CHAPTER 8

Polybios on Government,Interstate Relations,

and Imperial Expansion

Craige B. Champion

The Achaian Greek historian Polybios, whose fragmentary though substantial historyprovides our most reliable account of ancient Rome’s greatest period of imperialexpansion (c.265–c.150 BCE), has had a profound impact on political theorizing in theWestern intellectual tradition. In the sixth book of his history, he sets out to analyzethe Roman political and military system and to account for its astonishing success,embedding this analysis within his own general theory of the rise and fall of states. I wishto examine interrelationships between the internal structure and well-being of states,the competitive nature of interstate relations, and the moral dimensions of imperialexpansion in Polybios’ thought. I maintain that we can fully understand these topics inthe Histories only by placing them in the historical and political contexts from whichthey arose.

Polybios’ famous anakyklosis theory posited that states are much like biologicalorganisms, with a natural life-cycle of birth, growth, maturity, decline, and death.According to the theory, primitive kingship first arises and develops into monarchy,but over several generations the monarchy devolves into tyranny. This is replacedthrough revolutionary means by the rule of the best men, aristocracy, but over timeit also degenerates, turning into an abusive oligarchy. The next political form toarise by revolutionary convulsion is democracy, but yet again it eventually deterio-rates; this time into ochlocracy, or mob rule. At this point (and again as the resultof political convulsion) the circle, or anakyklosis, is completed, and the historicalcycle of these simple constitutional forms – monarchy/tyranny; aristocracy/oligarchy;democracy/ochlocracy – begins anew with the establishment of primitive kingship(cf. 6.3.5).

In Polybios’ view, the Roman system was superior to any of these simple constitutionsbecause it blended the monarchical element (represented by the annually-elected con-suls), the aristocratic element (represented by the senate), and the democratic element

A Companion to Ancient Greek Government, First Edition. Edited by Hans Beck.© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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(represented by the popular assemblies), into a harmonious system of governmentalchecks and balances (cf. 6.3.7–8). It is this aspect of Polybios’ political theory, hisconception of the so-called ‘‘mixed constitution,’’ that has made him such an importantfigure in the tradition of Western political thought. In the United States, as a readingof the Federalist Papers indicates, the evolution of the political theory of the FoundingFathers was indebted to Polybios. In 1787 John Adams, arguing against proponents ofsingle-assembly governments, underscored the point when he wrote: ‘‘I wish to assem-ble together the opinions and reasonings of philosophers, politicians and historians,who have taken the most extensive views of men and societies, whose characters aredeservedly revered, and whose writings were in the contemplation of those who framedthe American constitutions. It will not be contested that all these characters are united inPolybios’’ (A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,Letter 30). Indeed, Arnaldo Momigliano suggested that due to his deep influence onearly American political thinkers, Polybios should be considered as an honorary founderof the Constitution of the United States of America.1

All of this is well known. In this chapter I seek to enlarge our appreciation of Polybios’political theory by arguing two points; first, that it should not be considered in isolation,but rather must be understood in relation to his ideas on interstate power and imperialexpansion in the entire inhabited world, or oikoumene; and in particular that Polybiosbelieved states must be understood according to both their internal structures and theirexternal position in the international world, which must itself be evaluated in moralterms. Secondly, I maintain that we can best comprehend Polybios’ somewhat schematicrepresentation of the Roman politeia, his ideas on the place Rome occupied within theMediterranean interstate system, and his moral assessment of Roman behavior as Mediter-ranean hegemon, not merely as by-products of his political theory, but rather as politicalstatements in their own right, inextricably linked to the author’s political and social reali-ties and pressures at the time of his history’s composition. But before we can go into thesequestions, it is necessary to clarify just what the ancient Greek word politeia, usually trans-lated as ‘‘state’’ or ‘‘constitution,’’ actually meant for Polybios as a political conception.

Polybios’ Conception of the Politeia

The Liddell-Scott Greek–English Lexicon translates politeia as ‘‘the relation in whicha citizen stands to the state, the conditions and rights of citizenship’’; ‘‘the life andbusiness of a statesman, government, administration’’; ‘‘civil polity, the condition orconstitution of the state’’; ‘‘a well-ordered republican government, a commonwealth’’;‘‘a free community, republic.’’ In his consideration of the meaning of the word politeia,Plutarch (Mor. 826c–f ) gives several of these meanings as well as some others, such as‘‘a single brilliant act for the public benefit,’’ and even ‘‘a man of public affairs.’’ At theend of his catalogue, he settles for ‘‘an order and constitution of a state, which directsits affairs,’’ with reference to the famous ‘‘constitutional debate’’ which Herodotus(3.80–84) puts into the mouths of three Persian noblemen on the respective virtues andvices of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

The term politeia, therefore, had a wide range of uses among ancient Greek writers, butthe difficulty in pinning down just what is meant by it is compounded by the fact that they

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used the term politeia synonymously with polis in the sense of ‘‘a free state’’ or ‘‘republic’’(e.g., Hes. Works and Days: 240; Pind. Pyth. 2.160–161; Soph. OT : 22). Contemporaryscholars frequently use the terms almost interchangeably as well. This terminologicalconflation can create even further confusion in attempting to understand the meaning ofthe already conceptually elastic term politeia, since scholars working under the influenceof an Athenocentric orientation to ancient Greek history have often extrapolated theidea of the Athenian polis (conventionally translated as ‘‘city-state’’) to cover the ancientGreek political experience generally, which can result in violent historical distortion.Finally, by Polybios’ day the Greek world had embarked on the political experimentof the extended federal state, or koinon, in the form of the Achaian and Aitolianconfederations, as counterweights to the powers of the great Hellenistic monarchies,and the word politeia is frequently used to describe these composite political entities.

The koinon entailed a sort of dual citizenship. Polybios himself, for example, was acitizen of Megalopolis, his hometown, as well as a citizen of the Achaian confederation,which encompassed many of the poleis of the Peloponnese. Polybios’ text illustrates thedual aspect of citizenship in the Achaian confederation: on the one hand, he states thatmembers of the confederation, which had been compelled to join, nevertheless continuedto enjoy their ancestral politeiai (4.25.7; cf. 4.60.10, referring to the koine politeia of theconfederation); on the other hand, he chastizes the Tritaians, Pharaians, and Dymaiansfor failing to pay their contributions to the common politeia of the Achaians (4.60.10).In a hyperbolic passage on the Achaian confederation (2.37.9–11; cf. 2.38.4; 4.1.7–8),he states that under its aegis the Peloponnese has become as a single polis, with the samelaws, weights and measures, coinage, magistrates, deliberative assemblies, and courts; itwas one polis save for the fact that a single wall did not encircle it. As further examples ofthis expanded sense of the term politeia, Polybios states that his bete noire, the Aetolians,could not persuade the Medionians to share their politeia (2.2.7); conversely, all of thePeloponnesians willingly adopted the Achaian politeia (2.38.4).2

Polybios’ conception of politeia therefore encompassed the internal political organiza-tion of the individual polis, including its government, as well as the federal constitutionalmechanism of the Greek federal state. But the Polybian conception goes further thanthis: politeia in the historian’s view had a more expanded range of functions than whatwe would normally ascribe to the idea of constitution. The nature and structure of thepoliteia form the prime causal determinants for a people’s collective character (see 1.1.5,64.2–6; 6.2.3; 8.2.3; 39.8.7), and the politeia consists in moral, aesthetic, religious,cultural, social, and educational components. The politeia, therefore, leaves an indeliblestamp upon its people. At 6.52.10, for example, Polybios notes that Italians are bynature (physei) superior to Libyans and Phoinikians, in terms of physical strength andcourage, but he insists that Roman institutions have made these physical and moralqualities manifest. He states that ethical precepts and customs are the two fundamentalingredients of every state (6.47.1–2; cf. 5.106.1). In discussing Greek affairs, Polybiosargues that the people of Arkadia were able to counter the brutalizing influences of theirharsh environment by instituting musical training, festivals, and sacrifices (4.21.1–3; cf.4.20.7). In his view, politeiai generate historical agents’ practical intentions and actions.Individuals are for Polybios products of their politeiai; mirrors of the political and socialinstitutions of a communally shared culture (see esp. 6.47.3–5; cf. 16.22a).3

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These two aspects of Polybios’ conception of politeia – its expanded application toencompass political communities ranging beyond the polis and its moral and educativefunctions – beg at least two important questions. First, since the administration of theAchaian and Aitolian koina and Rome’s Italian confederation at times necessarily entailedthe application of force against individual constituent members and potential members,a question arises concerning the relationships of a state’s constitutional arrangements,its position in the international world, and imperial expansion. Second, since the politeiais the prime causal determinant for the behavioral characteristics of human beings, bothindividually and collectively, one can ask how in Polybios’ view it can and should beevaluated in moral terms.

Political Constitutions, Interstate Relations,and Imperial Expansion

The fact that Polybios evaluated politeiai in terms of interstate power relations andstanding among the international political community of the oikoumene could hardlybe clearer. At the outset of his work (1.1.5; cf. 8.2.3–4), he challenges the reader withthe following question: ‘‘Who is so thoughtless or lazy as not to be curious about how,and under what kind of politeia, the Romans became the first sole rulers of almost thewhole inhabited world in less than 53 years?’’ He lays particular stress on the Romanpoliteia at the beginning of Book III, where he gives an outline of the plan of his work.According to this plan, Polybios brings his historical narrative down to the climactic140th Olympiad (220–216 BCE), during which time Rome suffered the worst militarydefeat in its history at the hands of Hannibal. At this juncture, he states, ‘‘I shallpause in my narrative to discuss the Roman politeia, and how its peculiar charactergreatly helped the Romans not only in conquering the Italians, Sicilians, Spaniards,and Gauls, but also and finally, after they defeated Carthage, in conceiving the ideaof universal dominion’’ (3.2.6–7). Rome’s politeia, then, is the crucial factor in thisimperial development. After recounting the debacle at Cannae, Polybios reiterates hisintention to offer an account of the Roman politeia, not only because this account willbe crucial to one of the main purposes of his history – to explain Rome’s rise to worldpower – but also because it will be of great use to statesmen in forming and reformingtheir own political constitutions (3.118.11–12). The implicit assumption here is thatsuccessful politeiai will need to be capable militarily in relation to other states. Polybios’famous discussion of the morally didactic benefits for noble youths of viewing theRoman aristocratic funeral – which serves to inspire longings for martial achievementand glory – forms part of his analysis of the Roman politeia (6.53.1–54.4). Finally, theclose link between political constitutions and military performance in the internationalsphere is built into the analysis of the Roman state in Book VI: this book contains alengthy and detailed account of the Roman military system and the Roman militaryencampment (6.19–42).

In order to understand Polybios’ insistence on the linkage between political andsocial institutions and a state’s military capacity, it is necessary to reflect on the actualconditions of the world he inhabited. Interstate relations in this world were harsh; there

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were no effective international peacekeeping agencies; attempts at arbitration were usuallyineffectual; war and violence were constantly on the diplomatic horizon; and physicalannihilation at the hands of stronger powers was an ever-present concern. Polybios,like Thucydides before him, reflects these harsh realities in his grim outlook on theinternational community; and the bleak perspective of these two ancient historians hasmade them important sources for the so-called Realist international-relations theorists,who see the default condition of interstate relations as one of individual states’ strugglesfor security and survival within a climate of international anarchy.4

In Polybios’ mental universe, the fierce and brutal realities of interstate relations stemfrom his ideas on human nature in its primordial state. His conception of the humancondition is equally grim: human beings form political and social communities in the firstplace due to their inherent weakness (6.5.7), and the entire point in devising the politeiais to counter humankind’s innately brutish nature (5.75.2–3; 15.21.5). In rare cases isthis achieved to a completely satisfying degree; whenever this does occur, it typicallydoes not last for long. The examples of Chios, whose poor governmental structures andmisconduct of affairs led to self-inflicted catastrophe (15.21.3–4), and Boiotia, wherecivil disturbances resulted from institutional decay (20.7.3–4), are sadly much morecommonplace. The politeia’s degeneration quickly leads to powerlessness in the face ofhostile states and perhaps to utter annihilation (cf. 4.81.12–14, on Sparta). On the otherhand, when a state is well-ordered with an eye to fortitude and temperance, it cannoteasily be overcome by its rivals (6.48.4).

Nowhere does the brutal competition for survival in the interstate arena and thedetermining factor for survival of the condition of the politeia in Polybios’ thoughtemerge more clearly than in his account of the Second Punic War. In Book VI, twopassages – one on the primary cause of the fall of strong states; the other on the specificcause of Rome’s triumph over Hannibal – indicate both the close linkage between astate’s internal constitutional structures and its imperial success, as well as the moral andethical dimensions of both. In the first passage, the historian describes how successfulimperial states decline due to internal causes:

I hardly need argue that all things are subject to ruin and change, since natural necessityis proof enough. There are two ways in which every kind of politeia is ruined, the externaland the internal. The external has an indeterminate principle, but the internal an orderedone. I have already said what kind of state naturally comes first, and what second, and howthey change into each other, so that readers capable of connecting the beginnings of thisargument to its conclusion can themselves predict the future, which I think is plain. When apoliteia has warded off many great dangers to achieve supremacy and uncontested power, itslong familiarity with wealth will clearly make its way of life more luxurious, and its men moreambitious for office and other objects than they should be. As these tendencies progress, thedesire for office and the shame of obscurity, along with ostentation and luxury, will initiatea change for the worse. The common people will get the credit for this change, when theybelieve they are being wronged by some men seeking gain, and are puffed up with flattery byothers seeking office. Then, excited to anger, and deciding everything in passion, they willno longer be willing to obey or to have equality with their leaders, but will want everythingfor themselves. And when that happens, the constitution will adopt the fairest of all names,liberty and democracy, but the worst of all realities, mob rule. (6.57.1–9)

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In the second passage, Polybios explains the basic reason for the Roman defeat ofCarthage in the Second Punic War:

But at the time it was entering on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian state had declined,while that of Rome had improved. For everybody, or politeia, or action undergoes a naturalsuccession of growth, peak, and decay, and all its elements are strongest at its peak. It wasin this respect, and at this time, that the two politeiai began to differ from each other. In asmuch as the Carthaginians’ strength preceded that of the Romans, by so much was Carthagepast its prime when Rome’s politeia was at its peak. At that point the people already hadthe greatest power in the counsels of Carthage, but at Rome the Senate was at the heightof its power. With the masses deliberating in the former, and the best men in the latter, thepublic policy of the Romans proved superior, enabling them, though utterly defeated [atCannae], ultimately to prevail in their war with Carthage. (6.51.3–8)

These two passages provide a key to understanding how in Polybios’ conception there isa strong moral element in the connection between a state’s internal political structuresand its chances of success in its harsh international environment. In this connectionPolybios compares the ‘‘mixed constitutions’’ of Lykourgan Sparta and the Romanrepublic. He notes that the politeia devised by the (probably mythical) Spartan lawgiverLykourgos curtailed the lust for wealth among Sparta’s citizens, resulting in an enviablecommunal harmony, a spirit of civic union, and excellent conduct of internal affairs(2.46.7–9; cf. 4.81.12). But Lykourgos did not adequately address foreign relations andimperial ventures in his constitutional arrangements. As a result, the Spartans provedto be domineering and aggressive in their relations with the rest of the Greeks, andwhen they aimed at supremacy in Greece, they soon came close to losing their ownindependence. In terms of empire-building, Sparta’s failure was due to a moral defectin the historian’s mind (cf. 4.81.12). In this sense Sparta was decidedly inferior to theRoman republic (6.48.6–49.6).

Polybios’ history, then, is not simply an account of how the organization of Rome’spoliteia allowed it to conceive a design for universal dominion and then to execute it(cf. 6.2.9); it goes further, to provide an assessment in moral terms of Rome’s imperialsuccesses. Polybios states as much in no uncertain terms in his explanation of his changeof plan to extend the history from the climactic battle at Pydna, where Rome conqueredthe Macedonian monarchy and established undisputed hegemony over the Greeks,down to the catastrophic year 146 BCE, when the republic destroyed Carthage and thevenerable Greek city of Korinth:

There I would have had to stop, following my original plan by concluding my history withthese last-mentioned events – if it were possible to blame and praise men and governmentsaccurately on the basis of their successes and failure. At this point the 53 years were comingto an end, and the growth and progress of Roman power were complete. Besides, it seemedeveryone had been forced to obey Rome and to do its bidding. But judgments based onthe victors and the vanquished based merely on the contests between them are not final.What seemed the greatest successes have brought the greatest disasters on many who havemisused them, while the most shocking calamities have often turned out to be advantageousto those who have borne them bravely. Therefore, in addition to the foregoing facts, I mustspeak of the conqueror’s subsequent policy, and how they governed the world, as well as ofthe views and judgments of others about their rulers. I must also describe the desires and

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ambitions, both private and political, predominating in each of them. From all of this thepresent generation will learn whether they should shun or seek to be governed by Rome,and future generations whether to praise and admire or decry its rule. The usefulness of myhistory, both for the present and for the future, will mainly lie in this. (3.4.1–9)

The final section suggests that we can fully understand Polybios’ political and moraldidacticism in discussing politeiai, so forcefully and explicitly evoked in this latterpassage, only by attending to international political realities and Polybios’ personalpolitical predicament at the time of the composition of his history.

Achaia and Rome: The Morality of Empireand the Predicament of Polybios

Basing our understanding upon internal clues in Polybios’ text, we can assume withsome degree of confidence that he composed a great deal of his history before theyear 146 BCE. In Book XV (30.10), the historian refers to Carthage as if it were stillin existence (the Romans destroyed it in 146). Moreover, there are several passages inBooks III–IV (3.21; 4.27; 4.30; 4.31–33; 4.73–74), which seem to be relevant topolitical conditions in Greece around 150 BCE. The problem of the exact ‘‘publicationdate’’ of the history (or various parts of it) is fraught with difficulties, including issues ofrevisions and notes on events which Polybios made at the time of their occurrence andlater incorporated into the history at the appropriate places. These technical problemsof dating the text, or parts of it, are not essential for the purposes of this chapter, buta rough chronological anchor is necessary. For this purpose it is safe to say in generalterms that the composition of the sixth book, containing Polybios’ political theory,as well as all the passages cited so far in this chapter, can be chronologically placedprior to or around the mid-point of the second century BCE (see Walbank 1957–1979:I.292–297) for detailed discussion of the problems of dating the time of compositionof the Histories).

Around the year 150 BCE political tensions between Rome and Polybios’ Achaianconfederation were rife, and had been intermittently for the better part of fifty years(one of the thorniest problems for the Achaian confederation in its relations with Romethroughout this time was the question of the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaianfederal state). Polybios records a debate on Achaian policy between two Achaian politicalleaders, Aristainos and Philopoimen, perhaps to be dated to the mid-180s (24.11.1–13;cf. Plut. Philop. 17.3; Paus. 8.51.4), and although it is highly unlikely that these pairedspeeches were actually delivered in this form, they undoubtedly reflect political debatesamong Achaian politicians in this period concerning correct relations with Rome.5

According to Polybios’ account, Aristainos took the position that the Achaians shouldobey all Roman commands, even when Roman directives were in violation of Achaianlaws. Philopoimen (as well as Polybios’ father, Lykortas), on the contrary, firmly believedthat the Achaians should be compliant with Roman wishes, but only when they were instrict accordance with Achaian laws and the terms of the Achaian alliance with Rome. Inthe end, the approach of Aristainos won out (cf. Liv. 38.32.7: Diophanes arguing againstLykortas before the senate on the Spartan question), and Philopoimen and his political

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legacy were later regarded with suspicion by Roman political leaders. The problemfor Polybios was that he was on the losing side of history, since he associated himselfwith Philopoimen’s political vision, having served as a pallbearer at the funeral of thegreat Achaian statesman (Plut. Philop. 21), and later having to engage in some specialpleading with Roman authorities in order to have Philopoimen’s statues and formerhonors posthumously restored throughout Greece (39.3.3–11).

Polybios’ association with the Philopoimen–Lykortas group, and his independentpolitical stance regarding Rome, ultimately led to his extradition from Greece in theaftermath of Rome’s victory over the Macedonian king Perseus at Pydna in 168 and hisincarceration at Rome. Already in 180 the Achaian politician Kallikrates had denouncedmembers of the Philopoimen–Lykortas group before the senate, arguing that theRomans should recognize their true friends in Greece, lifting up those who supportedall Roman directives and casting down those Greek statesmen who in any way opposedthem, or even took a neutral position (24.9.1–10.5; cf. Liv. 41.23.6–18, Kallikrates’(174 BCE) speech against Perseus, urging total allegiance to Rome). In Polybios’ view,Kallikrates had taken Aristainos’ (and Diophanes’) conciliatory policy concerning theRomans to its logical but disgraceful conclusion, and he had ushered in evils for theGreeks in the future (24.10.8–9). Moreover, Polybios himself had to pay the price ofpolitical exile and the curtailment of his career in Achaian politics for his balanced andunpartisan political position vis-a-vis Rome (cf. 28.6.1–9). His retrospective assessmentof Aristainos, in which he supports his Roman policy and denies that Aristainos couldrightly be considered a traitor (18.13–15), is indicative of the careful game Polybios hadto play between Achaian and Roman political circles.

The stakes of that game were high, indeed. During the years of Polybios’ exile,several Achaian embassies arrived at Rome – in 164, 159, 155 (two embassies) and153 – requesting the release of the Achaian hostages, but to no avail (30.32.1–12;32.3.14–17; 33.1.3–8; 33.3.1–2; 33.14.1). It was under these trying circumstancesthat Polybios, as political prisoner, likely conceived and composed much of his greathistorical work on the rise of Rome to Mediterranean hegemony. It is no surprise,considering the political exigencies under which he wrote, that the historian strove toshow the similarities between the Achaian confederation, at the time when his ownpolitical group was in power, and the Roman politeia, at its prime. He goes to greatlengths to sustain a narrative structure that tracks the histories of the Roman and Achaianpoliteiai in parallel fashion. This structure represents both polities at their acme aroundthe close of the third century and the early decades of the second, but both statesprogressively deteriorate as Polybios’ narrative approaches the time of composition, themid-point of the second century, when Polybios’ political opposition within the Achaianconfederation had gained the upper hand. (See Champion 2004a: 137–169 for thisnarrative trajectory; Derow 1970 for Kallikrates’ embassy to Rome.)

Polybios devoted the first two introductory books (called the prokataskeue) to abrief recounting of Rome’s earlier history, when its political structures and moraldimensions were in the ascendant. He inserted a brief history into Book II (37–71),the so-called Achaian prokataskeue, which parallels the Roman prokataskeue, providingthe reader with a sketch of Achaia’s rise and pinnacle. He secures the close linkagebetween Achaia and Rome in his narrative by arguing that many of Achaia’s greatestsuccesses came in collaboration with the Romans, when both states were at their moral

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peaks (2.42.4–5) – and when Achaian affairs were under the direction of Polybios’ ownpolitical fraternity.6

Our author’s personal political predicament provides an important and under-appreciated key to understanding his emphasis on the moral dimensions of politeiai,and in particular his descriptions of the typical form of moral decadence which attendsthe dissolution of states. As we have seen in the previous section, successful imperialstates frequently fall, according to Polybios, because the spoiled popular element gainscontrol, and demagogues pander to it, recklessly leading the commonwealth to its ownruin (6.51.3–8; 6.57.1–9; cf. 13.1.1–1a.1 (the Aitolians Dorimachos and Skopas),15.21.3–8). Throughout his historical narrative, Polybios again and again advertises hisaversion to demagogic policies and any sort of radical socioeconomic measures. In aspeech he gives to Scipio Africanus in addressing mutinous troops in Spain, we have anextremely dim view of the capabilities of the common people7

I will plead your cause before Rome and before myself, offering a justification for youractions which all men will accept: that every crowd is easily misled in any direction. Crowdsare like the sea, which, for those who ply it, is harmless and immobile in its own nature,but seems to take on the violence of the winds that fall upon it and stir it up. In the sameway, those who deal with a multitude find that it takes on the character of its leaders andadvisors, both in appearance and reality. (11.29.8–12)

As another example, Polybios relays a speech which Timaios had given to the SicilianGreek statesman Hermokrates, with apparent approval of the sentiment containedtherein: that it is wise not to hold important political deliberations before the multitude(12.25k; for other examples and discussion see Champion 2004b: 199–203).

In passages such as these, Polybios advertised his own conservative, aristocratic politicalvalues, posing as the staunchest enemy of demagogic politics and schemes for radicalsocioeconomic measures. He ingeniously invoked the Romans’ respect for traditional,conservative values (typically expressed as a reverence for mos maiorum, ‘‘the ways ofthe ancestors’’), by linking the politeiai of Rome and Achaia in this sustained narrativetrajectory, according to which both states had reached their pinnacles in an earlier period.The subsequent decline that continued up until Polybios’ present, in his representation,was a descent into populist politics, demagoguery, and mob rule. In the case of Rome,for example, Polybios asserted that Gaius Flaminius’ popular land redistribution schemein Picenum signaled the beginning of Roman deterioration (2.21.8). In the case of theAchaian confederation, the historian represents his political enemies Diaios and Kritolaosas demagogic madmen who brought on Achaia’s ruin by Roman arms in the debacle of146 BCE, resulting in the dissolution of the confederation and the destruction of Korinth(38.12.7–13.1, 15.1–16.12, 17.1–18.12).

In several passages in Livy, probably derived from Polybios, we read that everywherein Greece the aristocratic element preferred Rome, whereas the masses were stronglyanti-Roman.8 The historicity of this reconstruction has been questioned, but it is clearthat Greek politicians thought that charging their political opposition with populistpolicies and demagogic tactics would be effective with Roman authorities in helpingthem overpower their political enemies, and that they regularly did so. For instance, in185 BCE agents of the Maroneians went to the Roman commissioners at Tempe andalleged that each best man (optimus quisque), who respected liberty and the law, had

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been driven into exile (Liv. 39.27.9–10).9 In the following year, the Achaian statesmanLykortas stated to the Roman commissioner Appius Claudius at a meeting at Kleitor inArkadia that the Lakedaimonian rebels from Achaia had incited the multitude to arms andhad slain the leading men (Liv. 39.36.13–14; cf. Polyb. 7.10.1). Inscriptional evidencefrom Achaian Dyme, one of the founding members of the Achaian confederation,strikingly demonstrates this sort of charge in an internal factional dispute before aRoman proconsul in the aftermath of the debacle of 146 BCE.10 And there is compelling(and under-appreciated) evidence that Polybios, a gifted political orator in his ownright before Achaian political assemblies, had himself been accused of rabble-rousing,demagogic behavior (Champion 2004b: 203–10).

A full appreciation of Polybios’ political theory, his notions on politeiai, and especiallyhis vehement and sustained excoriation of populist political measures and socio-economicreforms must take account of these historical and political contexts. Throughout hishistory, Polybios adopts the stance of the sage and judicious adviser, the experiencedpolitician and military leader, and above all the voice of reason against irrational,chaotic forces. He values courage, honor, moderation, and good faith, values whichwere of course intrinsic to the Roman aristocratic ethos. According to the historian,aristocratic virtue, whether Greek or Roman, must continually guard against threats tothe social order: barbarians, mercenaries, youthful impetuosity, women, and the masses(see discussion in Eckstein 1995: 118–160). Polybios thus aligned himself in his historywith core Roman aristocratic values, and in his sustained opposition to politeiai inwhich the masses had come to possess undue power, he provided a defense againstallegations he had likely faced before the Roman authorities. For him, as we have seen,imperial success in the interstate arena brings great dangers, with the greatest beingthe corruption of the common people through wealth and power, an imbalance in theproper order of things as the masses assume unwarranted powers in the state, and therise of demagogues who pander to the people’s irrational impulses. As we have alsoseen, this is precisely what had happened in Carthage at the time of the Hannibalic War.In Book X, Polybios issues a warning to the Romans by pointing to the example ofCarthage, whose arrogance and unbounded, aggressive, impulsive tendencies led to itsdownfall in Spain.

This has happened to many conquerors. It is a great thing, as I have often said, to succeedin one’s endeavors and to overcome one’s enemies, but it requires much greater skill andcaution to use such successes well. One can find many more who have won victories thanthose who have made good use of them. This was now the case with the Carthaginians,who after conquering the Roman armies and slaying both the generals, Publius and GnaeusScipio, believed that Spain was their undisputed possession, and began treating the nativeswith arrogance. As a result, they had enemies for subjects instead of allies and friends, justas might have been expected, since they won and kept their power by different means,failing to understand that dominance is best preserved by those who most strictly observethe principles by which they originally gained it. But it is very clear, and has been observedin many cases, that while men obtain advantages by treating others well and holding outhope of benefits to them, they begin to treat them badly and to rule them despotically assoon as they have what they wanted. Therefore it is natural that the conduct of the subjectsshould change with the changes in their rulers, which is what now happened under theCarthaginians. (6.36.1–7)

Polybios on Government, Interstate Relations, and Imperial Expansion 129

This sort of admonition is frequent throughout the Histories. In some cases it is explicitlyand directly addressed to the Romans, as when Polybios remarks on the laxity of thefinancial probity of present-day Romans in relation to their counterparts of a bygoneday (18.35.1–2), or when he comments on the ill will engendered in subjected peoplesby the Roman practice of removing precious art objects from their original homes(9.10.1–13; cf. 39.2–3). As he states in giving his reason for extending his history downto 146 BCE, readers will thereby be able to evaluate the Roman empire in moral termsfor the period after the Romans had achieved universal dominion (3.4.1–9). Polybiosprovided salutary warnings about the danger signs the Romans should watch out forin their signal success and prosperity in his typology of politeiai (cf. 6.9.10–12) – thepernicious growth of the popular element – thus echoing Roman aristocratic politicalconservatism and representing his own political views as being in line with those values.He prescribed a return to ancestral practices and old-time virtues, and again representedhimself as their exemplar.

Conclusion

Polybios’ conception of the politeia was elastic and wide-ranging; it could easily encom-pass the Roman state, which he viewed as a ‘‘mixed constitution’’ best suited to stavingoff the Roman political community’s decline for as long as possible. It is clear that inhis conception the politeia must not only be well organized to ensure the collectiveharmony of the citizenry, but it must also be equipped to prevail against rival statesin the zero-sum game of the competitive interstate system. It is here that the Polybianpoliteia has a strong moral dimension. Imperial success and collective prosperity area testing ground for the structure and health of the politeia, as the temptations toabuse power are at their greatest from such a position of supremacy, and it is herethat the popular element in the state becomes menacing. Polybios constantly returnsto this theme – the depravity of the multitude, the madness of radical socioeconomicmeasures, the devastating effects of demagogic political tactics – and thus establishes hisown conservative political credentials before a Roman aristocratic readership. It is inthis sense that Polybios’ political theory was also political apology, countering an imagewith which his political enemies within the Achaian confederation had most certainlybranded him. The pen indeed is a mighty sword, and Polybios’ political representationsin the Histories may have had much to do with his dramatic reversal of personal fortune(cf. 39.5.1–6), from suspected political prisoner at Rome to trusted commissioner in thepolitical reorganization of the Greek states in the aftermath of the debacle of 146 BCE.11

NOTES

1 See especially Federalist nos. 16, 18, 34, 38, 40 (‘‘this mixed constitution’’), 44, 51, 63,70. For the mixed constitution in Polybios’ thought and its legacy, see Fritz (1954); Nippel(1980); Hahm (1995); Lintott (1999); Hahm (2009); for Polybios and the ‘‘FoundingFathers,’’ Chinard (1940); cf. Richard (1994: 123–168); and Momigliano (1987: 77) forthe remark on Polybios as an honorary founder of the US constitution; cf. also Lintott (1999:251–55); Champion (2004a: 18–23). See most recently McGing (2010: 203–222) andliterature cited there for Polybios’ abiding influence in Western political thought.

130 Craige B. Champion

2 For Athenocentric distortions of the ancient Greek political experience, see Brock andHodkinson (2000); cf. Gawantka (1985); for the Hellenistic Greek federal state, or koinon,see Larsen (1955b, 1968); Beck (1997).

3 On the crucial role of politeiai in human behavior in Polybios’ thought, see Pedech (1964:38, nn. 73–74, 303–330).

4 The foundational text for the Realist approach to international relations theory is Waltz(1979); for its application to the ancient Mediterranean world, see Eckstein (2006, 2008).

5 For the likely date of the Aristainos–Philopoimen debate, see Petzold (1969: 43–46);Walbank (1979: 264–265); for Polybios’ assessment of Aristainos and the political issuesinvolved, see Eckstein (1987).

6 For the Achaian prokataskeue in Polybios’ history, see Gelzer (1964: 111–122, 123–154);cf. Champion (2004a: 122–137); Beck (2012), on the Roman prokataskeue.

7 Cf. 6.56.6–13; 16.12.9 (approval of fictions to deceive the multitude and preserve its pietytowards the gods); 21.31.7–15.

8 Liv. 35.34.3–4; 42.30.1–2, 4–5; 42.44.4–5; 45.15.8–10 (Rhodian speech before theRoman senate). For Livy’s sources, Nissen (1863) is still of fundamental importance; seealso Trankle (1977); Luce (1977: 139–184, esp. 178–180). For an argument against thehistoricity of a class-based division concerning Roman power in Greece in the context of theThird Macedonian War, see Gruen (1976).

9 Cf. Liv. 34.51.6; 35.34.3 for Flamininus’ conservative, pro-Roman constitutions in Greece,with Ste. Croix (1981: 300–326, 518–537).

10 Syll.3 684, conveniently translated in Bagnall and Derow (2004: 93–94), with Champion(2007).

11 Translations of Polybios are by Jay Kardan (with some slight modifications) for a newEnglish-language edition of the Histories, ed. Champion and Eckstein (forthcoming). Thehistorical commentaries of Walbank (3 vols, dated 1957, 1967, 1979) are indispensable tothe study of Polybios. Walbank (1972) provides the best general introduction to the manand his work; Derow (1982), Champion (1997), and Marincola (2001: 113–49) furnishbriefer accounts; and McGing (2010) now offers an excellent, up-to-date general survey ofPolybios’ Histories. Walbank (1985, 2002) collects together some of that scholar’s mostimportant papers on Polybios and the Hellenistic world. Pedech (1964) is of fundamentalimportance for the study of Polybios’ historical method. Gruen (1984) offers a masterlystudy of the political and diplomatic dimensions of Roman power in the Greek world inthe second century BCE. Eckstein (1995) and Champion (2004a) study the moral outlook,ethical positions, and cultural politics of Polybios’ history. Ferrary (1988) and Gruen (1990,1992) treat larger issues of the political and cultural interactions between Greece and Romeduring Polybios’ lifetime.