the

Australian government could not control their media: ‘Radio Australia’s reporting of events in

Indonesia to Indonesia in the Indonesian language was one of the greatest irritants – perhaps the

greatest irritant – in relations between the Suharto regime and Australia’.56 Perhaps the most salient

cause for tension in relation to the media is the differences between the media and its role in the

respective countries.57 For example, David Jenkins (1996) argues that Indonesia viewed the media as

Guardian, May 7, 2014, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/07/australia-needs-indonesia-more-than-they-need-us. 50 Philip Eldridge, “Recent Trends and Issues in Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” Politics 13, no. 1 (May 1978): 49, https://doi.org/10.1080/00323267808401637. 51 Josh Frydenberg, “Failing to See the Big Picture,” The Australian, August 14, 2013, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/failing-to-see-the-big-picture/news-story/92604f1c59c932c109aa9eb6a723626f. 52 Bayuni and Siagian, “Australia Needs to Figure out Its Own Place in Asia.” 53 Ignas Kleden, “Geographical Proximity and Cultural Distance: Australian-Indonesian Relations Re-Examined,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996), 86. 54 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 110. 55 Peter Mares, “Australia-Indonesia Media Relations,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 306. 56 Errol Hodge, Radio Wars: Truth, Propaganda and the Struggle for Radio Australia (CUP Archive, 1995), 204; Errol Hodge, “Constraints on Reporting Indonesia,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996), 55; Peter Sim, “Address to Foreign Affairs Seminar By Senator Peter Sim” (Seminar on Aspects of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship, Lakeside International Hotel, Canberra, 1979), 10, https://library.anu.edu.au/record=b1258126. 57 David Jenkins, “Culture and Convenience: The Press in Indonesia,” in Indonesia: Dealing with a Neighbour, ed. Colin Brown (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 148–53; Ratih Hardjono, “Fifty Years of Indonesian-Australian Relations A Eurasian Point of View,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South

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an instrument of development, while Australians generally see that the role of the media is to tell the

truth.58 As such, Indonesians are offended by the apparent urge of Australia to peer over the fence at

their ‘dirty laundry’.59 While Australia attempted to dampen media criticism of Indonesia in the New

Guinea case (Chapter 3), as we shall see in Chapter 5, Australia’s ‘megaphone diplomacy’ caused issues

in the relationship during the 1990s. According to the foreign minister at the time, Hassan Wirajuda:

‘There is a certain tendency in Australia to communicate through public diplomacy rather than a quiet

one. This is certainly in many ways not acceptable at least in terms of our preference.’60 ‘In Indonesia,’

he said, ‘when you want to enter someone's house, you cannot shout in front of it and then ask to

enter the house.’61

There has, however, been quite some separation between the opinions of the Australian

media and the Australian government62, as we shall see in the New Guinea case (Chapter 3). Yopie

Hidayat (1995) notes that, ‘the government to government relationship between Indonesia and

Australia might always be in good atmosphere; the media, however, have their own agendas towards

Indonesia’.63 In part, the many significant differences between Australia and Indonesia outlined above

provide easy fodder for populist media outlets to exploit. There is also the role of the ‘deep

resentment’ harboured by Australian media towards Indonesia for the death of five Australian

journalists in Balibo, East Timor in 1975.64 The mainstream media has been critical of the Australian

government’s stance towards Indonesia in a number of issues, including independence and West

Australia, 1996), 81; Yopie Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 290–91; Sim, “Address to Foreign Affairs Seminar By Senator Peter Sim,” 10. 58 Jenkins, “Culture and Convenience: The Press in Indonesia,” 150; See also Andre Malan, “Asia Desk: A Western Australian Perspective on Reporting Indonesia,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996), 66. 59 Bill Goodall, “Australia Not Keeping Pace Danger of Being Left behind Asia,” The Canberra Times, August 11, 1984; Jenkins, “Culture and Convenience: The Press in Indonesia,” 150; Ailsa Gwennyth Zainu’ddin, “Preface,” in Nearest Southern Neighbour: Some Indonesian Views of Australia and Australians, ed. Ailsa Gwennyth Zainu’ddin (Clayton, Vic., Australia: Monash University, 1986), 4. 60 Wirajuda, as quoted in Brendan Pearson, “Business as Usual,” The Australian Financial Review, November 2, 2001, Late edition, sec. News. 61 Wirajuda, as cited in Pearson. 62 Robert Catley and Vinsensio Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945: The Garuda and the Kangaroo (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt: Ashgate, 1998), 166. 63 Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” 289. 64 Ailsa Gwennyth Zainu’ddin, “Some Perceptions of Australia’s Opinion Makers,” in Nearest Southern Neighbour: Some Indonesian Views of Australia and Australians, ed. Ailsa Gwennyth Zainu’ddin (Clayton, Vic., Australia: Monash University, 1986), 43; Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” 289; See Jill Jolliffe, Cover-up: The Inside Story of the Balibo Five (Scribe Publications, 2001).

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Papua, resulting in the government being split from public opinion.65 The media has also been accused

of influencing negative perceptions, and public opinion polls reveal the negativity and misinformation

among the Australian and Indonesian perceptions of each other.66 To combat this, Virginia Hooker

(1996) calls for ‘value informed journalism, not sensationalism’.67 Ali Alatas, during his role as

Secretary to the Indonesian vice president, argued that misperception has been allowed to continue

by Governments, because they were not prepared to go against popular sentiments.68 Since the

introduction of a free press in Indonesia, and as a country with one of the largest amount of users on

Twitter69, there has been new challenges for informed, accurate and unbiased reporting, and has

allowed populations to access real time news and events through social media and citizen journalism.

It also allows for mass participation and sharing of public opinions, sentiment and debate, such as the

#coinforAbbott campaign, where Indonesians started fundraising to return Australian aid after Tony

Abbott tried to use it as a reason for Indonesia not to execute two Australian citizens on death row

for drug smuggling.

65 Eldridge, “Recent Trends and Issues in Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” 51; Duncan Graham, The People next Door: Understanding Indonesia, Contemporary Issues (Crawley, W.A: University of Western Australia Press, 2004), 5; Ken Setiawan, “On the Periphery: Human Rights, Australia and Indonesia,” in Strangers Next Door?: Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century, ed. Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae, 2018, 193–210, https://www-bloomsburycollections-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/book/strangers-next-door-indonesia-and-australia-in-the-asian-century/ch12-a-common-enemy-police-cooperation-between-australia-and-indonesia; Herb Feith, as quoted in Herb Feith, Ailsa Zainu’ddin, and Jamie Mackie, “Fifty Years of Engagement with Indonesia - Questions,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996), 43. 66 Endy Bayuni, “The View from Indonesia,” in Australia and Indonesia: Can We Be Friends?, ed. Jonathan Pearlman (Collingwood, AUSTRALIA: Schwartz Publishing Pty, Limited, 2018), 30–39, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/anu/detail.action?docID=5440542; David Penberthy, “Recent Reporting of Indonesia by the Australian Media,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, ed. Anton E. Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996), 68–72; Nancy Viviani, “Changing Australian Society and Its Implications for Bilateral Relations with Indonesia,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 207; Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” 288–89. 67 Virginia Hooker, “Complementarities and Cultural Dissonance: Political Culture and Public Discourse,” in Indonesia: Dealing with a Neighbour, ed. Colin Brown (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 132. 68 Ali Alatas, as cited in: “Perceptions of the Bilateral Relationship - Discussion” (Seminar on Aspects of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship, Lakeside International Hotel, Canberra, 1979), 38, https://library.anu.edu.au/record=b1258126. 69 Herman and Donny A. Mononimbar, “Indonesia Fifth-Largest Country in Terms of Twitter Users,” Jakarta Globe, May 3, 2017, https://jakartaglobe.id/tech/indonesia-fifth-largest-country-in-terms-of-twitter-users.

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While some authors note that government officials need to balance their comments70 and

avoid noisy diplomacy,71 others focus on the role of journalists, including their lack of understanding

of the Indonesian and Javanese cultures, which has led to many misunderstandings in print.72 Australia

and its media has been critiqued for appearing ‘self-righteous’ in Indonesia.73 And, as the epigraph to

the book: Nearest Southern Neighbour: Some Indonesian Views of Australia and Australians, clearly

articulates: ‘it is not in our culture to express our perceptions, especially to the people being perceived

… We Indonesians prefer to keep our perceptions of others in our hearts’.74

This leads to the second major factor often noted as a constraint in the relationship:

misperceptions and the ‘cultural gap’.75 Many authors argue that Australia and Indonesia need to

know each other better76, according to the Indonesian saying: ‘tak kenal maka tak sayang’ (you cannot

love someone if you do not know them).77 But it is not just more knowledge, rather understanding of

each other that is required. Contributors to the volume Strangers Next Door? Indonesia and Australia

in the Asian Century, argue that ‘Australia needs to understand Indonesia better to engage with it

more successfully, while also finding new ways to encourage it to do the same with Australia’.78 Indeed

a lack of knowledge and negative attitudes towards Indonesia persists in Australia.79 And Endy Bayuni

(2018) notes that the Indonesian public’s perception of Australia is also outdated.80 Nevertheless,

Simon Philpott (2001) argues that there is evidence that more information does not necessarily lead

70 C.J. Barnett, “Australia-Indonesia Relations: A Perspective from Western Australia,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 21. 71 Gareth J. Evans, Incorrigible Optimist: A Political Memoir (Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2017), 130; Budiono Kusumohamidojo, “The Indonesia-Australia Relationship: Problems between Unfamiliar Neighbours,” Australian Outlook 40, no. 3 (1986): 143. 72 Hodge, “Constraints on Reporting Indonesia,” 46; Malan, “Asia Desk: A Western Australian Perspective on Reporting Indonesia,” 66–67; Mares, “Australia-Indonesia Media Relations”; Eldridge, “Recent Trends and Issues in Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” 42. 73 Kusumohamidojo, “The Indonesia-Australia Relationship,” 143; Mares, “Australia-Indonesia Media Relations,” 301. 74 Umar Nimran, as quoted in Ailsa Gwennyth Zainu’ddin, ed., Nearest Southern Neighbour: Some Indonesian Views of Australia and Australians (Clayton, Vic., Australia: Monash University, 1986), 1. 75 Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, “An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region,” in Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, ed. John Monfries (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 18–19; Graham, The People next Door, 2–9; Eldridge, “Recent Trends and Issues in Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” 42. 76 Lindsey and McRae, “Strangers Next Door?,” 2–4. 77 General Try Sutrisno, as quoted in Gareth Evans, “Australian and Indonesia: Partnership in Diversity,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 13; Bayuni, “The View from Indonesia,” 51. 78 Lindsey and McRae, “Strangers Next Door?,” 4. 79 Dave McRae and Diane Zhang, “Ignorant and Ill-Disposed?: Opinion Polling and Attitudes to the Other between Australia and Indonesia,” in Strangers Next Door? : Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century, ed. Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae (Hart Publishing, 2018), 55–80, https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509918195. 80 Bayuni, “The View from Indonesia,” 50–51.

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to better relations. For example: the Australia-Indonesia relationship was at its best during Indonesia’s

independence, when Australians knew very little about what was the Dutch East Indies; fewer than 10

percent of Australians considered Indonesia as a possible threat during the 1960s and 1970s – despite

Indonesia having one of the largest communist parties until 1965; and by 1993 some 57 percent of

respondents saw Indonesia as a potential threat despite the communist party being long gone and

pro-Western president, Suharto, in charge.81 According to Philpott (2010), ‘familiarity, in this instance,

seems to have bred anxiety’.82 Instead, he argues, Australia needs to ‘better understand our own

epistemological assumptions’ to change deeply ingrained perceptions.83 Similarly, noting the

importance of national identity, Virginia Hooker (1996) argues that ‘nations which are secure in their

own sense of identity, and comfortable with their system of values … are best able to be tolerant and

reasoned about other cultures, and not threatened or judgemental’.84 As we shall see in Chapter 5,

the two differing perceptions held by former prime ministers Paul Keating and John Howard regarding

Australia’s national identity and role in the region would affect the relationship. Cultural differences

will always be there, what matters, many authors argue, is the way in which these differences are

managed.85 Other authors argue that while there are cultural differences, they are not

insurmountable.86

The above shows how the media and cultural misperceptions can lead to setbacks in the

Australia-Indonesia relationship. This brings us to the third notable factor in the turbulent relationship:

leaders and their relationships. Generally, the role of leaders and their interpersonal relationships are

considered to put the relationship back on track. A change in leadership can also lead to changes in

foreign policy, without either government losing face.87 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (2010) argues that the

bilateral relationship has been overshadowed by changes in leadership, ‘which have brought about

different feelings and perceptions about each other and, more importantly, generated debates and

scrutiny about the level of maturity and honesty in the relationship between the two countries’.88

81 Philpott, “Fear of the Dark,” 379. 82 Philpott, 379. 83 Philpott, 386. 84 Hooker, “Complementarities and Cultural Dissonance: Political Culture and Public Discourse,” 134. 85 Evans, “Australian and Indonesia: Partnership in Diversity,” 13–14; Hardjono, “Fifty Years of Indonesian-Australian Relations A Eurasian Point of View,” 80. 86 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 9; Sastrohandoyo, “An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region,” 18; Rudy J. Pesik, “Toward a Closer Economic Relationship: Start of a New Era?,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 443–44. 87 Vibhanshu Shekhar, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century : Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power (Routledge, 2018), 7, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315560977. 88 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy: The View from the Indonesian Side,” Australian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 118, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140903517742.

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Nevertheless, certain changes in foreign policy has been attributed to certain leaders; for example,

the role of former foreign ministers Adam Malik in the end of konfrontasi89 and Ali Alatas in changing

Indonesia’s foreign policy and the government’s relationship with the media.90 Former prime minister

Bob Hawke has been credited with Australia’s push towards Asia, which was taken up with greater

emphasis by his successor, Paul Keating.91 Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhhoyono has also

been credited for Indonesia’s proactive foreign policy in the 2000s.92 As we shall see, especially in

Chapter 5 (on the Bali Process), the role of lower-level leaders also matters, such as former foreign

minister Hasan Wirajuda’s outlook which was crucial in establishing the Bali Process.

The relationship between leaders is equally, if not more, important. This is frequently shown

in the literature in relation to the ‘warm and enduring personal relationship’93 between Gareth Evans

and Ali Alatas, as well as the close relations between Paul Keating and Suharto.94 More recently,

Gareth Evans (2017) has pointed to the friendship that Australia shared between Yudhoyono and his

foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, and the role that this played in the successes of that period.95 As

this thesis shows, relationships at lower levels also matter, such as the relationship between the

Indonesian foreign minister and the UNHCR representative during the Indochinese crisis (Chapter 4)

and the relationship between members of the police in the 1990s (Chapter 5). At the same time,

however, leaders and their relationships can also contribute to a decline in the relationship. For

example, Endy Bayuni (2018) notes that Australia and Indonesia’s dispute over the execution of two

Australian drug smugglers in Bali was fuelled by the two leaders Joko Widodo and Tony Abbott.96

Furthermore, as Robert Furlonger pointed out at a seminar in 1979, it is misleading to think that if

there was a close relationship between the leaders of Australia and Indonesia then the rest would

89 Sabam Siagian, “Stages of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Strategic Significance of Indonesia-Australia Relations,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 175–76. 90 Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” 292; Mares, “Australia-Indonesia Media Relations,” 295. 91 Viviani, “Changing Australian Society and Its Implications for Bilateral Relations with Indonesia,” 209. 92 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy,” 124–25; Shekhar, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, 11–16. 93 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, 200; Desmond Ball, “Indonesia and Australia: Strange Neighbours or Partners in Regional Resilience,” in Indonesia-Australia Relations: Diverse Cultures, Converging Interests, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Tim McDonald (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 107. 94 Sian Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded: Trust in Australia-Indonesia Relations, Keating & Suharto to Turnbull & Jokowi,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 126–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1583168; Evans, Incorrigible Optimist, 143; Ganewati Wuryandari, “Gaya Dan Substansi Politik Luar Negeri Australia 1996-2001,” in Indonesia Dalam Kebijakan Luar Negeri Dan Pertahanan Australia 1996-2001, ed. Ganewati Wuryandari, Seri Penelitian P2P-LIPI, no. 07/2001 (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2001), 47–50. 95 Evans, Incorrigible Optimist, 143. 96 Bayuni, “The View from Indonesia,” 53.

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take care of itself, as the experience of the Gough Whitlam period had shown.97 Jamie Mackie (2007)

similarly cautions against putting too much reliance on the ‘personal chemistry’ established between

leaders.98 Simon Philpott (2010) agrees and notes that efforts to reconcile the relationship by

Indonesian president and Australian friend, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), were sidelined by anti-

Australia attitudes after the East Timor crisis.99 It is also curious to note that the significant

achievement of the Bali Process – established a few short years after the East Timor crisis – occurred

under the leadership of John Howard and Megawati, who had a somewhat strained relationship, as

shall be explored in Chapter Five.

While the literature tends to focus on the causes of breakdown in the relationship, there are

many things that bring the two countries together. Most notably is the importance of mutual interest.

Jamie Mackie (2007), for example, argues that we should not:

put too much reliance on close personal relations between our heads of

government and foreign ministers, important though these can undoubtedly be

for creating a basis of mutual trust and better understanding of each other’s

actions, policies and politics. The basic determinants of success or failure in our

relations with Indonesia will depend on more enduring factors grounded in our

respective national interests, not on mere accidents of personal chemistry. But

trust is undoubtedly a crucially important element here.100

As we shall see in the proceeding chapters, both mutual interest and trust plays an important role in

cooperation and, importantly, this trust need not be between the ‘heads of government’ but at lower

levels across the governments. Nevertheless, many interviewees confirmed the emphasis on the

positive role of mutual interests found in the literature. Examples of when Australia and Indonesia

shared positive relations and mutual interests include the Timor gap treaty, where there was a mutual

interest to achieve an agreement, rather than one country gaining unilateral advantage.101 The

literature also highlights joint perceptions on regional and global security, such as in the Cambodian

peace process and in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)102, and notes that in the maritime

space, Australia and Indonesia share more similarities and interests.103 Despite the ups and downs of

the relationship, there has been cooperation where interests converge, including in the Inter-

97 Robert Furlonger, as quoted in “Perceptions of the Bilateral Relationship - Discussion,” 36. 98 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 117–18. 99 Philpott, “Fear of the Dark,” 378. 100 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 19–20. 101 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 3; Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, 201. 102 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, 202. 103 Martin Tsamenyi and Sam Bateman, “Good Neighbours at Sea?,” in Indonesia: Dealing with a Neighbour, ed. Colin Brown (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 173.

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Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGG), the security and stability of the region, trade and markets,

technology, managerial expertise, bilateral activities like sharing intelligence, reciprocal high-level

visits, joint exercises and training, developing mutual trust and understanding, constraining Chinese

assertiveness and combatting jihadist terrorism.104 Nancy Viviani (1982) notes there are similarities in

each government’s objectivities, including the need to control political strife and avoid economic

instabilities, however, it is their approach that differs.105 Despite sharing strategic interests, Andrew

Phillips and Eric Hiariej (2016) argue that Australia and Indonesia have struggled to achieve effective

security cooperation because of the ‘Bandung Divide’, that is, ‘the legacies of the 1955 Asian-African

Conference, which saw Indonesia and Australia adopt different normative orientations towards the

liberal international order, and divergent security strategies for South-East Asia’.106 Nevertheless, as

Harry Tjan (1979) notes, Australia and Indonesia do have common interests, but the perceptions of

which are always changing.107 As we shall see in the case of irregular migration, however, it is not

immediately clear that the two countries share a mutual interest.

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (2010) has usefully organised the literature on the Australia-Indonesia

relationship according to their various perspectives on the relationship itself, of which, he argues,

there are four. The first is the historical and geographical proximity perspective, whose authors focus

on the strength of the relationship based on its strong historical and geographical ties.108 Second, is

the political and strategic perspective, which is based on the importance of Indonesia to Australia’s

political and strategic interests and that a prosperous, politically and economically stable Indonesia is

104 H. C. McMichael, “Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” Australian Outlook 40, no. 3 (December 1, 1986): 140–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718608444916; Gareth Evans, “Australia and Indonesia: Neighbours for Half a Century,” in Indonesia: Dealing with a Neighbour, ed. Colin Brown (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 16; Ball, “Indonesia and Australia: Strange Neighbours or Partners in Regional Resilience,” 106; Andrew Phillips and Eric Hiariej, “Beyond the ‘Bandung Divide’? Assessing the Scope and Limits of Australia–Indonesia Security Cooperation,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 4 (August 2016): 422–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1153601. 105 Nancy Viviani, “Australia‐Indonesia Relations—Bilateral Puzzles and Regional Perspectives,” Australian Outlook 36, no. 3 (December 1, 1982): 26–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718208444791. 106 Phillips and Hiariej, “Beyond the ‘Bandung Divide’?,” 422. 107 Tjan, “Australia-Indonesia Relationship: The View of an Indonesian,” 14. 108 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy,” 119–20; See for example: Nancy Viviani, “Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards Indonesia 1950 to 1965” (Doctor of Philosophy, Canberra, Australian National University, 1973), https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/112146/4/b12930258_Viviani_Nancy.pdf; Philip Dorling, ed., Diplomasi: Australia & Indonesia’s Independence, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49 (Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1994); Martin O’Hare and Anthony Reid, Australia dan perjuangan kemerdekaan Indonesia =: Australia and Indonesia’s struggle for independence (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995); Anton E. Lucas, ed., Half a Century of Indonesian-Australian Interaction, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, no. 6 (Adelaide: Dept. of Asian Studies and Languages, Flinders University of South Australia, 1996).

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in Australia’s national interest.109 The third and related perspective is that based on ‘identity and fear’,

whose authors argue that the turbulence of the relationship is caused by the countries not ‘knowing’

each other well. This includes Australia’s insecurities about its own identity, as well as Indonesia’s fear

that Australia wishes to break up Indonesia.110

Finally, Sulistiyanto puts forward a fourth perspective: the domestic and foreign policy

perspective. This perspective highlights the ‘important relation between democracy, domestic politics

and foreign policy’.111 Sulistiyanto argues that ‘in the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy making,

there are three important aspects in domestic politics that need to be emphasized: the consolidation

of democratic institutions; the role of Islam; and the emergence of civil society’.112 He argues that

Australia needs to recognise the role of Indonesia’s domestic politics, its democratic institutions,

parliament, and non-government actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy making.113 Other authors agree,

such as Avery Poole who argues that ‘the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy also reflects shifting

domestic political roles and interests’.114 She also notes that such ‘domestic constraints are likely to

continue to hinder Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions’.115 Another scholar to consider factors below

the level of the state in Indonesia’s foreign policy making is I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana (2016), who

applies the English School perspective to Indonesian foreign policy and finds that Indonesian elites are

concerned with ‘the formation and maintenance of order in international societies’.116 These

109 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy,” 120; See for example: Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson, eds., Strange Neighbours: The Australia-Indonesia Relationship (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991); Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith, eds., Australia and Asia (Melbourne ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Paul Dibb, “Indonesia: The Key to South-East Asia’s Security,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 77, no. 4 (2001): 829–42; Richard Leaver, “Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/095127400100018534; Jamie Mackie, “Australia and Indonesia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001): 133–43; Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia, and the Independence of East Timor (Scribe Publications, 2004); John Monfries and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). 110 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy,” 120–21; James George and Rodd McGibbon, “Dangerous Liaisons: Neoliberal Foreign Policy and Australia’s Regional Engagement,” Australian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (1998): 339–420; Anthony Burke, “Strangers Without Strangeness: Ethics and Difference Between Australia and the Indonesian New Order,” Communal/Plural 8, no. 2 (October 1, 2000): 141–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/132078700426370; Philpott, “Fear of the Dark.” 111 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy,” 121. 112 Sulistiyanto, 121. 113 Sulistiyanto, 117. 114 Avery Poole, “The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and Identity,” in Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, ed. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian, Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 155, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397416_8. 115 Poole, 156. 116 I. Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, “International Society: The Social Dimensions of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” The Pacific Review 29, no. 5 (October 19, 2016): 742, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1047467.

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arguments demonstrate that domestic process and the ideas of decision-makers are important in

understanding Indonesia’s decision making and that such an understanding requires an approach

which breaks down the unitary actor of ‘the state’, interrogating the role of domestic factors in foreign

policy decision-making.

If it is considered true that, as outlined above, Australia and Indonesia have a turbulent

relationship but cooperate well when leaders are friendly and where there are mutual interests, it

raises questions about what mutual interests underlie their cooperation on irregular migration, and

how the Bali Process was able to be established under the strained relationship of Howard and

Megawati. This thesis further uses the findings of the above review – that media, culture and

leadership matters – in pursuing this research with a Foreign Policy Analysis approach, which, as

explained further below, highlights the importance of below-state factors in producing foreign policy

outcomes. Furthermore, as Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae (2018) note: despite the setbacks, the

relationship has grown warmer over the same period.117 It is therefore not useful not to check the

temperature of the relationship daily, but to analyse the relationship in context of its broader

trajectory – something this thesis responds to by adopting a longue durée (long-term) study of the

specific area of irregular migration, as opposed to histoire évenémentielle (history of events). This

chapter now turns to the literature on ‘cooperation’ in International Relations in order to understand

how two states, notwithstanding their differences, come to cooperate, and how this can be applied

to my research approach.

Understanding Cooperation in International Relations This chapter has thus far shown that the literature on interstate cooperation on migration

involves international and domestic aspects, but largely focuses on the destination state – neglecting

the preferences of origin and transit states. It then showed that the Australia-Indonesia relationship

is shaped by their differences, the media, culture, leaders and mutual interests, and that despite the

turbulence in the relationship, cooperation on the difficult area of irregular migration has endured,

evolved and changed over time. Armed with this understanding, this section will review literature on

‘cooperation’ in International Relations in order to choose the most relevant tools for explaining

Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in managing irregular migration. I will first explore theories that

may explain why Indonesia would cooperate with Australia in managing irregular migration, before

reviewing what the literature says about how this cooperation occurs. It will then look at how we can

use these theories to understand this particular research problem.

117 Lindsey and McRae, “Strangers Next Door?,” 5.

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Why do States Cooperate? Explaining cooperation among nations has been one of the major objectives for International

Relations scholars, who often use game theory models to understand cooperation. The Prisoner’s

Dilemma is one such model, which ‘embodies the tension between individual rationality (reflected in

the incentive of both sides to be selfish) and group rationality (reflected in the higher payoff to both

sides for mutual cooperation over mutual defection)’.118 This game-theory model explains cooperation

in a once-off situation under certain conditions. The results would be different should the prisoners

expect to meet again – in this case, an episode of reciprocity would occur. Reciprocity refers to an

exchange ‘of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior

actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad’.119 Specific

reciprocity is played out in a tit-for-tat strategy, where a player cooperates in the first instance, then

mimics the other player’s move in the second.120 In other words, cooperation is reciprocated with

cooperation and non-cooperation reciprocated with non-cooperation. The longer the ‘shadow of the

future’ (that states will repeatedly meet again) the more incentive there is for states to cooperate in

the long term than to reap the short-term benefits of reneging. Nevertheless, in instances where

states are not directly harmed by non-cooperation, then reciprocity does not hold much power.121 The

parties may, however, be subject to defuse reciprocity, where states cooperate ‘not because of

ensuing rewards from specific actors, but in the interests of continuing satisfactory overall results for

the group of which one is a part, as a whole’.122 As there are no direct rewards for cooperation, diffuse

reciprocity is maintained only by a sense of obligation. An alternative way to explain and predict

cooperation is with the Stag Hunt game, also known as a ‘trust dilemma’, where actors choose

between a safe option or social cooperation, based on their beliefs about what other actors will do.123

What the Prisoner’s Dilemma, reciprocity and the Stag Hunt tells us is that effective

cooperation is built on trust in and expectations of other actors. But what exactly is cooperation?

There is general consensus within this literature that cooperation can be defined as ‘when actors

adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others’ and can ‘only take place in

situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests’.124 This can be achieved

118 Robert Axelrod, “Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (March 1, 1980): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200278002400101. 119 Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 01 (December 1986): 8, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004458. 120 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 121 Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,” International Organization 40, no. 03 (June 1986): 618–19, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027296. 122 Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” 20. 123 Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 124 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1, 1985): 226, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357.

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in three main ways. First, cooperation can be achieved tacitly, that is, ‘cooperative behaviour emerges

as the expectations of the actors converge’.125 Second, it can be achieved through negotiation or

bargaining, that is, where cooperation emerges from conscious efforts to agree and formal

expressions of such agreements. Or third, cooperation can be achieved by a stronger party imposing

cooperation and forcing another party to alter its policies, which is more likely to occur in instances of

asymmetrical relations.126 In the next few chapters we will see more of the second type – negotiations

and bargaining.

There are, however, a number of instances where weaker states can have influence over a

stronger state in an asymmetrical relationship. Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson (1986) identify two

propositions from the literature that explains how weaker states can influence stronger states. One

proposition focuses on ’power bases’ and systemic factors, including ‘whether the international

system is hierarchical or hegemonical, and whether it is characterized by a balance of power or not’.127

Systemic factors affecting a weaker state’s influence over a stronger state include the level of tension

in the international arena, the strength of international norms, and the role of certain internal qualities

of the weaker state, including geographical factors, the reputation of the smaller state, its

organisational capabilities, and material factors like natural resources, industrial and technological

level and human resources.128 The second proposition deals with more ’direct’ causes and available

tactics. These include the role of the weaker state’s alignment policy or alliance membership,

exploitation of great power weaknesses, or through choosing specific diplomatic strategies, such as

ensuring conflicts with stronger powers are settled within the political sphere, exercising ‘bargaining

power’, or showing determination and credibility in making commitments.129 Credible threats can be

seen to be just as important as their implementation. Showing determination can be done through

‘issue escalation’, that is, convincing the other state that a practical question is a matter of principle,

or through ‘issue-linkage’, where the weaker state can link one issue to another issue in which the

state is in a better position than in the original issue area.130 In the case of irregular migration between

Australia and Indonesia, as will be shown, it is Indonesia that holds more power as Australia seeks its

cooperation on an issue of little importance to Indonesia.

125 Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 469, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010546. 126 Milner, 469. 127 Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson, “The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview,” Cooperation and Conflict 21, no. 2 (June 1, 1986): 81, https://doi.org/10.1177/001083678602100202. 128 Lindell and Persson, 81–85. 129 Lindell and Persson, 85–91. 130 Lindell and Persson, 88; Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32, no. 03 (1980): 357–405, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010109; Alexander Betts, Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

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Ultimately, these theories posit that a state decides to cooperate based on its strategic

interests given structural constraints. Nevertheless, strategic interest alone does not ensure

cooperation, especially if there is mistrust and power asymmetry. There are, however, strategies to

create effective cooperation in the face of mistrust and asymmetry. For example, Deborah Larson

(1997) and Andrew Kydd (2000) argue that trust can be built small agreements in areas of lower risk

which then initiate a chain of mutually rewarding behaviour.131 Michael Slobodchikoff (2013), on the

other hand, argues that it is not trust that is built, but ‘an expectation of certain future behaviours and

outcomes. In other words, it is possible to trust that a state will not violate a given agreement, even if

the weaker state does not fully trust the hegemon’.132 Therefore, cooperation can occur in situations

of mistrust and power asymmetry through ‘institutional design’, that is, by creating a relationship

based on expectation of certain behaviours. Over the next few chapters, we will see how in some

instances cooperation started off on a smaller scale, before becoming more entrenched, and that

institutional design was able to aid relations, especially in the case of the Bali Process (Chapter 5).

A number of strategic interests that make cooperation likely include: geographical proximity,

ensuring security, economic strategy, and (similar) ethnicity. This speaks to the realist reasoning for

explaining why states cooperate; for realists, humans are dishonest by nature, consequently, a state

would be foolish to trust another state and maintain their commitments.133 According to realists, the

condition of anarchy is problematic to cooperation, as ‘covenants, without the sword, are but words

and of no strength’.134 Cooperation, from this perspective, is the result of either: (1) a hegemon forcing

other states to comply; (2) the rules of a treaty codifying existing behaviour; or (3) the resolution of a

coordination game where no state has an incentive to violate the rules once equilibrium has been

achieved.135

For theorists of the neoliberal tradition, however, states perceive cooperation to be possible

and desirable. For example, they view international law and treaties as binding because rules are

established by mutual consent, and emphasise that cooperation is in the best interests of states over

the long term. Neoliberals tend to abide by the principle pacta sunt servanda, or, ‘agreements must

131 Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 1997), 5; Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 333. 132 Michael O. Slobodchikoff, Strategic Cooperation: Overcoming the Barriers of Global Anarchy (Lexington Books, 2013), 8. 133 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49. 134 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (Andrew Crooke, 1651), 85. 135 Ronald B. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization 48, no. 03 (June 1994): 428, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028253.

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be kept’ as opposed to realists who follow the principle rebus sic stantibus, which allows treaties to

become inapplicable because of a fundamental change in circumstances. These two rationalist strands

of thought see state cooperation as motivated by the ‘logic of expected consequences’, that is, states

choose among possibilities by evaluating the likely consequences, aware that other actors are doing

the same.136 Actors negotiate in pursuing their interests where there are benefits to collective action.

From this perspective, states will cooperate if the expected consequences of cooperation result in

benefits. This reasoning may explain why states cooperate with some commitments and violate

others. Nevertheless, in most of the cases to follow, it is not immediately clear what the expected

benefits are for Indonesia’s cooperation.

The sociological approach criticises the rationalistic logic of consequence approach for

ignoring the role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping behaviour.137 As opposed to the

rationalist approach, which treats state interests and identities as constant and exogenously given,

the sociological approach considers interests and identities to be constructed and ‘dependent

variables endogenous to interaction’.138 According to this perspective, states cooperate based on the

‘logic of appropriateness’, that is, in a specific situation states choose actions that are based on an

identity or role appropriate to that situation.139 As such, when states perceive a rule as ‘legitimate’

their compliance is motivated by an ‘internal sense of moral obligation’, rather than a fear of

retribution or as a calculation of self-interest.140 For Indonesia, a country which does not see itself as

a final destination for refugees and which has not signed the Refugee Convention, the logic of

appropriateness seems insufficient, as it has not subscribed to norms of refugee protection nor does

it identify as a destination state for refugees.

Though there are differing approaches to explaining state behaviour – as driven by interests

or by identity – it is important to note that identity does not necessarily stand apart from interests,

rather, ‘identities are the basis of interests’.141 This third approach recognises that both interests and

identity are important in explaining behaviour, and ‘neither is reducible to the other’.142 According to

136 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 949. 137 March and Olsen, 951. 138 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944711. 139 March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” 951. 140 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 387, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550913. 141 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 02 (1992): 398, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764. 142 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton University Press, 2008), 76.

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Ian Hurd, the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness are not mutually exclusive but can

be complementary.143 In arguing that states are rational actors in a social environment, Hurd’s

argument straddles both logics.144 I subscribe to this third view that takes into account both rational

and social factors. This will allow me to discover when, and to what extent, calculations relating to

consequences as well as perceptions of appropriateness inform Australia-Indonesia cooperation, and

how their influence varies in weight at different points in time. We can therefore see when a state

acts in accordance with the logic of appropriateness, they are not acting in pursuit of interests rather

than values, but in pursuit of interests that have been constructed by values.

Understanding the interface between the logics of consequence and the logic of

appropriateness can help us understand why states may cooperate in certain situations: they may see

it as in their interests or because it is the right and legitimate thing to do, and perhaps a combination

of both. Although this helps us understand why states cooperate, it does not tell us how they

cooperate.

How do States Cooperate? There are several useful concepts which explain how states cooperate in relation to irregular

migration and refugees. The first concept is ‘burden-shifting’, which describes a situation where states

create policies that result in the shifting of responsibility, or ‘burden’, to other states. In the migration

spaces, this is when ‘one state defects from a protection demand on the presumption that another

state will deliver protection’.145 This illustrates a situation where weaker states can be coerced into

cooperation by a more powerful state. On the other hand, a concept that describes a more reciprocal

approach to cooperation is the concept of ‘burden-sharing’, or, more aptly, ‘responsibility-sharing’146,

where responsibility is ‘consensually redistributed in a manner that is fair to all countries involved’.147

In asymmetrical relations, weaker states can influence cooperation from stronger states through

‘issue linkage’ and ‘cross-issue persuasion’, that is, by linking issues of irregular migration to other

issues like security, trade, and development.148

In our analysis of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the area of irregular migration

specifically, Amy Nethery and myself (2014) have argued that the concepts of burden-sharing, burden-

143 Hurd, 16. 144 Hurd, 25. 145 Gregor Noll, “Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden‐Sharing in the Asylum Field,” Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 240, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/16.3.236. 146 Stephen H. Legomsky, “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection,” International Journal of Refugee Law 15, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 606–7, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/15.4.567. 147 Taylor, “The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare,” 32. 148 Betts, Protection by Persuasion.

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shifting and cross-issue persuasion are not indicative of the unique relationship between Australia and

Indonesia.149 Rather, we argue that Indonesia cooperates with Australia in managing irregular

migration through a mechanism called ‘incentivised policy transfer’, which is a process whereby:

Governments are encouraged to adopt policy change in order to secure financial

assistance or investment. Rather than ‘compelling’ governments, [Incentivised

Policy Transfer] describes a situation where the financial and diplomatic benefits

of adopting the policy are presented in such a way that the host government can

adopt the policy in its own national interest.150

We argue that the dramatic changes in Indonesia’s asylum policies over the last decade is a result of

Australia’s persistent diplomatic and financial efforts, rather than the issue actually gaining more

importance in Indonesian domestic priorities: ‘through diplomacy, substantial levels of funding, the

provision of infrastructure and training, and the sharing of intelligence, Australia has achieved a

significant change in Indonesia’s asylum policy’.151 The Incentivised Policy Transfer explanation

therefore describes Indonesia’s cooperation with Australia as motivated by the logic of consequence,

as it shows that the reason Indonesia works with Australia is for an increase of benefits over costs.

Nevertheless, according to Susan Kneebone (2017), Incentivised Policy Transfer is an

incomplete explanation of Indonesia’s apparent cooperation with Australia’s policies. Kneebone

articulates a more nuanced understanding of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in this area.152 She

examines three periods of Australia-Indonesia cooperation between 2001-2016. Kneebone argues

that in the first period, Indonesia tolerates refugee protection but accepts Australian demand for

increasingly securitized measures. In the second period, Indonesia’s response to irregular migration is

more difficult to garner, as it is fragmented among regional, private, non-state and interstate actors,

while in the third period Indonesia separates itself from Australian influence and aligns its refugee

response more closely with the region, continuing to tolerate refugee protection. Kneebone argues

that ‘Indonesia’s current focus is on its own needs and those of the region’.153 Her conclusion that

Indonesia tolerates refugees but concentrates on its own needs suggests a combination of the logic

of consequence and the logic of appropriateness are at play and also points to the important role of

domestic and competing regional preferences in formulating its decision to cooperate. While both

Incentivised Policy Transfer and Kneebone’s account further our understanding of Australia and

149 Nethery and Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers,” 181–82. 150 Nethery and Gordyn, 183. 151 Nethery and Gordyn, 190. 152 Kneebone, “Australia as a Powerbroker on Refugee Protection in Southeast Asia.” 153 Kneebone, 37.

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Indonesia’s cooperation in managing irregular migration, these studies focus only on the

contemporary period.

Generally, these theories of cooperation reviewed above fail to take into account the role of

domestic politics in cooperation. Helen Milner (1992) argues that there are three main reasons why

considering the role of domestic politics is essential for understanding international cooperation. First,

examination of domestic politics can shed light on how preferences are aggregated and how the

national interest is constructed. Second, it can explain the strategies states adopt, be it tit-for-tat

issue-linkage and side-payments or the use of force. Third, in establishing agreements, domestic actors

agree to abide by the negotiated terms and ratify them domestically.154 Thus, as Milner argues, when

negotiating internationally, policymakers anticipate domestic reactions.155 This is in keeping with our

understanding of irregular migration as a foreign policy problem at the Frontier. While there is no

single theory of domestic politics and its role in international cooperation, Milner points out four

prominent theories. These include pluralist theories, which suggest that interest groups and party

systems matter most; elite theories, which focus on the role of the elite and their backgrounds and

beliefs, and the political context in which they operate; institutional theories, which highlight the role

of domestic decision-making structures, and; Marxist theories, which focus on the role of classes and

capitalism for cooperation.156 While Milner certainly makes a convincing case for domestic-level

theories contributing to the ‘biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future’157,

there is no denying the structure also plays a part, and that there needs to be integration across

various levels of analysis.

The above review has generated the following conclusions:

1) Irregular migration sits at the ‘Frontier’ between the international and domestic.

2) There remain lacunae in our knowledge by way of empirically grounded research which

understands the role of and process by which a state cooperates with another state in the

pursuit of border policies.

3) Despite relationship turbulence, the Australia-Indonesia relationship perseists.

4) The Australia-Indonesia relationship is affected not only by differences and mutual

interests, but by media, culture, leaders and their relationships.

154 Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations,” 493. 155 Milner, 493. 156 Milner, 494–95. 157 Milner, 496.

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5) Theories of cooperation in International Relations largely neglect, or at lease generate

inconclusive expectations about, these substate aspects.

The next section will elaborate on how these conclusions have directly informed my research

approach.

Research Approach and Methodology The question this thesis asks is: ‘how have Australia and Indonesia cooperated in managing

irregular migration since the 1960s?’ How is this question optimally approached in light of the findings

highlighted above? Points 1, 4 and 5 call for an approach that considers the full range of international,

domestic and individual-level factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and how they

interact to lead to instances of cooperation. Point 2 highlights the need for an empirically grounded

study giving more attention to the participation of a state in another state’s border policies, while

point 3 underscores the importance of a long-term study across time. In response, I conduct an

empirically grounded historical study, guided by a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach. The next

section will explain what I mean by an FPA ‘approach’. Then, I will detail my research design, the

process by which it was implemented, and the way in which it was analysed.

Research Approach: Foreign Policy Analysis As outlined in the above reviews of the literature, a more nuanced understanding of

international and domestic factors, as well as leaders and their relationships, is required to obtain a

fuller understanding of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in managing irregular migration (points 1, 4

and 5 above). I argue that this perspective is best offered by Foreign Policy Analysis, which ‘opens the

“black box” of the state and provides explanations of how and why foreign policy decisions are

made’.158 Generally, there are three main levels of analysis, or ‘images’ in explaining and

understanding international relations: individuals, states, and the international system.159 An FPA lens

encourages us to examine all the factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and decision-

makers, regardless of the level of analysis in which they originate. It therefore considers multifactorial

explanations to foreign policy decision-making across multiple levels of analysis, from the most micro

to the most macro, seeking to integrate these various factors in its explanation.160 Furthermore, FPA

‘puts individuals and groups (from committees to ministries) at the center of analysis’.161 It highlights

how human decision-makers perceive, react to, shape and are shaped by the world around them and

158 Smith, “Missing in Analysis,” 131. 159 Kenneth N Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 160 Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” 2. 161 Smith, “Missing in Analysis,” 131.

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how this impacts the process and result of human decision-making.162 As shown in the following

chapters, human decision-makers and their relationships are indeed very important in shaping

cooperation.

As FPA scholars are fascinated by the decision-making process, they seek to ‘get to the

bottom’ of how and why decisions are made, appreciating that actors take into account a variety of

influences from across different levels of analysis.163 This FPA ‘disposition’ has resulted in studies

focusing on the role of individual characteristics like leadership personality164 and cognitive biases;165

group decision-making and small-group dynamics;166 bureaucratic politics;167 the role of public

opinion, the media and interest groups;168 as well as societal characteristics, culture and national

identity169 in explaining foreign policy decision-making. These levels of analysis within the FPA

literature hint at what factors may influence Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in managing

irregular migration, especially as the review of literature on the Australia-Indonesia relationship

162 Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” 1, 2. 163 Benjamin Day, “Teaching Foreign Policy Analysis in Australia: On Cultivating an ‘FPA Disposition,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 6 (November 2, 2019): 541–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1683510. 164 Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1, 1980): 7–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600126; Stanley A. Renshon, “Presidential Address: George W. Bush’s Cowboy Politics: An Inquiry,” Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 585–614; Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 289–306, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2006.00031.x. 165 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin UK, 2011); David Patrick Houghton, “Invading and Occupying Iraq: Some Insights From Political Psychology,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 14, no. 2 (April 25, 2008): 169–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/10781910802017297. 166 Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink : A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston : Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/45411710; Dina Badie, “Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 277–96. 167 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24 (1972): 40–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010559; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed (New York: Longman, 1999); Martin A. Smith, “US Bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” Contemporary Politics 14, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 91–105, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770801913314. 168 Benjamin Day, “Australian Aid after the ‘Golden Consensus’: From Aid Policy to Development Policy?,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 641–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1220493; Douglas Foyle, “Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization: Public Opinion, World Opinion, and the Individual,” International Studies Review 5, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 163–202, https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.5020013; John W. Dietrich, “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China MFN Debates,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1999): 280–96. 169 Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, “Australia’s Place in the World,” in Making Australian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 208–32, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139168632; Valerie M. Hudson, “Cultural Expectations of One’s Own and Other Nations’ Foreign Policy Action Templates,” Political Psychology 20, no. 4 (1999): 767–801; K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 233–309, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584; Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest States,” International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 5–38.

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reveals that media, culture and leadership influences the relationship – these are factors that the

broader IR theories do not emphasise. FPA may also reveal how this cooperation has changed over

time if changes in different factors lead to different outcomes. This will also help us understand how

future changes to these factors might impact cooperation.

An FPA disposition further seeks to integrate these levels of analysis. FPA scholars seek to

identify and join the factors influencing decision-making in an effort to discover and explain the

‘simplicity that resides on the far side of complexity’.170 FPA can therefore offer an integrated, fuller

and more satisfying explanation of foreign policy decision-making, taking into account the

contribution of human beings.171 Valerie Hudson (2005) argues that FPA offers the ‘best conceptual

connection to the empirical ground’.172 I agree and decided that for my empirically grounded study,

approaching my research question with a self-consciously ‘FPA’ disposition would aloe me to ‘get

closer’ to the factors that the literature suggests as important to the relationship, as opposed to more

abstract theorising. As such, this project uses FPA as an organising principle, or a ‘toolbox’173 with

which to build an explanation from my empirical findings, which will be discussed in the next section.

Research Design As discussed above, the existing IR literature on cooperation (based as it is on assumptions

about mutual interests) would also lead us to expect cooperation to break down at every moment of

crisis given that these crises are borne of the misalignment of the two states’ interests. Instead we

need to understand how cooperation between the two countries works at an individual and

bureaucratic level – the home ground of FPA – in order to be able to analyse its successes and failures

over time. Furthermore, there is a need to defy the convention of studying the ‘flashpoints’ of the

Australia-Indonesia relationship and take a long-term view to trace its trajectory and the ebbs and

flows (point 3 above). I therefore conduct a chronological analysis of three instances of cooperation

between Australia and Indonesia: border crossers on New Guinea (1962-1973), the Indochinese

refugee crisis (1975-1979), and the boat arrivals of the 1990s and early 2000s which resulted in the

establishment of the Bali Process (1991-2002). I chose these cases because they stretch from the first

form of cooperation on irregular migration to the establishment of the Bali Process. By examining

these cases, I explain the historical background in the lead up to the Bali Process, which is neglected

in the literature. There is potentially one other case that could have been selected, and that is the case

of East Timorese refugees coming directly to Australia from Indonesia. Since East Timor was forcibly

170 Day, “Teaching Foreign Policy Analysis in Australia,” 542. 171 Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” 3–4. 172 Hudson, 1. 173 Jean-Frédéric Morin and Jonathan Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 11, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61003-0.

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incorporated by Indonesia in 1975 East Timorese have fled to Australia by various means, but in 1995,

the first arrived irregularly by boat on the Tasi Diak (discussed in Chapter Five). Given the level of

control the government had over resettling East Timorese, except the arrival of the Tasi Diak, I did not

choose this case as it generally does not fit the definition of irregular migration.

The goal of case study research is to shed light on a phenomenon through an in-depth

examination.174 Derek Beach and Rasmus Pedersen argue that case-based research allows scholars to

study ‘how things actually worked by tracing the empirical finger-prints left by a causal process within

a particular case’ (emphasis in original).175 It is therefore not enough to simply describe the case,

according to Mark Trachtenberg, but to ‘understand the logic that underlies the course of events’

(emphasis in original).176 This objective also neatly parallels the demands of an FPA approach.

In keeping with the need for empirically grounded research (point 2 above), I use an inductive

approach in understanding the logic that underlies this course of events. As opposed to a deductive

approach which ‘tests whether data are consistent with prior assumptions, theories, or hypotheses

identified or constructed by an investigator’177, I allowed the theory to emerge from the ‘frequent,

dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured

methodologies’.178 So while I use an FPA approach to analyse my findings, I did not set out to test FPA

hypotheses. This is to avoid pre-empting certain answers, ascribing more importance to certain factors

than is otherwise the case, and forcing findings into some ‘preconceived theoretical structure’.179

Therefore, rather than going into the field to test the role of media, culture, leaders and interests, as

the above literature review on the relationship suggests, I went to the field armed with an

understanding that substate factors may be of importance – which ones, and to what extent, I allowed

to emerge from the data. Specifically, rather than guiding interview questions towards this topic,

questions put to interviewees were open and designed to uncover which, if any, substate factors were

deemed important, and how. Furthermore, as archival documents were analysed, I developed a

spreadsheet to keep track of each document and tag them with the key themes in the document itself,

whether this be substate factors or otherwise.

174 “Historical Research,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, by Lisa Given (2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412963909.n199. 175 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Red Globe Press, 2020), 49. 176 Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 33. 177 David R. Thomas, “A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data,” American Journal of Evaluation 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 238, https://doi.org/10.1177/1098214005283748. 178 David R. Thomas, 238. 179 Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, 33.

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As such, this project uses FPA as an organising principle, or a ‘toolbox’180 with which to view

Australia and Indonesia’s management of irregular migration. This is in keeping with the need to be

open to the role of multilevel, and especially substate, factors (points 1, 4 and 5 above). In so doing, I

engaged in empirical ‘soaking and probing’ to find systematic patterns that shed light on the

underlying causes at play.181 By focussing on the process by which Australia and Indonesia came to

cooperate – or not cooperate – I engage ‘layered thinking’ about the many factors that produced – or

did not produce – cooperation.182 In so doing, I coded my interview transcripts and archival work with

the key themes emerging, then took a birds-eye view across my sources and cases to examine the

persistence of key themes. Indeed an FPA approach ‘often means putting together an ad hoc

construction’ and encourages ‘intellectual creativity’ in its analysis.183 This allows for theoretical

integration, which results in a greater understanding of the interrelationship among different levels

of analysis and improved explanation of the case at hand.184 As such, I considered the multiple factors

emerging from my cases and their interrelations. According to Valerie Hudson and Benjamin Day

(2019), ‘adopting a self-consciously integrative lens reveals how relevant factors, regardless of the

level of analysis from which they originate, will always interact with and be shaped by a range of other

factors. New concepts, new propositions, and new generalisations may arise’.185 Indeed through this

approach, I found that ‘trust’ was an important and overlooked factor in explaining cooperation and

its lack thereof. The next section will outline how I conducted and analysed this research and, in so

doing, discovered and conceptualised the role of trust.

Research Process As I have mentioned above, I undertook an inductive approach by first going to the ‘field’ and

allowing the findings to emerge. This section will define my ‘field’ and how I harvested it.

The field primarily involved archives and interviews, as well as Hansard, Factiva and Trove

databases, in addition to secondary sources. The first two cases, New Guinea and Indochina, were

predominately archive based, while the Bali Process case, given its relatively contemporary period,

was mostly interview based. Before approaching each case, I undertook desk research from secondary

sources in order to devise a detailed timeline of relevant events. This focused my archival analysis and

allowed me to create specific questions for my interviewees.

180 Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, 11. 181 Beach and Pedersen, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 49. 182 Valerie M. Hudson and Benjamin S. Day, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Third edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019), 192. 183 Morin and Paquin, Foreign Policy Analysis, 11. 184 Hudson and Day, Foreign Policy Analysis, 191–92. 185 Hudson and Day, 192.

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I analysed historical archives for the first two case studies: New Guinea and the Indochinese

refugee crisis at both the National Archives of Australia and the UNHCR archives in Geneva, as well as

publicly available published volumes of cablegrams. The files that I analysed were predominately

correspondence between Australian government departments, and in the Indochinese case, I mostly

relied on the files of the Australian embassy in Jakarta – the correspondence into, out of and within

the embassy, as well as their correspondence and records of meetings with the Indonesian officials

with whom they liaised. In the case of the Indochinese crisis, these archives have – to my knowledge

– never been published. The Bali Process case was too contemporary and, as a result, the archives had

not yet been made available. This was overcome by consulting the parliamentary record through

Hansard, newspaper archives through the Factiva and Trove databases, as well as other publicly

available documents and secondary sources.

For all case studies, I triangulated this archival work with semi-structured elite interviews of

both Australian and Indonesian officials, some of which were conducted in the Indonesian language.

Interviews were conducted across Canberra, Sydney, Jakarta, Jogjakarta and Geneva. This produced

over 43 hours of interview recordings from 32 interviewees on the Indonesian side and 15 on the

Australian side. Interviewees included former foreign ministers, ambassadors, chief of police, chief of

defence, advisors, academics, foreign correspondents and media, and civil society. As half a century

has passed since the first case study period, few people are still alive or healthy enough to be

interviewed for the early periods. As such, more interviewees were readily available for the most

recent case, which, conveniently, had no corresponding archive (except media and Hansard archives).

Table 1: Distribution of Interviewees.

New Guinea Indochina 1990s/Bali Process

Indonesia Australia Indonesia Australia Indonesia Australia

Foreign Minister 1 1

Ambassador 1 2 3

Government 1 1 2 3 7 2

Military/Navy/Defence 5 1

Police 1 3 3

UNHCR 3

IOM 2

Media 3 1

Civil Society 1 2

Academic/Research 1 4 2

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In conducting my research, I found that elite interviews in Indonesia is considerably different

to experiences documented in the Western-oriented research methodology literature on this

research.186 Most notably, snowballing is not particularly successful in Indonesia, as interviewees

typically do not recommend staff underneath them but will, however, refer to others at the same level

or above. Staff at lower levels would defer to their seniors, hindering my ability to get an on-the-

ground perspective of staff in favour for a birds-eye view from ministers. Furthermore, non-traditional

modes of contact (i.e. WhatsApp) are typically preferred in Indonesia, rather than email. This can make

it difficult to find the correct contact for a public figure, or find their junior staff. See Table 1 for a

distribution of interviewees, noting that some held multiple roles across the cases.

While I understand the Indonesian language, Indonesian sources were quite difficult to obtain,

especially historically, and I was unable to access the Indonesian archives. Nevertheless, while there

is more weight on Australian historical sources, many of the Australian files examined were able to

substantially articulate the Indonesian position. Future work based on Indonesian archives will deepen

the understanding of the cooperation uncovered in this thesis.

In analysing my sources, I coded the interview transcripts alongside my archival analysis to

reveal which common factors and patterns kept emerging as constraints, enablers, influencers or

inhibitors to cooperation. To code these sources, I developed a spreadsheet which allowed for tagging

each document and transcript with key themes. It was at this time I began to see the emergence of

‘trust’ as an important factor, and one which could become a ‘central category’, that is, ‘the category

that appears to have to greatest explanatory relevance and highest potential for linking all of the other

categories together’.187 This is in keeping with FPA’s focus on an integrated understanding of foreign

policy decision-making. In the process of analysis, I followed the criteria recommended by Juliet Corbin

and Anselm Strauss in choosing a central category:

• It must be abstract; that is, all other major categories can be related to it and placed

under it.

• It must appear frequently in the data. This means that within all, or almost all, cases

there are indicators pointing to that concept.

• It must be logical and consistent with the data. There should be no forcing of data.

186 For a good overview, see: Layna Mosley, ed., Interview Research in Political Science (Cornell University Press, 2013), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5wg. 187 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research (3rd Ed.): Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 3rd ed. (2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452230153.

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• It should be sufficiently abstract so that it can be used to do research in other

substantive areas, leading to the development of a more general theory.

• It should grow in depth and explanatory power as each of the other categories is

related to it through statements of relationship.188

As Beach and Pedersen note, inductive case study research involves a back-and-forth, iterative

process.189 With the understanding of which key themes emerged across my cases, and the emergence

of trust as a central explanatory category, I constantly moved between ‘writing the story line’190, back

to my data, and on to theoretical insights that may shed light on the emergence of this concept. The

next section will explain the results of this process of analysis.

Research Analysis Trust is an overlooked and underdeveloped concept in the FPA literature. There is, however,

a general sense that ‘developing trust through personal relations can have a profound effect on policy

outcomes’.191 The role of trust in guiding foreign policy decision-making has not been closely

interrogated, especially as related to one issue area over a long time period. This lacuna has been

recognised for some time. Alost two decades ago, Derek Collet and James Goldgeier highlighted the

need for FPA research to explore ‘the importance of personal relationships and trust both within

government and between governments’.192

More broadly in International Relations the concept of trust is receiving increased attention.

Notably, however, there is no broad consensus on how to define or conceptualise this notoriously

slippery term. According to Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Charles Keating’s typology, there are three main

approaches to the study of trust in IR: rational, social, and psychological.193 Each approach offers a

definition of trust based on a belief about how trust is generated. Rationalist conceptions, for example,

view trust as a conscious calculation about the likelihood that the other party will reciprocate. These

conceptualisations of trust, however, are critiqued for conflating trust with cooperation194 and

neglecting the ‘human factor’ or the social dynamics of trust by overstating cognitive calculations.195

188 Corbin and Strauss. 189 Beach and Pedersen, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 49. 190 Corbin and Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research (3rd Ed.). 191 Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, “The Scholarship of Decision-Making: Do We Know How We Decide?,” in Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited), ed. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2002), 168, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230107526_3. 192 Chollet and Goldgeier, 167. 193 Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Charles Keating, “Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations,” Journal of Trust Research 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 12, https://doi.org/10.1080/21515581.2015.1009082. 194 Ruzicka and Keating, 21. 195 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke [England] ; New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 234; Jonathan Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 77–106.

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Furthermore, trust based on predictability of actions cannot differentiate between trust and other

factors like coercion and asymmetrical power.196 By reducing trust to a rational calculation,

researchers are simply investigating ‘the processes by which individuals come to formulate and act on

the predictions about the behaviour of others’.197 Keating and Ruzicka differentiate trust based on a

one actor’s perceptions that another will reciprocate by calling it ‘confidence’.198 They argue that

confidence does not reduce an actor’s perception of risk – unlike trust – and ignores the social nature

of trust.199

The social approach, on the other hand, asserts that trust involves more than a simple

prediction about the behaviour of others. In so doing, it takes account of the social and relational

dynamics between actors. Proponents of this approach believe that in a trusting relationship, parties

will honour their promises even if they have something to gain from defecting, because ‘they value

both its existence and continuation’.200 Contrary to the rationalist definition of trust as a ‘confidence

in expectations’, the social approach views trust as a ‘confidence in expectations that others will ‘do

what is right’’.201 These conceptions stress social obligation, but like the rationalist conceptions, they

still rest upon the idea that trust is based on a perception that the trusted party will fulfil the

obligation.

The psychological approach takes into account emotions and the psychology of statespersons.

From this perspective, trust can be defined as ‘a feeling of optimism in another’s goodwill and

competence’.202 Such a feeling is not simply a result of a rational calculation about another’s interests

but an assessment of their trustworthiness203 and an exercise in empathy.204 Psychology is indeed

196 Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Thomas B. Lawrence, “Distinguishing Trust and Power in Interorganizational Relations: Forms and Façades of Trust,” in Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications, ed. C. Lane and R. Bachmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64–87, http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5657/. 197 J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” Social Forces 63, no. 4 (1985): 976, https://doi.org/10.2307/2578601. 198 Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 4 (October 2014): 755–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000059. 199 Keating and Ruzicka, 756–57. 200 Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 86, no. 1 (2010): 73. 201 Aaron M. Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations:,” European Journal of International Relations, July 24, 2016, 379, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066102008003003. 202 Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” 95. 203 Brian C. Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 243–73, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000014; Lawrence C. Becker, “Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives,” Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 45. 204 Naomi Head, “Transforming Conflict: Trust, Empathy, and Dialogue,” International Journal of Peace Studies 17, no. 2 (2012): 33–55.

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relevant to understanding trust as states are represented by persons, however, there remains a need

to take into account the structural constraints within which a statesperson works.

These various approaches view trust as either based on a rational calculation, a social

structure, or a feeling. But it is not helpful to think of them as one or the other. As Brian Rathbun

notes, ‘psychological and economistic insights still might work in tandem’.205 There may be cases

where rational theory cannot explain the incidence of trust fully, and psychological approaches ‘must

enter to explain the interesting questions’.206 I agree that trust is not only calculative but also

relational. Instead of considering these two as in conflict, scholars need to develop ‘a contextualized

account that acknowledges both rational and social inputs’ (emphasis in original), that is, calculative

processes are part of the fundamentals of trust, but ‘social and situational factors influence the

salience and relative weight afforded to various instrumental and non-instrumental concerns in such

calculations’.207

Similar to the rational and social approaches of defining trust as an expectation about

another’s behaviour, I define trust as the belief that the trusted party will not damage the trustor’s

interest in a given issue area, and argue that this belief is built by both rational and relational inputs.

That is, it is multi-faceted with distinct cognitive, emotional, and behavioural dimensions.208 I further

subscribe to the argument that ‘to effectively differentiate trust from power, we must consider both

predictability and goodwill’ (emphasis in original).209 Nevertheless, I did not initially embark on

fieldwork with the intent to test trust – or ‘beliefs’, for that matter – and as my case studies are

historical, access to living diplomats evenly across my cases was not always possible. I therefore do

not test theories of trust, but I identify the indicators of trust as, synthesised by Simon and Simon (see

Table 2), as they emerged from my data.

205 Rathbun, “Before Hegemony,” 268. 206 Rathbun, 269. 207 Roderick Moreland Kramer, Organizational Trust: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 208 Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” 969, 976. 209 Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence, “Distinguishing Trust and Power in Interorganizational Relations,” 65.

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Table 2: A list of trust-related feelings and behaviours, and their opposites, as identified in the trust

literature210

I identify the important role that the presence, absence and the building of trust plays in

influencing cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on irregular migration. While mutual

interests also proved important, I argue that trust – and the role of interests in building trust – is a

central and overlooked factor in the relationship and this story cannot be properly told without

notions of trust; it is the missing ingredient in fully explaining Australia-Indonesia dynamics over time.

210 Eszter Simon and Agnes Simon, “Trusting Through the Moscow-Washington Hotline: A Role Theoretical Explanation of the Hotline’s Contribution to Crisis Stability,” Journal of Global Security Studies, January 7, 2020, 7, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz062.

Trust-related Non-trust related

Feelings Hope No hope

Faith No faith

Confidence* No confidence

Relative security Fear

- feels safe Anxiety

- assured Suspicion

- comfortable Skepticism

Likeability Cynicism

- good to work with Wariness

- chemistry Anger (versus disappointment when

- positive first impression betrayed)

- compatible personalities

Behaviours Open, frequent, and collaborative communication patterns Avoidance of the other

- exchange of information (including sensitive information) Non-cooperative behavious

- removal of the unknown/misunderstood though giving reasons Pre-emption

- describing what is happening Hedging

- asking for information, help and/or advice Issuing threats

Task coordination Vigilance and watchfulness

- coordination of policy (joint vs parallel action) (behavioural monitoring)

- relying on trustee to implement decisions Distorting and/or refusing to provide

Consistency between words and deeds information

Demonstrating benevolence Attempts to increase control over the

- flexibility (giving away fromthing of balue, compromising, other

being easy to deal with) Resisting influence

- going the extra mile

- acting with discretion

- giving the other alternatives

- finding mutually beneficial solutions

Having shared identity

- shared language

- vision/goals

- motivation

* We use "confidence" and "trust" as synonyms in our analysis, because decision makers use them interhchangeably.

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Conclusion In conclusion, our current understanding of the ways in which states cooperate to manage

irregular migration is limited; there are very few empirically grounded studies that consider the role

of, and process by which, a state cooperates with another state in the pursuit of border policies. In

relation to Australia and Indonesia in particular, studies on cooperation in irregular migration focus

on the relatively recent past. Given the Australia-Indonesia relationship has historically been affected

by substate factors, consideration of how this cooperation has occurred historically needs to take into

account multifactorial and multilevel factors. In response, this thesis conducts an empirically grounded

historical study, guided by an FPA approach. As a result of this pursuit, I have found that the presence,

absence and the building of trust plays an important role in shaping and influencing cooperation

between Australia and Indonesia on irregular migration

The idea of trust is the centrifugal force around which the narratives in the forthcoming

empirical chapters were developed. When viewed in comparative perspective, these accounts yield a

number of findings that push forward our understanding of how Australia and Indonesia cooperate to

manage irregular migration since the 1960s. Most notably, I contribute an understanding of what

might be termed ‘low-politics trust’ and its operation in non-crisis cooperation. This is in sharp contrast

to contemporary cutting-edge research on trust in IR, which focuses on trust in high-level, high-stakes

and enemy relationships.211 By examining the underappreciated history of cooperation between

Australia and Indonesia in the area of irregular migration, these narratives have revealed the

importance of trust as a source of cooperation.

211 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2018).

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3. 1962-1973: New Guinea

Manfred Meho lives on Manus Island, a province of Papua New Guinea1 around 200kms south

of the equator. He lives in one of the twelve old, run-down houses on a large concrete slab built by

Australia to hold refugees.2 In 2017, Meho was invited by the Papua New Guinean government to

apply for citizenship, something he has lived without for over 40 years after he and his family were

sent to Manus Island by the Australian government, not in recent decades after the implementation

of the Pacific Solution, but in 1969, when his family crossed the land border between Indonesian

administered West Irian and Australian administered Papua New Guinea.3 The Australian

administration began transferring ‘border crossers’ to Manus Island from the 30th of October 1968

because it was “out of the way,”4 and did not want them disrupting the important but fragile

relationship that Australia had with its neighbour, Indonesia, by engaging in political activity close to

the border.

This is the first time that Australia found itself as a country of first asylum, and it is the first

form of ‘cooperation’ between Australia and Indonesia on irregular migration and asylum seekers. It

began in the early 1960s when western New Guinea, until then a Dutch colony, was transferred to

Indonesian administration. As a result of the transfer, a land border was created between Indonesia

and the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea. When it became clear that West New Guinea

would be transferred to Indonesian administration, Australia began to prepare for an influx of

1 The island of New Guinea today is divided into two countries: Papua New Guinea in the East, and Indonesia in the West. The Indonesian side had previously been known as Netherlands New Guinea (1895-1962), West New Guinea (1962-63), West Irian (1963-73), Irian Jaya (1973-2001) and Papua (2002-3), before becoming the two Indonesian provinces today called Papua and West Papua. In the East, the northern half had been known as German New Guinea (1884-1914) until it was captured by Australia in World War I and became the Territory of New Guinea (1920-1975), a League of Nations Mandate Territory under Australian administration. The southern half of eastern New Guinea was called British New Guinea (1884-1902), then the Territory of Papua from 1902, with Australian administration beginning in 1906. In 1949 the Territory of New Guinea and the Territory of Papua, both administered by Australia, were merged, and became known as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (1949-1971), until it was renamed Papua New Guinea in 1971. 2 Armbruster Stefan, “Fifty Years in the Making: Refugees in Australia’s First Manus Camp Offered PNG Citizenship,” SBS News, September 25, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20190220064645/https://www.sbs.com.au/news/fifty-years-in-the-making-refugees-in-australia-s-first-manus-camp-offered-png-citizenship. 3 Stefan. 4 Stuart Doran, ed., Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 629 n.4; J.R. Rowland, “Minute to R.F. Osborn: West Irian Border. Canberra, 4 June 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 8],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 784.

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refugees and cooperated closely with Indonesia over the issue.5 Over the next few years, a steady

trickle of people crossed the border, especially around the time of West Irian’s vote for independence

in 1969, the Act of Free Choice. Many were turned back; those granted ‘permissive residence’ were

relocated to remote villages away from the border, such as Manus Island, and were required to sign

an agreement promising not to engage in political activity.

Despite attempts on the part of the Indonesian and Australian governments to keep this out

of the media, newspapers in both Papua New Guinea and Australia were calling for a more generous

approach to asylum seekers, protesting the fact that the Australian administration sent most of them

back across the border. This became more of a concern when the Indonesians had engaged in ‘hot

pursuit’ and chased West Irianese across the border, accidentally shooting at an Australian border

officer in the process. This also highlighted differences between Australia’s Department of External

Affairs and the Department of External Territories, which was the administration of Papua New

Guinea. External Territories wanted a stiff protest to be sent to Djakarta,6 while the Department of

External Affairs said there would be no formal protest but a ‘friendly discussion’ with Indonesia.7 And

while the UNHCR were aware of the situation, Australia and Indonesia avoided international scrutiny

as much as possible, preferring to manage the issue in the bilateral space.

This chapter sheds light on how Australia has pursued its asylum and border policies through

its bilateral relationship with Indonesia in the 1960s. It asks: ‘how did Australia and Indonesia

cooperate to manage border crossers on New Guinea?’ This question drove my investigations of the

files in the National Archives of Australia, as well as interviews with several available officials who

worked on this issue. This chapter uses these sources to analytically elaborate on the factors shaping

cooperation from 1962, when the Dutch withdrew from West New Guinea, until the territory adopted

self-government in 1973 (Papua New Guinea gained full independence in 1975). In doing so, it reveals

the concerns among the Australian diplomats on the ground and the Indonesian officials with whom

they corresponded.

I show that cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on refugee and borders issues was

largely self-interested, with scant regard for humanitarian principles and international norms but a

large concern for security. This becomes evident through various records of communication both

within Australian official circles and between Australian and Indonesian officials. These records show

that attention was only given to humanitarian principles and international norms insofar as it was

5 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 5. 6 Present day Jakarta was known as Djakarta between 1942 and 1972, when it became Jakarta. This chapter uses their historically appropriate names for the period. 7 “N.G. Border Problems,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 2, 1969.

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needed to avoid international attention and damage to both countries’ reputations. As such, it builds

upon the work of Klaus Neumann and Savitri Taylor (2010).8 Neumann and Taylor argue that in its

response to asylum seekers from Papua, ‘the Australian government has attempted to appease the

sensitivities of its powerful northern neighbour, Indonesia, as far as it can without outraging a

domestic public sympathetic to West Papuans or drawing international condemnation by too

obviously breaching international law’.9 While I agree with this assessment, this chapter takes a

deeper dive into the historical context and various at factors at play which led to these policy choices,

in so doing, I add to Neumann and Taylor’s understanding of this case by showing the important role

that individuals and institutions played in achieving this balance.

Furthermore, Neumann and Taylor rightly argue that Australia adopted a number of strategies

to minimise harm to the relationship, including: publicly recognising that West Papua is an integral

part of Indonesia; liaising closely with Indonesian authorities; dealing with West Papuan asylum

seekers outside of the international refugee regime; directing West Papuan refugees away from

Australian territory; preventing West Papuan refugees criticising Indonesia while in Australian

territory, and restricting information about the situation in West Papua and refugee movements.10 I

argue that these strategies are trust-building initiatives, designed to build Indonesia’s ‘confidence’11

in Australia and recover from the rocky relations of the 1950s, which I will detail in a moment. This

chapter will demonstrate how the management of refugee and border issues in New Guinea aimed to

build trust through frequent and closed-door meetings between high and low level officials and was

motivated by mutual interest.

This chapter will proceed with an outline of the beginning of the Australia-Indonesia

diplomatic relationship, which began as a trusted relationship but soon faced turbulence. It will then

contextualise the creation of the border, before explaining the ways Australia shaped its policies in

response to people crossing the border, aimed at building Indonesia’s trust and maintaining a good

relationship. It then discusses this response vis-à-vis the international refugee regime and the way this

was navigated, before finally taking a brief look at Papuans who have sought asylum in Australia in

recent decades. This chapter argues that Australia’s responses were designed to build Indonesia’s

trust in Australian motives in order to maintain a good relationship for its own security interests.

Cooperation in managing border crossers was in the national interest of both Australia and Indonesia,

8 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009.” 9 Neumann and Taylor, 1. 10 Neumann and Taylor, 7. 11 Gordon Jockel, “Memorandum to the Australian Embassy: West Irianese in TPNG. Canberra, 22 October 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 11],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 631.

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but the key to this cooperation was friendly, strong relations and frequent, open communication

between diplomats from both sides to exchange information, demonstrate a lack of opportunity

seeking behaviour and to build trust. If there was no such relations or information sharing, it is

conceivable that, despite mutual interests to keep a calm border area, there would have been tensions

and misunderstandings and potential for relationship breakdown.

The Start of a Friendship Until 1949, Indonesia was a colony of the Dutch East Indies. At this time, Australia did not have

a large foreign service, though in 1935 it established an Austrade office in, and sent a Trade

Commissioner to, Batavia – the capital of the Dutch East Indies and present-day Jakarta.12 Despite

Australia’s strong connection to Britain and the influence London held over Australian foreign policy,

Australia began to pursue its own, distinct Australian interests at the end of World War II. One of these

interests was the independence of Indonesia. Australia’s help in securing Indonesia’s independence

would mark the beginning of a relationship and friendship between the two neighbours: ‘You are all

my friends,’ said Sutan Syahrir, the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia over ABC radio,

‘Friends in Australia, I am unknown to most of you and yet I call you my friends,’13 he said, thanking

Australians for their help in Indonesia’s fight for Independence. This section will briefly outline the

establishment of a friendship between Australia and Indonesia, where ‘[Australian] policies on

Indonesian independence driven by Chifley14 and Evatt15, officials like Burton16 and Critchley17 and

advisers like Ball18 and Kirby19 laid down a foundation which would make easier the management of

the problems to come.’20

First, it is apt to point out that Australia’s first refugee arrivals by boat, to the author’s

knowledge, were not the Indochinese refugees of the 1970s as is commonly thought, but were actually

Indonesians in the 1940s. In April 1942, a group of 67 Javanese families and single men who had been

living and working in Sumatra were returning to Java where they were recalled to work for a Dutch

12 “Trade Commissioner in Batavia,” The Courier-Mail, September 11, 1935, 6, http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article35944829. 13 “An Address to the Australian People” (ABC, November 26, 1945), http://www.abc.net.au/archives/80days/stories/2012/01/19/3414771.htm. 14 Prime Minister Ben Chifley, 1945-1949. 15 Minister for External Affairs, Herbert Vere Evatt, 1941-1949. 16 John Burton, Private secretary to Evatt, then Secretary of the Department of External Affairs 1947-1950. 17 Thomas Critchely, diplomat, department of External Affairs, assisted Australia's representation of Indonesia against the Dutch and served on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia between 1947 and 1950. 18 William McMahon Ball, Australia’s representative to the Allied Forces. 19 Justice Richard Kirby, New South Wales District Court Judge and investigator of war crimes in Indonesia for Lord Mountbatten and the United Nations Security Council. Australian representative to the "The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question". 20 Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic: La Trobe University Press, 2017), 22.

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arsenal. Due to the increase of Japanese attacks they were unable to reach their destination and so

travelled southwards to Australia.21 They arrived in Fremantle before being sent to Port Melbourne

where they were welcomed and taken to a Sunday school hall to be housed and looked after for three

years. Australia hosted a number of Indonesian refugees temporarily between 1942 when the Dutch

surrendered to the Japanese, until 1947 when Australia ordered their repatriation. These were

Indonesian merchant seamen of the of the Royal Netherlands Packet Line (KPM), members of the

Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), sailors in the Royal Netherlands Navy, workers for the

Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), domestic servants, civilian refugees and political

prisoners.22 Other groups of Indonesians had found themselves in camps in regional inland Australia.

These groups included merchant seamen who had gone on strike with the support of the Seamen’s

Union of Australia,23 and a group of Dutch prisoners of war who were previously interned in

Netherlands New Guinea but were relocated to Australia because the Dutch feared that the prisoners

might collaborate with the Japanese.24 When it was decided that these ‘prisoners’ should be released

into the Australian community, many used Australia as a base from which to conduct their nationalist

fight against the Dutch colonists, straining relations between the Dutch and Australia,25 but improving

those between the Indonesian nationalists and Australians.

This forged some people-to-people relationships between Australians and Indonesians.

Indeed the experience of the 50,000 Australian troops that had been stationed in the archipelago,

mostly in Balikpapan on the island of Borneo, as well the contact with the Indonesian political

prisoners brought by the Dutch ‘deepened the familiarity of many Australians with the islands of

Indonesia.’26 Indonesian nationalists created a Central Committee of Indonesian Independence in

Brisbane, and an Australia-Indonesia association was created in Sydney.27 The Seamen’s Union of

Australia played a large role in raising awareness of the plight of the Indonesians. It encouraged the

Indonesian Seamen’s Union to boycott shipping involved with the Dutch return to the archipelago.28

Indonesians had walked off Dutch ships in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne, and the Waterside

Workers Federation of Australia banned the loading of Dutch ships returning to the Netherlands East

Indies. A total of 559 Dutch ships supplying the Dutch effort to control Indonesia were paralysed.29 As

21 Jan Lingard, Refugees and Rebels: Indonesian Exiles in Wartime Australia (Australia: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008), 27. 22 Lingard, 10. 23 Lingard, 20–26. 24 Lingard, 61–76. 25 Lingard, Refugees and Rebels. 26 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 18. 27 Gyngell, 18. 28 Gyngell, 18; Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 16. 29 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 16.

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the striking Indonesian seamen refused to board Dutch ships the task of repatriating them caused

some difficulty for the Australian government. The government suggested that they be removed to an

offshore territory under Australia’s jurisdiction, such as Nauru.30 But in 1945 Australia began

repatriating Indonesians upon a British liner Esperance Bay.31 The Australian government was anxious

to have all the Indonesians returned as soon as possible, with the White Australia Policy still

influencing immigration in Australia. While some of the public believed the boycott was a ‘communist-

inspired plan to deny supplies to loyal allies’,32 there was some sentiment among the public that, in

the words of Geoffrey Sawer of Radio Australia: ‘Australia cannot be blind to the fact that 40 (sic)

million Indonesians in our near north may well, in the long run, be more important to our security …

than the few thousand Dutch who have hitherto controlled that area’.33

Indeed the Australian government needed to decide what its interests were in Indonesia, and

this decision was shaped by certain individuals. On the 17th of August, 1945, Indonesia declared

independence from the Japanese, two days after their unconditional surrender, but the Allied Forces

expected the Dutch to return.34 In November 1945, the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley sent William

McMahon Ball, Australia’s representative to the Allied Forces, to Indonesia. He was received warmly

by Sukarno and Hatta, Indonesia’s nationalist leaders, in contract to his ‘icy’ reception by the Dutch.35

Justice Richard Kirby had also been sent to Batavia in May 1946, ‘to investigate the death of three

Australian war crimes investigators’.36 Both Ball and Kirby were supportive of the Indonesian

nationalists and critical of the Dutch, with Thomas Kingston Critchley – an Australian diplomat who

served on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia between 1947 and 1950 and who would later

become Ambassador to Indonesia in 1978-1981 – condemning Dutch activities in Indonesia.37 In

August 1946, Australia withdrew its support for the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies and on the

9th of July 1947, Australia’s Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, John Burton, announced

de facto recognition of the Indonesian government.38

A further action with which Australia built Indonesia’s trust was when it, with India, brought

Indonesia’s case to the UN Security Council in 1947 – simultaneously causing tensions with the

30 NAA A1838 401/3/6/1/3 Part 1 and NAA 1838/2 401/3/6/1/3 as cited in Lingard, Refugees and Rebels, 154–55. 31 Lingard, 161–83. 32 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 19. 33 Geoffrey Sawer, Radio Australia Broadcaster 5th November 1945 as cited in Lingard, Refugees and Rebels, 194. 34 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 17. 35 Gyngell, 19. 36 Gyngell, 19. 37 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 17. 38 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 19–20.

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Netherlands, Washington and London.39 The UN established a Committee of Good Offices to reach a

settlement between the Indonesian and the Dutch. Displaying its trust in Australia, Indonesia chose

Australia to be its representative, which became its ‘most effective ally’40 as Justice Kirby and Critchley

negotiated between the Dutch and the Indonesians.41 Critchley had helped ‘break the impasse’ on the

question of the western half of New Guinea, which would be dealt with during negotiations at a later

date.42 On the 27th of December, 1949, sovereignty was transferred to the Republic of Indonesia. And

in 1950, Australia co-sponsored Indonesia’s admission to the UN.43

Establishing a close relationship with Indonesia was considered a national interest for the

Australian Labor government. It is questionable that the same policies would have been implemented

under the Menzies opposition, who had criticised Australia’s support of Indonesian nationalists

against the Dutch.44 Nevertheless, the key players in Australia’s foreign policy thinking at the time

believed this to be in line with its national interests. At a meeting held by India in 1949 to discuss the

issue in Indonesia, Burton’s notes reflected that: ‘Australia believes its own security and prosperity is

bound up with the security and prosperity of all Asian countries and that this depends on mutual

cooperation and respect throughout the area.’45 Indeed Syahrir, in his address thanking the Australian

people over ABC radio, also noted the mutual benefit to a strong relationship: ‘We know that your

country has come out of the war as an important industrial country. We are still an agricultural

country. We need your engines and other industrial products. I suppose, you can use our agricultural

products. Therefore, we can and we will certainly establish close relations as good neighbours,

exchanging the goods of our countries.’46

In supporting Indonesian nationalists against the colonial Dutch, Australia broke with the

tradition of aligning its interests to that of its great and powerful friends. It was an ‘early example of

the successful crafting of an Australian foreign policy shaped around Australia’s national interests’.47

The actions taken by Australians, both at the elite and community level, on behalf of the Indonesian’s

struggle against the Dutch secured Australia a ‘lingering affection’48 in Indonesia, and a valuable place

39 Gyngell, 20. 40 Gyngell, 21. 41 McMichael, “Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” 139. 42 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 22. 43 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 17. 44 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 21. 45 David Lee, “Indonesia’s Independence,” in Facing North. Volume 1, 1901 to the 1970s: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, ed. David Goldsworthy, vol. 1 (Carlton South, Victoria : Melbourne University Press, 2001), 144, https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/263086686 As cited in Gyngell, p.21-22. 46 “An Address to the Australian People.” 47 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 22. 48 Hodge, “Constraints on Reporting Indonesia,” 47.

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in their history books and the story of their nationhood. It was these relationships at the community

level and the ideas of key leaders in Australia which helped forge this trust. Nevertheless, it was

threatened by the events of the 1950s and 1960s, especially when it became time to discuss the status

of the western half of New Guinea. As some Indonesians had used Australia as a base to pursue their

fight for independence against the Dutch, disrupting relations between Australia and the Netherlands,

the Indonesians were concerned with the native population from the western half of New Guinea

using the Australian territory on the east to wage its war for independence against the Indonesians.

The next few sections will explain the ‘turbulence’ of the next two decades, against which Australia’s

responses to the border crossers were crafted, but which did no major damage to the relationship

overall thanks to skilled diplomats.

Hitting the Rocks Australia’s actions on behalf of the Indonesian independence movement had gained it

Indonesia’s trust. Nevertheless, there were a number of difficulties over the next two decades that

caused this trust to waiver. This section will briefly discuss the major factors testing the trust of the

relationship from Indonesia’s independence until the Indonesian administrative takeover of West New

Guinea, because it was these uncertainties in the relationship which formed the backdrop against

which Australia and Indonesia would shape their responses to border crossers on New Guinea.

The first notable factor was the change in government in Australia. In December of 1949,

Robert Menzies was elected as Prime Minister. His Liberal government was concerned with the rise of

communism and the influence of Moscow in the region, a concern which was hardened by the Korean

War and the Communist victory in Beijing. Menzies’ foreign minister from 1949-1951, Percy Spender,

was the first official state visitor to Indonesia. Nevertheless, growing concerns about communism

affected Australia’s view of Indonesia as Sukarno appeared increasingly influenced by the Indonesian

Communist Party (PKI). This also swayed Australian official opinion about who should have control

over the western half of New Guinea; while Australia had been supportive of Indonesia’s

independence, it was considered safer to have the Dutch as a land neighbour on New Guinea.

Causing a strain in relations, Australia initially supported Dutch retention of West New

Guinea.49 During his visit to Djakarta in 1950, Spender was forthright about his support for the Dutch.50

In 1954 Indonesia tried, unsuccessfully, to involve the UN in its dispute with the Netherlands, with its

resolution supported by the Afro-Asian countries as well as the Soviet Union and its allies, while

49 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 23–24; Cavan Hogue, Interview with Author, December 2017. 50 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 28.

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Australia ‘was a leading advocate’ for the Dutch.51 Amidst Sukarno’s increasingly closer ties with

Moscow and the PKI, the Menzies government feared that Indonesia might also have desires for the

eastern half of New Guinea.52 It made a joint statement with the Dutch in November 1957, ‘envisaging

administrative cooperation which would lead to a united New Guinea.’53

Australia’s maintenance of a friendly relationship with Indonesia while supporting the Dutch

in West New Guinea can be explained by a partial ‘fear’ of Indonesia as a security threat. Australia

treated Indonesia as a potential threat and was very conscious of the possibility of communism

spreading through the region like ‘falling dominoes’. Therefore, in foreign minister Percy Spender’s

words, New Guinea was ‘an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian defence’, and the

surrounding islands as its ‘last ring of defence against aggression’.54 As a result, Australia initially

supported the Dutch ‘vigorously’ in West New Guinea and opposed its transfer to Indonesia, hoping

instead for a unification of one Melanesian state.55

Nevertheless, the Australian government tried to maintain a friendly relationship with

Indonesia, and therefore did not involve itself in Djakarta’s disputes with dissidents in its own

territories of Sumatra and the North Celebes early in 1958.56 And in 1959, Indonesia’s foreign minister,

Subandrio, visited Canberra. During this visit, Subandrio issued a joint statement with the Australian

foreign minister, Richard Casey, noting that Australia would not oppose any agreement reached

peacefully between the Netherlands and Indonesia.57

There was, however, ongoing dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the future

of western New Guinea. Despite Indonesia’s claims to the territory, the Dutch insisted on keeping the

colony, arguing that its people were ethnically and culturally different to the people of Indonesia.

Between 1949 and 1962, the Dutch maintained colonial rule of West New Guinea and worked towards

51 Gyngell, 28. 52 John McFarlane, Interview with Author, July 25, 2017; Hogue, Interview with Author; “W. Papuan Exile Implores Action: Troops Training for Invasion?,” South Pacific Post, May 19, 1965; “Natives Tell of Indo. Terror,” Daily Telegraph, January 11, 1965; Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 22. 53 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 29. 54 Percy Spender, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates. No. 10, 1950” (The House of Representatives, March 9, 1950), 633, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansardr80/1950-03-09/toc_pdf/19500309_reps_19_206.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%221950s%22%20p633; See also Gordon Defence Committee, “Minute by Defence Committee: Review of Defence Situation in Papua/New Guinea. Canberra, 10 February 1966 [NAA: A1946, 1968/838],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 44–57. 55 Wilfred Kent Hughes, “Foreign Affairs Committee - Report on West New Guinea” (Canberra, October 9, 1958), A1209, 1958/6066, National Archives of Australia. 56 McMichael, “Australia‐Indonesia Relations,” 139. 57 McMichael, 139.

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the creation of a self-governing Papuan state by 1970.58 This included a ‘Papuanisation’ programme

that saw three quarters of administrative posts held by locals.59 Furthermore, the Dutch held an

election for a New Guinea Council in 1961, where locals won 22 of the 28 seats.60 The Netherlands

claimed there was better chance for self-determination under Dutch rule, and the Indonesians argued

that this was a ‘colonial ploy to encircle Indonesia’ and, as a former territory of the Dutch East Indies,

West New Guinea should be transferred to Indonesia.61 The dispute ended when the US brought the

Indonesians and Dutch together for negotiations, resulting in the 1962 New York Agreement. This was

seen as part of US foreign policy tactics to mend Cold War relations with Indonesia and broker a deal

in their favour.62 Australia withdrew its support for Dutch presence in West New Guinea after heavy

international pressure made it clear that the Dutch would inevitably withdraw.63

Australia’s policy shift was also enabled by Garfield Barwick, who took over the position of

foreign minister in 1961 with ‘no taste for the Dutch position’64 and a strong sense that the people of

West New Guinea should decide their own future.65 Barwick argued that the UK and the US would not

support Australia’s position and that a self-governing West New Guinea would open up a power-

vacuum in the region, which could potentially be filled by Moscow.66 The Australian cabinet reluctantly

accepted this argument, and acknowledged the importance of maintaining ‘friendly and cooperative’

relations with Indonesia.67 Barwick, who believed an Indonesian West New Guinea was not a threat

to Australia, helped changed Menzies’ mind, which was perhaps made easier since he did not need to

worry about an election for another three years, and a new parliamentary term with a new Minister.68

As a result, there was a total reversal of Australia’s policies from one supporting the Dutch in western

New Guinea, to one supporting Indonesia.69

58 Carmel Budiardjo and Soei Liong Liem, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 3rd ed (Thornton Heath, Surrey, UK: TAPOL, 1988), 8. 59 David Webster, “‘Already Sovereign as a People’: A Foundational Moment in West Papuan Nationalism,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 4 (2001): 513, https://doi.org/10.2307/3557804. 60 Webster, 513. 61 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 9. 62 Budiardjo and Liem, 9. 63 See Hank Nelson, “Fighting for Her Gates and Waterways: Changing Perceptions of New Guinea in Australian Defence,” ANU Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, SSGM Discussion Paper 2005/3, 2005, 18–19, https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/10140. 64 Peter Gifford, “The Cold War across Asia,” in Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia: Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, 2001, 214, https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/52145602. 65 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 30; Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 26–28. 66 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 30. 67 Gyngell, 30. 68 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 25–27. 69 Catley and Dugis, 27.

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Yet relations between Australia and Indonesia were strained again in 1963 over Konfrontasi,

where Sukarno sought to prevent the creation of Malaysia, fearing it would be a ‘puppet’ of the

West.70 This put Indonesia and Australia on opposing sides, with Australia supporting Malaysia and its

former colonial power, Great Britain. Nevertheless, Australia and Indonesia maintained

communication and cordial relations during this time.71 This was partly because of Barwick’s insistence

that Australia improve relations with Indonesia, as well as Australia’s Ambassador at the time, Keith

‘Mick’ Shann’s rapport with Sukarno, contributing ‘to one of Australia’s greatest diplomatic

successes’.72 Anxieties increased again after Barwick’s departure as foreign minister and Indonesia’s

withdrawal from the United Nations because Malaysia had been granted a seat, later reversed when

Suharto became president. Konfrontasi tensions climaxed in 1965-66, when Australian troops engaged

in fire against Indonesian forces on the Malaysian/Indonesian border on Borneo.

In 1965, konfrontasi ended with a bloody coup that removed Sukarno from office and replaced

him with Suharto, a move that was generally well received in Australia. Relations further improved

with frequent visits from Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1964-1969. In

1967 Australia also became a core member to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia to

coordinate provision of foreign assistance to Indonesia.73 And despite the tensions caused by

Australia’s initial support for the Dutch in West New Guinea and over konfrontasi, ‘Indonesians still

remembered Australia as their friend and supporter of the 40s’ during their independence struggle.’74

According to a former ABC Indonesia correspondent, Errol Hodge, during his trip to Indonesia in 1968-

1969 there was still a ‘lingering affection’ for Australia amongst Indonesians.75

In sum, while Australia’s own insecurities about ‘Indonesia’s disintegration, fear of

communism, and apprehensions about Indonesia’s expansionist intentions [contributed] to difficulties

in building bilateral trust and confidence’,76 a good foundation laid during the independence years,

plus the skilful diplomacy of Mick Shann and Garfield Barwick’s ‘new style and straightforward

approach’77 meant that relationship withstood potential breakdown.

70 Donald Hindley, “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives,” Asian Survey 4, no. 6 (June 1964): 907, https://doi.org/10.2307/3023528. 71 Mackie, Australia and Indonesia, 2007, 49. 72 Peter Edwards, “Shann, Sir Keith Charles Owen ('Mick’) (1917–1988),” in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra: National Centre of Biography, Australian National University), accessed January 30, 2020, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/shann-sir-keith-charles-owen-mick-15516; Viviani, “Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards Indonesia 1950 to 1965.” 73 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 35. 74 Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990, 1. 75 Hodge, “Constraints on Reporting Indonesia,” 47. 76 Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian Relations since 1945, 28. 77 Catley and Dugis, 28.

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Sharing a Border West Papua was transferred to Indonesian administration in 1963 after approximately six

months of being administered by the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, during which

time the Dutch administration was replaced by the Indonesian. As a result, this land border was

created between Indonesia and the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea. This section will

briefly outline the conditions of the transfer and the situation which lead to people crossing into

Australian territory, before outlining the creation of the official border between Australia and

Indonesia.

The Transfer As mentioned, the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands for Western New Guinea

was resolved with the New York Agreement. Under this Agreement, the transfer of West New Guinea

to Indonesia rested on the condition that Indonesia make arrangements ‘to give the people of the

territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice’, and decide ‘whether they wish to remain

with Indonesia (or) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia’.78 It seemed from the outset,

however, that Indonesia understood this to mean a ‘confirmation’ of Indonesian administration.79

Within the first few days of Indonesian administration Indonesia’s Minister of Culture held a fire in the

main square to burn Papuan artefacts, textbooks and flags in front of approximately 10,000 locals.80

A presidential decree placed West Papua in ‘political quarantine’ against non-Indonesian influences.

Locals were considered ‘indigenous Indonesians’ and the Papuanisation programme created by the

Dutch was cancelled.81 There were reports of local government employees being harassed, dismissed

from their jobs and robbed of their possessions.82 The New Guinea Council was replaced by a regional

assembly involving none of those who had previously been elected,83 and locals counted for a mere

20 percent of government employees.84 By 1964 there were reports that the resident Indonesian

78 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (New York Agreement)” (United Nations Treaty Series No. 6311, August 15, 1962), Article XVIII(c), http://peacemaker.un.org/indonesianetherlands-westguinea62. 79 Peter Hastings, “The Three Reasons for Trouble in West Irian,” The Australian, May 8, 1969; See also in “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1 - 6/1/NG part 1, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144: “The Papuans are now aware that Indonesia does not intend to honour its signature under the 1962 agreement and that there will be no plebiscite”, and “As you know, the Republic of Indonesia has since left the UN, and President Sukarno has stated that he considers the aforesaid agreement no longer valid and that West Irian forms an integral part of Indonesia.” 80 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 15. 81 Webster, “Already Sovereign as a People,” 516. 82 John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal (Routledge, 2003), 76–77. 83 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 15. 84 Alan Whittaker and Anti-Slavery Society, eds., West Papua: Plunder in Paradise, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series (London: Anti-Slavery Society, 1990), 31.

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population in West New Guinea had doubled, with no reports as to how the land was acquired for

those who had ‘transmigrated’.85 Not surprisingly, tensions arose between Papuan and Indonesian

nationalists, unfortunately this often involved arms, violence and deaths.86

It was not until 1969 when Indonesia gave the population of West New Guinea the choice to

remain as part of Indonesia or become independent. This was carried out through the Act of Free

Choice, which was not a plebiscite but rather an act of determination or consultation.87 This involved

eight special consultative assemblies which would discuss, deliberate, and reach consensus on the

future of West New Guinea. There were 1,025 members of these assemblies (less than one percent of

the population of West New Guinea) who were all selected by the Indonesian government.88 Not

surprisingly, the result was an Indonesian West New Guinea. Although there was much controversy

surrounding the way in which Indonesia performed the Act of Free Choice, Australia supported its

neighbour and again prepared for an influx of refugees of Papuan nationalists.

The Border The transfer of West New Guinea also meant that Australia now shared a land border with

Indonesia. The border was over 700km long. In the north, tall mountains and thick jungle dominated

the landscape, while, in contrast, the southern end was mostly flat but with swamps.89 Although the

population on either side of the border was thinly spread, the capital of West Irian was only 50kms

from the northern border.90 The border was not a major concern to the Australian administration in

Papua New Guinea while West New Guinea was under Dutch administration.91 There were two

international agreements regarding the border, one in 1895 between the Netherlands and Great

Britain, the other in 1936 between Australia and the Netherlands.92 There had also been a 1958

agreement between the Netherlands and Australia to photograph and map the border,93 but ‘because

of an easy-going understanding between the Dutch and the Australians, no proper survey had ever

85 Whittaker and Anti-Slavery Society, 63. 86 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 18–22. 87 For a detailed study, see Justus M. van der Kroef, “Australia and the West Irian Problem,” Asian Survey 10, no. 6 (June 1, 1970): 146, https://doi.org/10.2307/2642882. 88 van der Kroef, 484. 89 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 90 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees.” 91 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees.” 92 June Verrier, “The Origins of the Border Problem and the Border Story to 1969,” in Between Two Nations: The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and West Papua Nationalism, ed. Ronald May (Bathurst, NSW : Robert Brown and Associates, 1986), 35, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/127576. 93 Verrier, 36–37.

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been made.’94 The border largely followed the meridian of 141° longitude east, but neither Australian

nor Dutch officials knew exactly which side of the border sat particular villages.95

Highlighting Australia’s security concerns and potential mistrust, when Indonesia took over

western New Guinea, the Australian government undertook to have the border formally defined.96 In

1962, Hasluck got cabinet approval to start aerial mapping.97 In December 1962, Australia approached

Indonesia about the border demarcation but the Indonesian government wished to delay such

considerations until they took over administration.98 In September 1963, Djakarta agreed to

Australia’s placement of temporary markers in an approximate position of the border before survey

work could determine their permanent position, which was not communicated to the authorities in

West Irian.99 In November, Indonesian patrols tore these out and drove the Australian survey team

back at gunpoint.100 The situation was resolved at the diplomatic level and, as a result of

‘misunderstandings’, a conference of experts was called on formally defining the border.101 In mid-

1964, the Australian and Indonesian governments had agreed on the procedures to demarcate the

border,102 but there had been ‘administrative problems’ in Indonesia preventing active efforts,103

especially after the 1965 coup.104

Technical discussions on the border began in May, 1966. Discussions continued under ‘better

auspices’ as the new Djakarta government wished to better its relations with its neighbours.105 Border

surveys and demarcation took place over 1966-1967, when Australian and Indonesian teams had

placed 14 concrete meridian markers along the length of the border.106 ‘It was relatively easy’, recalls

Cavan Hogue, who worked in the Trusteeship section (later called the Papua New Guinea section) of

the Department of External Affairs, ‘it was a fairly straightforward border treaty negotiation’, but it

94 “Frontier with Asia,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 18, 1966. 95 Klaus Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Black Inc., 2015), 176. 96 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 97 Verrier, “The Origins of the Border Problem and the Border Story to 1969,” 36. 98 Verrier, 37. 99 Verrier, 38. 100 Verrier, 38. 101 “Frontier with Asia.” 102 “Frontier with Asia.” 103 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 104 “Frontier with Asia.” 105 “Frontier with Asia”; Department of External Affairs and Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, “International Border between West Irian and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Press Release,” May 29, 1966, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 1, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110017219. 106 “Address by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra,” May 16, 1969, Papua New Guinea - Press cuttings 11/1-6/1/NG/PC part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003145.

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took no account of the communities and familial ties on either side of the border.107 The aim was to

get a clear border, develop a border regime that would allow people living in the region to move across

without much fuss, and to manage the problem of the separatists.108

After the withdrawal of the Dutch from West New Guinea, Australia began to prepare for an

influx of refugees. Refugees were to be expected, as there were many groups resisting Indonesian

rule. In fact, there had long been independence movements and resistance to Dutch rule in West New

Guinea.109 The Dutch requested that the Australian administration in Papua New Guinea would, at the

expense of the Netherlands, accommodate around 1,200 Indonesian and Papuan refugees.110 On the

6th of August, 1962, the Australian Cabinet had agreed that the Minister for Territories would decide

the merits of each individual case, with consultation with the Minister of External Affairs ‘in view of

the political aspects.’111 Barwick was concerned about the difficulties they could cause with

Indonesia,112 but the open communication that would continue throughout this period he had also

informed the Indonesian ambassador that he would accept those who satisfied the need for refuge.113

Australia accepted a number of West Papuans who were openly critical of the Indonesian government

and who had applied for asylum from Hollandia – present-day Jayapura – and who were financially

supported by the Dutch for several years.114 The first one to be accepted without Dutch sponsorship

was Benjamin Nikijuluw and his family, in 1964.115 Some West Papuans studying at a tertiary level in

Port Moresby had applied for political asylum and were initially allowed to remain.116

In addition, there were also those who crossed the Australian border without prior

permission. Demonstrating the ways in which states define and redefine who is worthy of refugee

status, the Australians considered there to be three types of border crossers: (a) ‘Ordinary inland

village people, still fairly primitive, who cross the border for purposes such as hunting, subsistence

agriculture or visiting people of their clan’; (b) ‘Unskilled, semi-sophisticates generally with limited

primary school education who are half-heartedly looking for employment and a higher standard of

living’; and (c) ‘Genuine refugees.’117 During the six-month administration by the United Nations, 16

107 Hogue, Interview with Author. 108 Hogue. 109 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 4–6. 110 Neumann, Across the Seas, 176–77. 111 Neumann, 176–77. 112 David Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Case of Papuan Asylum-Seekers,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 52, no. 4 (2006): 580, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2006.00434a.x. 113 Barwick, as cited in Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 6. 114 Neumann, Across the Seas, 177. 115 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 16. 116 Neumann, Across the Seas, 177. 117 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 10; Department of External Territories, “Notes Prepared for the Information of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs:

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people who had crossed the border were given permissive residence.118 In June 1963, 250 people with

tribal relatives in Papua New Guinea had crossed the border and were given land by their relatives

and were permitted to stay after discussion between their leaders and representatives of Australian

and Indonesian administrations.119 These border crossers and Australia’s commitments to them will

be discussed in the next section. For now, it is sufficient to understand that conditions in the now

Indonesian administered western half of New Guinea caused tensions with certain sections of the

population, who then sought to flee, while others were afflicted with an international border through

their tribal lands.

Border Crossers To recap the above, Australia and Indonesia began their diplomatic relationship on a strong

footing, building a trusted friendship. This was threatened by Australia’s support for the Dutch’s

continued presence in West New Guinea and konfrontasi. However, due to skilful diplomacy and the

strong foundations from the independence struggle, the relationship was able to survive this ‘rocky’

period. Nevertheless, the relationship needed to recover from the suspicions that these events had

raised, and one way to do this was by demonstrating trust over border issues. As a former supporter

of the Dutch and a proponent of a unified New Guinea, Australia needed to build Indonesian

confidence in Australian motives and appease its new neighbour of its earlier stance. For Indonesia, a

country that had experienced hundreds of years of foreign rule, sovereignty and territorial integrity

were sensitive issues. It did not want to be seen as a country pandering to the West, and it wanted to

show its own people its strength. These concerns and sensitivities can be seen in the way the two

countries cooperated in New Guinea. Private, high-level exchanges and working together to avoid

international scrutiny were in both countries’ self-interest.120 Yet this was complicated in both

countries by the government’s – and its different departments’ – perception of its national interest,

and those of the public. Thus Australia needed to balance public opinion and its international

reputation with its desire to build Indonesia’s trust, which, at times, were in tension. This section will

Territory of Papua and New Guinea - West Irian Border: Statement of Border Movements.,” November 11, 1968, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144; Arnold Rørholt to High Commissioner of Refugees, “Report on My Mission to Hong Kong and Australia from 11 to 22 December 1968,” January 6, 1969, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144. 118 “L. R. McIntyre to Sadruddin Aga Khan,” April 21, 1967, Papua New Guinea - Press cuttings 11/0-6/1/NG/PC part 3, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003145. 119 “L. R. McIntyre to Sadruddin Aga Khan.” 120 Gordon Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 331–34.

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explain the ways in which the Australian government managed border crossers in order to build

Indonesia’s trust and maintain a stable relationship. First, this section will outline the ways in which

Australia attempted to build Indonesia’s trust in its response to border crossers. Then it will show how

certain border incidents raised concerns in the External Territories and in some sections of the public,

but which were overridden and managed by External Affairs in order to show Indonesia that Australia

could be trusted with Indonesia’s interests of avoiding international attention and discouraging

further independence movements.

A Lack of Trust Despite the successful start to the Australia-Indonesia relationship, the border crossers

threatened to exacerbate the previously mentioned tensions in the Australia-Indonesia relationship

at the time of west New Guinea’s transfer. By 1965, as Dr. Paul Weis, a Legal Adviser for the UNHCR

in Geneva, wrote to Alexander McIver, the UNHCR representative in Australia: ‘there is a possibility of

a refugee problem arising in Papua/New Guinea which may be complicated by Indonesia’s

confrontation policy against Malaysia, and Australia’s involvement in it.’121 In the words of then

Department of External Affairs Assistant Secretary Robert Furlonger, ‘[there is] no need to labour the

question of the delicacy of our relationship with Indonesia in New Guinea and the problems … arising

from our unique position as a country of Western European background living alongside an Asian

country—and a particularly turbulent one at that’.122

Australia’s government had anxieties about living next to Indonesia given the communist

influence on Sukarno, and were concerned about its expansionist desires for eastern New Guinea. The

setting up of an office of Indonesia’s Communist Party, the PKI, in West Irian had exacerbated

Australia’s concerns about communism in Indonesia. John McFarlane had visited Papua New Guinea

a number of times before he was posted there in 1963-1967 to undertake interviews of refugees from

West Irian seeking to enter Papua New Guinea and to be alert to any evidence of the possible

expansion of konfrontasi eastwards against Papua New Guinea. ‘And I can tell you’, McFarlane told

me, ‘there was some evidence that Sukarno may have intended to do that, but he was overthrown by

Suharto before any such plan could be implemented.’123 He recalled the Indonesians had ‘a very strong

anti-colonial feeling and that was directed principally against Britain and Holland, but because we

were close to them and because we had control of PNG it was pretty obvious that we’d likely be

121 “P. Weis to A. McIver,” March 1, 1965, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 1, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144. 122 Furlonger to B. C. Hill, 13 April 1965, NAA: A10034 225/6/18 part 1 as cited in Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 73. 123 McFarlane, Interview with Author.

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affected,’ thus, he was posted to Papua New Guinea to ‘assist in establishing a refugee interview

program which would help us get better intelligence on what is happening on the border and what

were the drivers forcing refugees to seek sanctuary in PNG … I wasn’t concerned with PNG nationalism,

in fact to the contrary I was quite happy about it. But I was concerned about the possible expansion

of konfrontasi and its implications for PNG.’124 Cavan Hogue confirms this suspicion: ‘there was a

degree of suspicion, on both sides’.125 This was triggered by Australia’s own ‘yellow peril’ anxieties,

but also Indonesia’s concerns about Australia being a colonial power, the White Australia policy, and

Australia’s initial support for the Dutch in West New Guinea.126 ‘On the Indonesian side’, Hogue recalls,

‘they were suspicious of us, they thought we were going to try and take Papua away from them, as

we had supported the Dutch, this was the mindset. So we were not to be trusted. And if we accepted

[border crossers] it will confirm their suspicions. On the other hand you had the lobby in Australia

which said ‘well they are wicked and persecuting these people and therefore we have to accept them’.

I think the balance [in the government] tended to be towards the relationship with Indonesia.’127

Despite these suspicions, Australia initially tolerated the crossing of West Irianese back and

forth across the border.128 According to the journalist, Peter Hastings:129 ‘It is an undoubtable fact that

in the years immediately following the Indonesian take-over during the Sukarnoist period the

Australian administration was collecting intelligence from the other side by freely allowing West

Irianese to cross the border back and forth.’130 This caused tensions in Indonesia, and the Indonesian

foreign minister, Adam Malik, ‘complained bitterly … of refugee activities in Australian New Guinea.’131

The Indonesians were particularly concerned about anti-Indonesia propaganda being sent back and

forth across the border, and believed Australia tolerated and encouraged such activity.132 Gordon

Jockel, the First Assistant Secretary, Division I, in the Department of External Affairs, wrote to Hasluck

in May 1967 warning of a ‘continuing and difficult problem’, noting that

Elements in the Indonesian Administration in West Irian are saying that their

troubles are due to the fomenting of disorders from the other side of the border.

We have been successful up to now in ensuring that matters are looked at

124 McFarlane. 125 Hogue, Interview with Author. 126 Hogue. 127 Hogue. 128 Peter Hastings, “Tension on the Border Where Australia Meets West Irian,” The Australian, March 24, 1969. 129 Peter Hastings was very familiar with the situation on New Guinea. In addition to his journalism, which involved a number of trips to New Guinea, he was also the executive officer of the Council on New Guinea Affairs, editor of its journal, New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South-East Asia, and author of the book New Guinea: Problems & Prospects (1969). 130 Hastings, “Tension on the Border Where Australia Meets West Irian.” 131 Hastings. 132 Hastings.

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rationally in Djakarta. But, … Even if the Indonesians accept the fact that the

internal dissidence in West Irian is not assisted from across the border, they could

resent the fact that T.P.N.G. at present represents a sanctuary for those enaged

[sic] in dissidence in West Irian.133

The government was aware it needed to mitigate these concerns, as it had the potential to unsettle

the relationship.

Trust Building Australia needed to regain Indonesia’s trust in order to strengthen their relationship and

guarantee their security. For Australia, this desire was partly out of fear and an acute awareness of its

own position as a Western country in the middle of Asia. After the 1966 coup and the resulting

improvement in relations between Djakarta and Canberra, the Administration adopted in a stricter

border policy in an effort to keep its relationship with Indonesia on solid ground.134 There were a

number of measures which the Administration adopted in an effort to build Indonesia’s trust on the

border. These included the return of many border crossers back to West Irian, placing special

conditions on those granted permissive residence, reiterating Australia’s support of Indonesia’s

sovereignty, engaging in open but confidential dialogue and avoiding international attention and

media by managing instead though strictly bilateral channels (which is in contrast to the next chapter

on the Indochinese crisis, where cooperation was more successful once the international was brought

into the management of the problem and taking it out of the bilateral space).

First, Australia adopted policies to ensure border-crossers would not cause issues or

embarrassment for Indonesia. It was Australian policy to return most border crossers.135 Nevertheless,

some were allowed to stay, albeit under strict instructions. The Intelligence and Security manual

instructed the border control officers that border crossers were to be returned if they had ‘no good

reason for entry, are not of intelligence interest, or are not of political importance’.136 As mentioned,

the government distinguished between three types of border crossers: ‘ordinary inland village people’

who cross the border for hunting or to visit clan members, ‘unskilled semi-sophisticates’ who cross for

economic reasons, and ‘genuine refugees’.137 Despite the mixed migration, the Australian government

believed that ‘it was important to ensure that all border posts were adopting a uniform approach to

133 Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7],” 332. 134 Hastings, “Tension on the Border Where Australia Meets West Irian.” 135 H.M. Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 382. 136 Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 74. 137 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 10.

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border crossers and that the approach should be a firm one’.138 In fact, many of those who had crossed

into the Australian side were sent back or ‘persuaded’ to return. 139 There were reports circulating in

the media that some who had returned were punished, sent to prison or shot.140

These return policies also functioned as a deterrent for future crossers. Arguably the first form

of deterrent that Australia employed was when the Dutch asked Australia to grant asylum to a number

of West Irianese – Australia delayed making a decision in order to avoid encouraging a large number

of requests.141 Nevertheless, Prime Minister Robert Menzies, while he was acting as Foreign Minister,

approved sixteen asylum applications because they had ‘good reason’ to fear Indonesian

authorities.142 Australia was then overwhelmed with asylum requests after clashes at pro-

independence demonstrations in West Irian in early 1963.143 As a result of anxieties about the future

growing numbers of border crossers, two conditions were added to the criteria for asylum

determinations, that requests be lodged and processed inside West Irian, and that it relates to actions

taken before the Dutch left in October 1962, unless there were special humanitarian circumstances.144

Forty-four border crossers in Vanimo were then returned from Vanimo on the Australian side of the

border as they did not meet the criteria.145 Later, commentators speculated that the length of time it

took to make a decision constitutes ‘a new psychological war … being waged in the hope that [asylum-

seekers] will give up in despair and go back to West Irian to face the music’,146 similar to criticisms of

the current processing regime in Australia.147

138 Minute, Besly to Warwick Smith as cited in Doran, Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, 576 see note 5; Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 139 “L. R. McIntyre to Sadruddin Aga Khan,” April 21, 1967; “Irianese Refugees Turned Back Illegally,” The Australian, August 29, 1969; “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 140 “W. Papuan Exile Implores Action: Troops Training for Invasion?”; “Australia, Please Help Us,” South Pacific Post, May 10, 1965; “Sukarno Men Kill Refugees Says MP,” Sunday Express, February 28, 1965; “8 Irian Rebels Drift ‘from Hell to Paradise,’” The Australian, February 18, 1969; Barry Wain, “Pressure on Irian Refugees Alleged,” The Australian, December 31, 1969; “Refugees in Hiding,” South Pacific Post, August 18, 1965. 141 Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 580–81. 142 Palmer, 582. 143 Palmer, 582. 144 Palmer, 852. 145 Palmer, 583. 146 “Frank Statement Needed on Irianese,” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, April 2, 1970. 147 Ben Doherty and David Marr, “The Worst I’ve Seen – Trauma Expert Lifts Lid on ‘atrocity’ of Australia’s Detention Regime,” The Guardian, June 19, 2016, sec. Australia news, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jun/20/the-worst-ive-seen-trauma-expert-lifts-lid-on-atrocity-of-australias-detention-regime; Nicole Hasham, “‘These Children Are among the Most Traumatised We Have Ever Seen,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 4, 2016, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/these-children-are-among-the-most-traumatised-we-have-ever-seen-20160204-gml9dv.html.

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In fact, because those who tried to escape West Irian across the Australian border were often

sent back, nine West Irianese left Sota, a village in in West Irian, through the jungle swamps where

they built a bamboo raft tethered with vine leaves, and used it to sail to Australia.148 After almost six

weeks, they arrived on the 16th of February, 1969 at Badu Island, about 65km north of Thursday

Island.149 Sadly, one of the group had perished at sea from thirst, starvation and exposure.150 The

Island’s Chieftain offered them permanent farms and homes,151 but after a week’s stay in a Catholic

parish hall on Thursday Island, the Australian government flew them to Weam by the border in Papua

New Guinea, where they would be dealt with in the same way as the border crossers.152

In dealing with this case, the Australian government prioritised a stable relationship with

Indonesia over humanitarian considerations. This priority, and the differences of opinion between

Australian government departments, are things we will see throughout the remainder of this case.

The return of the arrivals in the Torres Strait was decided at a meeting of government representatives

in Canberra, where External Affairs and Immigration pushed for them to be flown to Papua New

Guinea, not wanting to cause trouble with the Indonesians over the West Irian issue.153 The

representative for External Territories, however, believed that it was not the territory’s problem – but

also believed returning them to West Irian would be a good option and would please the Indonesian

government.154 Due to the publicity of their arrival, however, they could not be removed against their

will, thus they were persuaded with an implied threat of deporting them to West Irian, on that their

cases would be properly heard on their arrival in Papua New Guinea.155 In the end, they were denied

permissive residence and deported. The decision was made on the grounds that the men were lazy

and unwilling to work, with an ‘exaggerated opinion of their own importance’, and that some of the

men had been granted permissive residence in 1963 but chose to return in April 1968, since such time

the conditions in West Irian had not changed.156 Alex Toemboy, one of the men, claims he returned to

West Irian in 1968 after hearing a broadcast that the UN was going to ‘move back’ into West Irian to

prepare for and supervise the plebiscite.157 Just after Toemboy’s deportation was decided,

148 R. Cantley, “Flight by Frail Raft across a Treacherous Sea,” The Australian Women’s Weekly, March 26, 1969. 149 Cantley. 150 Cantley. 151 Cantley. 152 Cantley; “8 Irianese Flown to Border,” The Australian, February 26, 1969; “Some N. Guinea Border Crossers Sent Back,” The Australian, March 7, 1969. 153 Klaus Neumann, “Been There, Done That?,” in Yearning to Breathe Free: Seeking Asylum in Australia, ed. Dean Lusher and Nick Haslam (Federation Press, 2007), 22. 154 Neumann, 22–23. 155 Neumann, 23. 156 Neumann, 24. 157 Neumann, 24.

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Indonesians had crossed the border looking for him near the Weam patrol post, abducting and

questioning three adults and six children.158

The encouragement of return continued after the Act of Free Choice in 1969, when Australia

worked with Indonesia in aiding the return of border crossers still in Australian territory. Suharto

offered an amnesty on the 16th of September, 1969, for all West Irianese rebels outside of the territory

who wanted to come home.159 This was at a time of peak arrivals. In August 1969, 384 West Irianese

crossed into Papua New Guinea, the first since the Act of Free Choice began and the single biggest

group to cross. A newspaper in September reported that 582 had crossed in the past two weeks.160

Under the amnesty, returning West Irianese would need to swear allegiance to Indonesia and the 1945

Constitution, and ‘join efforts to establish security and public order’ and ‘work hard towards successful

implementation of the country’s five-year development plan’.161 After Australian and Indonesian

officials discussed the refugee matter in length, Australia agreed to Indonesia’s request to inform the

West Irianese living in their territory of the amnesty.162 Australia also agreed to allow a small team of

Indonesian officials to visit refugees in their territory to explain the amnesty, on the conditions that

Indonesians make their case ‘moderately and without threats’, and that anyone wishing to return

expressed this in writing.163 Four Indonesian officials visited the camps in Yako and Manus in December

of 1969.164 The Indonesian officials then announced that there was a deadline to the amnesty, of

December 30, surprising the Australian officials who accompanied them to the camps.165 The

Australian Administration assisted with transport where necessary. There were some reports that

refugees did not want to return and were suspicious of the amnesty but were encouraged ‘for their

own security’,166 though Australian officials denied this. An officer who accompanied them to

Djajapura reported that they were met by the army commander in West Irian, General Sarwo Edhie,

158 Neumann, 25. 159 “Suharto Pardons All Rebel West Irianese,” The Australian, September 18, 1969. 160 “384 Enter Papua from Irian,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August 20, 1969. 161 “Amnesty for W. Irianese,” The Australian, October 30, 1969. 162 “Amnesty for W. Irianese”; H.M. Loveday to Sadruddin Aga Khan, “Status Report on Border Crossers in TPNG,” April 2, 1970, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144. 163 Loveday to Aga Khan, “Status Report on Border Crossers in TPNG,” April 2, 1970; J.O. Ballard, “Ballard to Barnes: T.P.N.G. West Irian Border Liaison,” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran and Australia, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 951–52. 164 Loveday to Aga Khan, “Status Report on Border Crossers in TPNG,” April 2, 1970. 165 James Hall, “Indonesians Set Deadline on Amnesty,” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, December 5, 1969. 166 “Refugees Return to West Irian ‘in Fear,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 30, 1969; John Lombard, “Refugees Live in Terror - They Want to Stay!,” n.d.; Ballard, “Ballard to Barnes: T.P.N.G. West Irian Border Liaison.”

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and received an ‘excellent reception’.167 Over 500 had returned to West Irian in December, with more

applicants for permissive residency among those who wished not to take up the amnesty.168

Second, Australia attempted to build Indonesia’s trust in Australia through placing special

conditions on the residencies of those permitted to stay so that they would not disturb Indonesia.

Despite the firm approach at the border, a number of genuine refugees were accepted and were

resettled in Papua New Guinea from 1963.169 Those who were resettled in Papua New Guinea for

political reasons were given the status of ‘permissive resident’. This granted those who had crossed

the border for genuine humanitarian reasons temporary five year permits that allowed them to stay

in Papua New Guinea. These permits could be extended, and could, theoretically, lead to permanent

residency and citizenship.170 Nevertheless, they were only issued under certain conditions that

ensured they would not cause issues for the Australia-Indonesia relationship. For example, permissive

residents were required to sign a document indicating that they would not engage in anti-Indonesian

political activity, and understood that if they did, they would be returned. They were also restricted in

where they could live, and were not allowed to live near the border region. In 1968 border crossers

were sent to live in a camp on Manus Island because it was ‘out of the way’.171 Those who were moved

there considered Manus Island to be a prison with no bars.172 But Australia hoped that moving the

border crossers to Manus Island would prevent or reduce ‘any transmission of anti-Indonesian

material across the border’,173 in addition to avoiding Indonesian activity against dissidents in the

border region.174 Nevertheless, the government maintained the claim that most of the border crossers

were simply looking for economic opportunities, or were tribal occupants that did not know the

border existed.175 ‘There is at present no refugee problem in New Guinea’, wrote Robert Furlonger,

External Affairs Assistant Secretary, to McIver, ‘Indeed, the word ‘refugee’ is largely inapplicable to

167 Loveday to Aga Khan, “Status Report on Border Crossers in TPNG,” April 2, 1970; Ballard, “Ballard to Barnes: T.P.N.G. West Irian Border Liaison,” 952, n.4. 168 Loveday to Aga Khan, “Status Report on Border Crossers in TPNG,” April 2, 1970; “Amnesty Causes Refugees to Leave P-NG,” The Canberra Times, December 5, 1969. 169 Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7].” 170 van der Kroef, “Australia and the West Irian Problem,” 493. 171 Doran, Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, 629 n.4; Rowland, “Minute to R.F. Osborn: West Irian Border. Canberra, 4 June 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 8],” 784. 172 “Irianese Decide to Stay in New Guinea,” The Australian, June 17, 1969. 173 Jockel, “Memorandum to the Australian Embassy: West Irianese in TPNG. Canberra, 22 October 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 11],” 629; J.M. Starey, “Minute to Gordon Jockel: Situation in Border Areas of TPNG. Canberra, 21 August 1968 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/9]],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 587. 174 H.M. Loveday, “Cablegram to the Department of External Affairs: West Irian: TPNG. Djakarta, 5 February 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 Part 4],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 687–88. 175 “Freeth Backs W. Irian Plan,” The Sydney Morning Herald, April 28, 1969.

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the kind of cross border movement [in New Guinea]’, implying that it was mostly tribal movement.

But as Edward Polansky, a Dutch academic based at ANU, told Victor Beerman, McIver’s successor as

UNHCR representative in Australia, crossing the border in the north is very difficult and is only

successful if carefully prepared; those crossing know exactly that they are crossing an international

boundary into a foreign country.176 In fact, some had been turned back multiple times, before finally

being accepted.177 I will discuss this in relation to the international refugee regime later in the chapter.

Those who were refused residence would have to return to West Irian, and if they did not,

they would be charged with being illegal immigrants178 and be deported.179 In June 1969 two West

Irianese leaders who crossed the border with anti-Indonesian documents that they wished to bring to

the attention of the UN were offered permissive residency, but refused it because of the condition

that they could not engage in political activity.180 The two accepted permissive residency after Royce

Webb, a senior Administration officer, flew to Wewak to explain the position further with a magistrate

who could charge them immediately as illegal immigrants should they again decline the offer.181 They

were then moved to Manus Island. The Administration also threatened to charge about 400 West

Irianese with being illegal immigrants in late 1968.182 They had their application for residence in Papua

New Guinea denied and instead of going back across the border, built camps just inside Australian

territory.183 These actions, and the special conditions placed on their permissive residence, reassured

Indonesia that Australia was ensuring border crossers with anti-Indonesia political agendas were

‘taken out of the game’.184

The third means by which Australian officials attempted to reassure Indonesia was by

reiterating support of Indonesia’s sovereignty. This was mostly done by officials and diplomats,

reassuring Indonesian officials of Australia’s actions and policy concessions to demonstrate a lack of

opportunistic behaviour. For example, in the lead up to the Act of Free Choice in 1969, Australian

176 V.A.M Beerman, “File Note,” August 2, 1965, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 1, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144. 177 “N.G. Studies Refugee’s Bid to Stay,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August 21, 1965; “Admin. Gets New Plea for Asylum,” South Pacific Post, August 20, 1965; “Refugees in Hiding.” 178 The Australian administration considered an illegal immigrant to be one who entered the territory without a permit under the 1963 Ordinance Relating to Immigration, Deportation and Emigration, but according to Section 62, only specially authorised officers may institute prosecutions. 179 Donald Woolford, “N.G. Refugee Volunteers to Go Home,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 5, 1969; “Refugees Ordered to Leave,” The Age, December 4, 1969. 180 “W. Irianese Accept Papua-N.G. Residence,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 17, 1969. 181 “W. Irianese Accept Papua-N.G. Residence.” 182 Don Hogg, “NG Tells Refugees ‘Get out or Else,’” The Australian, November 1, 1968. 183 Hogg. 184 Doran, “Notes of Interdepartmental Meeting: TPNG Border Contingency Planning Canberra, 23 August 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 Part 2],” 590.

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officials reiterated its support of Indonesia’s sovereignty, which, given the previous years of colonial

rule was a sensitive issue to Indonesia. In 1967, two years before the Act of Free Choice, the Australian

ambassador to Indonesia, H.M Loveday, reiterated to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik,

that ‘the Australian Government wanted Indonesia to know that it harboured no ulterior designs of

any kind so far as West Irian was concerned’.185 In so reassuring Indonesia, Australia virtually endorsed

Indonesia’s sovereignty in West New Guinea, despite the controversial way in which the 1969 Act of

Free Choice was carried out.186 While some in Australia questioned the Australian Government’s

approach to its foreign policy on the basis of ‘might is right’, Gordon Freeth, who became Australia’s

foreign minister in February 1969, reassured his domestic audience that he neither approves or

disproves of the method that Indonesia would use to conduct the vote, but understands and

recognises the Indonesian method: ‘Indonesia is our next door neighbour … and we share with it a

common border in New Guinea. So we must have a practical interest. You don’t have to agree 100%

with your next door neighbour but if you can understand them that helps’.187 Members of the

Australian government were very ‘careful not to take any action which could be regarded as an

infringement on Indonesia’s sovereign rights [including] any action which could be interpreted as

support or encouragement for dissident elements’ in order not to disrupt Canberra’s relations with

Djakarta.188

Reassurance was also generally carried out through regular and private communication, to

‘build [Indonesian] confidence in [Australian] motives in the handling of border and border-crossing

questions and strengthen confidential exchanges’.189 When there were suspicions from the Indonesian

side that rebels were receiving training by dissidents on the Eastern side of the border, and

subsequently transferring anti-Indonesian material back across the border,190 Australian officials

worked hard to quell these fears. The Australian Embassy in Djakarta reminded key Indonesian officials

of the actions the Administration had taken to prevent the transmission of materials across the

185 Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 186 van der Kroef, “Australia and the West Irian Problem,” 499–500. 187 “Question and Answer Session by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra,” May 16, 1969, Papua New Guinea - Press cuttings 11/1-6/1/NG/PC part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003145. 188 ‘West Irian / Papua New Guinea border area: Department of Foreign Affairs interest’, paper left with PNGIC by M.G.M. Bourchier on 2 September 1971, NAA: A1838, 3036/10/6/4 part 1 as cited in Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 8. 189 Jockel, “Memorandum to the Australian Embassy: West Irianese in TPNG. Canberra, 22 October 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 11],” 631. 190 Doran, Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, 780; Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7],” 332.

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border,191 and reassured them that ‘we have deliberately kept the exile organizations192 at a

distance’.193 Furthermore, Australia reiterated that those permitted to stay in the East ‘would be

‘taken out of the game’ so far as the nationalist movement was concerned’,194 and emphasised that

border-crossers are accepted ‘only in cases where there are apparently genuine humanitarian

reasons’.195 The Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, was often satisfied with the way Australia

handled these issues and was ‘persuaded and [had] no room for doubt about [Australia’s] motives’.196

Fourth, Australia attempted to build Indonesia’s trust through open but confidential dialogue.

The briefings that the Australian ambassador in Djakarta provided the Indonesian government were

more detailed than those provided to the UNHCR and the Australian public in parliament.197 The two

countries had an agreement to discuss any problem relating to the border crossers privately rather

than publicly to serve their mutual interests: ‘if any problem arose involving refugees,’ Loveday asked

Malik, ‘either in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or among Malik’s colleagues, the Indonesians would

discuss it privately with us rather than making the issue public. This would either solve the problem or

at least lead to it being presented in the way least damaging to our mutual interests’.198 Loveday

recalled that ‘Malik said this was the right way to handle things.’199 Loveday and Malik further

discussed the sudden increase in border crossings in March 1968. According to Loveday’s summary of

the meeting:

[Malik] recalled clearly the Australian intention at that time to keep the matter in

as low a key as possible and our policy of returning as many as possible of those

who could be persuaded to go back. I went through the figures since, showing the

decrease that had occurred, and we both expressed satisfaction that the subject

had not made the news recently. Malik said that he had given instructions that no

one was to stir up publicity on this subject; when I mentioned the one critical

191 Jockel, “Memorandum to the Australian Embassy: West Irianese in TPNG. Canberra, 22 October 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 11],” 630. 192 The exile organisations are referring to two organisations in the Netherlands set up by West Irian political leaders, who left the country before Indonesian take-over, to raise awareness of developments in West Irian and ensure Indonesia fulfils its obligations under the 1962 New York Agreement. 193 Stuart Doran, ed., “Brief for Paul Hasluck: West Irian and Papua New Guinea. Canberra, Undated [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 Part 5],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 201–5. 194 Doran, “Notes of Interdepartmental Meeting: TPNG Border Contingency Planning Canberra, 23 August 1968 [NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 Part 2],” 590. 195 Doran, “Brief for Paul Hasluck: West Irian and Papua New Guinea. Canberra, Undated [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 Part 5],” 202. 196 Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 197 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 9. 198 Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 199 Loveday, 382.

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comment that had been made Malik hastened to assure me that he had moved to

prevent any recurrence.200

Malik’s reassurance indicates a level of trust building from the Indonesian side as well. This is also

suggested by Indonesia’s offer in 1973 to allow periodic inspections by Papua New Guinea officials to

check that returnees have not come to any harm.201

This kind of communication happened not only at the elite level, but also on the ground

between border officers on both sides. Through their monthly meetings and daily radio contact, both

sides could discuss ‘all matters concerning the border including persons crossing the border’.202 This

intelligence sharing included sharing any evidence the West had of anti-Indonesian activity occurring

in the East, which would be passed to the authorities in the East who would then ‘take appropriate

action’.203 There were limits to this, however, with Australian authorities refusing to divulge

information about refugees, which was ‘one of the major points at issue between the two sides’.

Nevertheless, Indonesia understood, if in part because of the ‘UNHCR stick’ the Australians would

‘wave … from time to time’ to quell any pressure from Indonesia relating to the categories which

Australia assigned to people – whether they were ‘political refugees or criminal fugitives’.204

Part of the importance of the confidentiality of these communications was to avoid the media

and international scrutiny. According to Jockel in 1967, Australia and Indonesia had ‘common interests

in being rigorous and avoiding international scrutiny’.205 Avoiding international scrutiny was not only

beneficial to Indonesia by drawing attention away from West New Guinea, but also to Australia as a

party to the Refugee Convention (but not the Protocol). It was thought that, according to First

Assistant Secretary in the Department of External Affairs, Gordon Jockel in 1967, ‘application of

international principles and practices may not be in the interests of the Australian and Indonesian

Governments’, because if international principles were applied, Australia may be pushed into

accepting a large number of refugees from West New Guinea.206 These commitments will be discussed

later. But Australia had always been concerned about numbers, Jockel continues ‘For us, it is not a

question of the occasional refugee who has managed to evade a system of tight internal controls, but

200 Loveday, 382. 201 Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Record of meeting between Conroy and DFA, NAA A1838 932/3/1/5 Part 3 as cited in 593 n.106. 202 David Hay, “Telex to Department of External Territories: 4445. Secret Priority. Port Moresby, 13 June 1969 [NAA: A452, 1969/2608],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 799. 203 Hay, 799. 204 DEA policy planning paper, NAA A452 1970/2113 as cited in Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 592–93. 205 Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7].” 206 Jockel, 332.

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adherence to the Protocol might oblige us to take unlimited numbers of anti-Indonesian West

Irianese’.207 Australia was especially concerned about the implications of accepting such large

numbers into a dependent territory where there may be future repercussions for that territory. Yet it

was equally concerned about the possibility of offering them residence in mainland Australia, where

they may find it easier to take up anti-Indonesian activities in the face of a sympathetic audience. To

avoid drawing international attention, as Ambassador Loveday reminded the Indonesian Foreign

Minister Malik, Australia ‘refrained from using terms like ‘political asylum’ and ‘persecution’.208

Nevertheless, Australia was able to use the threat of UNHCR involvement, according to an External

Affairs policy planning paper, as ‘a “stick” to get Indonesia to back off whenever it began to protest

too strongly about asylum grants’.209

Australian and Indonesian authorities worked together closely and behind closed doors to

avoid damning media attention to avoid domestic and international pressure for Australia to take in

more refugees, which could, in turn, harm its relationship with Indonesia. The government recognised

that diplomacy and the media are sometimes in conflict,210 and asked all public servants not to give

any information on the border to the press, and all correspondents to submit any questions in writing

to the Department of Information.211 There were indeed a few critics within the Australian public. For

example, a group of ‘Liberal Party RSL men’ wrote a letter to then Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck,

declaring that returning these refugees was ‘appalling’ and ‘to say they are illegal immigrants is

deplorable, and to force their return for health reasons is no excuse for us being a party to their

murdur [sic]!’.212 Another letter referred to the fact that Australian soldiers owed their lives to these

men for their help during the war.213 Nevertheless, even the Australian media understood the

‘strategic necessity’ in endorsing Indonesia’s policies in West New Guinea.214 Australia’s desire to keep

things away from the media and international attention in order to balance its interests will be

discussed later in the chapter.

207 Jockel, 332. 208 Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 209 DEA policy planning paper, NAA A452 1970/2113, as cited in Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 588. 210 “Address by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra.” 211 Donald Woolford, “Conflicting Pressures on N.G. Administration,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 9, 1969. 212 as cited in Neumann, “Asylum Seekers and ‘non-Political Native Refugees’ in Papua and New Guinea,” 366. 213 Neumann, 366. 214 van der Kroef, “Australia and the West Irian Problem,” 499.

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Renowned historian Klaus Neumann argues that much of this cooperation had to do with

protecting Australia’s and Indonesia’s image and reputation.215 He rightly argues that in many cases

Australia approved permissive residency simply because not doing so could provoke criticism from

within Australia and draw international attention to West New Guinea.216 While Neumann argues that

image and reputation were the main concerns, and that concerns about Australia’s internal and

external security did not inform its policies towards border crossers,217 Australia’s concern about its

image is in fact directly related to security concerns. For example, if Australia was to receive negative

attention about its border crosser policy, resulting in a tarnished international image, this could push

Australia into accepting more refugees. But accepting more refugees was considered undesirable and

against Australia’s national and security interests, as Australia was well aware that tensions could arise

with Indonesia around the border if Papua New Guinea is seen as a haven for refugees.218 If relations

between Australia and Indonesia deteriorated, it was possible that Indonesia could become active

against Papua New Guinea, resulting in a security threat.219

The Australian government worked to build Indonesia’s trust in Australia as a good neighbour

on New Guinea. It therefore adapted its policies to a firm approach in dealing with border crossers,

involving returns and ensuring that those who did stay would not cause issues in the relationship, and

worked to avoid international and domestic attention. Regular communication between officials was

important in building this trust, as was meetings on the ground between border personnel, which, in

addition to the mutual interest of avoiding friction, meant that the relationship could survive incidents

involving border incursions and shootings, as discussed below.

215 Hogue recalls that Australia put a lot of effort into its reputation, especially for UN visiting missions because the Territory of New Guinea was Australia’s responsibility under a League of Nations mandate: ‘We’d get one of our bright young Papua New Guinea future diplomats to go around with the missions. Partly as PR and partly to blunt them, give them a bit of exposure, and partly as somebody who actually knew the place.’ 216 Neumann, “Asylum Seekers and ‘non-Political Native Refugees’ in Papua and New Guinea,” 367. 217 Neumann, 368. 218 David Hay, “Letter to Warwick Smith, Port Moresby, 2 September 1968 with Attachment: Internal Security Committee T.P.N.G—Estimate of the Threat to Internal Security on Territory of Papua and New Guinea and of the Territory’s Capacity to Meet If from Its Resources—to 1973. 20 August 1968. [NAA: A452, 1968/4161],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 593; J.L. Legge, “Minute to Warwick Smith: Threat to Internal Security in TPNG. Canberra, 2 October 1968 [NAA: A452, 1968/4161],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 609. 219 Hay, “Letter to Warwick Smith, Port Moresby, 2 September 1968 with Attachment: Internal Security Committee T.P.N.G—Estimate of the Threat to Internal Security on Territory of Papua and New Guinea and of the Territory’s Capacity to Meet If from Its Resources—to 1973. 20 August 1968. [NAA: A452, 1968/4161],” 593; Legge, “Minute to Warwick Smith: Threat to Internal Security in TPNG. Canberra, 2 October 1968 [NAA: A452, 1968/4161],” 609.

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Hot Pursuit and Departmental Differences This chapter shows that the Australian government valued its relationship with Indonesia

above its other interests relating to humanitarian concerns, reputation and domestic opinion. These

concerns for humanitarianism, reputation and domestic opinion were met inasmuch as was possible

without upsetting the relationship with Indonesia, and this was demonstrated through Australia’s

response to border crossers. Yet as this thesis shows, ‘Australia’ is not a unitary whole, and each

government department did not necessarily share the same perceptions. This is demonstrated by

Australia’s response after a group of armed Indonesian officers shot at an Australian officer and his

staff on the Australian side of the border in early 1969. In response, the Department of External

Territories wanted to send a stiff protest to Djakarta, while the Department of External Affairs said

there would be no formal protest but a ‘friendly discussion’ with Indonesia.220 This section will explain

the incidents of ‘hot pursuit’ – that is, the direct pursuit of typically criminal suspects across territorial

lines – and Australia’s response, in order to clarify that maintaining a strong relationship with

Indonesia took precedence over the wishes of Papua New Guinea’s administrators.

As mentioned earlier, a camp had been found on the Australian side of the border in late 1968,

and the Australian authorities threatened the inhabitants with charges of being illegal immigrants and

deportation. The camp’s inhabitants then established a camp on the Indonesian side,221 where they

had planned to stay until the Act of Free Choice had been completed.222 Their anti-Indonesian

propaganda attracted the interest of Indonesian police and military patrols.223 A heavily armed para-

military group, known as the ‘Brimob’, was attempting to stop West Irianese from seeking haven

across the border around the time of the Act of Free Choice.224 Tony Try, the Assistant District Officer

of Wutung, recalls them carrying two-inch mortars, machine guns and rifles into the Australian side,

claiming they ‘did not know exactly where the border mark was situated’.225 In April, 1969, The

Indonesian force attacked the camp of dissidents on the Indonesian side,226 but the inhabitants’

intelligence was good and they were aware of the incoming patrol, subsequently fleeing across the

border.227 They had taken everything with them, including ‘a heavy typewriter, duplicating machine,

official rubber stamps of the Free Papua Movement, paper, letters and illegal propaganda

220 “N.G. Border Problems.” 221 Charles Barnes, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Ministerial Statement” (The House of Representatives, April 30, 1969), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1969-04-30%2F0093%22. 222 “We Strengthen Border after Shots at Irians,” The Australian, April 29, 1969. 223 “We Strengthen Border after Shots at Irians.” 224 Tony Try, “Life on ‘the Border,’” Una Voce, September 2003. 225 Try, 21. 226 Peter Hastings, “Indonesian Patrol Fires on Australian in NG,” The Australian, April 30, 1969. 227 Peter Hastings, “The Indonesians Pay a Visit,” The Australian, March 26, 1969.

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literature’.228 The eleven uniformed and armed Indonesian patrol proceeded to chase them over the

border into the Australian border post of Wutung.229 Wutung is around 30 miles from the West Irian

capital of Djajapura. It is a sizeable settlement of traditional houses in neat rows, adjacent to white

sandy beaches.230 It lies at a narrow valley, and flies the Australian flag.231 The 79 West Irianese had

scattered through the post on Saturday, the 26th of April 1969, with the 11 Indonesians in ‘hot

pursuit’.232 The patrol then went house to house, searching for the West Irianese, all the while firing

shots. It was then that Tony Try was shot at, along with his two native constables and the station

interpreter, all of whom were unarmed.233 Try then had a heated, prolonged discussion with the

Indonesians, after which they released a man they held, and returned across the border, with nobody

harmed.234 The 79 refugees were held at the Yako quarantine station and were cared for by the

Administration while their claims were investigated.235

As a result of the incident, the Australian administration sent 50 policemen and 12 riot squad

police as reinforcements to the border and, according to a senior official, took ‘all precautions to stop

further crossings by Indonesian police’.236 According to Charles Barnes, the Minister for External

Territories, who delivered a Ministerial statement delivered in parliament on the 30th of April, 1969:

‘the Indonesian Government, with which our relations in many fields, but particularly in regards to the

border, have been close and co-operative, has been fully informed of this incident. Strong

representations have been made to the Government of Indonesia to avoid any recurrence of such

incidents and that Government has given assurance to this effect’.237 While Barnes said that the

Indonesians had given assurances that such an event would not reoccur, it is not clear that Djakarta

were initially aware of what had taken place. Adam Malik originally said ‘We must not worry about

this. These things happen all the time.’238 Freeth agreed:

The kind of [border problems] we have I don’t see as having been very great up to

this stage. They have been pretty minor incidents. And they have got to be kept as

far as possible in a reasonable perspective. It’s no use endangering what are very

good relations with the Indonesian Government unnecessarily, when all the

228 Hastings. 229 Hastings, “Indonesian Patrol Fires on Australian in NG.” 230 Try, “Life on ‘the Border.’” 231 Peter Hastings, “Indonesia Plays down NG Border Incidents,” The Australian, April 30, 1969. 232 Hastings, “Indonesian Patrol Fires on Australian in NG.” 233 Hastings. 234 Barnes, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Ministerial Statement.” 235 Barnes. 236 “We Strengthen Border after Shots at Irians.” 237 Barnes, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Ministerial Statement.” 238 Hastings, “Indonesia Plays down NG Border Incidents.”

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indications we have are that [they are] in agreement with us about the methods

which should be applied, looking at these border incidents.239

This case also shows that there may have also been differences between Indonesian

government departments. It is likely that the ‘overzealous’ patrol came over on low level orders.240

Indeed as we will see in the next chapter, Djakarta had limited control over its outer provinces during

this period, especially in remote areas of West Irian. When Loveday spoke to Malik about reducing

active military patrols in the border region, Malik agreed and assured Loveday that no military

operations were going on near the border, but that ‘[he] could not always believe what the military

told [him and] many of them were prone to think that the best way to solve things was with a gun’.241

He lamented the death of the former Minister for the Interior, who was ‘much more civilian than

military’, unlike the current Minister, who ‘needed to be educated’.242 Indeed, further incursions and

‘hot pursuits’ continued, including one which involved the death of two West Irianese from their

gunshot wounds inflicted by the Indonesian patrol.243 This time, the Indonesian officers left messages

on the back of photographs belonging to the Australian district officer. Written in Indonesian, they

said: ‘We do not fight the people of TPNG. We find the murderers’ and ‘Head of Morehead sub-district:

We do not fight with the people of TPNG.’244

At the height of the influx, Try was required to radio into headquarters at Vanimo every hour,

24 hours a day, so that they knew everything was under control.245 There were 53 policemen from the

Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary based at Wutung during the peak of the activity, and for

24 hours a day police kept watch at all access points to Wutung, a situation which went on for a few

months.246 At one point, Try had fallen asleep and missed a few scheduled radio check-ins to

headquarters, which then ordered HMAS Madang to Wutung to assess the situation. Try woke up to

the sound of the boat, believing it was an Indonesian patrol. He gathered the policemen as they

239 David Solomon, “Irian Incidents Minor - Freeth,” The Australian, June 18, 1969. 240 Hastings, “Indonesia Plays down NG Border Incidents”; “A Right to Speak on West Irian,” The Australian, May 27, 1969; M.A. Besley, “Minute to Warwick Smith: Border Situation. Canberra, 28 April 1969 [NAA: A452, 1969/2608],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 754 n.6. 241 Loveday, “Cablegram to the Department of External Affairs: West Irian: TPNG. Djakarta, 5 February 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 Part 4],” 687. 242 Loveday, 688. 243 “Indonesians Shot Refugees - Coroner,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 7, 1969; “Indonesians Shoot Dead 2 Refugees but 4 Escape,” The Australian, June 6, 1969. 244 “Dutchman Held,” Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995), June 12, 1969; “Messages Left with Bodies of Irianese,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 12, 1969. 245 Try, “Life on ‘the Border,’” 21. 246 Try, 21.

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nervously awaited, only to find, after hearing ‘a very clear burst of swearing in a very Australian accent

[which] wafted across the water’, that the boat was here to ‘save’ him.247

Hot pursuit was a ‘very tricky issue’, Hogue recalls, ‘the terrain was very easy to go and get

lost in it, and it was very easy to pop across the border at night’.248 Stopping them was difficult and

the Australian Administration ‘just didn’t have the resources’ said Hogue, who suspected the

Indonesians must have ‘thought that we might be speaking with forked tongues sometimes’.249 And

while the Australian and Indonesian governments agreed that there should be no hot pursuit, it was

‘practice that was the problem’.250 ‘How do you stop them?’ Hogue questioned:

And how do you find them once they’ve got there? So it was really a bit of, did the

Indonesians really trust us? That we would try, how hard we were trying? It was a

question of resources I mean we had one battalion in Wewak and that was for the

military, the police were understaffed … So I think that was really not so much the

theory – well a bit of the politics with the groups – but mainly it just wasn’t easy

to find the buggers (laughs).251

In response to these incursions, Australia and Indonesia engaged in confidential dialogue. In

June, 1969, John Watson, a political secretary at the Australian Embassy in Djakarta, along with Royce

Webb and Ken Brown from the Australian Administration in Papua New Guinea met with Brigadier-

General Sarwo Edhie to discuss ‘ways to improve liaison between Indonesia and Australia along the

border’.252 These three day talks then resulted in discussions between Gordon Jockel, who became

Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia in March 1969, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Adam

Malik. Furthermore, Royce Webb was appointed Australia’s liaison in Djajapura.253 While he spoke no

Indonesian, he had ‘a long association with people from Djayapura’ before the transfer.254 As a result

of these talks, three border liaison posts were set up, in Wutung, Imonda and Weam, along with their

corresponding Indonesian posts in Tami, Waris and Sotar.255 The recommendations included radio and

telephone communications and regular meetings between the officers in charge.256 The first meeting

was at on the 25th of June, 1969.257 The Australian officers in charge of the border posts at Wutung,

Imonda and Weam each met with their respective Indonesian counterparts to discuss border

247 Try, 21. 248 Hogue, Interview with Author. 249 Hogue. 250 Hogue. 251 Hogue. 252 “Dutchman Held.” 253 “Australian to Help on Border Problems,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 3, 1969. 254 “People,” Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1, 1969. 255 “Liaison Plan for N.G. Border,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 18, 1969. 256 “Liaison Plan for N.G. Border.” 257 “Freeth Did ‘waltz’ with Suharto: N.G. Protest,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 26, 1969.

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problems.258 Indonesia saw the border liaison arrangements as cooperation to prevent 'training

camps' for Irianese rebels established on the Australian side of the border.259 This was, according to

Malik, 'a necessary part of a good neighbour policy',260 and worked to build trust and confidence in

Australia’s motives.

While the communication and cooperation between the Indonesian and Australian sides

improved after these incidents, it revealed differences in outlook between two Australian

departments: the Department of External Affairs and the Department of External Territories.

According to an op-ed in the Australian, ‘the most serious after-effect [of the incident] is not in the

Australian-Indonesian relations but in the barely-disguised differences between the ministers for

External Affairs and External Territories, Mr Freeth and Mr Barnes’.261 Barnes urged External Affairs to

send a ‘stiff formal protest’ to Djakarta.262 Freeth was on his first official visit to Indonesia, but External

Affairs recommended the any question of a formal protest be avoided. ‘To do so’, wrote Jockel:

would be to li[f]t these matters into major proportions affecting the relations of

the two governments and to imply doubt about the good faith of the present

Indonesian government … [who] would feel that such an action on our part would

be a setback to their efforts to restore relations of confidence among their

neighbours and their international good standing. The firmness and admirable

discipline shown by our own officers in the incident ... will not be lost on the

Indonesian officials dealing with this matter.263

Apparently, the Indonesian government had informed Freeth that it would not stop the border

crossers in future, and Freeth agreed that there would be no impediment to their crossing on the

Australian side.264 As Freeth explained at a press conference: ‘Mr Malik told me that he would be more

cooperative [and] try to get the police to be more cooperative in this and not only not stop them

crossing the border by shooting at them (because that is the only ultimate way of stopping them) but

also to give notice to our Administration up there of any substantial movements of people towards

the border so that our people could be ready to receive them’.265 This was in contrast with the

Administration’s policy of discouraging border crossers and encouraging their return in New Guinea,

as the media noted: ‘Mr Freeth has virtually reversed the policy without consulting the fellow-minister

258 “Freeth Did ‘waltz’ with Suharto: N.G. Protest.” 259 See Verrier, “The Origins of the Border Problem and the Border Story to 1969,” 44 n.17. 260 “New Guinea Sending Officer to West Irian,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 28, 1969. 261 “Who Decides What up There?,” The Australian, 1969. 262 Besley, “Minute to Warwick Smith: Border Situation. Canberra, 28 April 1969 [NAA: A452, 1969/2608],” 753. 263 Besley, 754 n.6. 264 “Who Decides What up There?” 265 “Question and Answer Session by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra.”

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who must carry it out’.266 Warwick Smith, secretary of the Department of External Territories wanted

to ‘follow up on the question of a formal protest. I don’t think what has been done is enough to rest

on’.267

From the perspective of External Affairs, Australia had an important relationship with

Indonesia which should not be damaged unnecessarily.268 While Freeth did not see that the recent

border intrusions were in ‘any sense comparable to the issues we faced during confrontation’, they

had the potential ‘of carrying the seeds of dissension.’269 ‘If we are too heavy handed,’ Freeth said,

‘these seeds could quite easily grow to critical size’.270 Newspapers questioned the government’s lack

of criticism toward Indonesia when ‘legitimate Australian interests are being affected.’271 ‘The

Government view seems to be,’ one editorial in The Australian said, indicating the strong foundations

of the relationship, ‘that Australian-Indonesian relations are incapable of absorbing either public or

private difference without rupturing. If this is true, the relationship must be strangely artificial but it

is difficult to accept such a view after the experience of the confrontation era’.272 Indeed, the Australia-

Indonesia relationship contains more ‘ballast’ than many would assume, as it is able to withstand

turbulence, indicating the resilience of trusting relationships in context of so much mistrust –

something we will see in the later cases.

But to build this trust, External Affairs saw that it needed to dampen the criticism coming from

External Territories, and especially from the Papua New Guinean House of Assembly. According to

External Affairs, international relationships were a matter for the Australian Government and

Parliament, not for the House of Assembly and Administration. So when members of the House of

Assembly proposed that the House would debate West Irian’s Act of Free Choice, External Affairs

warned them against it.273 But, as pointed out by Albert Maori Kiki, the secretary of the Pangu political

group in Papua New Guinea: ‘West Irian is our neighbour and our problem. In the years ahead we will

be much more affected by what happens there than Australia will be’.274 Some members wanted to

266 “Who Decides What up There?” 267 Besley, “Minute to Warwick Smith: Border Situation. Canberra, 28 April 1969 [NAA: A452, 1969/2608],” 754 n.6. 268 Solomon, “Irian Incidents Minor - Freeth.” 269 “Address by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra.” 270 “Address by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, M.P., to the National Press Club, Canberra.” 271 “A Right to Speak on West Irian.” 272 “A Right to Speak on West Irian.” 273 “N.G. Politicians May Ignore Irian Warning,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 23, 1969. 274 “N.G. Politicians May Ignore Irian Warning”; “New Guinea Politicians Want Free Vote for Irians,” The Australian, May 22, 1969.

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leave the problem to Australia,275 but the House of Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution that

condemned the West Irian act of free choice as not being free and demanded that Australia pass the

message on to the UN.276 Newspapers noted that there was no attempt to stop the House of Assembly

declaring opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which it did unanimously in 1968.277

Students had also staged a march and issued a petition to register their concern about the Act

of Free Choice.278 500 students protested in Port Moresby about the act and Australia’s apparent

approval, and a local political party with a membership of 6,000 issued a statement supporting the

students.279 A member of the house accused Freeth of going ‘waltzing matilda’ with Suharto.280 Others

were still worried about Indonesia’s desires on the eastern half of the island.281 Nevertheless, the

differences between Australian government departments was rejected by Senator Anderson, the

Government Leader in the Senate. He denied the conflict between External Territories and External

Affairs, arguing that the press played up the differences between the two departments.282

Balancing Act Australia tried to balance its interests between a secure relationship with Indonesia and its

international obligations.283 It did not want to draw international attention as doing so might force it

to adopt a policy that would risk its relationship with Indonesia and thereby threaten its security. It

therefore kept the management of its border as confidential as possible, maintained communication

with Indonesian officials, adopted a firm approach to border crossers and avoided calling them

‘refugees’, forced those who were accepted to adhere to special conditions, and reassured and

appeased Indonesia. It is clear that the issue of border crossers was dealt with through the strategic

and security lens, as evidenced by these policies surrounding the management of border crossers and

permissive residents. Nevertheless, Australia did recognise that there were some ‘apparently

genuine’284 cases which would require resettlement, and that it must meet certain obligations and to

fulfil its role as a good international citizen. This section will outline Australia’s response to the border

275 “Send Irianese Home, Says NG Leader,” The Australian, July 10, 1969. 276 Peter Hastings, “Ignoring the Facts of Political Life in New Guinea,” The Australian, 1969; “Cabinet May Get Problem of N. Guinea Protest,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 30, 1969. 277 “N.G. Politicians May Ignore Irian Warning”; “Freeth Did ‘waltz’ with Suharto: N.G. Protest.” 278 David White, “Government Miscalculation on West Irian?,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, 1969. 279 Woolford, “Conflicting Pressures on N.G. Administration”; “NG Group Plans W. Irian Protest,” The Australian, May 16, 1969. 280 “Freeth Did ‘waltz’ with Suharto: N.G. Protest.” 281 “Freeth Did ‘waltz’ with Suharto: N.G. Protest.” 282 Peter Hastings, “It’s ‘open Arms’ for West Irianese,” The Australian, May 2, 1969. 283 See Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place.” 284 Doran, “Brief for Paul Hasluck: West Irian and Papua New Guinea. Canberra, Undated [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 Part 5],” 202.

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crossers vis-à-vis the international refugee regime and how this is navigated in relation to its important

relationship with Indonesia.

The International Refugee Regime Refugees became a prominent issue on the international agenda during World War Two

(WWII). To manage the problem of refugees, the international state system created the international

refugee regime, which is based on the UNHCR, the Refugee Convention. By the time Indonesia

incorporated West New Guinea in 1963, the seeds of the International Refugee Regime that we know

today had been sewn. In response to the devastating effects of WWII, the UN General Assembly

adopted the Statute of the UNHCR on December 14, 1950. The organisation came to life on January 1

1951 with a three-year mandate, 33 staff members, and a budget of $300,000 with limited capacity

to raise extra funds.285 In July of that year, the 1951 Refugee Convention was adopted and came into

force on 22 April 1954 with eight signatories – Australia being the sixth. It was designed to regularise

the status of refugees and contains 46 articles setting out standard principles for the protection of

refugees, including: non-refoulement286; protection without discrimination; protection of a

humanitarian nature; protection without penalty for mode of arrival; cooperation on protection

without tension between states; cooperation with the UNHCR, and; expulsion only in exceptional

circumstances affecting national security.287

The Convention also, and importantly, brought in the first universal refugee definition.

According to the Convention, a refugee is someone outside the country of his or her nationality, and

‘as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 … owing to a well-founded fear of being

persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or

political opinion ... is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’.288 This would become

an important definition as it was used as reason why those crossing the border in New Guinea could

not call upon the same obligations as set out in the Convention.

Australia’s formal obligations to refugees began when it signed the 1951 Convention Relating

to the Status of Refugees. It was the sixth country to do so, which officially brought the Convention

into force. The ratification was touted by Australia's Permanent Representative to the UN, William

285 Erika Feller, “Evolution of the International Refugee Protection Regime, The,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 5 (2001): 131; Dennis Gallagher, “The Evolution of the International Refugee System,” International Migration Review 23, no. 3 (October 1, 1989): 580, https://doi.org/10.2307/2546429. 286 The principle that someone should not be returned to a place in which they face danger or harm. 287 Feller, “Evolution of the International Refugee Protection Regime, The,” 131–32; Gallagher, “The Evolution of the International Refugee System,” 580. 288 United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” vol. 189, United Nations Treaty Series (United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Geneva, 1951), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3be01b964.

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Douglass Forsyth, as ‘further evidence of our compassionate concern with this problem by formally

stating our binding adherence to a Convention which will elevate the standard of treatment of

refugees to the status of international legal obligation.’289 Nevertheless, when Australia signed the

Refugee Convention, it did so with reservations on six articles.290 The most significant, was that it ‘does

not accept the obligations stipulated in [Article 32]’, which prohibits states from ‘[expelling] a refugee

lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order’.291 During the drafting

process, Australia made numerous attempts to limit the Convention’s scope; as Klaus Neumann notes:

‘only the US delegation opposed as many key elements of the draft as the Australians’.292 There were

numerous concerns from the Australians that ratification of the Convention would result in

‘abandoning effective control over immigration’.293 In 1955, during the drafting of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Australian delegation protested the inclusion of the

right to asylum, arguing that ‘any limitation of the right to exclude undesirable immigrants or visitors

[was] unacceptable’.294 Indeed, Australia was very protective of the government’s right to control the

entry of persons, refugee or otherwise, which is a theme we will see throughout the remainder of this

thesis.

To this day, Indonesia has not ratified the Refugee Convention, because it was not part of the

drafting process and considers the Convention is not relevant to its region of the world.295 Other

reasons include Indonesia’s fear of a ‘pull factor’, concerns about economic burdens, fear of

conflict with locals, concerns about national security and a commitment to the ‘ASEAN way’

tradition of not interfering in the business of neighbouring countries.296 This means that Australia

and Indonesia face the issue of refugees from different stand points with different priorities,

perspectives and obligations. This is one of the reasons Australia uses Indonesia today to prevent

people arriving on its own shores and calling on its legal obligations under the Convention, as we shall

see in later chapters. During the period of the border crossers in New Guinea, however, Australia had,

289 Australia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, William Douglass Forsyth, as quoted in Katrina Stats, “‘Characteristically Generous’? Australian Responses to Refugees Prior to 1951,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 60, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 191, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12053. 290 Articles 17, 18, 19, 26, 28 and 32. 291 United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 201–2, 175. 292 Neumann, Across the Seas, 138. 293 John Horgan, as cited in Stats, “‘Characteristically Generous’?,” 190. 294 Stats, 191. 295 Sara Ellen Davies, Legitimising Rejection: International Refugee Law in Southeast Asia, Refugees and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 296 Gordyn, “Pancasila and Pragmatism,” 344; Mathew and Harley, “Refugee Protection and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: A Fieldwork Report,” 15; Sara E. Davies, “The Asian Rejection?: International Refugee Law in Asia*,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 52, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 562, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2006.00433a.x.

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for the first time, become a country of first asylum, and its obligations were not so clear, a haziness

that the government exploited. This next section will briefly explain.

Application of the Refugee Convention in New Guinea Despite Australia’s concerns that the Refugee Convention might limit its own immigration

policy, Australia acceded to the Convention – with six reservations – because it was applicable only to

those fleeing ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’ in Europe.297 Australia was unlikely to receive

spontaneous arrivals of people fleeing such events. While the Convention was extended to Norfolk

Island, Papua, New Guinea and Nauru,298 this reservation made the application of the Convention in

these territories ‘meaningless’.299 Therefore, when Australia found itself dealing with refugees from

Indonesian West New Guinea, it did not find the Refugee Convention applicable. But as Weis, a Legal

Adviser for the UNHCR in Geneva informed McIver, the UNHCR representative in Australia: ‘in view of

the declaration made by Australia according to article 1 Section B of the 1951 Convention, this

Convention cannot be regarded as applying to the [West Irianese]. This does not exclude, however,

that they could, on the merits, be regarded as refugees within the High Commissioner’s mandate

(Section 6B of the Statue) nor, of course, that the High Commissioner could extend his good offices to

them’.300

The granting of permissive residence was indeed seen as ‘an intention to treat them as

refugees’,301 despite not using the correct terminology. According to First Assistant Secretary of the

Department of External Affairs, A.J. Eastman, Australia had every intention to handle border crossers

in line with the international principles, specifically those ‘embodied particularly in the Convention

relating to the Status of Refugees and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum’.302 However, Eastman

continued, Australia considered its hands ‘legally free’ because ‘Declarations are not binding in

International Law and the Refugees Convention is limited in its application, in Australia’s case, to

persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe before 1st January, 1951’.303

297 Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record, Briefings [Series] (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 15–16; United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 200–202. 298 United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 150. 299 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 300 “P. Weis to A. McIver,” March 1, 1965. 301 Sir James Plimsoll, “Submission to Gordon Freeth: West Irianese: Zongganao and Runaweri. Canberra, 26 June 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 14]],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 814–16. 302 A.J. Eastman, “Submission to Gordon Freeth: West Irianese: Runaweri and Zonggonao. Canberra,31 July 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 15],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 866. 303 Eastman, 866.

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As mentioned, one of the major limitations to the application of the convention in New Guinea

was the temporal and geographic restraint which limited a refugee to someone who has fled events

in Europe prior to January 1951. But even after the Second World War had ended, new refugee

problems began to emerge that required UNHCR assistance. As a result, the 1967 Protocol to the

Refugee Convention was introduced. This Protocol to the Convention removed the original temporal

and geographic restrictions of the Refugee Convention, which meant that protection was no longer

limited to those fleeing persecution in Europe before January 1951. However, Australia did not ratify

the Protocol, as doing so would have confirmed an obligation towards the West New Guineans and

required that parties to the protocol cooperate with the UNHCR.304 At the time of the drafting of the

Protocol, Australia removed its reservations to the Convention.305 Nevertheless, Australia did not sign

the Protocol. And when it did sign the Protocol, it was in 1974, after Papua New Guinea was self-

administrating and just prior to its independence in 1975. Australia’s signing of the protocol did not

apply to Papua New Guinea, as it was Australian policy ‘not to commit PNG to treaties to which

Australia may become a party without the consent of Port Moresby’.306

Not only did Australia find the Convention inapplicable to border crossers on New Guinea, it

was simply not on its radar. For example, as noted by Victor Beerman, he found that the Department

of Territories was ‘not burdened by any specific knowledge of the 1951 Convention,’ he wrote that he

‘had to inform the official concerned that this document exists, and where he could find it’.307 Indeed,

Hogue does not recall any references to the Refugee Convention.308 John McFarlane, who interviewed

border crossers as part of his role, noted that ‘The refugee convention in those days didn’t really come

into it’.309 And while the local media in Papua New Guinea called for the Administration to take a more

generous approach to the border crosses, they referred not to the Convention but to Article 14 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights as motivation for a more accepting policy.310

304 Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 75; Jockel, “Submission to Paul Hasluck: Refugees from West Irian. Canberra, 30 May 1967 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 7],” 332. 305 [UNHCR] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Australia Withdraws Reservations to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, Press Release No. REF/985,” December 15, 1967, 10c/PRE-1967/37, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110017219. 306 Frank A. Bauman to I.C. Jackson, “Accession by Australia to Various International Instruments,” April 18, 1974, 11/2/67-671.2.AUL, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110013497. 307 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965; Confirmed also by Polansky’s assessment in Beerman, “File Note.” 308 Hogue, Interview with Author. 309 McFarlane, Interview with Author. 310 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965; Paul Longro, “A Plea to Admit W. Irian Refugees,” South Pacific Post, July 5, 1965; “W. Papuan Exile Implores Action: Troops Training for Invasion?”

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While Australia did not deem the Convention applicable in New Guinea, ‘the principle of non-

refoulement’, as Weis pointed out to McIver, ‘should apply regardless of the Convention status of the

persons concerned. This principle of non-refoulement is regarded as a general principle’, he wrote,

‘and Australia has moreover certain obligations as an administrating authority by virtue of Articles 74

and 76 (c) of the United Nations Charter’.311 But there were many reports of returns at the border:

‘With a few exceptions, one gets the impression that refoulement is the general line of conduct

followed by the local administration’.312 The press had reported that those returned faced torture

upon return.313 ‘It may be appropriate’, Weis wrote to McIver, ‘to discuss this matter … with the

Australian authorities in an informal way in order to ensure that there is no repetitions of

[refoulement]’.314

In fact, Australian officers on the border were instructed to ‘grant asylum to west-Irianese

who occupied prominent posts in their country in the time of the Dutch Administration; also to those

who in that period had actively participated in the defence of the territory against the Indonesian

infiltrators’.315 This was confirmed by John McFarlane, who said that of the border crossers who were

treated seriously and not just sent back, were that generation of local leadership

that the Dutch left behind. So an ordinary village person that came across from

West Irian wouldn’t really have a case to stay, but the more elite leadership from

West Irian in many cases did have a story that they would’ve been persecuted by

the Indonesians, possibly killed, because the Sukarno regime was pretty violent.316

From 1963 to 1967, one of McFarlane’s principle roles was to regularly go to the patrol posts on the

border for the purpose of interviewing those who were seeking asylum. The aim of the interviews was

to get the stories down with the limited resources available to ‘verify that what they said was basically

sound’.317 These included the documents they carried and other evidence they had in support of their

identity, and maps ‘so that they could explain how they went from A to B to C, so it was pretty clear it

wasn’t just a fabricated story’.318 His reports were sometimes 15 pages long, including pictures and

maps. McFarlane remembers people pleading with him, not to force them back, but it was not his role

to decide, he said. His reports were passed on to headquarters, from there, he did not know what

311 “P. Weis to A. McIver,” March 1, 1965. 312 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 313 “West Irian Throats Cut by Indonesians,” South Pacific Post, March 3, 1965; “Australia, Please Help Us.” 314 “P. Weis to A. McIver,” March 1, 1965. 315 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965. 316 McFarlane, Interview with Author. 317 McFarlane. 318 McFarlane.

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happened, but he knew ‘that there were no immigration officer up there doing identical work to what

I was doing. So it was pretty amateurish in a way’.319

According to UNHCR Legal Adviser, Arnold Rørholt, who was on a visiting mission to Australia

to discuss the overall problem of asylum seekers from West Irian into Papua New Guinea, if border

crossers gave reasons for crossing which had a ‘political aspect’, they would be questioned on the

basis of a questionnaire.320 The applicant’s statements, security reports and all other available

information were then sent to the Administrator in Port Moresby, David Hay, via the District Officers.

‘The Administrator has the possibility of stopping the report and refusing asylum’, Rørholt wrote of

his investigation into the procedure, ‘but I was told he never used this right and sends the reports to

Canberra, where a final decision is taken by the Minister of External Affairs. Six months may easily

pass between the original application and the final decision’.321 In practice, he was told, ‘all applicants

who are considered by the Frontier Control Officers to have political reasons for crossing into

Papua/New Guinea are given permissive residence’. However, he was also told that ‘for one reason or

another applicants with political reasons for seeking asylum may have been sent back’, but they were

not handed over to authorities on the other side, simply escorted to the border and ‘released’. Nothing

prevented them from returning again, which they often did.322 To sum up his report, Rørholt stated

that ‘the Australian authorities are dealing with the question of West Irian refugees with honesty,

sympathy and as efficiently as the conditions along the border permit’.323 He was not, however,

permitted to visit Papua New Guinea and relied on sources in Canberra. Furthermore, his visit was ,

to be conducted without publicity, at the request of the Australians. The UNHCR offered its assistance

in eligibility procedures a number of times, but, as Beerman noted: ‘Canberra rather prefers to hush-

hush the whole matter not wanting to further deteriorate its already so difficult relationship with the

Indonesia of President Sukarno’.324 This is an example of how Australia worked with the UNHCR insofar

as it would not upset its relationship with Indonesia. And it is to the UNHCR’s involvement that we

now turn.

319 McFarlane. 320 Rørholt to High Commissioner of Refugees, “Report on My Mission to Hong Kong and Australia from 11 to 22 December 1968,” January 6, 1969. 321 Rørholt to High Commissioner of Refugees; David Hay, “Statement by the Administrator of Papua and New Guinea,” October 31, 1968, Papua New Guinea - Confidential 11/1-6/1/NG part 2, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110003144. 322 Rørholt to High Commissioner of Refugees, “Report on My Mission to Hong Kong and Australia from 11 to 22 December 1968,” January 6, 1969. 323 Rørholt to High Commissioner of Refugees. 324 “V.A.M Beerman to High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 13, 1965.

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The UNHCR’s Involvement The UNHCR was, in fact, aware of the situation in New Guinea. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan,

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1966-1978, was not convinced about Australia’s method

for determining which border crossers should be ‘persuaded’ to return and which should be granted

permissive residence, nor the lack of appeal regarding this decision.325. Nevertheless, the UNHCR was

largely sympathetic towards Australia as a Western country living alongside a turbulent Asian country

by treating all information about the issue as confidential. Although the organisation offered to assist

between Australia and Indonesia, Australia and Indonesia’s relationship was close enough to not

require (or want) this assistance.326 Indonesia had stated that it prefers bilateral arrangements and

does not wish to have the UNHCR involved, as involving the UNHCR could result in negative reports

getting back to the UN. Australia also preferred these ‘pragmatic’ bilateral relations. Even though such

a broad understanding ‘may lead to difficulties and incidents’, as Jockel wrote, it was preferable to

have a ‘pragmatic, developing approach’ rather than a concrete ‘regime of detailed understandings’

which may tie the two governments to a particular course of action should things deteriorate.327

While Australia gave Prince Sadruddin privileged access to information and statistics (in

exchange for his secrecy on the issue), Australia was giving the Indonesian government much more

detailed information including a list of all permissive residents in Papua New Guinea and occasional

access to those in refugee camps.328 Indeed, the UNHCR’s Director of Operations Thomas Jamieson

promised Australia relative secrecy and silence on the issue, and that “officers down the line knew the

position”.329 Prince Sadruddin enforced this by reprimanding any UNHCR officer who brought this

issue to the attention of other UN officials.330 Furthermore, Prince Sadruddin warned the Australian

government that ‘members of his Legal Department were pushing him to do something officially on

this matter [of reports of refoulement to West New Guinea] as he would normally do in cases where

such allegations had been made publicly’.331 This issue was handled with the highest level of secrecy

until 1973, when, after the election of the Labor party Prince Sadruddin found that he no longer had

privileged access to information and he then made the secret files on New Guinea available to other

UNHCR staff.332

325 Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 74. 326 Neumann, 74. 327 Gordon Jockel, “Cablegram to Sir James Plimsoll: West Irian. Djakarta, 6 June 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 Part 5],” in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1966-1969, ed. Stuart Doran, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006), 790. 328 Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 76. 329 Thomas Jamieson as cited in Neumann, 73. 330 Neumann, 74. 331 as cited in Neumann, 74. 332 Neumann, 75.

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It was not only the UNHCR that was aware of, and somewhat complicit in, this situation. In

1969 two ‘border crossers’ requested travel documents from Australia in order to take the case of the

West New Guinean people to the UN in New York. Australia attempted to delay this process until the

Act of Free Choice was complete, in which case it would be too late. The Netherlands also refused to

help these border crossers when approached for the issuing of identity documents. The United States

were also no help, as they were concerned that the presence of these refugees ‘could have an

unsettling affect at the United Nations’.333 This lack of international concern may be explained by the

fact that the international refugee regime at the time was still primarily concerned with communism,

rather than refugees of no political interest or use to the West, such as the West New Guineans.

Accepting refugees from communist states was a tactic used by Western states to discredit

communism and legitimise the liberal world.334

Interestingly, even though Australia considered itself ‘legally free’ it still payed reverence to

the Convention both behind closed doors and publicly. Behind closed doors Australia reminded

Indonesia that it was bound by international laws and obligations. Loveday reminded Malik that the

Australian government was ‘not completely free agents in that we ha[ve] to bear in mind international

law and practice in respect of the rights of refugees’.335 It also reassured Indonesia that it would avoid

invoking these obligations by refraining from using terminology like political asylum and

persecution.336 Publicly, Australia affirmed its commitment to international principles; as Loveday told

the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in 1971: ‘the Australian Government, while not a party

to the Protocol of the Convention on Refugees, is publicly committed to be guided by the principles

embodied in the convention and the Declaration on Political Asylum and has consistently honoured

this undertaking’.337 Australia’s ratification of the Convention, according to Australia’s permanent

333 Eastman, “Submission to Gordon Freeth: West Irianese: Runaweri and Zonggonao. Canberra,31 July 1969 [NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 Part 15],” 866. 334 Laura Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” International Journal of Refugee Law 14, no. 2 and 3 (April 1, 2002): 244, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/14.2_and_3.238; Matthew J Gibney and Randall Hansen, Asylum Policy in the West: Past Trends, Future Possibilities (Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003), 1, http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2003/en_GB/dp2003-068/; Daniele Joly, Global Changes in Asylum Regimes (Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10057384; Charles B. Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters,” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 307; Gil Loescher, “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?,” Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 357; Julie Mertus, “The State and the Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: New Models, New Questions,” International Journal of Refugee Law 10, no. 3 (July 1, 1998): 325, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/10.3.321; Adam Roberts, “More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11 (1998): 378. 335 Loveday, “Loveday to Department of External Affairs: Refugees from West Irian. Djakarta, 18 August 1967 [NAA: A1838, 936/6/5 Part 2],” 382. 336 Loveday, 382. 337 Loveday, as cited in Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 77.

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representative to the UN, was ‘further evidence of our compassionate concern with this problem by

formally stating our binding adherence to a Convention which will elevate the standard of treatment

of refugees to the status of international legal obligation’.338 In reality, Australia only signed the

Protocol after Papua New Guinea became self-governing, and on the condition that the Protocol does

not apply to Papua New Guinea, though as a customary principle, it was still bound by non-

refoulement.339 Although these reservations and legal loopholes meant that the border crossers from

West New Guinea came under the UNHCR’s mandate and required no action from Australia, Australia

was still bound by the principle of non-refoulement, though this was not always reflected in its policies.

As a result of these measures, the Department of Foreign Affairs (replacing the Department

of External Affairs in 1970) and the Department of External Territories could claim that ‘the refugee

problem was no longer a pressing one’ by mid-1971.340 From January 1970, Foreign Affairs discussed

the cases of rejected applicants with the PNG Administrators’ Executive Council, which could permit

the person to stay on normal immigration criteria.341 On the 1st of December, 1973, Papua New Guinea

became self-governing, ending Australia’s formal responsibility for border crossers. At this time,

around 500 refugees held permissive residence in Papua New Guinea.342

West Papuan Asylum Seekers in Recent Decades The West Papuan issue has continued to be a ‘pebble in the shoe’ of Australia-Indonesia

relations, especially after the independence of East Timor, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Neumann and Taylor argues that this form of cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on the

issue of border crossers in New Guinea has been somewhat continuous, besides an incident under the

Howard government, and that accepting refugees from Indonesia will not necessarily result in long-

term deterioration of bilateral relations.343 This section will briefly explore some of more recent cases

of West Papuans seeking asylum in Australia.

In November 1991, nine West Papuans were granted refugee status or residency in Australia

on compassionate grounds.344 They had arrived on Torres Strait islands in small boats between 1985

and 1987. The government had delayed processing their claims while they established the events

related to their case, in addition to avoiding both political sensitivities with Jakarta and an incentive

338 William Douglass Forsyth, as quoted in Stats, “‘Characteristically Generous’?,” 191. 339 Neumann, “Hush-Hushing the Whole Matter,” 77. 340 See Palmer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 595. 341 Palmer, 595. 342 Palmer, 593. 343 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 25, 27. 344 Greg Roberts, “Former Irianese Rebels to Stay Here,” The Sydney Morning Herald, November 27, 1991.

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for others to follow suit. Surprisingly, there was a very minor stir in Indonesia.345 While Jakarta

reportedly asked Canberra to deport the asylum seekers, a spokesman from the Indonesian embassy

noted that ‘it was a matter for Australia, [but] the Indonesian Government would be happy to discuss

their fate with the Federal Government "if it wants to deport them"’.346 The Australian Government

allowed nine of the refugees, all of whom were involved in the OPM (Free Papua Movement), to settle

permanently. Despite an expected straining of the relationship and a sharp retaliation, there was no

such reaction.347 Australia’s open dialogue with Indonesia and the increasingly strong relationship

under prime minister Paul Keating and president Suharto, which will be discussed in Chapter Fiveon

the Bali Process, prevented this becoming a major crisis.

In subsequent arrivals of West Papuans in Australia, the government returned them to Papua

New Guinea. On September 25, 1996, 21 West Papuans arrived on Australia’s Tudu Island, but because

they had permissive residency in Papua New Guinea, they were returned. In January 4, 1998, 30 West

Papuans arrived on Tudu Island because they heard Papua New Guinea would repatriate them to West

Papua – they returned when they were sufficiently reassured this would not happen.348 In May 2006,

three West Papuans arrived on Australia’s Boigu island. Papua New Guinea agreed to return them

under the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding in relation to Migration, Refugees, Irregular

Migration and People Smuggling, as were five West Papuans who arrived on Australia’s Saibai Island

on August 2007.349

The incident which did affect relations was that in 2006, when 43 West Papuans aboard a

traditional canoe arrived in Weipa, Queensland, seeking political asylum. The government granted

protection to 42 of the asylum seekers within two months. This infuriated Indonesia who, in response,

withdrew their ambassador and demanded an apology. The Indonesian president at the time, Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono was quoted as saying ‘Don't insult us, don't toy with us and don't deny us

justice’.350 But Howard did not apologise, citing that common sense is needed from both sides and

respect for each other’s point of view.351 Howard stated that while he respects ‘the sensitivity of

Indonesia towards the Papuan issue’, he called for Indonesia to ‘accept that we have a procedure, we

345 Roberts. 346 Greg Roberts, “Deport Irianese, Urges Jakarta,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 21, 1991. 347 Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990, 29. 348 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 14. 349 Neumann and Taylor, 14–15. 350 Banham and Coorey, “Jakarta.” 351 Banham and Coorey.

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have a process according to our interpretation of law, and we don't intend to bend and vary that

because it's the code under which we live in this country’.352

Nevertheless, Howard met with the Indonesian president and announced changes in

Australia’s asylum seeker policies that would see all unauthorised arrivals to be processed offshore

(the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, which later lapsed in the

Senate. The government argued that these policies would ‘allow [Australia] to balance the three

priorities that we have in this area’, that is, ‘our requirements under the convention, … border

protection commitments to the Australian community and … our foreign affairs obligations to keep

good and stable relationships with our neighbours’.353 It is here we see Australia attempt to balance

its bilateral relationship with its international obligations, as then Prime Minister John Howard notes,

‘you can be certain that [Australia] will continue to meet our international obligations, and that we'll

also, as we should, pay proper regard to the importance of the relationship between Australia and

Indonesia … I hope people understand just what we're dealing with. We're dealing here with the future

of the largest Islamic country in the world and a moderate Islamic leadership’.354

As a result of Australia’s acceptance of the West Papuan asylum claims, Indonesia recalled its

ambassador to Australia, Hamzah Thayeb, in March 2006. Thayeb was somewhat annoyed to have to

return to Jakarta, because his children had just joined him in Canberra from New York.355 He spent

three months in Jakarta before returning to Canberra. The media took a lot of interest in the story,

but Thayeb felt it was best to avoid the media out of fear that it could make matters worse – so he

stayed with his sister upon his return to Jakarta to avoid the frequent visits from journalists and to

‘cool [things] down’.356 While he was in Jakarta, he met with his colleagues in foreign affairs to

determine which programs with Australia they could continue and which to delay, including the

question of cooperation on people-smuggling.357 He also played a significant role in quelling the angst

from Indonesian parliamentarians towards Australia. Some parliamentarians wanted to go to

352 John Howard, “Transcript 22233: Interview with Liam Bartlett, 6PR, Perth” (Interview, Perth, April 18, 2006), https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-22233. 353 Senator Amanda Vanstone “Questions Without Notice: Asylum Seekers” (The Senate, June 13, 2006), 30, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansards/2006-06-13/0037/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 354 John Howard, John Howard and Peter Costello, “Transcript Joint Press Conference the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP and Treasurer Peter Costello: Taskforce on Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Business; Indonesia; Petrol Prices; Wind Farms,” April 7, 2006, http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2006/036.htm&pageID=&min=phc&Year=2006&DocType=2. 355 Hamzah Thayeb, Interview with Author, April 18, 2018. 356 Thayeb. 357 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 22; John Monfries, ed., “Introduction,” in Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 8; Thayeb, Interview with Author.

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Canberra to show their displeasure, but he stopped them because not only was the Australian

parliament in recess and therefore such a trip would be unfruitful, but he did not want them to

embarrass Indonesia, so he told them to wait until he was back in Canberra.358 He returned after three

months because it was a ‘sufficient’ amount of time for things to cool down – he recalls that Jakarta

made all the decisions, while Canberra was patient.359

For the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Bill Farmer, relations ‘went very cold’ over the

West Papuan asylum seekers.360 While relations were ‘on ice’ for about three months, he said, they

‘found a variety of ways to thaw things’, resulting in the Lombok Treaty on the Framework for Security

Cooperation which was signed in November of that year.361 Contributing to the defrosting, was

working to expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest, but also the diplomatic workmanship of

both foreign ministers, Hassan Wirajuda and Alexander Downer.362 At an international meeting,

Downer and Wirajuda had conversations in the corridors, where they agreed to engineer a meeting

between the two leaders of Australia and Indonesia, Howard and Yudhoyono, which happened in

Batam on the 26th of June, 2006.363 It is also important to note that the president of Indonesia,

Yudhoyono, was more internationally minded, and had a friendly disposition to Australia, especially

after Australia’s assistance in the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami.364

The Lombok Treaty, which was signed as a result, was an umbrella agreement under which a

whole range of agency by agency cooperation could be developed. It also contained treaty level

commitment not to encourage or support separatism, which was directly relevant to the Papua issue

and is ‘the nub of thing that we still rely on in terms of talking with the Indonesians in talking about

Papua’.365 It is another form of Australia’s recognition and reiteration of Indonesia’s sovereignty over

West Papua,366 though more formal than those expressed in the colonial period.

As previously mentioned, this incident involving the 43 West New Guineans asylum seekers

appears as an anomaly in the cooperation between Australia and Indonesia over New Guinea.

Neumann argues that it was exceptional in two respects: that Australia processed the claims of West

Papuans in the same way as claims by non-Papuans, and that it resorted to legislative measures to

solve the issue, where previously ‘the government had defused tensions with Indonesia over the West

358 Thayeb, Interview with Author. 359 Thayeb. 360 Bill Farmer, Interview with Author, December 2017. 361 Farmer. 362 Farmer. 363 Farmer. 364 Farmer. 365 Farmer. 366 Neumann and Taylor, “Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan Refugees, 1962-2009,” 8.

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Papuan refugee issue through diplomatic channels rather than by responding so obviously to publicly

articulated Indonesian anger’.367 It is also different in that Australia seemingly responded to the boat

arrivals in line with the principles of the international refugee regime before it considered its strategic

and security interest with Indonesia. As Neumann and Taylor note, however, given the relationship

had managed to recover from the East Timor crisis, it ‘was unlikely to be destroyed by a boatload of

asylum seekers’,368 and therefore such attempted legislative measures and appeasement may not

have been necessary. Yet these attempts at trust-building signals its motivations to the Indonesian

government and a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour. The issue was resolved in the same method

Australia had always used with Indonesia over this issue: ‘close liaison with the Indonesian

government, physical policing of Australia’s borders and … expression of unequivocal support for

Indonesian territorial integrity’.369 Besides the 2006 affair, this had been a consistent and continuous

method of cooperation. It is clear that over irregular migration from Indonesian Papua, Australia is

motivated to appease Indonesia, operating on the principles of friendship, security and reputation.

Given this continuity, as Neumann and Taylor argue, ‘the dictates of foreign policy do not need to

shape Australian refugee policy [but] will depend to a greater extent on the domestic political

climate’.370

Conclusion This chapter tells the story of how Australia shaped its response to border crossers on New

Guinea in order to build Indonesia’s trust. It is about the resilience of trusting relationships in the

context of so much mistrust. This is not to say that there is or is not trust, but the building, absence

and presence of trust across many different levels of government plays a role in the cooperation

between Australia and Indonesia.

This story reveals the importance of Australia’s perceptions of its national interest in

formulating its response to border crossers, where that national interest is strong relationship with its

neighbour, Indonesia, balanced with its own reputation and domestic opinion. In building a strong

relationship with Indonesia, Australia demonstrated a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour by

returning many border crossers to West Irian, placing special conditions on those granted permissive

residence, avoiding international attention and media by managing instead though strictly bilateral

channels, and used its diplomats to reiterate Australia’s support of Indonesia’s sovereignty and engage

in open but confidential dialogue.

367 Neumann and Taylor, 23. 368 Neumann and Taylor, 25. 369 Neumann and Taylor, 24. 370 Neumann and Taylor, 27.

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Such actions were to build Indonesia’s trust in Australia’s motives in New Guinea and in the

relationship. Australia kept these solutions out of the domestic and international eye in order to make

these solutions possible. At the time Australia was a party to the Refugee Convention and not the

Protocol, which meant it only had obligations to those fleeing events occurring in Europe prior to

January 1951. However, with the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ considered customary law, Australia

did have an obligation to not return anyone who may face harm upon their return. While the UNHCR

was aware of the problems surrounding the border in New Guinea, including potential instances of

refoulement, it maintained secrecy for the preservation of Australia’s strategy and security. In practice,

therefore, Australia applied its own determination procedures and returned many West Irianese, to

the concern of the UNHCR.

It was in both Indonesia and Australia’s interest that this issue be managed in the bilateral

space, which, as we will see, is in contrast to the next two cases where management of irregular

migration benefited from the move out of the bilateral into the regional and multilateral space. But

this chapter also revealed that while it was managed in the bilateral space, this, at least initially, was

largely limited to the central governments. These strong relations at the elite level were not

necessarily translated to the remote parts of West Irian and the officials operating in those areas, for

example, when Indonesian patrols pushed back an Australian survey team at gunpoint, despite having

agreements from Djakarta to be carrying out works.

This chapter showed how Australia’s support for Indonesia’s independence helped to build

strong foundations which helped the relationship survive the turbulence of the 1950s and 1960s. But

it is important to note the role of certain individuals in building and these foundations, such as those

carried out by Burton, Critchley, Ball and Kirby, as well as those who maintained the relationship

despite the turbulence, such as Barwick and Shann, but also on the Indonesian side from president

Sukarno and his vice-president Mohammad Hatta and the prime minister Sutan Syahrir. Tensions still

existed as Australia supported the Dutch in West Irian and Malaysia in konfrontasi, and later when

Australia granted asylum to the West Papuans. Australia sought to ease these tensions and build trust

in the relationship through its response to border crossers, and its unsuccessful legislative response

to the West Papuans. But as this chapter shows, with certain individuals who value the Australia-

Indonesia relationship, there is a resilience in the context of mistrust.

The importance of individuals is also obvious in the cases of the last few decades, where the

Indonesian ambassador, Hamzah Thayeb, worked to minimise the damage to the relationship after

Australia accepted the 43 West Papuans in 2006 by avoiding journalists and quelling the angry

response from parliamentarians. The relationship’s recovery also rested on the two foreign ministers,

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Wirajuda and Downer, meeting in the corridor to plan the thaw in relations, as well as Yudhoyono’s

friendly disposition towards Australia.

Through building trust motivated by mutual interest to maintain a strong relationship over

the border, Australia and Indonesia were able to survive relationship turbulence and issues that were

a serious threat. Indeed, quelling border issues was in the interest of both countries to avoid

international scrutiny and escalating security threats. But there were also many reasons for the two

countries not to cooperate out of suspicion, and there were issues that could have otherwise caused

a breakdown in relations, such as issues around hot pursuit and the shooting at an Australian officer

by Indonesian patrols. Such breakdown did not eventuate due to both countries desire to build and

maintain trust.

What was key in gaining Indonesia’s cooperation as opposed to its resistance is the role of

certain individuals and their strategic outlook and their relationships. Evidence of trust-building can

be found in these relationships based on Simon and Simon’s indicators of trust. First, there was

frequent communication, at the elite level, which was then augmented by communication on the

ground between border officers on both sides. Second, there is evidence of task coordination in

relation to border surveys and in communicating the amnesty. Third, there was attempts to

demonstrate benevolence and a lack of opportunistic seeking behaviour when Australian diplomats

worked hard to convince Indonesian counterparts that they harboured no ulterior motives for West

Irian and assisted in moving dissidents away from the border. Fourth, there were shared interests in

maintaining confidentiality and keeping incidents to a minimum.

And this chapter has found that neither Australia nor Indonesia particularly saw the protection

of asylum seekers and refugees as part of their interest. For Australia, it did so as far as it could be

seen to be fulfilling its image as a ‘good international citizen’ so that it would not need to take in more

and damage its relationship with Indonesia and thereby its own security. Whatever their interests –

protecting asylum seekers was not the primary.

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4. 1976-1979: The Indochinese Crisis

A political counsellor in the Australian embassy in Jakarta in the 1970s, Geoffrey C. Allen was

a ‘nice fellow’ and a good tennis player.1 He was busy at work during the Indochinese crisis, trying to

persuade Indonesia to hold boat loads of refugees before they sailed onwards to Australia. ‘The

Indonesians remain wary of our intentions in respect to the Indochinese refugees seeking to reach

Australia by boat, and hitherto have not rpt [sic] not been helpful’, he wrote to Canberra in September

1977, ‘there remains a residual feeling that we will still seek to prevent some of these refugees

travelling to Australia and that Indonesia will be left with the problem of resettling them’.2 Allen

repeatedly assured his Indonesian counterparts that Australia only sought ‘to ensure that groups of

refugees do not arrive in isolated and inhospitable parts of Australia where adequate assistance was

not always available’.3 Nevertheless, as one of the embassy’s regular contacts on the Indonesian side

disclosed: ‘the Indonesian authorities were not convinced that they could trust completely Australian

assurances. They were quite determined that Indonesia would not accept any of the refugees and did

not want to find themselves in a position where Australia took the cream and left them with the

[unacceptable] refugees’.4 Despite these concerns, in 1979 Indonesia offered the international

community the use of its Galang Island as a refugee processing centre for up to 10,000 refugees at a

time for no longer than 3-5 years.5 In the end, the centre remained opened, and for much of the time

hosted refugees beyond its capacity, for a total of 17 years, which effectively stopped boats arriving

on Australia’s shores for almost a decade.

Indeed the region was overwhelmed with boat arrivals. It was the turmoil and unrest that

followed the fall of Indochina to communism in 1975 that caused this mass exodus; more than 3

million people fled between 1975 and 1995, many of them on boats. The majority fled to neighbouring

countries including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines. Just over

2,000 refugees made it to Australia on boats and became known as Australia’s first ‘boat people’.6

1 Hogue, Interview with Author. 2 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees (a),” September 5, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 3 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Refugee Boats,” July 18, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 4 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Refugee Boats,” May 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 5 Antje Missbach, Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015), 32–33. 6 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first recorded boat of refugees was a group of 67 Javanese families who were unable to reach Java due to Japanese attack and later arrived in Fremantle in April 1942.

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Compared to the rest of the region these were relatively small numbers, especially for a ‘huge and

wealthy country’ like Australia.7 Australia was traditionally a resettlement country, but for the first

time the Australian mainland found itself as a country of first asylum for large numbers of refugees;

rather than selecting refugees for resettlement from distant refugee camps, refugees were arriving

on Australian shores. This called into question the Australian government’s ability to manage its

borders and control immigration. In fact, Australia only had an ad hoc approach to refugees until its

first refugee policy was articulated in 1977.

As a result, the Australian government took a number of steps to prevent these boat arrivals,

including issuing public statements to warn refugees of the ‘hazardous boat journey’ and resettling

refugees from camps in the region to allay their need to take such a risk. It is the latter policy that has

been lauded as evidence of Australia’s proud humanitarian tradition, often in contrast to Australia’s

policies today. But as this chapter will show, such polices were motivated by the desire to stop boats

and exercise control over who was eventually resettled in Australia. In addition to these policies,

Australia sought help from countries in the region, such as Indonesia, a country through which many

refugees transited before embarking upon the final leg of their journey to Australia. Thus Australia

sought Indonesia’s assistance in preventing these boats continuing their journey. But it was

Indonesian policy to facilitate their movement so as not to be landed with refugees for an extended

amount of time. It is thus surprising that Indonesia should agree to hold boats of refugees that could

otherwise sail out of its territory and on to Australia.

This is the first example of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in relation to refugees travelling

to Australia via Indonesia, and is Australia’s first attempt to coax Indonesia’s cooperation to help ‘stop

the boats’. While much has been written about the Indochinese refugee crisis and the actions of the

international community in response8, there has yet to be any study of the cooperation, or lack

7 Vincent Stove, “Boat People Embarrass Australia,” The Straits Times, April 11, 1978. 8 Court Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus & the International Response (Zed Books, 1998); W. Courtland Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck,” Journal of Refugee Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 319–33, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/17.3.319; Nancy Viviani, The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Melbourne University Press, 1984); Barry Stein, “The Geneva Conferences and the Indochinese Refugee Crisis,” The International Migration Review 13, no. 4 (1979): 716–23, https://doi.org/10.2307/2545184; Valerie O’Connor Sutter, The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ Pr, 1990); Alexander Betts, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (1988-1996),” in Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime (Cornell University Press, 2011), 112–42; Penelope Mathew and Tristan Harley, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees,” in Refugees, Regionalism and Responsibility (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 143–61; Pierre‐Michel Fontaine, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) on Indo‐Chinese Refugees: Prospects for the Post‐CPA and Implications for a Regional Approach to Refugee Problems.,” Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 7, no. 2 (January 1, 1995): 39–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781159508412801; Davies, Legitimising Rejection.

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thereof, between Australia and Indonesia during this period, despite multiple references to its

occurrence.9 In fact, one sentence in Nancy Viviani’s seminal study, The Long Journey: Vietnamese

Migration and Settlement in Australia, referred to such cooperation. It was then cited in every other

text which mentioned such cooperation, with no further evidence. It was due to an insatiable curiosity

to fill this exact gap that this thesis was conceived.

This chapter intends to fill this gap by asking how Australia and Indonesia cooperated in

managing the boats of Indochinese refugees, especially given Indonesia did not want the ‘burden’ and

Australia was perceived to be a large wealthy nation with plenty of room? This question drove my

investigations of the files of Australia’s embassy in Jakarta, which I triangulated with public statements

and the parliamentary record, as well as interviews with key (available) players in Australia and

Indonesia. This chapter uses these sources to analytically elaborate on the factors shaping cooperation

– and its lack thereof – from 1976, when the first boat arrived in Australia, until 1979, when the Galang

refugee processing centre was opened in Indonesia. In doing so, it reveals the concerns among the

Australian diplomats on the ground and the Indonesian officials with whom they corresponded.

Unlike the previous chapter, I argue that meaningful coopeartion between Australia and

Indonesia only began once it was internationalised, that is, it became multilateral rather than bilateral

cooperation. This story reveals the importance of bureaucratic cohesion, diplomatic persistence,

policy concessions, and moving problematic issues out of a bilateral space and into the multilateral. It

shows that while some individuals within certain departments may wish to cooperate, cooperation

may not occur unless those individuals have the power and ability to convince more of the

government.

Australia attempted to build Indonesia’s trust to achieve cooperation by demonstrating a lack

of opportunistic behaviour, that is, by making concessions in its policy that it was previously unwilling

to make and providing this in writing to assure Indonesia it will not take advantage if it held the boats.

Australian officials in Jakarta not only worked to build Indonesian officials’ trust, but also that of the

policy makers in Canberra – who did not initially want to make the concessions required to build

Indonesia’s trust. In the end, Australia was unable to build Indonesia’s trust alone, so it hedged its

efforts with other resettlement countries. Eventually Australia was able internationalise the problem,

and through an international effort involving the UNHCR, Indonesia was sufficiently assured that it

would not be left with the ‘burden’ of refugees. As a result of this assurance – and other factors which

9 Viviani, The Long Journey, 83; Katrina Stats, “Welcome to Australia? A Reappraisal of the Fraser Government’s Approach to Refugees, 1975–83,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 78–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.952707; Jack Smit H., “Malcolm Fraser’s Response to ‘commercial’ Refugee Voyages,” Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2 (2010): 89.

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I will explain – Indonesia opened a refugee processing centre on its Galang Island to host refugees

before they are resettled. This shows, similar to the next chapter on the Bali Process, how cooperation

on irregular migration is sometimes more easily facilitated once the issue is moved out of the bilateral

space and into the regional or multilateral.

This chapter will first briefly outline the Indochinese crisis and Australia’s early and

unsuccessful attempts at seeking Indonesia’s cooperation, followed by the domestic context in

Australia which was putting pressure on the Australian embassy to achieve Indonesia’s cooperation.

It then describes a test case for cooperation as an effort in trust-building, but with repeated failures

in achieving Indonesia’s cooperation, Australia sought to ‘internationalise’ the problem. This was first

attempted through the US but did not come to fruition after the US could not commit to resettlement

places from Indonesia. Eventually, Australian and Indonesian officials signed agreement on boat-

holding but was again unsuccessful due to persistent disagreements elsewhere in the bureaucracy.

This chapter then outlines how Indonesia’s ultimate lack of trust in Australia’s assurances and a lack

of value for the relationship as a whole prevented cooperation succeeding, resulting in Australia’s

further attempts at internationalisation, this time hedging its efforts with other resettlement

countries to reassure Indonesia that it would not be left with the burden. Finally, this chapter

highlights the other factors at play in Indonesia’s decision to open Galang Island.

The Indochinese Crisis: the ‘First Wave’ of Boats The fall of Saigon triggered an outflow of boats that began to arrive in Indonesia and Australia,

prompting Australia to take action and seek Indonesia’s cooperation. In 1975 the Indochinese

peninsula fell like ‘dominoes’ to communism. Phnom Penh was captured by the Khmer Rouge on the

17th of April, just before Saigon fell to the Viet Cong on the 30th of April, 1975. In August the Pathet

Lao had entered Vientiane in Laos and had established a firm hold by the end of the year. About 7,000

refugees were airlifted out of Vietnam by the US and its allies before May of 1975; those left behind

made their own journeys out of Vietnam, many by boat. By June 1975 there were 167,307 refugees

across Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and

Thailand.10

The Australian Government was aware that many refugees had begun leaving Vietnam on

boats and was keen to prevent them arriving in Australia. In early May of 1975 there were reports of

25 boats carrying 3,710 Vietnamese refugees anchored off Singapore, and around 1,000 of these

10 K.H. Rogers, “Vietnamese Refugees - Policy, Submission for Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,” June 12, 1975, 6, A1838, 1634/70/2 part 5, National Archives of Australia.

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refugees wanted to settle in Australia.11 A cablegram sent on the 5th of May 1975 from Canberra to

Australia’s post in Singapore revealed the government’s concern for a potential influx of small

unseaworthy vessels sailing from Singapore to Australia, and stated that it would ‘do whatever we can

to prevent this’. ‘The persons on board the vessels must be therefore be told’ Canberra advised, ‘that

unless they hold authority to enter Australia they will not be permitted to land here’.12 Canberra also

noted that ‘If any of the vessels tried to sail to Australia they would have to pass through Indonesian

waters. We think that the Indonesians would not allow them to proceed unless Indonesia had an

assurance that Australia would permit the persons travelling on the vessels to enter Australia’.13 But

as it turned out, this confidence in Indonesia’s willingness to prevent onward travel was misplaced.

The Indonesian government would, for humanitarian reasons, let them travel onwards. It

would ‘provide assistance for the transit of refugees to other destinations as desired by the refugees

themselves’, according to an Indonesian press statement.14 But it was ‘in principle … against receiving

any outsiders’.15 For Indonesia, the responsibility for the Indochinese refugees rest with the United

States, as it was their intervention that caused the exodus.16 The first17 (reported) boat of Vietnamese

refugees arrived in Indonesia on the 19th of May, 1975, calling in to Tarempa on Sintan Island on their

way to Singapore.18 And the first reported boat to stay in Indonesia arrived on the 25th of May 1975

on Laut Island in the north of the Natuna Islands, in a tragic state.19 From then on ‘wave after wave’

11 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al., “Vietnamese Refugees,” May 5, 1975, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 12 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al. 13 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al. 14 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” May 13, 1976, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 15 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Canberra. 16 Ismayawati, 2013, cited in Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 31. 17 The first direct approach to Australia made by the Indonesian government regarding the resettlement of refugees was in relation to Lam Ly Hung and his family, who arrived in Indonesia with his wife and 7 children and were mistaken for ‘Chinese infiltrators’. Upon interview by Indonesian intelligence officers, hr revealed his family’s desire to resettle in Australia. General Moerdani of HANKAM (Ministry of Defence and Security) asked the Australian ambassador, Richard Woolcott, to consider his request sympathetically as the Indonesian Government would not like to see the family returned to Vietnam. The boat, however, was already at sea. Australia indicated that if they arrived in Australia, the family would be accepted. see: Richard Woolcott to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees: Lam Ly Hung and Family,” April 11, 1975, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia; Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Vietnamese Refugees: Lam Ly Hung and Family,” April 18, 1975, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 18 Moh Fandik, “Penampungan Orang Vietnam Di Pulau Galang 1975-1979,” Avatara 1, no. 1 (January 28, 2013): 166. 19 Fandik, 166.

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of refugees arrived,20 and by the 28th of May, 1975, there were several hundred Vietnamese refugees

in Indonesia.21

It was not until the 28th of April 1976, almost one year after boats began arriving in Indonesia,

that Australia received its first boat of Indochinese refugees. The boat and its five passengers arrived

in Darwin after being denied entry to other countries in the region. In comparison to boat arrivals in

later years, it went by almost unnoticed and did not cause public alarm despite its unannounced and

unauthorised arrival.22

Over the next five years, 2,059 people arrived on Australian shores in boats.23 In response, the

Australian government took steps in deterring boat arrivals, including issuing public statements to

warn potential arrivals, in language that would be reprised years later. On the 10th of June 1977,

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Michael Mackellar, made a public warning to those

considering traveling onwards to Australia by boat, highlighting the risks involved in undertaking a

‘long and hazardous journey’, and that those arriving in Australia may land on a remote part of

Australia where food, water and assistance may not be available and even so, may only be permitted

to stay temporarily, not permanently.24 Mackellar stressed that he issued these warnings because he

was concerned for the safety of refugees. He emphasised that ‘Australia is and always has been,

prepared to play its part in the resettlement of refugees’, but that priority will be given to family

reunion and depend on Australia’s capacity to absorb people.25 This press statement was circulated

to posts in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines to draw attention to the

‘general concern within the Australian government at the very real possibility of loss of life among

people who attempt to reach Australia in small boats’, and to encourage authorities to advise anyone

against making such a journey.26 These statements were framed to convey Australia’s humanitarian

concerns for the potential loss of life at sea, as well as its reputation as a good global citizen ‘prepared

to play its part’. At the same time, these concerns and responsibilities were carefully balanced with its

domestic interests and ‘capacity’.

20 Fandik, 167. 21 C. Mace, “Numbers of Persons from Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos as of 28 May 1975,” May 28, 1975, A1838, 1634/70/2 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 22 Viviani, The Long Journey, 68. 23 Betts, “Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia,” 34. 24 Michael MacKellar, “Press Release from Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs: Warning to Boat Refugees,” June 10, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 25 MacKellar. 26 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al., “Indochinese Refugees,” June 16, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia.

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The Australian government announced its first refugee policy on the 24th of May 1977. This

policy attempted to strike a balance in an issue-area vulnerable to a collision between Australia’s

domestic public opinion and its foreign policy interests. For example, in his speech announcing this

policy, Minister Mackellar acknowledged Australia’s legal and moral responsibilities in dealing with

the problem of refugees:

As a matter of humanity, and in accord with international obligations freely

entered into, Australia has accepted a responsibility to contribute toward the

solution of world refugee problems. To this end: it has ratified the Convention on

the Status of Refugees; it is a member of the Executive Committee of the United

Nations High Commission for Refugees and contributes to the resettlement funds

of the UNHCR; it recognises the need through its immigration policy to fulfil the

legal obligations required by the Convention and to develop special humanitarian

programs for the resettlement of the displaced and/or the persecuted.27

He outlined that four principles upon which the government’s approach to refugees rests. These

principles are first, that ‘Australia fully recognises its humanitarian commitment and responsibility to

admit refugees for resettlement’; second, ‘the decision to accept refugees must always remain with

the Government’; third, special assistance will often need to be provided for refugees and their

resettlement, and; fourth, it may not be in the interest of some refugees to settle in Australia but

elsewhere, and the government annually contributes to the UNHCR which is responsible for such

resettlement.28 Although highlighting Australia’s membership to international conventions, what the

policy did not specify was a strict interpretation of the definition of refugee. It did not refer to the

Refugee Convention’s definition but rather recognised that situations and needs differ, and that this

‘will enable [Australia] to respond to the needs of those who are displaced, without the constraint of

technical definition’.29 This basically allowed the government to use loose or strict interpretations of

the refugee definition depending on what suited at the time.

In accordance with the principle of government control over accepting refugees, and to deter

future boat arrivals, the government sent an immigration team to camps in the region to process

refugees for resettlement in 1977. Prime Minister Malcom Fraser said that ‘with proper processing’

there would be no need for refugees to take the hazardous voyage.30 Thus it was intended that

successful applicants would be moved within a month, allaying their need to take the hazardous

27 Michael MacKellar, “Speech: Refugee Policy and Mechanisms” (The House of Representatives, May 24, 1977), http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1977-05-24/0126/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 28 MacKellar. 29 MacKellar. 30 “Chief Secretary Wants Boat People Stopped NT Head Calls for Navy,” The Canberra Times, November 26, 1977.

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voyage in search of settlement.31 This, in addition to seeking cooperation with other countries in the

region to hold boats, was designed to prevent the onward movement of boats. Indonesia was the

often the last port of call on a boat’s journey to Australia, and as such, Australia sought Indonesia’s

help in managing and preventing these journeys. The remainder of this chapter will, for the first time,

shed light on this bilateral ‘cooperation’ during the Indochinese crisis.

Seeking Indonesia’s Cooperation Australia’s early attempts at achieving cooperation came in the form of requests that

Indonesian departments share information on the boats transiting Indonesia’s waters. The embassy

in Jakarta was under pressure from other departments in Canberra to achieve agreement on

information-sharing, especially as the federal election neared, but Canberra misread Indonesia’s

willingness to cooperate. The Indonesians did not trust Australia’s intentions in requesting such

information, yet Canberra – ignoring the advice of its embassy officials – refused to make the

appropriate concessions to build Indonesia’s trust.

Australia first requested that Indonesia share information on the boats in its waters that

planned on going to Australia through a number of channels in 1977. Australian officials approached

the foreign ministry (DEPLU), State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) which chaired an inter-

departmental committee on the refugee problem, Ministry of Defence and Security (HANKAM) and

the police.32 The Australian Embassy in Jakarta wrote to DEPLU asking to be informed of any ‘further

landings of South Vietnamese refugees [who] may be planning on going to Australia’,33 and the

Australian Ambassador at the time, Richard (Dick) Woolcott brought it up with the Governor of Nusa

Tenggara Timur, El Tari, during his visit there in June. El Tari mentioned that two Vietnamese fishing

boats had visited two days prior with about 30 people on board, intending to go to Australia.34

Woolcott told El Tari that this information was useful and often failed to reach him in Jakarta, and El

Tari agreed to pass on information about reports of Vietnamese refugees passing through his area,

though I found no further evidence of such information-sharing from El Tari.35 The embassy also, in

line with Mackellar’s advice cabled in June, requested that Indonesian authorities ‘advise refugees of

31 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al., “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” 24 November 19778, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 32 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees (a),” September 5, 1977; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” August 16, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 33 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 1053,” July 13, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia; Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 822/77,” June 8, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 34 Richard Woolcott to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” June 23, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia. 35 Woolcott to Canberra.

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the dangers involved in such a hazardous journey and in discouraging such people from attempting

it’.36

Such information was also requested by other departments within the Australian government.

The Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation of the Department of Defence, R.N. Hamilton,

complained to the Department of Immigration about that lack of precise and reliable information on

the surveillance of boats, and suggested the Australian Embassy in Jakarta seek the assistance of the

Indonesian government in this area: ‘It might be put to the Indonesians’, Hamilton suggested, ‘that

we are seeking their assistance inter alia on humanitarian grounds’.37 The embassy staff, however,

knew that Indonesia could not be easily fooled – on the letter, Hamilton’s suggestions were

highlighted and accompanied by the handwritten retort: ‘he’s been out of the real world for a long

time!’ and ‘I do not think we need “reminding”’.38

One particular individual in the embassy, Geoff Allen, understood that such requests may not

be accepted by the Indonesians, as they believed that Australia may use the information to prevent

refugees from entering Australian waters, thus creating problems for Indonesia.39 Allen therefore

suggested that Canberra could mitigate Indonesia’s concerns by assuring them that Australia does not

intend to prevent entry to refugee boats, but ‘only to ensure that groups of refugees do not arrive in

isolated and inhospitable parts of Australia where adequate assistance was not always available’.40 He

realised that the Indonesians may take advantage of this assurance and encourage refugees to leave

for Australia, but he believed that Indonesian officials were doing this anyway, so, he wrote to

Canberra: ‘it seems we have little to lose, especially if we can obtain meaningful co-operation from

this end’.41 Making this assurance would demonstrate to Indonesia that Australia is not engaging in

opportunity seeking behaviour – an attempt to build Indonesia’s trust in Australia’s intentions.

Canberra did not heed this advice and was unwilling to make a concession in its policy by

assuring Indonesia. While Canberra agreed with Allen that such an assurance would likely facilitate

Indonesia’s information exchange, it ‘would be tantamount to saying we will unconditionally accept

refugees in Australia’, which might open the way for Indonesia to pass on refugees and require

36 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 1053,” July 13, 1977. 37 R.N. Hamilton to R. Fernandez, “South-East Asian Refugees,” July 14, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 38 Hamilton to Fernandez; R.N. Hamilton to R. Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” July 18, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 39 Allen to Canberra, “Refugee Boats,” July 18, 1977. 40 Allen to Canberra. 41 Allen to Canberra.

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Australia to ‘forego our selection procedures’.42 Canberra’s advice to the Embassy was to ‘sidestep the

question of assurances to refugees on being able to stay in Australia, if indeed it is raised’ and instead

stress that Australia is ‘concerned about dangers of extended voyages in unseaworthy vessels and also

the hazards to refugees landing on stretches of coastline where they may not be able to obtain very

quickly the sort of assistance they might need’.43 Therefore, while humanitarian concerns were

presented to Indonesia as the primary reasons for Australia’s request, the control and management

of Australia’s border proved to be the primary reason behind Australia’s approach, and this underlying

motive stopped Australia from providing Indonesia with an assurance that information would not be

used to turn boats around. As a result, Indonesia held steadfast to its official policy to prevent refugees

from settling in Indonesia.44

Another major problem in obtaining Indonesia’s cooperation was the lack of coordination

between Indonesia’s own bureaucracies. For example, Commodore Soedarsono, the Director of the

Indonesian Directorate of Asia and Pacific Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs, told Allen

that there should be no difficulty in supplying Australia with the information that he had requested45,

however, he also indicated that ‘Indonesians did not know themselves of some of these boats until

they landed at Indonesian ports prior to departing for Australia’.46 As Indonesia is an archipelago made

up of more than 17,000 islands it is likely that this statement is correct, however, it would also provide

the Indonesians with an excuse should they be unwilling to pass information on to Australia. Allen was

frequently assured that his requests would be passed on to the relevant bodies within the Indonesian

bureaucracy. But Allen, in a cablegram to Canberra on the 16th of August 1977, indicated that he was

not sure that these assurances ‘will be any more fruitful than previous ones we have sought and

obtained’.47 Australia needed to build Indonesia’s trust that it would not engage in opportunistic

behaviour, and it would have this opportunity when a boat of refugees arrived in Merak.

Australia makes an offer easily refused: Refugees in Merak To gain Indonesia’s cooperation, Australia needed to demonstrate that it would not engage in

opportunistic behaviour in order to show Indonesia that it would not to damage Indonesia’s interests.

42 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Refugee Boats,” August 8, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 43 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 44 Author Unknown Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Record of Conversation with Col. Soenarso,” August 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 45 The information requested included: the course each boat intends to follow after leaving Indonesian waters, and the number of people on board and their age, sex, family composition and general state of health. See: Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Information Required,” August 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 46 G.C. Allen, “Record of Conversation Allen/Soedarsono,” August 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 47 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” August 16, 1977.

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When it had the chance to do so, Indonesia was unconvinced. This opportunity arose when the

embassy heard, on the 22nd of August 1977, that a boat had arrived for provisions in Merak on Java’s

north-western coast, but its passengers had been arrested due to their lack of passports.48 Major Putu

from BAKIN said they were not arrested in the formal sense but had their movement restricted and,

after a short stay, they would continue their journey to Darwin. He said that the Indonesians would

continue their usual practice of supplying fuel, provisions and water, but he could not say when the

boat would depart49, indicating that Indonesia would not comply with Australia’s requests for

information sharing.

Indonesia’s unwillingness to cooperate prompted Canberra to make an offer that it believed

Indonesian authorities would ‘no doubt’ accept.50 Canberra offered that if those who had arrived in

Merak ‘travel to Jakarta and apply for entry to Australia, are confirmed to be refugees and are not

obviously medical rejects, they may be accepted’. There was ‘no doubt’, according to the cable from

the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, that ‘the Indonesian authorities will cooperate for

this purpose’.51 The cable also instructed the embassy to warn the Indonesians that this ‘exercise is

not to be regarded as a precedent and should proceed without publicity’, with a follow-up cable from

Canberra to reiterate the wish to avoid ‘misleading impressions that such journies [sic] can be safely

accomplished and that those who arrive in Australia will be accepted’.52 Canberra’s confidence in

Indonesia’s willingness to cooperate was misguided – the Indonesian authorities told the embassy

that the Merak refugees had left for Australia some six or seven days after the boat had actually

departed.53

While Australia’s confidence in Indonesia’s willingness to help was misplaced, there was one

Indonesian officer who was sympathetic to Australia’s proposal. Colonel Soenarso was the Liaison

Officer with BAKIN, which was a member of the inter-departmental committee on the problem of

refugees, consisting of Foreign Affairs, HANKAM, Immigration and Social Affairs (the Jakarta

Committee). He had developed a good relationship with the embassy staff and was generally

sympathetic towards Australia’s position. On the 3rd of September, 1977, he explained Indonesia’s

48 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” August 22, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 49 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” August 23, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 50 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” August 25, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 51 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 52 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta; Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” August 30, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 53 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees (b),” September 5, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia.

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concerns and told Allen that if the Merak offer had been accepted, it would be preferable that

Australian authorities interview the refugees wherever they are located, instead of having them travel

to Jakarta. He also tested Australia’s intentions, by questioning the outcome of such an activity if the

refugees were ‘obviously medical rejects’, which hinted at Indonesia’s concerns about having

undesirable refugees left on its shores.54 Earlier that morning, the Jakarta Committee devised a new

approach to the arrival of refugee boats. Previously, the coastguard reprovisioned boats and sent

them on their way, but according to the new approach, the coastguard was to contact the Jakarta

Committee immediately, should the refugees indicate their intention to travel to Australia.55 The

Jakarta Committee would then contact the embassy, while the coastguard held the boat awaiting

further advice. If the Merak refugees were to call into another Indonesian port before arriving in

Australia, Indonesia would treat them ‘in accordance with the new Indonesian policy on refugees’.56

Despite the new policy, mistrust remained. The Australian Defence Attaché at the embassy in

Jakarta, Colonel Drabsch, questioned whether this new procedure would be a ‘breakthrough’ or a

‘run-around’.57 The answer to this concern would be revealed once the Merak refugees reached

Australia. The embassy suggested that officials in Australia interrogate the arrivals from Merak on

which Indonesian ports they called into and on which dates, as such information ‘would be invaluable

… to test Indonesian sincerity’.58 They arrived in Australia on the 21st of September, and another boat,

the Kien Gang, arrived on the 13th of September. The interrogation revealed that not only had the

boats arrived in Indonesian ports a number of times, they had been given food, fuel, and a map with

bearings to Australia.59 It seems that Australia had been given the run-around; these boats had indeed

departed Indonesia after Indonesia developed new policy to pass on such information via the Jakarta

Committee. Australia could not rely on Indonesian officials’ assurances, because the Indonesian

54 Allen to Canberra. 55 Allen to Canberra. 56 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 5, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia; Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Record of Conversation with Col. Soenarso.” 57 D.A. Drabsch to Defence Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 6, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 58 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 27, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 59 The Kein Giang had stopped on the 17th of August at Bangka Island and received 600 litres of fuel from Indonesian police. On the 21st it arrived in Jakarta and received 1,000 litres of fuel from Indonesian police and, leaving again on the 3rd of September, it was given a further 2,700 litres in Surabaya by the Indonesian Navy. It stopped again at Sumba Island on the 7th of September before arriving in Yampi Sound, Western Australia on the 12th of September. The Merak refugees were given fuel, oil, food and a map to sail to Australia in Merak. It left on the 26th of August and, after hitting a reef, was taken to Bali on the 3rd of September where it remained for 5 days, during which time the Australian Red Cross provided food, fuel and medicine. See: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 30, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia.

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officials did not trust the Australian assurances – and while some Indonesian officials may have been

more open to cooperation, they could not convince enough of their colleagues.

Bureaucracies: No Unity, No Assurances One problem hindering the building of trusted assurances was bureaucratic problems on both

sides. While Australia could get agreement from Colonel Soenarso, this was not reflective of wider

agreement within the Indonesian bureaucracy. Furthermore, the Australian embassy in Jakarta could

not convince Canberra to make the assurances that the Indonesians were requesting in order to build

this trust.

It is unclear whether the ‘run-around’ that Indonesia gave Australia with the Merak refugees

was intentional or simply bureaucratic incompetence. Soenarso had admitted that while ‘all area

commands had been asked to report details of refugee boats this information was slow to come in’.60

Furthermore, communication between the relevant departments in Jakarta was also lacking. In late

September 1977, the embassy staff spoke to the Foreign Ministry representative on the Jakarta

Committee, Aspoor. He was unaware of the new policy to inform the Australian embassy of boats

intending to travel to Australia. He said he would, however, inform them of any future arrivals.61 In

fact, he said there had been an arrival of 24 persons at Pontianak around three weeks prior, who were

repairing their vessel before departing for Australia.62 Both Aspoor and Soenarso, possibly testing

Australia’s intentions, had questioned whether Australia would be prepared to accept these people.

The Australian officials had replied that the matter would be referred to Canberra and that it was ‘low

priority’, given they were resettling from other countries in the region.63 The embassy officials,

however, knew that Australia needed to provide more formal assurances to secure Indonesia’s

cooperation, and advised Canberra that ‘a show of good faith at this stage could be quite

advantageous’.64

What would convince Indonesia to trust Australian assurances, embassy staff knew, was a

formal, written assurance that Australia would not prevent boat arrivals in Australian waters and leave

Indonesia with the burden of resettling them: ‘if we are to expect their complete co-operation we will

have to consider whether some sort of assurance that this will not rpt [sic] not happen if possible,’

60 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” October 24, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 61 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” September 30, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 62 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra. 63 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees (a),” September 5, 1977; Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” September 30, 1977. 64 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” September 30, 1977.

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Geoff Allen wrote to Canberra.65 Indonesian intelligence staff from HANKAM had asked for a formal

note outlining the actions Australia would be willing to carry out, and mentioned that there was a

similar arrangement with the US.66 Allen suggested that Canberra provide a similar undertaking, which

could ‘persuade the Indonesians of our genuine concern about the fate of the refugees and result in

more active co-operation’.67 ‘On the other hand’, Allen had anticipated Canberra’s concern, such ‘an

undertaking could raise expectations that we will take more refugees than our current policy

anticipates and, if we were to spell out our criteria, the Indonesians would be aware that few, if any,

boat refugees would be eligible for entry’.68 Furthermore, Allen foresaw that Indonesia may have

difficulty accepting Australia’s view that those already in Indonesia should be treated differently to

those on a boat who were heading for Australia – who would not need to meet such criteria.69

Again, Canberra would not provide such an assurance, and, despite positive responses from

certain Indonesian officials, namely Soenarso, the Indonesian government remained unconvinced. The

embassy staff questioned Soenarso on the continued lack of cooperation and on Aspoor’s ignorance

of Indonesia’s new policy. He admitted that some members of the Jakarta Committee were concerned

Australia would use the information to prevent refugees from entering Australian waters, thus

creating a problem for Indonesia. Allen reiterated Canberra’s line: ‘we could not give an assurance

that we would not prevent their onward movement because of the wider implications for our refugee

policy’, but he pointed out to Soenarso that all those who arrived were, in fact, accepted.70 This may

have been to emphasise Australia’s true humanitarian concerns, but would only give Indonesia further

reason to let the boats proceed to Australia where they would all be accepted.71 Allen knew that

without ‘firm assurances from either side’, he surmised, ‘[Australia] could not rely on Indonesian

support …any assistance [Indonesia gives] to us will only be given provided it does not put their policy

at risk’.72

65 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees (a),” September 5, 1977. 66 Allen to Canberra; The US did not have a formal agreement, but had an understanding with the government that the US would take as many refugees as possible who fell within their normal immigration criteria. See: G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 7, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 67 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 7, 1977. 68 Allen to Canberra. 69 Allen to Canberra. 70 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” October 7, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 71 Despite Indonesia’s lack of commitment, and Australia’s desperation to stop the boats, the Australians would not provide assurances and instead repeated all the ‘good work’ it has done resettling refugees from the region. 72 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” October 7, 1977.

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Indonesian interest in cooperation was, however, triggered by an Australian piece of

intelligence detailing boats leaving Southeast Asia, which highlights the benefit of linking the irregular

migration issue to other areas in the relationship. Geoff Allen noticed that BAKIN was interested in

the list that the embassy had provided, detailing boats leaving mainland Southeast Asia. Allen believed

that continuing to supply such information would encourage a positive response from the

Indonesians. ‘At worst’, Allen wrote, ‘it will enable us to talk to BAKIN more regularly on this subject

which will obviate the necessity for us to rely solely on the Indonesians to contact us’.73 Indeed a

pathway for regular communication was necessary to building trust between the two parties. In the

next chapter on the Bali Process we will also see how Indonesian interest in obtaining access to

Australia’s intelligence and expertise was one motivating factor for cooperation.

Another attempt to navigate Indonesia’s bureaucracy and build trust was to make

representations with individuals at higher levels in the government. Woolcott, Australia’s

Ambassador, met with General Moerdani, the head of the Indonesian Military’s Strategic Intelligence

Centre (Pusintelstrat), on the 26th of October, 1977. Woolcott told Moerdani that the present system

was ‘not working satisfactorily’, and despite being in regular contact with the foreign ministry, BAKIN,

the navy and HANKAM, Australia was not receiving the required information.74 Woolcott stressed that

the need for such information was based on humanitarian as well as practical reasons, such as

coordinating additional surveillance and quarantine concerns, but made no effort to reassure

Moerdani that Australia would not turn boats around or submit the formal note that Indonesian had

been requesting. Moerdani said he saw no reason why a more effective notification system could not

be worked out and assured Woolcott that he would look into the matter.75 The embassy staff relied

on Moerdani’s position within the Indonesian government to make this work, but little changed.

This was demonstrated by the arrival of two boats off the North-West coast of Australia on

the 28th of October. These boats had stopped in Jakarta on the 3rd of October where each received

100 gallons of fuel before stopping at a number of Indonesian ports on their way.76 On the morning

after the Embassy had received this information from Canberra, Major Putu (BAKIN) had called the

embassy to advise that these two very boats had departed Bali on the 15th of October. Geoff Allen

proceeded to read Major Putu the cable from Canberra, which detailed the boat’s itinerary and

73 Allen to Canberra. 74 Richard Woolcott, “Indochina Refugees,” October 27, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 75 Woolcott. 76 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Vietnamese Refugees,” November 1, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia.

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highlighted the fact that the boats had been in Jakarta on the 3rd of October.77 Major Putu apologised

and indicated that the information had only just reached him from HANKAM.78 Allen reminded him of

the conversation between Woolcott and Moerdani and requested that new procedures be devised

that would enable earlier notification.79 Yet similar instances continued to occur.80 An exasperated

Allen sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra about ‘the sort of

response (or lack of it)’ coming from the Indonesians. ‘Our last hope,’ he wrote, ‘rests with the

Ambassador’s discussion with General Moerdani … [but] it is, as yet, too early to conclude that this

approach will be more successful than others’.81 The fact that Indonesia made no improvement in its

policy indicates that this may have been more intentional than simply bureaucratic incompetence;

Indonesia was giving Australia the run-around.

A Looming Federal Election and the Arrival of the Song Be 12 As the federal election loomed, the Australian government became more eager to stop the

boats; the numbers of boats in the region were rising and there were reports that Southeast Asian

countries were pushing boats back out to sea. With concerns growing among the public, the Australian

government needed to balance its messaging between its foreign and domestic interests and

audiences, and to build both Indonesia’s and its own voters’ trust in the government’s border policies.

The tension felt in Australia between protecting its borders and maintaining a humanitarian

policy is best demonstrated by the reaction to the Song Be 12, a refrigerated prawning trawler. The

trawler had 181 persons on board and arrived in Darwin in late November of 1977 after the crew

‘overpowered’ the communist guards on board.82 Many in Australia had branded those on board as

‘pirates’ and demand they be returned amidst growing concerns of an organised ‘racket’ of boats.83

77 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” November 2, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 78 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” November 2, 1977. 79 Allen to Canberra. 80 G.C. Allen to The Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 8, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia; R. Hasanoeddin to D.A. Drabsch, “Pengungsi2 Vietnam Yang Menuku Australia,” November 4, 1977; D.A. Drabsch to Brig-Gen. Soeharto, “Letter to Vice Deputy HANKAM,” November 7, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia. 81 Allen to Department of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 8, 1977. 82 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Hanoi, Australian Embassy, Jakarta, and Australian High Commission, Singapore, “Vietnamese Refugee Boat - Song Be 12,” November 30, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 83 Frank Cranston, “No Plans to Turn Back Refugees,” The Canberra Times, November 30, 1977, 1; “Another Boat Arrives MacKellar Denies Refugee ‘Armada,’” The Canberra Times, November 28, 1977; Queensland Premier, Bjelke Petersen, claimed that there was clearly an organised refugee route from Vietnam to Australia, and that Vietnamese in Australia were providing information to others on how to get here. He said that this highlighted the openness of northern Australia and the need for increased air and sea patrols to detect ‘illegal shipping’. See: Radio Australia, “Radio Australia News Summary,” October 25, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 2, National Archives of Australia.

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These concerns called into question the ‘genuineness’ of the refugees and raised anxieties about the

security and quarantine implications of their arrival.84 An editorial in the Australian referred to the

recent boat arrivals as lacking ‘the lean and hungry look’ of the ‘hungry penniless ones who first arrived

a year ago’.85 Waterside workers in Darwin threatened to stop work for two hours every time a refugee

boat enters harbour.86 But according to one Immigration official, who was tasked with responding to

letters to the minister, Australian responses were generally mixed. There were three general

categories of mail received: those who thought Australia should take more, that it should take less,

and that it is taking the right amount but in the wrong way. The larger pile of letters, recalls the official

(who wished to remain anonymous) was those in the ‘take more’ pile.87

But there had been rumours that Australia may adopt a pushback policy, which alarmed the

governments of Australia’s neighbours. The transport minister, Peter Nixon, suggested that ‘If [the

refugees] leave the camps without going through Australian immigration checks, then their boats will

be sent back to where they came from’ and that a patrol boat base would be built in Darwin to give

effect to this decision.88 This prompted the UNHCR to enquire with the Australian government about

what, exactly, its policy was.89 The Federal President of the Labor Party, Bob Hawke, suggested that

those who did not meet Australia's policy and standards should be sent back: ‘Any sovereign country

has the right to determine how it will exercise its compassion and how it will have an accretion of

population’.90 The spokesperson for the federal opposition, Senator Mulvihill, also stated that Labor

would reverse the government’s ‘open door’ policy and stated that the government should ‘make an

example’ by sending a few unauthorised refugees back to where they came from.91 In a letter to the

Canberra Times, the Thai Ambassador retaliated, reminding Mulvihill that Thailand had ‘accepted the

84 Editorials called for a well thought-out policy, and to balance Australia’s special moral duty, by finding a response between ‘open-ended generosity’ and ‘letter of-the-law rigidity’. See: “Problems by the Boatload,” The Age, November 25, 1977; There were some calls for the government to allow an increase in the refugee intake, see: Frank Cranston, “Government May Set up Camp for Boat Refugees,” The Canberra Times, November 28, 1977; Others asked to keep the refugee issue in perspective, and not allow it to become an election issue given evidence points to these refugees being ‘genuine’. See: Canberra to Australian Embassy, Hanoi et al., “Vietnamese Refugees: Press Reports,” November 28, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 85 “Dangers in the Flood of Viet Refugees,” The Australian, November 25, 1977. 86 “Boat People ‘Need Humane Treatment,’” Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995), November 24, 1977. 87 Anonymous Australian Government Official, Interview with Author, September 2017. 88 “Disagreement on Refugee Policy,” The Canberra Times, December 8, 1977; “Fraser’s Tough Move to Halt Refugees,” The Straits Times, December 8, 1977. 89 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Department of Foreign Affairs Canberra, “Australia: Reception of Indochinese Boat Refugees,” December 7, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 90 Frank Cranston, “Largest Refugee Boat Nears Darwin,” The Canberra Times, November 29, 1977. 91 “Labor ‘Might Send Boat Refugees Back,’” The Canberra Times, November 25, 1977; “Thai Envoy Links Mulvihill’s View to Election,” The Canberra Times, November 26, 1977; Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok, Australian High Commission, Singapore, and Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: Press Reports,” November 25, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia.

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burden’ of refugees in a country with more population than Australia and less space than the Senator’s

own state of New South Wales.92 Prime Minister Fraser said that he ‘couldn’t rule out [the] possibility’

that some Vietnamese refugees arriving on boats could be flown back to Southeast Asia, but he

‘hop[ed] that that situation would not arise’.93 Talk of push-backs were not well received in the region,

and would give Indonesia more reason to be suspicious of Australia’s intentions.94

In response, the government sought to strike a balance between appeasing the public’s

concerns and placate the concerns of governments watching from Southeast Asia: ‘it was essential

that entry to Australia was controlled – but any action to ensure this had to be leavened with humanity

and compassion for the plight of genuine refugees’.95 The Australian minister for foreign affairs,

Andrew Peacock, said that those who were genuine refugees would not be returned. He issued a

statement criticising the overseas press for misrepresenting Australia’s policy, especially in asserting

that Australia might turn the boats around, saying that this was without founding and that Australia

would not renege on its international commitments or adopt a ‘callous and inhumane attitude to the

refugee problem’.96 The immigration minister, Michael Mackellar, reassured the public that that there

was no substance to rumours of an arriving refugee armada and a widespread racket of rich people.97

He also emphasised Australia’s legal obligations under the convention.98 He urged Australians to keep

the arrival of boat people in perspective and reassured them that the flow of boats would be

dampened by the government’s taskforce, which was sent to the region to interview refugees applying

to come to Australia99 and confirmed that ‘urgent consideration was being given to surveillance

requirements essential to safeguard Australia against unauthorised entry and to maintain the effective

standards of quarantine’.100 According to the foreign minister, Andrew Peacock, Australia could not

92 Wichet Suthayakhom, “Finding Homes for Vietnam’s Refugees,” The Canberra Times, November 26, 1977. 93 “Chief Secretary Wants Boat People Stopped NT Head Calls for Navy.” 94 In a meeting with Singaporean officials, Australian officials said that ‘Australia would reserve the right to deport refugees who entered illegally’. The Singaporean officials expressed strong scepticism as ‘they did not see that there was any other place to which Australia could send them’. See: Australian High Commission, Singapore to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 23, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 1, National Archives of Australia; Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 25, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 95 Michael MacKellar and Ralph Hunt, “Joint Statement by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affiars and the Minister for Health,” November 23, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 96 Andrew Peacock, “Press Release by Minister for Foreign Affairs: Vietnamese Refugees,” December 2, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 97 “Another Boat Arrives MacKellar Denies Refugee ‘Armada.’” 98 “Another Boat Arrives MacKellar Denies Refugee ‘Armada.’” 99 “Another Boat Arrives MacKellar Denies Refugee ‘Armada.’” 100 “Action on Indo Exodus,” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, November 25, 1977; MacKellar and Hunt, “Joint Statement by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affiars and the Minister for Health.”

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be a ‘dumping ground’ and continue to accept those arriving unannounced, yet the refugee question

had to be handled in the most humane way possible.101

Just twelve days before the Federal election, Mackellar and Peacock issued a joint statement

to dampen public angst about boat arrivals:

by accident of timing – and there is no reason to believe that it is other than an

accident – the issue of the acceptance of Vietnamese refugees by Australia has

come to the fore in the middle of an election campaign. There is a real danger that

it might become an election issue … It must not be allowed to do so … because the

basic question of human suffering involved transcends partisan advantage in an

election context … because, in terms of recent history, Australia has particular

responsibility to these peoples. And … because Australia’s status within the region

would be seriously – and justifiably – damaged if it were … The problem is a

regional problem and the validity of Australia’s credentials as good neighbour will

depend largely on a willingness to meet our regional obligations by bearing part of

the burden.102

These humanitarian concerns were qualified by an appeal to Australia’s desire for control,

reassuring Australians that ‘This is not an “open door” policy. It is a flexible policy as any policy must

be which operated in crisis situations’ and that the risks of disease and infiltration of political activists

were taken ‘very seriously’.103 Nevertheless, the ministers reminded Australia, ‘this government will

not “make examples” of boat refugees by indiscriminately turning some of them back … we will not

risk taking action against genuine refugees just to get a message across. This would be an utterly

inhuman course of action’.104 They asked all political parties ‘not to exaggerate the dimensions of the

problem, not to attempt to exploit the assumed fears of sections of the Australian public, and not to

forget the human tragedy represented by these few small boats. Common humanity and Australia’s

interest require that we insulate this problem from party politics. If we do not, we shall diminish

ourselves – both in our own eyes and those of our neighbours’.105

Indeed Australia was concerned for its reputation abroad and its effect on achieving

cooperation on boat holding arrangements. The Australian government’s immigration taskforce was

seen as a way to mitigate these concerns and balance a humanitarian approach with Australia’s

national interest. The taskforce was primarily operational in Singapore. The embassy in Jakarta

101 Andrew Peacock, as quoted in: Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: Press Reports,” November 24, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia; and: Neumann, Across the Seas. 102 Andrew Peacock and Michael MacKellar, “Joint Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs: Refugees,” November 29, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 103 Peacock and MacKellar. 104 Peacock and MacKellar. 105 Peacock and MacKellar.

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thought that such a taskforce in Indonesia might make the Indonesians suspicious, seeing it as

Australia’s way of limiting the number of refugees travelling to Australia or of ‘skimming the cream’

and leaving Indonesia with unwanted refugees. Unless there was a ‘blanket acceptance’ of all boat

cases entering Indonesian waters, Cavan Hogue, the minister at the Australian embassy had advised,

Indonesia would not prevent boat departures.106 Such a task force would be useful in speeding up

processing and saving refugees from hazardous voyages, but unless the tap could be tuned off in

Thailand, Malaysia or Singapore, then the taskforce would need to visit Indonesia regularly and would

not be able to prevent rejects setting out for Australia in boats with Indonesia actively helping them

as they are now. ‘It would not lead to better information’ Hogue warned, and ‘might well have the

opposite effect’.107 Hogue was aware that Indonesia could pressure Australia to take more refugees

as Australia was ‘a rich, regional country with plenty of room and whatever economic and

unemployment problems [Australia] may have at present cannot compare with those faced by other

countries in the region’.108 Furthermore, the embassy worried that any extra surveillance could be

interpreted as an intention to turn boats back to Indonesia – making Indonesia even more suspicious

of Australia’s motives.109

A Test Case for Cooperation: The Hong Kiang While the domestic election loomed, the Australian embassy in Jakarta was receiving

information from Indonesian officials, albeit often late or incomplete, on boats transiting Indonesia

wishing to travel on to Australia. The next step for the embassy was to encourage the Indonesian

government to hold the boats and allow an Australian team to interview them. But the Indonesian

government did not trust that Australian policy would support their objective to not be landed with a

protracted refugee problem. The Indonesians believed that ‘interviewing’ was a sorting process

whereby only the desirable would be resettled, leaving the unacceptable in Indonesia.110

Nevertheless, after persistence from the Australian embassy, Canberra and Jakarta worked together

on ‘a test case’ for cooperation, involving a refugee boat named Hong Kiang. Cooperation was

achieved with a significant concession in Australia’s policy in order to gain Indonesia’s trust, but this

was ultimately hindered by bureaucratic difficulties. It did, however, build inroads for more

cooperation, which will be shown in the next section.

106 Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 25, 1977. 107 Hogue to Canberra. 108 Hogue to Canberra. 109 Hogue to Canberra. 110 P. White to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” December 22, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia.

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Having achieved some degree of information sharing, on the 28th of November 1977 Major

Putu (BAKIN) informed the Australian Embassy that a boat, Hong Kiang, arrived in Tanjung Priok, a

port in North Jakarta, three days prior.111 Putu’s message contained information on the vessel and the

breakdown of passengers on board as Australia had requested.112 On the 8th of December, the boat,

was still in port. It was damaged and undergoing repairs, but upon completion would depart for

Australia.113 The US Embassy in Jakarta indicated that they would process the 25-40 refugees who

wished to go to the US, but were unable to do so until the refugees had been vetted by the UNHCR

representative, who, at that time, was in Kuala Lumpur and unable to travel to Jakarta until January

or February. Indonesia had promised the US that the refugees would be held until such time, yet both

the US and Australia had little faith in this assurance.114 On the 9th of December, two of the refugees

from the Hong Kiang had persuaded the Indonesian Navy to let them off their ship to visit the

Australian Embassy in Jakarta.115 They told Australian officials that 26 refugees wished to go to the US

but had not yet been interviewed, and 39 wished to go to Darwin. The boat could be ready to sail by

Monday, they said, but they were hoping for an alternative to such a dangerous voyage. They would

return to the Embassy on Wednesday, if the Navy allowed, to receive Australia’s answer to their

request for resettlement.116

Under the pressure of the looming federal election, the Department of Immigration and Ethnic

Affairs made a significant bend in their policy, confirming that they would accept all refugees from the

Hong Kiang not accepted by the US, subject to a medical clearance.117 Accepting these refugees before

they had been processed was a significant bend in Australia’s policy. Canberra asked the Embassy to

seek Indonesia’s permission for an Australian immigration team to visit Jakarta and process these

refugees, and to reiterate to the Indonesians that all 39 refugees will be accepted.118

Indicating a persistent level of mistrust, Aspoor, from the foreign ministry, first sought

Australia’s agreement to resettle the entire group, as there were concerns that the US would not

111 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” November 28, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 112 Allen to Canberra. 113 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 8, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 114 Allen to Canberra. 115 G.E.C. Gibson to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” December 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 116 Gibson to Canberra. 117 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Vietnamese Refugees Aboard Hong Kiang,” December 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia; Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “HT217 Hong Kiang,” December 9, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 118 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Vietnamese Refugees Aboard Hong Kiang,” December 9, 1977.

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accept the 26 applications that it had received. According to Aspoor the whole group of 65 now wished

to resettle in Australia. But according to the group’s leader, the group had only made this claim at

Aspoor’s insistence. In reality, he said, 47 wished to settle in Australia – including the original 39, plus

eight who had changed their mind – and 18 still wished to settle in the US where they had family or

work connections.119 Nevertheless, Aspoor was ‘most put out’ at Australia’s insistence to only see the

39 who originally wished to resettle in Australia, and made it clear that he could not guarantee that

the boat would remain in Indonesia.120 According to Aspoor, this was a test case and would set the

stage for further cooperation in boat holding for orderly processing as Australia had requested; unless

Australia showed good faith, the Ministry of Defence would revert to a hard-line approach.121

In a show of good faith, the Australian immigration officer, Mr White, completed processing

on the afternoon of the 22nd of December and accepted all of the original 39, including ‘two doubtful

cases’.122 ‘One major aspect of this exercise’, wrote Mr White, was ‘to develop procedures to prevent

further boat arrivals in Australia … our best course of action is to reach a suitable compromise [with

Indonesia]’.123 To reassure the Indonesians, White recommended, the additional eight should be

interviewed as soon as possible. This time, however, White suggested that Canberra give no more

advance assurances that it will accept people, as, although such an assurance had given them initial

access to the refugees, it ‘tended to weaken our hand and … has undermined the basis of our selection

operation in Indonesia’.124 Canberra’s response was that Australia should maintain interviewing and

medical examinations to ensure that applicants are ‘genuine’ refugees and do not pose a health risk.

Australia would be ‘prepared to consider’ interviewing other boat people not accepted by other

countries.125

Despite the compromise and Australia’s acceptance of the 39 refugees, a level of mistrust

remained among the Australian and Indonesian officials. White was suspicious that Indonesia may

push the boat off before Australia could arrange their transport. Thus he gained agreement from the

processed 39 refugees that they would not sail to Australia and suggested Canberra move them to

Australia as soon possible to pre-empt any attempt by the Indonesians to force departure.126 Indeed

Indonesia became fed up with the time that Australia was taking to move the refugees and informed

119 White to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” December 22, 1977. 120 White to Canberra. 121 White to Canberra. 122 White to Canberra. 123 White to Canberra. 124 White to Canberra. 125 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” December 30, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 126 White to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” December 22, 1977.

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the Embassy on the 27th of December that the Hong Kiang would soon proceed to Australia after being

repaired.127 Despite the threat, Australia was able to move the 38 refugees to Australia on a QANTAS

flight on the 6th of January, 1978, with one, who was believed to have hepatitis A, to travel a month

later.128 The Embassy protested this medical delay, as it would cause ‘considerable difficulties’ for their

‘negotiating position’, believing that this would confirm to the Indonesian government that Australia

would leave unacceptable refugees in Indonesia. They requested reconsideration urgently as there

was no definite evidence of hepatitis.129 The embassy further recommended that any immigration

team interviewing in Indonesia should have discretionary power rather than authority to process fixed

numbers, as this scared the Indonesians in regard to the Hong Kiang when eight changed their mind.130

Indonesia was still insisting that the remaining refugees wanted to go to Australia, while the refugees

themselves said there were only eight who wished to resettle in Australia.131

It had appeared that the test case had worked. Canberra was still deciding to accept a number

of additional cases, which indicates that Australia was finally becoming flexible and willing to change

policy to gain Indonesia’s trust and achieve cooperation.132 Despite Indonesia’s apprehension in

allowing interviews and still insufficient information given to Australia about the movement of boats,

Aspoor was receptive to the idea that an immigration team continue to interview people remaining in

camps in Indonesia.133 An Australian selection official, Dobson, was went to Jakarta on the 14th of

February, 1978, and by the 17th of February, Dobson had interviewed 86 refugees in Jakarta, bringing

the total number of refugees expected to be airlifted to 107. Aspoor expressed his appreciation of

Australia’s effort and promised full cooperation in any future exercise.134

The Run-Around: Boat VNSG-1028 Nevertheless, full cooperation was not achieved in future exercises. Attempting to recreate

the cooperation that worked in the Hong Kiang case, Australian officials approached Soenarso when

they heard that a boat, VNSG-1028, had arrived in Tanjung Priok on the 12th of March, 1978, requesting

127 Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “No.D. 1341,” December 27, 1977, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 128 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Vietrefs HT 217 Ex Jakarta,” January 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 129 G.E.C. Gibson to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Medical Documents Viet Refs. Ex. HT 217.,” January 4, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 130 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, “DRAFT Indo-Chinese Refugees - Indonesia,” n.d., A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 131 Gibson to Canberra, “Medical Documents Viet Refs. Ex. HT 217.,” January 4, 1978. 132 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo China Refugees - Indonesia,” March 3, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 133 White to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” December 22, 1977. 134 Dobson to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indon Chinese Refugees in Indonesia,” February 22, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia.

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fuel and provisions to enable them to continue to Australia.135 The Australians had hoped that

Indonesia would hold the boats so that those wishing to go to Australia may be interviewed and

medically examined. Soenarso asked if, as with the Hong Kiang, Australia would guarantee that it

would take all the refugees, implying that unless assurances could be given, the boats would be

refuelled and sent on their way.136 Canberra agreed, but requested firm undertakings from the

Indonesians that boats and occupants would be held.137 In view of the assurances, which he requested

formally in writing, Colonel Soenarso said he would try to persuade the relevant authorities to hold

the vessel, which was preparing to depart shortly.138 The Australians questioned whether oral

assurances would be enough to hold the boat while Canberra provides its written guarantee, but

Soenarso indicated that there was little sympathy amongst Indonesian authorities to such proposal.139

What still concerned the Indonesians was what would happen to those on board who did not wish to

settle in Australia, and at whose expense. Soenarso suggested the formation of a committee of

representatives from all refugee receiving countries who could accept responsibility and resettle

refugees. Australia agreed to pass this on.140 A similar arrangement would eventually occur with the

1979 Geneva conference, as we shall see.

The very next day, Australia submitted its assurance in writing to Soenarso. The written

assurance expressed Australia’s ‘willingness to accept all refugees seeking to settle in Australia. The

Government would, however, need to interview all of these people to establish that they are genuine

refugees and that they are medically sound’.141 To calm any Indonesian concerns about being left with

a refugee problem, the assurance also added that ‘an unsatisfactory medical report does not mean

rejection for entry into Australia. It would merely alert the Australian authorities to the need that, in

respect of the individual concerned, special medical handling will be necessary on his arrival in

Australia’.142 When passing this to Soenarso, Geoff Allen stressed that this was a major concession in

terms of Australia’s selection procedures and expressed the hope that Indonesia would respond in a

135 Smith Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees - Malaysia,” March 14, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 136 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” March 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 137 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indochinese Refugees,” March 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 138 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.CH649238),” March 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.CH649849),” March 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 139 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.CH649849),” March 16, 1978. 140 Allen to Canberra. 141 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 357/78,” March 17, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 142 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs.

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similar spirit. Allen explained that stopping the boats was important to ease the cost of surveillance

activities, to protect Australia’s strict quarantine regulations and to ensure that refugee entry was

controlled and orderly. These assurances, however, did not seem to avail Soenarso’s concerns related

to those who did not wish to travel on to Australia, as there was no guarantee that other countries

would accept them.143 When embassy officials passed this note to Aspoor the following day, Aspoor

informed Allen that the boat had already left Tanjung Priok at 5.15pm the day before.144

It had turned out that ten of the 88 refugees on board the VNSG-1028 had been provisionally

accepted by the US, and that Australia had also previously interviewed those on board and rejected

nine because of ‘integration and employment prospects or because they refused to travel without

other distinct family members, [and] one was rejected on medical grounds because he has a claw left

hand resulting from a bullet injury’.145 When VNSG-1028 was due to arrive in Darwin, Minister

Mackellar sent out a news release outlining the details of its voyage – there was now news that the

boat had originally been hijacked between Vietnam and Malaysia, with the four original guards on

board being sent adrift on a life-raft and later picked up but a Hong Kong shipping vessel. Mackellar

referred to those on board as ‘queue jumpers’146, stating that there is now no reason for ‘genuine’

refugees to make such a long and hazardous journey when Australia is resettling so many from the

camps: 1,800 had been resettled from Malaysia, approximately 2,500 from Thailand, and 160 had

been approved for entry from Indonesia.147

Given the political implications of boats continuing to arrive in Australia148, the government

was increasingly concerned about Indonesia’s persistent hard-line position, especially considering the

assurances that both Australia and the UNHCR had given, which seemed to cover Indonesian concerns

143 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” March 17, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 144 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (b),” March 18, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 145 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo Chinese Refugee Boat: VNSG 1028 ADC,” March 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 146 Whitlam was the first to use the term “queue” in relation to refugee boats. See: Stats, “Welcome to Australia?,” 77; McVeigh, of the National Country Party also used the term on the 14th of March, 1978 Tom McVeigh, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates: Governor-General’s Speech” (The House of Representatives, March 14, 1978), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1978-03-14%2F0050%22. 147 Canberra et al., “Indo-Chinese Refugees, News Release by Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” March 25, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 148 Negative news stories warned about the ‘embarrassment’ refugees were causing Australia, calling them illegal backdoor entrants who have no reason to bypass Australia’s procedures. ‘Until now the Australian Government has been reluctant to refuse entry to the boat people because of the poor image such a move would project both at home and abroad. But a growing number of government officials believe that the refugees should be turned away, particularly when there is doubt that they are true refugees’, see: Stove, “Boat People Embarrass Australia.”

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about resettlement.149 The embassy relayed to the Indonesians these implications and, appearing

increasingly frustrated at Indonesia’s unwillingness to cooperate, appealed to Indonesia’s obligations

and regional duties. Geoff Allen told Soenarso that while Australia realises that there is concern that

‘a few Indo-Chinese refugees would remain in Indonesia’, ‘in terms of an international approach to

this humanitarian problem, Indonesia should be prepared to resettle those very few refugees who did

not wish to be resettled elsewhere’.150 Appealing to Indonesia’s membership in ASEAN, Allen

highlighted the ‘quite significant contributions being made by Indonesia’s ASEAN partners’.151

Australian officials expressed to Soenarso and Soedarsono their hope that some agreement would be

possible before the subject became an issue between Australia and Indonesia. Soedarsono said he

was at a loss as to why agreement had not yet been reached and was ‘fully sympathetic to our point

of view’.152 Thus, while cooperation had been promised in some cases, it was not necessarily a widely

accepted policy as mistrust remained elsewhere in the Indonesian bureaucracy.

Colonel Soenarso, who was one Indonesian official particularly helpful to the Australians, had

suggested that the Australians meet directly with General Moerdani.153 Heeding Soenarso’s advice,

Cavan Hogue from the Australian embassy met with Moerdani on the 21st of April, 1978. Hogue

reminded Moerdani of Australia’s undertaking to accept all genuine refugees from Indonesia who

want to come to Australia. In view of some recent cases, however, this guarantee was to the exclusion

of ‘any person who has taken part in the seizure of a vessel’.154 In return, Australia hoped that

Indonesia would hold the vessels in Indonesia so that processing may take place and refugees can be

flown to Australia. Hogue stressed to Moerdani that this proposal was both in Indonesia and

Australia’s interest: ‘Apart from humanitarian considerations’, Hogue said, Australia hoped that this

agreement would ‘reduce the number of boats arriving in Indonesia and cause the Indonesians a

minimum of trouble’.155 Indicating a level of mistrust in these intentions, Moerdani asked if Australia

was interested in a written agreement. Hogue replied that Australia was ‘more interested in the

149 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” April 4, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 150 Allen to Canberra. 151 Allen to Canberra. 152 Allen to Canberra. 153 Allen to Canberra. 154 Author Unknown Australian Government, “Aide Memoire,” April 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Boat People in Indonesia,” April 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 155 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Boat People in Indonesia,” April 22, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia.

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practical side of things and simply wanted a quick and effective solution to the problem’.156 Moerdani

said the proposal seemed reasonable and he would take it up with the relevant authorities.157

After more than two weeks without a response from Moerdani, Cavan Hogue, as ad interim

Charge d’Affaires, wrote to Kelso, the Assistant Secretary of the Consular and Immigration Branch in

DFAT, about the lack of response from his approach to Moerdani, believing the matter was still being

discussed.158 A regular source who was close to Moerdani told Hogue that despite numerous

explanations, Indonesia was still worried about Australia’s insistence on medical examination.

Therefore, Hogue suggested, Australia should give Indonesia a ‘reasonably formal piece of paper

setting out our position’ to ‘push things along’.159 Hogue believed that after the US Vice President

Mondale visited Indonesia – who would reiterate Australia’s assurances (discussed later) – Australia

may be in a position to submit such a formal note. For an even more effective approach, though it

would take longer to achieve, Hogue suggested signatures from other resettlement countries, making

a formal joint approach to guarantee that the Indonesians would not be left holding anybody.160 Even

so, Hogue noted, ‘the Indonesian bureaucracy is complex, cumbersome, timid and suspicious [which]

does not make for not rapid decision making!’.161 Therefore, Hogue suggested, ‘we need to give them

as many formal assurances on paper as we can so that everyone involved can feel they are covered in

case anything goes wrong … and every loophole has been plugged’, after all, Hogue noted, currently

Indonesia can ‘get rid of them all at minimum cost – whether they want to go to Australia or not,

hijackers or not, medically fit or not. It’s not easy to match a deal like that’.162 His suggestions of a joint

effort, which had early been suggested by Soenarso, eventually came to fruition, as discussed later,

when the international community held an international conference in Geneva in 1979, guaranteeing

resettlement of all refugees, which will be discussed later.

Indonesia’s cooperation with Australia was therefore never a widely accepted policy within

Indonesia, and needed to be sought continuously through persistent representations to different

Indonesian departments. The embassy understood the Indonesians’ concerns, and, as Hogue

suggested above, Australia needed to provide watertight, written guarantees and share these efforts

156 Hogue to Canberra. 157 Hogue to Canberra. 158 Cavan Hogue to J.R. Kelso, “Hogue to Mr J.R. Kelso, Assistant Secretary, Consular and Immigration Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.,” May 9, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 159 Hogue to Kelso. 160 Hogue to Kelso. 161 Hogue to Kelso. 162 Hogue to Kelso.

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with other countries. But, as with the disagreement within the Indonesian bureaucracy, there was also

disagreement among the Australian side, especially between the embassy and Canberra.

Australia obtains Agreement, then gives Indonesia the Run-Around Managing bureaucracy was not only a problem within the Indonesian government, but also in

Australia. While there were certainly issues in obtaining a unified position from the Indonesian

bureaucracy, there were similar disagreements between Canberra and its embassy in Jakarta. As seen

above, the officials in Canberra had pushed for providing assurances and written guarantees that

Australia would resettle all refugees held, which, as shown above, eventually Canberra agreed to. But

in the case I will outline below, the embassy in Jakarta finally obtained agreement from the

Indonesians to hold two boats, VNKG-0928 and VNKG-0793 for processing and guaranteed

resettlement, which Canberra then tried to subtly withdraw from on the basis that the passengers

were not acceptable by Australian criteria – precisely what Indonesians were concerned about.

The two boats, carrying 77 on board163, arrived in Tanjung Priok and were being refuelled and

resupplied by the Indonesian Navy, which expected them to depart on the 13th of June 1978.164 Before

the two boats could depart, the Embassy’s Vice Consul interviewed the refugees, all of whom indicated

that they were determined to go to Australia. Geoff Allen wrote to Canberra that he was ‘not

optimistic’ of the embassy’s ability to ‘convince the Indonesians’ to hold the boats, however, if

Canberra would agree to accept all the refugees on the basis that they wish to settle in Australia, there

may be a possibility that Indonesia would comply. Such a confidential guarantee would need to be

passed on immediately, Allen noted, to prevent the boats departure.165

On the 13th of June Indonesia finally agreed to hold the two boats for one week for processing,

provided Australia gave a watertight guarantee that ‘all will proceed to Australia’.166 The Embassy saw

no choice but to provide Indonesia with such a guarantee, which was given to Colonel Sudhono from

BAKIN that day.167 The guarantee stated that ‘Australia will accept all refugees seeking to settle in

Australia’.168 Pre-empting Indonesia’s concerns about the interview process, the guarantee continued

that Australia ‘needs to interview all of these people to ensure that they are genuine refugees and

163 Sources conflict between having 76 or 77 passengers on board. Most recent sources state 77. 164 G.C. Allen to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 12, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 165 Allen to Canberra. 166 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 167 Allen to Canberra; Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 719/78,” June 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 168 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 13, 1978; Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 719/78,” June 13, 1978.

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that they are medically sound. The purpose of the prior medical examination is solely to determine

whether special medical handling will be necessary’.169 The only exception would be if persons were

involved in the seizure of a vessel, a proviso which, the note read, does not apply in these cases.170

The guarantee also highlighted that the UNHCR would be responsible for costs incurred by the

refugees during their stay.171 The next day BAKIN informed the Australian Embassy that Indonesia’s

Department of Defence agreed to hold the two boats in Tanjung Priok until the 22nd of June, which

was a further six days, to enable Australia’s processing.172 A medical officer, Dr R. Ganguly, was

arranged to travel from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta on the 15th until the 18th.173

On the same day that the guarantee was handed to Indonesia, however, the Australian High

Commission in Kuala Lumpur sent a note to Canberra and Jakarta with information regarding these

two boats. It turned out that 72 of the passengers on board these boats were interviewed on the 23rd

of April at Pulau Tengah in Malaysia.174 The passengers were all peasant farmers and fishermen from

the one village and had no English or employable skills. The High Commission in Kuala Lumpur were

concerned that they would present immediate resettlement problems, including being a long-term

charge on public funds, if resettled in Australia.175 The group were quite stubborn about resettlement

in Australia, and the High Commission in Malaysia had explained to them that ‘illegal entry intro

Australia would not be permitted and that [Australia] would not allow them to dictate terms … the

Australian Government alone has the right to choose those who will or will not be admitted into

Australia’.176

Given this information from Kuala Lumpur, Canberra wrote to Geneva on the 20th of June,

1978 to request that the UNHCR urgently arrange resettlement for the 76 refugees elsewhere,

because ‘of the considerable difficulty which we would have in successfully resettling [them]’.177 This

was despite having already provided a ‘watertight guarantee’ that Australia would resettle all of the

refugees from these boats and, on that basis only, receiving Indonesia’s agreement to hold them for

169 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Note No. 719/78,” June 13, 1978. 170 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs. 171 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs. 172 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 14, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 173 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 174 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “VNKG0793 and VKNG0928 Refugee Boats Which Left Pulau Tengah 3 June,” June 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 175 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 176 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 177 Canberra to Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia.

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processing. Canberra suggested that they be returned to camps in Malaysia during processing, but

recognised that ‘in order to meet [Australia’s] undertakings to the Indonesians we may have to move

the group to Australia. However, in view of the likely difficulty in arranging resettlement elsewhere

once they are in Australia we hope that the UNHCR will be able to accept responsibility for the group

while it is in Jakarta’.178 After the Embassy’s persistence in seeking Indonesia’s agreement and

convincing Canberra to give a watertight guarantee, Australia tried to find a way out because the

refugees were considered ‘unsuitable’. It appears then, that rather than resettle refugees from camps

to allay their need to take a boat and thereby appease its domestic audience, the control and selection

of refugees was the primary interest for the Australian government.

The Australian Embassy in Jakarta was indeed not happy with Canberra’s requests of the

UNHCR. Thomas Critchley, replacing Woolcott as Ambassador in early 1978, told Canberra that

Indonesia has only ‘recently shown signs of greater flexibility’ and have only allowed the refugees to

temporarily stay because of Australia’s assurance that the group would be moved within a week or

two.179 ‘It seems to me’, Critchley continued, ‘that the Indonesians see this as a test case and they

have already asked us when the group will depart. Unless we honour this undertaking, both in the

letter and in spirit, I would expect us to lose our credibility with Indonesia and to receive no further

cooperation’, therefore, he advised, the group should be moved to Australia ‘as soon as possible’.180

Canberra assured the Embassy that there was no intention that Australia would renege on its promise,

it simply wanted to ‘put maximum pressure on the UNHCR to secure resettlement elsewhere and to

accept responsibility for the group’.181 The UNHCR’s response was cautious, and suggested that

Malaysia would not agree to the return of the refugees.182 The UNHCR had enquired about Australia’s

request with their officer in Jakarta, Carpenter, and was told that Australia had in fact already accepted

the whole group for permanent resettlement and that 71 would leave in the next ten days followed

by six pending medical treatment. The UNHCR was understandably concerned to learn that Australia’s

willingness to move refugees to Australia did not mean that it would be the ultimate country of

resettlement.183 Nevertheless, the group were given letters of authority to stay in Australia – for a

period of only three months only.184

178 Canberra to Australian Consulate-General, Geneva. 179 T.K. Critchley, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 180 Critchley. 181 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indochinese Refugees.,” June 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 182 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 183 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Canberra. 184 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo China Refugees,” June 23, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia.

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This case demonstrates the varying concerns between the Embassy, whose staff understood

Indonesian concerns and what exactly would be required, and the government in Canberra, which had

domestic and other concerns to consider. As Hogue recalls, when writing cables, the embassy staff

thought ‘okay the government can accept our advice or reject it, that’s what they’re paying for, but

our job is to tell it like it is, say what we think is in Australia’s interest, to say what the Indonesian

position is.’ He said this sometimes got confused:

between setting out clearly what the Indonesian view is, and being told that you’re

arguing for Indonesia, well I think no there’s a difference, you do have a duty to

say ‘this is what they think – you might not like it – but this is what they think’, and

okay we try and argue against all this but you’ve still got to tell them this is what

they think.185

And the embassy, unlike Canberra, did not have to worry about domestic politics.186 Nevertheless,

there were some in Canberra who understood the embassy’s predicament. The embassy received a

call from Kevin Scott of Foreign Affairs in Canberra, who highlighted concerns of the embassy and

noted that the Department of Immigration ‘did not fully appreciate the importance of moving quickly

the 77 Vietnamese boat people’.187 They agreed that Geoff Allen would be the regular point of contact

for Immigration and take ‘every chance to stress to Immigration the need for speed in this particular

case’.188

A Great and Powerful Friend: Seeking US Help The Australians were aware of Indonesia’s unwillingness to land itself with a protracted

refugee problem and thus, the Indonesians were uncooperative. A protracted refugee problem may

occur if Indonesia held the boats while Australia processed all those wishing to resettle in Australia,

while the remaining refugees wanted to settle elsewhere waited for other countries, such as the US,

to complete their processing – possibly rejecting them. The resettlement process for the US was taking

months, and in some cases, up to a year. As such, refugees who have been approved by the US for

resettlement often gave up on waiting and either sought acceptance by other countries or continued

their journey to Australia in a boat.189 Australia therefore needed to work with the US in speeding up

its process and to hedge its efforts and make a joint approach to Indonesia, reassuring the Indonesian

government that no refugee will be left behind. The problem for the US in making this pledge,

185 Hogue, Interview with Author. 186 Hogue. 187 Cavan Hogue to T.K. Critchley and G.C. Allen, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 23, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 188 Hogue to Critchley and Allen. 189 Department of Foreign Affairs Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees: Brief for Talks with U.S. Officials,” April 24, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia.

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however, was in obtaining parole authority, that is, legal permission for otherwise inadmissible

migrants to enter the US due to urgent humanitarian reasons, for an additional 25,000 annually.190 If

parole authority was granted, the State Department would accept all refugees who are not accepted

by other countries, allowing Australia to make a joint approach to Indonesia with the US.191 These joint

approaches would involve: assurances that boat refugees would be resettled in other countries;

requests that boat refugees be allowed to land and remain in their countries pending processing;

confirmation that all possible measures will be taken for prompt processing and onward movement;

and suggestions that regional countries take appropriate measures to dissuade and prevent refugees

from continuing to Australia without prior authority, including actions to seize, impound or immobilise

arriving boats.192 Furthermore, the US and Australia discussed making approaches to the UNHCR,

including suggestions for placing a permanent representative in Indonesia, encouraging them to take

the lead in multilateral discussions and to make a selective appeal to other countries to resettle more

refugees and make financial contributions.193

Australia also enlisted the help of US Vice President Mondale during his Southeast Asia tour.

On the 4th of May, 1978, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, sent a cable to

Mondale during his stay in Bangkok requesting his help in approaching the Indonesians.194 Peacock

informed Mondale of Australia’s ‘serious and urgent problem of a large new concentration of boats

capable of making a dramatic and disturbing new series of unauthorised arrivals’ on Australia’s shores,

which, he said, ‘could become publicly unmanageable’ if domestic opinion were to turn against the

acceptance of refugees, thereby harming ‘our mutual interest in resolving the refugee problem.’195

Peacock informed Mondale of Australia’s efforts in Indonesia so far, including its offers of assurances,

yet Indonesia had not given Australia ‘a substantive reply and have in fact been providing food and

fuel to enable to boats to continue their journey to Australia without delay’.196 According to Peacock,

most refugees who have arrived in Australia wanted to resettle elsewhere, but risked the journey due

to the lengthy delays in processing from refugee camps. Therefore, Peacock requested, ‘it could be

most helpful for Australia’s representations if you could reinforce our position and the urgency with

which we view the matter at the highest levels in Indonesia by assuring the Indonesians that any

190 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, “Indo-China Refugees Discussions in Washington,” April 27, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 191 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, “Indochina Refugees,” April 28, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 192 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra. 193 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra. 194 Canberra to Gordon Jockel, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” May 4, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 195 Canberra to Jockel. 196 Canberra to Jockel.

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refugees that do not … go to Australia will be accepted by the United States’.197 While Peacock

understood the difficulty in giving such an assurance pending the confirmation of parole authority, he

figured that the numbers were relatively small and therefore feasible. It would greatly ease Australia’s

mind, Peacock wrote, ‘if we could feel that Indonesia was prepared to cooperate with us and stop the

flow of boats to Australia’, if this were the case, Australia ‘could then get on with the tasks of further

developing an effective program to handle the boat case people without hazard to themselves or

popular support for our policies’.198

The US State Department recommended that Mondale take up Peacock’s message, if he

wished, during discussions with the Indonesian Government on his visit between the 7th and 9th of

May, 1978. The suggested response was that the US ‘would be prepared to accept all boat refugees

in Indonesia not accepted by Australia and third countries and not inadmissible under United States

Immigration Laws (a very small number)’ and gently approach the question of asking Indonesia to

‘cease and desist facilitating the onward movement of boats to Australia’.199 They agreed that the

continual arrival of boats may jeopardise Australia’s program, which was already generous on a

population basis. Edward Masters, the US Ambassador in Indonesia who accompanied Mondale

during his appointments, informed the Australian Embassy that ‘Mondale raised the substance of

[Peacock’s] letter with [Indonesian] Vice-President Malik’.200 According to Masters, Malik ‘took it in’,

but did not make any comments.201 During a meeting in Washington, Erland Heginbotham – the

deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in Washington, who accompanied

Mondale on his visit – told the Australians that Mondale’s visit to Indonesia ‘had probably been the

most productive of the three South-East Asian stops.202

The Australians were eager to secure US assurances that they would resettle the remaining

refugees who did not want to resettle in Australia, if Indonesia would hold the boats, before

Mackellar’s visit to the region, previously discussed above. The Australian Embassy thought that

Mackellar’s visit would be more effective if he could present ‘clear-cut and comprehensive proposals

which meet [Indonesia’s] known difficulties’, which would require US support.203 Yet, as late as the

197 Canberra to Jockel. 198 Canberra to Jockel. 199 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok and Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” May 5, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 200 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Vice President Mondale and Indo Chinese Boat People,” May 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 201 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra. 202 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, “Vice President Mondale’s Trip,” May 18, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 203 Australian Embassy, Jakarta and Canberra, “Visit by Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” May 22, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia.

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26th of May, the US Embassy could still not confirm its ability to make this joint approach as parole

authority had still not been granted ahead of MacKellar’s visit in early July.204 On the 30th of May,

Canberra, defeated, cabled the embassy: ‘we appear to have exhausted the courses of action open to

us pending firm advice about a United States decision on a new parole authority’.205

Canberra did, however, finally agree with their embassy in Jakarta, that ‘it is most important

that Australia demonstrate its commitment to meet the undertakings given to the Indonesians and

we accept that if arrangements with the United States fall through … we would have to accept all of

the 148 [refugees] on shore plus those on the VNKG-1061’.206 ‘Meanwhile’, Canberra informed the

Embassy, ‘to indicate our goodwill to Indonesia action should proceed quickly’.207 The embassy

enthusiastically agreed with Canberra’s advice, with counsellors leaving notes in the margins of the

cable reading ‘about time too’, ‘spot on’, and ‘couldn’t agree more’.208 Furthermore, a note was left

on the top of the cable reading ‘Ambassador, I think the kindest thing we can do with this is to ignore

it, we are processing the medicals and will get them out ASAP’.209

Indeed, the arrangements with the US did fall through. It was not until the 14th of June that

US parole authority was granted. Under the numbers of the new parole authority, it was clear that the

US would no longer act as a ‘country of last resort’ by no longer accepting any refugee not accepted

by other counties.210 This meant that the proposed Australia-US joint approaches to Indonesia were

no longer feasible, and took Australia back to where they started in trying to convince Indonesia to

hold the boats.211 Cavan Hogue recognised that if Australia could ‘give a clear guarantee to take all the

people on a particular boat – and if we process and send them on quickly – the Indonesian authorities

will hold the boats’.212 He wrote to Canberra that ‘if we do not give such a guarantee, the boat will be

resupplied and sent on its way to Australia. No amount of pleading or pressure from us will significantly

204 G.E.C. Gibson to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” May 26, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 205 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Washington, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” May 30, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 206 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” May 26, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 207 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 208 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 209 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 210 Australian Embassy, Bangkok and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” June 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, “Indo-China Refugees,” June 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; Cavan Hogue, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” July 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 211 Hogue, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 16, 1978; Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” July 7, 1978. 212 Hogue, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 16, 1978.

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vary this Indonesian policy’.213 Therefore, he continued, ‘…we must accept responsibility for all

refugees to enable processing in Indonesia … reconcile ourselves to the continued and uncontrolled

arrival of refugee boats in Darwin, or seek some kind of international arrangement which the

Indonesians will accept in lieu of a guarantee from Australia’.214 Hogue suggested that the answer to

this, and in addressing Indonesia’s concerns that it will be stuck with refugee ‘rejects’, would be in

‘some kind of international conference which would include the ASEAN countries as well as receiving

countries’.215 Indeed, this would take place in Geneva in 1979.

The Gentlemen’s Agreement As shown above, agreements were difficult to secure, but Australia persisted. The government

hoped that an arrangement could be settled during an upcoming visit by the Australian immigration

minister, Michael Mackellar. He was touring the region in mid-1978 to consult with ASEAN

governments about the Indochinese problem, to discuss orderly processing arrangements, and seizing

the opportunity to assess the situation first hand.216 As this section shows, even when agreements

could be settled between leaders, they were not necessarily trusted elsewhere within the

bureaucracy. This highlights the importance of bureaucracies – not just the interaction between them

but of effective policy implementation by each side.

Australia hoped that Mackellar’s visit to Indonesia would strengthen and continue

cooperation and information sharing on a pragmatic basis, and would express Australia’s appreciation

for Indonesia’s cooperation thus far.217 On the 10th of July 1978, Mackellar and Critchley met with

General Panggabean, the Minister Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs and Commodore

Soedarsono, Director of the Directorate of Asia and Pacific Affairs in DEPLU about Indochinese

Refugees.218 Mackellar stressed that it was critical for Australia that boats be stopped in transit to

allow countries to process refugees in a fast and orderly fashion, and requested Indonesia’s

cooperation. Panggabean said that Indonesia valued the role that Australia was playing and could

expect Indonesia’s cooperation as much as possible and would hold the boats so long as resettlement

could be guaranteed. He said, however, that Indonesia could not allow refugees to stay in Indonesia.219

He added that Indonesia’s policy was to arrange for humanitarian assistance and, if the refugees

213 Hogue. 214 Hogue. 215 Hogue. 216 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al., “Visit of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs for Head of Mission,” July 6, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 217 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al. 218 Ian Simington, “Record of Conversation between General Panggabean, Mackellar and Critchley,” July 10, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 219 Simington.

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wanted to go to Australia, there was little they could do to stop them. If they were allowed to stay it

was on the condition that it be temporary until arrangements are made for their resettlement

elsewhere, but Indonesia was not keen on the idea of establishing transit camps out of fear it would

encourage more refugees to come to Indonesia.220 The solution to the Indochinese crisis, according to

Panggabean, was to be found in international dialogue involving Hanoi.221 Panggabean did not give

much hope for a departure in Indonesia’s policy, citing the same concerns that Australia has heard

before. Again, suggestion for international dialogue involving Hanoi was in the works and would result

in the Geneva conference of July 1979.

On the 11th of July, Mackellar met with President Soeharto and Professor Mochtar, the

Minister for Foreign Affairs.222 Soeharto said he ‘appreciated the difficulties’ that the Indochinese

refugees created, and reiterated that Indonesia could not accept any refugees for settlement in

Indonesia due to Indonesia’s own development problems, making a point that most of the under-

privileged in Indonesia resided in the areas closest to Australia.223 He expressed his understanding of

Australia’s dilemma, but reiterated two problems, namely, some boats simply insisted on going to

Australia, and that the movement of these boats were not always known in Jakarta.224 Nevertheless,

Indonesia would cooperate where possible, including providing transit accommodation and access to

medical facilities. He also mentioned repairing boats – but the Australians were unsure if this was only

meant for those boats that insisted on going to Australia.225

Mackellar had more success with General Yoga Soegomo, Chief of Staff of the National

Command for the Restoration of Order and Security (KOPKAMTIB), where a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’

was established. Mackellar put it to Yoga that refugees be taken off boats and located at a central

point for processing, otherwise Australia would be willing to send officers to their point of arrival. If

Indonesia would do this, Australia, together with the UNHCR, would guarantee their resettlement.226

Yoga said that Indonesia would be prepared to do this, provided the UNHCR were responsible for the

costs and the refugees were moved on quickly.227 He felt though, that the United Nations should play

a more active part in solving the problem and that greater international cooperation was needed –

220 Simington. 221 Simington. 222 T.K. Critchley, “Record of Conversation between President Soeharto, Professor Mochtar, Mackellar and Critchley,” July 11, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 223 Critchley. 224 Critchley. 225 Critchley. 226 Ian Simington, “Record of Conversation between General Yoga Soegomo, Mackellar and Critchley,” July 10, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 227 Simington.

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and, as will be discussed later, is exactly what was required.228 To prevent Indonesia becoming an

attraction to refugees, Yoga agreed not to publicise this Gentlemen’s Agreement.229 Reflecting on the

visit, Hogue reported that the meetings were a positive step and constituted an agreement at a high

level, yet it remained to be seen whether the agreement would be carried out in practice given

bureaucratic difficulties in Indonesia (and Australia).230

Mackellar’s visit to the ASEAN region was seen to be a success.231 The press statement

released by Mackellar said that Australia and Indonesia would develop arrangements for closer

cooperation in processing refugees, including posting an Australian Immigration official to Jakarta to

work with the recently posted UNHCR officer and Indonesian officials.232 He was, he said, ‘reassured

by the mutual concern of Indonesia and Australia to co-operate in solving problems of people from

Indo-China’.233 Furthermore, Australia would develop a liaison for transmitting intelligence to

Indonesia on boat movements from Vietnam, maintain cooperation with UNHCR representative in

Indonesia and develop arrangements for medical examination in Jakarta.234 The success of the

Gentlemen’s Agreement, however, would be tested once more refugee boats arrived. While

Australia’s Department of Defence was happy to learn of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, they were still

keen to have Indonesia share information with them and improve intelligence on the early warning of

boats arriving. If the Gentlemen’s Agreement was not successful, then they would need to be alert to

opportunities to approach Indonesia again regarding such timely information.235 ‘Quite apart from

humanitarian concerns for the safety of the people involved’, the letter reads, ‘early warning can mean

very substantial savings in coastal surveillance effort, and helps to keep in perspective the sensitive

public issues which are generated by unannounced arrivals’.236

228 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Visit of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” July 10, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 229 Hogue to Canberra. 230 Hogue to Canberra. 231 Michael Mackellar, “Indo-Chinese Refugees - Visit of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Mr M.J.R. Mackellar to South East Asia, 7-28 July 1978,” July 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 232 Michael MacKellar, “Press Statement by Mr Mackellar, Australian Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” July 11, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 233 MacKellar. 234 Mackellar, “Indo-Chinese Refugees - Visit of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Mr M.J.R. Mackellar to South East Asia, 7-28 July 1978.” 235 N.L. Webb to Defence Attache Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Australian Coastal Surveillance and the Movement of ‘Boat People’ Through Indonesian Waters,” August 25, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 236 Webb to Australian Embassy, Jakarta.

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Testing the Gentlemen’s Agreement: The Hong Hai On the 17th of November, Australia’s Ambassador, Critchley, wrote to Yoga reminding him of

the Gentlemen’s Agreement. ‘Unfortunately,’ he wrote, ‘this agreement does not seem yet to be

working well in practice’.237 He made reference to the Hong Hai, a boat that arrived in Darwin earlier

that week, and listed the four Indonesian ports it called into.238 According to a report by Australia’s

Office of National Assessments, the arrival of the Hong Hai ‘suggests that the Indonesians may have

ignored the Gentlemen’s Agreement’.239 While Indonesia may have intentionally ignored the

Gentlemen’s Agreement, the Agreement’s flawed implementation may have also been due to

problems with Indonesia’s bureaucracy and Australia’s inflexibility.

Despite finally getting the agreement it sought after, the Australian government made

attempts to bypass it by involving the UNHCR. For example, Australia’s Naval Attaché in Indonesia had

come across press reports that the Hong Hai, with 38 refugees on board, had left Cirebon on Java’s

northern coast, where it spent four days while undergoing repairs to the vessel.240 Allen at the

embassy in Jakarta contacted the UNHCR representative in Malaysia, Rajah Surampatkumar to ask

that the UNHCR use their good offices to ensure the boat is held in Indonesia.241 Allen preferred that

the UNHCR approach Aspoor, so that the UNHCR would be their first point of contact and so that

Australia could avoid the impression, by not asking first, that they would automatically accept all of

the refugees on board – effectively avoiding their own Gentlemen’s Agreement. The embassy did,

however, pass this information on to Soenarso, reminding him of the Gentlemen’s Agreement.242

Soenarso claimed that he was unaware of the boat but assured the Embassy that if the boat was

located, it would be held so that the refugees can be processed.243 By the 30th of October there had

still not been word of the location of the Hong Hai, but Major Putu had despatched messages to the

ports east of Cirebon where the vessel would likely call into for provisions.244

Further evidence of Indonesia’s disregard for the Gentlemen’s Agreement occurred when

Indonesia had allowed a number of boats to leave port without informing Australia or holding the

237 T.K. Critchley to Yoga Soegama, November 17, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 238 Critchley to Soegama. 239 Office of National Assessments, “The Boat Exodus from Vietnam: Regional Reactions” (Canberra, November 16, 1978), 3, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 240 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Joint Intelligence Organisation Canberra, “Vietnamese Boat Refugees,” October 2, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 241 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” October 24, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 242 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” October 24, 1978. 243 Allen to Canberra; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” October 25, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 244 G.C. Allen, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” October 30, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia.

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refugees for orderly processing.245 For example, a 65 foot vessel with 65 refugees on board reached

Darwin on the 6th of December.246 According to the master of the vessel, the boat had been

intercepted by an Indonesian patrol boat on the 19th of November and was warned against landing.247

Thus, they continued their voyage and were again, on the 26th of November, intercepted by an

Indonesian patrol boat, given 44 gallons of water and a map with bearings to Timor and onward to

Cape Don in the Northern Territory.248

Nevertheless, it seemed that the details of the Gentlemen’s Agreement had not been passed

on to all relevant authorities. On the 3rd of November Australia’s Naval Attaché learned from a

discussion with the Indonesian Director of Naval Intelligence that the Hong Hai left Ampenan in

Lombok on the 28th of October.249 Evidently, the Director was unaware of the Gentlemen’s Agreement

and any instructions to hold the vessel. The Embassy spoke with Soenarso and expressed amazement

that the Navy were unaware of Australia and Indonesia’s agreement. Soenarso ‘appeared genuinely

concerned at what he said appeared to be a breakdown in communications’ and instructed, in the

presence of the embassy officials, ‘Major Putu to contact the intelligence authorities at the Ministry

of Defence to ensure that the substance of our agreement was passed to all concerned and the

request that the boat be located and held be reissued’.250 The boat was found by the Australian Navy

60km from Darwin and brought into harbour on the 13th of November.251 It turned out the boat

stopped a number of times at Indonesian ports, where it was given a detailed map, provisions, and to

disembark and later re-embark an ill passenger for hospitalisation. No attempt was made to stop the

boat, and it was given final clearance by Indonesian officials, who knew the intended destination of

the boat, on the 7th of November.252

The Navy were not the only Indonesian department which had not yet heard of the

Gentlemen’s Agreement. On the 30th of November, the Embassy spoke to Indonesia’s Secretary to the

Directorate General of Foreign Relations and Security in DEPLU, Colonel Damanik. Australian officials

245 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” December 4, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 28, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugee Boat - THR 8677,” November 29, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 246 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Vietnamese Refugee Boat No 3501 KG,” December 5, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 247 Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Indo Chinese Refugee Vessel 3501 KG,” December 6, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 248 Canberra and Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 249 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees - VNKG0054ADC,” November 3, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 250 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” October 24, 1978. 251 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugee Vessel - VNKG0054A,” November 14, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 252 Canberra.

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raised the matter of the Gentlemen’s Agreement with him, but Damanik said he was unaware of it.253

He said it was Indonesia’s basic policy was not to allow refugees to land in Indonesia. This is because

Indonesia had its own problems and did not want to create a precedent attracting large numbers of

refugees, yet, for humanitarian reasons, it would allow emergency cases to land temporarily, including

boats with damage, engine trouble or limited supplies. In such cases, Indonesia would administer

assistance and allow the boats to proceed, unless boats were irreparable, in which case they would

be allowed to stay under the responsibility of the UNHCR.254 Furthermore, they would not accept

refugees from commercial vessels and considered this the problem of the shipping company

(Indonesian ships were under strict instruction not to pick up refugees). Indonesia was, he said,

concerned that the UNCHR could not give a watertight guarantee regarding the resettlement of all

refugees and that refugees were held in Indonesia for many months pending resettlement.255

Essentially, according to many officials, Indonesia’s policy had not changed at all, despite the various

agreements discussed above. In a comment to the Indonesian parliament on the 4th of December,

1978, foreign minister Mochtar said that refugee ships would be able to birth and replenish their fuel

and food supplies in Indonesia, but they must then proceed on their voyage to other countries. He

also called for an ASEAN common policy in handling the issue.256

This lack of cooperation from Indonesia was evidence of Indonesia’s growing impatience with

Australia’s delays in processing. The embassy had again been approached by DEPLU to request the

early movement of 304 refugees in Tanjug Pinang that Australia had already accepted, and to again

check the number of refugees that Australia would accept from the Southern Cross, a vessel with over

1,200 refugees on board whom it had claimed to rescue at sea, but it was later revealed that they

were paid passengers collected at the mouth of the Saigon River with the help of Vietnamese

officials.257 When Malaysia and Singapore refused its entry, the Captain beached the ship on the rocky

outcrop of Indonesia’s Pengibu Island in September, 1978.258 The Indonesian government were furious

but eventually received guarantees for resettlement from the US, Australia and Canada.259 Indonesia

became more nervous in October with the presence of the Hai Hong in the region, another organised

253 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees_ Indonesia’s Policy,” December 2, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 254 Allen to Canberra. 255 Allen to Canberra; G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” November 6, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 256 Australian Embassy, Jakarta to Canberra, “Indonesian Foreign Policy: Current Issues,” December 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 257 Davies, Legitimising Rejection, 99; Larry Clinton Thompson, Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975-1982 (McFarland, 2010), 150. 258 Davies, Legitimising Rejection, 99; Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 28. 259 Thompson, Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975-1982, 150.

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boat with 2,450 on board.260 After the arrival of the Southern Cross and with the Hai Hong in the

region, Indonesian authorities were becoming more nervous about Australian intentions with regard

to the Gentlemen’s Agreement.261 It had been more than three months since Australia had accepted

304 refugees and yet none had been moved to Australia.262 Given the delays in processing, the

Embassy was concerned that Indonesia might question the Gentlemen’s Agreement and withdraw

cooperation.263 As of the 25th of November, 493 refugees had departed Indonesia for Australia, 335

waiting for movement with 257 planned departures and 71 awaiting clearances, not including

refugees off the Southern Cross, of which Australia intended to take 110.264

While some Indonesian officials were unaware of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, others had

different understandings on what it meant. This is further evidence of the importance of bureaucracies

– not just the interaction between them but of effective policy implementation by each side. On the

22nd of December 1978, Allen met with Colonel Damanik (DEPLU) and Colonel Bintoro (Defence), who

did not accept Australia’s understanding of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, rather, they believed that

under the agreement Indonesia was to notify Australia of boats passing through to Australia and were

not aware of any agreement to hold boats for orderly processing.265 To clear up the misunderstandings

around the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the Embassy sent a letter to General Yoga (as he was unavailable

to meet), and, in the meantime, spoke to Colonel Soenarso (Director, Overseas Operations, BAKIN).

Soenarso said that there had been ‘an administrative mix-up’ arising from Yoga’s joint function, that

is, Yoga sent out instructions that all boats transiting Indonesian waters be held pending further

instructions in his capacity of Head of BAKIN, which cannot issue orders, rather than Chief of Staff of

KOPKAMTIB, which can issue orders.266 Soenarso believed that the issue could be resolved, but Allen

was not so sure: ‘we have heard almost as many versions as we have seen people’.267 Soenarso showed

Allen a copy of the draft reply from Yoga to the Australian ambassador on the 6th of January, 1979. It

sets out the Indonesian understanding of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, suggesting there are two

categories of boats: (1) where all passengers intend to go to Australia, and are to then be held under

260 Davies, Legitimising Rejection, 99–102. 261 Allen to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” November 6, 1978. 262 Allen to Canberra. 263 Allen to Canberra. 264 “Statistics on Vietnamese Refugees - 25 November 1978,” November 25, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra to Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, “Indochinese Refugees - ‘Southern Cross’ and ‘Hai Hong,’” December 1, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 265 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 29, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 266 G.C. Allen to Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees: Gentlemen’s Agreement,” January 16, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 267 Allen to Canberra.

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the Gentlemen’s Agreement for orderly processing, and (2) where only some passengers wish to go

to Australia, and are to be refuelled, replenished, and sent on their way.268 Allen replied that this did

not match Australia’s understanding, and explained the ‘considerable advantages for Indonesia in

terms of its own policy on Indochinese refugees in accepting our version of the Gentlemen’s

Agreement’.269 Australia would, Allen said, make concessions to Indonesia in a confidential bilateral

manner. Soenarso suggested that Australia outline its position to the Jakarta Committee, which would

meet soon.270

Holding the Boats: Indonesia’s Perspective Ultimately, cooperation on the ground under the Gentlemen’s Agreement was stifled because

the key departments within the Indonesian government did not know about the agreement, and of

those that did, there were misunderstandings on what the agreement meant. There were a number

of reasons for Indonesia’s unwillingness to hold the boats and to commit to cooperation in general.

This section will outline the reasons for Indonesia’s unwillingness to cooperate with Australia in

sharing information or holding the boats for processing.

First, Indonesia was concerned about the cost involved. Soenarso personally believed that the

Jakarta Committee would accept Australia’s proposal to hold boats, but that it would take time, and

stressed the important role of the UNHCR. If the UNHCR would be willing to hold the refugees at their

expense and take responsibility for those not settled in Australia, it would likely lead to a positive

answer from the Indonesian side and resolve Indonesia’s concerns.271 In addition, the Navy were

anxious to get rid of boats as soon as possible because they were the ones footing the bill while the

refugees remained on board their boats.272

Second, Indonesia did not see the refugee issue as their responsibility. As Cavan Hogue recalls,

the Indonesians would argue ‘well, you know, you should be taking them, you caused the problem,

you were invading Vietnam, it’s nothing to do with us, so they should all be going to Australia’.273 And

if there was any mention of the Refugee Convention, ‘it fell on deaf ears’.274 The Indonesians would

say ‘well we didn’t sign it. But we are humane and you know we looked after people and so on’.275

268 Allen to Canberra. 269 Allen to Canberra. 270 Allen to Canberra. 271 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (a),” March 18, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 272 R.J. Whitten, “Record of Conversation with Colonel Sigit, Deputy to Navy Chief of Staff and Captain R.J. Whitten, Naval Attache: Retention of Vietnamese Refugee Vessel VNKG 1061 in Tanjung Priok,” May 10, 1978. 273 Hogue, Interview with Author. 274 Hogue. 275 Hogue.

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Third, there were bureaucratic difficulties. Aspoor alluded to the upcoming presidential

elections as a reason why Indonesia would not comply with Australia’s request despite the written

assurance.276 The ministers were in caretaker mode, pending the election of a new executive and it

had not been possible for the Jakarta Committee to meet and consider Australia’s assurances.277

Furthermore, as shown repeatedly above, the central government in Jakarta had little control over

what happened in the outer provinces. According to Cavan Hogue:

There were definitely cases where [refugees] were taking off by themselves

because there was no local control, although they were not being pushed off they

were going with the connivance of the local authorities … And we were trying to

get the Indonesians to stop that happening. … They were a bit diffident about it

and they were anxious to get rid of them. … Again, I suspect they didn’t need to be

pushed.278

As most of my interviewees pointed out: ‘the sway of Jakarta out in the provinces is pretty well, it’s

(chuckles) it has much less impact … [they] have a molasses like bureaucracy that sort of sets and it’s

hard to shift … [and] you have corruption which creates problems in the way of an effective

centralised, control of things’.279

Not only did the central government in Jakarta have limited control over its outer provinces,

there was wide disagreement within the central government in Jakarta itself. While some individuals

were sympathetic to Australia’s position, this was not widely held in all departments. For example,

Soenarso said that he was seeking to amend the refugee procedure based on the precedent

established with the Hong Kiang and Australia’s confidential assurances, but this would have to be

agreed to by Ministry of Defence, who was responsible for co-ordination of the policy.280 When boat

VNSG-1061 had arrived in Tanjung Priok on the 7th of May 1978 with 37 passengers – 20 of whom

were children – Australia’s Naval Attaché, Captain RJ Whitten, asked Colonel Sigit, the deputy to the

Chief of Staff of Indonesia’s Navy, to hold the boat for ‘humanitarian reasons’.281 He wanted to

recreate the arrangement that worked for the Hong Kiang, and he pre-empted Indonesia’s concerns

by promising a quick processing time and that he understood that the UNHCR would meet these costs.

Nevertheless, he sensed that the Navy’s willingness to cooperate ‘is very much hampered by the lack

276 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (b),” March 18, 1978. 277 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (a),” March 18, 1978. 278 Hogue, Interview with Author. 279 Farmer, Interview with Author. 280 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.JA17935),” March 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia. 281 Whitten, “Record of Conversation with Colonel Sigit, Deputy to Navy Chief of Staff and Captain R.J. Whitten, Naval Attache: Retention of Vietnamese Refugee Vessel VNKG 1061 in Tanjung Priok.”

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of decision and the lack of coordinating machinery at a higher level’.282 Foreign Affairs were also

sympathetic, but noted that the final decision would be made by the military.283 And while the Ministry

of Defence was not inclined to change its hard-line approach, there were other levels of the Indonesian

Government – middle levels of Defence and BAKIN – that believed that Australia’s proposal was

‘constructive and deserved further consideration’.284 Another problem was that there was some

reluctance at the middle levels of the Ministry of Defence to broach the matter with General Moerdani

who is in charge of any changes to the policy, and as Soenarso suggested, Australia should perhaps

meet with Moerdani directly.285 Similarly, for example, Soenarso was confident that a boat, VNKG-

0042, could be held and asked Defence to hold it if it, and the VNSG-1061, called in at other ports.286

Aspoor, on the other hand, informed the embassy on the 21st of March 1978 that VNKG-0042 had

actually left Tanjung Priok at 4.15pm the day before and was rather ‘equivocal’ about the question of

holding VNSG-1061, should it stop at another port.287

Fourth, as mentioned above, while the continuing departure of boats raised questions about

the level of control Jakarta had in the provinces, it also raised questions about whether these promises

were intentionally broken. The Javanese, for example, are known to avoid saying no to save face. Batak

culture, however, is typically known for being more straightforward. As Hogue recalls:

you always had cultural factors of course, which sometimes you had to explain to

people in Canberra, things they didn’t understand. I still remember when (laughs)

where we had a minister come through, and Indonesians were going to have to

tell him something that you know, he wasn’t going to like. So he lined up to see

four ministers, three Javanese, and one Batak. And so the three Javanese were all

very Javanese with sweetness and light, and he got to the minister for Defence

Panggabean, who gave it to him between the eyes, in the best Batak manner. And

he came back and he said to us ‘oh, there’s not a problem’ he said, ‘you know there

was one bloke who was a bit difficult, but three of them, you know they didn’t

have a problem’. ‘Minister – you haven’t got the message’ (laughs). The Batak was

the messenger. So these were some of the things you had to deal with.288

Fifth, long waits in processing and moving refugees made Indonesia nervous. Whitten had

sensed, upon requesting that VNSG-1061 be held, that the fact that there were still refugees in

Indonesia from a boat which had been in Indonesia for two months – despite some of its passengers

282 Whitten. 283 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees - VNKG 1061,” May 10, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 284 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” April 4, 1978. 285 Allen to Canberra. 286 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.JA17935),” March 21, 1978. 287 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (O.JA17942),” March 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 3, National Archives of Australia; Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees (b),” March 18, 1978. 288 Hogue, Interview with Author.

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already being resettled in Australia – was hindering Australia’s bargaining position.289 Australian

processing officer, Paul Smith, interviewed refugees in camps at Tanjung Pinang on Bintan Island and

Tanjung Priok, Jakarta.290 Despite the relaxed criteria, Smith had only recommended 28 of the 107

interviewed in Tanjung Pinang for entry to Australia. In Jakarta, eight refugees were considered

‘acceptable’ and 33 of ‘low priority’.291 This concerned the Embassy, which cabled Canberra to stress

that such a rate of acceptance would not convince the Indonesians ‘that there would be any mileage

for them in stopping boats’.292 Smith, it turned out, was not aware of the generous criteria and the

actions Australia told Indonesia that it was prepared to take.293 Furthermore, in December of 1978

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Professor Mochtar, visited Australia for four days to discuss the bilateral

relationship, defence, ASEAN, strategic developments and events in Indochina.294 Australian officials

in Canberra told Mochtar that Australia wanted to give more substance to the relationship and

coordinate its policies with ASEAN countries, and suggested that they establish regular bilateral

ministerial meetings.295 But while Mochtar said that Indonesia was happy with Australia’s cooperation

regarding Indochinese refugees, he also criticised Australia’s policies to a news conference: ‘In general

if you talk about refugees then you should not pick and choose because they are people in distress’.296

Although the Indonesian Government had also strengthened its sea patrol to prevent the arrival of

‘any unnecessary new complications caused by the refugees’.297

Indonesia had publicly voiced its impatience. In a public statement on the 16th of November,

Information Minister Ali Murtopo said that Indonesia was not prepared to bear the burden of the

refugees stranded in Indonesia.298 He called on the UNCHR to move the refugees temporarily

accommodated in Indonesia to other countries, and reminded them that Indonesia was only prepared

to provide transit facilities for refugees passing through as Indonesia was limited in facilities and

289 Whitten, “Record of Conversation with Colonel Sigit, Deputy to Navy Chief of Staff and Captain R.J. Whitten, Naval Attache: Retention of Vietnamese Refugee Vessel VNKG 1061 in Tanjung Priok.” 290 G.E.C. Gibson, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: Indonesia,” May 26, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 291 Gibson. 292 G.E.C. Gibson to Department of Foreign Affairs Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” May 24, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 293 Gibson to Canberra. 294 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, “Visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister,” December 19, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 295 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Jakarta. 296 “Minister Mochtar on Refugees,” Antara, December 18, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 297 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 298 As cited in: D. Irvine to Canberra, “Vietnamese Refugees,” November 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia.

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financial capabilities.299 This was concerning for Australian officials, unsure if ‘transit facilities’ was a

reference to the holding arrangement, or simply assistance for the boats to move on. 300 Dorsett, from

the Australian Embassy, wrote on the 20th of November: ‘taking everything into consideration, I think

the Indonesians are being uncooperative in all this. Our record for moving people is far better than

any other country … and would be even better [if] facilities were available to do our processing in an

orderly manner.’301

Sixth, Indonesia has its own problems and it was keen to prevent a protracted refugee

situation becoming another. Despite Australia’s repeated representations, Indonesia’s Ministry of

Defence was sticking to its hard-line approach.302 In its view, there were three categories of refugees:

those arriving in small boats of good condition which would be reprovisioned and sent on, those

picked up by shipping traffic who are considered to be responsibility of ship and not allowed to berth,

and those who arrived in unseaworthy boats and therefore kept in camps pending resettlement.303

The Ministry of Defence were concerned about the possibility of category 3 refugees remaining in

Indonesia and did not want to add category 1 to the group.304 Furthermore, according to a report by

Australia’s Office of National Assessments, Indonesia could be expected to adopt an increasingly tough

approach to the rise in numbers of refugees, particularly of ethnic Chinese origin.305

Finally, in light of the above, Indonesia did not trust that Australian policy would not damage

these interests. If Australia interviewed boat people, it implied that some will be rejected, and if

Australia rejects them, other resettlement countries are likely to do so as well – leaving them in

Indonesia. If they were sent on to Australia, however, they would all be Australia’s problem and not

Indonesia’s, thus there was little incentive for Jakarta to cooperate and hold boats for processing. Any

action that may leave Indonesia with more refugees for longer periods would not be welcomed and

would lead to even less cooperation than Australia is currently receiving.306 One of the Australians

Embassy’s regular contacts revealed that the problem was that the Indonesians ‘were not convinced

that they could trust completely Australian assurances’.307 Indonesia was quite determined not to

accept any refugees and ‘did not want to find themselves in a position where Australia took the cream

299 As cited in: Irvine to Canberra. 300 Irvine to Canberra. 301 A.J. Dorsett to T.K. Critchley, Cavan Hogue, and R.J. Whitten, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 302 Allen to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” April 4, 1978. 303 Allen to Canberra. 304 Allen to Canberra. 305 Office of National Assessments, “The Boat Exodus from Vietnam: Regional Reactions.” 306 Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 25, 1977. 307 Hogue to Canberra, “Refugee Boats,” May 15, 1978.

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and left them with the refugees unacceptable to Australia’.308 As a result, Indonesia would need a

formal written guarantee that sets out precisely Australia’s intentions and reiterate that Australia

would not go back on its word, which would be examined carefully to ensure there were no

loopholes.309

Not only did Indonesia not trust Australia’s assurances, there was limited importance placed

on the relationship. According to Moerdani, Indonesia had never seen Australia as a threat, rather,

threats were to the North.310 He claimed that the immediate threats to Indonesia included illegal

fishing by foreign trawlers, oil tankers passing through the Straits of Malacca and the associated

dangers of oil spills, and the unsettled boundary near Vietnam where oil was likely to be found. While

Indonesia was ‘fairly well disposed towards Australia … the Timor issue had caused some problems’,

but despite this, Indonesia did not consider Australia closely and Australia’s importance to Indonesia

was thus limited.311 Although, Moerdani noted, a start could be made by increasing military joint

exercises.312 In May 1978, Australia’s Ambassador, Critchley, made a courtesy call to Indonesian

Director General for Foreign Relations and Security in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Brigadier

General Adenan. Adenan said that Indonesia was concerned about the attitude of reporting in

Australia of developments in Indonesia and Irian Jaya, which seem to be false and sensationalist, and

was also keen to commence negotiations on the Seabed Boundary between Indonesia and

Australia.313

The Indochinese refugees was not a significant enough concern for the Indonesians. Though

Moerdani suggested that, as a result of US Vice President’s Mondale’s visit, there could be agreement

on holding refugees in camps for a week or two before sending them all to the US, and he hoped that

this would meet Australia’s problems.314 David Irvine, the First Secretary at the embassy, interpreted

Adenan’s response as a polite reply more than any kind of commitment, as Adenan continued to stress

that Indonesia had enough problems of its own and did not intend to take any Indochinese refugees

itself.315 This sentiment was echoed by Colonel Soenarso of BAKIN during his talk with Mr. Grant, a

308 Hogue to Canberra. 309 Hogue to Canberra. 310 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Conversation with General Moerdani,” May 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 311 Hogue to Canberra. 312 Hogue to Canberra. 313 D. Irvine, “Courtesy Call: Australian Press; Indonesia/PNG Relations; East Timor; Family Reunions; Indo-Chinese Refugees; Sino-Indonesian Relations; Seabed Negotiations; Indonesian-Singapore Relations,” May 24, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 314 Hogue to Canberra, “Conversation with General Moerdani,” May 13, 1978. 315 Irvine, “Courtesy Call: Australian Press; Indonesia/PNG Relations; East Timor; Family Reunions; Indo-Chinese Refugees; Sino-Indonesian Relations; Seabed Negotiations; Indonesian-Singapore Relations.”

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counsellor at the embassy, on the 25th of May.316 Soenarso indicated appreciation and sympathy and

Australia’s position, but stressed that Indonesia’s actions were governed by a desire to not be landed

with refugees unacceptable to resettlement countries, therefore, policy would be to encourage

refugees to move through Indonesia as quickly as possible.317

In sum, Indonesia was reluctant to cooperate because of the potential costs involved, it saw

the responsibility for the refugees to rest with the countries which were directly involved in the

Vietnam War, there were bureaucratic difficulties and disagreements, and it wanted to avoid a

protracted refugee situation but could not trust Australia to not damage this interest. Finally, for

Indonesia, the issue was not likely to cause damage to bilateral relationship which, at that time, there

was little interest in prioritising.

Diversifying Strategy: Internationalisation Australia had a two-pronged approach in addressing the boat problem. Besides trying to stop

boats in the region and seeking cooperation from neighbouring countries, Australia also tried to

internationalise the problem by appealing to governments for greater resettlement places, as had

been recommended by both Indonesian officials and Australian staff at the embassy. To this end,

Australia and the US had sounded out attitudes to an international conference for states to pledge

resettlement places and funds. The idea was not initially received favourably Canada318 and France319,

and the UNHCR had doubts about its success.320 But ASEAN states also wanted to internationalise the

problem so they could get guarantees that refugees would be resettled.

The refugee exodus had necessarily drawn regional interest and a number of regional

meetings were held during 1978.321 Australia encouraged Indonesia to take an active part in these

316 W.M. Grant, “Record of Conversation with Col. Sunarso and Grant: ONN-Suharto Talks,” May 25, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 317 Grant. 318 Australian Embassy, Washington and Canberra, “Indo-China Refugees,” June 22, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 319 The French were concerned a conference could be counterproductive, argued against special attention to Indochinese refugees, who, they believed, did not fall within the UNHCR definition of “refugee”. They were further concerned that resettling refugees would play into Hanoi’s hands, the results of the conference could be meagre and unpredictable, and France wished to avoid criticising the Vietnamese government in a UN context. See: Australian Embassy, Paris to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees - French Views on Internationalisation,” June 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; The French also wished to avoid bringing their current resettlement program to domestic attention and to avoid unnecessary identification with the US. See: Canberra to Australian High Commission, Ottawa et al., “Indochinese Refugees - Internationalisation,” June 29, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 320 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” June 26, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; Canberra to Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur et al., “Indochinese Refugees,” October 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 321 For example, on the 3rd of July the UNHCR held a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to update interested foreign missions of the refugee situation in Malaysia. See: Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Australian

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meetings; Geoff Allen asked Soedarsono, the Director for Asia-Pacific in Indonesia’s Department of

Foreign Affairs, to play an active role in the Kuala Lumpur Meeting322 in setting out the problem for

resettlement countries.323 Soedarsono mentioned that it was not such a big problem for Indonesia324

– but that Indonesia would act in concert with ASEAN.325 At the meeting, the only country of first

asylum to speak was Indonesia – represented by their deputy chief of mission in Kuala Lumpur. He

said that Indonesia did not accept refugees except on humanitarian grounds, and, rather than putting

forward resettlement countries’ position and explaining their difficulties as Allen had requested, the

Indonesian representative requested resettlement countries speed up processing and relax

assessment criteria.326

Australia saw that internationalising the issue and involving the UNHCR would ease some

tension in Australia and Indonesia’s bilateral relationship as well as give some room for Australia to

move in its guarantees.327 Given Australia’s wavering success in having Indonesia hold boats for orderly

processing, Australia’s ambassador in Jakarta, Critchley, argued that the most effective – and possibly

the only – way of stopping boats leaving Indonesia for Australia is to give ‘cast iron’ guarantees to

Indonesia.328 However, the Embassy also noted that such guarantee would have ‘the negative effect

of virtually waiving our right to select refugees for settlement and of putting the word around that

Australia will take anyone who gets to Indonesia’.329 Therefore, according to the Critchley, the only

way for Australia to dial back its guarantees would be to get greater involvement from the UNHCR.

Critchley noted, however, that Indonesia may see this as an attempt by Australia to withdraw its

Embassy, Bangkok and Australian Embassy, Manila, “Vietnamese Refugees,” June 29, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; There was also a meeting called by Sampatkmar, the UNHCR representative, between the heads of missions in Singapore to discuss the situation in Singapore and its new, tighter, policies. See: Australian High Commission, Singapore to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” October 5, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 322 On the 20th and 21st of September the UNHCR held a meeting between representatives from traditional resettlement countries and ASEAN countries in Kuala Lumpur to continue the process of high level consultation between the UNHCR and governments. See: Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees - Kuala Lumpur Meeting,” September 22, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; And: Australian Government, “Aide Memoire.” 323 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 324 Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar had previously outlined that it was an issue of great importance to Thailand and Malaysia, then Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia, in that order. See: Hogue to Canberra, “Visit of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” July 10, 1978. 325 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” September 13, 1978. 326 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees - Kuala Lumpur Meeting,” September 22, 1978. 327 T.K. Critchley to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” July 27, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 328 Critchley to Canberra. 329 Critchley to Canberra.

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guarantees and therefore withdraw its cooperation.330 Thus he advised that to mitigate this risk,

Australia should not be directly involved in UNHCR approaches to Indonesia, and make it clear ‘that

our guarantee still stands in respect of anyone not sent elsewhere (i.e. in effect, we take over the

“country of last resort” guarantee which the US considered earlier)’.331

ASEAN also wanted to internationalise the problem. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting

on the 16th of June 1978, the Foreign Ministers had decided to propose to the UNHCR an agreement

to hold refugees in their respective countries, provided that the UNHCR accepts responsibility for the

resettlement of all refugees and that resettlement countries accept a fixed quote of these refugees.332

The meeting called for more assistance and action in handling the refugee problem. Including refugee

problems at this meeting shows that ASEAN countries viewed the refugee problem as a regional

problem. According to the Thai Foreign Minister, Upadit Pachariyangkun, ‘this problem does not

concern just Thailand or the five ASEAN countries but is a humanitarian problem which concerns the

world’, and echoed by Singapore’s foreign minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, who pointed out that

the refugee problem is a heritage of a war not created by ASEAN countries and is therefore not an

ASEAN problem but an international one.333 Mackellar, at a press conference in Bangkok on the 21st

of July 1978, said that ‘The countries of ASEAN are calling for a sympathetic response to the human

tragedy of Indo Chinese refugees’, and that Australia would be joining with ASEAN’s push to widen

the international response to the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.334

Australia did just this. On the 9th of October 1978, Australia’s Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock

issued a press statement in New York, stating that Australia would, at the UNHCR EXCOM meeting,

call for formal international consultations in relation to the Indochinese refugee crisis before the end

of the year.335 He said that Australia, its ASEAN neighbours and traditional resettlement countries were

concerned about the limited nature of the international community’s response.336 Australia sought

approval from ASEAN governments, including Indonesia, in drafting its statement to the UNHCR

EXCOM meeting requesting that the UNHCR initiate international consultations with member and

330 Critchley to Canberra. 331 Critchley to Canberra. 332 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” June 28, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 333 Australian Embassy, Bangkok to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees,” June 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia; “US ‘Needed in SE Asia,’” The Canberra Times, August 5, 1978; See also calls from Malaysian Foreign Minister: “Action Urged on Refugee Problem,” The Straits Times, June 15, 1978, eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19780615-1.2.23.2. 334 Michael MacKellar, “Mackellar Press Conference - Bangkok,” July 21, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 335 Andrew Peacock, “Press Release - Refugee Situation,” October 9, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 336 Peacock.

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non-member governments.337 The UNHCR was unhappy with such a call and resisted arguments for

an international conference338, yet, according to the EXCOM’s wishes, the UNHCR called for

consultations before the end of the year at the UN General Assembly. Australia naturally welcomed

this call in its statement to the UN General Assembly on the 14th of November, highlighting that

Australia is ‘very conscious of the particular difficulties with which countries of first refuge in South

East Asia are coping. [Australia] believe[s] that their burden should be recognised and that the efforts

they have made in the interests of humanity should be applauded. The best means of achieving these

ends would lie in the intensification of efforts to promote the resettlement of refugees in a wider

range of countries’.339

Yet Indonesia initially wanted to avoid international attention. It was not interested in sending

high level representation to the consultative Meeting with Interested Governments on Refugees and

Displaced Persons in South-East Asia convened by the UNHCR on the 11th and 12th of December 1978

in Geneva. The meeting was to ‘identify the ways of alleviating and solving the problems of refugees

and displaced persons in South East Asia [and] translate these ways into immediate action and

results’.340 Australia encouraged ASEAN governments to send a ministerial representation to the

conference, but Indonesia planned to only send its representative in Geneva.341 According to Damanik

(Acting director general for press and security affairs, DEPLU), Indonesia was concerned about the

337 Canberra et al., “U.N.H.C.R Executive Committee (Draft Statement),” October 10, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; G.C. Allen to Axioma Sudiro, October 23, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” November 1, 1978, D, https://www.unhcr.org/excom/unhcrannual/3ae68c2f4/addendum-report-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html; G.C. Allen to Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: UNHCR EXCOM,” October 9, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur et al., “Indo-Chinese Refugees - UNHCR Excom Meeting (9-17 October),” 6 October 1978, n.d., A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 338 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur et al., “Indochinese Refugees,” October 13, 1978; Canberra to Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “UNHCR Executive Committee,” October 11, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 339 Australian Delegation, “Australian Statement on the Report of the United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees at UNHA 33 Third Committee,” November 14, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 4, National Archives of Australia. 340 Poul Hartling, “Opening Statement by Mr. Poul Hartling, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Consultative Meeting with Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, Geneva, 11 December 1978,” UNHCR, December 11, 1978, https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fce4c/opening-statement-mr-poul-hartling-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html. 341 Canberra to Australian High Commission, Singapore et al., “Singapore: Indochinese Refugees,” November 15, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; G.C. Allen to Defence Canberra and Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indochinese Refugees Geneva Conference,” December 8, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia.

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refugee problem but felt there was little it could do.342 Soenarso, again being typically helpful to the

Australians, advised the embassy that if it wanted Indonesia to send a higher representation, Australia

should get Malaysia and Thailand to approach Indonesia through ASEAN solidarity.343 Malaysia had

encouraged ASEAN countries to increase their level of representation at the conference, however, to

no avail.344 According to the embassy, Indonesia’s resistance to upgrading its representation at the

conference was due to its desire to keep a low profile, as it had relatively few refugees on its shores

which are resettled at an acceptable rate. Taking a more active role could increase refugee interest in

Indonesia.345 But on the 7th of December, Indonesian media reported the Foreign Minister, Mochtar,

stating that at the request of the Thai government, Indonesia would send a delegation headed by

Indonesia’s ambassador to Geneva to the Geneva conference.346 For Indonesia, he said, the refugee

problem was serious as there was no sign of its end and that it was a problem of humanity to which

Indonesia could not remain indifferent.347 This is indicative of Indonesia’s lack of trust in Australia and

the need to bring the international in to help convince Indonesia.

The December meeting involved 38 countries. At the conference, Mackellar delivered the first

general statement of the conference, where he reiterated Australia’s humanitarian obligations, but

also recognised that it had limited capacity to absorb refugees.348 He emphasised the humanitarian

efforts of countries in the region and pushed for orderly processing to determine genuineness of

refugees, and that anyone breaking out of the orderly process ‘must be returned into the process, so

that the entire pattern of organised movement is not broken’.349 According to Indonesia, however, the

conference was not entirely successful because most participating countries were not prepared to

receive the refugees. Damanik believed some of the proposals may help ASEAN countries, but also

might encourage more to leave Vietnam.350 The Australians considered the meeting a success and

342 Cavan Hogue to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” November 23, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 343 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees - UNHCR Consultative Meeting,” December 1, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 344 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: Geneva Consultations,” December 6, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; Allen to Canberra and Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indochinese Refugees Geneva Conference,” December 8, 1978. 345 Allen to Canberra and Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indochinese Refugees Geneva Conference,” December 8, 1978. 346 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 7, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 347 Allen to Canberra. 348 Michael MacKellar, “UNHCR Consultative Meeting with Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persions in South East Asia - Speech by Australian Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs the Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar, M.P.,” December 11, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 349 MacKellar. 350 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 20, 1978.

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produced a doubling or resettlement places and increased funding,351 while the New York Times

reported seven months later that it had little impact on the refugee problem.352

With numbers of refugees rising in 1979, the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim,

invited 71 countries to a meeting of ‘purely humanitarian character’ on Indochinese refugees in order

to seek to find new homes for the thousands of displaced.353 The conference was held in Geneva over

the 20th and 21st of July, 1979, and was considered largely successful. It resulted in an increase in

resettlement places from 125,000 to 260,000 and Vietnam agreed to halt departures and instead

promote orderly and direct departures. Donations to UNHCR reached $160 million and Indonesia and

the Philippines agreed to open processing centres.354 This program virtually stopped the arrival of

boats in Australia, with no boats arriving from Indochina from the last to arrive in 1981 until the next

arrived in 1989.355 But given Indonesia’s persistent refusal to be landed with a protracted refugee

problem – and indeed it was, the centre remained open for almost 17 years, with occupants reaching

up to 18,000356 – how did Indonesia eventually decide to host a processing centre on Galang Island?

It is this question the final section will address.

Galang Island Processing Centre While the Geneva conference of 1979 resulted in firm commitments for a regional transit

centre, the idea for had been discussed for some time. Indonesia made the decision based on ASEAN

solidarity, a good relationship with the UNHCR and significant reassurance that it would not be landed

with a protracted refugee problem.

During Mackellar’s ASEAN visit to the region in July 1978, he met with Singapore’s President

Lee Kuan Yew, Rajaratnam and Home Affairs Minister Chua Sian Chin. They discussed Australia’s

proposal of having an UNHCR funded island processing centre in Singapore to be used as a staging

camp for refugees selected out of Malaysian camps in order to reduce overcrowding and minimise

necessity to take boats to Australia.357 In July 1978, Washington was interested in establishing

351 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees: UNHCR Consultations,” December 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 352 Kathleen Teltsch, “U.N. Calls Indochina Refugee Talks in Geneva July 20,” The New York Times, July 1, 1979, sec. Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/un-calls-indochina-refugee-talks-in-geneva-july-20-waldheim-is-in.html. 353 Teltsch. 354 Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997,” 319. 355 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” text, July 23, 2013, 22, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/BoatArrivals#_ftn59. 356 “More than 50 Vietnamese Refugees Stranded off Indonesia,” Reuters News, November 13, 1990, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011129dmbd006of&cat=a&ep=ASE. 357 Australian High Commission, Singapore to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees Mr MacKellar’s Visit,” July 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; Michael MacKellar, “Record of Conversation

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processing centres in the Philippines and Macao, but had not considered Indonesia as yet.358 By the

time of the December consultations in Geneva that year, however, both the US and Malaysia had

approached Indonesia about the possibility of using an Indonesian island as a temporary holding

centre.359 Australia was sceptical that Indonesia would agree to such a proposition. The embassy

thought that Indonesia would see it as an ‘attempt by Malaysia to off-load some of the refugees’ in or

on their way to Malaysia, and to shift some of the problems and responsibility to Indonesia, which

would result in more refugees being held for longer periods of time – completely contrary to

Indonesia’s policy.360

During the December consultations, there was strong ASEAN support for a regional processing

centre.361 The US called on Southeast Asian countries to ‘more equitably share the burden of first

asylum with Thailand and Malaysia, while Malaysia called for an island processing centre ‘not

necessarily in Guam’ but on another island in the Pacific.362 According to Indonesia, the solution lay in

not providing more places of temporary refuge, but in more final places of resettlement. While

Indonesia supported the idea of a regional processing centre, they believed it should be located

outside of the region. This could mean that Indonesia was expressing its unwillingness to host such a

centre, or, as the Malaysian representative suggested, the Indonesian representative may have been

unaware of the high-level approaches that have already been made to the Indonesian government

about hosting a processing centre.363

After these consultations, on the 22nd of December 1978, the counsellor at the Australian

embassy, Geoff Allen, spoke with Colonel Damanik (DEPLU) and Colonel Bintoro (Defence) about the

proposal of an island centre. He said that ASEAN would be prepared to host such a centre provided

refugees were moved on in ‘no more than a year’.364 If there were guarantees, he said, such a centre

could be held in Indonesia. He believed that while a direct approach to Vietnam would not be feasible,

ASEAN could formulate an approach involving ‘holding posts’ for those in Vietnam who wished to

between the Hon. Michael MacKellar, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore,” July 12, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia. 358 Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, Australian Embassy, Manila, and Australian High Commission, Singapore, “Indo-China Refugees,” July 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 5, National Archives of Australia; Canberra to Australian Embassy, Washington, “Indochinese Refugees,” November 16, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; Australian Embassy, Washington to Canberra, “Indo-China Refugees,” November 20, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 359 Allen to Canberra and Australian Consulate-General, Geneva, “Indochinese Refugees Geneva Conference,” December 8, 1978. 360 Allen to Canberra and Australian Consulate-General, Geneva. 361 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al., “Indo Chinese Refugees December Consultations,” December 13, 1978, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 362 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al. 363 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al. 364 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” December 29, 1978.

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leave, and mentioned the idea of a transit centre.365 According to Darusman, Indonesia had been

dragging its feet and could do more to assist ASEAN.366

The prospect was discussed at an ASEAN senior officials meeting in Indonesia, early January,

1979. It was expected that ASEAN would agree on the holding centre provided there were

international guarantees that refugees would be moved out within a given time.367 The island would

need to be far enough from the population, and resettlement countries would need to provide

assurances and to give a commitment that no one refugee would stay on the island for more than

three to five years.368 The US were happy with the idea of an island processing centre, but did not like

the conditions that ASEAN were hoping to attach.369 Interestingly, however, on the 12th of January,

Darusman denied that Indonesia had offered such a centre to Roger Peren, the New Zealand

Ambassador. He said that there had been consideration of this centre at the ASEAN senior officials

meeting but was only drawing up a checklist of ‘horrendous problems’ that would need to be sorted

out before the idea could become a reality, and it did not want to create a ‘little Vietnam’ in Southeast

Asia.370 As a result of ASEAN pressure, on the 12th of January 1979, Vietnam established a new

emigration policy whereby those with family abroad can apply to leave the country.371

On the 15th of January the media reported that the UN would operate ‘an island haven’ which

would shelter between 50,000 to 60,000 refugees, but details on where were yet to be released.372

On the 23rd of January the Australian embassy was informed by the US embassy that Indonesia was

‘seriously considering offering the use of an island as a “first haven” for Vietnamese refugees’.373 There

was yet to be a final decision whether it would be in Malaysian or Indonesian territory, but the island

would be offered in the name of ASEAN. Indonesia had agreed in principle to making an island

365 Allen to Canberra. 366 G.C. Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” January 12, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 367 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Refugees from Vietnam,” January 10, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia; Australian high Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “ASEAN: Senior Officals Meeting: Press Reports,” January 9, 1979, National Archives of Australia; Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees - Regional Holding Centre,” January 11, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 368 Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, “Indo Chinese Refugees - Regional Holding Centre,” January 11, 1979. 369 Australian Consulate-General, Geneva to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” January 12, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 370 Allen to Canberra, “Indochinese Refugees,” January 12, 1979. 371 Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 55–56. 372 Gerry de Silva, “Indon Isle May Be Used,” New Nation, January 17, 1979; “U.N. to Operate Island in ASEAN as Temporary Housing for Refugees,” Antara, January 15, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. 373 D. Irvine, “Vietnamese Refugees - Possible Indonesian ‘First Haven,’” January 23, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia.

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available provided guarantees were given, but needed to convince other Indonesian departments,

namely HANKAM and the security organisations. The US was encouraging Indonesia to make an early

decision, but this was a major turnaround in Indonesian policy and too much pushing may be counter-

productive.374

The UNHCR convened a small meeting between the UNHCR and the Heads of Mission of the

major resettlement countries to discuss the island centre on the 22nd of January 1979.375 It was

expected that there would be an Indonesian offer before the end of the week. While the UNHCR had

no information or details, the country that would host the centre would need to retain sovereignty

and remain responsible for law and order, although the UNCHR would administer it. The UNHCR would

not be prepared to go ahead with this project until it had ‘iron clad’ guaranteed that all refugees would

be taken within a ‘fair time’, which my mean countries need to forego selection criteria, the UNHCR

did not want to be looking after the old and weak.376 But it seemed most countries present were

cautious about giving such guarantees. The main issue was the ‘residuals’, and to avoid a ‘Palestinian’

problem.377

Meanwhile, there were disagreements between Malaysia and Indonesia on the details of the

island. Apparently, the Malaysian proposal put forward by Home Affairs minister Ghazali, that there

would be an island where they could send all the refugees in Southeast Asia, and then patrol

together.378 The foreign minister of Indonesia, Mochtar, thought this was ‘crazy’, and that it was ‘not

the way to deal with these people’.379 It seemed to him to be a way for ‘all the other countries [to]

just dump it all on our land’ for them to take care of, essentially, it would leave them with the problem

they could not afford.380 Indonesia did not want them to stay forever: ‘we have enough people to take

care of!’381 Because of that, the government was convinced that the best way forward would be to

have a centre, as put forward by the UNHCR, where Indonesia would take care of them for an

intermediary period, with the proviso that there was agreement to have them all resettled in other

countries. This guarantee was important, because Indonesia needed to ensure it was digestible

domestically. According to Wanandi, it was ‘natural’ for Indonesia to host the centre: ‘Indonesia is the

biggest country and more ASEAN, and is the one that is open, so therefore you know, you cannot

374 Irvine. 375 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al., “Indo/Chinese Refugees - Island Centre,” January 23, 1979, A4359, 61/27 part 6, National Archives of Australia. The UNHCR also had follow up meetings with the Indonesian government in March, 1979. 376 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al. 377 Canberra to Australian Embassy, Bangkok et al. 378 Jusuf Wanandi, Interview with Author, March 22, 2018. 379 Wanandi. 380 Wanandi. 381 Wanandi.

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Malaysia or Singapore to propose something nobody believes them! You know, but Indonesia was

willing to do that and so everybody came! [to the meeting]’.382

But there were also disagreements within the Indonesian government, especially between the

foreign minister, Mochtar, and military intelligence, General Moerdani and General Yoga. The three

came together at the invitation of Mochtar, so that he could explain what he was planning to do with

the island proposal. According to Wanandi, Mochtar was under a lot of pressure, and began the

meeting by saying, ‘you generals, what do you know about strategy! You know that the wind from the

south to the north is strong enough, and if we need to, we just put them in the boat and they go

naturally back to their country!’ So the generals just stood up and left.383 Mochtar, however, had the

support of Suharto, and eventually Moerdani agreed with the idea of the processing centre. Jusuf

Wanandi, as a close friend and confidant of Moerdani (and also a close informant of staff at the

Australian embassy) 384, helped convince him of the idea, which would not have been possible if it was

coming from the foreign ministry.385 The processing centre was decided upon after a series of

meetings between ASEAN states and resettlement countries386, and announced at the Meeting on the

Establishment of a Processing Centre for Indochina Refugees on 15-16 May 1979 which was attended

by ASEAN, donor countries and the UNHCR.387

According to Wanandi, Indonesia opened the processing centre to avoid Malaysia’s proposal,

and because the UNHCR had requested their help. Indonesia had been open to working with UNHCR

since it had worked in East Timor.388 Wanandi recalls that the UNHCR sent a team of good, wise people,

who knew how to deal military men. The UNHCR team and the foreign minister, Mochtar – who was

very open to the UNHCR – had gotten to know each other. This personal relationship was very

important, Wanandi said, ‘because we trust each other. And he meant well with us, we know that,

and that’s why we have to do our part’.389 He also noted that today, Indonesia would not open a centre

for Australia because ‘we don’t have that rapport anymore and that trust’.390

382 Wanandi. 383 Wanandi. 384 Hogue, Interview with Author. 385 Wanandi, Interview with Author. 386 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 32–33. 387 Ministerial Meeting ASEAN, “Joint Communique Of The Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Bali, 28-30 June 1979,” June 30, 1979, https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twelfth-asean-ministerial-meeting-bali-28-30-june-1979; Wanandi, Interview with Author. 388 Wanandi, Interview with Author. 389 Wanandi. 390 Wanandi.

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Eventually, after more meetings between ASEAN states and resettlement countries, Indonesia

and the Philippines offered an island for a processing centre.391 Indonesia offered Galang Island in the

Riau Archipelago for up to 10,000 refugees at a time for no longer than 3-5 years.392 While the

international community and the UNHCR provided the funding and the UNHCR administered the

centre, Indonesia retained sovereignty, and refused to accept any refugees for permanent

resettlement. With overcrowding due to direct arrivals because Malaysia implemented tougher policy,

Indonesia eventually opened a second centre. This effectively stopped the boats arriving into the mid-

80s, until refugees left because of overcrowding. This led to the Comprehensive Plan of Action in 1989

which saw refoulement become the dominant ‘durable solution’. The last refugee was moved in 1996

when the centre was closed down.

Conclusion This chapter tells a story about the cooperation and lack thereof between Australia and

Indonesia during the Indochinese crisis, and the establishment of the Galang Island processing centre.

It demonstrates how an absence of trust stifles cooperation. This story reveals the importance of

bureaucratic cohesion, diplomatic persistence, policy concessions, and moving problematic issues out

of a bilateral space and into the multilateral. It shows that while some individuals within certain

departments may wish to cooperate, cooperation may not occur unless those individuals are unable

to convince more of the government. As we will see in the next case on the Bali Process, cooperation

is facilitated once enough of the right individuals were convinced.

This chapter showed that even low-level cooperation on something not of shared interest,

such as information sharing on boats, would not take off unless Australia was able to mitigate

Indonesia’s concerns and demonstrate a lack of opportunistic behaviour through making assurances

and concessions in policies. While the embassy was willing to make such assurances, it needed to

convince Canberra to make the concession. Canberra was willing to make an assurance once the

domestic pressures to stop the boats pushed it into making a concession in its policy. It therefore

finally agreed to resettle all refugees, even if they did not fit the Australian’s criteria.

This chapter highlighted the importance of bureaucracies – not just the interaction between

them but of effective policy implementation by each side. This chapter showed that agreements made

between some departments within the government were not agreed to by others. This was

particularly the case in Indonesia, a ‘complex, cumbersome, timid and suspicious’393 bureaucracy.

391 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 32–33. 392 Missbach, 32–33. 393 Hogue to Kelso, “Hogue to Mr J.R. Kelso, Assistant Secretary, Consular and Immigration Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.,” May 9, 1978.

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While there had been agreements at various times with various individuals, a persistent lack of trust

permeated the government as a whole, which requested formal, written, watertight guarantees from

Australia. And when Australia eventually provided such a guarantee, they too sought ways out, for

example, by moving two boats back to Malaysia and under UNHCR care, by pushing the UNHCR to

make first approaches to Indonesia for boat holding, and by turning resettlement promises into an

international affair, giving ‘room to move in its guarantees.394 With the internationalisation of these

guarantees, in addition to the UNHCR’s trustworthiness and legitimising role, Indonesia eventually

opened Galang processing centre which effectively stopped boats arriving on Australia’s shores for

almost a decade. Through failed attempts at building trust, Australia effectively hedged its efforts and

moved the issue out of the unsuccessful bilateral space and into the international, multilateral arena.

Material benefits were clearly important, as cooperation made small steps forward when

there was a benefit to Indonesia, such as BAKIN receiving access to Australian intelligence on boats.

But in this case, such benefit to Indonesia was minimal, at best. Cooperating by holding boats for

resettlement was seen to be more of a cost than a benefit. Indonesia was worried that it would be left

with the burden of refugees, especially those that were considered ‘unfit’ for Western countries.

Indonesia never trusted Australia sufficiently to not harm this interest. To reassure Indonesia that it

would not be left with the burden, Australia internationalised the problem – it was then in Indonesia’s

interest to participate as it would result in no refugees left behind on its shores.

A key factor in shaping cooperation and lack thereof was the decision-making elite. While

Australia had great and friendly relations with some, they could not reach an overwhelming support

from within other parts of the bureaucracy. The Indonesian foreign minister, Mochtar, was also key in

deciding to open Galang Island. His personal relationship with and trust in the UNHCR aided this

decision. It is therefore clear that material interests, and the lack thereof, play a role in achieving

cooperation. But there are other relational factors which also shape decisions.

This chapter overwhelmingly shows how cooperation cannot be expected without obvious

benefit and, importantly, trust. Cooperation happened when Indonesia could be assured that it would

not be left with the burden. This assurance was built through internationalising the problem. This

shows, similar to the next chapter on the Bali Process but different to the previous chapter on New

Guinea, how cooperation on irregular migration is more easily facilitated once the issue is moved out

of the bilateral space and into the regional or multilateral.

394 Critchley to Canberra, “Indo-Chinese Refugees,” July 27, 1978.

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In this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on the process of how Australia and Indonesia

worked together during the early days of the Indochinese crisis. And in doing so, I have revealed the

key factors that shaped this cooperation and lack thereof, including reaching sufficient levels of

agreement within the right places of Indonesia’s bureaucracy, making policy concessions to

demonstrate a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour, leadership values and outlook, as well as the

important role of the multilateral space and UNHCR. And this chapter has found that neither Australia

nor Indonesia particularly saw the protection of those vulnerable to irregular migration – asylum

seekers and refugees – as part of their interest. For Australia, it was largely about control and domestic

optics; for Indonesia, it was avoiding being landed with the ‘burden’. Whatever their interests –

protecting asylum seekers was not the decider.

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5. The 1990s and Bali Process (1991-2002)

In Jakarta’s presidential palace at the end of 1995, President Suharto and Prime Minister Paul

Keating surprised their constituents as they watched their foreign ministers, Ali Alatas and Gareth

Evans, sign a security agreement which they had negotiated in secret. ‘More than anything else’, said

Keating, ‘this agreement is a declaration of trust. It is a declaration of trust about the strategic

intentions of each of us. … [it] gets to the fundamental point that there is a basis of trust between us

and together we can do substantial things together’.1 He later told his cabinet that ‘through the

agreement, Indonesia is making a clear statement that it is not a threat to Australia and is committing

itself to co-operating with us’.2 But on the 16th of September 1999, Indonesia rescinded the agreement

due to Australia’s involvement in East Timor’s independence from Indonesia.

The 1990s was indeed a turbulent period for the Australia-Indonesia relationship. While the

decade had begun with a strong working relationship between the two countries and their leaders, by

the decade’s close, the relationship had reached the lowest point in its history.3 The primary source

of the relationship’s breakdown was Indonesia’s dissatisfaction with Australia’s involvement in the

1999 East Timor referendum for independence from Indonesia, then leading UN forces to restore

order after the vote for independence.4 Indonesia itself was in the midst of reformasi, a period of

transition to a somewhat open political system after more than three decades of authoritarian rule.

At the time, the country and its institutions were also preoccupied with the fallout of the 1997 Asian

Financial Crisis, as well as outbreaks of communal violence in various regions around the country.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century the relationship between Australia and Indonesia

appeared distant, especially under the leadership of Indonesian President Megawati, who took little

interest in foreign affairs and the relationship with Australia. At that time, Australia was experiencing

a ‘third wave’ of boat arrivals. Between 1999 and 2001, 180 boats carrying 12,176 asylum seekers,

predominantly from the Middle East, had entered Australian waters5 – the majority of which came

1 Paul Keating, “Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating MP, Press Conference, Presidential Palace, Jakarta,” December 18, 1995, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9894. 2 Graeme Dobell, “The National Archives Releases (Part 1): The Keating–Suharto Security Treaty,” The Strategist (blog), January 1, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/keating-suharto-security-treaty/. 3 Or, as some would argue, since konfrontasi. 4 The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) observed the referendum but the Indonesian military provided the ‘security’. Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) went in to restore order (with a UN mandate), then security was handed over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Peace-Keeping Force in February 2000. 5 Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 22.

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through Indonesia. As noted above, Indonesia had its own issues to grapple with, and as such,

Megawati ignored and refused then Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s requests for assistance

in managing the arrival of boats.6 It was not until October 2002 that the relationship was rekindled, as

is often cited, by the tragedy of the Bali Bombings.

It is thus surprising that in February of 2002, seven months before the bombings, Australia

and Indonesia instituted and co-hosted the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons

and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process). As demonstrated by Megawati’s refusal to answer

Howard’s calls in regards to a ship of rescued asylum seekers, the Tampa (which will be discussed

later), relations between the two countries were still strained post-East Timor, and irregular migration

was not a priority for Indonesia as it dealt with reformasi. In fact, people-smuggling was not considered

a crime in Indonesia until 2011. Despite their icy relations, the two countries had agreed to cooperate

on the issue of irregular migration, which was of little priority to Indonesia, less than three years since

the relationship breakdown over East Timor and some seven months before the Bali Bombings – the

oft-cited forerunner of rekindled cooperation.

How can we explain the emergence of this cooperative venture, established under an

indifferent Indonesian president on an issue that was of little importance to her country, especially

given the relationship was severely strained only a few short years prior? Michael Wesley argues that

timing played an important role in achieving this cooperation: ‘Jakarta desperately wanted to find an

issue on which it could demonstrate regional leadership after the introspection and turmoil of the

post-Asian financial crisis years. Indonesia felt its ‘governance prestige’ was on the line, following

successive crises over economic management, corruption, official brutality in East Timor and internal

extremism’.7 Dewi Fortuna Anwar says that Indonesia began to show more serious desires for tackling

the problem of people-smuggling after the sinking of SIEV X in October of 2001, an Indonesian fishing

vessel that sank en route to Christmas Island, killing 353 asylum seekers. She argues that Indonesia

offered to host a regional conference on people-smuggling to prevent a reoccurrence.8 Amy Nethery

and myself propose that ‘incentivised policy transfer’ explains Indonesian cooperation, which was

6 Megawati was repeatedly unavailable to take Howard’s call, and later refused to meet with him at the 2001 APEC Summit in Shanghai. See: Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996-2006 (ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2007), 180–82. 7 Wesley, 194. 8 ‘Untuk mencegah terulangnya tragedi seperti yang dialami SIEV-X Indonesia menawarkan diri menjadi tuan rumah konperensi regional tentang penyelundupan manusia’, ‘To prevent a recurrence of the tragedy like that which was experienced by SIEV-X Indonesia offered to host a regional conference about people-smuggling’ (My translation) in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” in Indonesia Dalam Strategi Keamanan Australia: Persoalan Migrasi Ilegal, ed. M. Riefqi Muna (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2002), 75–76.

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secured through financial and diplomatic incentives, making cooperation politically expedient with

Indonesian voters and appealing to its national interest.9

While these are potential answers to the question of why the Bali Process was established

when it was, they do little to shed light on the process of how Australia and Indonesia came to the

same table given the rift in their relations after the East Timor crisis. Given this puzzling scenario and

competing and inadequate explanations, this chapter excavates the history of how the Bali Process

emerged, given that this issue was not a priority concern for Indonesia, especially under a president

who took little interest in the Australia-Indonesia relationship – which had just been at its lowest point

less than three years prior.

These questions drove my investigations of publicly available documents10, which were then

triangulated with semi-structured interviews with both Australian and Indonesian officials and

academics. Based on this investigation, I found that while the Bali Process seemed to have been

established rather quickly, Australia had been persuading Indonesia of the importance of cooperation

in this area since the late 1990s. Despite the public relationship breakdown between governments,

strong bureaucratic and personal ties kept opportunities open for Australia to push its case. I argue

that the establishment of the Bali Process at this puzzling time was due to long term investments in

bureaucratic bilateral links, leadership strategic outlook and personal relationships, as well as

important domestic and international contextual factors that rendered cooperation beneficial to state

interests. I will show that while Wesley, Anwar and Nethery and myself partly explain the

establishment of the Bali Process, these accounts are missing the important role of individuals and

relationships. I argue that through key individuals and efforts at building trust, Australia and Indonesia

were able to establish the Bali Process in the face of what appeared to be relationship turbulence.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the Keating-Suharto years. According to Sian Troath

(2019), the Keating-Suharto years represent a case of bonded trust.11 Bonded trust is ‘where trust and

the trusting behaviour it enables are created out of a process of interpersonal bonding’.12

Nonetheless, she argues that this ‘trust never became embedded among a broader range of

government actors nor between societies, and consequently the precarity has continued. The

difficulty’, she notes, ‘of building trust between Australia and Indonesia is compounded by the rapid

turnover of both leaders and ministers in Australia over the past decade, which does not provide

9 Nethery and Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers.” 10 The National Archives of Australia has not yet opened documents for this relatively contemporary period. 11 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded.” 12 Wheeler, Trusting Enemies, 51.

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adequate time for the development of trusting relationships’.13 Therefore, this chapter begins first

with an analysis of the Keating-Suharto period in order to understand this level of trust and to render

visible the changes in the relationship that occurred after a change in leadership, all the while

considering the issue of irregular migration in the relationship.

This chapter will then examine the Howard years and the fall of Suharto, outlining how this

changed Australia’s view of immigration and its relationship with Indonesia, before discussing the

impact of the East Timor crisis. Soon after the East Timor crisis Australia experienced the ‘third wave’

of boat arrivals. This chapter will discuss the response to this flow of irregular immigration in Indonesia

and Australia – focusing on Australia’s early attempts at securing Indonesia’s help in this area until

2001, when the issue gained a large spotlight in the media and caused a public rift when Megawati

refused to answer Howard’s calls. In so doing, it highlights the role of diplomats and the police in

keeping cooperation on irregular migration continuing despite this public rift. Finally, it discusses the

establishment of the Bali Process over the last few months of 2001 and the first meeting in 2002. It

highlights the role of trust between institutions and individuals at the lower echelons, as well as

commitment from key individuals, in achieving this cooperation. It therefore shows, in contrast to

Troath’s (2019) argument, that while there may not have been bonded trust between Keating and

Suharto’s successors, there was, in fact, trust between a broader range of government actors which

kept the relationship functioning under the radar during public rifts. This can only be understood with

a long-term view of the relationship.

1991-1996: The Keating-Suharto Years Often hailed as the strongest years in the relationship and an example of ‘bonded trust’14, it

is important to understand the Keating-Suharto years. It is also an important period in which to

understand Australia’s response to asylum seekers arriving by boat, and therefore the eagerness with

which Australia sought to solve this problem with Indonesia. As such, this section will first outline the

situation of boats leaving Indonesia for Australia before outlining the Australian domestic political

context, including Australia’s response to the ‘second wave’ of boat arrivals and Paul Keating’s

assumption of the Prime Ministership in 1991. It then discusses the Australia-Indonesia relationship,

including the importance of the leadership and the personal relationship between Keating and

Suharto, as well as the growing ties between the Defence and Police forces of both countries. This

section argues that the interpersonal trust between Keating and Suharto allowed for investments into

the relationship, sowing the seeds for closer inter-institutional relations that, as I will later show,

13 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded,” 128. 14 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded.”

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enabled the relationship to bounce back after the East Timor crisis and to maintain cooperation on

irregular migration despite high-level rifts.

The ‘Second Wave’ The seeds of Australia’s harsh approach to boat arrivals, which was the impetus to the Bali

Process, had already begun to sprout in the first half of the 1990s. As discussed in the previous chapter,

the Indochinese crisis of the 1970s saw a little over 2,000 people arrive in Australia by boat from

Vietnam.15 This became known as the ‘first wave’ of boat arrivals. The second wave started in

November of 1989, when a small boat – the first to arrive since 1981 – arrived in Broome with 26

Cambodians on board.16 During the second wave, which lasted from 1989 until 1998, an average of

almost 300 asylum seekers – predominantly from Cambodia, Vietnam and southern China – arrived

on Australia’s shores per year.17 These numbers, however, were miniscule compared to those arriving

in Indonesia.

In the first five months of the decade, 5,000 boat people had arrived in Indonesia, largely due

to increasing hostility in Hong Kong camps and Malaysia’s strategy of pushing boats back out to sea.18

The Galang processing centre, which was originally designed to hold 5,000 people, held more than

17,000 people by July 1990.19 Many of the centres inhabitants had to sleep in temporary barracks or

on the beach, and medical supplies were running low.20 The Australian Government had recognised

this ‘serious pressure’ on Indonesia and provided $1.5 million to upgrade Galang’s facilities.21 But the

money, said Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alatas, would not solve the dilemma: ‘We can build

beautiful houses but they will stay on’ he said, and criticised the West’s choosey policies for leaving

Indonesia with the old and the infant22 – precisely what they were trying to avoid in the previous

15 Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 22; James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 183. 16 Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, “Review ’90: Annual Report of the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs” (Canberra: Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 90 1989), 46, https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-906351137. 17 Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 1. 18 Chris Peterson, “Vietnamese Boat People - Fifteen Years On, The Problem Is Worse,” Reuters News, May 4, 1990, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011128dm5400qde&cat=a&ep=ASE; Michael Byrnes, “When the Boats Come In,” The Australian Financial Review, June 22, 1990, Late edition, sec. Weekend Review. 19 Claire Bolderson, “Indonesia Concerned as Cambodians Take to Sea: Claire Bolderson Reports on a Sudden Influx of Cambodian Boat People and Its Regional Implications,” Financial Times, July 3, 1990. 20 Enny Nuraheni, “Indonesian Refuge for Boat People Running Out of Medicine,” Reuters News, June 7, 1990, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011128dm67015oq&cat=a&ep=ASE. 21 “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, No. 139, 28 May 1990” (The Senate, May 28, 1990), 1188–89, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2F1990-05-28%2F0049%22. 22 “Indonesia in a Bind over Influx of Cambodian Refugees,” Reuters News, May 30, 1990, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011128dm5u028c4&cat=a&ep=ASE.

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chapter on the Indochinese crisis. Given the growing pressure in Galang, it alarmed Australia when an

Indonesian navy official told the media that Indonesia had reprovisioned a boat so that it may continue

its journey to Australia.23 While Alatas denied reports that Indonesia had pushed people back out to

sea and pointed them to Australia,24 he affirmed that those who wished to continue to Australia could

not be stopped: ‘why should we prevent them?’ he asked. 25

Australia appealed to mutual interests in seeking Indonesia’s cooperation, but knew better

than to criticise Indonesia’s approach. The Australian Minister for Immigration, Nick Bolkus, said that

‘The Australian Government would hope that, in the interests of life and safety, the Indonesian

Government would hold these, and any such other arrivals, in its territory’.26 He noted that the

Government is ‘naturally concerned at the implications of any such decision [to assist boats onwards

to Australia]’, but he praised Indonesia for its ‘excellent record in providing first asylum and the

particular problems posed by the Cambodian boat arrivals’.27 With similar terms to that which we saw

in the previous chapter, Bolkus continued: ‘We believe it is in both Indonesia's and Australia's

interests, and in the interests of the safety of the boat people themselves, to land boats from

Cambodia which enter Indonesian waters’.28 Gareth Evans warned that assisting Cambodian boat

people would encourage others, but said that ‘Indonesia's policy on the Cambodian boat people is

understandable and would be difficult to argue against under international law’.29 In June 1990

Australian Trade Negotiation Minister Neal Blewett visited Jakarta to discuss the matter. He and Alatas

agreed ‘it was in their common interest to reduce incentives for boat people to leave Cambodia’.30

Blewitt added that ‘the international community had a responsibility towards Indonesia on this

matter’.31 Indeed commentators in Australia noted that Indonesia’s role in stopping boats of refugees,

rather than pushing them onwards, was ‘something we should be grateful for’.32

23 Muklis Ali, “Cambodians Said to Have Left Sumatra for Australia,” Reuters News, May 15, 1990, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011128dm5f016qj&cat=a&ep=ASE. 24 “Indonesia Will Seek UN Help to Handle Wave of Refugees,” Straits Times, May 15, 1990, sec. Asean, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=STIMES0020050711dm5f006ja&cat=a&ep=ASE. 25 Ali, “Cambodians Said to Have Left Sumatra for Australia.” 26 “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, No. 139, 28 May 1990.” 27 “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, No. 139, 29 May 1990” (The Senate, May 29, 1990), 1318, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2F1990-05-29%2F0064%22. 28 “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate, No. 139, 29 May 1990,” 1318. 29 “Indonesia Rapped for Helping Boat People to Get to Australia,” Straits Times, June 16, 1990, sec. World, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=STIMES0020050711dm6g00a8b&cat=a&ep=ASE. 30 “Canberra, Jakarta Agree to Act to Curb Refugee Flow,” Straits Times, June 6, 1990, sec. Asean, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=STIMES0020050711dm66007wq&cat=a&ep=ASE. 31 “Canberra, Jakarta Agree to Act to Curb Refugee Flow.” 32 Peter Hastings, “Could We Deal with a Big Rise in Refugees?,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 14, 1990, sec. News and Features.

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This began to change in mid-1991, when boats of Chinese began arriving. The Indonesian

authorities were confused – there had been procedures for dealing with Vietnamese and Cambodian

boat people, but not Chinese. In the end, Indonesia provided fuel and supplies and sent the Chinese

on.33 In January, 1992 Australian authorities tried to talk to a group of Chinese boat people detained

in Indonesia to persuade them not to continue their journey, but was blocked by Indonesia.34 A

spokesman for the Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs said that while it was preferred that

Indonesia accepted the boat people, Australia had no grounds for complaint if Indonesia offered

provisions to boats heading for Australia.35 Nevertheless, Australia continued to seek Indonesia’s help

as more and more boats of Chinese began arriving in Australia.36 In May 1992, an agreement was

reached between Australia and Indonesia to exchange information about transiting boats.37

Throughout the next two years, boats of Chinese arrived in Australia which had stopped in Indonesia

for provisions and repairs, increasing when Galang began returning people to the homelands, forcing

the refugees to try their chances in sailing to Australia.38 This continued until September 1994, when

Indonesia intercepted a boat of Chinese off East Java and returned them to Galang, instead of allowing

them to continue their journey to Australia.39 And in November of 1994, Australia began deporting

boat arrivals back to Galang, the camp in Indonesia, rather than their country of origin.40

The arrival of boats in this period did not cause major harm to the relationship, though two

cases caused a spike in tension. The first was, as mentioned at the end of the New Guinea chapter,

the nine West Papuans who were granted refugee status or residency in Australia on compassionate

grounds.41 They had arrived on Torres Strait islands in small boats between 1985 and 1987. The

government had delayed processing their claims while they established the events related to their

case, in addition to avoiding both political sensitivities with Jakarta and an incentive for others to

33 “Boatload of Chinese Refugees Stranded off Indonesian Island,” Reuters News, August 7, 1991, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011124dn8703u1o&cat=a&ep=ASE. 34 Greg Austin and Chips Mackinolty, “Boat People: Indonesia Cited,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 23, 1992, sec. News and Features. 35 Austin and Mackinolty. 36 “Jakarta Urged to Help Stop Refugee Flow,” Straits Times, May 23, 1992, sec. Asean, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=STIMES0020050711do5n02ict&cat=a&ep=ASE; Tony Wright, “Boat People to Be Quizzed on Claims,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 25, 1992, sec. News and Features. 37 Wright, “Boat People to Be Quizzed on Claims.” 38 Gay Alcorn, “Boat People Slip Past Security,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 23, 1994, sec. News and Features. 39 “Vietnam Refugees to Be Returned to Indonesian Camp.,” Reuters News, September 12, 1994, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020030220dq9c00fct&cat=a&ep=ASE. 40 Peter Gregory and Karen Middleton, “Boat People Fail To Stop Deport Order,” The Age, November 18, 1994, sec. News; Katrina Willis, “Boat People Given No Chance, Says Lawyer,” The Age, November 25, 1994, sec. News. 41 Roberts, “Former Irianese Rebels to Stay Here.”

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follow suit.42 Surprisingly, there was only a very minor stir in Indonesia.43 While Jakarta reportedly

asked Canberra to deport the asylum seekers, a spokesman from the Indonesian embassy noted that

‘it was a matter for Australia, [but] the Indonesian Government would be happy to discuss their fate

with the Federal Government "if it wants to deport them"’.44 The Australian Government allowed nine

of the refugees, all of whom were involved in the OPM (Free Papua Movement), to settle permanently.

The second case was the arrival of the Tasi Diak in 1995, a boat of 18 East Timorese who

arrived in Darwin seeking asylum. According to Hugh White, who was, in 1995 the Deputy Secretary

for Strategy and Intelligence in the Department of Defence, the issue of East Timor continued to be

‘the pebble in the shoe’ of the relationship, but the Australian government was ‘determined to

maintain a good relationship with Indonesia not withstanding East Timor’, and as a result, had ‘built a

little bit of a protective membrane around the East Timor irritant’.45 Despite pressure from parts of

the public and certain elements within the Labor party, the Government ‘saw the relationship with

Indonesia as being much more important than what was happening in East Timor and by and large it

remained to be well managed and quarantined’.46 Predictably, however, the Indonesian government

retaliated when Australia decided to release the East Timor arrivals from detention and grant them

bridging visas, with Alatas threatening: ‘it's you who will be in the end sorry and not us’, and ‘don't

call them refugees or give them asylum because it will cause you problems later on. You are setting a

precedent’.47 He claimed that the East Timorese were not being persecuted, simply seeking ‘a better

life’. Evans was quick to point out that the bridging visas did not mean they had received refugee

status, rather, they were given a temporary visa that allowed them to leave detention to receive

medical care.48 Prime minister Keating pointed out that the East Timorese could not, in fact, be

considered refugees, as they still had Portuguese citizenship.49 Keating met with Suharto in Bali of

September 1995, just three months before the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security, to

discuss recent tensions.50 The strong relationship between the two leaders and their foreign ministers

allowed for these tensions not reach its potential intensity. Alatas reminded journalists: ‘Of course

there are differences that sometimes come up but that doesn't mean that our friendship has been

42 Roberts. 43 Limn, Australia-Indonesia Relations 1986-1990. 44 Roberts, “Deport Irianese, Urges Jakarta.” 45 Hugh White, Interview with Author, August 2017. 46 White. 47 Lindsay Murdoch, “Illegals Likely To Pour In - Jakarta,” The Age, July 31, 1995, sec. News. 48 Lindsay Murdoch, “We’ll Be Tough On Visas, Evans Tells Jakarta,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 2, 1995, sec. News and Features; “Australia Gives E. Timorese Visas, Not Refugee Status,” Asian Political News, July 31, 1995, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=apnw000020011024dr7v0027x&cat=a&ep=ASE. 49 “Keating Spurns Timor Refugees,” The Guardian, October 11, 1995; Karen Middleton and Paul Chamberlin, “Boat People Not Refugees, Says Keating,” The Age, October 11, 1995, sec. News. 50 “Mr Keating Goes To Bali,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 18, 1995, sec. News and Features; Leaders.

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affected.’51 Developing a strong working relationship with Indonesia was, in fact, one of the main

priorities of the Australian Government under the leadership of the then Foreign Minister, Gareth

Evans, and especially incoming Prime Minister, Paul Keating.

Australia’s Response to the ‘Second Wave’ of Boat Arrivals: Growing Tougher Keating took over the Prime Ministership on the 20th of December 1991 after successfully

contesting the leadership of Prime Minister Bob Hawke. This was at a time of recession in Australia,

which was suffering from the highest rate of unemployment at 11 percent.52 Keating took little interest

in the migration program,53 and as a result of the slowing economy, the migration intake was

reduced.54 And, while only three boats arrived in the previous two years, in 1991 six boats arrived in

Australia with 214 people on board.55

In response to the increasing boat arrivals, the Keating Labor Government amended the

Migration Act in 199256, which made the detention of people arriving in Australia without valid visas

mandatory. Public opinion was largely in support of immigration detention: according to a 1993 Irving

Saulwick poll, 44 percent of respondents wanted to ‘sen[d boat arrivals] straight back where they

come from, despite what they say may happen to them’, with 46 percent believing that their claims

should be assessed, ‘with all other migrant applicants, and held in custody in the meantime’.57 Only 7

percent were in favour of allowing boat arrivals to stay as migrants.58 Furthermore, in 1994 a joint

parliamentary committee endorsed the detention system, with only one dissident.59 There were,

however, criticisms of the lengthy delays of processing.60 Nevertheless, further amendments were

51 Murdoch, “Illegals Likely To Pour In - Jakarta.” 52 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 46. 53 Katharine Betts, “Immigration Policy under the Howard Government,” The Australian Journal of Social Issues 38, no. 2 (May 2003): 175. 54 Betts, 176; Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 222; Michelle Grattan, “Immigration and the Australian Labor Party,” in The Politics of Australian Immigration, ed. James Jupp and Marie Kabala (Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1993). 55 Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 22. 56 The main outcome of these reforms was the introduction of mandatory detention for “unlawful non-citizens” (i.e. those who do not possess a valid visa). Another change was in the introduction of four-year temporary protection visas (TPVs) rather than permanent residence for refugee and humanitarian cases. This was done partly to deal with large number of Chinese students remaining in Australia after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. This program was ended in November 1993 but was again later adopted by the Howard government. In 1994 the Migration Reform Act (1992) came into effect, which removed the 273 day time limit of detention and extended detention to all unlawful citizens, and bridging visas were not available to people who had arrived in Australia without authority, e.g. boat arrivals. See: Andreas Schloenhardt, “Australia and the Boat-People: 25 Years of Unauthorised Arrivals,” University of New South Wales Law Journal, The 23, no. 3 (December 2000): 33. 57 Betts, “Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia,” 41. 58 Betts, 41. 59 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 184. 60 Jupp, 184.

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made to existing laws as the decade progressed, resulting in tougher approaches to boat arrivals. All

of which shows that the seeds of Australia’s harsh approach to boat arrivals seen later in the decade

had already begun to sprout in the first half of the 1990s.

The Australia-Indonesia relationship under Keating and Suharto: Growing

Tighter While Keating did not take much interest in Australia’s migration program, he did take great

interest in Australia’s relationship with Indonesia: ‘No country is more important to Australia than

Indonesia’ he said, early in 1994, ‘If we fail to get this relationship right, and nurture and develop it,

the whole web of our foreign relations is incomplete’.61 As such, Keating worked to build a strong

relationship with Indonesia and a close personal relationship with Suharto, which is memorialised as

the ‘high point’ of the rocky relationship.62 These strong interpersonal relationships demonstrate how

‘key individuals can be driving forces for the development of trust in a relationship’.63 So strong, as I

will show below, that it could survive a period of unease between subsequent national leaders. This

section will first discuss the Keating Government’s strategic outlook, which drove his interest in

developing a strong relationship with Indonesia; second, it will discuss his close relationship with

Suharto; and third, the closer institutional cooperation that arose as a result. This section shows that

the strength of the Keating-Suharto years allowed for investments into the relationship that forged

closer inter-institutional relations. And, as Keating in 1992 quoted from Prime Minister John Curtin in

1942: ‘On what we now do depends everything we may like to do’64, these relations laid the

foundations on which the Bali Process could be built in 2002.

First, Prime Minister Paul Keating’s personal strategic outlook drove him to develop a tighter

relationship with Indonesia. He saw that Australia’s destiny as a nation was in the Asia-Pacific and that

closer relations with Indonesia were beneficial to a prosperous and secure Australia. In a speech on

the 7th of April, 1992, Keating encouraged a move away from the Menzies-era attitude of relying on

the British, or the US, for that matter, for Australia’s security and stability towards Australia’s

geographical region: ‘Success at home’, he stated, ‘depends on … establishing beyond doubt that Asia

is where our future substantially lies [and] that we can and must go there’.65 This shift was noticed in

Indonesia, with one Indonesian interviewee, a former advisor to the Vice President, commenting:

61 Paul Keating, “Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating MP, Australia Today Indonesia ’94, Overseas Passenger Terminal, Sydney,” March 16, 1994, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9155. 62 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded,” 2. 63 Troath, 8. 64 Paul Keating, “Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating MP, Australia and Asia: Knowing Who We Are,” April 7, 1992, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8485. 65 Keating.

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When Australia is fully planted in the region, then Indonesia has always been there

for Australia, that was Keating’s position remember? That Australia is more part of

the region, then relations with part of Indonesia has always been very smooth. But

when Australia is under an administration that is more oriented towards the

Atlantic oceans … that it has a house here but its home is not here, and it behaves

in a way that it is only a temporary visitor here, that is not really willing to engage

with the neighbours, it’s not really willing to understand the cultures, that it’s not

really willing to be where, to be when in Rome do like the Romans do, it continues

to behave it was somewhere in the Irish sea, then it gets into problems, …

particularly with Indonesia. If you look at the ups and downs in relations between

Jakarta and Australia, it really reflects very much the ups and downs in how

Australia itself looks strategic environment.66

Keating’s Foreign Minister, Evans, was of the same ilk; his concerns were to give ‘substance to the

perception that Australia’s future depended more on our geography than our history’ which involved

‘consolidating, developing, strengthening ties with Asia, with Indonesia in particular … to try and put

some ballast in the relationship so that it wasn’t blown apart which each passing wind which had been

the case’.67 Both Keating and Evans were committed to building a strong relationship with Indonesia,

with effects felt for years to come. When fieldwork interviews were conducted between 2017-2019,

many interviewees brought up the importance of Keating’s leadership without prompt. One

Indonesian academic referred to Keating as an ‘Indonesian Diplomat’, and pointed out that educated

Indonesians sympathise more with the Labor party because Keating was well known in Indonesia.68

Second, Keating backed up his strategic vision by forging a close interpersonal relationship

with Suharto, as did Evans with Alatas. Sian Troath (2019) argues that these are examples of bonded

trust.69 For bonded trust to occur, two leaders need to be able to exercise security dilemma sensibility

and acquire an index of trustworthiness through face-to-face interaction. During this interaction,

bonded trust develops through the positive identification of interests, which allows the two leaders

to ‘see the other’s interests as their interests’, and humanisation, in which they come to see each

other as a human being, not simply ‘a representative of cold state interests’.70 As noted by Troath,

these existed in the case of Keating and Suharto.71 While these interpersonal relationships are widely

considered quite strong, such relationships cannot be separated from the point above: that it was also

the personal strategic outlook, and thereby their strategic commitment to the relationship that made

this close personal relationship possible. In other words: ‘key individuals play a crucial role in shaping

66 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Interview with Author, October 2017. 67 Gareth Evans, Interview with Author, September 2017. 68 Dr. Dafri Agussalim, Interview, 2017. 69 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded.” 70 Wheeler, Trusting Enemies, 61–62. 71 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded,” 8–11.

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the nature of a bilateral relationship, both through their personal belief that it is a strategically

favourable endeavour, and their ability to develop trust with their counterparts’ (emphasis added).72

Third, with such a strategic outlook and trusting relationship, the two countries worked

together in areas of mutual interest and invested in cooperation between institutions. Evans and

Alatas signed a treaty on the East Timor Gap, worked closely together on the Cambodian Peace

Process and Keating and Suharto achieved the APEC summits. As was acknowledged by many

interviewees, the Australia-Indonesia relationship works best when the two countries are working

together towards some bigger objective. The highlight of this close working relationship was the

signing of the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), mentioned in the

opening paragraph of this chapter. This agreement was quite a significant achievement and took many

observers by surprise because of Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ (bebas aktif) foreign policy. It was free

in the sense that it was non-aligned, active in that it became the leader of ASEAN and the non-aligned

movement, and was so, partly, because of its 'basic distrust of great powers and super-power polities’,

as well as its bitter colonial experiences under the Dutch.73 Furthermore, Indonesia did not make

agreements outside ASEAN, and has not had an agreement like this before.74 The fact that it was

established in secret over an 18-month period demonstrates the role of the personal relations

between Keating and Suharto.75 The three key principles of the AMS were regular ministerial

consultation, consultation in the case of adverse challenges, and the development of mutually

beneficial cooperative activities in the security field76, codifying the keys to trust-building:

communication and mutual interest.

While it was a high-level agreement, the AMS codified existing lower-level cooperation. It

provided for future increases in defence cooperation, which were already at an all-time high.77 This

72 Troath, 11. 73 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 1994, 146; Alan DuPont, “The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement,” The Australian Quarterly 68, no. 2 (1996): 56, https://doi.org/10.2307/20634725. 74 DuPont, “The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement,” 56. 75 In June-July 1994 there were Keating made suggestions towards a security agreement. In September 1995, there were suggestions that Suharto added impetus to consideration of the agreement. I was announced on December 18th, 1995. See: Gary Brown, Frank Frost, and Stephen Sherlock, “The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement - Issues and Implications,” Research Paper, Parliamentary Library (Canberra: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 96 1995), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/96rp25. 76 The Commonwealth Government of Australia and The Republic of Indonesia, “Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security,” December 18, 1995, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/96rp25. 77 Burke, Fear of Security, 163.

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was in part because the US suspended its International Military Education and Training Program for

Indonesia after the East Timor massacre in 1991. Indonesia then needed to look for alternative sources

of training, of which, Australia became a principal provider78 and acted as a conduit for communication

between Indonesia and the US.79 By 1995, more than 200 Indonesians were receiving military training

from Australian institutions per year, compared to three in 198980, and Indonesia held more military

exercises with Australia than any other country.81 The AMS was seen as a formal expression of this

high level of informal defence cooperation, taking the relationship beyond the close personal

relationship of Keating and Suharto and ‘formalis[ing] the existing close relationship so it would not

be dependent on personalities’.82

Enduring interpersonal and institutional connections were also established between the

police forces during this time. The Indonesian police were part of the Indonesian military until 1999.

Australia first sent a police liaison to Jakarta in 1977 to help fight Australia’s ‘war on drugs’, and, after

failing to gain much traction, was recalled in 1987.83 But by the early 1990s the relationship began to

grow closer: on the 22nd of April 1992, after a decade of negotiation, Australia and Indonesia concluded

an extradition treaty84; in July the AFP Commissioner visited Indonesia by the invitation of the Chief of

the Indonesian National Police85; and, in December of that year, the AFP sent a liaison officer back to

Jakarta.86 The AFP liaison, Detective Superintendent Steve Polden, said that relations between the

police forces were ‘extremely co-operative’: ‘From the day that I arrived here the Indonesian police

have been outstanding … if we continue to get the sort of co-operation from the Indonesian police

that we have at the moment ... we'll be able to keep the lid on [the drug trade]’.87 Nevertheless, the

mostly fax-based communication was a significant barrier to developing close personal ties.88 This

78 DuPont, “The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement,” 54, 58. 79 Brenton Crowhurst, “The Australian Indonesian Security Agreement,” Australian Defence Force Journal 132, no. September/October (1998): 37. 80 Greg Earl, “Looming Poll Spurred Signing,” The Australian Financial Review, December 15, 1995, Late edition, sec. NEWS, 16. 81 David Jenkins, “Australia’s Helping Hand In Indonesia’s Military Muscle,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 4, 1995, sec. NEWS AND FEATURES; Opinion. 82 Earl, “Looming Poll Spurred Signing,” 16. 83 Michael McKenzie, “Securitising Transnational Crime: The Political Drivers of Police Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia,” Policing and Society 29, no. 3 (March 24, 2019): 338, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2017.1299734. 84 Attorney-General The Commonwealth Government of Australia, “Extradition (Republic of Indonesia) Regulations,” 1994, http://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F1996B01255/Explanatory Statement/Text. 85 Janice Jarrett, “Commissioner Visits Indonesia,” Platypus, September 1992, 24. 86 Terry Friel, “Press Interest in Jarkarta Post,” Platypus, Spring 1993. 87 Polden, as quoted in Friel. 88 Michael McKenzie, “A Common Enemy: Police Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia,” in Strangers Next Door?: Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century, ed. Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae, 2018, 213, https://www-bloomsburycollections-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/book/strangers-next-door-indonesia-and-australia-in-the-asian-century/ch12-a-common-enemy-police-cooperation-between-australia-and-indonesia.

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barrier was partially removed with the Management of Serious Crime Course (MOSC), developed by

the AFP in 1991. The first Indonesian officer to attend the course was Lieutenant Colonel named Made

Pastika, who developed a friendship with then AFP Commander Mick Keelty, which would later be

important for facilitating cooperation between the two police forces.89 These personal relationships

were indeed key to police cooperation. As highlighted by Graham Ashton, the AFP liaison in the Jakarta

embassy from 1995-1997:

I’ll probably just reemphasise if I could that personal relationship bit. With

Indonesia it’s so critical … if I was to say anything over and over it’s just to

reemphasise that poit. You can have all the structures and MoUs and agreements,

and all that, but if you haven’t got investment in the personal side of it, you’re

wasting your time in Indonesia yes.90

In sum, the Keating-Suharto years are widely considered to be the high-point of the

relationship; the strategic outlook of leaders were driving forces for the development of trust in a

relationship, not only between the leaders themselves, but between their government departments

and institutions – in this case, the AMS, the military and the police force. Even though the AMS was

later abrogated, the strength of the Keating-Suharto years forged closer inter-institutional relations

and friendships which continued to develop until the East Timor crisis, and it was these relationships

that withstood a change in leadership and laid the foundations on which the Bali Process could be

built in 2002.

1996-1999: The Election of Howard, the Fall of Suharto and the East

Timor Crisis Given the emphasis placed on the significance of the Keating-Suharto relationship in

commentary on the Australia-Indonesia relationship, it is important to understand how a change in

leaders impacted relations between the two countries. If there was no impact on relations, this

indicates that there is something ‘stickier’ than the interpersonal relationship between leaders, which

warrants explanation. The Australia-Indonesia relationship would indeed become strained not only

with the change in leadership, but with impending East Timor crisis. This further confounds the puzzle

of how Australia and Indonesia were able to recover the relationship relatively quickly, and begs the

question of how much the investments made into the relationship during the Keating and Suharto

years were able to support it during this tumultuous period. In explaining the creation of the Bali

Process, it is also important to understand the Australian domestic context relating to irregular

immigration and, by extension its eagerness to work with Indonesia in finding a solution. As such, this

89 McKenzie, 214; Terry Browne, “MOSC Attracts Indonesian Interest,” Platypus, Spring 1993, 3. 90 Graham Ashton, Interview with Author, January 2018.

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section will first outline the election of John Howard and his stance on migration. Second, it will discuss

the Australia-Indonesia relationship after a change in leaders, before outlining the East Timor crisis, in

order to understand the extent of the break in relations before the creation of the Bali Process. This

section shows that due to domestic politics, Australia’s approach to irregular migration grew

exponentially tough. It argues that despite the change in leaders, there was a level of trust among

institutions which continued through to the East Timor crisis.

Howard and Immigration As noted above, many Indonesians respected Paul Keating and were sympathetic toward the

Labor party. So when the Howard Liberal Government came to power on the 2nd of March 1996, there

was ‘a collective sharp intake of breath amongst most observers of Australian foreign policy in Asia’.91

Much of this concern was related to Howard’s ‘racist’ views. For example, in 1988 he announced his

belief that it would be in interest of ‘social cohesion if it [Asian immigration] were slowed down a

little’, and, at his party speech in Esperance, he warned of the ‘dangers of multiculturalism’.92 In

response to these comments, then prime minister Hawke moved that parliament give its

‘unambiguous and unqualified commitment to the principle that, whatever criteria are applied by

Australian Governments in exercising their sovereign right to determine the composition of the

immigration intake, race or ethnic origin shall never, explicitly or implicitly, be among them’.93 Howard

voted against this and instead asked the house to confirm that, among other things:

it is the very essence of national sovereignty that only the democratically elected

government has the right to determine both the overall and the specific

composition of our migrant intake; ... that any government must reserve the right

from time to time to vary and alter policy, including adjustments to the size and

composition of the immigration program in response to changing requirements,

be they social, economic, political or humanitarian; … [and] confirms that

established principles of any immigration policy will always be subject to this

overriding right.94

Many Coalition supporters crossed the floor to vote with Labor, including Ruddock, who became the

shadow immigration minister in 1989, and Ian Macphee, while Michael Mackellar abstained.95 This

rhetoric is something that would feature later in Howard’s tenure as Prime Minister of Australia.

91 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 9. 92 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 107. 93 “Commonwealth of Australia Votes and Proceedings. No. 70, 25 August 1988” (The House of Representatives, August 25, 1988), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber/votes/1988-08-25/0018;query=Id:%22chamber/votes/1988-08-25/0018%22. 94 “Commonwealth of Australia Votes and Proceedings. No. 70, 25 August 1988.” 95 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 125; Betts, “Immigration Policy under the Howard Government,” 177.

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Indeed, after his election, Howard made changes to Australia’s immigration program. Howard

reportedly banned the word ‘multiculturalism’ from the Public Service96, and he abolished the Office

of Multicultural Affairs within Prime Minister and Cabinet, as well as the Bureau of Immigration,

Multicultural and Population Research.97 Under Howard, immigration was reduced and the waiting

period for welfare (other than Medicare) to all non-humanitarian arrivals was extended from 6 months

to 2 years.98 In relation to refugee policy specifically, Howard linked the ‘onshore’ and ‘offshore’

aspects of Australia’s immigration program, that is, when one refugee is admitted via onshore

application (after arriving in Australia), it would reduce by one the places available for offshore

applicants – refugees applying from camps around the world.99 Furthermore, in 1999 he introduced

Temporary Protection Visas, which provided protection for three years before re-evaluating the

situation in their home countries and did not allow visa-holders to sponsor family members.

Nevertheless, Howard’s actions in the migration space were largely consistent with

community attitudes. For example, 73 percent of people polled in 1991, and 65 percent of those polled

in 1996 thought that Australia’s immigration intake was too high.100 But in 1998 a poll showed that

the average Australian was overestimating number of people arriving by 70 time the amount actually

arriving.101 Further demonstrating the feeling among the Australian public, Pauline Hanson was

elected in 1996 and in the 1998 election her right wing One Nation Party, which favoured zero net

migration, gained one million votes with the largest swing in the country.102 During her maiden speech

to parliament in 1996, she stated that she believes that ‘we are in danger of being swamped by

Asians’.103 The fact that Howard did not criticise her views raised alarm bells in Asia of a return to the

White Australia Policy.104 Howard did not want to engage with her remarks, he later wrote in his

autobiography, because he ‘wanted to retain those former Coalition voters who were supportive of

some of the things being said by Pauline Hanson’.105 In the lead up to the 2001 election the One Nation

party began to crumble and ‘the race was therefore on to attract [those] voters’, who ‘had broken

96 See Betts, “Immigration Policy under the Howard Government,” 187. 97 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 52. 98 Jupp, 148. 99 Betts, “Immigration Policy under the Howard Government,” 182. 100 Katharine Betts, “Immigration and Public Opinion in Australia [1961 to 1996.],” People and Place 4, no. 3 (1996): 10. 101 David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Allen & Unwin, 2003), 37. 102 Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, 195. 103 Pauline Hanson, “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates. No. 208, 1996” (The House of Representatives, September 10, 1996), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1996-09-10%2F0038%22. 104 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 232–33. 105 John Howard, Lazarus Rising (Pymble, N.S.W: HarperCollins, 2010), 260.

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away from the major parties to vote for One Nation in 1998’.106 This encouraged Howard to adopt

policies ‘which have resonated with the more disgruntled end of the electorate and prepared the way

for the stronger but essentially similar meat that One Nation now has on offer’.107 Remembering

Howard’s own stance on Asian immigration in 1988, this understandably made Australia’s Asian

neighbours nervous and media across Asia expressed concern Australia was reverting to the White

Australia Policy108; Howard would need to earn their trust.

Howard and the Australia-Indonesia Relationship If Keating shifted Australia’s focus to the region, John Howard turned it back to its ‘Great and

Powerful Friends’. He argued, however, that Australia need not ‘choose between her geography and

her history’.109 Howard wanted to separate Australian foreign policy from the Keating-Evans approach

before him, as is demonstrated by his policy ‘Asia first … but not Asia only’.110 As this section will show,

the relationship was not as close as it was under the Keating years, though it did not initially change

as much as was expected – that is of course, until the East Timor crisis. Scholars have explained the

relative stability of the Howard years in Asia as a result of his maturation, or of luck and circumstance,

or because of a shift in his personal focus and interest.111 According to Michael Wesley, some of

Howard’s success lies in the managerial approach his government took, and in its ‘transnational

diplomacy’, that is, the ‘day to day collaboration of Australian officials with regional counterparts,

enabled by the transnational negotiation of common approaches to governance issues’.112 As this

section shows, it was the maintenance of relationships, not necessarily at the leadership level but at

the bureaucratic level, which was integral to the relationship’s resistance to a change in leaders.

Therefore, it is not only key individuals – as shown above – that can be driving forces for the

development of trust in a relationship; trust across lower levels of government was essential to the

establishment of the Bali Process so soon after the East Timor crisis. This section will explore the

factors driving the continuation of stable relations from the election of Howard until the East Timor

106 William Maley, “Australia’s Refugee Policy: Domestic Politics and Diplomatic Consequences,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 673, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1220494. 107 Chandran Kukathas and William Maley, The Last Refuge: Hard and Soft Hansonism in Contemporary Australian Politics, Issue Analysis, no. 4 (St. Leonards, N.S.W: Centre for Independent Studies, 1998), https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2945. 108 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 232–33. 109 John Howard, “Australia and Asia: An Enduring Engagement” (Australia-Asia Society, May 8, 1997), https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-10335. 110 John Howard, “The 5th Annual Sir Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop ASIALINK Lecture” (Melbourne, November 11, 1997), https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-10606. 111 See a summary of these debates in Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 24–25. 112 Wesley, 189–90, 212.

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crisis. First, it will discuss Howard’s strategic outlook, second, the institutional relationships in the

Australian embassy in Jakarta, among the police forces and the military.

While Howard did not take to Asia with nearly as much enthusiasm as Keating, Howard

accepted the relationship that Keating had worked hard to construct. For example, when Suharto

cracked down on pro-democracy movements in 1996, neither Howard nor his foreign minister,

Alexander Downer, made a comment. Furthermore, the 1997 Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper

considered Indonesia as one of Australia’s four most important relationships.113 The White Paper

demonstrated Australia’s desire to ‘support and encourage Indonesia’s continuing stability and

economic growth, and to maximise the shared benefits to be gained from this … not only in

government and business, but also between the two societies more generally’.114 The 1997 Asian

Financial Crisis seemed to confirm that Howard had taken the right approach; it highlighted the

weaknesses of the regional institutions that Keating had focussed on and allowed Howard to prove

that, in the words of his foreign minister Alexander Downer, Australia was an ‘all weather friend, not

just a fair-weather friend’.115 When Indonesia suffered from the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997,

Australia contributed almost $1 billion of financial assistance to Indonesia by in October.116

Furthermore, in March of 1998, Downer had made an unscheduled trip to Washington to urge the

IMF and World Bank to be more lenient towards Indonesia.117 While Howard and Suharto did not have

a close personal relationship, nor did Downer with Alatas, his election was not the major impediment

to the relationship that it could have been, especially as Howard came to power as Suharto was

nearing the end of his.

The leaders of Australia and Indonesia no longer shared a close personal relationship.

Nevertheless, the Australian embassy in Jakarta kept the relationship working. The incoming

Ambassador in 1997 after Howard’s election, John McCarthy, found the relationship to be ‘in pretty

good shape’ upon his arrival because of the investments made during the Keating period: ‘there wasn’t

a lot more to do’, he reflected, ‘it was more just keeping it working … keeping things ticking over and

doing more of the same’.118 After Suharto resigned on the 21st of May of 1998 following severe

economic crisis and political pressures, McCarthy saw that his role was ‘to get right, the transition. To

113 Commonwealth of Australia, ed., In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy: White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/1997/08/apo-nid74891-1122316.pdf. 114 Commonwealth of Australia, 62. 115 Alexander Downer, “Australia - Stability in the Asia Pacific” (Australian-American Association, Harvard Club, New York, June 8, 1998), https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1998/stability-asia_jun98.html. 116 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 73. 117 Wesley, 135–36. 118 John McCarthy, Interview with Author, December 2017.

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make sure we understood what was happening, to make sure we had links out to all the parties, that

we basically got it’.119 McCarthy was satisfied that he was able to establish links with people in all the

camps, as well as with the Indonesian and Australian press – something which he worked on from the

time of his arrival. While this task became difficult during the Timor crisis and the following six weeks,

the connections which McCarthy established made getting the relationship back on track in the year

2000 much easier.120

An AFP senior liaison officer was also stationed in Australia’s embassy in Jakarta. From 1995

to 1997 this was Graham Ashton, who, with a locally based assistant, facilitated interaction between

Australian law enforcement and Indonesian law enforcement across a range of activities, including

extraditions, investigations and capacity building, on cases including drugs, terrorism, fraud, and

people-smuggling – which was not at that time seen as a big issue, but was beginning to emerge.121 At

this time, Ashton recalled, ‘the relationship more broadly was really solidifying, and so the work we

were doing was really starting to take off in its importance and relevance at that time’.122 This was

partly because of the community unrest surrounding the end of the Suharto era, and as such, there

was a need for more defence engagement: ‘the police were reaching a level of maturity in Indonesia

where they were starting to become more relevant to government in terms of a solution, because the

look of military getting involved and dealing with public disorder was not a good look

internationally’.123 This made Australia become ‘really quite relevant across the range of different

areas’, especially policing, but also in other areas in the embassy.124

The strength of the police relationship was leveraged by the embassy for other matters.

Ashton recalls how other embassy officials would be surprised to see such senior Indonesian police

attend functions, because for their own engagement they would have trouble being able to penetrate

into some of the bureaucracies.125 This was because, according to Ashton – but reflected in numerous

other interviews – policing is a big family in one context, a ‘brotherhood’, a ‘fraternity’, and there’s a

sense of comradery, because all police do the same work.126 To ‘make formal the high level of

cooperation which already exists between Australia and Indonesia’, in what was a first between the

AFP and law enforcement in the Asia-Pacific, the two police forces signed a Memorandum of

119 McCarthy. 120 McCarthy. 121 Ashton, Interview with Author. 122 Ashton. 123 Ashton. 124 Ashton. 125 Ashton. 126 Ashton; See also: McKenzie, “A Common Enemy: Police Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia.”

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Understanding regarding Cooperation in Law Enforcement in 1997.127 At the time of signing, the

Indonesian National Police Chief, General Dibyo Widodo, said that ‘I have to report that our current

cooperation amongst the police of Australia and Indonesia is very good both on a personal and an

organisational level’.128 According to Ashton, this MoU was established because ‘the Indonesian

government particularly felt that our relationship, while we had some good personal relationships,

they should be strengthened by a formal document’, which would require the police agencies to meet

formally, annually, to progress work that would build capacity on both sides and build on the broader

relationship at a bureaucratic level. This bilateral diplomacy ‘under the radar’ helped to progress the

relationship more generally,129 and is an example of how trusted relationships can lead to codified

cooperation.

In relation to irregular migration, while it was not a major issue at that time, Australian and

Indonesian police were working together. According to Ashton, ‘it wasn’t a big deal to Indonesian

police, and Indonesian government’, though there were some Indonesian detention centres – places

you would not want to find yourself in.130 People-smuggling networks were just starting to form, and

the epicentre for those was at Kupang, in the east of Indonesia, where quite a few Australians could

be found. It was not easy for Australian authorities to engage the central Indonesian Government on

this issue, because they did not see this as a big priority – after all, irregular migrants were not staying

in Indonesia but simply passing through on their way to Australia and New Zealand – however, the

Indonesian police did work with Australian Federal Police on some jobs off their own volition. It should

be noted that a liaison officer is not operational, and as such, they have no powers to act within the

country, but instead rely on local enforcement to assist as much as possible. And so the Indonesian

police assisted in identifying the networks and providing intelligence, while AFP were able to identify

the Australians involved.131

Cooperation between the militaries was also ongoing and further demonstrative of efforts to

maintain trust. Towards the end of 1998 Australia and Indonesia began planning a workshop on what

a military should look like in the 21st century, which was held in Jakarta over three days in March of

1999 and was attended by 40 Australians and 40 Indonesians.132 On the second day of the workshop,

the Chief of the Australian Defence Force, Chris Barrie, received a call from Canberra informing him

127 Mick Palmer, “MOU Signed with Indonesian National Police,” Platypus, December 1997. 128 Palmer. 129 Ashton, Interview with Author. 130 Ashton. 131 Ashton. 132 Chris Barrie, Interview with Author, January 2018; “Indonesian, Australian Army Heads Meet, Stress Importance of Leadership.,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, March 13, 1999, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcfe00020010901dv3d00jjc&cat=a&ep=ASE.

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that Canberra would announce the raising of the readiness of the First Brigade in Darwin to be the

equivalent of the third Brigade in Townsville.133 Expecting that this would make the Indonesians

nervous, Barrie sought to maintain the Indonesian Army’s trust by openly communicating the

announcement. Barrie told General Wiranto that this announcement would be made, and that

although there might be some media commentary that this is about East Timor, he explained that this

action was about concurrency in the region – where Australia had operations in the Solomon Islands,

Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu and Bougainville. Therefore, according to Barrie, the decision was

about having sufficient troops to put on the ground if Australia had two concurrent operations in

different places. It seemed to Barrie that Wiranto accepted that line of reasoning, ‘whether he

believed me or not is a different story’.134 The announcement did not affect the success of the

workshop. On the final day, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at that time the Chief of Staff for Territorial

Affairs in Indonesia’s military summed up the workshop with a speech that Barrie thought he would

have been proud to give, about how the Indonesian armed forces needed to reform themselves; they

needed to become professional forces and get out of running the country.135 Indeed, this workshop

was held in March 1999, which was three months after Howard had delivered the controversial letter

about East Timor (which will be discussed below) to Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, who stepped

up from his role as Vice-President to lead the country when Suharto resigned in May 1998.

Therefore, the Howard election was not quite as debilitating as observers of Australian foreign

policy would have expected. This was in part because of the investments of the Keating-Suharto years

which were able to be maintained by personal and institutional relationships.

East Timor The events surrounding the independence of East Timor are very well canvassed in the

literature.136 For that reason, this section will briefly sketch the outline of such events, in so far as it is

important to understand why the crisis caused a break in the Australia-Indonesia relationship and a

halt in their cooperation.

The East Timor issue had been a ‘pebble in the shoe’ of the Australia-Indonesia relationship

since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, especially due to the unexplained killings137 of five Australian

journalists covering the invasion, in Balibo, which made anything to do with East Timor a hot issue in

133 Barrie, Interview with Author; “Why Our Army Is Heading North,” Herald-Sun, March 23, 1999. 134 Barrie, Interview with Author. 135 Barrie. 136 For a comprehensive account, see Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom, Current Affairs (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002). 137 Jolliffe, Cover-Up.

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Australian press.138 Nevertheless, succeeding Australian governments tried to balance the East Timor

sensitivity with foreign policy objectives, and were often accused by the Australian public of placing

more emphasis on the relationship with Indonesia than the human rights of the people of East

Timor.139

Around the time of Suharto’s resignation, the East Timor issue had become more noticeable

to the rest of the world. In 1996, two East Timorese opposition leaders were awarded the Nobel Peace

Prize140 and in 1998, Australia’s Labor party in opposition officially supported East Timor’s self-

determination as party policy.141 Under mounting pressure, Howard delivered a letter to Habibie in

December of 1998 stating that while Australia supported East Timor as a part of Indonesia, he

encouraged a situation along the lines of the Matignon Agreements between France and New

Caledonia, which allowed for a ten-year period before a referendum on Independence.142 This upset

president Habibie, who objected to being likened to France because France is a colonial power, which

Indonesia is staunchly against. He considered East Timor to be integrated into the republic of

Indonesia, not as a colony, but as an integral part of the republic with equal rights and responsibilities

with other provinces, including members of parliament from East Timor sitting in Indonesian

assemblies and becoming prominent officials within the bureaucracy of the republic of Indonesia,

which was not afforded to the New Caledonians.143 Although in practice, it was not dissimilar.

While Habibie’s reaction to this letter was initially adverse, after re-reading the letter he sent

a note to the national security section of his cabinet, suggesting that Indonesia think seriously about

giving East Timor independence, a move which some members of government had already been

encouraging. This would, however, need to be endorsed by parliament – the same parliament that

had incorporated East Timor in the first place.144 By January of 1999, Habibie decided not to take the

advice in the Howard letter and spend ten years working it out, rather, he announced that he would

hold the ‘consultative process’ in the next few months. This announcement upset the leadership of

138 Hidayat, “Facing the New Era: The Role of Media in Indonesia-Australia Relations,” 289; Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, 200; Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 75; Zainu’ddin, “Some Perceptions of Australia’s Opinion Makers,” 43. 139 Herb Feith, as quoted in Feith, Zainu’ddin, and Mackie, “Fifty Years of Engagement with Indonesia - Questions,” 43; Ball, “Indonesia and Australia: Strange Neighbours or Partners in Regional Resilience,” 123; Viviani, “Australia‐Indonesia Relations—Bilateral Puzzles and Regional Perspectives,” 28; Graham, The People next Door, 5; Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 75. 140 Fred Barbash, “East Timor Dissidents Win Nobel Peace Prize,” Washington Post, October 12, 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/10/12/east-timor-dissidents-win-nobel-peace-prize/32ebce8f-356d-41d7-b686-8c5fa6ea3319/. 141 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 77. 142 Wesley, 78. 143 Anwar, Interview with Author. 144 McCarthy, Interview with Author.

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the army and the Timorese who had a stake in the status quo.145 Australian intelligence agencies had

gotten word that pro-Jakarta militias were operating in East Timor, supported by the leadership of the

Indonesian army, and could intimidate voters.146 It was not until late April when Howard pressed

Habibie on a peacekeeping force before the vote at a meeting in Bali.147 The referendum finally

occurred on the 30th of August 1999, with a result of 78.5 percent for independence.148 Largescale

violence ensued.

With horrifying reports coming out of East Timor149, Indonesia faced mounting pressure to

allow peacekeeping forces to enter East Timor. The IMF threatened economic sanctions and the US

threatened a peacekeeping force.150 On the 11th and 12th of September there was an APEC Summit in

New Zealand, where John Howard put the East Timor issue on the agenda.151 On the 12th of

September, Habibie announced his government’s ‘readiness to accept international peacekeeping

forces through the United Nations, from friendly nations, to restore peace and security in East

Timor’.152 Habibie had requested that Asian nations join the forces, which would be more palatable to

the Indonesians and would avoid the idea that there is a Western force occupying East Timor, as the

‘ground anger against them [Australia] was very great’.153 A few days after the announcement, on the

16th of September, Indonesia abrogated the Security Agreement which was signed between Keating

and Suharto in 1995, and on the 20th of September, the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET)

coalition, led by Australia, began deploying troops. Many Indonesians considered this hypocritical,

given the apparent encouragement of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor in the first place.

As a result, there was a total breakdown of relations. Not only was the AMS abrogated, the

Australian ambassador at the time, John McCarthy, was attacked by a rioting crowd of protesters –

apparently deliberately unhindered by Indonesian police, and military joint training exercises were

145 McCarthy. 146 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 79. 147 Burke, Fear of Security, 200. 148 Susan Harris-Rimmer and Juli Effi Tomaras, “Aftermath Timor Leste: Reconciling Competing Notions of Justice” (Parliamentary Library, May 22, 2006), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/TimorLeste. 149 Yenny Wahid, the daughter of the soon to be president of Indonesia, Gus Dur, won the Walkley Award for her coverage of the brutality, which played a role in persuading her father of the true nature of what was happening in East Timor. See: Greg Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President: A View from the Inside (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002), 280–81. 150 Burke, Fear of Security, 201; Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 82–83. 151 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 82. 152 President B.J. Habibie, quoted in Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Habibie Accepts Peacekeeper Force - Timor-Leste,” ReliefWeb, September 13, 1999, https://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/habibie-accepts-peacekeeper-force; Susan Sim, “Habibie Accepts UN Troops.,” Straits Times, September 13, 1999, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=stimes0020010911dv9d005i3&cat=a&ep=ASE. 153 Sim, “Habibie Accepts UN Troops.”; Anwar, Interview with Author.

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cancelled.154 It would appear to be a total breakdown in trust. Policy Analyst, Peter Chalk, argued in

2001 that it was highly unlikely relations would ever be as strong as they were during the Keating-

Suharto years. He argued that the relationship could be rebuilt based on practicalities, rather than

sentiment.155 ‘Australia’, Chalk argued, ‘can seek to engage Indonesia in areas of common interest’156,

and could ‘usefully collaborate in addressing proximate "soft", non-traditional military threats, such

as piracy and unregulated population movements’.157 In hindsight, Chalk gave strong advice. Yet what

was the threat to Indonesia given irregular migrants were heading for Australia? How was this issue

one of common interest? Were personal relationships no longer important? The next section will look

at the issue of irregular migration in Australia and Indonesia while uncovering the factors that

precipitated the Bali Process after the fallout over East Timor.

1999-2000: The ‘Third Wave’ of Boat Arrivals The third wave of boats began to emerge, when, in the first 10 months of 1999, around 1,700

people arrived, mostly from China.158 In 1999 Australia received a record number of boat arrivals in

any one year: remembering around 2,000 people arrived during the Indochinese crisis, 3,721 had

arrived in 1999 alone.159 It is important to understand what was happening in the relation to irregular

migration in both Australia and Indonesia, as this will reveal whether there was indeed a shared

interest in its management that could explain the emergence of the Bali Process. As such, this section

will first outline Indonesia’s response to irregular migration, which was not a priority. Second, it will

outline the response and the politics of irregular migration in Australia, which was a major concern.

Third, it will highlight the early signs of cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in this area. It

argues that while irregular migration was not an important interest in Indonesia, domestic politics in

Australia encouraged a crackdown in arrivals, and to be successful, cooperation with Indonesia would

be necessary – something that lower level bureaucrats worked hard to achieve.

154 Peter Chalk, “Australia and Indonesia: Rebuilding Relations After East Timor,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (2001): 237–38. 155 Chalk, 234. 156 Chalk, 241. 157 Chalk, 247. 158 Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti, “Tinjuan Umum Kebijakan Kimigrasian Australia,” in Indonesia Dalam Strategi Keamanan Australia: Persoalan Migrasi Ilegal, ed. M. Riefqi Muna (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2002), 15; Philip Ruddock, “Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy.,” September 6, 2001, MPS 131/2001, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FLRW46%22;src1=sm1. 159 Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 22.

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Irregular Migration in Indonesia: Not an Important Issue Indonesia’s approach to irregular migration was developing slowly over the course of the

1990s with the introduction of domestic laws regarding immigration and its participation in related

regional instruments. The issue was not, however, a major concern for Indonesia, especially in the

disorderly years following the Asian Financial Crisis, the Fall of Suharto, and the independence of East

Timor. Nevertheless, in 1991 Indonesia received formal observer status in the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM).160 In 1992, Indonesia passed law 9/1992 Law on Immigration, which

was the first law relating to the detention of foreigners. While the law allowed for detention, it rarely

happened in practice.161 Meanwhile, through the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action – designed to

halt the ongoing influx of boats – the Indochinese refugee crisis was coming to an end. In June 1996

the UNHCR ceased funding for Vietnamese refugees throughout the region,162 and the remaining

Vietnamese left Galang that same year. Also in 1996, the UNHCR in Indonesia received the first five

Afghan and the first seven Iranian applications for protection, which was only the beginning of what

was soon to be known as the ‘third wave’.163 By 1999, the IOM recorded 3,779 irregular immigrants in

in Indonesia, of those, 364 were returned and 216 had been placed in third countries.164

New laws began to pass in the late 1990s. Notably, in 1998 Indonesia ratified the Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).165 This

confirmed Indonesia’s obligation against refoulement, which is enshrined in Article 3: ‘No State Party

shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial

grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’.166 Furthermore, in

1999 Law 37/1999 was passed, which mentions the right to apply for asylum in Indonesia but places

the authority to grant asylum through a presidential decree which was not passed until 2016.167 Law

39/1999 was also passed, which implemented which reiterates the right to seek asylum and provides

for due process of the law.168

160 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 134. 161 Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, “Exporting Detention,” March 1, 2013, 94. 162 Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997,” 330. 163 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 42. 164 Japanton Sitohang, “Masalah Imigrasi Ilegal: Dari Dan Melalui Indonesia,” in Indonesia Dalam Strategi Keamanan Australia: Persoalan Migrasi Ilegal, ed. M. Riefqi Muna (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2002), 51. 165 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 157–58. 166 United Nations, “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Treaty Series, December 10, 1984, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&clang=_en. 167 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 158; Carly Gordyn, “Assessing Indonesia’s New Decree on Refugees,” New Mandala, February 9, 2017, http://www.newmandala.org/assessing-indonesias-new-decree-refugees/. 168 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 158.

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Indonesia began to work with other countries, including Australia, in regional instruments

relating to migration. As a core member of ASEAN, Indonesia took an active part in developing the

Bangkok Declaration, which put forward the Asian values perspective on human rights before the 1993

World Conference on Human Rights. Article 11 of the Bangkok Declaration emphasises ‘the

importance of guaranteeing the human rights and fundamental freedoms of vulnerable groups such

as ethnic, national, racial, religious and linguistic minorities, migrant workers, disabled persons,

indigenous peoples, refugees and displaced persons’.169 Later in the decade, Indonesia, along with

other regional states including Australia, participated in regional cooperation process, considered to

be, in part, a precursor to the Bali Process.170 These processes included the 1996 Regional Seminar on

Irregular Migration and Migrant Trafficking in East and South Asia (the Manila Process), in which the

IOM lead a series of regional seminars, and the Intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on

Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants, a regional meeting organised by the Australian

Government and the UNHCR and of a broader focus than the Manila Process.171 This resulted in the

1999 Bangkok Declaration, which, among other things, called for ‘countries of origin, as well as

countries of transit and destination, … to reinforce their efforts to prevent and combat irregular

migration by improving their domestic laws and measures, and by promoting educational and

information activities for those purpose’.172 Yet the Declaration made no reference to human rights,

refugees, or the UNHCR.

Some observers have noted the rise in people arriving by boat in Australia through Indonesia

after Indonesia’s abrogation of the AMS.173 The AMS was cancelled in September, 1999, and between

September and December, 2,519 people had arrived. In the previous year, only 200 had arrived.174

Yet, as interviewees were quick to remind me, this was a time of turmoil for Indonesia – the country

was simply in chaos. Throughout the latter half of the 1990s there had been outbreaks of communal

violence around the country, including the May 1998 riots that resulted in what is estimated to be

more than 1,000 deaths. As a result, there were mass populations of internally displaced persons.

Furthermore, Indonesia had just come out of more than three decades of authoritarian rule, was in

the middle of Reformasi and was politically in a period of internal consolidation, not to mention the

169 Regional Meeting for Asia, “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (Bangkok Declaration),” April 29, 1993, 5. 170 Kneebone, “The Bali Process and Global Refugee Policy in the Asia–Pacific Region,” 599. 171 Kneebone, 599. 172 “The Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration (1999)” (International Symposium on Migration “Towards Regional Cooperation on Irregular/Undocumented Migration” 21 – 23 April 1999, April 23, 1999), Article 6, /publication/the-bangkok-declaration-on-irregular-migration-1999/. 173 Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” 68. 174 Ruddock, “Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy.”; Phillips and Spinks, “Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976,” 22.

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events in East Timor. The government’s grip over the country was still rather shaky and legitimate

institutions were still in a point of transition – Indonesians had lost trust in the old institutions, but

they had not yet reinvented or completely reformed the institutions. The economy was still in a very

difficult situation. In addition, there was the influx of outside migrants coming through Indonesia,

further exacerbating the criminal activity going on Indonesia at the time – the waters around Indonesia

were infested with Indonesian pirates, so there was piracy, smuggling, and other transnational crimes

carried out by Indonesians. And the Indonesian law enforcement agencies were really not that well

equipped to deal with these problems.175

Therefore, for Indonesia, the issues of the day were far, far greater and more concerning than

that of people transiting its islands on their way to Australia. In the words of Chris Barrie, but reflecting

the sentiment of most interviewees: ‘we often look at Indonesia and think the strings are all being

pulled … I think more often than not it’s just a coincidence. ... we’re always looking for the mastermind

in this. And I suspect it doesn’t exist’.176 ‘Frankly’, said the former Assistant Minister of State

Secretariat for Foreign Affairs during the Habibie Presidency, Dewi Fortuna Anwar:

it was not appreciated at the time that the Australian government behaved as if

the people coming from the Middle East were Indonesia’s fault, that Indonesia is

not doing enough to try to stop them. Just dealing with Indonesia’s own internal

security was more than that government could handle at the time.177

Given the domestic climate in Indonesia, there did not seem to be an interest in controlling of irregular

migration and preventing of people-smuggling.

Irregular Migration in Australia: An Increasingly Important Domestic Issue The issue of irregular migration in Australia, however, was a major issue in terms of domestic

politics. On Christmas Eve in 1998, a boat of 52 Chinese beached at Araru Point in Northern

Territory.178 In March a group of 26 Chinese landed at Holloways Beach near Cairns, and in April a

group of 60 landed in Scotts Head in New South Wales, requiring a search to find some of the

arrivals.179 This led to an intense flash of public anxiety about a potential invasion from the North

175 Anwar, Interview with Author. 176 Barrie, Interview with Author. 177 Anwar, Interview with Author. 178 David Reardon, “Boat Woman Dies In Remote North,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 30, 1998, sec. News And Features. 179 Debra Way, “1999 - the Year of Boat People.,” Australian Associated Press, December 26, 1999, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aap0000020020308dvcq002v4&cat=a&ep=ASE; “Chronology of Recent Illegal Landings.,” Australian Associated Press, August 14, 1999, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aap0000020020307dv8e00eho&cat=a&ep=ASE; Kevin Meade, “They Can Hide - but They Can’t Run.,” The Australian, May 28, 1999.

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through Australia’s wide open northern borders, coinciding with the popularity of Pauline Hanson and

her one nation party.

In response to these clandestine arrivals, Howard established a Coastal Surveillance Task

Force180 and tightened domestic policies. The Howard Government introduced new legislation to

restrict immigration, including amendments to the Migration Act and the introduction of the Border

Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 and Crimes at Sea Act 2000. These allowed Australian

officers to board and search ships, and for asylum seekers to be taken to and detained on the

Australian mainland, pending refugee status claims. It also created people-smuggling offences, with

organisation or facilitation of bringing in more than five people to Australia knowing they would be

unlawful citizens punishable for imprisonment of up to 10 years or a 1,000-penalty unit fine.181

Amendments also denied refugee status to asylum seekers who have not taken ‘all possible steps’ in

finding safe haven in any country where they have spent seven or more consecutive days en route to

Australia, or if they have dual nationality or a right to reside in another safe country, regardless of

however the temporary right of stay.182 As previously mentioned, Temporary Protection Visas were

introduced in that year and, in October 1999, the Woomera detention centre was opened. Bill Farmer,

who was Secretary for the Department of Immigration at the time, recalls that at Christmas of 1998,

the Department was considering closing the detention centre at Port Hedland due to low numbers. In

no less than a year, however, the centre was bulging, and by November 1999 the detention centre at

Woomera was opened.183

The Government established a second task force: the Unauthorised Arrivals in Australia Task

Force, in late 1999. Its purpose was to look at issues of international cooperation to combat irregular

migration and people smuggling; measures to bolster the international protection framework; and

steps to improve coordination and efficiency among Australian Government agencies.184 By the year

2000 irregular immigration became a central concern for the Australian Government. The 2000

Defence White Paper had, for the first time, included non-traditional security threats such as ‘illegal

immigration’, highlighting the role of the Defence Force in surveying the coast.185 This was because,

according to one of the White Paper’s central authors, Hugh White, the low level undocumented

180 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Commonwealth Government of Australia, “Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force,” 1999, https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/31274595. 181 Mary Crock, Ben Saul, and Azadeh Dastyari, Future Seekers II: Refugees and Irregular Migration in Australia (Federation Press, 2006), 49. 182 Crock, Saul, and Dastyari, 110–11. 183 Farmer, Interview with Author. 184 Ruddock, “Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy.” 185 Commonwealth of Australia, ed., Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Parliamentary Paper / The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, no. 451 of 2000 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2000), VIII.

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arrivals through the latter half of the 1990s raised questions about the extent to which Australia was

effectively managing its northern approaches.186 It had become a defence issue as well as an

immigration issue because the defence forces were responsible for maritime surveillance.

Furthermore, there was widespread belief around the world that the end of the Cold War meant the

end of conflict between states and the emergence of new security threats, including social, sub-state

and trans-state, which would be mixed with other issues including irregular migration. The Defence

department was equipped to deal with traditional security threats, and while it could build a ring

around the Australian borders it would bear great cost on the government. Howard understood this,

until of course, the Tampa affair187, discussed later.

In sum, Australia saw that it was within its immediate interest to control irregular migration,

and to do so, it would need to engage with countries in the region, including Indonesia, a country

which did not share this interest.

Irregular Migration: Australia Seeks Cooperation As irregular migration became an increasing domestic concern, the government began to seek

greater international cooperation in its control. Chinese passengers arriving on boats undetected were

able to be repatriated thanks to a deal brokered between Australia and China a few years prior in

1996, but an increasing number of boats carrying Middle Eastern refugees were arriving via Indonesia.

The Australian ambassador in Jakarta at the time, John McCarthy, recalls that this was not a major

issue for the Australian embassy in Jakarta, but a ‘second-tier’ concern until the end of 2000.188

Nevertheless, efforts were made to engage Indonesia’s cooperation, resulting in a ‘regional

cooperation arrangement’. This section will highlight the ways in which Australian bureaucrats sought

cooperation in tackling irregular migration and, in doing so, sought to convince Indonesia this was in

their interest too.

Australia began to increase its efforts abroad in seeking to prevent irregular migration. In

October 1999 the Australian minister for immigration launched a publicity scare campaign to dissuade

people travelling to Australia by boat.189 Publicity material was distributed through both source and

transit countries to explain Australia’s new and tougher penalties against people-smuggling and

explain that unlawful arrivals are detained and deported.190 In the early months of 1999, then

186 Commonwealth of Australia, VIII. 187 White, Interview with Author. 188 McCarthy, Interview with Author. 189 Crock, Saul, and Dastyari, Future Seekers II, 50. 190 Barry York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources, vol. 2, Chronology (Australian Parliamentary Library, 2003), 92, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/online/Refugeess6.

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Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Bill Farmer, Australia began to

‘break new ground’ by seeking ways in which to cooperate with Indonesia on preventing irregular

departures.191 Farmer led a delegation of senior officers of the Departments of Immigration, Defence,

Customs and Coastwatch, Ausaid and the Australian Federal Police, to find ways in which the two

countries could cooperate to prevent people leaving Indonesia for Australia.

The Indonesian government and Indonesian citizens were not convinced that they should

cooperate. According to Farmer, journalists would ask the delegation in press conferences about why

Indonesia should help stop the boats, as it was seen to be Australia’s problem.192 Playing on their mind

was the Galang detention centre, which had closed only four years prior after being in operation for

17 years. Galang was seen to be a headache for Indonesia as they felt that they were left with the

problem, and was one in which they did not want to repeat, which, according to Farmer, was part of

their mindset at the beginning of every discussion. This demonstrates that the Indonesians did not

trust Australia to not leave them with the burden, again. Another problem was the difficulty with

which Jakarta was able to have impact in the further provinces, especially given the range of people

with autonomous and semi-autonomous powers, in addition to issues with the military and with

corruption. Because of this lack of effective control, in comparison to China for example, achieving

cooperation with Indonesia was much more difficult.193

In order to convince Indonesia that they should cooperate, Farmer highlighted the ways that

the passage of people through Indonesia to Australia is not just an Australian problem. ‘For a start,’

Farmer recalled his line to the Indonesian press:

people are entering or they’re leaving Indonesia illegally, but to the extent that

they’re in Indonesia, they are causing problems … a variety of social and other

problems and so it is manifestly an issue that is a problem for Indonesia, to the

extent that that trade is stopped, that suits both Australia and Indonesia.194

Farmer’s approach was an early venture which, within a very short time, became the precursor to

much more detailed interventions and ministerial visits. According to Farmer, this approach went

‘from a slow start to reasonably promising in terms of the positives of the atmospherics … through to

pretty intensive engagement and of course the Bali Process’.195 As a result of this trip, the two

countries agreed on a range of measures to combat people smuggling, including ‘an extension of

existing cooperation and coordination with Defence, Immigration, Police and Customs authorities;

191 Farmer, Interview with Author. 192 Farmer. 193 Farmer. 194 Farmer. 195 Farmer.

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improving systems for the exchange of information and criminal intelligence; a range of technical

cooperation issues to improve Indonesia's capacity to combat people smuggling; and arrangements

for an education/media program to promote knowledge of the dangers and penalties involved in

people trafficking’.196 It was the Indonesian Justice Minister, Dr. Muladi, who proposed a formal

agreement to cover the work of all the agencies involved in these efforts.197

Indeed in the year 2000 Australia was very active in internationalising the issue of controlling

irregular migration.198 The Budget allocated more than $12 million for the expansion of the number

of Immigration compliance officers overseas, including posts in Islamabad, Belgrade, Moscow,

Amman, Tehran, Suva and Cairo, with more money given to developing and expanding detention

centres.199 Throughout the year, Ruddock visited senior ministers in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia

as well as representatives from the UNHCR, IOM and the Red Cross to promote Australia’s strong anti-

people smuggling position and to develop a ‘global approach’ to the problem. Agreements were made

to cooperate in the exchange of intelligence on people smuggling, increased technical cooperation,

and (in the cases of Syria and Turkey) agreement on the return of illegal entrants.200

From June 2000, a number of high-level Australian military officials visited Jakarta to restore

the cooperation that had ceased after the East Timor crisis.201 In relation to irregular migration

specifically, a regional cooperation arrangement was established between Indonesia, Australia and

the International Organization for Migration and the UNHCR.202 Under this arrangement, the IOM

undertook ‘case management and care’ for people who were identified by Indonesian authorities as

likely to travel irregularly to Australia or New Zealand, while those with asylum claims were referred

to and processed by the UNHCR.203 The IOM’s costs were covered by Australia, so while asylum-

seekers’ claims were being processed, they were able to live in Australian-funded accommodation,

196 York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002, 2:88. 197 York, 2:88. 198 In August, Philip Ruddock, the Australian immigration minister, announced that he will lead Australia’s 'intensified efforts in working with other countries and United Nations officials to reform the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ to make it more effective in “meeting the challenges of providing protection to those most in need, while combating people smuggling” York, 2:97. 199 York, 2:96. 200 As part of these measures tackling people smuggling abroad, the Department of Immigration released three video productions for distribution in people smuggling “source and transit countries”, which contain warnings from victims of people smugglers. In March, Ruddock visited England, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy to discuss strengthening Australia’s global approach to combating people smuggling. In July, Ruddock visited Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India and France to discuss people smuggling and to develop international cooperation against it. Much of this work is also carried out and continued in 2001. See York, 2:94–98. 201 Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” 72–73. 202 Missbach, Troubled Transit, 2015, 138–39. 203 Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, “Exporting Detention,” March 1, 2013, 95.

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with an Australian funded stipend, in the Indonesian community while those with failed claims were

returned. The aim of this arrangement was three-fold: to stabilise the population of irregular migrants,

arrest and prosecute people-smugglers, and get Indonesia’s cooperation in arresting people

smugglers. This ‘arrangement’ was not a formal agreement, as one anonymous Australian immigration

official wished to emphasise; there is no signed document, rather, it was an interlocking informal

arrangement of international understandings and Indonesia’s cooperation.204 According to this

anonymous Australian official, the arrangement worked ‘tolerably well’: Indonesia kept people in

detention, which stabilised the population. There were, however, a number of challenges: it was not

a formal agreement therefore it could be easily bypassed. Obtaining Indonesia’s cooperation in

arresting and prosecuting people-smugglers was somewhat tricky, given people-smuggling was not

yet a crime in Indonesia. Law enforcement therefore needed to find other crimes, such as credit card

fraud, to arrest suspects. Furthermore, as Indonesia had other priorities, this was an issue to which it

would not give huge resources. Resettlement was also slow, partly because the UNHCR and Indonesia

did not wish to create a resettlement hub or magnet in Indonesia.205

Meanwhile, the relationship between the two police forces continued to strengthen. Exactly

one year after the East Timor intervention, the Indonesian police were special guests of the AFP at the

2000 Sydney Olympics in September, where, as part of their earlier Memorandum of Understanding

(1995), they signed a protocol specifically to work together on targeting people smuggling

syndicates.206 Former AFP agent, Leigh Dixon, recalls walking around the Olympic stadium with the

Indonesian police generals. He knew these generals well as he had been posted to the Indonesian

police headquarters during the East Timor crisis. Indonesia allowed an AFP posting during that time

‘to make sure there were no misunderstandings about what was going on, [which] showed the

resilience of the relationship’.207 Former AFP commissioner Mick Keelty later told a Senate inquiry:

To give you an indication of the extent of [the police to police] relationship, we

maintained that even during the period that we were in East Timor. The policing

relationship is a very different one from, for example, the defence relationship. In

law enforcement, it is largely considered that we are all working to the one goal,

204 Anonymous Australian Government Official, Interview with Author. 205 Anonymous Australian Government Official. 206 Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident Report (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), 9, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/maritimeincident/report/index. 207 Leigh Dixon, Interview with Author, March 2018.

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particularly in terms of transnational crime. We were able to operate on the

goodwill of the existing relationship.208

Dixon agrees, emphasising that despite causing strains in the government relationship, the East Timor

crisis ‘didn’t affect [police cooperation] at all!’, according to Dixon, ‘because everybody knew each

other’.209 So while ‘politically’, Indonesia and Australia were ‘at the lowest point in the road’,

‘practically’, it was ‘business as normal’.210

It is important to note that this cooperation was in the year 2000 – only one year after the

East Timor crisis. After the signing of the protocol in September 2000, Australia began training the

Indonesian National Police for investigations into people smuggling operations the very next month

in Bali, October 2000.211 In November there was an arrangement for funding of equipment and funding

to members of the strike team, that is, the Joint Agency People-Smuggling Strike Team. The team was

made up of fifteen analysts and certified investigators, five people from Australia’s immigration

department and ten from the AFP. It was created by Australia’s cabinet to look at the ‘organised

criminality behind people-smuggling’, and was charged with undertaking investigations with the aim

of prosecuting the people involved.212 Further cooperation with other countries had been modelled

off the ‘Jakarta model’, as it is colloquially known. This involved the ambassador or deputy ambassador

meeting with senior representatives of key agencies, including police, customs, immigration and

defence, at least weekly. This was to ensure that the embassy – as the key point of engagement with

the host government – is focused and unified.213

By the end of the year 2000, cooperation on people-smuggling between the two countries

had become more high-profile. In December, eleven Australian ministers and five Indonesian ministers

met in Canberra for the 5th Meeting of the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum (AIMF). At the

meeting, Ministers agreed that ‘illegal migration posed a threat to national security and prosperity

and expressed their commitment to continue developing closer cooperation against illegal people

208 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, “Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 11/07/2002” (Commonwealth of Australia, July 11, 2002), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommsen%2F5640%2F0008%22. 209 Dixon, Interview with Author. 210 Dixon. 211 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, “Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 11/07/2002,” 1956. 212 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1997. 213 Commonwealth of Australia, “Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Estimates” (Senate, May 28, 2009), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22committees/estimate/12042/0001%22.

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trafficking and smuggling, including in international fora and with international organisations’.214 As a

result, the two foreign ministers signed a Joint Plan of Action, which included Law Enforcement and

Illegal People Trafficking. This kind of cooperation would pick up a greater pace in 2001. As would the

boats: in the last two weeks of December 2000, 11 boats arrive with 743 people on board.215

In sum, as Indonesia experienced a tumultuous few years through the Asian Financial Crisis,

reformasi, and the loss of East Timor, irregular migration was not a major concern. Yet it was a huge

concern for Australia, and some low level cooperation bubbled away under the surface despite the

chaos in Indonesia as Australia worked to convince Indonesia of its interest in managing the problem.

2001: Tampa, 9/11 and the Australian Federal Election It is important to understand what was happening in the context of the Australia-Indonesia

relationship in 2001 that led to the creation of the Bali Process early the next year. Changes in

Indonesian leadership and an Australian federal election, in addition to the 9/11 attacks on the World

Trade Centre in New York, set the backdrop to irregular migration in the Australia-Indonesia

relationship. Indeed, it is surprising after the turbulent year of 2001 that the Bali Process should

emerge in February of 2002. This section will first show how Australia solidified its commitment to

internationalising the solution to irregular migration, to which Indonesia was central. Second, it will

show that despite the relationship between the leaders of the two countries being somewhat rocky,

cooperation on the ground, especially between police, continued. Third, it will show how the Tampa

crisis and the 9/11 attacks led to a double-down in Australia’s efforts to curb irregular migration.

Fourth, it shows that while Indonesia saw irregular migration as primarily Australia’s problem, it felt

the pressure to be cooperative after the 9/11 attacks. Finally, it argues that key individuals saw

cooperating with Australia on irregular migration to be an opportunity to rebuild reputation, to ‘mend

the fence’ and to reap rewards of a productive relationship, bringing the two countries to the same

page. Central to this discussion, then, is the role that individuals and their relationships do and do not

play in securing cooperation.

Australia’s Approach to a Growing Problem. The increase in numbers had alarmed the Australian government. Between July 1999 and June

2001, there were 8,316 people who arrived on unauthorised boats, more than double than the

amount arriving in the previous decade.216 On the 6th of September (shortly after the Tampa crisis and

nearing the federal election), Howard’s Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Philip

214 Alexander Downer, “Australia Indonesia Ministerial Forum and Australia-Indonesia Development Area Ministerial Meeting,” December 7, 2000, https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2000/fa135_2000.html. 215 Ruddock, “Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy.” 216 4,114 arrived in the period from 1989-90 to 1998-99. See: Ruddock.

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Ruddock, released a background paper outlining the Howard government’s approach to irregular

migration. It rested upon three main elements: preventing flows from countries of origin and first

asylum; working with other countries to disrupt people smugglers and intercept their clients; and

developing reception arrangements for unauthorised arrivals who reach Australia, and the removal of

those found not to be refugees.217 Ruddock said that a key element is developing a “broad

international consensus on the need for action and strengthened cooperation,’ which he had been

working on ‘over the past five years”.218 Indeed, in June 2001, Ruddock visited Indonesia and, with the

Australian Ambassador Ric Smith, met Indonesian officials to discuss options for stopping boats from

leaving Indonesia. One possibility, Ruddock proposed, was for Indonesia to establish a detention

centre to hold irregular migrants. This idea was rejected by Indonesia – again, the memories of Galang

were not so distant.219 Despite Indonesia’s rejection of this idea, Australia persisted throughout the

year in seeking Indonesian cooperation.

Rocky Relationships As seen in earlier sections, warm relations between Australia and Indonesia’s leaders can lead

to a strong relationship and successful cooperation, but also, that less-than-warm relations between

leaders does not necessarily result in a breakdown. Following the fall of Suharto, Indonesia went

through three changes in presidents over the next few years. In October of 1999, president

Abdurrahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, became Indonesia’s 4th President in the first parliamentary

elections in 44 years. He was therefore the president in the aftermath of the East Timor vote for

independence, yet he was also the first Indonesian president to visit Australia since Suharto’s visit in

1975. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2002), the relationship began to improve after this visit.220

Understanding how a low point can be followed by such a gesture in less than two years may give us

insight into how the two countries restored relations and established the Bali Process. This section will

briefly examine the Gus Dur period.

Gus Dur was a foreign policy enthusiast. He consulted his foreign minister, Alwi Shihab, on

issues related to the Middle East and his spokesman, Wimar Witoelar, on issues to do with the West,

yet he made many decisions himself.221 He generally liked Australia and Australians and, before his

death, had visited Australia approximately 35 times.222 According to Bruce Grant (2010), ‘He was the

first of Indonesia's presidents to confront the Australian public on its own terms — open, democratic,

217 Ruddock. 218 Ruddock. 219 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 31, 33–34; Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” 72. 220 Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” 63. 221 Wimar Witoelar, Interview with Author, March 2018. 222 Witoelar.

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humanist, humorous’.223 Gus Dur saw his values shared by Australia and Australians, especially in the

form of pluralism.224 Despite his negative views of Australia’s involvement in East Timor225, he had a

change of heart after reading an article in the Sydney Morning Herald, written by his daughter,

Yenny.226 While Gus Dur had positive feelings towards Australia, other sections of the Indonesian

government did not share this sentiment. He even shared a strong friendship with Australia’s foreign

minister Alexander Downer, whom other Indonesian officials did not particularly like (though his

relationship with Howard was more remote).227 Gus Dur had many differences of opinions with other

members in his government, which eventually led to his impeachment. But his affection for Australia

was mutual, as former Ambassador to Indonesia Ric Smith notes, Gus Dur was a good president in for

the Australia-Indonesia relationship: he ‘was really committed to a much more open relationship,

acknowledging all the differences … he was very decent to [Australia] and good to work with’.228

Nevertheless, Gus Dur’s visit to Australia in 2001 was largely symbolic and expressed genuine

sentiment, rather than achieving policy objectives. As his presidency was coming to an end amid

growing discontent with his leadership in Indonesia, he was not able to fully repair the ‘cold’

government to government relationship. Unfortunately, Gus Dur’s presidency was chaotic, and for

internal political reasons, he was impeached. On the 23rd of July, Megawati became the 5th Indonesian

president.

John Howard, upon invitation, attended Megawati’s inauguration in August 2001. While he

was there, he met with her ministers to discuss the prospects of Indonesia hosting a detention centre,

to which they again refused.229 Nevertheless, Howard and Megawati issued a Joint Communique

during this visit, in which, amongst other things, the two leaders ‘emphasised the significance of

continued cooperation to deal with irregular people movement and transnational crime, including

drug trafficking and organised people smuggling’. To this end, they agreed ‘to exchange information

and to intensify bilateral and international cooperation to address these problems’.230 At this time

Australia was in the midst of an increasing number boats arriving on its shores – 1,212 had arrived in

August, 2001, where in the previous two months the number was only 132.231 Against this background

223 Bruce Grant, “Indonesian Leader Was a Man for All People,” The Sydney Morning Herald, January 1, 2010, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/indonesian-leader-was-a-man-for-all-people-20091231-lkxa.html. 224 Witoelar, Interview with Author. 225 Singh, Defense Relations Between Australia and Indonesia in the Post-Cold War Era, 135. 226 Witoelar, Interview with Author; Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid , Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President, 280–81. 227 Witoelar, Interview with Author. 228 Richard (Ric) Smith, Interview with Author, January 2018. 229 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 46. 230 John Howard, “Joint Communique On the Occasion of the Visit of the Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon. John Howard, to Indonesia,” August 13, 2001, http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12160. 231 Ruddock, “Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy.”

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came the Tampa crisis, only a few days after Howard’s visit in Jakarta, which would put the Joint

Communique to the test.

In Three Weeks: Tampa, the Pacific Solution and 9/11 On the 26th of August, the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) asked ships in the area

to respond to a vessel in distress. The Tampa, a Norwegian shipping vessel, responded to the call and

took aboard 433 asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.232 The captain of the Tampa,

Arne Rinnan, initially headed towards the Merak port in Indonesia, however, when the asylum seekers

learned about their destination five men aggressively approached Rinnan and demanded the boat

head towards Australia; they threatened that they ‘had nothing to lose’.233 Rinnan requested

permission from Australia to take the asylum seekers to Christmas Island, a request the Australian

Government not only rejected but threatened that if Rinnan was to do so, he would be prosecuted as

a people smuggler.234 Rinnan pleaded with Australian authorities, reporting that several asylum-

seekers needed urgent medical assistance. On the 29th of August Rinnan issued a mayday alert and

entered Australian waters without permission, which triggered a deployment of 45 Australian SAS

members who boarded the Tampa.

This resulted in a ‘stand-off’, with both Australia and Indonesia refusing to take the asylum-

seekers. In fact, Megawati did not answer Howard’s phone calls.235 The UN had offered to mediate

between Australia and Norway, which was rejected by the Australian Government. Yet the very next

day Howard called Kofi Annan to ask that East Timor receive the asylum seekers, an offer which Annan

rejected. In the meantime, however, the UNHCR had lined up countries including the US, Sweden and

Norway, to accept the asylum seekers. According to the Assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees,

Soren Jenssen Petersen: ‘We had enough indications to know we could have solved the problem very

quickly’.236 But by this time, Howard had accepted New Zealand’s offer to take 150 of the asylum

seekers, and have the others processed on Nauru.237

The Tampa incident triggered a raft of new legislations and responses to irregular migration.

By the end of September, seven new bills were passed by the Senate.238 These laws effectively gave

232 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 180. 233 Sandra Jordan and Jason Burke, “All Australia Can Offer Is Guano Island,” the Guardian, September 2, 2001, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/02/sandrajordan.jasonburke. 234 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 25. 235 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 180–84; Marian Wilkinson and David Marr, “The Pacific Solution,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 22, 2001, sec. News And Features. 236 Soren Jenssen Petersen Assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees Marian Wilkinson, “Spurned: UN Tampa Solution,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 20, 2001, sec. News And Features. 237 Wilkinson and Marr, “The Pacific Solution.” 238 The seven Bills are: The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001, The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001, The Border Protection

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rise to the ‘Pacific Solution’. There are three main pillars to this strategy: the excision of certain

Australian islands so that anyone arriving on those islands will not be able to apply for a protection

visa, the transfer of arrivals to detention centres in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea,

and Operation Relex – the interception and return of boats.

Indonesia was surprised by Australia’s response to the Tampa, according to Smith it ‘sent a

pretty clear signal and one that we were determined about this’.239 And so Australia persisted. On the

6th of September, Downer, Ruddock and Reith visited Indonesia and met with Indonesian ministers to

again ask for Indonesia to host a detention centre to process the asylum seekers, with the costs borne

by Australia.240 The three Australian ministers explained to the Indonesian ministers (about half the

Indonesian cabinet) about why this was an issue for Australia. It was not because Australia did not

want refugees or immigrants – they took 190,000 immigrants a year – but that people were arriving

without authorisation. The Australian ministers explained that it was also a problem for Indonesia

because it strained the bilateral relationship and could potentially jeopardise Defence cooperation.

Furthermore, Indonesian men were being deceived by people smugglers and sailing boats out of ports

in Indonesia and going to jail in Australia. ‘We were saying’, Smith recalls, ‘you know it’s actually a

problem for you too, and by the way, if it’s a problem for us, we’ll make it a problem for you’.241

Indonesia seemed only concerned about their nationals who were involved, and the request

for hosting a detention centre was again rejected: ‘We already have enough problems with our own

internally displaced persons’, said a senior official from the Indonesian foreign ministry, ‘we do not

want to be someone else's fort’.242 According to Smith, it was a ‘pretty direct’ meeting, and the

Indonesian ministers were not happy with the tone of it. Not only did memories of Galang dictate their

response, but they saw it as an Australian domestic problem which was being exploited at the expense

of their relationship. Furthermore, Indonesia was facing criticisms from the overseas Muslim

community for assisting the West and not allowing Muslims to come to Australia, which made the

Indonesians worried about its Haj quota for Umrah.243 Finally, the Indonesians knew that the arrivals

did not want to stay but to keep moving on to Australia, and they did not see why they should stop

(Validation and Enforcement Powers) Bill 2001, The Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill 1998, The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2001, The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 5) 2001 and The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001. 239 Smith, Interview with Author. 240 Marr and Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 136–37; Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 182–83. 241 Smith, Interview with Author. 242 John Aglionby, “Asylum Ship Captain Condemns Howard,” The Guardian, September 7, 2001, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/07/johnaglionby; Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 182–83. 243 Dixon, Interview with Author.

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them. Smith thought this might have achieved something in the mid-term, however, five days later

was the day of the World Trade Centre attacks in New York.

The September 11 terror attacks had major implications for the entire world. As the largest

Muslim country, it had immediate policy consequences in Indonesia’s bilateral relations with the US

and its allies, and it seemed to justify Australia’s hard-line response to the Tampa. The Indonesian

government were concerned for the growing antipathy, misperception and ‘clash of civilisation’

consequences for Indonesia as the largest Muslim country, and so issued very strong statements

condemning the attacks.244 It therefore affected the relationship between Australia and Indonesia,

especially the idea that Howard was the ‘deputy sheriff’ to the United States, and that Australia is part

of the Christian world neighbouring the country with the largest majority of Muslims.245

Relations under Strain There was certainly tension in the relationship, especially between the upper levels of

government. This had a slight impact on cooperation on the ground, but not enough: the day after the

September 11 attack, an AFP liaison officer in Jakarta received a call from the Indonesian Police to

advise that the protocol on people smuggling had been ‘set aside’.246 This was because, as the AFP

commissioner at the time, Mick Keelty, understood, the Indonesian foreign ministry felt that there

needed to be a ‘more formal government-to-government arrangement, and that was one of the

catalysts or levers leading to the ministerial summit in February’.247 The suspension of the protocol

did lead to fewer arrests and fewer disruptions of smuggling activities, and in the three months

following the suspension more than 12 boats left Indonesia for Australia.248 Nevertheless, after an

initial period of reduced contact between the forces,249 ‘We [the two police forces] were able to

operate on the goodwill of the existing relationship’,250 and cooperation continued ‘on a case by case

basis’.251 In an attempt to reinstate cooperation, Keelty visited his counterpart, Da’i Bachtiar, in Jakarta

on September 17.252 It was clear to Keelty that the suspension was not coming from the Indonesian

police but from the Indonesian department of foreign affairs.

244 Wirajuda, Interview with Author. 245 Wirajuda. 246 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, “Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 11/07/2002,” 1967. 247 Keelty as quoted in Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1939, 1939. 248 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1975–76; Kerry Taylor, “Jakarta Froze Boat People Pact - AFP.,” The Age, July 12, 2002. 249 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, “Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 11/07/2002,” 1975–76. 250 Keelty in Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1955. 251 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1940. 252 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 1954.

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Keelty and Bachtiar had a well-known friendship. Bachtiar felt that Keelty understood

Indonesian culture. He told a former Ambassador to Australia, Imron Cotan, that he saw Keelty as an

orang Indonesia (Indonesian), to which Cotan disagreed – shocking Bachtiar. Cotan explained that he

did not see Keelty as an orang Indonesia, but as an orang Jawa (Javanese) – which Bachtiar found very

pleasing and amusing.253 Keelty earned this perception through his close, informal relationship with

his counterparts, which was influential in having Indonesian police work closely with Australian police

in preventing onward migration at the time. This relationship was formed and maintained through

cross-cultural understanding, not only from Keelty towards Indonesian culture but also Bachtiar

towards Australian culture. According to Bachtiar:

Well, the MoU you asked about, yes, that's only on paper. Those who implement

it are people, and people have their own personal characteristics. If they’re open

minded, I think that’s much better. It doesn’t have to be formally ‘you must do

this, you must do that’, but okay, we trust each other, because what is difficult is

to build trust, right?254

The relationship was so strong, in fact, during the second Bali Bombings in 2005, Bachtiar was called

upon during his retirement to help Indonesian police work with the Australian police.255

While the relationship was good at the police level, relations between the higher echelons of

government, particularly between the two heads of state, were rather tense. In addition to ignoring

phone calls and appointments in relation to the issues of irregular migration and people smuggling,

Megawati refused to meet Howard at the APEC Conference in Shanghai.256 Part of the issue was

Australia’s ‘megaphone diplomacy’, especially when Howard implied Australia’s boat problem was

because Indonesia was not doing enough to prevent them.257 According to the foreign minister at the

time, Hassan Wirajuda: ‘There is a certain tendency in Australia to communicate through public

diplomacy rather than a quiet one. This is certainly in many ways not acceptable at least in terms of

our preference’. ‘In Indonesia,’ he said, ‘when you want to enter someone's house, you cannot shout

in front of it and then ask to enter the house’.258

253 Da’i Bachtiar, Interview with Author, October 2017. 254 “Nah saya yakin bahwa segela MoU yang Anda tanyakan tadi, ya, itu hanya di atas kertas. Yang menjalankan tetap manusianya, manusia tergantung pada sifat pribadinya masing-masing. Kalau sifatnya adalah openmind ya, itu saya kira lebih enak gitu. Tidak formal ‘harus ini, harus ini’ no begitu tapi kan oke, kita saling percaya, karena susah membangun trust, ya” (my translation). Bachtiar. 255 Bachtiar. 256 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 182. 257 Gerard McManus and Simon Kearney, “Indonesia to Blame Howard Points Finger over Immigrant Row.,” Sunday Herald Sun, September 2, 2001; Belinda Goldsmith, “Australia Turns up Heat on Indonesia on Boat People.,” Reuters News, August 30, 2001, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010830dx8u00gcy&cat=a&ep=ASE. 258 Wirajuda, as cited in Pearson, “Business as Usual.”

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Another source of tension was Operation Relex – Australia’s first ‘turn back the boats’ policy.

According to Admiral Chris Barrie – the man often credited for the idea of Operation Relex – there

were a number of important points to the operation, the first being that no one should lose their life

in the operation of Relex. The Defence force now played a more active role; where previously the

Defence forces were responding ad hoc to the issue, it was now committed to taking action and

conducting proper surveillance and response.259 In the early part of the operation this action involved

taking boats to locations in the reef area and trying to repair their destroyed engines so that they

could go on a one-way trip back to Indonesia, then informing the embassy in Jakarta.260 Between

October and December 2001, Operation Relex was responsible for 12 interceptions and 4 successful

returns of boats to Indonesia. ‘Indonesian authorities accepted that outcome’, Barrie said, ‘although,

you wonder why they made it easy to do, since they ended up owning the problem. And I’m not quite

sure how that was agreed to, but certainly it seemed to work, for a bit’.261 According to the Australian

Ambassador to Indonesia at the time, Ric Smith, the Indonesians were perplexed by the return of

boats. Once the Australian embassy were informed that a boat was being returned, embassy staff

would send a diplomatic note advising the Indonesian authorities that a ‘vessel, originating from

[whichever] Indonesian port without an established lawful purpose for entering Australian waters has

been apprehended and returned in the direction whence it came’.262 The embassy never got any

responses. Smith said he knew who was fielding these diplomatic notes on the fax machine at the

other end, ‘and he was scratching his head he didn’t know what to do with it’. Smith suspects that

Megawati never knew about the turnbacks.

Nevertheless, Indonesians were critical of the turnbacks. Many of my Indonesian interviewees

said that Indonesia was offended by Australia unilaterally turning the boats back to Indonesia and

pointed out that such actions were contrary to Australia’s position as a party to the 1951 Refugee

Convention: ‘Australia is a party to the 1951 Convention, and one principle of the 1951 convention is

the non-refoulement policy. Australia may decide to accept or not to accept, but certainly not to just

simply reject these people. It’s a question of principle’.263 Many also questioned Australia’s identity

and values, for example:

for us you know, it just don’t make sense. … we can understand that Japan is always

a very insular country, it’s always been hostile towards outsiders ... but Australia

[is] populated by migrants, and so the attitude is considered to be hypocritical and

even worse, to turn away a boat and allowing women and children to suffer like

259 Barrie, Interview with Author; White, Interview with Author. 260 Barrie, Interview with Author. 261 Barrie. 262 Smith, Interview with Author. 263 Wirajuda, Interview with Author.

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that, it’s just inhumane and it is totally unacceptable. See that Indonesia is a poor

country in comparison to Australia, and we have so many internal problems … and

yet, you know Indonesians saw Australia behaving like this, to helpless human

beings! They’re human beings! … that was totally unacceptable.264

Operation Relex continued to turn boats back until March 2002, when it was replaced by

Operation Relex II, which continued until 2006. One boat arrived each year from 2002-2004, slowly

increasing again until then prime minister Tony Abbott implemented Operation Sovereign Borders in

2013.

Getting on the Same Page Given the previous turbulence in the relationship and the tense relationship at the

government level vis-à-vis irregular migration specifically from August 2001, it seems surprising that

the Bali Process was able to be established a few months later, in February 2002. There are a number

of important factors which brought about a conducive environment for the Bali Process: the fact that

the Indonesian police were also concerned about irregular migration, the persistence of Australian

diplomats, the completion of Australia’s federal election and the presence of key individuals with the

same strategic outlook who also believed this cooperation was in their interest.

While it was difficult to engage the central government on this issue, the police continued to

work together. Elsewhere in the country, especially in Eastern Indonesia where there were much

smaller communities, the issue had become more noticeable. People smugglers and their clients were

gathering in places like Roti and Kupang and caused problems for the local police.265 More problems

were created after Australia returned boats under Operation Relex, when those on board went looking

for the people smugglers who ‘set them up to fail’ and taken their money.266 This was creating

problems for the local police in Eastern Indonesia, which would lead to a meeting convened by Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono who was, at that time, Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs.

Yudhoyono had a good relationship with the Australians and who had recognised the problem that

police were facing in Eastern Indonesia.267

While the issue had become a problem for police in Eastern Indonesia, it was not yet

recognised as a problem at the national level. Indeed, Australian diplomats worked tirelessly to

convince Jakarta otherwise. Yet the Indonesian government still viewed the problem as a minor issue

– there were only small numbers coming through Indonesia – and a matter of Australian politics which

was exploited for political reasons ahead of a federal election. Thus it had been a difficult matter to

264 Anwar, Interview with Author. 265 Smith, Interview with Author. 266 Smith. 267 Smith.

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engage the central government on. The Australian Ambassador at the time, Ric Smith, recalls that the

Indonesian authorities were ‘following the age old technique of simply not answering the telephone

or receiving appointments, and they just didn’t want to talk about it because we were so persistent

on this issue. Through the election period they declined to take any calls or receive any appointments

on the whole issue,’ but the relationship was not in the ‘deep freeze’ as they would communicate on

other issues.268 While Indonesia did not want to be caught in such politics, Smith argued to the

Indonesians that Australia is an open transparent country, so political issues are worked out publicly

but that does not mean there is no real substance to them.269 He also pointed out that the continuance

of unlawful arrivals risked the continued public support for such a hard-line approach. Smith persisted

in trying to persuade Indonesia to see how it was not only an Australian problem but an Indonesian

problem, he would ask them ‘do you know how many people you’ve got in this country who may or

may not have come in lawfully, who are actually trying to move on to Australia? What are they doing

while they’re here? What forms of corruption are they engaged in? What are they doing to the market

prices? … women were being molested … [they were] causing some social distress in small pockets,

and contributing a whole new line of corruption’.270 Again, while Indonesian authorities did not like

the idea that their sovereignty was being abused, they did not think it was such a big problem.271

For Australia, however, the issue was ramping up. Before the federal election in November,

two more controversial cases involving asylum seekers captured the media’s attention. The first was

the Children Overboard Affair, where the government claimed that asylum seekers were throwing

their children overboard as a ploy to attain rescue and entry into Australia. This was later found to be

false and Howard was accused of misleading the public to secure his federal election victory. The

second was SIEV X, a vessel which sunk en route to Australia, killing 146 children, 142 women and 65

men. The Australian government was questioned for how much it knew about and had the

opportunity to rescue the vessel before it sunk.272 According to Dew Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia became

more serious about reducing people smuggling after the sinking of SIEV X.273

On the 10th of November, the federal election in Australia returned the Coalition Government

to power with an increased majority. As Indonesia had made clear by ignoring appointments and calls

on this issue during the election campaign, it did not want to be involved in Australian domestic

politics. The very day after the Australian elections, Ambassador Ric Smith received a call from the

268 Smith. 269 Smith. 270 Smith. 271 Smith. 272 Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident Report. 273 Anwar, “Aspek Imigran Ilegal Dalam Hubungan Indonesia-Australia, 1999-2002,” 75.

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Yudhoyono’s office, ‘hi Ambassador’ he said, ‘we haven’t seen you in a long while, what have you been

doing?’ Smith replied, ‘well I’ve spent a lot of time trying you up, but anyway, what have you got?’. He

informed Smith that the very next day, Yudhoyono would be convening a meeting in Bali with the

police commissioners from eastern Indonesia to talk about this problem of people smuggling and

invited Smith along. ‘Certainly’, Smith replied, ‘I’ll be on the first plane out’.274 ‘We intend to totally

crack down on this problem,’ Yudhoyono said, ‘although we cannot brush off its humanitarian

aspect’.275 It seemed to Smith that – in addition to the police force recognising Indonesia’s problem

with irregular migration and getting Yudhoyono on side – once Australia’s federal elections were out

of the way Indonesia were ready to ‘get on with it’.276

2001-2002: The Bali Process Soon after the election, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, visited Australia

and met with Prime Minister Howard and Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer. On the 18th

of November the ministers announced that Australia and Indonesia agreed to co-host a regional forum

on people smuggling, bringing together source, transit and destination countries together in Bali the

following February. Informants disagree on whether the initiative was started by Australia or

Indonesia, but it seems that both experienced Australian officials and the Indonesian foreign minister,

Hassan Wirajuda were crucial to its formation. This section will outline the Australian efforts, the

Indonesian perspective – especially Wirajuda’s outlook – and briefly describe the combined efforts on

the part of Australian and Indonesian officials leading to the first meeting of the Bali Process.

Australian officials had learned from previous examples in the Asia Pacific, drawing upon their

experiences with Australia’s six political-military dialogues with regional countries, the Cairns Group,

Downer’s Coolum Forums, APEC, and Australia’s long history of second-track diplomacy in the

region.277 Drawing on these examples they realised the importance of creating relaxed, informal

atmospherics – thereby establishing a ‘process’ and not an institution – and in achieving support from

key players in the region, such as Indonesia and Thailand, which would give the proposal more weight

than one put forward by Canberra alone, thus, Australian officials worked to convince Indonesia to co-

chair the meeting.278 According to Wesley’s (2007) account of the Bali Processes’ creation, Australian

diplomats met a receptive Jakarta, one that needed an issue on which to demonstrate regional

leadership, after its ‘governance prestige’ was on the line following the turbulent ending to the

274 Smith, Interview with Author. 275 Don Greenlees, “Jakarta Vows to Block Smugglers.,” The Australian, November 10, 2001. 276 Smith, Interview with Author. 277 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 192–93. 278 Wesley, 192–94.

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century.279 However, Australia’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, himself wrote that ‘In November

the Indonesian foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda, proposed that Indonesia and Australia gather

ministers from around the region to build a united front in the fight against people-smuggling’ and

‘the idea of the conference emerged because Australia and Indonesia both recognized that people-

smuggling cannot be addressed by domestic laws and measures alone’.280

From the Indonesian perspective, officials understood that controlling irregular migration was

an important issue for Australia and would often result in Indonesia being dragged into Australia’s

domestic political tension. Indonesia saw that this was not good for the relationship, and rejected the

idea that they should be blamed for this problem: ‘we are all pointing fingers!’ said a former

ambassador to Australia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, ‘forgetting that when you point your finger three

of your fingers point at yourself’.281 Indonesia saw itself as a victim to the attractiveness of Australia

as a destination for migrants, and therefore found it frustrating that the Australian government should

blame Indonesia for the flow of irregular migrants to Australia’s shores and thereby affect the bilateral

relationship.282 Wirajuda considered the problem of irregular migration to be a regional problem,

therefore, ‘the solution must be found by involving countries of origin, countries of transit, and

countries of destination’.283 He saw the Bali Process as a way to end the public blame game and to

‘mend the fence’ in the relationship.284 Therefore, bringing cooperation out of bilateral space and into

the regional, as with the previous chapter on the Indochinese crisis, was key to securing productive

cooperation.

Wirajuda was a proactive foreign minister and believed in a forward-looking approach to

Indonesia’s foreign policies, especially post the East Timor crisis. He saw that mending the fence and

improving relations with Australia had broader benefits. Similarly, in his response to a question about

what brought the Australia-Indonesia relationship from the low point of the East Timor crisis to the

Bali Process, Wirajuda said: ‘whether we like Australia or not, geographically, Australia is our

neighbour and would be forever our neighbour and ideally, not only that we are a neighbour but

should be a good friend’.285 He added, ‘And then to me, whenever I visited Australia, it reminded me

that Australia is a developed economy [while] Indonesia is developing, and our bilateral relations can

279 Wesley, 194. 280 Alexander Downer, “Let’s Stop the People-Smugglers An Asia-Pacific Concern,” International Herald Tribune, February 27, 2002, sec. OPINION, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=inht000020020227dy2r0000a&cat=a&ep=ASE. 281 Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Interview with Author, November 2017. 282 Wirajuda, Interview with Author. 283 Wirajuda. 284 Marty Natalegawa, Conversation with Author, September 2017. 285 Wirajuda, Interview with Author.

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be complimentary, we can learn, can benefit from the fact that Australia is a developed country’.286

Australian officials also recognised Indonesia’s willingness to be a good neighbour, with one

anonymous Australian immigration official saying: ‘they’re nice guys. Despite the tiffs, Indonesia

recognised the need for a good relationship with Australia. Australia said it was a problem, the UNHCR

said it was a problem, governments do try to work together on mutual problems. Resources and

commitment may vary, but Indonesia was happy to come to the table’.287 A number of Indonesian

interviewees explained this sense of neighbourliness with the adage: ‘a close neighbour is better than

distant relatives’. As seen in the earlier section of this chapter, Indonesia and Australia have better

relations when there is something on which they can work together – working together on the people

smuggling issue would not only take the public blame away from Indonesia but also help mend their

fences.

After agreement to co-host the Bali Process meetings were secured, Dr Geoff Raby, First

Assistant Secretary in the International Legal Division of DFAT, together with Dr Marty Natalegawa, a

senior Indonesian diplomat with a PhD from the Australian National University, toured Southeast Asia

together to secure ministerial representation from regional countries.288 It was late 2001, and

Southeast Asian states were surprised to see Australia and Indonesia caucusing together, only two

years post the East Timor crisis – giving the Bali Process proposal greater credence.289 During these

meetings, Raby and Natalegawa gauged perspectives on irregular migration to develop the agenda for

the meeting in Bali.290 The preparations for the first Bali meeting were extensive and involved a pre-

meeting of a steering committee in Jakarta – involving representatives from Australia, Indonesia, New

Zealand, Thailand, the IOM and the UNHCR – to sort out policy issues from other sensitive issues.291

Planning was so extensive that the agendas for the Bali meetings were ‘choreographed’ in minute

detail, including ‘the order of speaking, supposedly spontaneous ‘interjections’ and the general

content of what each delegate would say’.292 By the time the ministers met in Bali, a common set of

policy preferences had already been negotiated and a pre-determined non-binding statement from

the co-chairs had been cleared by participants beforehand.293

In February 2002, Howard visited Megawati. The issue of people smuggling was not discussed

as it was seen to be too sensitive, yet later that month, the first ministerial meeting of the Bali Process

286 Wirajuda. 287 Anonymous Australian Government Official, Interview with Author. 288 Wesley, The Howard Paradox, 195. 289 Wesley, 195. 290 Wesley, 195–96. 291 Wesley, 196. 292 Wesley, 196. 293 Wesley, 197–98.

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was held, quite successfully. Opening the conference, Megawati said ‘I wish to state that my

Government is firmly committed to addressing the issues of illegal migrants, particularly that of

people-smuggling’.294 Wirajuda echoed her statement, saying that for Indonesia, ‘inaction is not an

option’, linking people smuggling with other transnational crimes and terrorism.295 As a result of the

conference, two expert working groups were set up to turn this support into action and concreate

measures for fighting people-smuggling. Australia appointed a full-time ambassador for people-

smuggling issues.296

Conclusion: What Explains the Emergence of the Bali Process? This chapter tells a story about the establishment of the Bali Process in spite of apparent

turbulence in the Australia-Indonesia relationship and between their two leaders. This story reveals

the importance of the individual, their strategic outlook, and their interpersonal relationships in

securing cooperation as well as the role of domestic politics and the international political context in

shaping perceptions about interests. It shows that while turbulence may have been visible at the top

levels, cooperation on the ground between the lower echelons was able to continue, especially when

it was viewed to be within their interest – something that Australian diplomats worked hard to

achieve. This is also exemplified by the way in which the publicly visible, high-level agreements of the

AMS in 1995 and the MoU on police cooperation in 1997 had codified already existing relationships

and cooperation on the ground.

This chapter showed how the interpersonal trust between Keating and Suharto allowed for

investments into the relationship, sowing the seeds for closer inter-institutional relations that enabled

the relationship to bounce back after the East Timor crisis and to maintain cooperation on irregular

migration despite high-level rifts. Such trust was able to be built because the strategic outlook of the

leaders at the time – developing a strong working relationship with Indonesia was one of the main

priorities of the Australian Government under the leadership of the Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans,

and Prime Minister, Paul Keating. This enabled trust to develop not only between the leaders, but it

created space for a trusting relationship to be built between their government departments and

institutions. And it was these relationships that withstood a change in leadership and laid the

foundations on which the Bali Process could be built in 2002. Therefore, while Sian Troath (2019)

argued that ‘trust never became embedded among a broader range of government actors’297, this

294 Don Greenlees, “Megawati’s Swipe `not at Us’ - Downer.,” The Australian, February 28, 2002. 295 Greenlees. 296 Don Greenlees, “United Front on People-Smugglers.,” The Australian, March 1, 2002. 297 Troath, “Bonded but Not Embedded,” 128.

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chapter shows that there was in fact levels of trust found among a broader range of government, most

notably the police.

As Indonesia experienced a chaotic end to the decade – making irregular migration a minimal

priority – low-level cooperation bubbled away under the surface as Australia worked to convince

Indonesia of its interest in managing the problem. Controlling irregular migration was a major priority

for Australia, especially after the Tampa crisis, and Indonesia’s help was crucial in succeeding. While

lower-level help from Indonesia’s police forces continued, securing agreement at the higher levels was

secured due to a number of factors because of the pressure Indonesia felt after the September 11

attacks in 2001, the conclusion of Australia’s federal election and therefore an opportunity for

enduring, non-political cooperation and, of course, the foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda’s strategic

outlook.

The Bali Process was therefore created despite the turbulence because of long term

investments in bureaucratic bilateral links that established trusting relationships, because of

leadership strategic outlook and personal relationships, as well as important domestic and

international contextual factors that rendered cooperation beneficial to state interests. It was also a

way to take the issue of irregular migration out of bilateral space and into the regional, as with the

previous chapter on the Indochinese crisis, which was key to securing productive cooperation.

Cooperation for the Bali Process was secured when it was in Indonesia’s interest, which was

informed by domestic and international factors, yet it was certain individuals that perceived this

cooperation to be beneficial to Indonesia’s overall interest. It is conceivable that with different leaders

this would not have happened. Without a strong relationship with the police, it would have been

difficult to achieve cooperation in this area. Without Yudhoyono, who was Coordinating Minister of

Political and Security Affairs and had a good relationship with Australia, it would have been difficult to

convince Jakarta that this is an issue the police should focus on. Without Hassan Wirajuda, a foreign

minister who saw a good relationship with Australia to be important to his foreign policy goals, and

who had a good relationship with his counterpart under a president who paid little attention to foreign

affairs, it is difficult to imagine the Bali Process would have taken off. And the great benefit of the Bali

Process was that it was able to take the controlling of irregular migration out of a bilateral blame-

game and multilateralise the issue, spreading responsibility among the region.

Through building trust against a background of commitment, Australia and Indonesia were

able to establish the Bali Process in the face of what appeared to be relationship turbulence. The

decision-making elite, especially Hassan Wirajuda, saw that maintaining the relationship was valuable

and that benefits outweighed the costs, informed by domestic and international factors (such as

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Indonesia’s need to be friendly with the West after September 11, needing a fence-mending activity

to build a better and beneficial relationship with Australia, to boost its regional reputation after the

crises of the late 1990s). It was also important that decision-makers were convinced there were shared

interests here – the police believed that people-smuggling was causing secondary crime in Indonesia

and it was in their interest to work with Australia to stop it. It is therefore clear that material interests

play a role in achieving cooperation. But there were also many reasons for Indonesia not to cooperate,

as Australian officials were reminded by Indonesia’s frequent references to Galang, as well as the

residual tension in the relationship after East Timor and the many other issues of higher priority.

There were also some indications of a lack of trust, namely, avoidance of the other. While this

happened between some – Megawati and Howard – and for a certain duration – leading up to the

election – avoidance was not across the board, and cooperation continued among police even when

the Protocol was temporarily suspended. There are also a number of factors that impacted

cooperation in a negative way, including Australia’s political style of public ‘megaphone’ diplomacy,

negative media reports as well as misunderstandings and misperceptions.

What was key in gaining Indonesia’s cooperation as opposed to its resistance is the role of

certain individuals, their strategic outlook and their relationships. Evidence of trust-building can be

found in these relationships based on indicators of frequent communication, shared values and lack

of opportunistic behaviour. First, there was frequent communication, if informally, across all levels,

but most significantly, between the police and military where there was exchange of information.

Second, there is evidence of task coordination, again, especially between police and military. Third,

Australian diplomats attempted to demonstrate a lack of opportunistic behaviour by convincing

Indonesian counterparts that Australia was not simply ‘passing the buck’, but that irregular migration

was an issue for Indonesia as well. Fourth, there were shared interests in rebuilding relations.

In this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on the process of how Australia and Indonesia

came to the same table given the rift in their relations after the East Timor crisis. And in doing so, I

have revealed the key factors that brought about the Bali Process, including investments in

bureaucratic bilateral links – especially between the police forces, leadership personality and personal

relationships, as well as important domestic and international contextual factors that rendered

cooperation beneficial to state interests. These key interpersonal relationships built trust and were

able to aid Indonesian leaders’ understandings of their interests. And this chapter has found that

neither Australia nor Indonesia particularly saw the protection of those vulnerable to irregular

migration – asylum seekers and refugees – as part of their interest. For Australia, it was largely

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domestic optics; for Indonesia, it was positioning its foreign policy. Whatever their interests –

protecting asylum seekers was not the decider.

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6. Conclusion

This thesis opened by juxtaposing snapshots of irregular migration as an issue in the Australia-

Indonesia relationship. Recall that Australia’s immigration policy under prime minister John Howard

rested on the notion that his government ‘will decide who comes to this country and the

circumstances in which they come’, in contrast to his government’s rather quick decision to grant

asylum to 43 Papuans who arrived in Australia by boat in 2006. Remember that in retaliation to

Australia’s decision, the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, recalled his ambassador

in Canberra, Hamzah Thayeb. But Thayeb was returned three months later, and, by the end of the

year, Australia and Indonesia had signed the Lombok Treaty on the Framework for Security

Cooperation. And remember that just three years later, in 2009, the Australian Oceanic Viking had

rescued 78 Sri Lankan asylum seekers from Indonesia’s search and rescue zone but the Indonesians,

Thayeb included, refused to allow it to berth at one of their ports. The ship spent three days in limbo

in international waters, until then prime minister, Kevin Rudd made a personal request to Yudhoyono.

Yudhoyono shocked Thayeb by granting the boat permission to dock and allowing the asylum seekers

to be processed in Indonesia.

It may initially seem strange that a government with a hard-line approach toward boat arrivals

accepted the Papuan refugees, which greatly upset the Indonesian president, while that same

Indonesian president then allowed Australia to return a boat of Sri Lankan asylum seekers to Indonesia

for processing when the rest of his government refused. But if we can understand, as this thesis has

shown, the factors that drive, inhibit and foster Australia and Indonesia’s management of irregular

migration, then these events no longer seem inexplicable. This thesis has shown that Australia and

Indonesia can successfully manage issues of irregular migration when there is mutual interest and

trust between individuals and institutions.

Although this thesis conducted a historical analysis up until 2002, these findings could guide

an explanation of the above snapshots. For example, Australia’s decision to grant refugee status to

the Papuan asylum seekers caused a breakdown in Indonesia’s trust in Australia’s intentions regarding

West Papua. Thayeb was a key individual and played a crucial role in avoiding even further breakdown

by avoiding the media and quelling action in the Indonesian parliament. Further highlighting the role

of medium-level leaders, the two foreign ministers, Hassan Wirajuda and Alexander Downer, who

shared a good relationship, sought to rebuild trust – signing the Lombok Treaty was one such method.

In 2009 there may have been a lack of interest and trust within the Indonesian government

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departments causing them to decline requests to receive the 78 Sri Lankan asylum seekers – they were

onboard an Australian vessel, after all. But as this thesis has emphasised, leaders and their personal

relationships matter, and based on a personal request from Rudd, Yudhoyono allowed the boat to

dock.

These explanations for the cases in 2006 and 2009 are based on the lessons learned from the

historical analysis of this thesis – further research for the contemporary period is necessary and

encouraged. This conclusion will first reflect on the key empirical findings of this thesis. Second, it will

explain how these findings have made significant contributions to our understanding, especially by

the way of trust and its role in the relationship. It will then highlight the implications of these findings

moving forward.

A Recap In this thesis, I asked the question: how have Australia and Indonesia cooperated in managing

irregular migration since the 1960s? In answering this question, I conduced a historical analysis of

three cases of irregular migration in the Australia-Indonesia relationship, guided by a Foreign Policy

Analysis lens. In so doing, I have identified factors shaping Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation, and

revealed how turbulent waters in the relationship can be bridged through trust. While I argue that

trust has been the main reason that cooperation has continued despite the turbulence in the

relationship, this has been demonstrated by identifying the presence and absence of trust at various

points in history, and the effect this has on cooperation – or the lack thereof. Viewing these historical

cases through an FPA lens has revealed a number of factors that have shaped cooperation, including

leaders – especially at the middle level – and their strategic outlook; domestic public opinion;

interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships; the role of the media, and; the international

political context in which cooperation occurs. But the ubiquitous and generally overlooked factor

underpinning this was the role that trust played – its presence, absence and attempts at building it at

various levels – not just at the leadership level, but also at the bureaucratic level. This section will

recap the essence of these cases before highlighting the key findings from and across each case study.

New Guinea The New Guinea case study tells a story of how Australia shaped its response to border

crossers in order to build Indonesia’s trust. At the time that Indonesia took over western New Guinea,

there were strains and suspicions in the relationship caused by Australia’s support of Dutch retention

of western New Guinea and its support for Malaysia during konfrontasi. Due to its own insecurities

about living next to a ‘turbulent’ neighbour, Australia needed to rebuild trust in the relationship, and

one way to do that was in its response to border crossers.

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To build trust, Australia demonstrated a lack of opportunistic behaviour by returning many

border crossers to West Irian, placing special conditions on those granted permissive residence,

avoiding international attention and media, using terminology such as ‘border crossers’ instead of

‘refugees’, opening channels of communication, and using diplomats to reiterate Australia’s support

of Indonesia’s sovereignty and engage in open but confidential dialogue.

Indeed, mutual interests were also important. It was in both Indonesia and Australia’s interest

that the issue of border crossers be assuaged; for Indonesia, this was to avoid international

condemnation and suspicions of its presence in West Irian as anything other than legitimate. For

Australia, this was due to its insecurity in being a Western country in the middle of Asia, living next to

a ‘turbulent’ neighbour in its last ring of defence. But there were also many reasons for the two

countries not to cooperate and many areas of tension which could have escalated suspicions if there

had not also been a level of trust and desire to further build trust. Through trust-building, Australia

and Indonesia were able to survive relationship turbulence.

This story reveals the importance of Australia’s perceptions of its national interest in

formulating its response to border crossers. In this case, the government saw that its national interest

was a strong relationship with its neighbour, Indonesia, balanced with its own reputation and

domestic politics. And this chapter has found that neither Australia nor Indonesia particularly saw the

protection of asylum seekers and refugees as part of their interest. For Australia, its concerns for

refugees and asylum seekers extended as far as it could fulfill its image as a ‘good international citizen’

without damaging its relationship with Indonesia, and thereby its own security. Whatever their

interests – protecting the vulnerable was not the primary.

Indochina The Indochina case tells a story about how Indonesia’s lack of trust in Australia’s intentions

shaped their response to managing the Indochinese refugee boats. To build trust, Australia

demonstrated a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour by making concessions in its policies. There

were also attempts to use an intermediary – that is, where there was a trusted relationship with one

Indonesian official, Australian diplomats encouraged them to convince others in the Indonesian

government. As this attempt was unsuccessful, Australian officials brought the issue out of the

bilateral space and hedging efforts with other countries to reassure Indonesia. It shows that while

some individuals within certain departments may wish to cooperate, cooperation may not occur

unless those individuals are able to convince more of the government. While there had been

agreements at various times with various individuals, a persistent lack of trust permeated the

government as a whole, which requested formal, written, watertight guarantees from Australia.

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Through failed attempts at building trust, Australia effectively hedged its efforts and moved the issue

out of the unsuccessful bilateral space and into the international, multilateral arena. Galang centre

was opened when resettlement guarantees were internationalised, and was aided by the UNHCR’s

trustworthiness and legitimising role in Indonesia. As a result, boats stopped arriving on Australia’s

shores for almost a decade.

As mentioned, the presence and absence of mutual interests also plays a role in securing

cooperation. This case showed that even low-level cooperation on something not of shared interest,

such as information sharing on boats, would not be successful unless Australia was able to mitigate

Indonesia’s concerns and demonstrate a lack of opportunity seeking behaviour through making

assurances. While the embassy was willing to make such assurances, it needed to convince Canberra

to make the concession. Canberra was willing to make an assurance once the domestic pressures to

stop the boats pushed it into making a concession in its policy, thereby agreeing to resettle all refugees

– even if they did not meet Australia’s strict migration criteria. These assurances, however, were not

enough and came too late to convince Indonesia.

This story reveals the importance of bureaucratic cohesion and effectiveness not only in

reaching sufficient levels of agreement across the bureaucracy, but also in policy implementation. It

further highlights the importance of concessions in Australia’s policy to demonstrate to Indonesia its

benevolence and lack of opportunity seeking behaviour, in contrast to simply offering material or

financial benefits in exchange for cooperation. Moreover, the values and outlook of Indonesian

leaders played an important role in their perceptions of and interests in cooperation. Unlike the New

Guinea chapter, the Indochina case reveals the important role of the multilateral space and UNHCR

when mutual interests are less obvious. And this chapter has found that neither Australia nor

Indonesia particularly saw the protection of those vulnerable to irregular migration – asylum seekers

and refugees – as part of their interest. For Australia, it was largely about control and domestic optics;

for Indonesia, it was avoiding being landed with the ‘burden’. Whatever their interests – protecting

asylum seekers was not the decider.

The Bali Process The Bali Process case tells a story about the creation of the Bali Process despite apparent

turbulence in the Australia-Indonesia relationship and between their two leaders, and in so doing,

reveals the importance of trusted relationships among lower level leaders and institutions. In order to

seek effective cooperation in managing irregular migration in this period, Australia leveraged the

personal and institutional relationships that had been forged in earlier periods.

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Mutual interests were also important. For Australia, controlling irregular migration was

domestically politically expedient, and Indonesia’s help was crucial in succeeding. While the central

government in Jakarta may not have felt that cooperating was in its interests, the police in the east of

Indonesia had already accepted that irregular migration was problematic and that working with

Australia to combat such activity was in its interests. But central to the role of mutual interests

affecting policies is that an individual leader believes that cooperation is of interest and that they have

the power to act in that interest or be the intermediary in encouraging others within the government.

This study showed that there were various factors influencing Indonesian decision makers’

perceptions of interest, such as the pressure Indonesia felt after World Trade Centre terror attacks in

2001. But there were also many reasons for Indonesia not to cooperate with Australia, as Australian

officials were reminded by Indonesia’s frequent negative references to its experience with Galang, as

well as the residual tension in the relationship after East Timor and the many other issues of higher

priority.

The Bali Process was therefore created despite the turbulence because of long term

investments in bureaucratic bilateral links that established trusting relationships, because of

leadership strategic outlook and personal relationships, as well as important domestic and

international contextual factors that rendered cooperation beneficial to state interests. It shows that

while turbulence may have been visible at the top levels, cooperation on the ground between the

lower echelons was able to continue, especially when it was viewed to be within their interest –

something that Australian diplomats worked hard to achieve. The great benefit of the Bali Process was

that it was able to take the management of irregular migration out of a bilateral space and

multilateralise the issue, spreading responsibility among the region. And this chapter has found that

neither Australia nor Indonesia particularly saw the protection of those vulnerable to irregular

migration – asylum seekers and refugees – as part of their interest. For Australia, it was largely

domestic optics; for Indonesia, it was positioning its foreign policy into the future. Whatever their

interests – protecting asylum seekers was not the decider.

Key Contributions In conducting this research, I spent valuable months in the bowels of the Australian National

Archives, with a short visit to the Archives of the UNHCR in Geneva. I spent many more months

conducting, transcribing and following up on interviews. During this time, it became apparent that a

number of factors shaped cooperation, including leaders – especially at the middle level – and their

strategic outlook; domestic public opinion; interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships; the role

of the media, and; the international political context in which cooperation occurs. But the ubiquitous

and generally overlooked factor underpinning this was the role that trust played – its presence,

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absence and attempts at building it at various levels – not just at the leadership level, but also at the

bureaucratic level. Viewing these historical cases through an FPA lens has revealed which contextual

factors inform decision-makers’ perceptions of interests and their role in building or damaging trust.

This thesis underscores just how important long-term investments in institutional and personal

relationships will be to ensure these neighbours are able to enjoy productive international relations

into the future. This section will emphasise the contribution these findings make to the broader body

of knowledge.

Understanding Irregular Migration as a Foreign Policy Problem As discussed in Chapter Two, irregular migration is an issue which sits at the ‘Frontier’ of the

domestic and the international. This is evident in this thesis. In the New Guinea case, the elite’s

perceptions of national interest were in tension with domestic attitudes in Australia. One reason the

Australian government attempted to keep the border crossers issue out of the media was because if

the Australian public were to find out about the situation, they may place more pressure on Australia

to resettle more refugees. This would disturb Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, which Australia

was keen to stabilise for its own security concerns. The Indonesian government also sought to avoid

the media to avoid any suspicion that its claims to western New Guinea were illegitimate. In this case,

the governments were attempting to control public reactions in order to carry out policies according

to their interest.

In the Indochina case, the Australian government reiterated to the domestic population that

Australia was resettling large amounts of refugees and living up to its reputation as a humane country

and a good international citizen, but that it was also strictly assessing entrants according to security

and quarantine concerns. This was a domestic message, and the Australian government preferred that

it not be circulated to authorities in the region. It wanted Indonesia to know that it was accepting all

refugees who sailed to Australia and did not plan on turning them around and causing issues for

Indonesia. The government also attempted to stop the issue becoming an election issue.

While in the above cases the Australian government sometimes acted against what the

domestic audience might want but controlled its media messaging to frame policies in a way that they

might accept, in the case of the Bali Process, the Howard government followed, shaped and inflamed

public opinion. Rather than enacting and framing policies that may have not been popular, as seen in

the New Guinea case, he followed pushed for a popular hard-line approach to irregular migration,

seeking Indonesia’s help in doing so. While media was previously avoided and cooperation largely

occurred behind closed doors, Howard used ‘megaphone diplomacy’, deeply offending the

Indonesians who prefer quiet diplomacy. Much of what motivated Australia’s approach at this time

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was domestic politics, as opposed to the previous case studies where domestic politics was somewhat

controlled in order to pursue policies in line with other external pressures.

Much of Australia’s actions in this space can be considered to be non-entrée practices – the

practice of going to great lengths to ‘keep refugees away from their territories but without formally

resiling from treaty obligations’.1 This includes forms of ‘cooperative non-entrée’, like working with

Indonesian police to counter people-smuggling efforts and at a broader cooperative level through the

Galang Island processing centre and the Bali Process. As Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C.

Hathaway (2015) have argued, ‘the truly pernicious nature’ of these practices ‘is especially clear when

the cooperation is with countries not themselves legally bound to protect refugees’2, such as the

cooperation between Australia, a signatory to the Refuge Convention, and Indonesia, which has not

signed the Convention. As a result, many refugees have become stuck in Indonesia, as a pendopo, and

their ‘transit’ has become a ‘life in limbo’.

This study adds to this body of knowledge by providing empirical insights into how Indonesia

has participated in such policies. Indonesian officials have, at times, shaped Australian policies. For

example, during the Indochinese crisis, Indonesian officials promised cooperation if Australia was

willing to bend its policy and resettle all Indochinese refugees held on Indonesian shores, regardless

of whether they fit Australia’s migration criteria and medical standards. It also shows how Indonesian

opinion on these matters is not unified across the government bureaucracies. Future studies into

Indonesian archives would augment our current, and recently expanded, understanding of its

historical participation in and shaping of Australia’s policies.

Understanding the Australia-Indonesia Relationship The existing literature on the Australia-Indonesia relationship is skewed towards episodic

analysis, as a result, our understanding of the relationship is incomplete because the literature is

unable to take account of the continuities that lie beneath the episodic crises. That the relationship is

fraught by turbulence has become conventional wisdom which obscures the long history of quiet

cooperation. This longue durée account of the relationship reveals that despite relationship

turbulence – and, in the case of the Bali Process, despite what was considered a total relationship

breakdown – cooperation and relationships at some levels endure. This therefore casts the history of

Australia-Indonesia cooperation in a different light.

1 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” 235; Hathaway, “The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée.” 2 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence,” 256.

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The literature on the relationship, as discussed in Chapter Two, reveals that the media,

cultural misperception, leaders and mutual interest play a role in its successes and setbacks. This study

demonstrated that to be true. It further adds to our understanding, however, by highlighting the fact

that while the media may affect perceived relations at the public level, this does not necessarily reflect

government to government relations in certain areas.

Furthermore, this study adds another component to the list of factors affecting the

relationships successes and setbacks: the role of inter-institutional and bureaucratic links. When these

links are weak it is difficult to achieve productive cooperation. When these are strong, however,

cooperation can continue reasonably unscathed by dips in the broader relationship. While the

literature is correct in arguing that leaders play an important role in relations, this study shows that it

is leaders not just at the top levels but at lower rungs of government that play just as important role.

Overtime, Australia and Indonesia’s inter-institutional links have become stronger, as seen from the

New Guinea case to the Bali Process. This study echoes the call from an increasing body of literature

calling for more consideration of Indonesia’s domestic institutions and constraints in its foreign policy

decision-making.3

In addition, while the literature considers mutual interests as important in strengthening the

relationship, this study adds nuance to this understanding by emphasising the fact that it is certain

decision-makers who decide what does and does not constitute their interests – and this can be

shaped by their relationships.

Understanding Cooperation in International Relations As discussed in Chapter Two, ‘cooperation’ from an international relations perspective is

defined as ‘when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others’ and

can ‘only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests’.4

We have certainly seen evidence of cooperation across these cases, in spite of conflicting interests,

and sometimes despite the differences in bureaucracies. In IR, cooperation is generally thought to

emerge either through the convergence of expectations, through negotiation and bargaining, or

through a stronger party imposing cooperation and forcing another party to alter its policies, which is

more likely to occur in instances of asymmetrical relations.5 In these three cases, where there has

been cooperation, it has been largely due to the result of negotiation and bargaining. The issue of

3 Sulistiyanto, “Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy”; Poole, “The Foreign Policy Nexus”; Wicaksana, “International Society.” 4 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 226. 5 Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations,” 469.

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irregular migration is indeed not an important issue for Indonesia, which leaves Australia with the

work of convincing Indonesia to cooperate.

While international relations theories tend to view a state’s policy choice as a result of either

the logics of consequence or the logic of appropriateness, this thesis highlights the importance of

taking a third view: that both interests and identity are important in explaining behaviour, and ‘neither

is reducible to the other’.6 According to Ian Hurd, the logic of consequence and the logic of

appropriateness are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary.7 This can be seen in the

interrelation of interests and personal relationships in achieving cooperation between Australia and

Indonesia in the area of irregular migration.

This study has augmented our understanding of the reasoning and processes in achieving

cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, on irregular migration specifically. Amy Nethery and

myself have argued that it is a case of ‘incentivised policy transfer’,8 whereby Indonesia is encouraged

to adopt certain policies pushed by Australia. This is certainly the case especially in the post 2001

years, but my study has enhanced this understanding by showing how Australia has made changes in

its own policies – for example restrictions on permissive residents on New Guinea and relaxation of

its criteria in the Indochina case – to also bring about Indonesia’s cooperation. While Incentivised

policy transfer explains the material incentives that Australia offers to Indonesia, the perspective of

trust highlights the changes Australia makes in its own policies in seeking Indonesia’s cooperation, and

the important role of relationships in doing so.

This thesis has furthered our understanding of irregular migration as an issue at the Frontier

of domestic and international policies, of Australia and Indonesia’s relationship and of their

cooperation in the area of irregular migration. It is important to note, however, that the contribution

this thesis makes is not to each of these areas in silos, but to an integrated understanding of how

states come to cooperate in the irregular migration space through an empirically grounded historical

study, guided by an FPA approach. Such an approach had resulted in the finding that all of these areas

can speak to the role that trust and trust-building plays in cooperation.

Trust Trust is an overlooked concept in the FPA context. There is, however, a general sense that

‘developing trust through personal relations can have a profound effect on policy outcomes’.9 Indeed,

as this thesis has shown, the presence, absence and attempts at building trust at various levels –

6 Hurd, After Anarchy, 76. 7 Hurd, 16. 8 Nethery and Gordyn, “Australia–Indonesia Cooperation on Asylum-Seekers.” 9 Chollet and Goldgeier, “The Scholarship of Decision-Making,” 168.

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including the bureaucratic level – affects cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on irregular

migration. In the case of Papua New Guinea, Australia’s foreign affairs department wanted to build

Indonesia’s trust in Australia’s motivations on the New Guinea, that it was not trying to separate West

Irian from Indonesia and that it respected Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the

Department of External Affairs – the administrators of eastern New Guinea – were advocating for an

approach that would have damaged Australia and Indonesia’s relationship and any trust building

between them.

In the Indochinese case study, Indonesia requested watertight guarantees, indicating that

Indonesia mistrusted Australia, but which could be mitigated by providing a written assurance. After

many delays, Australia’s decision to provide such a guarantee came too late, and while some

Indonesian decision-makers trusted Australia’s assurances and intentions, many did not. Eventually,

Indonesia opened Galang when it could be assured that it would not be left with the burden of

refugees, in part aided by trusted members of the UNHCR who developed close relations with the

Indonesians. If Indonesian decision-makers did not trust that the UNHCR and countries of

resettlement would, in fact, resettle all the refugees from Indonesia, it is fair to say that Galang would

not have opened.

In the case of the Bali Process, trusted interpersonal relations between leaders, namely

Suharto, Keating, Alatas and Evans, paved the way for closer inter-institutional relationships that

withstood the East Timor crisis and led to the creation of the Bali Process. As Indonesia experienced a

chaotic end to the millennium – making irregular migration a minimal priority – low-level cooperation

bubbled away under the surface as Australia worked to convince Indonesia of its interest in managing

the problem. Without trusted relationships between police forces and foreign ministers, it is clear that

cooperation would not have gained enough traction to convince Indonesia to cooperate.

These cases highlight that trust is not static, it ebbs and flows with the relationship itself, but

there is a sense in which ‘trust’ is ‘stickier’ than the broader relationships and anchors it. While the

scholarship on trust tends to view trust as either a rational calculation about another’s behaviour, an

ideational structure or a feeling of optimism, this thesis shows that trust – as the belief that the trusted

party will not damage the trustor’s interest in a given issue area – can be built by both rational and

relational inputs. That is, conceptions of trust are built on a prediction about another’s actions based

on their interests and their goodwill. This thesis has shown that there have been three central factors

to building trust: people – their strategic outlook and their relationships, especially at lower levels of

government; bureaucracies – the interaction between them, within them, and effective policy

implementation by each side; and trust-building manoeuvres – demonstrating a lack of opportunity

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seeking behaviour, frequent and honest communication, and involvement (or avoidance) of

international organisations depending on the strength of mutual interests, as I will explain below.

Leaders and their relationships Leaders play a crucial role in shaping cooperation on irregular migration in two interrelated

ways. First, the degree to which leaders’ actions are informed by their own broader visions,

perceptions and ambitions for Indonesia’s foreign policy plays an important role in this cooperation.

Second, the long-term development of personal relationships between leaders, discussed in the next

section, also plays a significant role in the success of this cooperation. The degree to which certain

Indonesian ministers are influenced by broader visions, perceptions and ambitions for Indonesian

foreign policy, that is, what they saw as an important issue and the various options that they saw

available to them, partly explains why Indonesia works with Australia in managing irregular migration.

There are many examples of this throughout the thesis. One such example is, as the majority of my

interviewees for the Bali Process chapter pointed out, the crucial role played by Indonesian foreign

minister Hassan Wirajuda in the establishment of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, despite the

recent crisis over the East Timor intervention. Wirajuda was a proactive foreign minister and believed

in a forward-looking approach to Indonesia’s foreign policies. He believed that rebuilding relations

with Australia was important for Indonesia’s future and the Bali Process would be one such way to

‘mend the fence’. It is fair to assume that this would be a different story if the Indonesian foreign

minister did not value the relationship with Australia.

As diplomats see certain relationships important to their own foreign policy, they accordingly

see the establishment of personal relationships with those foreign leaders as important, although the

development of interpersonal relationships and friendships is not always strategic. These relationships

are not only important at the elite level, but across other departments and agencies such as the police.

For example, the UNHCR team sent to Indonesia to deal with the Indochinese crisis was one

contributing factor to Indonesia’s decision to open Galang. The team knew how to deal with military

men and had gotten along well with the Indonesian decision-makers. As one Indonesian recalled,

Galang was opened at the request of the UNHCR ‘because we trust each other. And he meant well

with us, we know that, and that’s why we have to do our part’.10 The personal friendship between the

the Indonesian Police Chief Da’i Bachtiar and the Australian Federal Police Chief Mick Keelty was also

key in securing cooperation on irregular migration. Bachtiar felt that Keelty understood Indonesian

culture, and considered him an orang Indonesia (Indonesian). In fact the police relationship was such

that it was able to survive the tumultuous time of the East Timor crisis. This demonstrates that where

10 Wanandi, Interview with Author.

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there is disagreement between the central governments, cooperation on the ground may continue

due to the trusted relationships formed at the ground-level and between bureaucracies.

Bureaucracies As shown above, despite disagreements within one level of the government, there may be

agreement in other departments and agencies. Evidence of bureaucratic differences were consistent

and pervasive throughout each case study. In the New Guinea case, there were agreements made

between the foreign ministers that did not necessarily flow through to the remote parts of West Irian

and the officials operating in those areas, for example, Indonesian patrols pushed back an Australian

border survey team at gunpoint, despite having agreements from Jakarta to carry out survey works.

This was also the case in the Indochinese period: while Australia had great and friendly relations with

some of Indonesia’s decision-makers, they could not reach an overwhelming support from within

other parts of the bureaucracy. If an agreement was made at one level, such as the Gentlemen’s

Agreement, it may not have been agreed to or even communicated to other departments, nor would

it necessarily trickle down to the administrations in the outer provinces. Furthermore, the officials in

the Australian embassy sometimes had difficulty in convincing Canberra of certain choices. In the final

case study, as mentioned, despite difficulties in the foreign ministry there was still cooperation at the

police-to-police level. Cooperation in this period was easier to secure due to the long-term investment

in bureaucratic links. Therefore, while trust may exist between certain leaders or departments, it may

be simultaneously absent in others, thereby requiring efforts to navigate complex bureaucracies in

attempting to build trust.

Trust-Building This thesis has shown that where there is a lack of trust between individuals and

bureaucracies, certain attempts are made – generally by Australia – to build this trust. This comes in

the form of demonstrating a lack opportunistic behaviour by making policy concessions, providing

assurances or inviting in third parties. For example, in the Indochinese case, the Indonesians did not

quite trust Australia’s intentions in relation to its proposed boat holding arrangement, and therefore

asked for an assurance and written guarantee that the Australians would resettle everyone on board

the boats in holding. Australia was only able to gain some momentum in cooperation when it bent its

policy to allow this to happen – assuring Indonesia that it would not damage its interests.

Furthermore, this thesis has found that bilateral cooperation is sometimes more successful

through a regional or multilateral format, depending on the strength of mutual interests. Where there

are sufficient mutual interests, third party involvement is not necessary, and in fact may damage

cooperation if the third party’s interests do not align with those of Australia and Indonesia. For

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example, cooperation during the New Guinea period was consciously and strictly maintained at the

bilateral level. The UNHCR’s requests to intervene were rejected as Australia and Indonesia wished to

keep the situation confidential and not draw attention to the ‘refugee’ aspect of cross-border

movements. This was quite the opposite in the following two cases, where mutual interests were not

quite so strong. In these cases, bringing in third parties was one way to mitigate a lack of trust. For

example, in the Indochinese case, Australia and Indonesia were only able to achieve a meaningful level

of cooperation after it was removed from the bilateral space and conducted in the multilateral arena.

This occurred in the 1979 Geneva conference made up of origin, transit and destination states who

agreed to cooperate in dealing with the problem of Indochinese refugees – and thus Galang Island

was opened. Leading up to the Bali Process, while cooperation began and gained traction at the

bilateral level, there was a specific choice to move it into the regional multilateral space: ‘the solution’

said Hassan Wirajuda, ‘must be found by involving countries of origin, countries of transit, and

countries of destination’ and avoid playing the ‘blame game’.11

All of the above factors inform the decision-making elite’s perceptions of interests. Indeed

when there is mutual interest there is a significant likelihood that Australia and Indonesia will

cooperate, but this is not always sufficient. The less likely that there are mutual interests, the role of

trust in relations becomes more important. In the New Guinea case, there is clearly a mutual interest

in avoiding conflict over its shared border. Indonesia did not want the negative attention on people

fleeing its territory, and Australia did not want to be seen as avoiding humanitarianism to appease

Indonesia. So Australia and Indonesia kept cooperation quiet and behind closed doors and worked

together for the quiet management of this problem. Nevertheless, there were many instances which

could have escalated tensions, and where certain departments preferred an approach which would

have escalated tensions but which were navigated due to trust-building.

In the Indochinese case there is less mutual interest. While Australia had an interest in

stopping boats, Indonesia had an interest in avoiding a large population of refugees stuck in limbo on

its shores. It was, however, in Indonesia’s interest to cooperate with the UNHCR and resettlement

countries to ensure that all refugees in transit would be resettled. Nevertheless, if Indonesian

decision-makers did not trust that the UNHCR and countries of resettlement would, in fact, resettle

all the refugees from Indonesia, it is fair to say that Galang would not have opened.

In the Bali Process case the understanding of mutual interest was stronger among the police

forces than of the central government, while Australian diplomats worked persistently to convince

Jakarta that combatting irregular migration was, in fact, in its interest: irregular migrants were

11 Wirajuda, Interview with Author.

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marrying Indonesian women, potentially bringing in drugs and partaking in international crime. What

seemed to be key in achieving cooperation in this instance was the role of individuals in certain

positions, such as foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda and then Coordinating Minister of Political and

Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in believing that working with Australia was in their

interest.

Against the backdrop of all case studies is the international and political context. For example,

in the New Guinea case, Australia’s perceptions, motivations and concerns were largely informed by

the Cold War and a fear of communism. In the Indochina case, Australia felt an obligation to resettle

refugees fleeing communism, and a war in which Australia had played a role. There were also

pressures from the US for Australia to play a larger role – therefore stopping boats and resettling

refugees from the region was one way it could maintain its border control while meeting these

pressures. For Indonesia, refugees were largely of Chinese ethnicity, and due to its own domestic

issues with ethnic Chinese, did not want to encourage a large population among its islands. The Bali

Process was formed in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks and the War on Terror, feeding

the securitised approach toward irregular migration and informing Indonesia’s choice to play an active

role. The Indonesian government was concerned for the growing antipathy, misperception and ‘clash

of civilisation’ consequences for Indonesia as the largest Muslim country, and so issued very strong

statements condemning the attacks.12 Opening the Bali Process, Megawati said ‘I wish to state that

my Government is firmly committed to addressing the issues of illegal migrants, particularly that of

people-smuggling’.13 Wirajuda echoed her statement, saying that for Indonesia, ‘inaction is not an

option’, linking people-smuggling with other transnational crimes and terrorism.14

In sum, trust as the belief that one’s interests will not be damaged are built by calculations of

another’s behaviour based on their interests as well as their relationships. Throughout the three

empirical case studies, we have seen some instances where the presence of trust between leaders is

key, while at other times cooperation is made possible despite the absence of trust between leaders

due to trust between medium level bureaucrats and bureaucracies. We have seen that in some

instances trust is enhanced by keeping the relationship insular and denying input from regional and

international organisations who might want to shape policies in different directions, but at other times

the absence of trust is overcome by inviting in international parties and organisations as guarantors

or "trustees" of cooperation. While at times trust is present at one level or between certain people, it

may be simultaneously absent at other levels and across different departments, which is something

12 Wirajuda. 13 Greenlees, “Megawati’s Swipe `not at Us’ - Downer.” 14 Greenlees.

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to be navigated in achieving cooperation. Whether trust is absent or present, the aim of building trust

– and generally in this story, it is Australia’s intention to build Indonesia’s trust due to the fact that

Australia has greater interests in regulating irregular migration – is an underlying motivator for many

of the policy outcomes we have seen across these cases.

Looking Back, Moving Forward The empirical and conceptual findings of this thesis open up new pathways for future

research. First, as indicated in the opening of this conclusion, the findings from this thesis may help us

explain more recent episodes in irregular migration between Australia and Indonesia. While much of

the literature on Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation relating to irregular migration is grounded in

the post-2000 period, my research begs questions of how this cooperation has been conceptualised

and how leaders and bureaucracies have helped or hindered cooperation in matters relating to

irregular migration in these more recent decades.

Second, the insights gained from this study direct us to take further considerations of the role

of leaders and their interpersonal relationships at lower levels across the Australian and Indonesian

government, as well as bureaucracies and their effectiveness both within and across governments

when considering the Australia-Indonesia relationship. An FPA disposition could be applied to other

areas of the Australia-Indonesia relationship to investigate the extent to which these factors play a

role in the broader relationship.

Third, this research calls for further empirically grounded, longue durée studies which

challenge the notion of turbulence in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. That the relationship is

turbulent is a refrain that has continued well until today. As this thesis has shown, however, this

conventional wisdom obscures long term cooperation in other areas of the relationship which may

continue quietly under the radar. This thesis calls for a long term perspective of episodes in the

Australia-Indonesia relationship.

Finally, the research process involved in this thesis had unintentionally brought to light the

role of trust in Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation in areas of irregular migration. It has therefore

framed the case studies around narratives revealing the importance of its presence, absence and

attempts at building trust at various levels – not just at the leadership level, but also at the

bureaucratic level. Further research is needed to specifically set about testing this role of trust – as a

belief of one party about the other – in this relationship. Further research could specifically investigate

conceptualisations of trust between parts of the Australian and Indonesian governments not only in

the area of irregular migration, but in other aspects of the relationship. There are valuable conceptual

insights to be gained from testing the beliefs of certain policymakers, as well as the role of the material

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and relational aspects of trust in formulating their beliefs. More empirically grounded studies testing

trust across government departments – its emergence, elasticity and stickiness – are necessary,

encouraged, and important in not only fully understanding the nature of the Australia-Indonesia

relationship, but in other bilateral relationships and cooperation as well.

Conclusion In choosing the title of this thesis, I considered the title: ‘A Pebble in the Shoe’. This was a

phrase used by Ali Alatas after he was questioned on Portugal’s portrayal of Indonesia as a ‘pariah’

state because of its East Timor issue. Given Indonesia’s role in the Non-aligned Movement, in ASEAN,

APEC, in the region and its contributions to the UN, Alatas rejected the notion that Indonesia was a

‘pariah’ state; he acknowledged that East Timor was an issue, but ‘only as bothersome as the

proverbial “pebble in the shoe”’.15

This phrase has since been used by scholars in reference to irregular migration. Looking into

the etymology of the phrase, I found a quote by Muhammad Ali and a story of similar credence.

Muhammad Ali is quoted saying: ‘It isn’t the mountains ahead to climb that wear you out; it’s the

pebble in your shoe’. In a related story, two men are hurriedly walking down the road when one stops

to remove a pebble in his shoe; the other reprimands him for slowing down: ‘I also have a pebble in

my shoe, but we do not have time to stop!’ Twenty minutes down the road, the man who continued

with the pebble in his shoe begins to limp, slowing the pair down until he cannot walk, when he finally

decides to take the pebble out of his shoe, revealing a blistering sore on his foot caused by the pebble.

The moral of the story is to take the time to deal with a problem before it causes too much pain and

costs more time in the future, and ensure that a small pebble does not wear you out before you are

able to climb the mountain. Indeed, as Alatas noted in his memoir: ‘in its final years, the East Timor

problem was no longer a mere pebble in the shoe but had become a veritable boulder’.16 Regrettably,

it had become the blistering sore.

This thesis, however, shows that irregular migration in the Australia-Indonesia relationship

does not necessarily slow them down nor cause them great amounts of pain, it is not something that

festers into a blistering sore but is something that they can work on together, often despite the

turbulence. The analogy to a pebble in the shoe, then, is not applicable here. Sometimes the waters

between Australia and Indonesia are stormy; sometimes the flood waters rise and sometimes they

abate, but by individuals and institutions building a bridge of trust and finding mutual interest,

Australia and Indonesia can cross the turbulent waters below.

15 Alatas, The Pebble in the Shoe, 240–41. 16 Alatas, 241.

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———. Letter to Canberra. “Indochinese Refugees,” January 12, 1979. A4359, 61/27 part 6. National Archives of Australia.

———. Letter to Canberra. “Indochinese Refugees - UNHCR Consultative Meeting,” December 1, 1978. A4359, 61/27 part 6. National Archives of Australia.

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———. Letter to Australian Consulate-General, Geneva. “UNHCR Executive Committee,” October 11, 1978. A4359, 61/27 part 5. National Archives of Australia.

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Canberra, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, Australian High Commission, Singapore, and Australian Embassy, Jakarta. “Indo-Chinese Refugees, News Release by Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,” March 25, 1978. A4359, 61/27 part 3. National Archives of Australia.

Canberra, and Australian Embassy, Jakarta. “Indo Chinese Refugee Vessel 3501 KG,” December 6, 1978. A4359, 61/27 part 6. National Archives of Australia.

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