A Companion toEpistemology

Second Edition

edited by

JONATHAN DANCY,ERNEST SOSA,

and

MATTHIAS STEUP

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

A Companion to Epistemology

Already published in the series:

1. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second EditionEdited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric Tsui-James

2. A Companion to EthicsEdited by Peter Singer

3. A Companion to Aesthetics, Second EditionEdited by Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper

4. A Companion to Epistemology, Second EditionEdited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup

5. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy(two-volume set), Second EditionEdited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit

6. A Companion to Philosophy of MindEdited by Samuel Guttenplan

7. A Companion to Metaphysics, Second EditionEdited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and Gary S.Rosenkrantz

8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and LegalTheoryEdited by Dennis Patterson

9. A Companion to Philosophy of ReligionEdited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro

10. A Companion to the Philosophy of LanguageEdited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

11. A Companion to World PhilosophiesEdited by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe

12. A Companion to Continental PhilosophyEdited by Simon Critchley and William Schroeder

13. A Companion to Feminist PhilosophyEdited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young

14. A Companion to Cognitive ScienceEdited by William Bechtel and George Graham

15. A Companion to Bioethics, Second EditionEdited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer

16. A Companion to the PhilosophersEdited by Robert L. Arrington

17. A Companion to Business EthicsEdited by Robert E. Frederick

18. A Companion to the Philosophy of ScienceEdited by W. H. Newton-Smith

19. A Companion to Environmental PhilosophyEdited by Dale Jamieson

20. A Companion to Analytic PhilosophyEdited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa

21. A Companion to GenethicsEdited by Justine Burley and John Harris

22. A Companion to Philosophical LogicEdited by Dale Jacquette

23. A Companion to Early Modern PhilosophyEdited by Steven Nadler

24. A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle AgesEdited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone

25. A Companion to African-American PhilosophyEdited by Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman

26. A Companion to Applied EthicsEdited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman

27. A Companion to the Philosophy of EducationEdited by Randall Curren

28. A Companion to African PhilosophyEdited by Kwasi Wiredu

29. A Companion to HeideggerEdited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall

30. A Companion to RationalismEdited by Alan Nelson

31. A Companion to Ancient PhilosophyEdited by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin

32. A Companion to PragmatismEdited by John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis

33. A Companion to NietzscheEdited by Keith Ansell Pearson

34. A Companion to SocratesEdited by Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar

35. A Companion to Phenomenology andExistentialismEdited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall

36. A Companion to KantEdited by Graham Bird

37. A Companion to PlatoEdited by Hugh H. Benson

38. A Companion to DescartesEdited by Janet Broughton and John Carriero

39. A Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyEdited by Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski

40. A Companion to HumeEdited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

41. A Companion to the Philosophy of History andHistoriographyEdited by Aviezer Tucker

42. A Companion to AristotleEdited by Georgios Anagnostopoulos

43. A Companion to the Philosophy of TechnologyEdited by Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, andVincent F. Hendricks

44. A Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureEdited by Garry L. Hagberg and Walter Jost

45. A Companion to Latin American PhilosophyEdited by Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and Otávio Bueno

Also under contract:

A Companion to SchopenhauerEdited by Bart Vandenabeele

A Companion to RelativismEdited by Steven D. Hales

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as awhole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the keyfigures, terms, topics and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for courseuse, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike.

A Companion toEpistemology

Second Edition

edited by

JONATHAN DANCY,ERNEST SOSA,

and

MATTHIAS STEUP

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This second edition first published 2010© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd except for editorial material and organization © Jonathan Dancy, ErnestSosa, and Matthias Steup

Edition history: Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 1992)

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell’s publishing programhas been merged with Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered OfficeJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

Editorial Offices350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UKThe Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book, please see our website atwww.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The right of Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup to be identified as the authors of the editorialmaterial in this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may notbe available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brandnames and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registeredtrademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information inregard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged inrendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to epistemology / edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup. – 2nd ed.p. cm. – (Blackwell companions to philosophy)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-4051-3900-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Dancy, Jonathan.

II. Sosa, Ernest. III. Steup, Matthias. BD161.C637 2009121–dc22

2009020185A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 9.5/11pt Photina by Graphicraft Limited, Hong KongPrinted in Singapore

1 2010

v

Contents

List of Contributors xiiiPreface to the First Edition xixPreface to the Second Edition xxiii

Part I Ten Review Essays 1Skepticism and Closure Anthony Brueckner 3Contextualism Richard Feldman 12Foundations and Coherence Michael Huemer 22Recent Work on the Internalism–Externalism Controversy Laurence BonJour 33A Priori Knowledge Albert Casullo 43The Common Sense Tradition Noah Lemos 53The Power of Perception Peter Markie 62Virtue Epistemology John Greco 75Social Epistemology Alvin Goldman 82Bayesian Epistemology Alan Hájek and Stephan Hartmann 93

Part II Twenty Epistemological Self-profiles 107Robert Audi 109Laurence BonJour 114Stewart Cohen 118Earl Conee and Richard Feldman 123Fred Dretske 130Richard Foley 134Richard Fumerton 139Alvin I. Goldman 144Gilbert Harman 152Peter Klein 156Hilary Kornblith 163Keith Lehrer 168Alvin Plantinga 173John Pollock 178Ernest Sosa 185Barry Stroud 190Michael Williams 194Timothy Williamson 199Crispin Wright 204Linda Zagzebski 210

contents

vi

Part III Epistemology from A to Z 217(Entries without author list cross references)

A 219a priori/a posteriori Albert Casullo 219abduction Christopher Hookway 221absurdity Robert S. Tragesser 221Academy (Plato) Nicholas P. White 221act/object analysis Michael Pendlebury 222adverbial theory Michael Pendlebury 222agnosticism Alvin Plantinga 223Alston, William P. (1921–2009) Robert Audi 223analyticity Jerrold J. Katz 224anamnesis Nicholas P. White 230antinomy Robert S. Tragesser 230apodeictic Robert S. Tragesser 231aporia Robert S. Tragesser 231apperception David McNaughton 231Aquinas, Thomas (1225–74) Scott MacDonald 231argument Albert Casullo 235argument from analogy Jonathan Dancy 235argument from illusion Richard Fumerton 236Aristotle (384–322 BC) Terence Irwin 240Armstrong, David M. (1926– ) Adrian Heathcote 244association Barry Stroud 245ataraxia Charlotte Stough 245Augustine, St (354–430) Scott MacDonald 245Austin, John L(angshaw) (1911–60) Graham Bird 247avowals David Pears 249axiomatization, axiomatics Robert S. Tragesser 249Ayer, A(lfred) J(ules) (1910–89) Graeme Forbes 250

B 253Bacon, Francis, Lord Verulam (1561–1626) G. A. J. Rogers 253basic belief Matthias Steup 253behaviourism Edward Erwin 254belief John Heil 254belief in and belief that John Heil 259Bergmann, Gustav (1906–87) Laird Addis 260Berkeley, George (1685–1753) Michael Ayers 261Blanshard, Brand (1892–1987) Michael Williams 264Brentano, Franz (1838–1917) R. M. Chisholm 265burden of proof Douglas N. Walton 266

C 267Carnap, Rudolf (1891–1970) Wesley C. Salmon 267Cartesianism John Cottingham 268causal theories in epistemology Carl Ginet 268certainty Peter D. Klein 272Chisholm, Roderick (1916–99) Richard Foley 275

contents

vii

circular reasoning Douglas N. Walton 277cogito John Cottingham 277coherentism Keith Lehrer 278collective belief Margaret Gilbert 281commonsensism and critical cognitivism Noah H. Lemos 282concepts Christopher Peacocke 285Continental epistemology Linda Alcoff 287convention Robert S. Tragesser 292conversational implicature Duncan Pritchard 293criteria and knowledge Bruce Hunter 294criterion, canon Bruce Hunter 298critical cognitivism 299

D 300Davidson, Donald (1930–2003) Ernest Lepore 300death of epistemology Michael Williams 301defeasibility Bruce Hunter 304definition Robert S. Tragesser 305Derrida, Jacques (1930–2004) Samuel C. Wheeler III 306Descartes, René (1596–1650) John Cottingham 306Dewey, John (1859–1952) Peter H. Hare 310dialectic (Hegel) Kenneth R. Westphal 312dialectic (Plato) Nicholas P. White 313different constructions in terms of “knows” Jaakko Hintikka 313direct realism L. S. Carrier 318disposition John Heil 322dogmatism Alvin Plantinga 322doxastic voluntarism Sharon Ryan 322Dutch book argument 325

E 326empiricism Bruce Hunter 326Epicurus (c.341–271 BC) Phillip Mitsis 331epistemic deontologism Sharon Ryan 332epistemic luck Mylan Engel 336epistemic supervenience John Turri 340epistemic virtue Guy Axtell 343epoche Dagfinn Follesdal 347essence (Husserl) Dagfinn Follesdal 347essence (Plato) Nicholas P. White 348essentialism 348ethics and epistemology Jonathan Dancy 348evidence Richard Feldman 349evolutionary argument against naturalism Omar Mirza 351evolutionary epistemology Edward Stein 354existence Christopher Hookway 356experience, theories of Michael Pendlebury 357explanation Wesley C. Salmon 361external world 364externalism/internalism Laurence BonJour 364

contents

viii

F 369fact/value Robert Audi 369fallibilism Adam Leite 370feminist epistemology Lorraine Code 375first philosophy Christopher Hookway 380Firth, Roderick (1917–87) John Troyer 380Foucault, Michel (1926–84) Linda Alcoff 381foundationalism William P. Alston 382Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925) David Bell 385Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939) Jim Hopkins 387

G 389Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900–2002) Linda Alcoff 389genetic epistemology Richard F. Kitchener 389genetic fallacy Douglas N. Walton 393geometry Wesley C. Salmon 393Gettier problem Paul K. Moser 395given, the Alan H. Goldman 397Goodman, Nelson (1906–98) Catherine Z. Elgin 400Grice, H. Paul (1913–88) Richard E. Grandy 402

H 404Habermas, Jürgen (1929– ) Hans-Johann Glock 404Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Kenneth R. Westphal 405Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976) Charles Guignon 408Hempel, Carl Gustav (1905–97) Jaegwon Kim 409Hempel’s paradox of the ravens Peter Achinstein 410hermeneutics Charles Guignon 412Hintikka, Jaakko (1929– ) Risto Hilpinen 413historical knowledge Jack W. Meiland 414historicism David Bakhurst 416Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) Tom Sorell 417holism Christopher Hookway 420Hume, David (1711–76) Barry Stroud 420Husserl, Edmund (1859–1938) Dagfinn Follesdal 423

I 425idea R. S. Woolhouse 425idealism Nicholas Rescher 425ideology David Bakhurst 429illusion 431immediacy, presence Alan H. Goldman 431in itself/for itself M. Okrent 432incorrigibility William P. Alston 433indeterminacy of reference Christopher Hookway 433indeterminacy of translation Christopher Hookway 434Indian epistemology J. N. Mohanty 434indubitability William P. Alston 438induction, problem of 438induction: enumerative and hypothetical Gilbert Harman 438infallibility William P. Alston 444

contents

ix

inference Robert S. Tragesser 444inference to the best explanation Richard Fumerton 445infinite regress argument John F. Post 447informal fallacies Douglas N. Walton 450innate ideas G. A. J. Rogers 454introspection Vrinda Dalmiya 456intuition and deduction Robert S. Tragesser 460intuition in epistemology Bruce Russell 464isostheneia Charlotte Stough 468

J 469James, William (1842–1910) Peter H. Hare 469judgement John Heil 470justification Matthias Steup 471

K 472Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) James van Cleeve 472KK-thesis Risto Hilpinen 476knower paradox 476knowledge 476knowledge and belief Steven Luper 476knowledge by acquaintance/by description David B. Martens 479knowledge how, who, why etc. 482knowledge-seeking by questioning Jaakko Hintikka 483

L 487Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646–1716) R. C. Sleigh, JR 487Lewis, Clarence Irving (1883–1964) John Troyer 489limits of human knowledge Nicholas Rescher 490linguistic understanding Christopher Peacocke 492literature and knowledge Paisley Livingston 497Locke, John (1632–1704) R. S. Woolhouse 500logical construction R. M. Sainsbury 503logical empiricism 504logical positivism Barry Stroud 504logicism David Bell 506lottery paradox Jonathan Vogel 506luck, epistemic 511

M 512Marxism David Bakhurst 512mathematical knowledge Mark Steiner 514memory Tom Senor 520Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1908–61) John J. Compton 524methodology Wesley C. Salmon 525Mill, John Stuart (1806–73) John Skorupski 525Molyneux’s problem Steve Smith 527Montaigne, Michel de (1533–92) Richard H. Popkin 528Moore, G(eorge) E(dward) (1873–1958) Thomas Baldwin 529Moore’s paradox Roy A. Sorensen 531moral epistemology Jonathan Dancy 532myth of the given 537

contents

x

N 538naïve realism 538natural science, epistemology of Wesley C. Salmon 538naturalism Philip Pettit 542naturalized epistemology Hilary Kornblith 543necessary/contingent David Blumenfeld 546necessity, modal knowledge Albert Casullo 547Neoplatonism S. Strange 548Neurath, Otto (1882–1945) Andy Hamilton 549Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900) Alexander Nehamas 551nihilism 552noumenal/phenomenal James van Cleve 552Nozick, Robert (1940–2002) Sherrilyn Roush 554Nyvya J. N. Mohanty 556

O 558objective/subjective Robert Audi 558objectivity David Bell 559Ockham, William of (c.1285–1347) Marilyn McCord Adams 562ontological commitment Christopher Hookway 563ontological relativity Christopher Hookway 564ostensive definition P. M. S. Hacker 564other minds Akeel Bilgrami 566

P 572paradox Jonathan Vogel 572paradox of the knower C. Anthony Anderson 572paradoxes of analysis Felicia Ackerman 574paranormal knowledge Patrick Grim 577Peirce, Charles S. (1839–1914) Christopher Hookway 580perceptual knowledge Fred Dretske 581perspectivism 586phenomenalism Richard Fumerton 586phenomenology Charles Guignon 590philosophical knowledge Felicia Ackerman 590Plato (c.429–347 BC) Nicholas White 593Popper, Karl (1902–94) Anthony O’Hear 597positivism 599pragmatism Susan Hack 599preface paradox Earl Conee 604presence 606presocratic epistemology J. H. Lesher 606prima facie reasons Jonathan Dancy 609primary and secondary qualities Barry Stroud 609principle of charity Ernest Lepore 613principle of contradiction Robert S. Tragesser 613principle of credulity William P. Alston 614principle of identity Robert A. Tragesser 615private language argument P. M. S. Hacker 616probability, theories of Brian Skyrms 622problem of the criterion Matthias Steup 626

contents

xi

problem of the external world George Pappas 628problem of induction 634problem of other minds 634problem of rule-following Philip Pettit 634problems of induction Laurence BonJour 638projection, projectibility Catherine Z. Elgin 643proof Robert S. Tragesser 643propositional knowledge Robert K. Shope 644protocol sentences Andy Hamilton 649psychologism David Bell 649psychology and epistemology Edward Erwin 649Putnam, Hilary (1926– ) Thomas Tymoczko 654Pyrrhonism Charlotte Stough 655

Q 657Quine, Willard Van Orman (1908–2000) Christopher Hookway 657

R 659rationalism Edwin Curley 659rationality L. Jonathan Cohen 663realism Philip Pettit 668reasons/causes Robert Audi 672Reichenbach, Hans (1891–1953) Wesley C. Salmon 673Reid, Thomas (1710–96) Keith Lehrer 674reification, hypostatization Christopher Hookway 676relativism Harvey Siegel 676relevant alternatives Stewart Cohen 678reliabilism Alvin Goldman 681religious belief, epistemology of Alvin Plantinga 692religious belief, epistemology of – recent developments Michael Bergmann 697representation Robert Cummins 699representative realism Frank Jackson 702Rescher, Nicholas (1928– ) Robert Almeder 705Rorty, Richard (1931–2007) Michael Williams 706rule-following 707Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872–1970) R. M. Sainsbury 707Ryle, Gilbert (1900–76) Graham Bird 709

Ssafety 712Santayana, George (1863–1952) John Lachs 712Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–80) Gregory McCulloch 713scepticism Peter D. Klein 714scepticism, contemporary Peter D. Klein 715scepticism, modern Richard Popkin 719Schlick, Moritz (1882–1936) Andy Hamilton 722scientia media 723self-consciousness Vrinda Dalmiya 723self-evidence Alan H. Goldman 723self-knowledge and self-identity Sydney Shoemaker 724self-presenting Alan H. Goldman 726

contents

xii

Sellars, Wilfrid (1912–89) Jay Rosenberg 727sensation/cognition Fred Dretske 729sense-data Alan H. Goldman 732sensitivity and safety Duncan Pritchard 732Sextus Empiricus Charlotte Stough 736simplicity Elliott Sober 738social sciences, epistemology of Fred D’Agostino 739sociology of knowledge David Bloor 744Socrates 747solipsism Clive Borst 747Spinoza, Benedict (also Baruch) (1632–77) Don Garrett 749Stoic epistemology J. V. Allen 750Strawson, Peter Frederick (1919–2006) P. F. Snowdon 753strong programme David Bloor 754Suárez, Francisco (1548–1617) Jorge J. E. Gracia 755subjectivism Richard Foley 756subjectivity Christopher Peacocke 758supervenience 760surprise examination paradox Roy A. Sorensen 760

T 763tabula rasa R. S. Woolhouse 763testimony Jennifer Lackey 763theory Wesley C. Salmon 768transcendental arguments A. C. Grayling 768tripartite definition of knowledge Paul K. Moser 771truth, theories of Paul Horwich 772truths of reason/truths of fact David Blumenfeld 777

U 779underdetermination of theory Christopher Hookway 779use/mention Matthias Steup 779

V 780verificationism Barry Stroud 780Vico, Giambattista (1668–1744) Leon Pompa 780Vienna Circle Andy Hamilton 782

W 783Whitehead, Alfred North (1861–1947) Donald W. Sherburne 783Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951) David Pears 783

Z 788zebras and cleverly disguised mules Mylan Engel 788

Index 793

xiii

Peter AchinsteinJohns Hopkins University

Felicia AckermanBrown University

Laird AddisUniversity of Iowa

Linda Martín-AlcoffHunter College

J. V. AllenUniversity of Pittsburgh

Robert F. AlmederGeorgia State University

William P. Alston†

C. Anthony AndersonUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Robert AudiUniversity of Notre Dame

Guy AxtellUniversity of Nevada Reno

Michael AyersUniversity of Oxford

David BakhurstQueen’s University at Kingston, Canada

Thomas BaldwinUniversity of York

David BellUniversity of Sheffield

Michael BergmannPurdue University

Akeel BilgramiColumbia University

Graham BirdUniversity of Manchester (Emeritus)

David BloorUniversity of Edinburgh

David Blumenfeld

Laurence BonJourUniversity of Washington

Clive Borst

Anthony BruecknerUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

L. S. CarrierUniversity of Miami

Albert CasulloUniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln

R. M. Chisholm†

Lorraine CodeYork University, Ontario

L. Jonathan Cohen†

Stewart CohenUniversity of Arizona, Tucson

John J. ComptonVanderbilt University

Earl ConeeUniversity of Rochester

Contributors

contributors

xiv

John CottinghamUniversity of Reading

Robert CumminsUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Edwin CurleyUniversity of Michigan

Fred D’AgostinoUniversity of Queensland

Vrinda DalmiyaUniversity of Hawai’i at Manoa

Jonathan DancyUniversity of Reading andUniversity of Texas, Austin

Fred DrestkeDuke University

Catherin Z. ElginHarvard University

Mylan EngelNorthern Illinois University

Edward ErwinUniversity of Miami

Richard FeldmanUniversity of Rochester

Richard FoleyNew York University

Dagfinn FøllesdalStanford University

Graeme ForbesUniversity of Colorado at Boulder

Richard FumertonUniversity of Iowa

Don GarrettNew York University

Margaret GilbertUniversity of Connecticut

Carl GinetCornell University

Hans-Johann GlockUniversität Zürich

Alan H. GoldmanCollege of William and Mary

Alvin I. GoldmanRutgers University

Jorge J. E. GraciaUniversity at Buffalo

Richard E. GrandyRice University

A. C. GraylingBirkbeck, University of London

John GrecoSt. Louis University

Patrick GrimState University of New York at Stony Brook

Charles GuignonUniversity of South Florida

Susan HaackUniversity of Miami

P. M. S. HackerSt John’s College, Oxford

Alan HájekAustralian National University

Andy HamiltonDurham University

Peter H. Hare†

Gilbert HarmanPrinceton University

Stephan HartmannTilburg University

Adrian HeathcoteUniversity of Sydney

John HeilWashington University

contributors

xv

Risto HilpinenUniversity of Miami

Jaakko HintikkaBoston University

Christopher HookwayUniversity of Sheffield

Jim HopkinsKing’s College London

Paul HorwichNew York University

Michael HuemerUniversity of Colorado at Boulder

Bruce HunterUniversity of Alberta

Terence IrwinKeble College, University of Oxford

Frank JacksonAustralian National University

Jerrold J. Katz†

Jaegwon KimBrown University

Richard F. KitchenerColorado State University

Peter D. KleinRutgers University

Hilary KornblithUniversity of Massachusetts

Jennifer LackeyNorthwestern University

John LachsVanderbilt University

Keith LehrerUniversity of Arizona (Emeritus)

Adam LeiteIndiana University

Noah M. LemosCollege of William & Mary

Ernest LePoreRutgers University

J. H. LesherUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Paisley LivingstonLingnan University

Steven LuperTrinity University

Scott MacDonaldCornell University

Peter MarkieUniversity of Missouri

David B. MartensUniversity of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Marilyn McCord AdamsUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Gregory McCulloch†

David McNaughtonFlorida State University

Jack W. Meiland†

Omar MirzaSt. Cloud State University

Phillip MitsisNew York University

J. N. MohantyTemple University

Paul K. MoserLoyola University Chicago

Alexander NehamasPrinceton University

Anthony O’HearUniversity of Buckingham

contributors

xvi

M. OkrentBates College

George PappasThe Ohio State University (Emeritus)

Christopher PeacockeColumbia University

David Pears†

Michael PendleburyNorth Carolina State University

Philip PettitPrinceton University

Alvin PlantingaUniversity of Notre Dame

John Pollock†

Leon Pompa

Richard H. Popkin†

John F. PostVanderbilt University

Duncan PritchardUniversity of Edinburg

Nicholas RescherUniversity of Pittsburgh

G. A. J. RogersKeele University

Jay Rosenberg†

Sherrilyn RoushUniversity of California, Berkeley

Bruce RussellWayne State University

Sharon RyanWest Virginia University

R. M. SainsburyUniversity of Texas at Austin

Wesley C. Salmon†

Tom SenorUniversity of Arkansas

Donald W. SherburneVanderbilt University (Emeritus)

Sydney ShoemakerCornell University

Robert K. ShopeUniversity of Massachusetts Boston

Harvey SiegelUniversity of Miami

John SkorupskiUniversity of St. Andrews

Brian SkyrmsUniversity of California

R. C. Sleigh, JrUniversity of Massachusetts (Emeritus)

Steve SmithYale University

P. F. SnowdonUniversity College London

Eliiott SoberUniversity of Wisconsin – Madison

Tom SorellUniversity of Birmingham

Roy A. SorensenWashington University in St. Louis

Ernest SosaRutgers University

Edward SteinBenjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Mark SteinerThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem

contributors

xvii

Matthias SteupPurdue University

Charlotte Stough†

S. Strange

Barry StroudUniversity of California

Robert S. Tragesser

John TroyerUniversity of Connecticut

John TurriHuron University College

Thomas Tymoczko†

James Van CleveUniversity of Southern California

Jonathan VogelAmherst College

Douglas N. WaltonUniversity of Windsor

Kenneth R. WestphalUniversity of Kent

Samuel C. Wheeler IIIUniversity of Connecticut

Nicholas P. WhiteUniversity of California (Emeritus)

Michael WilliamsJohns Hopkins University

Timothy WilliamsonUniversity of Oxford

R. S. WoolhouseUniversity of York (Emeritus)

Crispin WrightNew York University

Linda ZagzebskiUniversity of Oklahoma

xix

The present Companion, like the majority ofthe other volumes in the Blackwell Compan-ions to Philosophy series, is organized as astandard reference book, with alphabeticallyarranged articles of varying length (anythingfrom 250 to 3500 words) on leading theories,thinkers, ideas, distinctions and concepts inepistemology. It aims for a broad readership,while recognizing that the nature of contem-porary epistemology inevitably imposes restric-tions on this. In some other areas of philosophyit remains feasible to design a book which islargely accessible to the general reader; inepistemology, however, the main readershipis likely to be students from undergraduate levelupwards, as well as professional philosophers,and it is to them that the Companion is pri-marily addressed. A minority of topics resisttreatment other than at an advanced level: theyhave not for that reason been excluded, lestcoverage of the area become incomplete. Butthe vast majority are accessible to all levels ofthe intended readership.

Not all entries will be comprehensible ontheir own: at least, not to the inexperiencedreader. This is where the cross-referencingsystem comes in. I have used two interrelatedmethods of guiding readers from one entry to another. Within the text itself terms ornames occur in small capitals; this will oftenoccur where reference is made to descartes,or to realism, for example. This means thatthere is an entry on this person or topic, andthat it would be worthwhile having a look atit for present purposes. The mere fact thatthere is an entry on this person or topic, how-ever, is not sufficient for me to flag it. Not allreferences to Descartes or to realism aresignificant. What is more, a person or topicmay not be flagged in this way on its first

occurrence in an entry; I may wait for the bestmoment, as it were. And sometimes one andthe same person or topic is flagged more thanonce in the same entry, where there has beena long gap or I think it particularly appropri-ate for some other reason.

Most of the flagging that is done within thebody of the text is of this form; a word orphrase is highlighted in the sentence, as Ihighlighted descartes above. In doing this, I have not insisted slavishly that the wordhighlighted be exactly the same one as theheadword that the reader is effectively beingreferred to. For instance, I may direct thereader to an entry on realism by flagging theremark that Santayana was a realist. Some-times, however, I was unable to work thecross-reference into the text in this way. Onthese occasions it is inserted at the end of therelevant sentence or paragraph.

There are also cross-references to be foundat the end of most entries. These fulfil twofunctions. First, they enable me to point outareas to which the present entry is related, but which have not occurred significantly inthe text. Second, they enable me to insist a bit that you should consider again looking atan entry that has already been flagged in thetext. So if you see a person or topic flagged bothwithin and at the end of an entry, you can takeit that I think you really should have a lookat it.

The Blackwell series of Companions is conceived as related primarily to Anglo-American philosophy. The topics the editorschose to cover were selected with this inmind. But this does not mean that other traditions are completely ignored. There is anentry on Indian epistemology and, as well asa general entry on Continental epistemology,

Preface to the First Edition

jonathan dancy

preface to the first edition

xx

there are many entries on individual thinkersin that tradition. We do not pretend, however,to give that tradition as detailed coverage aswe give to the one which is our main focus.

It might be thought that the jacket illus-tration is symptomatic of our general ap-proach.1 Here we have the solitary thinkerworking in private. Isn’t he a wonderfulexample of the cartesian approach to epi-stemology which is so characteristic of theAnglo-American analytic tradition, and whichis so vehemently rejected on the Continent?There is some truth in this, which we willcome to in a moment. There are two points to be made against it. First, the attempt toescape from the clutches of the Cartesianparadigm is as common within the analytic tradition as it is outside. Second, our solitarythinker is not as solitary as all that. He isreading a book, which could be taken toshow that he is not relying entirely on his ownresources, as the Cartesian mind is supposedto do (see reid; testimony). Against this, onecould point out that the picture exemplifies aconception of knowledge as something to begained by rational enquiry and perceptionrather than in practical life and action. This“logocentrism” may be a more insidious feature of the Cartesian approach, and cer-tainly the emphasis on practice and action isdistinctive of Continental epistemology (seefor example heidegger), as is an emphasis onsocial considerations.

One difficulty the editors faced in decidingwhich topics to cover derived from the inter-connectedness of philosophical areas. Epi-stemology can be to some extent separatedfrom adjacent areas, but only with a justifiedsense of artificiality. The nearest areas aremetaphysics, philosophy of mind and philo-sophy of science. These gave us two problems,one theoretical and one practical. The prac-tical one was that in considering whether to include an entry on a topic, we had to askourselves whether there would be an entry onit in one of the other Companions, and if so howour entry should be related to that one. At thelimit, we have an entry on natural science, an area which will on its own occupy a largepart of one Companion. But there are manyother occasions where the shortness of our cov-

erage here is caused by our sense that themajor entry on this topic should not appear ina Companion to Epistemology. The theoreticalone was that there are many occasions whereviews in epistemology are dependent onviews in metaphysics or in the philosophy ofmind, and we could not hope to cover every-thing equally well. Contributors were asked toconcentrate on epistemology, and the entrieshave been written accordingly. When readingentries on individual thinkers, therefore, youshould bear in mind that these entries do not pretend to be complete accounts of theirsubject’s work in philosophy; they are con-centrating on the epistemology as far as thatis possible. The same applies to topics. The entryon natural science is concerned only with the epistemology of science, the entry on reli-gious belief limits itself to epistemologicalconsiderations, and so on. The limitation toepistemology is normally implicit rather thanexplicit; otherwise every entry would have tobe headed “X’s epistemology” or “the episte-mology of Y”.

This Companion has two editors, divided bythe Atlantic (and rejoined by electronic mail).Its general shape was conceived during avery pleasant weekend which I spent inProvidence, RI, in Spring 1989. Thereafter, I relied on Ernest Sosa for a constant streamof suggestions about who in the US we might approach as potential contributors – astream that was evidence of his enviableknowledge of the profession. UK contributorswere my responsibility. Beyond that, thedetailed editing of contributions has been my province, though I am very grateful tomy co-editor for help and advice on the occasional knotty points that arose. I am, ofcourse, equally grateful to our contributors forbeing willing to undertake what in manycases was a fairly thankless and far from easytask – and for the openness with which somany of them received my suggestions forchanges to suit my own idea of how thingsshould be. I have had many occasions toexpress my appreciation of the professionalismof the profession.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Sarah,who helped me with various aspects of the edit-ing process, and my son Hugh, who spent

preface to the first edition

xxi

note

1 This paragraph refers to the cover illustration fromthe first edition, Georg Friedrich Kersting’sLesender bei Lampenlicht.

two weeks last autumn turning entries intocomputer-readable form. For a while thisCompanion was a family affair.

Keele, February 1992

xxiii

The second edition of the Companion to Epi-stemology differs from the first edition inbeing divided into three parts. Part I consistsof ten new review essays that analyze anddiscuss recent developments in the mainareas of epistemology. Part II presents thereader with a novel approach to portraying a philosophical discipline: twenty epistemo-logical self-profiles. The purpose of these self-profiles is to let their authors give succinct,authoritative accounts of their views andchief arguments in support of them. Readingthrough all twenty of them will give studentsand practitioners of epistemology an excel-lent view of the range of theories and thehigh level of sophistication characteristic of thecurrent state of the art in the field. Decidingwhom to invite to contribute a self-profileobviously raised some difficult issues. Theeditors’ choices were guided by the thoughtthat authors of self-profiles should have pro-duced a stream of significant publicationsspanning the past two decades, publicationsaddressing the main issues of epistemologyand advancing the state of play in the dis-cipline. This approach slanted our choices in favor of seniority, excluding several morejunior epistemologists who, using differentcriteria, would have deserved inclusion.

The first edition of the Companion makes up most of Part III, Epistemology from A–Z. The following new or significantly revisedentries have been added to this part: a priori(Albert Casullo), Alston, William (RobertAudi), belief ( John Heil), defeasibility (BruceHunter), empiricism (Bruce Hunter), con-

versational implicature (Duncan Pritchard),doxastic voluntarism (Sharon Ryan), epi-stemic deontology (Sharon Ryan), epistemicluck (Mylan Engel), epistemic supervenience(John Turri), epistemic virtue (Guy Axtell),ethics and epistemology ( Jonathan Dancy),evolutionary argument (Omar Mirza), falli-bilism (Adam Leite), feminist epistemology(Lorraine Code), the given (Alan Goldman),intuition in epistemology (Bruce Russell), lottery paradox ( Jonathan Vogel), memory(Tom Senor), Robert Nozick (Sherilyn Roush),moral epistemology ( Jonathan Dancy), nat-uralized epistemology (Hilary Kornblith), relativism (Harvey Siegel), reliabilism (AlvinGoldman), religious belief – recent develop-ments (Michael Bergmann), sensitivity(Duncan Pritchard), testimony (JenniferLackey), zebras and cleverly disguised mules(Mylan Engel).

I wish to thank David Coss and Tanya Hall (at the time, philosophy majors at St. Cloud State University) for proofreadingthe scanned first edition files, Erin Kealey atPurdue for correcting the entire set of pageproofs for the second edition and preparing theindex, and Nick Bellorini and Liz Cremona atBlackwell for their editorial help and guidingthe second edition through the productionprocess. I also wish to thank my co-editors,Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, for theirexpert advice on planning and puttingtogether this volume.

Matthias SteupPurdue University

Preface to the Second Edition

Part I

Ten Review Essays

3

Skepticism and Closure

1. preliminary formulations ofclosure

I know the conjunction of some axioms (say, those of Peano Arithmetic), and I provea theorem T on their basis. My belief of T presumably amounts to knowledge. That is how knowledge is generated in the so-calleddeductive sciences. As a first shot, we mightformulate a generalized Closure Principle forknowledge as follows:

CL1: Necessarily, for all S,ϕ,ψ: if S knowsthat ϕ, and ϕ entails ψ, then S knowsthat ψ.

Call this principle closure of knowledge underentailment. The meaning of the word “clo-sure” here follows its mathematical usage,according to which a set α is closed under afunction F defined on its members just in caseF when applied to a member (or members) of α always yields a member of α as its value. So the set of even natural numbers is closed under addition, since the sum of evenaddends is always even. Similarly, CL1 saysthat, for any member ϕ of the set K of propo-sitions known by some S, each entailed con-sequence ψ of ϕ will also be a member of K.But CL1 is obviously false. There are infinitelymany entailed consequences of the conjunc-tion of the Peano axioms of which I amunaware. Since I do not believe these pro-positions, I lack knowledge of them.

Suppose that we try to solve the problem byrestricting CL1 to those entailed consequencesof a known proposition that are known to besuch:

CL2: Necessarily, for all S,ϕ,ψ: if S knowsthat ϕ, and S knows that ϕ entails ψ,then S knows that ψ.

Call this closure of knowledge under knownentailment. There are two problems with CL2.First, suppose that I know the conjunction ofthe Peano axioms and also know that thisconjunction entails T*. However, owing to asort of cognitive disconnect, I fail to put these

two pieces of knowledge together and thus failto deduce T*. Suppose, then, that I fail tobelieve T*. Then I shall fail to know T*.Second, suppose, again, that I fail to put mytwo pieces of knowledge together but never-theless believe T* because I think that theghost of Elvis has testified to the truth of T*.Then I again fail to know T*.

In order to deal with these problems, we shallrestrict CL2 to those entailed consequences of a known proposition that are (1) known tobe such, and (2) believed on the basis of anappropriate inference:

CL3: Necessarily, for all S,ϕ,ψ: if S knowsthat ϕ, and S knows that ϕ entails α,and S believes that ψ on the basis ofan inference from ϕ and (ϕ entails ψ),then S knows that ψ.1,2

2. the closure-based cartesianskeptical argument

CL3 can be used in the construction of aCartesian skeptical argument concerningknowledge of propositions about the externalworld. Let us choose a target proposition fromthe set of those propositions about the ex-ternal world which I take myself to know. Letus choose H = I have hands. Let SK be theproposition that I am a brain in a vat with expe-riences just like those I actually have, produced by a supercomputer’s stimulation of my brain. Let “K(S,ϕ)” stand for S knows that ϕ. Let“B(S,ψ,α,β)” stand for S believes that ψ on thebasis of an inference from α and β. Let “ab”stand for Anthony Brueckner. Here is the skep-tical argument:

(1) If K(ab,H), and K(ab,[H entails ~SK]),and B(ab,~SK,H,[H entails ~SK]), thenK(ab,~SK).

(2) {K(ab,[H entails ~SK]) and B(ab,~SK,H,[H entails ~SK])}.

(3) ~K(ab,~SK).So:(4) ~{K(ab,H), and K(ab,[H entails ~SK]),

and B(ab,~SK,H,[H entails ~SK])}.So:(5) ~K(ab,H).

skepticism and closure

4

Premise 1 is just an instance of CL3. Premise2 is in fact true of me: I know that the per-tinent entailment holds, and I believe that~SK on the basis of an inference from mybeliefs that H and that the entailment holds.What of premise 3? My sensory evidence forbelieving ~SK does not favor ~SK over SK,since I would have that same evidenceregardless of whether I am in a world inwhich ~SK is true (a normal world) or,instead, in a world in which SK is true (a vatworld). In other words, my sensory evidencefails to discriminate between ~SK and SK.Thus, it seems to follow that my evidencefails to justify me in believing that ~SK.Hence I do not know that ~SK, supposingthat justification is a necessary condition forknowledge. This reasoning in support ofpremise 3 can be seen as resting upon the following Underdetermination Principle:

(UP) If S’s evidence for ϕ does not favor ϕover an incompatible hypothesis ψ,then S is not justified in believing ϕand rejecting ψ.3

The antecedent of UP says, in effect, that S’sevidence underdetermines a choice between ϕand ψ. As for the rest of the argument, 4 follows from 1 and 3 by Modus Tollens, andthe conclusion 5 follows from 2 and 4 by pro-positional logic.

The foregoing argument would seem togeneralize to all putative knowers and to just about all putatively known propositionsabout the external world.4

3. denying closure: nozick

One way to block the skeptical argument is to deny CL3. If CL3 is not an exceptionless general principle about knowledge, then theskeptic cannot appeal to this principle as therationale underlying premise 1. In a famousdiscussion, Robert Nozick argues that, on hisTracking Analysis of Knowledge, CL3 fails.5 Let“ϕ �→ ψ” stand for the subjunctive condi-tional If ϕ were the case, then ψ would be the case.According to Nozick’s Tracking Analysis, Sknows that P if and only if:

(I) P is true.(II) S believes that P.(III) ~P �→ ~(S believes that P).(IV) P �→ S believes that P.

Let us assume that the truth-conditions for ϕ �→ ψ are these: the ϕ-worlds (possibleworlds in which ϕ is true) closest to (mostsimilar to) the actual world are ψ-worlds.According to Nozick’s analysis, S knows thatP just in case S tracks P’s truth-value throughthe following range of possible worlds: theclosest ~P-worlds, the actual world, and theclosest (non-actual) P-worlds. Condition IIIhas come to be known as Sensitivity. Itexplains failures to know in Gettier cases,cases of lucky guesses, and cases of wishfulthinking.6 Condition IV captures anotherdimension of the non-accidentality of knowledge. It explains failures to know inHarman’s assassination case7 and in cases inwhich a brain in a vat arrives at a rare truebelief that P owing to a passing whim of hisvat-keeper (who does not happen to give himthat true belief in close P-worlds).

Sensitivity reveals that the skeptic is rightabout one thing: his premise 3. In order toknow ~SK, S must satisfy this logical equiva-lent of the pertinent instance of condition

III: SK �→ ~(S believes that ~SK).

But S does not satisfy this condition, becausethe closest SK-worlds are worlds where S does believe that ~SK (just as he actuallybelieves). No one satisfies the condition inquestion for knowing ~SK, because everyonewho is in a vat world mistakenly believes thathe is not in a vat world.

I myself do not at present claim to knowwhether I am in a normal world or a vatworld, given that I am in the middle of an evaluation of the skeptical argument andClosure’s role in it.8 However, I think thatthere are some subjects in some possibleworlds who satisfy Nozick’s conditions forknowing H (our “hands” proposition), invirtue of inhabiting normal, non-vat worlds.Call one such subject Ace. H is true in Ace’snormal world; Ace correctly believes H; inthe ~H-worlds close to Ace’s world Ace