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THE ROLE OF TRUST IN PEACE ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION
A CASE STUDY IN THE BANGSAMORO
A CPCS Learning Paper
Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang
2017
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THE ROLE OF TRUST IN PEACE ACCORD
IMPLEMENTATION:
A CASE STUDY IN THE BANGSAMORO
A CPCS Learning Paper
by
Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang
Centre for Peace and Conflict StudiesSiem Reap, Cambodia
2017
2
Author’s note
This is an abridged version of the author’s thesis under the Master’s Programme on Applied Conflict Transformation Studies of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies and Pannasastra University – Cambodia.
About the author
Fred Lubang is a Mindanaoan/Filipino peace builder. Fred is the National Coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Regional Representative of Nonviolence International in Asia and at the United Nations. He is a peace education trainer and founded the ‘Building Peace by Teaching Peace’ in south Thailand and the Bangsamoro. Fred has taught in various universities in the region in the area of peace and conflict studies, humanitarian disarmament and international humanitarian law. He is mostly based in Cotabato City implementing an agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government that was signed in 2010 in Kuala Lumpur to clear the Bangsamoro areas of explosive remnants of war. Fred is an active member of various global humanitarian disarmament campaigns. Currently, he is a member of the board of the global Control Arms network, which successfully campaigned for the Arms Trade Treaty at the United Nations in 2013 and serves as the regional lead in East Asia. He is an active member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and the Cluster Munitions Coalition.
Original Research and Author: Alfredo Ferrariz LubangCopy editors: Dr. Laurens J. Visser, Harshadeva Amarathunga
Lay-out artist: Boonruang Song-ngamPhotos: Fred Lubang
Publisher: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ............................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 5
DEFINING TRUST ..................................................................... 11Micro/Individual Level .......................................................... 11Organization level ................................................................. 12Societal Level ........................................................................ 13Cross-level Approach ............................................................ 16
RESEARCH APPROACH ............................................................ 17
ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 21Demographics for the community survey ............................ 21
Observations from Community Survey Results .................... 23
Observations from Interviews with Key Actors .................... 25
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 29
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 33
REFERENCES .............................................................................. 37
ANNEx 1 ................................................................................... 39
ANNEx 2 ................................................................................... 43
ANNEx 3 ................................................................................... 47
ANNEx 4 ................................................................................... 52
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ACRONYMS
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force
BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CBM Confidence Building Measure
CCCH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
EU European Union
FAB Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
FSD Fondation Suisse de Deminage (or Swiss Foundation for
Mine Action)
GPH Government of the Republic of the Philippines
ICG International Contact Group
IMT International Monitoring Team
LGU Local Government Units
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
NGO Non-Government Organization
PCBL Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines
SHA Suspected Hazardous Area
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
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INTRODUCTION
Implementing peace accords signed by parties previously at war entails sustaining trust in a fragile period between and among the parties involved in the implementation of the accord. How can the implementation of a peace accord ensure that the parties do not go back to war? How do you ensure that the signatories to the accord remain true to their words and implement what they have agreed upon? It was from these questions that the original action research project was developed.
At the time of finalizing this research, the negotiating panels of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the armed group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are still trying to agree on the last two annexes of what will become part of the comprehensive peace agreement. While they negotiate, Mindanao is brimming with violence. A deadly bombing occurred in the north of Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City. Weeks after, another tragic bombing occurred just a few meters away from our office in Cotabato City. Days later, two bombing incidents occurred in the south of Mindanao, Davao City. In the west side of Mindanao, Zamboanga City, and its neighboring islands, an even worse incident happened which resulted in a humanitarian crisis where tens of thousands of people were and continue to be displaced caused by the ongoing armed clashes between the government and a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF cites the failure of the implementation of 1996 peace accord they had with the government and has been calling for its full implementation. The MNLF and the GPH signed the peace agreement in 1996 but armed clashes resumed in 2001. The recent incident in Zamboanga, or more popularly dubbed by the mainstream media as the “Zambaoanga siege,” is just the continuation of these armed clashes despite the existence of a signed peace accord. These armed clashes and incidents of explosive violence are manifestations of a fragile peace affecting several communities.
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A number of studies have pointed out that signing peace accords does not necessarily equate to their implementation. Studies compiling various peace agreements globally showed that only around 50% of signed peace agreements surpass five years before conflict resumed (Bekoe, 2003; Bekoe, 2005; Joshi & Darby, 2012; Stedman, 2001). Another finding showed that the average span of peace brought about by peace agreements lasts about three and a half years before the parties went back to war (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001 in Bekoe, 2003). These studies are significant in the Philippine context since there are a number of political negotiations sealed in the past and, likewise, a number of peace negotiations with other armed groups are currently ongoing.
Implementing negotiated agreements is as crucial as the peace negotiations. Previously warring parties, who fought for decades, are now faced with various tasks of implementing together a compromised but agreed set of aspirations, which address a particular issue that both parties view as crucial in the resolution of the armed conflict and its consequences. In a personal interview with MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal, he expressed that trust between the peace negotiating panels is not a precondition to the peace negotiations. Both negotiating panels did not and cannot choose their counterparts. However, once an agreement has been signed, implementing what both parties agreed upon entails an environment where there should be trust.
In their study on Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), which is a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, covering the years between 1989 and 2006, Joshi and Darby (2012, p.5-6) cited the importance of trust in the implementation of peace agreements. Implementing provisions of what was agreed balances the trust deficit between the previously warring groups. The study encourages parties to build an environment of trust to be able to implement the provisions and the desired social, economic, and
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political change (Joshi and Darby: p.6), all of which are needed to conclude a peace agreement.
A study by the Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and the International Peace Academy revealed a number of determinants of peace implementation from various outcomes (Stedman et al., 2001). These factors were attributed for the failures, partial success, and successful implementation of peace agreements they have examined between 1980 through to 1997. In his preface to the study, IPA President David Malone alluded that “peace implementation has been more practiced than studied” (Stedman, 2001:2). This is often the case since practitioners do not have the blueprint on ‘how to implement peace agreements.’ Most of the time, as my PCBL colleague Sol Santos Jr. once wrote, “we learn from our own practice and from the practice of others”. This is what this learning paper envisions: to produce a guideline that highlights the role of trust in implementing peace agreements.
The role of trust during peace accord implementation is quite stark, especially if the conflict is intra-state or internal armed conflict. Primarily due to the fact that previously warring parties have to accept that they will be living and working together in the same area, unlike inter-state conflicts where warring parties go their separate ways and back to their territories. This is the case in the Philippines context where armed conflicts have severely affected populated communities and areas of livelihood. Thus, the research focuses on the role of trust during the process of implementing peace agreements, particularly using the agreement by the GPH and the MILF on the Joint Mines/UXO Detection and Clearance Operations in partnership with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD or Fondation Suisse de Deminage) as a case study. The implementation of this agreement has been supported by the EU.
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There were ‘big’ wars between the government troops and the MILF forces in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2008. These armed confrontations have displaced hundreds of thousands of people and inflicted tens of thousands of casualties on both parties. Consequently, civilians bear the brunt of wars and their communities affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO). UXOs are categorized as explosive remnants of war (ERW) and pose dangers to communities even after fighting have ceased. The PCBL and FSD have recorded a number of victims caused by the UXOs over the past several years.
A mines UXO clearance operation in Barangay Lapok, Shariff Aguak Municipality, Maguindanao Province.
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The Philippines has been challenged for several decades by a number of internal armed conflicts against several armed groups. One of these groups is the MILF who waged an armed struggle against the government for more than four decades asserting their right to self-determination.
In 15 October 2012, after several years on the negotiating table, MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim stepped foot in Malacanang Palace, the official residence of the President the Republic of the Philippines to witness the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) by both negotiating panels.
In his speech, MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim expressed:
Today, we extend the hands of friendship and partnership to the President and the Filipino people as we jointly embark on the historic journey to rebuild our homeland, institute justice, end occupation and the reign of violence, and restore normalcy to the lives of the masses of our people in Mindanao and Sulu.
(2012, October 15)
In his remarks, Philippine President Benigno Simeon Aquino III welcomed the historic milestone:
This framework agreement is about rising above our prejudices. It is about casting aside the distrust and myopia that has plagued the efforts of the past; it is about learning hard lessons and building on the gains we have achieved. It is about acknowledging that trust has to be earned—it is about forging a partnership that rests on the bedrock of sincerity, good will, and hard work.
(2012, October 15)
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The signing of the FAB signaled that both parties were finally on the same track towards building a strong foundation to support the agreed and signed Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. A peace studies thinker John Paul Lederach refers to this phase through a metaphor of constructing a building (Lederach, 1997: 82-83). The FAB is considered as the core idea behind the construction of the ‘building of peace’ in Mindanao while the supporting annexes provide for the blueprint of the various parts of the building (foundation, flooring, roofing etc). Indeed, a lot of aspects to take into consideration and a lot of construction workers needed.
This research was completed in the midst of the completion of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. In spite of the crucial political developments and the recent change in the leadership of the Philippine administration, this study intends to help us understand why trust plays a key role in peace accord implementation and why there is a need to look deeper into the bases of trust that will help the Bangsamoro peace process move forward.
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DEFINING TRUST
How do people define trust within the context of implementing a peace accord? What are the important factors of trust in implementing a peace accord? What factors help sustain it? What factors diminish trust during the implementation period? Probing these questions entails a brief scan on the theoretical perspectives of trust from different levels of analysis:(1) the micro/individual approach; (2) organizational/inter-organizational; and (3) cross-level approach (society and the economy).
Micro/Individual Level
Leaders play an important role, particularly looking into an armed group’s hierarchical structure and the perceived political will of the leadership to seal a peace agreement. It is important that the political will of the leaders who signed the agreement are translated into actions and implemented by their followers and partners in the peace process. This would mostly rely on the leaders and their followers to commit in the implementation of the signed agreements and that is the reason why micro level analysis should also be taken into consideration when discussing trust.
Trust among followers toward their leaders was conceptualized by Dirks (2006) as a “psychological state held by the follower involving confident positive expectations about the behavior and intentions of the leader, as they relate to the follower (p.15).” According to Dirks (2006), there are two different perspectives on trust, the first view is a relationship-based perspective which gives emphasis on the nature of the leader-follower relationship and how the follower understands the nature of the relationship (p.16). The other view is the character-based perspective that looks into “the perception of the leader’s character and how it impacts a follower’s vulnerability
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in a hierarchical relationship (p.16).” This perspective focuses on the follower’s assumptions about the leader’s attributes, such as integrity, dependability, fairness and ability, and how these will affect the follower, and also includes what will be exchanged and the likelihood of receiving it when giving trust (p.16).
Dirks’ micro level conceptualization poses a limit as the follower solely gives trust. Thus, there is a need to look into other levels of analysis.
Organization level
In an environment full of uncertainties and risk, opportunistic behaviours emerge that affect intra-organizational trust. Before one organization can trust another, it has first to build its own trust between its members and leaders. Long and Sitkin (2006) looked into the relationship between integrating actions in promoting trust and control, and concluded the direct relationship between the two. Long and Sitkin asserted that organizations exerting efforts to build trust to enhance the organizational effectiveness need to have a balance between trust and task control, where task control can foster trust and vice versa (Long and Sitkin, 2006).
Assessing risks of losing control and losing trust would entail looking into monitoring potentially opportunistic behaviour. One study suggests that there should be a balance between investing in monitoring opportunistic behavior and investing in the development of an atmosphere of trust (Madhok, 2006). These balances are important in organizational level analysis because it will put into place measures that can sustain trust within the organization.
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Societal Level
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (2000:94) recognized that trust has never been a topic in mainstream sociology and pointed out that empirical research on trust was based on general ideas that led to the confusion of the concept of trust in relation to attitudes toward political leadership or institutions, alienation, hopes and worries, and confidence. Luhmann’s other cited works likened trust to concepts of solidarity, meaning, and participation (Luhmann, 2000). Luhmann (2000) further nuanced the concepts of familiarity, confidence, and trust, in relation to expectations, disappointment, and risks. He argues that familiarity is ‘an avoidable fact of life’ (Luhmann, 2000, p.94) and should not be neglected when we study the conditions of trust and its limit. Thus, there is a need to explore “familiarity” within the context of the peace agreement, which will be explored in this learning paper. While recognizing the need for a deeper clarification of the theory of trust, I believe that more empirical studies, particularly in the context of implementing peace agreements, may contribute to deepening the sources for a more elaborate theory.
Confidence and trust concepts, often used interchangeably, should be nuanced. Luhmann (2000, p.98) offered a distinction between the two through attribution. He described the distinction through this explanation:
If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust. In the case of confidence you will react to disappointment by external attribution. In the case of trust, you will have to consider an internal attribution and eventually regret your trusting choice.(p.98)
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This distinction explains why confidence-building measures, also known as CBMs, are called for before warring parties agree to a political settlement or peace negotiation or why CBMs are needed between and among the parties to sustain the negotiations. However, once an agreement is achieved even on a particular specific aspect of the peace negotiations agenda, trust becomes crucial in the implementation of the agreement.
Studying Luhmann’s theory of trust entail going back to the works of Georg Simmel. Guido Mollering (2001) studied the works of key thinkers on the theory of trust and identified and traced them back as influences from Simmel’s original work. Simmel (cited in Mollering, 2001, p.403) argued that there is a weak link between trust bases and a trustful state of expectations. He pointed to a ‘further element’ which he defined as a kind of faith which is required to understand trust and its nature.
Figure 1: Simmel’s Theoretical Framework
Bases of Trust
Trustful State of Expectations
“Kind of Faith”
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Due to the weakness of the link between the bases of trusts and the outcome through the unexplainable “kind of faith”, Mollering (2001), using Simmel’s work, offered to conceptualize trust as a mental process of three elements: expectations (outcome), interpretation (good reasons), and suspension (leap of trust) which captured Simmel’s notion of trust in a simplified model. Mollering explains:
The first is expectation: the state reached at the end of the trust process and which can be favourable (in the case of trust) or unfavourable (in the case of distrust). Secondly, interpretation captures the idea that human experiencing of the life-world gives bases for trust (‘good reasons’). However, thirdly, the mental leap of trust (from interpretation to expectation) needs to be enabled by suspension: the bracketing of the unknowable which represents a defining aspect of the nature of trust.
(Mollering, 2001)
Figure 2: Mollering’s Framework
SUSPENSION(leap of faith)
INTERPRETATIONS ExPECTATIONS
UNKNOwABLE
REFLExIvE PROCESS
REALITY
BASES FOR TRUSTPOSITIvE
OUTCOMENEGATIvEOUTCOME
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Cross-level Approach
My reflections based on experience and using the various levels of analysis on the concept of trust reveal specific bases of trust: expected gain is greater than loss, governance/delivery of services, commitment, reliable leadership, open communication, transparency, governance, sincerity, expertise, familiarity, past experiences, religion/faith, forgiving, forgetting, honesty, respect, implementing mostly what was agreed, and leap of faith (Personal Journal 2013 in cycle 1).
The complex nature of the conflict between the government and the MILF affects the complexities of trust because of the various levels of analysis by which trust can be defined. Through time, the relationship between the warring parties has gone through several developments and stalls, with the peace negotiations entering into an on and off period which only proved that trust between the negotiating parties is not static. The GPH and MILF peace process has shown through time that trust is a dynamic and active concept. For this reason, this research uses a cross-level approach that defines the bases of trust that cross the various levels I have described above.
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RESEARCH APPROACH
The main objective of this learning paper is to produce policy and action recommendations for peace accord implementers on how to sustain trust during peace accord implementation. I explore three basic questions in this learning paper:
1. How do people define trust within the context of implementing a peace accord?
2. What are the important factors of trust in implementing a peace accord? And what factors help sustain it?
3. What factors diminish trust during the implementation period?
The first question addresses my first research objective, which is to identify how trust is defined by the different stakeholders. The second question is intended to identify what factors sustain trust, and the last question to identify what factors diminish trust. The answer to these questions led to the various respondents’ conceptual notion of trust and their bases of trust that they perceived to be important factors in sustaining trust during peace accord implementation, which I integrated as sustainability measures of trust in the development of modalities in the actual implementation of peace accords, particularly the mines/UXO detection and clearance agreement between the GPH and the MILF.
I went through secondary data using relevant literature on peace accords implementations, peace accords and materials, including data, which the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines has archived since 2001. Primary data was gathered through the in-depth interviews, personal notes and journal, compilation and documented feedbacks, conversations, and monthly reports.
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Primary data was also gathered during my community survey, which targeted two communities in Maguindanao covered by the PCBL-FSD operations.
Content review and contextual analysis was done in relation to the primary and secondary data gathered. These analyses were compiled based on action research cycles, and the data gathered from the survey underwent statistical treatment and analysis. (See Annex 1-4 for statistical treatment of survey data.)
I made careful assessments of the context and situation of every cycle and their relation to the aims of the action research project. I used my personal observations and analysis of each cycle as a guide in the next cycle in terms of interventions and the development of the guide for peace accord implementers on sustaining trust. After each cycle, I went through a process of reviewing and reflecting on the challenges we had during operations, the issues that came out, the institutions and the key actors involved, and my own personal involvement as an implementer in this peace accord implementation.
Key actors and personalities in the implementation of the agreement and the peace process were tapped as key informants, particularly the members of the GPH and MILF peace negotiating panels, the members of the Task Force which includes the IMT, Joint CCCH, PCBL, FSD, and some members of the International Contact Group (ICG) which is a transparency component mechanism of the peace negotiations.
All members of the implementation team work on operations in implementation in the conflict-affected areas. The PCBL-FSD project team comprised of eight (8) Community Liaison Officers who answered the survey questionnaire. The head of operations of FSD’s Mindanao programme and the members and the board of the PCBL were also tapped as respondents in the interviews.
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When implementing the community survey, I had three criteria for selecting the communities: (1) it should belong to the conflict-affected communities; (2) there should be presence of explosive remnants of war; (3) one community should have undergone UXO/mines clearance, and the other where clearance has to be implemented.
Two communities fit the criteria I set above. Barangay Lapok, Shariff Aguak Municipality was one of the very first areas where we conducted joint clearance operations. In contrast, Barangay Bayanga Norte, Matanog Municipality was identified as a suspected hazardous area (SHA) which have not yet undergone our joint clearance operations because the implementers are still waiting for the approval of the Task Force for the operations.
I was able to survey all households surrounding the exact spot where a suspected UXO was found. In Barangay Lapok, there are twenty two (22) households living around the suspected site and, in Barangay Bayangan Norte, there were ten (10) households living near the SHA where a 500-lb bomb was dropped during the 2001 all-out war between the GPH and the MILF. Both communities were heavily affected by previous wars, the former during the 2000 all-out war and the latter during the 2008 all-out war.
The joint clearance operations cover four (4) provinces wherein there are twenty six (26) municipalities with three hundred forty eight (348) barangays. However, I made the decision to conduct the community survey in only two of the barangays, which I chose due to the criteria I set above and which I believe would represent the dichotomy of this case study: areas where implementation have already occurred and areas where there is no implementation. Also, the limitation to tap other areas in the survey questionnaire was not approved due to an ongoing armed conflict between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the AFP.
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The research approach also put a special focus on the key actors during the negotiation of the peace accord and the actors in the implementation of the peace accord used as a case study.
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ANALYSIS
Demographics for the community survey
The survey was done in three areas: Cotabato City, Matanog, and Shariff Aguak Municipalities. For purposes of comparing and differentiating the different groupings of participants in the survey, I will use the municipalities/city as a point of reference.
As described earlier, Shariff Aguak is experiencing rehabilitation from armed conflict in the past. There are several ongoing development projects in this municipality, including building new schools which required earlier clearance operations and compliance. The municipality of Matanog experienced heavy fighting throughout the armed conflict between the GPH and the MILF but unlike Shariff Aguak, Matanog has not yet been cleared of UXOs and certain issues prevent the implementation of the clearance operations. Cotabato City is the home of the PCBL-FSD Project Team which is implementing the Joint Mines/UXO detection and clearance operations.
The survey was evenly distributed to both male and female respondents.
% Distribution by Gender
Percentage (%)
Female
Male
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
50%
50%
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Majority of the respondents were based in the community. Based on my personal communication with all the respondents during the survey, their livelihoods are also located within their communities.
The educational attainment of the respondents varied in levels with a minority (15%) who did not receive any formal education. A majority of the respondents completed elementary education(37.5% total) including those who reached or graduated from elementary. 25% had reached or graduated from high school, and only 22.5% reached college level and higher.
% Distribution by Occupation
Vegetable Gadener
Student
Rebel
Housekeeper
Farmer
CLO
0 5 10 15 20
2
1
3
9
17
8
Series 1
% Distribution by Educational Attainment
Graduate Schooling
College Graduate
College/Vocational
High school Graduate
High School
Elementary Graduate
Elementary Level
No Education
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
2.50%
17.50%
17.50%
27.50%
7.50%
10%
15%
2.50%
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Eighty (80) percent of the respondents came from the conflict affected communities, with 55% of the respondents coming from Shariff Aguak, and 25% from Matanog Municipalities. Twenty (20) percent came from the implementing project team based in Cotabato City.
Observations from Community Survey Results
Definitions of Trust (See Annex 1)
The significant statistical differences in these results may be explained through the different context of each of the location. Matanog placed a higher importance to LEAP OF FAITH. Matanog has not yet felt the actual implementation of the accord – so their bases of trust are still unknowable and relied on their trust towards their leadership which was supported by the survey result. It was the second most important factor in the combined means and ranked first in Matanog, as well as in individual discussions with the participants.
Shariff Aguak placed a lower importance to COMMITMENT TO A HIGHER VISION. Looking into the open-ended section of the survey results, participants from Shariff Aguak pointed out that commitment has never been questioned. This area is one of the biggest base camps of the MILF, and the constituents of the community have never doubted the commitment to a higher vision of the MILF and of each other. Therefore, commitment for them was not the most important factor – it was a given.
% Distribution by Location
Cotabato City
Matanog
Shariff Aguak
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
55%
25%
20%
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What is important for Sustaining Trust (See Annex 2)
The statistical difference in these results on the mean score on COMMITMENT from Matanog and Cotabato compared to Shariff Aguak is evident from the tests. Cotabato City represents the implementers of the accord in the communities. They face a higher challenge to meet expectations, and commitment is required for them to deliver despite these challenges. In the case of Matanog, they have a higher reliance toward their community leaders and their leaders’ capacities, which fuels their commitment to work toward the gains of the peace process. Shariff Aguak, as mentioned earlier, does not consider COMMITMENT an issue for them in implementation – they have a high confidence in their leadership to see through the implementation as agreed upon in the accord.
Factors Sustaining Trust (See Annex 3)
Cotabato City had a significantly lower mean score in BASED ON RELIGION/FAITH as factors in sustaining trust. The Cotabato City group is part of the implementers which is why they have a higher sense of efficacy in that they can implement the accord through transparency and commitment as bases of trust.
Matanog was the hardest hit during the 2001 all out war between the GPH and MILF, and this accounts for the reason why the respondents said that forgiving and forgetting is not part of trust when it comes to peace accord implementation. Two respondents were victims of war and shared the same sentiment. If an accord needed implementation, they do not feel the need to forgive nor forget what they experienced during the war.
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Factors Diminishing Trust (See Annex 4)
In the case of Shariff Aguak, the participants felt that not fulfilling obligations during the implementation of an accord was mainly due to limitations that surround peace negotiations and implementation processes. That is why they perceived that not fulfilling all the aspects of the accord is not a threat to their trust. Also, the location of their community, inside one of the biggest base commands, means the community is privy to updates and communications from their community leaders about developments or stalls.
Observations from Interviews with Key Actors
Perceptions of Trust In my interview with MILF Chair Mohagher Iqbal, he reiterated his earlier pronouncement that “trust and confidence are important in negotiations but not a precondition” while GPH Chair Miriam Coronel Ferrer recognized the impact and importance of MILF’s expression of their trust and confidence on the current administration of the government of the Philippines. MILF have expressed this in many occasions and public statements. These are all very important for the current negotiations to move forward.
During the implementation of the accords, both leaders of the negotiating panels shared the same view that trust is continually reaffirmed from time to time. According to Chairman Iqbal, trust is dependent on how the two parties are performing in the implementation of the agreements. GPH Chair Ferrer, likewise, expressed that trust should be affirmed and built again and again, especially when there are disagreements along the way.
In both interviews, I gathered that both sides consider trust to be dynamic and need conscious efforts. Trust also hinges on implementing what was agreed upon.
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Factors that sustain trust
For MILF Chair Iqbal, factors that sustain trust are directly linked to what the leaders of both parties can deliver. A strong political will to deliver their commitment and obligations stated in the accords they signed makes a difference. If the leaders are decisive, according to him, they can overcome all obstacles.
Furthermore, he said that guarantees that the accord will be implemented require the participation of other groups, particularly the IMT and the ICG. Implementation of agreements should not only be left to the direct parties. A mechanism should be put in place for third parties to play a role in the implementation as guarantees both for resources and because as more actors buy into the accord it will be more difficult to abrogate.
Forgiving and forgetting ranked low among the perception of the communities during the initial discussions I had with community leaders. They are not even contemplating about it yet despite what their faith says about forgiveness. They prefer attainable justice. Maybe then, they said, they can forgive and forget.
Factors that diminish trust
According to Chairman Iqbal, for the MILF, nothing can break a peace accord except if the MILF or the government says they are throwing everything away. Minor violations on the provisions of the accord will not break its implementation. The civil society and the international community have invested so much that they will not allow this to happen.
For GPH Chair Ferrer, trust diminishes if you see it clearly that someone undercuts the implementation process. This is the reason why there should be protocols and mechanisms in place but there is also room for flexibility. One crucial aspect is when the people
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you trust on the other side leave, or their hold on the process of implementation is weakened. You may not entirely lose trust in the people but then you would doubt the entire institution to live up to their commitment. It is crucial that the people you are dealing with have integrity.
Implementing peace accords and sustaining trust is like the proverbial chicken and egg situation, according to the GPH Chair. If you do not fulfill your obligations in the signed agreements you lose trust, and if you do not have trust implementing agreements will be very difficult.
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A soldier from the Philippine Army and a mujaheed from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) help secure the area during the destruction of a UXO in
Talayan Municipality, Maguindanao Province
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CONCLUSION
After going through the quantitative and qualitative data gathered throughout the action research project, I created a matrix that shows how the bases of trust are processed by the different levels of analysis through classifying them as individual, group and inter-group perceptions.
Levels of Analysis
Important Factors in Trust
Important Factors in Sustaining Trust
Factors That Diminish
Trust
Individual Transparency
Open communication
Leap of faith
Transparency
Open communication
Leap of faith
Sincerity
Honesty
Confidence on leadership
Commitment
Based on religion/faith
Insincerity
Group Transparency
Reliable leadership
Open communication
Commitment to a higher vision
Transparency
Based on religion/faith Familiarity
Reliance on leaders
Commitment
Doubt
Insincerity
Inter-Group
Transparency
Open communication
Implementation of what was agreed
Reliable leadership
Governance
Transparency
Familiarity
Reliance on expertise
Open communication
Doubt
Insincerity
Disrespect
Not fulfilling its obligation
30
Through the findings, trust was shown to be a reflexive process. Individuals’ process trusts through their own experiences and share these with their community. Thus, trust is not just an individual process, and can be illustrated below:
Trust is a societal as much as an individual reflexive process with the individual having an equal role compared to groups, inter-groups, and the larger society because the basic unit of society remains to be the family or group.
People within communities, especially in the case of armed conflict communities, form the bases of trust from their past experience as a community and from their collective memory. All factors that are important in sustaining trust such as transparency, based on religion/faith, familiarity, reliance on leaders and commitment, entails interaction with others.
TRUST BASES
TRUST BASES
TRUST BASES
TRUST BASES
INDIVIDUAL GROUP
INTER-GROUPBANGSAMORO SOCIETY
31
The community, as observed in this research, is closely knit and, to a point, ensure that the community processes experiences or events as a whole, which then contributes to another level of perception - the group perception. Since the individual perception of trust affects the group perception of trust in communities, sustaining individual trust through transparency, open communication, and leap of faith will also result in sustaining community trust.
This group perception is then taken into consideration when dealing with other groups, in this case, other institutions that are involved in the implementation of the accord. The perception of trust required of inter-group analysis then becomes more elaborate and needs more bases to accommodate both individual and group levels of analysis.
During the action research cycles, every juncture in implementation was met with some challenges that needed to be overcome before implementation could move forward. Overcoming these challenges leads to a trustful state because implementers and stakeholders alike saw positive outcomes, which then adds to the inter-group perceptions.
There are many factors that could form the bases of trust. However, these become limited in an armed conflict situation, even more limited after years of experiencing armed conflict and violence. Transparency, open communication, and leap of faith came out as the most important factors because people in armed conflict communities are coming from an environment where they are either given limited information, or they themselves limit the information they receive because of their own doubt.
Transparency and open communication are the first steps towards forming the bases of trust, as they are formed during individual levels of analysis, as shown in the table above, and leap of faith follows after a series of positive outcome and reflexive process.
32
Transparency and open communication are needed at this point to sustain the momentum of interest that communities have for the peace process. It will also help weaken the tendency of armed groups to splinter and create factions.
Through the years of experiencing hardships during war, familiarity, sincerity, and commitments were tested. That is why communities have the tendency to rely on their leaders. The reliance of the communities towards their leaders will remain strong even after a peace accord is signed, and will remain strong after its implementation. On the other hand, the leaders have stated their desire for people to help develop better institutions so as not to rely solely on people, both mentioned by the GPH and MILF.
The communities brought up reliance on the expertise of third parties and resources because there is recognition that the implementers within the area do not have all the capacities or resources necessary to implement the signed accords. The involvement of third parties was also seen as a sign that there is shared ownership of the peace accords and who may also act as guarantors of the implementation.Religion or faith serves the interest of sustaining trust. The values that religion or faith prescribes that peace should be attained helps sustain peoples trust in the peace negotiations.
33
RECOMMENDATIONS
This learning paper was able to identify factors that are closely linked to how people define trust and how to sustain trust in an environment where challenges do not end, in this case between a government and an armed group tasked to implement a peace accord. Based on this action research, trust is a reflexive process derived from their direct encounters and experiences with their partners in implementing a peace accord, where positive outcome builds reason. Establishing implementation mechanisms with clear obligations and responsibilities but giving room for flexibility forms routine. Reflexivity happens when people form trust bases, which they then process, based on realities and positive outcomes weighed against the unknowable. Through trust bases and a reflexive process, individuals or groups reach a trustful state with the notions of arriving at a positive outcome propelling them to take that leap of faith.
Therefore, trust is very crucial in implementing peace accords because it creates an enabling environment where there is suspension of the unknowable that allows that ‘leap of faith’ which, in turn, creates spaces for understanding and flexibility, therefore giving peace a chance during the implementation of peace accords.
Sustaining trust during peace accord implementation is crucially relevant as both panels approach the completion of the annexes of what will become the comprehensive agreement. The next big challenge is to implement the comprehensive peace agreement and this is where the bases of trust, highlighted in this case study, play a crucial role.
This research poses that the signatories of the peace accords come from an environment that utilizes already existing bases of trusts rather than come from an environment that only seeks to lessen the factors that have diminished trust in the past. Therefore, sustaining
34
trust during peace accord implementation should be integral in the formulation of implementing guidelines or mechanisms that will strengthen the future institutions that will be created from the comprehensive peace agreement. Thus, this learning paper recommends the following:
For the future Bangsamoro
The Basic Law for the future Bangsamoro should have provisions • that will allow the freedom of information. This provision will empower every Bangsamoro to become part of implementing the comprehensive agreement and, consequently, sustaining the level of trust while institutions are being built.
Prior to the approval of the Basic Law, the MILF leadership • should put in place a mechanism for transparency and open communication where everyone’s right to know are respected and attained.
For the leaders of the MILF and the Government of the Philippines and its agencies
It is crucial that the current Philippine president is trusted by the • MILF. Likewise, that the current administration trusts the current leadership of the MILF. This trustful state of the leadership of both parties should be sustained.
Institutions and mechanisms that will carry on the momentum of • trust built after the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro should be put into place. The trust between the MILF and GPH should go beyond changes in the leadership of the GPH administration, and it should also go beyond the transition towards the creation of the Bangsamoro political structure.
35
Guarantees should be in place to ensure that accords will be • implemented through creating mechanisms and/or policies assuring commitments, obligations, and expectations are met. Involvement of third parties such as international organizations and institutions, and local civil society should be tapped to provide guarantees.
For the implementers of peace accords
Implementing guidelines, Terms of Reference, Memorandum of • Understanding, and Memorandum of Agreement that will be drawn from the comprehensive peace agreement should include provisions that will sustain trust. In order to do so, transparency mechanisms should always be present.
A prerequisite in peace accord implementation is a clear • delineation of roles, responsibilities, communication channels, and transparency mechanisms, and the room for flexibility to change what will not work. Insincerity and doubt, whether it is just perceived or actually true, has the same effect, as it will diminish trust and will put stumbling blocks to implementation.
Mechanisms for sharing of information to the community and • the larger society about the developments and updates on the implementation of the accord should be created. One of the clear findings of this research is that people would want to know what is happening to earn their continued trust.
36
For the community
Communities affected by the armed conflict and violence should • take the lead in engaging the Bangsamoro institutions through their community leaders or community organizations.
The signed peace accord is symbolic of a negotiated future. This • is about implementing a peace accord that will hopefully end the armed conflict. However, the success of the implementation of the peace accord between the GPH and the MILF will enable an environment that peace is indeed possible and sustainable. The successful implementation will allow other armed groups to witness how peace can be achieved through a negotiated political settlement. Thus, there is a need to continue in making the leaders of the GPH and the future Bangsamoro champions of peoples’ rights and freedom.
37
REFERENCES
Bachmann, R., and Zaheer, A. (2006). Handbook of Trust Research. [electronic version]. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK.
Bekoe, D. A. (2003). Toward a theory of peace agreement implementation: The case of Liberia. [electronic version] Journal of Asian and African Studies, 38, 256–294.
Bekoe, D.A. (2005). Mutual vulnerability and the implementation of peace agreements: Examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia. International Journal of Peace Studies. 10 (2): 43-68.
Curall, S.C & Inkpen, A.C (2006). On the complexity of organization trust: a multi-level co-evolutionary perspective and guidelines for future research. In Bachmann, Reinhard and Zaheer, Akbar (eds.). Handbook of Trust Research. [electronic version]. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK. 235-246.
Hill, C. A. and O’Hara O’Connor, E.A. (2005 December). A cognitive theory of trust. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-51. [electronic version]. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=869423 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869423
Jarstad, A. K., and Nilsson, D. (2008). From words to deeds: The implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace Accords. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25, 206-223.
Joshi, M. and Darby, J. (2012). Introducing the peace accords matrix (PAM): A database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989-2006. Presented at the 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, April 1-4, 2012, San Diego, CA. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
Lederach, J.P. (1997) Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Endowment of the United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C.
38
Luhmann, N. (2000). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In Gabetta, Diego (ed.) Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations, [electronic version]. Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/luhmann94-107.pdf 94-107.
Mollering, G. (2001). The nature of trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expection, Interpretation and Suspension. Sociology. 35: 2. 403-420.
Newton, K. & Norris, P. (1999). Confidence in public institution: Faith, culture or performance? [electronic version]. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.
Stedman, S. J. (2001). Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy makers. IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation. International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University. New York.
“Speech of President Aquino during the signing of the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro” http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/speech-president-aquino-during-signing-gph-milf-framework-agreement-bangsamoro
accessed 15 May 2013 Posted on Tuesday, 16 October, 2012 - 15:39
“Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim delivers his message during the Signing of Framework Agreement” http://luwaran.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2892:chairman-al-haj-murad-ebrahim-delivers-his-message-during-the-signing-of-framework-agreement&catid=347:gggg&Itemid=543 accessed 15 May 2013
39
ANNEx 1
Definition of Trust per Municipality4.100
3.900
3.700
3.500
3.300
3.100
2.900
2.700
2.500
Mea
n Sc
ore
(x)
Cotabato City Matanog Shariff Aguak Combined
Definitions
Higher E
xpecte
d
Gain
Implement w
hat
was agre
ed
Leap of F
aith
Commitment t
o
higher v
ision
Having r
eliable
leadership
Transp
arency
Open
Communication
40
AN
OVA
Tab
le
Sum
of
Squa
res
dfM
ean
Squa
reF
Sig.
Expe
cted
gai
ns is
hi
gher
than
loss
*
Mun
icip
ality
Impl
emen
t mos
tly
wha
t was
agr
eed
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)4.
409
22.
205
3.19
1.0
53
With
in G
roup
s25
.566
37.6
91
Tota
l29
.975
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)1.
157
2.5
782.
427
.102
With
in G
roup
s8.
818
37.2
38
Tota
l9.
975
39
Leap
of f
aith
*
Mun
icip
ality
Com
mitm
ent t
o a
high
er v
isio
n *
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)8.
900
24.
450
9.40
9.0
00
With
in G
roup
s17
.500
37.4
73
Tota
l26
.400
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)8.
900
24.
450
9.75
7.0
00
With
in G
roup
s16
.875
37.4
56
Tota
l25
.775
39
41
Hav
ing
relia
ble
lead
ersh
ip *
M
unic
ipal
ity
Tran
spar
ency
*
Mun
icip
ality
Ope
n Co
mm
unic
ation
*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)6.
739
37.1
826.
739
37
With
in G
roup
s6.
739
37.1
82
Tota
l7.
100
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).3
462
.173
.933
.404
With
in G
roup
s5.
939
32.1
86
Tota
l6.
286
34
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).4
012
.201
.791
.463
With
in G
roup
s7.
864
31.2
54
Tota
l8.
265
33
42
Mul
tipl
e Co
mpa
riso
ns
Tuke
y H
SD
Dep
ende
nt v
aria
ble
Mea
n D
iffer
ence
(I
-J)
Std.
Err
orSi
g.
95%
Con
fiden
ce
Inte
rval
Low
er
Boun
d U
pper
Bo
und
Leap
of f
aith
Com
mitm
ent
to a
hig
her
visi
on
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
-1.0
0000
00*
.262
2900
.001
-1.6
4037
7-.3
5962
3
Cota
bato
City
.250
0000
.283
9373
.656
-.443
229
.943
229
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
1.00
0000
0*.2
6229
00.0
01.3
5962
31.
6403
77
Cota
bato
City
1.25
0000
0*.3
2621
91.0
01.4
5354
12.
0464
59
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
-.250
0000
.283
9373
.656
-.943
229
.443
229
Mat
anog
-1.2
5000
00*
.326
2191
.001
-2.0
4645
9-.4
5354
1
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
-1.0
0000
00*
.257
5637
.001
-1.6
2883
8-.3
7116
2
Cota
bato
City
-.875
0000
*.2
7882
09.0
09-1
.555
737
-.194
263
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
1.00
0000
0*.2
5756
37.0
01.3
7116
21.
6288
38
Cota
bato
City
.125
0000
.320
3408
.920
-.657
107
.907
107
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
.875
0000
*.2
7882
09.0
09.1
9426
31.
5557
37
Mat
anog
-.125
0000
.320
3408
.920
-.907
107
.657
107
43
ANNEx 2
How important are the following in sustaining trust?
4.100
3.900
3.700
3.500
3.300
3.100
2.900
2.700
2.500
Mea
n Sc
ore
(x)
Cotabato City Matanog Shariff Aguak Combined
Sustaining Trust
Govern
ance
Familia
rity
Commitment
Reliance
Confidence on
Leadersh
ip
Transp
arency
44
AN
OVA
Tab
le Sum
of
Squa
res
dfM
ean
Squa
reF
Sig.
Gov
erna
nce
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Fam
iliar
ity *
M
unic
ipal
ity
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).3
612
.181
.765
.473
With
in G
roup
s8.
739
37.2
36
Tota
l9.
100
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).1
612
.081
.320
.728
With
in G
roup
s9.
339
37.2
52
Tota
l9.
500
39
Com
mitm
ent *
M
unic
ipal
ity
Relia
nce
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)9.
900
24.
950
10.1
75.0
00
With
in G
roup
s18
.000
37.4
86
Tota
l27
.900
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)2.
707
21.
353
5.44
7.0
08
With
in G
roup
s9.
193
37.2
48
Tota
l11
.900
39
45
Confi
denc
e on
Le
ader
ship
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Tran
spar
ency
(sha
ring
in
form
ation
)*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).4
112
.206
.813
.451
With
in G
roup
s9.
364
37.2
53
Tota
l9.
775
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).5
142
.257
.977
.386
With
in G
roup
s9.
197
35.2
63
Tota
l9.
711
37
46
Mul
tipl
e Co
mpa
riso
ns
Tuke
y H
SD
Dep
ende
nt v
aria
ble
Mea
n D
iffer
ence
(I
-J)
Std.
Err
orSi
g.
95%
Con
fiden
ce
Inte
rval
Low
er
Boun
d U
pper
Bo
und
Com
mitm
ent
Relia
nce
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
-1.0
0000
00*
.266
0107
.002
-1.6
4946
1-.3
5053
9
Cota
bato
City
-1.0
0000
00*
.287
9650
.004
-1.7
0306
2-.2
9693
8
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
1.00
0000
0*.2
6601
07.0
02.3
5053
91.
6494
61
Cota
bato
City
0.00
0000
0.3
3084
661.
000
-.807
757
.807
757
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
1.00
0000
0*.2
8796
50.0
04.2
9693
81.
7030
62
Mat
anog
0.00
0000
0.3
3084
661.
000
-.807
757
.807
757
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
-.590
9091
*.1
9010
60.0
10-1
.055
050
-.126
768
Cota
bato
City
.034
0909
.205
7957
.985
-.468
356
.536
538
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
.590
9091
*.1
9010
60.0
10.1
2676
81.
0550
50
Cota
bato
City
.625
0000
*.2
3644
13.0
31.0
4773
21.
2022
68
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
-.034
0909
.205
7957
.985
-.536
538
.468
356
Mat
anog
-.625
0000
*.2
3644
13.0
31-1
.202
268
-.047
732
*. T
he m
ean
diffe
renc
e is
sig
nific
ant a
t the
0.0
5 le
vel.
47
ANNEx 3
which factors help sustain trust?
4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
Cotabato City Matanog Shariff Aguak Combined
Sustaining Trust
Familia
rity
Commitment
Forgi
veness
Forge
tting
Since
rity
HonestyPast
experie
nces
Reliance
on
experti
se
Based on
relig
ion/faith
Transp
arency
Mea
n Sc
ore
(x)
48
AN
OVA
Tab
le
Sum
of
Squa
res
dfM
ean
Squa
reF
Sig.
Fam
iliar
ity *
M
unic
ipal
ity
Tran
spar
ency
*
Mun
icip
ality
Past
exp
erie
nces
*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)1.
809
2.9
052.
581
.089
With
in G
roup
s12
.966
37.3
50
Tota
l14
.775
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).8
452
.423
.982
.384
With
in G
roup
s15
.930
37.4
31
Tota
l16
.775
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)2.
403
21.
202
2.54
0.0
93
With
in G
roup
s17
.032
36.4
73
Tota
l19
.436
38
Base
d on
relig
ion/
faith
*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)8.
684
24.
342
26.3
76.0
00
With
in G
roup
s6.
091
37.1
65
Tota
l14
.775
39
49
Relia
nce
on e
xper
tise
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Com
mitm
ent *
M
unic
ipal
ity
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)1.
309
2.6
552.
184
.127
With
in G
roup
s11
.091
37.3
00
Tota
l12
.400
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).7
022
.351
1.05
9.3
57
With
in G
roup
s12
.273
37.3
32
Tota
l12
.975
39
Forg
iven
ess
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Forg
etting
*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)21
.170
210
.585
16.8
60.0
00
With
in G
roup
s23
.230
37.6
28
Tota
l44
.400
39
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)33
.136
216
.568
23.9
10.0
00
With
in G
roup
s25
.639
37.6
93
Tota
l58
.775
39
Sinc
erity
*
Mun
icip
ality
Hon
esty
*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).3
792
.189
.969
.391
With
in G
roup
s5.
864
30.1
95
Tota
l6.
242
32
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).3
792
.189
1.47
1.2
46
With
in G
roup
s3.
864
30.1
29
Tota
l4.
242
32
50
Mul
tipl
e Co
mpa
riso
ns
Tuke
y H
SD
Dep
ende
nt v
aria
ble
Mea
n D
iffer
ence
(I
-J)
Std.
Err
orSi
g.
95%
Con
fiden
ce
Inte
rval
Low
er
Boun
d U
pper
Bo
und
Base
d on
re
ligio
n/fa
ithSh
ariff
Agu
akM
atan
og-.1
3636
36.1
5474
04.6
55-.5
1416
0.2
4143
3
Cota
bato
City
1.11
3636
4*.1
6751
14.0
00.7
0466
01.
5226
13
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
.136
3636
.154
7404
.655
-.241
433
.514
160
Cota
bato
City
1.25
0000
0*.1
9245
60.0
00.7
8012
21.
7198
78
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
-1.1
1363
64*
.167
5114
.000
-1.5
2261
3-.7
0466
0
Mat
anog
-1.2
5000
00*
.192
4560
.000
-1.7
1987
8-.7
8012
2
Forg
iven
ess
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
1.44
5454
5*.3
0219
21.0
00.7
0765
72.
1832
52
Cota
bato
City
-.579
5455
.327
1326
.193
-1.3
7823
5.2
1914
4
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
-1.4
4545
45*
.302
1921
.000
-2.1
8325
2-.7
0765
7
Cota
bato
City
-2.0
2500
00*
.375
8467
.000
-2.9
4262
4-1
.107
376
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
.579
5455
.327
1326
.193
-.219
144
1.37
8235
Mat
anog
2.02
5000
0*.3
7584
67.0
001.
1073
762.
9426
24
51
Forg
etting
Shar
iff A
guak
Mat
anog
2.12
7272
7*.3
1747
55.0
001.
3521
612.
9023
85
Cota
bato
City
.102
2727
.343
6773
.952
-.736
810
.941
356
Mat
anog
Shar
iff A
guak
-2.1
2727
27*
.317
4755
.000
-2.9
0238
5-1
.352
161
Cota
bato
City
-2.0
2500
00*
.394
8552
.000
-2.9
8903
3-1
.060
967
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iff A
guak
-.102
2727
.343
6773
.952
-.941
356
.736
810
Mat
anog
2.02
5000
0*.3
9485
52.0
001.
0609
672.
9890
33
*. T
he m
ean
diffe
renc
e is
sig
nific
ant a
t the
0.0
5 le
vel.
52
ANNEx 4
what factors diminish trust?
Mea
n Sc
ore
(x)
Cotabato City Matanog Shariff Aguak Combined
Diminishing Trust
Not fulfillin
g its.
..
Not doing a
nything
Disresp
ect
Doubt
Dishonesty
Insince
rity
4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
53
AN
OVA
Tab
le
Sum
of
Squa
res
dfM
ean
Squa
reF
Sig.
Dis
hone
sty
* M
unic
ipal
ity
Insi
ncer
ity*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).9
942
.497
1.15
5.3
29
With
in G
roup
s12
.475
29.4
30
Tota
l13
.469
31
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).3
192
.159
.550
.583
With
in G
roup
s8.
400
29.2
90
Tota
l8.
719
31
Not
fulfi
lling
its
obl
igati
on/
resp
onsi
bilit
y*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d)13
.369
26.
684
14.7
97.0
00
With
in G
roup
s13
.100
29.4
52
Tota
l26
.469
31
Dis
resp
ect*
M
unic
ipal
ityBe
twee
n G
roup
s(C
ombi
ned)
10.0
272
5.01
39.
732
.001
With
in G
roup
s11
.333
22.5
15
Tota
l21
.360
24
Dou
bt*
Mun
icip
ality
Betw
een
Gro
ups
(Com
bine
d).6
672
.333
.647
.533
With
in G
roup
s11
.333
22.5
15
Tota
l12
.000
24
54
Mul
tipl
e Co
mpa
riso
ns
Tuke
y H
SD
Dep
ende
nt v
aria
ble
Mea
n D
iffer
ence
(I
-J)
Std.
Err
orSi
g.
95%
Con
fiden
ce
Inte
rval
Low
er
Boun
d U
pper
Bo
und
Not
fulfi
lling
its
obl
igati
on/
resp
onsi
bilit
y
Shar
iffA
guak
Mat
anog
-1.4
0000
00*
.283
3840
.000
-2.0
9985
9-.7
0014
1
Cota
bato
City
-1.1
5000
00*
.294
2456
.001
-1.8
7668
3-.4
2331
7
Mat
anog
Shar
iffA
guak
1.40
0000
0*.2
8338
40.0
00.7
0014
12.
0998
59
Cota
bato
City
.250
0000
.326
5840
.727
-.556
547
1.05
6547
Cota
bato
City
Shar
iffA
guak
1.15
0000
0*.2
9424
56.0
01.4
2331
71.
8766
83
Mat
anog
-.250
0000
.326
5840
.727
-1.0
5654
7.5
5654
7
*. T
he m
ean
diffe
renc
e is
sig
nific
ant a
t the
0.0
5 le
vel.
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