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A GRAMMAR OF MOOD AND CLAUSAL ADJUNCTION IN KOREAN
by
Yugyeong Park
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partialfulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics
Winter 2015
© 2015 Yugyeong ParkAll Rights Reserved
All rights reserved
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Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
UMI Number: 3685337
A GRAMMAR OF MOOD AND CLAUSAL ADJUNCTION IN KOREAN
by
Yugyeong Park
Approved:Benjamin Bruening, Ph.D.Chair of the Department of Linguistics and Cognitive Science
Approved:George H. Watson, Ph.D.Dean of the College of Arts and Science
Approved:James G. Richards, Ph.D.Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the aca-demic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for thedegree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Signed:Satoshi Tomioka, Ph.D.Professor in charge of dissertation
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the aca-demic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for thedegree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Signed:Benjamin Bruening, Ph.D.Member of dissertation committee
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the aca-demic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for thedegree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Signed:Frederick Adams, Ph.D.Member of dissertation committee
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the aca-demic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for thedegree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Signed:Muffy E. A. Siegel, Ph.D.Member of dissertation committee
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Satoshi Tomioka,
who encouraged my research and allowed me to grow as a linguist. I would like to thank
him for his abundantly helpful comments and invaluable suggestions and guidance. This
dissertation would not have been completed without his support. I would also like to thank
the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Benjamin Bruening, Dr. Fred Adams, and
Dr. Muffy Siegel for serving as my committee members despite their busy schedule. I want
to thank them for their critical comments, brilliant suggestions and helpful discussions. Their
invaluable critiques allowed me to enrich and strengthen my research.
I would also like to convey thanks to the following linguists, Dr. Chungmin Lee,
Dr. Seungho Nam, and Dr. Sun Ja Park for introducing the field of Semantics to me. Great
thanks also goes to my proofreaders, Jane Chandlee, Adam Jardin, Justin Rill, Tayler Miller,
and Luke Bates, for patiently proofreading my dissertation.
In addition, I would like to thank my friends, Jang Ho Yoon, Lan Kim, Yohana Veni-
randa, Jooyoung Kim, Hyun-Jin Hwangbo, Young-Eun Kim, Myeongyun Choi, Hyunjin
Park, Bo Hyun Kim, Regine Lai and Jihye Seong for sharing happy memories with me dur-
ing my Ph.D. studies. Special thanks also go to the following people for helping me with
judgments of their languages: Seonghan Jeong, Soohye Kang, Choohyang Song, Jeong-Ae
iv
Kwon, Insoon Seok, Jeongwoon Sohn, Seong-Gon Kim, Changmin Lee, Choonsik Roh,
Hyunkyoung Ryu, Jongmee Kim, Zenghong Jia, David Rubio Vallejo, Manex Agirrezabal.
Finally, I would like to thank my father, Yoo-Mee Park, my mother, Eun-Kyoung Lee,
and my sister, Seulah Park, who supported me throughout this entire process. I would espe-
cially like to thank my late grandfather, Ji-Hong Park, who sparked my interest in linguistics.
He always encouraged me when I wanted to give up.
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Chapter
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 General Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.3 Background Information on Korean Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111.4 Overview of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 MODIFYING MOOD PHRASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Causation at Different Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.2 Problems with the Three-Level Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Nikka-clauses do not modify speech acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.2.2 An overt modal is a must . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292.2.3 Unembeddability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312.2.4 Summary of Section 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 A New Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Condoravdi and Lauer (2012): imperatives as modalizedpropositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.2 Nikka-clauses are mood phrase modifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Applying the Proposed Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4.1 Modifying preferences rather than speech acts . . . . . . . . . . . 482.4.2 No implicit modal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522.4.3 Linear order matters: cross-linguistic comparison . . . . . . . . . . 53
vi
2.4.4 Unembeddability of nikka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572.4.5 More on propositional causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.5.1 Connecting two mood phrases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 612.4.5.2 Is -nikka Evidential? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702.4.5.3 Temporal nikka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5 Summary of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3 KOREAN BISCUIT CONDITIONALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763.2 Two Types of BCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813.3 Type 1: the Decision Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3.1 Relevance relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833.3.2 Type 1 BCs involve a solution-seeking question . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3.2.1 Dynamic semantics for conditional questions . . . . . . 903.3.2.2 Interpreting Type 1 BCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.3 Explaining data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013.3.4 The speaker’s decision problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123.3.5 Marking relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153.3.6 Cross-linguistic comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.4 Type 2: Explicitly Spelled out Speech-act Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.4.1 Type 2 BCs and exhortative mood indicator -ca . . . . . . . . . . . 1273.4.2 Discourse markers in Type 2 BCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4 EMBEDDING MOOD PHRASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1364.2 Tamyen vs. Myen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1374.3 Previous Approaches to -tamyen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.3.1 Bak (1988): -tamyen as an irrealis conditional marker . . . . . . . 146
vii
4.3.2 Yeom (2004): -ta as a settledness operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.4 Tamyen as a Hypothetical Conditional Marker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.4.1 If x assumes p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1634.4.2 Declarative mood and tamyen’s hypothetical meaning . . . . . . . 166
4.5 Explaining Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.5.1 Non-hypothetical conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1714.5.2 Anaphoric conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1814.5.3 Temporal Interpretation of tamyen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACC Accusative
ADN Adnominal
APE Apperceptive
APR Apprehensive
CL Classifier
COMP Complementizer
COP Copular
DEC Declarative
EVID Evidential
EXH Exhortative
GEN Genitive
HON Honorific
IMP Imperative
INCH Inchoative
INT Interrogative
NOM Nominative
NML Nominalizer
ix
PASS Passive
PERF Perfective
PL Plural
PRES Present
PROG Progressive
PROM Promissive
SUP Supportive
TOP Topic
VOC Vocative
QUOT Quotative
x
ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates whether something bigger than a proposition, such as
moods and speech acts, could be subject to a semantic operation. In particular, this disserta-
tion focuses on adjunct clause modification in Korean. I discuss three topics related to this
issue.
First, I discuss the causal connective -nikka ‘because’ in Korean. In Korean, -ese is
only used to mark propositional causations, whereas -nikka can mark the (so-called) epis-
temic and the speech act level causation as well as propositional causation. I argue that such
a difference is due to the fact that nikka-clauses target the mood of the main clause. I further
claim that the three different readings are not attributed to the different levels of attachment,
but rather the different moods of the main clause.
I also explore Korean biscuit conditionals (BC). I provide an explanation for why the
acceptability judgments for Korean BCs are unpredictable. I divide Korean BC sentences
into two types and provide different explanations for each type of BC. In Type 1, I show that
the antecedent provides a context that involves the addressee’s decision problem and the con-
sequent gives the information which leads the addressee to the best solution. Formally, Type
1 BCs are understood as involving a pragmatically reconstructed solution seeking question
‘what should I do?’, which introduces an additional inquisitive update. In Type 2, I show
xi
that a speech act verb like allyi- ‘inform’ must appear in the antecedent clause, and the con-
sequent clause performs the speech act of that verb. I claim that the antecedent modifies the
speech act of the consequent clause by explicitly spelling out one of Searle’s speech act rules.
In this view, Type 2 BCs are understood as modifying the speech act of the main clause. I
also show that moods and speech acts can be interpreted in the scope of other semantic op-
erators like conditionals. In Type 2 BCs, the antecedent clause embeds an exhortative mood
marked phrase, and the exhortative mood is needed to modify the following speech act.
Lastly, I examine the two Korean conditional connectives -myen and -tamyen ‘if’. I
argue that while a myen-clause functions as a domain restrictor for any kind of modal op-
erator, a tamyen-clause functions as a hypothetical conditional marker as well as a domain
restrictor. I show that a myen-clause can be used either in a hypothetical conditional, which
involves a supposition, or in a non-hypothetical conditional in which the if -clause functions
as a simple domain restrictor. By contrast, a tamyen-clause morphologically includes hypo-
thetical meaning, and so it can only be used in hypothetical conditionals. I show that the
hypothetical meaning of -tamyen is gained by embedding a declarative mood marked phrase
under a conditional.
xii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Introduction
The literature in the field of compositional semantics usually focuses on propositions
or something smaller than a proposition. The question then arises, “Are there any semantic
objects bigger than a proposition?” The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate
whether something bigger than a proposition, such as moods and speech acts, could be sub-
ject to a semantic operation. More specifically, this dissertation attempts to answer the fol-
lowing questions: i) Can adjunct clauses such as because-clauses and if -clauses target the
mood or the speech act of the main clause? And ii) Is it possible that moods or speech acts
are interpreted in the scope of other semantic operators like conditionals?
In order to answer these questions, this dissertation looks at data taken from the Ko-
rean language. Unlike English, Korean marks the clause type of a sentence with an overt
mood indicator as shown in (1).
(1) a. mina-kaMina-NOM
pang-ulroom-ACC
takk-nun-ta.clean-PRES-DEC
‘Mina is cleaning the room.’
b. mina-kaMina-NOM
pang-ulroom-ACC
takk-koclean-
iss-ni?PROG-INT
1
‘Is Mina cleaning the room?’
c. mina-ya,Mina-VOC
pang-ulroom-ACC
takka-la!clean-IMP
‘Mina, clean the room!’
These mood marked clauses can appear embedded, as shown in (2). In (2a), for exam-
ple, the declarative mood marked clause is embedded under a conditional (i.e. myen-clause).
In these embedded contexts, clause type indicators play an important role in interpreting the
entire sentence. In (2a), the meaning of the sentence can differ depending on whether the
declarative marker -ta appears in the embedded clause or not. (2a) without -ta expresses that
the addressee is scheduled to go to Seoul. By contrast, (2a) with -ta expresses that the ad-
dressee has not decided whether or not to go to Seoul. In (2b), if the exhortative mood marker
is missing, the sentence sounds odd. Thus, Korean provides visible evidence suggesting that
mood marked clauses can be embedded under the semantic operator like conditionals.
(2) a. [ Seoul-eySeoul-at
ka-(n-ta)]-myen,go-(PRES-DEC)-if,
na-eykeyme-to
cenhwahay-la.call-IMP
without -ta: ‘When you go to Seoul, call me!’with -ta: ‘If you go to Seoul, call me!’
b. [ kopayk-ulconfession-ACC
ha-?(ca)]-myen,do-(EXH)-if
na-nI-TOP
ku-wahe-with
hamkkeytogether
ilhakito.work
silh-ta.dislike-DEC
with -ca: ‘If I may make a confession, I don’t like working with him.’without -ca: ‘?If I make a confession, I don’t like working with him.’
2
In Korean, there are also examples suggesting that a mood marked clause can be
subject to adjunct clause modification (e.g., because-clause, conditionals). For instance, the
causal clause in (3a) does not express the causal relationship between two propositions or
events. Instead, it modifies something bigger than a simple proposition (i.e., the speaker’s
preferential attitude toward the proposition). Similarly, the antecedent clause of the condi-
tional sentence in (3b) modifies not the proposition, but the speech act of the main clause
(i.e. CONFESSION act).
(3) a. kotsoon
yenghwa-kamovie-NOM
sicakha-nikka,begin-because
[ 3D3D
ankyeng-ulglasses-ACC
sse-cwu-seyoput.on-give-IMP
].
‘Please put on your 3D glasses, because the movie starts soon.’
b. han-kacione-CL
kopaykha-ca-myen,confession-EXH-if
[ na-nunI-TOP
cheum-pwuthebeginning-from
al-koknow-and
iss-ess-taexist-PAST-DEC
].
‘If I may make one confession, I knew it from the beginning.’
What is modified seems to vary depending on the adjunct clause. For example, in
(3a), the nikka-clause targets a mood of the main clause, but not a speech act. In (3b), by
contrast, the conditional clause is modifying the speech act of the consequent clause. In the
following chapters, we will see that what is modified is determined by the type of adverbial
clauses.
3
1.2 Assumptions
In addressing the current topic, I employ many different ideas, concepts, and assump-
tions from previous studies. In this section, I introduce some that play a central role in this
dissertation.
Lewis (1970) distinguished two parts of an uttered sentence: a sentence radical,
which indicates the descriptive content of a sentence, and a mood, which indicates the way
of using the propositional content of the sentence radical (also Stenius 1967; Searle, 1969).
In this way, the sentences in (4) have the same sentence radical (i.e. Mina clean the room),
but are different in their moods: declarative, interrogative, and imperative, respectively. The
structure of these sentences is schematized in (5).1
(4) a. Mina is cleaning the room. (Declarative)
b. Is Mina cleaning the room? (Interrogative)
c. Mina, clean the room! (Imperative)
1 The structure comes from Lewis (1970) with my own modification.
4
(5)Sentence
MOOD
declarativeimperative
interrogative
S
Mina clean the room
According to Lewis, the sentence radical (i.e. S) is the topmost level where the truth
conditional meaning of the sentence is calculated. In other words, whether or not the sen-
tence is true is determined at the sentence radical level.
Then the following question arises: what does a mood-marked sentence mean? One
plausible explanation comes from dynamic semantics (e.g., Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1991). In order to understand how to interpret a mood marked sentence under
a dynamic approach, I begin with the notion of Common Ground (CG), which was first
introduced in Stalnaker (1978). According to Stalnaker, CG is understood as “mutually
recognized shared information” of the interlocutors (Stalnaker 2002: pp.704). Given that
information can be expressed in the form of propositions, CG can be treated as a set of
propositions shared by the discourse participants. Also, if we assume that a proposition is a
set of worlds in which the proposition is true, the context can be construed as a set of worlds
in which all of the propositions of CG are true. In Stalnaker’s analysis, this set of worlds is
called the Context Set of the discourse.
Gunlogson (2001, 2003) provided a more articulated version of CG. Gunlogson (2001,
2003) argued that each conversation participant has a set of propositions representing their
5
own Public Beliefs (PB), or Discourse Commitments (DC). Under this view, the CG can
be derived from the conversation participants’ PBs (or DCs), as follows: (Gunlogson 2003:
pp.29 (58))
(6) Let CG{A,B} be the Common Ground of a discourse in which A and B are the indi-
vidual discourse participants.
a. DCA of CG{A,B} = { p: ‘A believes p’ ∈ CG{A,B} }
b. DCB of CG{A,B} = { p: ‘B believes p’ ∈ CG{A,B} }
In this dissertation, I assume this articulated version of CG. Let us suppose there are
two conversation participants, Paul and Anna. Both of them are aware of the fact that John
made Mary a cake. In this case, the proposition ‘John made Mary a cake’ is in the CG.
Note that the CG is a set of mutually recognized beliefs. Thus, if the proposition p is part
of the CG, it should be the case that each participant of the discourse believes p, and that
all participants believe that all participants believe p. As the conversation continues, the dis-
course participants may become aware of new information. That new information adds to
the CG. For example, in the Paul and Anna’s conversation, suppose that Anna says “John
loves Mary”. Paul was completely ignorant of John’s love for Mary. After Anna made a
remark, Paul becomes aware of Anna’s belief that John loves Mary. As a result, the propo-
sition ‘Anna believes that John loves Mary’ becomes part of the CG. Since the accessibility
relations for individual beliefs is transitive, Anna also believes she believes that John loves
6
Mary. Each member’s PB and the CG of the conversation are illustrated as in (7), where
PBp is Paul’s public belief and PBa is Anna’s public belief. Since Paul did not accept the
proposition ‘John loves Mary’ as true, this proposition belongs to neither Paul’s PB nor the
CG.
(7) PBp = { Anna believes John loves Mary. }
PBa = { John loves Mary, I (=Anna) believes John loves Mary. }
CG{p,a} = { Anna believes John loves Mary. }
Let us now consider how to interpret an uttered sentence (or a mood marked sen-
tence). The context where the conversation takes place can be defined with respect to the
CG. If we consider the notion of possible worlds, the context is understood as a set of pos-
sible worlds in which all the propositions of the CG hold. Then, uttering a sentence is con-
strued as a change of the context set from the input context to the output context where the
proposition of the sentence holds. Thus, the meaning of an uttered sentence is how the con-
text set changes, its context change potential (CCP). In accordance with Gunlogson (2001,
2003) and Davis (2009), I assume that the CCP of declarative mood sentences is to update
the conversation participant x’s PB with its propositional content.
In the discussion of this dissertation, the notion of Question Under Discussion (QUD)
is also an important concept to be familiar with. Following Stalnaker (1978), Roberts (1998)
assumed that the main purpose of conversation is to learn information about our world and
7
share it with other discourse participants (Roberts 1998: pp.2). According to Stalnaker, the
goal of a conversation can be seen as a general question (e.g., “what is the way things are?”
or “what is the state of the world?”). To achieve the goal (or to answer the question), we
need plans or strategies, including sub-inquiries, i.e. the questions driven by the general
question. Viewing language as a type of game, Roberts (1998) assumed that the players
(i.e. conversation participants) can take one of the following two moves: set-up moves (i.e.
questions) and payoff moves (i.e. assertions).2 According to Roberts, each move has its
presupposed content and proffered content. The proffered content refers to what is said in
an assertion or a non-presupposed content of a question. Given Hamblin’s semantics for
questions, the proffered content of a question is the possible answers. When a question
is accepted by conversation participants, finding the answer for that question becomes the
common goal of the conversation (Roberts 1998: pp.3). In this case, the question is the
immediate topic of the discussion, so it is called the (Immediate) Question Under Discussion.
At this point, one might wonder how to deal with QUD in the CCP semantics. Davis
(2009) suggested a decomposition of the QUD. According to him, each discourse agent x in
a context C has a set of public questions (PQcx), which is a stack consisting of sets of proposi-
tions. The topmost element of the stack is considered the immediate public question for the
agent x in C (PQcx[0]). In this way, an interrogative sentence p? is understood to denote that
the immediate public question of the set of agents A must be identical with the denotation of
the interrogative radial. The denotation of an interrogative sentence p? is illustrated in (8).
Note that, in Davis (2009), the denotation of the interrogative radical p is the singleton set
2 These two moves were originally introduced in Carlson (1983).
8
{∣∣p∣∣}.
(8) ∣∣ p? ∣∣ = λA.{ <C, C′> ∣ PQcA[0] = {∣∣p∣∣} } (modified, Davis, 2009: pp.192)
The issue which arises from the question p? is interpreted as asking whether or not
p is true, and so it can be interpreted as a partition on the set of possible worlds. In Davis
(2009), the partition is derived from the equivalence relation, which is illustrated in (9).
(9) Question-induced Equivalence Relation over Worlds
w =Q w′ iffdef ∀q ∈ Q : q(w) = q(w′) (Davis, 2011: pp.193 (172))
According to (9), the worlds in equivalence relations form a cell of the partition. In
this way, the discourse effect of an agent x’s immediate public question (PQcx[0]) is as fol-
lows:
(10) Public Question Principle
a. If PQcx[0] = Q, then x is understood to be committed to seeking a resolution to
question Q.
b. Resolution of Q for x is achieved in a context c iff: ∀w,w′ ∈ ∩PBcx =Q w′
(Davis, 2011: pp.193 (173))
9
By uttering an interrogative sentence p?, the agent x’s public question is updated with
the denotation of the interrogative radical. At the same time, the agent x is committed to
seeking a resolution to the question p?. The issue associated with the question p? partitions
the possible worlds based on the equivalence relation defined by the propositional content of
the question. The question p? is resolved just in case the set of worlds in which x’s public
beliefs hold occupies the single cell of the partition induced by the equivalence relation
defined by the question (Davis 2011: pp.193).
Another important aspect of QUD is that QUD is not always about the state of the
world. Davis (2009) claimed that QUD can also be driven by the solution-seeking question
‘what should I do?’ under certain circumstances. According to Davis, van Rooy’s decision
problem (i.e. the set of possible actions that the agent of the context can take to solve the
problem s/he faces) can be viewed as a special kind of QUD which is driven not by the
question ‘what is the way things are?’ but by the solution-seeking question ‘what should I
do?’ (i.e., ‘Which one is the best action to resolve the agent’s decision problem?’) (Davis
2009; pp.347). According to Davis (2009), if the QUD is driven by the solution-seeking
question ‘what should I do?’, there is a decision problem in which the agent needs to decide
what action to perform, which is understood as a set of actions, A = { a1, a2, ... an } (van
Rooy 2003: pp.733). Considering the context set as a set of information (i.e. propositions),
each proposition in the context set has the corresponding contextually salient possible action.
In this way, the issue derived from the solution seeking question is understood to partition
the possible worlds based on the propositions associated with one of the possible actions.
Here, I assume, as was van Rooy (2003) did, the set of alternative actions can lead to a set of
10
propositions (van Rooy 2003: pp. 736). Van Rooy (2003) claimed that the set of propositions
partitions the context set if each possible world has only one possible action which is strictly
better than any other actions.
In Davis (2009), even when the QUD is related to the general information-seeking
question ‘what is the state of the world?’, it is assumed that there is a corresponding decision
problem. In this case, the decision problem of the agent is to decide what to believe, A
= { Believep1 , Believep2 , ... , Believepn } (Davis 2009: pp.355). This means that both
types of QUD partition the context set in the similar way. In this dissertation, however, I
do not discuss the details of dealing with questions about the status of the world. For the
sake of simplicity, I distinguish the propositions involving perlocutionary actions from other
(ordinary) propositions and assume that the QUD, which is driven by the solution-seeking
question, partitions the context set based on the optimal actions. It should also be noted that
I use the concept of QUD in this dissertation, but not as a semantic object. I do not discuss
all the details about QUD and its status in dynamic semantics.
1.3 Background Information on Korean Grammar
Before we begin the discussion of this dissertation, there are a couple of concepts
that need to be established about the Korean language. The first thing to know about Korean
is the clause type indicators. Like English, Korean clauses can also be classified into three
major types: Declarative, Interrogative, and Imperative. As we have seen above, Korean has
overt mood markers. Examples are in (11).
11
(11) a. mina-kaMina-NOM
cacenke-lulbike-ACC
tha-n-ta.ride-PRES-DEC
‘Mina is riding a bike.’
b. mina-kaMina-NOM
cacenke-lulbike-ACC
tha-ni?ride-INT
‘Is Mina riding a bike?’
c. mina-ya,Mina-VOC,
cacenke-lulbike-ACC
tha-la!ride-IMP
‘Mina, ride a bike!’
Although the three way classification seems to be universal, Korean has two more
additional mood indicators, i.e. exhortatives and promissives, as in (12). In this dissertation,
I will focus on the three major moods, treating exhortatives and promissives as subclasses of
imperatives.
(12) a. (wuliwe
hamkkey)together
cacenke-lulbike-ACC
tha-ca!ride-EXH
‘Let’s ride a bike together!’
b. nay-kaI-NOM
cacenke-lulbike-ACC
tha-ma.ride-PROM
‘I will ride a bike.’
Each clause type is marked with a class of sentence ending particles depending on the
relationship between the speaker and the hearer. According to Pak (2008), there are seven
12
styles in Korean.
(13) Korean Sentence Ending Particles
SpeechLevel
DEC INT IMP EXH PROM
Plain -ta -ni, -nya -(a/e)-la -ca -(u)maIntimate -a/e -a/e -a/e -a/e -l-kkey, -
a/eFamiliar -ney -na, -((n)-
(u)nka-((u)si)-key-(na)
-sey(-na)
-(u)m-sey
Polite -a/e-yo -a/e-yo,-na-yo,-((n)-(u)nka-yo
-((u)si)-a/e-yo
-a/e-yo -l-kkey-yo,-a/e-yo
Semi-formal
-o/uo/so -o/uo/so -o/uo/so -p-si-ta -li-ta, -kess-so
Formal -(su)pni-ta
-(su)pni-kka
-(sip)-si-o -(u)sip-si-ta
-oli-ta,-kess-nai-ta
Super-polite
-nai-ta -nai-kka -(si-op)-so-se
(Pak 2008: pp.133, Table 5)
Another thing to know about Korean is the position of an adjunct clause in a sentence.
Korean adjunct clauses usually appear in the sentence-initial position, as in (14a). They can
also appear in the middle of the sentence. As shown in (14b) and (14c), some elements, like
the topic marked subject (i.e., Mina-nun) or the object of the main predicate (i.e., hakkyo-
lul), can come before the adjunct clause. As shown in (14d), however, they cannot appear
after the main predicate. The sentences like (14d) may be allowed as a dislocation in certain
circumstances.
13
(14) a. tunglokkum-ituition-NOM
eps-ese,not.exist-because
mina-nunMina-TOP
hakkyo-lulschool-ACC
kumantwu-ess-ta.quit-PAST-DEC
b. mina-nun,Mina-TOP
tunglokkum-ituition-NOM
eps-ese,not.exist-because
hakkyo-lulschool-ACC
kumantwu-ess-ta.quit-PAST-DEC
c. mina-nunMina-TOP
hakkyo-lulschool-ACC
tunglokkum-ituition-NOM
eps-ese,not.exist-because
kumantwu-ess-ta.quit-PAST-DEC
‘Because Mina didn’t have money for school fees, she quitted school.’
d. *mina-nunMina-TOP
hakkyo-lulschool-ACC
kumantwu-ess-ta,quit-PAST-DEC
tunglokkum-ituition-NOM
eps-ese.not.exist-because
(Intended) ‘Mina quitted school, because she didn’t have money for school fees.’
In truth, not all adjunct clauses can appear in the middle of the sentence. For in-
stance, the if -clause in a biscuit conditional cannot appear in the middle of the main clause,
as shown in (15).
(15) a. pay-kastomach-NOM
aphu-myen,hurt-if,
yak-unmedicine-TOP
selapcangdrawers
an-eyinside-at
iss-e.exist-DEC-HON
‘If you have a stomachache, the medicine is in the drawers.’
b. *yak-un,stomach-NOM
pay-kahurt-if,
aphu-myen,medicine-TOP
selapcangdrawers
an-eyinside-at
iss-e.exist-DEC-HON
(Intended) ‘If you have a stomachache, the medicine is in the drawers.’
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
The main body of the dissertation consists of three chapters: Chapter 2-4. Chapter
2 presents a new analysis of the causal connective -nikka ‘because’ in Korean. I begin by
14
exploring the differences between the two Korean causal connectives, i.e., -ese and -nikka.
While the usage of -ese is limited to the propositional level modification, -nikka seems to
mark a cause/reason for the speaker’s epistemic judgment or the speech act of the main
clause as well as propositional causations. I show that such a difference follows from the
fact that nikka-clause is attached to a mood marked phrase (i.e., MoodP). I also show that
the various functions of the nikka-clause result from the different types of mood in the main
clause. These facts suggest that the adverbial clause modification can target a Mood Phrase.
Chapter 3 discusses Korean biscuit conditionals. This chapter provides an explana-
tion for why the acceptability judgment for Korean BCs are unpredictable. I divide Korean
BC sentences into two types, and provide different explanations for each type of BC. In Type
1, I show that the antecedent provides a context which involves the addressee’s (potential)
decision problem and the consequent gives the information which helps the addressee to find
the best solution. Thus, the context-dependency of the relevance relation between the de-
cision problem and the solution results in the unpredictable acceptability judgment in Type
1 BCs. In Type 2, I show that a speech act verb like allyi- ‘inform’ must appear in the an-
tecedent clause, and the consequent clause performs the speech act of that verb. It will be
claimed that Type 1 BCs are conditional questions involving a pragmatically reconstructed
solution seeking question, which introduces an additional inquisitive update. In Type 2, I
claim that the antecedent modifies the speech act of the consequent by explicitly spelling out
one of Searle’s speech act rules. Under this analysis, Type 2 BCs are understood as mod-
ifying the speech act level phrase. I also show that the antecedent clause of a Type 2 BC
embeds an exhortative mood marked phrase, and the exhorative mood is needed to modify
15
the following speech act.
Chapter 4 examines the difference between two conditional connectives -myen and
-tamyen, ‘if’ in Korean. I conclude that while a myen-clause functions as a domain restrictor
for any kind of modal operator, a tamyen-clause functions as a hypothetical/suppositional
conditional marker as well as a domain restrictor. I show that a myen-clause can be used
either in a hypothetical conditional, which involves a supposition, or in a non-hypothetical
conditional in which the if -clause functions as a simple domain restrictor. By contrast, a
tamyen-clause morphologically includes hypothetical meaning, and so it can only be used
in hypothetical conditionals. I show that the hypothetical meaning of -tamyen is gained by
embedding a declarative mood marked phrase under a conditional.
16
Chapter 2
MODIFYING MOOD PHRASES
2.1 Causation at Different Levels
This chapter aims to investigate the semantic functions of the Korean causal connec-
tive -nikka ‘because’, by a comparison with another causal connective -ese. In Korean, both
-ese and -nikka are used to denote a causal relation between two propositions or events. For
example, in (16), both -ese and -nikka indicate that the rain caused the sky’s being dark.1
(16) pi-karain-NOM
o-ase/(?)nikkacome-because
hanul-isky-NOM
etwup-ta.dark-DEC
‘The sky is dark because it is raining.’
In the above example, the two causal connectives seem almost interchangeable: re-
placing one with the other doesn’t result in a significant change in meaning. As often ob-
served in the previous literature, however, they are not fully interchangeable (Lee C. 1979;
1 Even though it is commonly assumed that at least in propositional causation the two causalconnectives are fully interchangeable, many native speakers feel a slight oddity in using anikka-clause in sentences like (16). The sentence becomes better if we replace the declarativemood -ta with the presumptive/suppositive mood -ci, the apperceptive mood -ney, or theapperceptive mood -kwun. This seems to be because a nikka-clause conveys the meaningthat the causal relation is the outcome of the speaker’s subjective reasoning. I will discussthis in detail in Section 2.4.5.
17
Nam and Lukoff, 1983; Sohn, 1993; Oh, 2005; Yoon, 2005; Hwang, 2008; Jeong, 2012;
among many others). First of all, only -nikka can be used in sentences that express epistemic
judgments:
(17) pwukhan-iNorth.Korea-NOM
nampwuk.cikthongcenhwa-lulSouth-North.hot.line-ACC
chatanha-ciblock-
anh-ass-unikka/#ese,not-PAST-because
tayhwaha-ltalk-ADN
uici-kawill-NOM
acikyet
namaiss-nunremain-ADN
keyNML
pwunmyengha-pni-ta.sure-HON-DEC
‘I’m sure that North Korea is still willing to talk, because they didn’t block the South-North hot line.’
Unlike (16), (17) cannot be construed as expressing a causal relation between propo-
sitions or events. It doesn’t mean that keeping the South-North hot line open caused North
Korea to be willing to talk. Rather, it expresses that the speaker’s knowledge of keeping the
South-North hot line open caused the speaker to conclude that North Korea is still willing
to talk. In the previous literature, this usage has been called ‘epistemic’ causation because
the causal clause gives a reason for the speaker’s epistemic judgment described in the main
clause (e.g., Sweetser, 1990; Kyratzis et. al, 1990; among many others).2
Note that the causal connective -ese can also appear with an epistemic modal as in
(18a). In this case, however, -ese is understood to express propositional causality under the
scope of the epistemic modal. In turn, (18b) shows that -ese is compatible with a deontic
modal like -eya ha- ‘should/must’. In this case, -ese takes scope over the deontic modal.
Deontic modals are often assumed to be lower than epistemic modals with respect to their
2 This type of causation is also called ‘evidential’ causation (e.g., Kyratzis et. al 1990). Inthis dissertation, I will use ‘epistemic’ causation, because as we will see in 2.4.5, epistemicmodals but not inferential evidentials can occur with epistemic causation.
18
syntactic position (e.g., Cinque, 1999). In this sense, we might be able to explain the scope
relations between two modals and an ese-clause by assuming that its syntactic position is
somewhere between the two modals, as in (18c).
(18) a. Gina-nunGina-TOP
yengesillyek-iEnglish.ability-NOM
chwulcwunghay-seoutstanding-because
taykiep-eybig.company-to
cwicik-toy-nenter-PASS-ADN
ke-yNML-COP
thullimeps-e.must-DEC
Reading1: ‘I’m sure that Gina entered a major company because of her outstand-ing English skills.’ (mustepis > -ese)
*Reading2: ‘Gina must have entered a major company, because her Englishskills are outstanding.’ (-ese > mustepis)
b. na-nI-TOP
swuhak-ulmath-ACC
moshay-senot.good-because
swuhak.kongpwu-lulmath.study-ACC
hay-yado-have.to
ha-n-ta.do-PRES-DEC
*Reading1: ‘It should be the case that I study math because of my poor mathgrade.’ (have to > -ese)
Reading2: ‘I have to study math, because I’m not good at math.’ (-ese > have to)
c. Hyuna-nunHyuna-TOP
pesu-lulbus-ACC
nohchy-esemiss-because
taksi-lultaxi-ACC
tha-yatake-have.to
hay-ss-uldo-PAST-ADN
swu-tochance-also
iss-ta.exist-DEC
‘I guess Hyuna had to take a taxi because she missed the bus.’ (mayepis > -ese >have to)
Another difference between the two causal connectives is that only -nikka is compat-
ible with non-assertion sentences, namely imperatives (19a), exhortatives (19b), and promis-
sives (19c).
19
(19) a. kilum-igas-NOM
ttelecy-erun.out-PROG
ka-nikka/*se,-because,
cwuyuso-eygas.station-at
tulle-la!stop.by-IMP
‘Stop at the gas station, because we are running out of gas.’
b. nalssi-kaweather-NOM
coh-unikka/*ase,good-because
nakksiha-ledo.fishing-to
ka-ca.go-EXH
‘Let’s go fishing, because the weather is good.’
c. top-nun-ta-nunhelp-PRES-DEC-ADN
yaksok-ulpromise-ACC
cikhy-ess-unikka/*ese,keep-PAST-because
senmwul-ulpresent-ACC
cwu-ma.give-PROM
‘I will give you a present, because you kept your promise to help me.’
As with the epistemic usage, nikka-clauses in non-assertion sentences do not indi-
cate a causal relation between propositions or events. Rather, they seem to express the
cause/reason for the main clause speech act. For example, the nikka-clause in (19a) gives
a reason why the speaker orders the hearer to stop by the gas station. This use of causal
clauses has been called ‘speech act’ causation (e.g., Sweetser, 1990; Sohn, 1992; Kim, H.,
1994; and many others).
Unlike -nikka, -ese is compatible with a non-assertion sentence just in case it is in
the scope of the main clause speech act. In the following example, the ese-clause does not
give a reason why the speaker tells the hearer not to get married. Rather, it gives a reason for
marriage.
(20) honcasal-ki-kaalone.live-NML-NOM
silh-esedislike-because
kyelhonha-ci-(nun)get.married-NML-(TOP)
ma-seyyo.NEG-IMP
20
‘Don’t get married just because you don’t want to live by yourself.’
Furthermore, only a nikka-clause is compatible with performative predicates (e.g.,
pwuthakha- ‘request’ or chwuchenha- ‘recommend’) which overtly express speech acts such
as REQUEST or RECOMMEND, as follows:
(21) a. ney-kayou-NOM
swuhak-ulmath-ACC
calwell
ha-*ese/nikka,do-because
wulittalmy.daughter
kwaoy-lultutoring-ACC
pwuthakhan-ta.request-DEC
‘I request the after-school tutoring for my daughter, because you are good at
math.’
b. ne-nyou-TOP
khi-kaheight-NOM
cak-??ase/unikka,small-because
haihilhigh.heels
sinnun-ke-lwear-NML-ACC
chwuchenhan-ta.recommend-DEC
‘I recommend you to wear high heels, because you are small.’
In short, the usage of -ese is limited to propositional causations, (16), whereas -nikka
can also be used in epistemic, (17), or speech act causations, (19), as well as propositional
causations (e.g., Sohn, 1993; Oh, 2005).3
3 Strictly speaking, Oh’s (2005) analysis cannot be called “three” level approach. FollowingCrevels’ (2000) four-semantic level approach, Oh (2005) suggested a four-level distinctionin which -ese is interpreted more frequently on a content level (i.e., propositional-level),whereas -nikka is interpreted more often on an epistemic, a textual, or an illocutionary level(i.e., speech act-level) (Oh 2005: pp.470). In a textual usage, -nikka is assumed to give a
21
The distinction among the three different types of causation was originally suggested
in Sweetser (1990). In her analysis of English because-clause, Sweetser argued that be-
cause-clauses are ambiguous depending on the level of causation: propositional, epistemic,
and speech act-level causation. Examples are shown in (22) (Sweetser, 1990: pp.77, (1)).
(22) a. John came back because he loved her. (Propositional level)
b. John loved her, because he came back. (Epistemic level)
c. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on. (Speech act-level)
The difference between Korean and English is that while English utilizes one word
(i.e., because) to express the three different types of causation, Korean uses two different
expressions (i.e., -ese and -nikka) depending on the causality level (e.g., Kim H., 1994).4
reason for the whole preceding context, as in (i) (Sejong Spoken: pp.87, Oh, 2005: pp.480(12)).
(i) A: Sohyun, you should give me the CD, too. We have to get a signature.B: I will bring it tomorrow.A: Tomorrow?B: ettehky toy-l-ci molu-nikka
how become-PROP-if don’t.know-because‘Since I don’t know what will happen.’
In (i), however, the nikka-clause doesn’t seem to give a reason for the entire preceding con-text, but gives a reason for her preceding utterance (i.e. I will bring it tomorrow). In addition,in the following section, I will show that three different levels of causation do not exist inKorean.
4 Although it is now somewhat archaic, English uses “for” to convey epistemic or speechact causation as in (i) (Prof. Benjamin Bruening p.c.).
(i) John will return, for he loves her more than life itself.
22
Three-level causation has also been found in German (e.g., Scheffler, 2008). Like
Korean, German has two causal connectives, denn and weil, which seem to have distributions
very similar to those of Korean causal connectives. While both weil and denn can be used to
express a causal relation between propositions, only denn can be used to mark the cause of
an epistemic judgment or speech act. Scheffler (2008) proposed an analysis of denn in which
the three different usages of denn are understood as being the result of the fact that a denn-
clause can take different types of phrases as its argument. To be more specific, she claimed
that denn-clauses can target a propositional-level phrase, a covert epistemic-level phrase
(i.e., the syntactic projection between IP and an utterance-level phrase, which involves an
implicit epistemic modal in its head), or an illocutionary-level phrase. These three levels of
attachment result in propositional, epistemic, and speech act-level causation, respectively.
As the distribution of -nikka is very similar to that of denn, some might want to
adopt Scheffler’s (2008) formal analysis. In such a three-level analysis, an ese-clause takes
a propositional-level phrase (e.g., IP), whereas a nikka-clause takes an epistemic-level (e.g.,
ModP) or speech act-level phrase (e.g., ForceP), as well as a propositional-level phrase. The
structures of the sentences in (16), (17) and (19a) can be schematized as follows:5
(23) Propositional-level causation
5 Here, the structures come from Scheffler (2008), with my own modifications for Korean.In fact, Scheffler (2008) suggested that the causal meaning of denn is a conventional impli-cature. Thus, in her analysis, denn projects its causal meaning on a different meaning tier(i.e., a not-at-issue meaning tier). Unlike German, the causal meaning of -nikka is alwaysat-issue meaning, and so -nikka projects its causal meaning on the at-issue meaning tier (Formore details see Section 2.2.3).
23
ForceP
CP
becauseP
pi-ka o-nikka‘because it rains’
CP
hanul-i etwup-‘the sky is dark’
Force
-taDEC
(24) Epistemic-level causationForceP
ModP
because-CP
pwukhan-i nampwukcikthongcenhwa-lulchatanha-cianhass-unikka‘NK didn’t blockthe S-N hot line’
ModP
Mod
MUST
CP
tayhwa uici-kaacik namaiss-nun keypwunmyenghapni‘NK has will to talk’
Force
-taDEC
24
(25) Speech Act-level causationForceP
becauseP
kilum-i ttelecyeka-nikka‘because we are runningout of gas’
ForceP
CP
cwuyuso-ey tulle-‘stop at the gas station’
Force
-laIMP
At first glance, this three-level analysis looks appealing. In what follows, however, I
will present a variety of reasons why we can’t simply adopt this analysis for Korean. I will
then suggest an alternative analysis which argues that a nikka-clause always takes a mood
phrase (i.e., a clause type marked phrase): [φ-nikka, [Mood(ψ)]]. In this way, the three
different readings are not attributed to the different levels of attachment but the different
clause types of the main clause.
2.2 Problems with the Three-Level Approach
In this section, I provide data that indicates that the three-level approach cannot give
the correct result for Korean causal clauses. I will show that i) a nikka-clause doesn’t modify
the main clause speech act; ii) there is no covert epistemic-level phrase; and iii) even in the
propositional usage, the two connectives show different distributions.
25
2.2.1 Nikka-clauses do not modify speech acts
The three-level analysis says that a nikka-clause gives a cause/reason for the main
clause speech act. For example, the nikka-clause in (26) can be understood to modify the
ORDER act of the main clause. From this perspective, (26) is paraphrased as ‘I am ordering
you to stop at the gas station, because we are running out of gas.’
(26) kilum-igas-NOM
ttelecy-erun.out
ka-nikka,PROG-because,
cwuyuso-eygas.station-at
tulle-la!stop.by-IMP
‘Stop at the gas station, because we are running out of gas.’
If this explanation is correct, we should expect that a nikka-clause can give a cause/reason
for a QUESTION act in the main clause as well. As shown in (27), however, a nikka-clause
cannot be followed by an interrogative, which contradicts the expectation of the three-level
analysis.
(27) a. *kokay-lulhead-ACC
ttelkwu-kolower-PROG
iss-unikka,-because
mwesomething
ancoh-unbad-ADN
ilevent
iss-ni?exist-INT
(Intended) ‘Did something bad happen to you, because you are hanging yourhead low.’
b. *naI
cwusolokaddress.book
mantu-nunmake-ADN
cwung-i-nikka,while-COP-because
neyou
etiwhere
sa-ni?live-INT
(Intended) ‘Where do you live, because I’m making an address book.’
The examples in (27) show that the nikka-clause cannot be followed by a question.
Some might argue that the sentences in (27) are ungrammatical because it is impossible to
26
give a reason/cause for a QUESTION act. However, if the speech act meaning is explicitly
represented in the syntax, as in (28), the sentences become grammatical. Indeed, the corre-
sponding English sentences in (27) are all grammatical. Therefore, the ungrammaticality of
the sentences in (27) should not be attributed to a semantic anomaly of the causal relation
between the proposition and the following speech act (i.e., QUESTION).
(28) a. kokay-lulhead-ACC
ttelkwu-kolower-PROG
iss-unikka-because
mwut-nuntey,ask-and
mwesomething
ancoh-unbad-ADN
ilevent
iss-ni?exist-INT
‘Did something bad happen to you? I’m asking you because you are hangingyour head low.’
b. nay-kaI-NOM
cwusolokaddress.book
mantu-nunmake-ADN
cwung-i-nikkawhile-COP-because
mwut-nuntey,ask-and
neyou
etiwhere
sa-ni?live-INT
‘Where do you live? I’m asking you because I’m making an address book.’
There’s another example that suggests that a nikka-clause does not modify the main
clause speech act. (29) shows that a nikka-clause may not be compatible with an imperative.
(29) is not acceptable even though the nikka-clause gives a plausible reason for the main
clause ORDER act: as a father, one can order/suggest his kid to do something.
(29) #nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikka,father-because
enehakkwa-eyLinguistics.Dept.-to
ciwenhay-la!apply-IMP
(Intended) ‘Apply to the department of Linguistics, because I’m your father.’
27
Like the case with a question in (28), the overtly expressed order act meaning makes
the sentence grammatical. This indicates that a causal relation between the proposition and
the intended speech act is expressible in principle.
(30) nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikkafather-because
malha-nunte,say-and,
enehakkwa-eyLinguistics.Dept-to
ciwenhay-la!apply-IMP
‘Apply to the Linguistics department! I’m ordering you because I’m your father.’
In truth, native speakers understand what (29) is supposed to mean. For that meaning,
however, they try to use the sentence with a speech act expression like malhata ‘say’ or
myenlyenghata ‘order’ as in (30).
To understand the unacceptability of (29), it is necessary to compare it with felicitous
examples like (26). The nikka-clause in (26) appears to give a reason why the speaker orders
the hearer. In this sense, (26) can be paraphrased as ‘the speaker orders the hearer to stop at
the gas station because of a lack of fuel.’ While this paraphrase seems reasonable, (26) can
also be paraphrased as ‘because the car is running out of gas, the hearer must stop at the gas
station and gas up.’ The interpretation is almost the same, but in this case the causal clause is
followed by a modalized proposition. In this way, (29) is paraphrased as ‘because I’m your
father, you must apply to the Linguistics department.’ Given this paraphrase, we can capture
the reason why (29) is not allowed. The unacceptability of (29) is due to the fact that the
causal link between being the hearer’s father and the necessity of applying to the Linguistics
department is not very likely: the father and son relationship is not directly related applying
28
to the Linguistics department.6 If the proposition of the main clause is directly related to the
father and son relationship, native speakers judge the sentence to be acceptable, as shown in
(31).
(31) nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikka,father-because,
na-eykeyme-to
nophimmal-ulhonorifics-ACC
sse-la!use-IMP.
‘Use honorifics, because I’m your father!’
In Korean, children should use honorifics to their parents. Thus, using honorifics is
closely related to the father and son relationship.
2.2.2 An overt modal is a must
In Scheffler’s (2008) analysis, it was claimed that a denn-clause takes a covert epis-
temic modal phrase to mark epistemic causality. One might think that the Korean nikka-
clause, which shows a very similar distribution to that of denn, takes an implicit epistemic
6 Sentence (29) sounds a bit better in the context where the speaker is a linguist and takingover the family business is considered as a matter of course by social norms (or where thefather’s dearest wish is to see his kid become a linguist). In such a context, (29) is interpretedas ‘because I am a linguist, as a son of a linguist, apply to the linguistics department!’ In thiscase, the father and son relationship does cause the son’s college application. Since manyKorean parents want their children to become a doctor and they are proud of their childrenwho enter medical school, Korean native speakers judged that the following sentence isslightly better than (29).
(i) ??nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikka,father-because
uytay-eymedical.school-to
ciwenhay-la!apply-IMP
‘Apply for medical school, because I’m your father.’
29
phrase whose head is an implicit modal operator. However, Korean doesn’t seem to have
a covert modal operator. Unlike English or German, an explicit epistemic modal expres-
sion, such as pwunmyengha- ‘certain’ or thulliumeps- ‘must’, is needed in the epistemic
usage as shown in (32).7 If the epistemic modal expression is not shown on the surface, the
nikka-clause loses its epistemic causality. For example, (32a) without thulliumeps- ‘must’ is
interpreted as expressing propositional causation, and as a result it is judged to be infelici-
tous: the light’s being on cannot cause someone to be in the house.
(32) a. pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-ci-eturn.on-PASS-PROG
iss-unikka,-because
cip-eyhouse-at
nwukwunkasomeone
issnun-keyexist-NML
thullimeps-ta/#iss-ta.sure-DEC/exist-DEC
‘There must be someone in the house, because the light is on.’(without thullimeps-) ‘#Because the light is on, there’s someone in the house.’
b. hyena-kaHyuna-NOM
phyenci-lulletter-ACC
mospat-ass-ta-nikka,not.receive-PAST-DEC-because
paytaldelivery
cwung-eywhile-at
pwunsil-toy-nloss-PASS-ADN
keyNML
pwunmyengha-ta/#pwunsil-toy-ess-ta.certain-DEC/loss-PASS-PAST-DEC
‘The letter must have gotten lost in transit, because I was told that Hyuna couldn’treceive the letter.’(without pwunmyengha-) ‘#Because I was told that Hyuna couldn’t receive theletter, the letter got lost in transit.’
7 Even in English, explicit epistemic modals appear to be required if a because-clause pre-cedes the main clause as in (i). We will discuss this issue in Section 2.4.2.
(i) a. There is someone in the house, because the light is on.b. ??/*Because the light is on, there is someone in the house.c. Because the light is on, there must be someone in the house.
30
c. twultaboth
phathi-eyparty-to
annot
wass-unikka,came-because,
eceyspamlast.night
twutwo
salam-hantheyperson-to
#(pwunmyenghi)certainly
mwusunsome
il-iaffair-NOM
iss-ess-e.exist-PAST-DEC
‘Something must have happened to them last night, because both of them didn’tcome to the party.’(without pwunmyenghi) ‘#Because both of them didn’t come to the party, some-thing happened to them last night.’
Under the three level approach, a nikka-clause can take an implicit modal phrase
headed by a covert modal operator. If that is the case, however, we should explain why both
implicit and explicit epistemic modals are needed.
2.2.3 Unembeddability
Under the three-level analysis, it is assumed that both -nikka and -ese can be used
in propositional-level causations. Then, the question arises, Are they fully interchangeable
when used as a proposition connector? It doesn’t seem so. Unlike an ese-clause, a nikka-
clause cannot be embedded under semantic operators such as negation, conditionals, and
questions (e.g., Kim, H., 1994). First of all, a nikka-clause cannot be interpreted in the scope
of a question operator. For example, we can ask the question in (33) in the context where the
students in the class dropped out for many different reasons (e.g., poverty, illness, emigra-
tion, etc.). In such a question, a nikka-clause cannot be used.8
8 For a different reason, a nikka-clause cannot be used outside the scope of a question oper-ator. The examples were shown in (27).
31
(33) nwukawho
tunglokkum-ituition-NOM
eps-ese/*unikkanot.have-because
hakkyo-lulschool-ACC
kumantw-ess-ni?quit-PAST-INT
‘Who quit school because he couldn’t afford the tuition fees?’
Second, a nikka-clause cannot be embedded under a conditional. As in (34), while an
ese-clause can be understood to be inside the scope of a conditional -(u)myen ‘if’, a nikka-
clause cannot.
(34) aphu-ese/*nikkasick-because
nuckeylate
wass-umyen,come-if
sihemcang-eyexam.room-to
tuleka-lenter-AD
swucan
iss-ta.-DEC
‘You can enter the exam room if you are late because of sickness.’
A nikka-clause is compatible with a conditional if it is interpreted outside the scope
of the conditional. In (35), for example, the nikka-clause does not give the reason why John
entered a modeling competition. Rather, it provides a reason for the speaker’s conclusion
that John could win first prize in the modeling competition.
(35) con-unJohn-TOP
khi-kaheight-NOM
khu-nikka,tall-because,
moteyl.contesutu-eymodeling.competition-at
naka-ss-umyen,enter-PAST-if
iltung-ha-yss-ulfirst.prize-do-PAST-will
ke-ya.-DEC
‘Because he is tall, if John had entered a modeling competition he would win firstprize.’
32
Lastly, a nikka-clause cannot be embedded under negation, as in (36).
(36) minwu-nunMinwoo-TOP
yengecemswu-kaEnglish.grade-NOM
nac-ase/#unikkalow-because
colep-ulgraduation-ACC
mosha-ci-(nun)cannot.do-not-(TOP)
anh-ass-ta.not-PAST-DEC
‘It was not the case that Minwoo failed to graduate because he got a bad grade inEnglish.’
In Korean, the long form negation -ci anh- ‘not’ with a rising tone (and/or a topic
marker -nun) can take scope over causation (e.g., Kim K., 2005; and many others). Thus,
(36) can be used in the context where Minwoo failed to graduate not because of his English
grade but because of his poor attendance. However, a nikka-clause is not allowed in such a
situation. A nikka-clause is acceptable just in case Minwoo was able to graduate because of
his poor English grade. In that case, a nikka-clause is understood to be outside the scope of
negation. However, it seems improbable that somebody could graduate because of his/her
poor grade.
In German, Scheffler (2008) showed that denn-clauses cannot be embedded under
semantic operators. Based on this, Scheffler argued that denn contributes its causal meaning
on a not-at-issue meaning tier, i.e., a conventional implicature dimension. Thus, in a sentence
‘p, denn q’, denn conventionally implicates the causal relation between p and q, i.e., ‘q
CAUSE p’ (Scheffler, 2008: pp.53). Under this analysis, only the proposition of the main
clause, i.e., p, is part of the at-issue content. In her paper, Scheffler presented a variety of
facts concerning denn that suggest that its causal meaning is Conventional Implicature (CI)
33
in the sense of Potts (2005): i) the proposition of the denn-clause cannot be backgrounded;
denn cannot be used in cases where the complement of a denn has been already mentioned
in the context; ii) the causal meaning of a denn-clause cannot be negated or questioned.
Unlike a German denn-clause, however, the causal meaning of -nikka does not satisfy
the criteria for CI. The proposition of the nikka-clause can be backgrounded. For example, in
(37), a nikka-clause can be used even if its propositional content has been already mentioned.
Also, the causal meaning of a nikka-clause can also be negated, as in (38), showing that the
content of the nikka-clause is at-issue meaning.
(37) a. Propositional -nikka
thayphwung-ityphoon-NOM
o-nikkacome-because
palam-iwind-NOM
pwul-ko,blow-and
palam-iwind-NOM
pwu-nikkablow-because
changmwun-iwindow-NOM
kkaycy-ess-ta.broke-PAST-DEC
‘Wind blew because a typhoon came, and the window broke because the windblew.’
b. Epistemic -nikka
(John and Sera are planning on going to the ball game.)
John: pakk-ey pi-wa!outside-at rain-come‘It is raining outside!’
Sera: kulekey,right,
pi-karain-NOM
o-nikka,come-because
kyengki-kagame-NOM
chwisotoyssulbe.canceled
cimay
mol-la.not.know-DEC
‘The game might have been cancelled, because it is raining.’
c. Speech act -nikka
34
(Insoon and Mina are riding in the car together.)
Insoon: kilum-i ta ttelecy-e ka.gas-NOM all run.out PROG
‘We are running out of gas.’
Mina: kulay.yes.
kilum-igas-NOM
eps-unikkanot.exist-because
cwuyuso-eygas.station-at
tull-ess-tastop.by-PERF-and
ka-ca!go-EXH
‘Yes. let’s stop at the gas station, because we are out of gas.’
(38) a. Propositional -nikka
Q: pokkwen-eylottery-to
tangchem-toy-nwin-PASS-ADN
keNML
calanghakoboast
siph-unikkawant-because
cenhwaha-ncall-AD
ke-ni?NML-INT
‘Is it the case that you call me because you want to boast that you won the lot-tery?’
A: aniya, ni moksoli tutko siph-unikka hayss-e.no, your voice hear want-because did-DEC
‘No, I called you because I want to hear your voice.’
b. Epistemic -nikka
Q: sakenhyuncang-eysethe.crime.scene-at
kuwihis
cokcek-ifootprints
nawass-unikka,come.out-because
ku-kahe-NOM
pemin-incriminal-COP
ke-ya?NML-INT
‘Is it the case that he is the criminal because his footprints were found at thecrime scene?’
A: aniya,no,
kuwihe-NOM
pemhayngcangmyen-icriminal.act-NOM
pangpem.khamera-eysecurity.camera-on
ccikhyess-kicaptured
ttaymwun-i-ya.because-COP-DEC
35
‘No, it is because his criminal acts were caught on security camera.’
It is important to note that, a nikka-clause cannot be syntactically embedded under
negation. However, as in (38) above, the causal meaning of the nikka-clause can be a target
of semantic negation. For instance, the answer in (38a) can be roughly paraphrased as ‘It is
not the case that I called you because I want to boast.’
2.2.4 Summary of Section 2.2
In this section, I have shown that there are at least three problems in adopting the
three-level approach. First, contrary to the expectations of the three-level approach, a nikka-
clause cannot always express the cause of the following speech act. Second, for an epistemic
reading, a modal must be overtly expressed on the surface. If we assume that a nikka-clause
targets an implicit epistemic phrase, we cannot explain why an explicit modal expression is
needed in the main clause. Lastly, the two causal connectives, -nikka and -ese, behave differ-
ently even when they are used to express propositional-level causations; while an ese-clause
can be embedded under other semantic operators (i.e., negation, questions, and conditionals),
a nikka-clause cannot. If we assume that a nikka-clause can take a CP or an IP argument, the
unembeddability of a nikka-clause cannot be explained.
2.3 A New Analysis
Based on the observations in Section 2.2, I argue that, unlike German or English, the
three different usages of nikka-clause cannot be explained by assuming that a nikka-clause
takes different types of phrases as its argument. Alternatively, I suggest that a nikka-clause
36
always takes a propositional argument, i.e., a clause type marked phrase (i.e., Mood Phrase).
Following Condoravdi and Lauer (2010, 2012), I assume that the denotation of a clause type
marked phrase is a (modalized) proposition, and a nikka-clause targets such a propositional
argument. From this assumption, the three different causations are combined into a single
type.
2.3.1 Condoravdi and Lauer (2012): imperatives as modalized propositions
The proposed analysis is inspired by Condoravdi and Lauer’s (2012) analysis con-
cerning imperatives. Before turning to the new analysis of the nikka-clause, I will briefly
give an overview of their analysis.
An assertion of a declarative sentence has often been understood as adding a proposi-
tion to the Common Ground (i.e., CG), which is ‘the set of propositions that the participants
of the conversation mutually assume to be taken for granted and not subject to (further)
discussion’ (von Fintel, 2000: pp.1).9 Unlike declaratives, imperatives have been often as-
sumed to denote actions or properties (e.g., Mastop, 2005; Portner, 2005, 2007). Portner
(2005) claimed that imperatives are associated with actions the addressee has to take (i.e.,
the addressee’s To-Do List). Thus, an utterance of an imperative adds a property to the
addressee’s To-Do List rather than to the CG. For example, Portner (2005) illustrated the
semantic representation of the imperative sentence (39a) as in (39b), where c refers to the
9 In this dissertation, I will assume, following Gunlogson (2001, 2003), that the uttereddeclarative sentence adds a proposition to the discourse agent x’s public belief. For moredetails, see Section 2.4.5.
37
context of the utterance and w* is an evaluative world.
(39) a. Stay inside!
b. ∣∣ Stay inside! ∣∣w∗,c = [ λwλx: x = addressee(c). x stay inside in w ]
(Portner, 2005: pp.5)
Schwager (2006), departing from Portner (2005), suggested that imperatives add to
the propositional content just like declaratives do. Based on the fact that imperatives and
performatively-used modal verbs are semantically equivalent, as in (40), she claimed that
an imperative sentence contains a modal operator OPImp, whose meaning is very similar to
deontic must.
(40) a. You must close the door immediately! (Performatively-used modal verb)
b. Close the door immediately! (Imperative)
(Schwager, 2006: pp.246 (18))
The semantic representation of OPImp is shown in (41), where the ordering source g
is a contextually given set of preferences.
(41) ∣∣ OPImp ∣∣c,s = λfλgλpλw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc ⋓ f,g,w) )[p(w′)]
(Schwager, 2006: pp.248 (22))
38
From this point of view, the denotation of an imperative is a modalized proposition
(i.e., OPImp(φ)), and the utterance of an imperative updates the CG with the modalized
proposition. This means that the utterance of an imperative is considered to be a usual
update of the CG. In her analysis, a variety of illocutionary forces of imperatives arise when
the particular condition of the contextual parameters (i.e., modal base and ordering source)
is satisfied. It is assumed that in order to get performative readings, the speaker should have
full knowledge of the parameters and the ordering source should be made up of the speaker’s
preferences.
Following Schwager (2006), Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) argued that imperatives
involve a modal operator, and the denotation of an imperative is a modalized proposition.
However, their analysis differs from Schwager (2006) in that the meaning of an impera-
tive operator is not similar to that of deontic must. Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) claimed
that the speaker’s preference for the propositional content is the core meaning of an impera-
tive sentence. In their analysis, (40b) expresses the speaker’s preference for closing the door.
Formally, an imperative mood contains a modal operator PEP, which expresses the speaker’s
preferential attitudes. The semantic representation of the imperative mood is shown in (42),
where Sp is the speaker in the context c.
(42) ∣∣ IMP ∣∣c := λp [ λw [ PEPw (Sp, p) ]]
(Condoravdi and Lauer, 2012: pp.48 (34))
39
According to (42), the imperative mood IMP takes a proposition p and yields a modal-
ized proposition PEP(p). In this way, an imperative utterance p! “commits the speaker to act
as though he preferred p” (Condoravdi and Lauer, 2010: pp.9). For example, (43a) denotes
the modalized proposition as in (43b), where Ad refers to the addressee in the context c.
Thus, the utterance of (43a) commits the speaker to act as though he preferred the hearer to
stay inside.
(43) a. Stay inside!
b. ∣∣ IMP(λv[Ad stays inside in v]) ∣∣c = λw[PEPw(Sp,λv[Ad stays inside in v])]
By assuming that imperatives only represent the preferential attitudes of the speaker,
the fact that imperatives can be associated with different types of illocutionary force can be
accounted for without listing every single illocutionary force in the semantic denotation of
the imperative mood.10
10 In Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), the variety of illocutionary forces of imperatives istaken to be a matter of pragmatics: a declarative sentence can be used to express variousspeech acts, as long as it meets certain contextual conditions. In this chapter, the data I’mconcerned with do not show whether illocutionary force should be interpreted in the compo-sitional semantics domain. However, I assume that there is an utterance-level phrase whichis responsible for speech acts, which is higher than the clause type marked phrase. There aretwo reasons: i) Given the previous literature, there seems to be a relation between types ofillocutionary acts and grammatical forms. Lee (1975), for example, showed that there aredistributional differences between the order/command acts and other types of illocutionaryacts, ii) The conditional sentences I’m dealing with in Chapter 3 show that a speech act canbe subject to adverbial clause modification.
40
According to Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), since other ‘non-assertion’ sentences
also involve the speaker’s preferential attitude (e.g., promissives or exhortatives), the analy-
sis of imperatives can be extended to those ‘non-assertion’ type sentences. In fact, promis-
sives and exhortatives often count as imperatives with a different agent (e.g., Zanuttini et. al,
2012). A promissive sentence can count as an imperative whose agent is the speaker him-
self, and an exhortative can be considered as an imperative which involves a plural agent,
the speaker and the addressee. For example, the exhortative in (44a) denotes the modalized
proposition in (44b). Thus, the utterance of (44a) commits the speaker to act as though he
preferred that he and the hearer go.
(44) a. Let’s go!
b. ∣∣ IMP(λv[Sp&Ad go in v]) ∣∣c = λw[PEPw(Sp, λv[Sp&Ad go in v])]
In this dissertation, I adopt Condoravdi and Lauer’s (2012) analysis rather than Schwa-
ger’s, because at least in Korean imperatives seem to behave differently from performative
modals when they are used with a causal clause. A performatively-used deontic modal ex-
pression -(e)ya ha- ‘must’ allows both ese-clauses and nikka-clauses, while an imperative
allows only a nikka-clause, as shown in (45). Such a difference between the two causal
clauses cannot be explained by Schwager’s (2006) analysis.11
11 As marked with (?), -nikka is preferred over -ese in (45a). However, it is also true that thecontrast between -ese and -nikka in (45a) is not so great compared to the contrast in (45b).
41
(45) a. ai-kachild-NOM
naccam-ulnap-ACC
ca-nikka/(?)sesleep-because
coyonghiquiet
ha-eyado-must
ha-y.-DEC
‘You have to be quiet, because the child is taking a nap.’
b. ai-kachild-NOM
naccam-ulnap-ACC
ca-nikka/*sesleep-because
coyonghiquiet
hay-la!do-IMP
‘Be quiet, because the child is taking a nap.’
Under Condoravdi and Lauer’s (2012) analysis, we might explain the difference in
(45) by assuming that the imperative operator takes a propositional argument, whereas the
deontic modal -(e)ya ha- ‘must’ takes a relatively lower-level phrase (e.g., VP).12
2.3.2 Nikka-clauses are mood phrase modifiers
The analysis of imperatives as modalized propositions enables us to explain the pe-
culiar distribution of nikka-clauses in the case of (so-called) speech act causation. Adopt-
ing Condoravdi and Lauer’s (2010, 2012) analysis, I assume that an imperative denotes a
modalized proposition that involves the modal operator PEP, which represents the preferen-
tial attitude of the speaker. I further argue that in a speech act-level causation, a nikka-clause
modifies an imperative mood marked phrase, i.e., IMP(φ). In this way, the syntactic structure
and the semantic representation of (46) can be illustrated as in (47) and (48), respectively.13
12 As we have seen in (18), -ese cannot take scope over an epistemic modal like thullimeps-‘must/sure’, but it can take scope over a deontic modal like -yea ha- ‘should/must’. In thisway, -ese is allowed in (45a), because its syntactic position is somewhere above the deonticmodal -eya ha-.
13 The structures in this subsection come from Condoravdi and Lauer (2011) with somemodifications for Korean causal clauses.
42
(46) kilum-igas-NOM
ttelecy-erun.out-PROG
ka-nikka,-because,
cwuyuso-eygas.station-at
tulle-la!stop.by-IMP
‘Stop at the gas station, because we are almost out of gas.’
(47)MoodP2
becauseP
kilum-i ttelecy-e ka-nikka‘because we are almostout of gas’
MoodP1
IP
cwuyuso-ey tulle-‘stop at the gas station’
Mood
-laIMP
(48)∣∣ -la ∣∣c = λp [λw[PEPw (Sp, p)]]∣∣ MoodP1 ∣∣c = ∣∣ [Ad stops at the gas station]-la ∣∣c
= λw[PEPw(Sp, λu[Ad stops at the gas station in u])]∣∣ -nikka ∣∣c = λpλq. CAUSE(p, q)∣∣ becauseP ∣∣c = λq. CAUSE(λv[Sp & Ad are run out of gas in v], q)∣∣ MoodP2∣∣c = CAUSE(λv[Sp & Ad run out of gas in v], λw[PEPw(Sp,λu[Ad
stops at the gas station in u])])
According to (47), a nikka-clause targets a modalized proposition, rather than a
speech act.14 In this way, a nikka-clause is understood as giving a reason for the speaker’s
preference for the proposition of the main clause. In (46), for example, the lack of gas caused
14 As shown in the tree structure, I assume that attaching a nikka-clause is adjunction of theadverbial clause to MoodP.
43
the speaker’s preference for ‘(the hearer’s) stopping at the gas station.’ Thus, (46) can be
roughly paraphrased as ‘I prefer that you stop at the gas station, because we are almost out
of gas.’
Since other ‘non-assertion’ type sentences (i.e., promissives and exhortatives) can
also be construed as expressing the preferential attitude of the speaker, the current analysis
can extend to such cases when a nikka-clause attaches to exhortatives or promissives. For
example, the denotation of the exhortative in (49a) can be illustrated as in (49b). The sen-
tence in (49a) conveys the meaning that the speaker’s knowledge that today is the hearer’s
birthday caused the speaker to prefer to come early. Thus, (49a) can be paraphrased as ‘I
prefer to come early because today is your birthday.’15
(49) a. onul-untoday-TOP
neyyour
sayngil-i-nikkabirthday-be-because
ilccikearly
o-ma.come-PROM
‘I will come early because today is your birthday.’
b. ∣∣[today.is.your.birthday]-nikka, IMP(λv[Sp comes early in v])∣∣c
15 In (21), we saw that only a nikka-clause is compatible with performative predicates (e.g.,pwuthakha- ‘request’, chwuchenha- ‘recommend’, etc.) which express speech acts such asREQUEST or RECOMMEND, as follows:
(i) ney-kayou-NOM
swuhak-ulmath-ACC
calha-*ese/nikkado.well-because
wuliour
ttaldaughter
kwaoy-lultutoring-ACC
pwuthakha-n-ta.request-PRES-DEC
‘I request the after-school tutoring for my daughter, because you are good at math.’
According to Condoravdi and Lauer (2011), performative verbs like promise also involvea PEP operator in their semantic denotations (see Condoravdi and Lauer, 2011: 11 (31)).From this perspective, the nikka-clause in (i) can be understood as modifying the speaker’spreference, which is described by the performative predicate pwuthakha- ‘request’.
44
= CAUSE(λu[today is Ad’s birthday in u], λw[PEPw(Sp, λv[Sp comes early in v])
Given that a nikka-clause takes a clause type marked phrase, it is natural to think
that a nikka-clause attaches to a declarative mood marked phrase. The syntactic structure is
shown in (50), where φ and ψ are propositions and DEC is a declarative mood. Given that
there’s no implicit epistemic phrase in Korean, I argue that the structure in (50) provides both
the propositional-level and epistemic-level causation.
(50) ψ-nikka [ DEC(φ) ]
Thus, the syntactic structure and the semantic representation of the declarative sen-
tence (51) are illustrated in (52) and (53), respectively.
(51) pi-karain-NOM
o-nikka,come-because
ttang-iground-NOM
chwukchwukhay-ci-n-ta.wet-INCH-PRES-DEC
‘The ground is getting wet, because it is raining.’
45
(52)MoodP2
becauseP
pi-ka o-nikka‘because it rains’
MoodP1
IP
ttan-i chwukchwukha-e ci-n-‘the ground is getting wet’
Mood
-taDEC
(53)∣∣ MoodP1 ∣∣c = ∣∣DEC([the ground is getting wet])∣∣c
= λv[the ground is getting wet in v]∣∣ -nikka ∣∣c = λpλq. CAUSE(p, q)
∣∣ becauseP ∣∣c = λq.CAUSE(λv[it rains in v], q)
∣∣ MoodP2 ∣∣c = λq. CAUSE(λv[it rains in v], λu[the ground is gettingwet in u] )
Since there is no implicit modal operator, the difference between an epistemic reading
and a propositional reading is whether the main clause includes an overt epistemic modal.
In other words, if the proposition of the main clause includes an epistemic modal, e.g., thul-
limeps- ‘must’ or -ul kes- ‘will’, the nikka-clause is understood as giving a reason for the
speaker’s epistemic judgment. In contrast, if the proposition of the main clause does not
contain a modal, the nikka-clause is interpreted as expressing the propositional causal re-
lation. For example, the nikka-clause in (54a) gives a reason for the possibility of Mina’s
being sick, because the main clause includes the epistemic modal thullimeps- ‘must’. The
46
sentence in (54b) expresses the causal relation between the two events (i.e., the sunset caused
the darkness), because there’s no explicit modal in the main clause.
(54) a. onultoday
mina-kaMina-NOM
hakkyo-eyschool-to
annot
o-ass-unikka,come-PAST-because
aphunsick
keyNML
thullimeps-ta.must-DEC
‘Mina must be sick, because she didn’t come to school today.’
b. hay-kasun-NOM
ci-nikkago.down-because
pakk-ioutside-NOM
kkamkkamhay-ci-n-ta.dark-INCH-PRES-DEC
‘It is getting dark outside because the sun has set.’
The semantic representations for the sentences in (54a) and (54b) are illustrated in
(55a) and (55b), respectively:16
(55) a. ∣∣ [M didn’t come to school today]-nikka, DEC([M must be sick])∣∣c
= CAUSE(λv[M didn’t come to school today in v], λu[M must be sick in u])
b. ∣∣ [the sun has set]-nikka, DEC([it is getting dark outside]) ]∣∣c
16 In (55a), the epistemic modal -thullimeps ‘must’ takes scope over the proposition (e.g.,Must [Mina is sick]). In this case, however, the epistemic modal does not serve as a headof the covert epistemic phrase (e.g., ModP in (24)). According to Kratzer (2012), the covertepistemic modal MUST is very similar to the overt epistemic modal expression must, but dif-fers from its explicit counterpart in its evidentiality. In her analysis of conditionals, Kratzer(2012) claimed that if there’s an overt must, the sentence can be understood as doubly modal-ized.
47
= CAUSE(λv[the sun has set in v], λu[it is getting dark outside in u])
In (55a), the nikka-clause gives a reason for the epistemic necessity of Mina’s illness.
In contrast, the nikka-clause in (55b) gives a reason for getting dark.
2.4 Applying the Proposed Analysis
In this section, I will show how the proposed analysis explains the peculiar distribu-
tion of nikka-clauses in Korean.
2.4.1 Modifying preferences rather than speech acts
In cases of (so-called) speech act causation, the proposed analysis assumes that a
nikka-clause takes a modalized proposition rather than a speech act. This directly explains
why sentences like (56) are not acceptable even though the nikka-clause gives a proper rea-
son for the following ORDER act. For example, (56) is infelicitous although it is natural
for fathers to order their kids to do something like ‘apply for a college’. Under the current
theory, the unacceptability of (56) is due to the fact that a nikka-clause does not give a proper
reason for the speaker’s preferential attitude in the main clause: being one’s father (i.e., the
father-and-son relationship) cannot directly cause him to have a preference for his son to
‘apply to the linguistics department.’
(56) #nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikka,father-because
enehakkwa-eyLinguistics.Dept.-to
ciwenhay-la!apply-IMP
48
(Intended) ‘Apply to the department of Linguistics, because I’m your father.’
If the proposition of a nikka-clause describes the direct reason for the speaker’s pref-
erence for the main clause, the sentence becomes natural, as in (57). In (57a), having an
aptitude for linguistics can be a direct reason for the speaker’s preference for the hearer to
apply to the linguistics department. Similarly, (57b) is felicitous, because being one’s father
can directly cause his preference for his kid (= the hearer) to be polite.
(57) a. neyyour
cekseng-eyaptitude-to
mac-unikkafit-because
enehakkwa-eyLinguistics.Dept.-to
ciwenhay-la!apply-IMP
‘Apply to the Linguistics Dept., because you have a good aptitude for Linguis-tics.’
b. nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikkafather-because
na-hanteyme-to
kongsonhakeypolitely
malhay-la!speak-IMP
‘Speak politely, because I’m your father.’
The present theory can also explain why a nikka-clause cannot be followed by an
interrogative sentence, as in (58). According to the current analysis, a nikka-clause always
takes a propositional constituent as its argument. Note that a modalized proposition is still
propositional. Thus, the ungrammaticality of (58) is due to the fact that the denotation of the
interrogative sentence is a set of propositions rather than a (single) proposition.17
(58) *nay-kaI-NOM
cwusolokaddressbook
mantununmake
cwung-i-nikka,while-Cop-because
neyou
eti-eywhere-at
sani?live
17 In this dissertation I adopt the idea that the semantic denotation of a question is a set ofpossible answers to the question (e.g., Hamblin, 1958, 1973).
49
(Intended) ‘Where do you live, because I’m making an address book.’
Note that (58) is ungrammatical, not because the main clause is in the form of a ques-
tion, but because the semantic denotation of the main clause is not a single proposition. Let
us consider the following examples:
(59) a. naI
cwusolokaddress.book
mantu-nunmake-ADN
cwung-i-nikka,while-COP-because
neyou
comlittle
towa-cwul-lay?help-give-will.INT
‘Will you help me because I’m making an address book?’
b. ne-nunyou-TOP
yeca-nikka,woman-because
yeca-tul-iwoman-PL-NOM
ettenwhat
yenghwa-lulmovie-ACC
cohaha-nuncilike-COMP
calwell
alknow
keNML
ani-ni?not-INT?
‘It is the case that you know well what movies women like because you are awoman, right?’
The sentences in (59) are all grammatical even though the main clause is in the form
of a question. If we take a closer look at these examples, however, we can see that the
main clause questions cannot be construed as denoting a set of propositions. The idea of
the semantic denotation of a question as a set of propositions is based on the assumption
that the interpretation of a question is a set of its possible answers (e.g., Hamblin, 1958).
For example, the yes-no question Is it raining? is understood as denoting the set of its pos-
sible answers: {It is raining, It is not raining}. Since the main clause of (59a) is not an
information-seeking question, it doesn’t seem to be the case that its semantic denotation is a
set of propositions. (59b) can be explained in a similar way. In this case, the speaker doesn’t
50
want to know whether the hearer knows about what women like. Instead, the speaker seems
to have a preconception that the hearer must know well about what women like, and wants
the addressee to decide whether he agrees with that. In addition, the fact that (59b) cannot
be followed by a negative response also shows that it is not a normal question denoting a set
of propositions.18
(60) A: ne-nunyou-TOP
yeca-nikka,woman-because
yeca-tul-iwoman-PL-NOM
ettenwhat
senmwul-ulpresent-ACC
cohaha-nuncilike-COMP
calwell
alknow
keNML
anh-ni?not-INT?
‘It is the case that you know well what presents women like because you are awoman, right?’
B: #Ani.‘No.’
Recall that if the speech act meaning is explicitly represented in the syntax, the sen-
tences (56) and (58) become natural. The examples are shown in (61).
(61) a. nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
apeci-nikkafather-because
malha-nuntey,talk-and
enehakkwa-eylinguistics.dept.-to
ciwenhay-la.apply.for-IMP
‘Apply to the Linguistics Department, I’m ordering you because I’m your father.’
b. nay-kaI-NOM
cwusolokaddressbook
mantununmake
cwung-i-nikkawhile-COP-because
mwut-nuntey,ask-and
neyou
eti-eywhere-at
sa-ni?live-INT
18 Since this is not a normal question, the addressee doesn’t have to answer. This wasinspired by an anonymous reviewer’s comment.
51
‘Where do you live, I am asking you because I’m making an address book.’
The current analysis naturally captures the grammaticality of these sentences. The
speech act is overtly expressed as a verb (e.g., mwut- ‘ask’). Consequently, in (61), the nikka-
clauses are followed by an ordinary declarative sentence that expresses the causal relation
between two propositions. For example, (61a) means that being the hearer’s father caused the
speaker to order the hearer to do something, and (61b) means that the address book making
caused the speaker to ask a question.
2.4.2 No implicit modal
Under the proposed analysis, it is assumed that a nikka-clause takes a mood phrase,
whose denotation is a modalized proposition. Under this assumption, we can have epistemic
or propositional causation when a nikka-clause is attached to a declarative mood phrase. The
difference between the epistemic and the propositional causation rests in the existence of an
explicit modal in the proposition of the main clause. Unlike German or English, there is no
implicit epistemic modal operator, and as a result an epistemic causal reading can be derived
only when the main clause includes an explicit modal expression, such as pwunmyengha-
‘must’, as in (62).
(62) a. pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-ci-eturn.on-Pass
iss-unikkaProg-because
cip-eyhouse-at
nwukwunkasomeone
issnun-keyexist-nml
pwunmyengha-ta.certain-DEC
52
‘There must be someone in the house, because the light is on.’
b. #pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-ci-eturn.on-Pass
iss-unikkaProg-because
cip-eyhouse-at
nwukwunkasomeone
iss-e.exist-DEC
(Intended) ‘There’s someone in the house, because the light is on.’
In (62b), since the main clause proposition does not include an overt modal expres-
sion, the sentence is understood to mark a propositional causation. (62b) is infelicitous,
because it makes little sense that the light’s being on caused someone to be home.
2.4.3 Linear order matters: cross-linguistic comparison
Given the data we have seen in this chapter, one difference between English and Ko-
rean is that while English because-clauses allow epistemic- and speech act-level causations,
Korean causal clauses do not. If we consider the location of the causal clause, we may come
to a different conclusion. Even in English, the epistemic-level causation and speech act-level
causation seem impossible if the because-clause comes after the main clause. As shown in
(63), a requirement for an overt modal seems to correlate with the position of the causal
clause. If a because-clause precedes the main clause, an overt epistemic modal is needed:
(63) a. There is someone in the house, because the light is on.
b. ??/*Because the light is on, there is someone in the house.
c. Because the light is on, there must be someone in the house.
53
The possibility of modifying the speech act is also related to the position of the causal
clause. If a because-clause comes before the main clause, modifying the main clause’s
QUESTION act is not available:
(64) a. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on.
b. ??/*Because there’s a good movie on, what are you doing tonight?
Many previous researchers have pointed out that a because-clause behaves differently
depending on where it occurs (e.g., Verstraete, 2004; Krifka, to appear; etc.). For exam-
ple, Krifka (to appear) showed that sentence-initial because-clauses only express a proposi-
tional causal relation, whereas sentence-final because-clauses can also be used to modify the
speech act of the main clause.19
Together with Korean nikka-clauses, we can find a cross-linguistic pattern that sentence-
initial causal clauses can only express propositional causations, while sentence-final causal
clauses can also express higher-level causations, i.e., epistemic or speech act causations.
When the causal clause precedes the main clause, the speech act modification is not available
and an epistemic reading can arise just in case the main clause includes an overt epistemic
modal. This assumption can be supported by the fact that if a nikka-clause occurs after the
19 In his analysis, epistemic causation is understood as justification for the speaker’s as-sertion of the main clause. In other words, a because-clause is analyzed as modifying anASSERTION speech act of the main clause. Also, in his analysis, the sentences with an overtmodal (e.g., (63c)) were not discussed.
54
main clause, the sentence sounds a bit better, as exemplified in (65).
(65) a. ?cip-eyhouse-at
nwukwunkasomeone
iss-e.exist-DEC.
pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-ci-eon-PASS
iss-unikka.PROG-because
‘There’s someone in the house. This is because the light is on.’
b. ??neyou
eti-eywhere-at
sa-ni,live-INT
nay-kaI-NOM
cwusolokaddressbook
mantununmake
cwung-i-nikka.while-COP-because
‘Where do you live, because I’m making an address book.’
In the sentence-final position, the particle -ketun ‘because’ can be used instead of
-nikka.20 Since -ketun is a sentence-ending particle, it is more natural than -nikka in the
sentence-final position.
(66) cip-eyhouse-at
nwukwunkasomeone
iss-e.exist-DEC.
pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-ci-eon-Pass
iss-ketun.Prog-because
‘There’s someone in the house. This is because the light is on.’
A ketun-clause seems to be able to modify a preceding sentence’s speech act as well.
In (67a), for example, the ketun-clause is giving a reason why the speaker asked the question.
Similarly, the ketun-clause of (67b) is giving a reason why the speaker gives the order ‘to be
20 The particle -ketun has been understood to be ambiguous between a causal meaning anda conditional meaning. When it occurs in sentence-final position, it has a causal meaning. Incontrast, if it occurs in a subordinate clause, it functions as a conditional marker (Kim K. Y.,2005).
55
quiet’: in this case, the ketun-clause expresses that being one’s father gives the authority to
order the kid to do something.
(67) a. ilyoil-eysunday-at
mwewhat
hay?do?
po-kosee
siphunwant
yenghwa-kamovie-NOM
iss-ketun.exist-because.
‘What are you going to do on Sunday? Because there’s a movie I want to see.’
b. coyonghibe.quite
hay-la!do-IMP
nay-kaI-NOM
neyyour
appa-ketun?father-because
‘Be quite! Because I am your father.’
Such a relation between the level of causation and the position of the causal clause
can also be found in many different languages. (68) shows two distinct causal connectives in
Spanish: como and porque. A como-clause always comes before the main clause, whereas a
porque-clause appears after the main clause. As shown in (68), unlike porque, como-clauses
do not seem to allow an epistemic reading when there’s no overt modal expression.
(68) a. JohnJohn
laher
ama,love
porque/*comobecause
vinocome
ato
suher
fiestaparty
deof
cumpleanos.birthday
‘John loves her, because he came to her birthday party.’
b. *porque/??comobecause
JohnJohn
vinocome
ato
suher
fiestaparty
deof
cumpleanos,birthday
laher
ama.love
‘Because John came to her birthday party, he loves her.’
c. comobecause
JohnJohn
vinocome
ato
suher
fiestaparty
deof
cumpleanos,birthday
debemust-3rd-PRES
deof
amarla.love.her
56
‘Because John came to her birthday party, he must love her.’
Given the data we have seen in this section, we can see that English and Korean, in
fact, are not different. If we compare sentence-initial causal clauses, the two languages are
essentially the same. In both languages, sentence-initial causal clauses do not modify the
implicit epistemic-level phrase or the speech act of the main clause. In contrast, sentence-
final causal clauses can modify those higher-level phrases. The only difference between the
two languages is that English uses a because-clause regardless of where it occurs, whereas
Korean uses different causal clauses depending on where they appear. While -ese and -nikka
can be used when the causal clause comes before the main clause, -ketun is used when the
causal clause comes after the main clause or as a separate sentence.21
2.4.4 Unembeddability of nikka
In Section 2.3, we saw that a nikka-clause cannot be embedded under other semantic
operators such as negation, conditionals, and questions, as in (69). The proposed analysis
enables us to explain this un-embeddability of nikka-clauses.
(69) a. Nikka-clause in the scope of the conditional
21 In (i), since is better than because. However, since is different from Korean nikka in thatit can be followed by a question as in (ii) (Prof. Ben Bruening p.c.).
(i) Since we’re almost out of gas, pull over at the next rest stop!
(ii) Since we’re having guests over tonight, what should make for dinner?
In this dissertation I do not discuss the details about since. I leave this issue for future work.
57
aphu-ese/*nikkasick-because
nuc-ess-umyen,late-PAST-if
sihemcang-eyexam.room-to
tulekalenter
swucan
iss-ta.-DEC
‘You can enter the exam room if you are late because of sickness.’
b. Nikka-clause in the scope of a question
nwukawho
swukcey-lulassignment-ACC
annot
nay-ese/*nay-ss-unikkasubmit-because/submit-PAST-because
F-lulF-ACC
pat-ass-ni?receive-PAST-Q
‘Who received an F because he didn’t submit the assignment?’
c. Nikka-clause under negation
mina-nunMina-TOP
pesu-lulbus-ACC
nohchi-ese/*nohchi-ess-(u)nikkamiss-because/miss-PAST-because
nuc-ci-(nun)late-not-(TOP)
anh-ass-ta.not-PAST-DEC
‘Mina wasn’t late because she missed the bus.’
The current analysis says that a nikka-clause is attached to a Mood phrase. In other
words, a nikka-clause is attached to an intermediate-level phrase located between an utterance-
level phrase (e.g., ForceP) and a propositional-level phrase (i.e., IP) which is responsible for
the core proposition of the sentence. Since semantic operators like negation are part of a
proposition, they should be calculated before the proposition is packaged with the clause
type indicator (i.e., mood) and is ready to be uttered. For example, the negation operator,
whose semantic type is <st, st>, takes a proposition and provides another proposition. Since a
58
nikka-clause takes a clause type marked phrase, which is higher than the (core) propositional-
level phrase, it is outside the scope of such operators.22
The analysis of a nikka-clause as targeting a MoodP is also supported by the fact
that a nikka-clause can be embedded under verbs of attribution, such as mit- ‘believe’ or
malha- ‘say’. According to Krifka (to appear), verbs like say or wonder can take speech
act arguments. In (70a), for example, the verb say takes an ASSERTION act as its argument.
Similarly, the verb wonder in (70b) takes a QUESTION act (Krifka, to appear: pp.23 (53b),
(61b)).
(70) a. Mary said she hates John.
b. John wonders who Mary saw.
The verbs of attribution in Korean also seem to take a speech act argument, as shown
in (71). In (71a), for example, the verb malha- takes the utterance ‘I(=Mina) hate John’ and
Mina is understood as the speaker of the uttered sentence.
22 Note that a nikka-clause can be embedded if the semantic operator is in a higher clause,as in (i).
(i) Mina-nunMina-TOP
pesu-lulbus-ACC
nohchi-ess-unikkamiss-PAST-because
nucunlate
ke-yNML-COP
ani-ta.not-DEC
‘It is not the case that Mina was late because she missed the bus.’
59
(71) a. mina-nunMina-TOP
con-ulJohn-ACC
silhehan-ta-kohate-DEC-INT
malhay-ss-ta.say-PAST-DEC
‘Mina said she hates John.’
b. mina-nunMina-TOP
hyuna-kaHyuna-NOM
nwukwu-lulwho-ACC
po-ass-nuncisee-PAST-INT
mwul-ess-ta.ask-PAST-DEC
‘Mina asked who Hyuna saw.’
Given that attribution verbs like malha- ‘say’ or mwut- ‘ask’ can embed an utterance-
level phrase, it is expected that a nikka-clause can be embedded under such attribution verbs.
To assign an illocutionary force to a sentence, the clausal type of the sentence should be
identified. Thus, the utterance-level phrase should involve a clause type marked phrase (i.e.,
MoodP). Since verbs like ‘say’ embed an utterance-level phrase, they are predicted to be able
to embed a Mood phrase as well. This turns out to be true, as seen in (72); a nikka-clause
can be used under attributions, and the causal meaning of the nikka-clause is affected by the
veracity of the main clause. For example, in (72b), the causal meaning of the nikka-clause
can be cancelled, depending on whether the main clause is true or not.
(72) a. kwakepast
salamtul-unpeople-TOP
ttang-iground-NOM
phyengphyengha-nikkaflat-because
cikwu-toearth-also
phyengphyengha-takoflat-COMP
sayngkakhayss-ta.thought-DEC
‘In the past, people thought that the earth was flat because the ground is flat.’
b. mina-nunMina-TOP
con-iJohn-NOM
kil-ulway-ACC
molu-nikkanot.know-because
nuc-ess-takolate-PAST-COMP
mitnunta.believe
hacimanhowever
con-unJohn-TOP
kil-ulway-ACC
calwell
alkoknow
iss-ess-ta.exist-PAST-DEC
60
‘Mina believes that John was late because he doesn’t know the route. However,
he knows the route very well.’
It should be noted here that an ese-clause can be embedded under other semantic
operators, as seen in (69). The proposed analysis explains this by assuming that an ese-
clause takes an IP. In other words, although both causal connectives, nikka- and ese-clauses,
take a propositional argument, only a nikka-clause can take a Mood Phrase, which is higher
than a CP. Since an ese-clause is part of the core proposition (i.e., the radical), it can be
understood to be inside the scope of other semantic operators.23
2.4.5 More on propositional causation
2.4.5.1 Connecting two mood phrases
In the proposed analysis, the difference between -ese and -nikka is due to the different
arguments they take: while a nikka-clause takes a clause type marked phrase (i.e., MoodP),
an ese-clause takes an IP. Schematically, this can be illustrated as in (73).
23 Since an ese-clause attaches to an IP under a MoodP, it cannot be followed by a phrasemarked by its own clause type. This explains why an ese-clause cannot be used to modifya non-assertion type clause like imperatives. An ese-clause can be compatible with a non-assertion type clause only if the whole sentence is embedded under the scope of a Mood, asin (i). In (i), the ese-clause is understood to be inside the scope of the Mood, IMP.
(i) ip-imouth-NOM
simsimhay-sebe.bored-because
mek-ci-(nun)eat-NEG-(TOP)
ma-seyyo.NEG-HON.IMP
‘Don’t eat just because you want to put something in your mouth.’
61
(73) a. ψ-nikka [Mood(φ)]
b. Mood([ψ-ese φ])
Once the complements of the causal connectives are taken into consideration, the
structures in (73) might need some modifications. As in (74), nikka-clauses are different
from ese-clauses in that they are obligatorily tensed (e.g., Lee E. K., 1990; Lee S. P., 1978;
and many others).
(74) a. pi-karain-NOM
o-nikka,come-because
ttang-iground-NOM
cec-ess-ta.wet-PAST-DEC
‘The ground got wet, because it rained.’
b. pi-karain-NOM
o-ass-unikka,come-PAST-because
ttang-iground-NOM
cec-ess-ta.wet-PAST-DEC
‘The ground got wet, because it rained.’
c. pi-karain-NOM
o-(*ass)-ase,come-(*PAST)-because
ttang-iground-NOM
cec-ess-ta.wet-PAST-DEC
(Intended) ‘The ground got wet, because it rained.’
The temporal interpretation of a nikka-clause may differ depending on the tense
marker. As in (74a), if there’s no overt tense marker, the nikka-clause receives a present
tense interpretation; the raining event overlaps with the ground’s getting wet. In contrast, as
in (74b), if the past tense marker -ass- is realized, the event of the nikka-clause is interpreted
62
as past (i.e., past of the utterance time); it rained in the past of the utterance time shortly be-
fore the ground’s getting wet. Thus, the nikka-clause and the main clause are independent of
one another with regard to their temporal interpretations. As seen in (74c), unlike -nikka, the
tense interpretation of the ese-clause hinges on the tense interpretation of the main clause.
Even though there is no past tense marker, the event of the ese-clause is interpreted as past:
it rained in the past of the utterance time shortly before the ground’s getting wet.
Based on what we just observed in (74), I claim that unlike -ese, the complement of
-nikka must be marked by mood. This is also supported by the fact that the Korean declara-
tive mood marker must be preceded by a tense.
(75) a. pi-karain-NOM
o-#(n)-ta.come-(PRES)-DEC.
‘It is raining.’
b. pi-karain-NOM
o-#(ass)-ta.come-(PAST)-DEC.
‘It rained.’
Even if there’s no overt tense marker, as in (74a), I assume that a phonologically
unpronounced declarative marker φdec is involved. In other words, the Korean declarative
marker has a phonologically null allomorph, and so the complement of the nikka-clause is
marked by the covert declarative mood marker φdec.24 In this way, the causal connective
24 It should be noted that a nikka-clause can include an overt declarative marker, and havingan overt declarative marker results in additional meaning, i.e. a reportative evidentiality
63
-nikka is understood as combining two mood marked clauses. From this perspective, the
structures in (73) can be revised as follows:
(76) a. [Mood(ψ)]-nikka [Mood(φ)]
b. Mood[ψ-ese φ]
Since a declarative mood is semantically almost vacuous, in the propositional usage,
-nikka and -ese are often interchangeable without a significant difference in their meanings.
The example is repeated below:
(77) pi-karain-NOM
o-ase/(?)nikka,come-because
pakk-ioutside-NOM
kkamkkamhay-ci-n-ta.dark-INCH-PRES-DEC
meaning. For example, (i) conveys the additional message that there is a reportative sourcefor the proposition of the nikka-clause: the sentence ‘p-ta-nikka, q’ roughly means ‘BecauseI was told that p, q.’ This is because -ta-nikka in (i) is in fact an abbreviated form of thequotative expression -ta-ko ha-nikka- ‘because I was told that ...’ As shown in (ii) ese-clausescan also include a quotative expression -ta-ko ha-. Thus, on the surface an ese-clause seemsto be directly preceded by the mood marker, but in fact an abbreviated quotative expression-ta-ko hay-se ‘Because I was told that ...’ is embedded. In this way, -ese is preceded by averb -ha, but not the mood -ta.
(i) pi-karain-NOM
o-n-ta-nikka,come-PRES-DEC-because,
wuwulha-ta.depressed-DEC
‘I feel depressed because I was told that it is raining.’
(ii) Mina-kaMina-NOM
o-ass-ta-yse,come-PAST-DEC-because,
na-toI-also
wacome
po-ass-e.see-PAST-DEC
‘Because I was told that Mina came, I also came.’
64
‘It is dark outside, because it is raining.’
As marked by the parenthesized question mark, however, using -nikka does not sound
as perfect compared to -ese. Also, as the previous literature pointed out, there are exam-
ples that suggest that -nikka and -ese convey slightly different meanings even when they
are fully interchangeable. Unlike -ese, -nikka expresses that the causal relation is a result
of the speaker’s subjective reasoning (e.g., Nam, 1978; Nam and Lukoff, 1983; Sohn, 1992;
Hwang, 2008; and many others). For example, while (78a) simply states the fact that Hyuna’s
beauty caused her to be popular, (78b) means that the speaker inferred that Hyuna’s good
looks caused her popularity.25
(78) a. hyena-nunHyuna-TOP
yeypp-esepretty-because
aytulkids
sai-eyseamong-in
inki-kapopularity-NOM
manh-a.many-DEC
25 Since the causal relation is part of the speaker’s thoughts or beliefs, other people mightthink differently (e.g., her personality or intelligence might cause her to be popular). Inother words, a nikka-clause leaves other alternative possibilities but highlights the reasonwhich was chosen by the speaker. Thus, (52a) is often used in the context where everybodyagrees with the causal relation, whereas (52b) can be used even if it is debatable whetherHyuna’s good looks caused her popularity. For a similar reason, a nikka-clause can be usedeven when the causal relation goes against common sense, as follows:
(i) e?oh?
tayyonglyangmassive
phocang-ulpackage-ACC
sa-nikka/#se,buy-because,
kaps-icost-NOM
ohilyerather
temore
pissa-ney.expensive-APR
‘Oh, wait. (Contrary to general expectations) it is rather expensive because I bought itin bulk packages.’
(ii) pi-karain-NOM
o-nikka/#ase,come-because
tep-ta.hot-DEC
(Yoon, 2005: pp.181)
‘It’s hot, because it is raining.’
65
‘Hyuna is popular with her friends, because she is pretty.’
b. hyena-nunHyuna-TOP
yeypp-unikkapretty-because
aytulkids
sai-eyseamong-in
inki-kapopularity-NOM
manh-a.many-DEC
‘[I inferred that] Hyuna is popular with her friends, because she is pretty’
Another well-known difference between the two connectives in the propositional us-
age is that a nikka-clause is often infelicitous as an answer to a why-question (Sohn, 1993;
Hwang, 2008; among many others).
(79) a. A: Why did you walk to work?
B: chapi-kabus.fare-NOM
eps-ese/#unikka-yo.not.have-because-HON
‘Because I don’t have bus fare.’ (Hwang, 2008: pp.58 (4))
b. (In the bank)
Teller: ettenwhat
il-lowork-for
osyess-supni-kka?came-HON-INT
‘For what reason did you come here?’
Customer: sinyongkhadu-lulcredit.card-ACC
pwunsilhay-ese-yo/#pwunsilhayss-unikka-yo.lost-because-HON/lost-PAST-because-HON
‘Because I lost my credit card.’
In (79), the unacceptability of nikka seems to be interconnected with its subjectivity.
If somebody asks a simple information-seeking question, nobody would expect that the an-
swerer gives his/her own opinion or judgment as an answer. If this explanation is correct, we
66
should expect that a nikka-clause can serve as an answer to a why-question if the addressee’s
opinion or reason for a decision is asked for. As we can see in (80), this turns out to be true.
In (80), A is asking what B thinks is the reason for people not trusting politicians.
(80) (Asking about the speaker’s opinion)
A: waywhy
salamtul-unpeople-TOP
cengchiintul-ulpoliticians-ACC
mit-citrust-
moshan-ta-konot-DEC-QUOT
sayngkakhay?think
‘Why do you think people do not trust politicians?
B: kutul-ithey-NOM
senkekongyak-ulelection.promises-ACC
calwell
cikhi-cikeep-
mos-hayss-unikka.not-did-because
‘Because they have failed to keep their election promises.’
Given that a propositional -nikka combines two declarative mood marked phrases, we
may assume that nikka’s subjectivity has something to do with the meaning of the declarative
mood operator. Although the declarative mood has often been considered to be semantically
vacuous, some dynamic semantic analyses assume that the declarative mood also plays some
role in the semantics (Gunlogson, 2003; Davis, 2011; and others). In dynamic semantics,
the function of a mood operator is to express how the proposition of the sentence is up-
dated (i.e., its context change potential). In this way, the declarative mood operator can be
understood to denote that the agent’s public beliefs are updated with its proposition. For
example, Davis (2011) provided the semantic denotation of a declarative sentence in (81)
67
(Davis, 2011: pp.44 (23)).26
(81) ∣∣DEC p∣∣ = λc.{ c′ ∣ ∣∣p∣∣ ∈ PBc′
spkr }
Going back to propositional nikka-clauses, I assume that -nikka combines two declar-
ative mood marked phrases. Together with the denotation in (81), we can say that -nikka
provides a causal relation between the two beliefs of the speaker: one piece of the speaker’s
knowledge (i.e., the denotation of nikka’s complement) caused the speaker to commit herself
to believing the proposition of the main clause. In this way, the speaker’s subjective reason-
ing meaning can be understood as concomitant to the expression of a causal relation between
two beliefs.
Now let us consider (so-called) speech act nikka-clauses and epistemic nikka-clauses.
The idea of embedding a declarative mood marked phrase inside a nikka-clause doesn’t seem
to go against the present analysis of -nikka in the speech act and epistemic usages. In speech
act causation, a nikka-clause can be understood to provide the speaker’s belief/knowledge as
the reason for the speaker’s preferential attitude as described in the following main clause.
For example, (82a) can be roughly paraphrased as, ‘Because of my knowledge that the child
26 In Gunlogson (2003) and Davis (2011), it is claimed that the declarative mood operatorDEC does not specify whose commitments are updated: the commitments of a conversationparticipant (i.e., the agent x) are updated. A rising/falling intonation determines which par-ticipants’ commitments are updated (Davis, 2011: pp.43). The rising intonation assigns theaddressee to the agent x, whereas the falling intonation assigns the speaker to the agent x.For simplicity, we assume that the declarative mood updates the speaker’s commitments inthis chapter.
68
is taking a nap, I prefer you to be quiet.’ Similarly, the nikka-clause in the epistemic usage
can be understood to provide the speaker’s belief/knowledge as a reason for the speaker’s
epistemic judgment in the main clause. For example, (82b) roughly means, ‘Because of my
knowledge that he didn’t call us, I make the judgment that he is still on his way home.’
(82) a. ai-kachild-NOM
naccam-ulnap-ACC
ca-nikka,sleep-because,
coyonghibe.quite
hay-la.do-IMP
‘Because the child is taking a nap, be quite!’
b. cenhwa-kaphone.call-NOM
annot
wass-unikka,came-because,
acikyet
ka-kogo-
iss-nunPROG-ADN
keyNML
thullimeps-ta.must-DEC
‘Because he didn’t call us, he must be on his way home.’
The previous literature did notice the difference between the two causal connectives,
i.e., -ese and -nikka, in the propositional usage (e.g., Nam and Lukoff, 1983; Sohn, 1993;
Hwang, 2008; among many others).27 However, no existing analyses seem to give a clear
explanation for the difference. Although the current theory cannot give a complete answer,
at least we can see that the two causal clauses must have different syntactic structures, and
27 Nam and Lukoff (1983) claimed that while -nikka expresses a reason for the speaker’sdiscovery in the main clause, -ese expresses a cause for the following proposition/event. Incontrast, Hwang (2008) claimed that -ese expresses a reason for the following proposition,whereas -nikka expresses ‘opportunity’, which leads the speaker to have the thought in themain clause. In Sohn (1993), it was claimed that the two causal connectives are different inthat nikka-clauses function as a frame setting topic. Also, she claimed that “-nikka signals aspeaker’s affective disposition in that it indexes the speaker’s assertive and emphatic attitudetoward the propositional content it is attached to” (Sohn, 1993: pp.94).
69
the subjective meaning is closely related to such structural differences. I will discuss this
issue in a follow-up study, which basically goes along with the main ideas of this paper.
2.4.5.2 Is -nikka Evidential?
Given that a nikka-clause indicates that the causal meaning was drawn from the
speaker’s subjective reasoning, one might argue that -nikka is an inferential evidential ex-
pression, in the sense of McCready and Ogata (2007). McCready and Ogata (2007) argued
that inferential evidentials indicate that the speaker’s conclusion, i.e., judgment of probabili-
ties or expectations, was drawn from inference. For example, in (83), the Japanese inferential
evidential -rashii ‘seem’ indicates that the speaker’s knowledge about John’s coming was ob-
tained from inference (McCready and Ogata, 2007: pp.153-154).
(83) Jon-waJohn-TOP
konya-notonight-GEN
paatiiparty
nito
kurucome
rashiirashii
‘It seems that John will come to the party tonight.’
(McCready and Ogata, 2007)
This evidential analysis seems to explain all the peculiar properties of -nikka we
have seen in this chapter. First, the evidential analysis appears to explain the propositional -
nikka’s subjectivity. Secondly, the evidential analysis may explain why the epistemic reading
requires an overt epistemic modal expression. Under the evidential analysis, the requirement
70
for explicit modals in the epistemic usage can be understood to be due to -nikka’s eviden-
tial nature: as an inferential evidential marker, nikka requires the main clause to be the
speaker’s epistemic judgment. Thirdly, the overgeneration problems of (so-called) speech
act -nikka may also be explained. As we have seen, a nikka-clause cannot be followed by an
interrogative. Under the evidential analysis, a nikka-clause offers evidence for the speaker’s
conclusion as represented in the main clause. From this perspective, it is natural to provide
evidence leading to the conclusion represented by a proposition, but not a set of propositions.
We cannot, however, simply jump to such a conclusion. The distribution patterns in
relation to other inferential evidentials seem to make the evidential analysis more complex.
Under the evidential analysis, since -nikka expresses that its causal meaning comes from the
speaker’s inference, -nikka is considered as an inferential evidential marker. If so, however,
we cannot explain why -nikka can be used with other inferential evidentials like kes kath-
‘seem’. For example, in (84a) and (84b), since -nikka already expresses that the causal
meaning comes from the speaker’s subjective reasoning, there’s no reason to use another
inferential evidential kes kath- ‘seem’. In addition, it is cross-linguistically rare to use double
evidentials.
In contrast, -nikka does not allow other inferential evidentials in the main clause when
it is used to mark an epistemic reading. As shown in (84c), a nikka-clause appears to be com-
patible with explicit epistemic expressions, but not inferential evidential predicates like kes
kath- ‘seem’, tus sip- ‘seem’, and kes-ulo poi- ‘look like’. According to the evidential analy-
sis, in the epistemic reading, -nikka gives evidence for the conclusion of the main clause. If
so, there’s no reason not to allow evidential expressions in the main clause.
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(84) a. con-unJohn-TOP
annot
o-lcome-will
kesNML
kath-unikka,seem-because,
wulikkiliwe
sicakha-ca.start-EXH
‘Let’s start without John, because he doesn’t seem to be coming.’
b. ton-imoney-NOM
eps-unikka,not.have-because
kyelhonsik-ulwedding-ACC
annot
ha-ndo-ADN
kesNML
kath-a.seem-DEC
‘It seems that they didn’t have the wedding, because they do not have enoughmoney.’
c. sakenhyencang-eysethe.scene.of.the.incident-at
kuuyhis
cimwun-ifingerprint-NOM
nawass-unikka,was.found-because
con-iJohn-NOM
kunye-lulher-ACC
i) cwukini) kill
keyNML
thullimep-/must/
ii) cwuky-ess-ulii) kill-PAST
cimay
molun-/not.know/
iii) *cwuki-niii) kill-ADN
kesNML
kath-/seem
iv) *cwuki-niv) kill-ADN
kes-uloNML-as
poi-n-ta.look.like-PRES-DEC
‘Because his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime, i) John must havekilled her/ ii) John may have killed her / iii-iv)*it seems John killed her.’
The evidential analysis may give us a better explanation for nikka-clauses. If we con-
sider the examples in (84), however, it is still hard to argue that -nikka is an evidentiality
marker. In the current analysis, in contrast, the examples in (84) can be explained. In (84a),
-nikka expresses that the causal meaning is the result of the speaker’s subjective reasoning,
and the inferential evidential marker kes kath- ‘seem’ expresses that the propositional content
of the nikka-clause is just a guess. Similarly, in (84b), -nikka expresses that the causal mean-
ing comes from the speaker’s subjective reasoning, and the inferential evidential marker kes
kath- ‘seem’ expresses that the entire sentence is just a guess (i.e., there’s no clear reason to
think so). In (84c), the nikka-clause cannot have an epistemic reading if there’s no epistemic
modal in the main clause. In other words, evidentials cannot replace epistemic modals.
72
2.4.5.3 Temporal nikka
There is another use of -nikka that we have not discussed. In a sentence like (85),
only nikka-clauses can appear. In this case, a nikka-clause is understood as having a tem-
poral/sequential meaning (e.g., Sohn 1992). This is because the event of the main clause is
understood to take place in the context in which the event or action of the causal clause took
place first. Considering -nikka’s causality, performing the action of the nikka-clause causes
the speaker’s personal realization or observation in the main clause. In (85), for example,
after the speaker opens the window, s/he came to know that it is raining outside.
(85) a. changmwun-ulwindow-ACC
yel-eopen-
po-nikka/#ese,see-because,
pi-karain-NOM
o-kocome-PROG
iss-ess-ta.-PAST-DEC
‘Opening the window, I found it was raining.’
b. cha-lulcar-ACC
sa-kobuy-
na-nikka/#se,PERF-because
ka-lgo-ADN
tey-kaplace-NOM
eps-ta.not.exist-DEC
‘Now that I have bought a car, I have no place to go.’
I claim that in this case the nikka-clause modification targets the declarative mood
marked phrase. In this way, the causal clause is understood to cause the propositional content
of the main clause to be added to the speaker’s public beliefs. Since this update is only
applied to the speaker’s public beliefs, the main clause only expresses the speaker’s personal
feelings, experience, realizations or observations.28
28 As shown in (85), -ese cannot be used in this temporal/sequential usage. Since an ese-clause does not take a mood marked phrase as its argument, it cannot give a reason for thechange of the speaker’s public belief.
73
Intuitively, in (85) what the speaker has found/observed in the main clause seems
to go against his/her original expectations. As a result, this type of causal sentence often
expresses the speaker’s regret or dissatisfaction. In (85b), for instance, the speaker expected
that there are many places to go by car, but in reality s/he realized that there’s no place to go
even after the purchase of a car. This unexpectedness is due to the fact that the nikka-clause
gives a reason for the update of the speaker’s beliefs. The speaker’s belief world has been
changed only after performing the action/event of the causal clause. This may convey the
implied message that the speaker didn’t know the content of the main clause before or that
the speaker believed that the content of the main clause is not the case.
2.5 Summary of Chapter 2
This chapter examined the semantic function of the causal connective -nikka in Ko-
rean. I have claimed that three different levels of causal meaning do not exist in Korean.
Instead, I have proposed that a nikka-clause always takes a propositional argument. It was as-
sumed that a nikka-clause is attached to a constituent which includes a Mood0 (i.e., MoodP).
On the basis of this structure, it was argued that the different types of mood result in the dif-
ferent types of causation of the nikka-clause. In other words, the causal meaning of the nikka-
clause differs depending on the clausal type of the main clause. For example, in the case of
the (so-called) speech act usage, the nikka-clause is attached to a constituent that includes
the imperative mood and gives a reason for the speaker’s preferential attitude associated with
the proposition of the main clause. In this case, I assume, following Condoravdi and Lauer
(2012), that the denotation of an imperative is a modalized proposition that expresses the
74
speaker’s preferential attitude. Since other non-assertion sentences such as exhortatives and
promissives can be considered as an imperative with a different agent, a nikka-clause is un-
derstood to give a reason for the speaker’s preference when it is followed by an exhortative or
a promissive sentence. I have further claimed that the epistemic and propositional causations
arise when the nikka-clause is attached to a declarative mood marked phrase. In this way,
the difference between a propositional reading and an epistemic reading was taken to be the
existence of the overt epistemic modal in the main clause proposition. The present theory
can explain all the peculiar distributional properties of -nikka, which cannot be explained
under the three-level analysis.
75
Chapter 3
KOREAN BISCUIT CONDITIONALS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the discussion of adjunct clause modification above a ‘core’
propositional level. It will be claimed that conditional clause modification can target an
interrogative mood or a speech act. It will also show that a conditional clause can embed a
mood marked phrase, and in such a case the mood marker plays a key role in interpreting the
entire conditional sentence.
Conditionals like (86b) have been distinguished from ordinary predictive conditionals
because the veracity of the consequent clause seems independent of whether the antecedent is
true or not. In ordinary conditionals like (86a), the antecedent clause specifies the conditions
under which the proposition of the consequent clause is true. Thus, in (86a), the cancelation
of the match is determined by the rain. Conditionals like (86b), by contrast, do not seem to
show such a truth-conditional dependency. Instead, the antecedent clause seems to provide
a situation or context in which the utterance of the consequent clause is relevant (e.g. Bhatt
and Pancheva, 2006; Siegel, 2006; Scheffler, 2008; and many others). In (86b), for example,
the existence of the umbrella is not determined by whether or not it rains. Rather, the utter-
ance of ‘there’s an umbrella beside the door’ is relevant in the event of rain.
76
(86) a. If it rains later, the match will be canceled.
b. If it rains later, there’s an umbrella beside the door.
These seemingly “non-conditional” conditionals have been called many different
names: Biscuit Conditionals, after Austin’s famous example “There are biscuits on the side-
board if you want them” (Austin, 1961: pp.158) (Derose and Grandy, 1999; Siegel, 2006;
etc.), Relevance Conditionals (Iatridou, 1991; Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006; Scheffler, 2008a, b;
Kaufmann and Schwager, 2011; etc.), Speech-act Conditionals (Sweetser, 1990; Bak, 2003;
Shizawa, 2011; etc.), and many others. In this chapter, I will use the most neutral name,
Biscuit Conditionals (BC), which doesn’t seem to reflect any particular analysis.
Korean also has BC sentences, as exemplified in (87). Just like English BCs, the truth
of the consequent clause is not determined by whether the antecedent is true or not. Instead,
the antecedent clause seems to specify a situation in which the utterance of the consequent
clause is appropriate.
(87) a. chwu-umyen,cold-if
yeppang-eynext.room-in
tamyoblanket
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are cold, there’s a blanket in the next room.’
b. chingchan-ulcompliment-ACC
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
kul-ulessay-ACC
acwuvery
calwell
ssess-ta.wrote-DEC
‘If I may praise you, you did a good job of writing the essay.’
77
In (87a), the existence of the blanket is not determined by whether or not the ad-
dressee feels cold. Rather, informing the addressee of the location of the blanket is relevant
when the addressee feels cold. Similarly, in (87b), the fact that the addressee wrote a good
essay does not change regardless of whether the speaker gets permission to praise her or not.
If we try to translate all the English sentences that are considered as BCs into Ko-
rean, however, we find that there’s a huge range of variability in the acceptability judgments.
For instance, some BCs like (87b) are uniformly judged grammatical by native speakers. At
the other end of the spectrum, by contrast, BCs like (88a) are uniformly judged unnatural.
Native speakers understand what they are supposed to mean. For example, native speakers
do understand (88b) was intended to mean something like ‘if you don’t know me, here’s a
piece of information which is relevant to you, my name is Soojin Kim.’ However, for some
reason native speakers don’t accept them as natural Korean sentences. As marked by #, the
sentences in (88) are not syntactically ill-formed, but they cannot convey the meanings the
English counterparts mean as BCs. Since there’s no real causal relation, these sentences
cannot be interpreted as ordinary conditionals as well. For example, in (88b), the speaker’s
name does not change depending on whether the addressee knows the speaker.
(88) a. #AndyAndy
Warhol-eyWarhol-to
tayhayseabout
al-koship-umyen,know-want-if,
ku-uyhe-GEN
ponmyeng-unreal.name-TOP
AndrewAndrew
WorholaWorhola
Jr.-ya.Jr.-DEC
(Intended) ‘If you want to know about Andy Warhol, his full name is AndrewWorhola Jr.’
b. #ce-lulme-ACC
calwell
molu-sin-ta-myen,not.know-HON-DEC-if
ceymy
ilum-unname-TOP
kim.swucin-ipni-ta.Kim.Soojin-HON-DEC
78
(Intended) ‘If you don’t know me, my name is Soojin Kim.’
To express the same idea, Korean native speakers would use the sentences in (89)
instead of (88).
(89) a. AndyAndy
Warhol-eyWarhol-to
tayhayseabout
al-koship-umyen,know-want-if,
malhay-cwu-lkey.say-give-PROM
ku-uihe-GEN
ponmyeng-unreal.name-TOP
AndrewAndrew
WorholaWorhola
Jr.-ya.Jr.-DEC
‘If you want to know about Andy Warhol, let me tell you (this). His full name isAndrew Worhola Jr.’
b. ce-lulme-ACC
calwell
molu-sin-ta-myen,not.know-HON-DEC-if
ceymy
sokay-lulintroduction-ACC
ha-kess-supni-ta.do-will-HON-DEC
ceymy
ilum-unname-TOP
kim.swucin-ipni-ta.Kim.Soojin-HON-DEC
‘If you don’t know me, let me introduce myself. My name is Soojin Kim.’
In addition, some BCs seem to be somewhere between the two extremes. The ac-
ceptability judgments of those BCs are gradient. For example, BCs like (90a) are slightly
degraded under the intended interpretation. Native speakers understand that the speaker is
giving advice for the addressee’s hunger, but they would prefer to use a conditional impera-
tive that gives more direct advice, as in (90b).
(90) a. (?)nacwungeylater
paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
sikthak-wi-eytable-above-at
pananabanana
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry later, there’s a banana on the table.’
79
b. nacwungeylater
paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
sikthak-wi-eytable-above-at
iss-nunexist-ADN
panana-lulbanana-ACC
mek-ela!eat-IMP
‘If you are hungry later, eat the banana on the table!’
In addition, native speakers’ judgments of BCs like (91) are not uniform. In truth, no
native speaker considers them to be perfect. However, there are some native speakers that are
more willing to accept these sentences. Note that the corresponding English BC sentences
are all acceptable.
(91) a. %aphu-myen,sick-if
tangcikuysa-kadoctor.on.call-NOM
hangsangalways
tayki-cwung-i-eyo.stand.by-in.progress-COP-DEC
‘If you are sick, there is always a doctor on call.’ (translated, Oliveira 2000)
b. %nacwungeylater
nay-kaI-NOM
philyoha-myen,need-if,
na-nI-TOP
halucongilall.day
cip-eyhome-at
iss-ulke-ya.exist-will-DEC
‘If you need me later, I’ll be home all day.’ (translated, Scheffler 2008b)
Some might want to argue that this is just a matter of translation. If we take a closer
look at the data, however, we can find a pattern suggesting that we can’t just treat them as
poorly translated sentences. The main purpose of this chapter is to answer the question of
why Korean BCs show such variability in their acceptabilities, in contrast to English BCs.
First, I will show that, as was shown to be the case with Japanese by Shizawa (2011), there are
two types of BCs in Korean: Type 1 and Type 2. For Type 1, I will show that the acceptability
is determined by the following two conditions: i) the antecedent clause must provide a clear
80
decision problem, and ii) the consequent clause must resolve the decision problem. This will
explain the range of variability in acceptability judgments of these sentences. For Type 2,
I will show that the antecedent clause modifies the speech-act of the consequent clause by
overtly expressing one of the communicative rules in Searle (1965, 1969).
3.2 Two Types of BCs
In Japanese, many researchers have noticed that there are two different types of BCs
(Nakau 1994; Uchida 2001; Shizawa 2011, and many others). For example, Shizawa (2011)
divided Japanese BCs into Type 1 and Type 2. While Type 1 BCs do not include a speech-act
verb such as iu ‘say’ or osieru ‘inform’, as in (92), Type 2 BCs must include a speech-act
verb, as in (93a). Since the existence of a speech-act word is obligatory in Type 2, if the
speech-act verb is missing as in (93b), the sentence becomes infelicitous.
(92) nanikasomething
tabe-taieat-want
nara,if
reezooko-nifridge-at
tabemono-gafood-NOM
aru-wa-yo.exist-PAST-yo
‘If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’ (Shizawa, 2011: pp.20
(1))
(93) a. hontoo-notruth-GEN
koto-othing-ACC
ie-ba,say-if
boku-waI-TOP
nattoo-ganatto-NOM
kirai-da.dislike-COP
‘Honestly speaking, I don’t like natto.’
b. #hontoo-notruth-GEN
koto-othing-ACC
kiki-ta-kereba,hear-want-if
boku-waI-TOP
nattoo-ganatto-NOM
kirai-da.dislike-COP
(Intended) ‘If you want to hear the truth, I don’t like natto.’
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Just like Japanese, Korean BCs can also be classified into two types. While speech-
act verbs such as malha- ‘say’ or yaksokha- ‘make a promise’ do not have to occur in BCs
like (94), the existence of a speech-act verb is obligatory in BCs like (95a). If the speech-act
verb yaksokha- ‘make a promise’ in (95a) is replaced with yaksok-ul tut- ‘hear a promise’,
the sentence becomes infelicitous, as in (95b). Following Shizawa (2011), these two types
of BCs will be called Type 1 and Type 2 BCs, respectively.1
(94) aki-kababy-NOM
yel-ifever-NOM
manhimuch
na-myen,occur-if,
hyeyyelceyfever.reducer
selapcang-eydrawer-at
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If the baby has high fever, there’s a fever reducer in the drawer.’
(95) a. hanaone
yaksokha-ca-myen,promise-EXH-if,
tasinunagain
kecismallie
annot
ha-lke-ya.do-will-DEC
‘If I may make a promise, I will never lie again.’
b. #yaksok-ulpromise-ACC
tutkohear
sip-umyen,want-if,
tasinunagain
kecismallie
annot
ha-lke-ya.do-will-DEC
1 Franke (2007, 2009) claimed that there are two different types of BCs in English: intelligibility conditionalsand conditionals related to communicative rules. In (i), an intelligibility conditional, the antecedent clause givesa clue for how to interpret the consequent clause properly. The other type of BCs correlates with “communica-tive rules or the actual linguistic conduct of the speaker” (Franke 2007: pp. 5). In this type, the antecedentclause usually takes a phrase like “if I may interrupt”, “If I may say so”, etc. (Franke 2007: pp.5 (5)-(6)).
(i) If you want to go out tonight, I’m Jill. (Intelligibility conditional)
(ii) If I may say so, you are not looking good. (BCs related to communicative rules)
The classification of English BCs in Franke (2007, 2009) looks similar to that of Korean/Japanese. However,it is hard to say whether Franke’s classification of English BCs equals that of Japanese/Korean. First of all,the antecedent clauses of a Type 1 BC in Korean/Japanese doesn’t seem to give a clue for the appropriateinterpretation of the consequent clause. If the antecedent of a Type 1 BC has the same function to that ofFranke’s intelligibility conditional, we should expect that the sentences in (88) are all acceptable. Second,Franke (2007, 2009) didn’t provide more detailed explanation about the second type of conditionals. Accordingto Franke, using the second type BCs is closely related to being polite. However, in Korean, Type 2 BCs do notnecessarily correlate with the politeness.
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(Intended) ‘If you want to hear a promise, I will never lie again.’
Another interesting fact to consider is that the discrepancies between judgments are
only found with Type 1 BCs, not with Type 2 BCs. As we have seen in (87)-(95), while
native speakers’ judgments for Type 1 BCs seem unpredictable, e.g., (87a), (88), (91), and
(94), Type 2 BCs are uniformly judged acceptable, e.g., (87b) and (95). In the next section,
I will show that this discrepancy between judgments is greatly influenced by Type 1 BCs’
context dependency.
3.3 Type 1: the Decision Problem
3.3.1 Relevance relation
Intuitively, Type 1 BCs seem acceptable just in case the content of the consequent
clause is ‘relevant’ with respect to the antecedent clause. For instance, since the consequent
clause in (96a) is certainly not relevant, the sentence is judged to be infelicitous; the revo-
lution of the earth has nothing to do with being hungry. In contrast, (96b) is judged natural
because the existence of bagels in the basket is relevant information to the addressee who
is hungry. Taking into account sentences like (96c), however, things become more diffi-
cult. Although grocery shopping is somehow related to being hungry, for some reason native
speakers’ judgments are divided on this sentence. Also native speakers find it difficult to
give a judgment for sentences like (96c).
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(96) a. #paykophu-myen,hungry-if
cikwu-nunearth-TOP
thayyang-uysun-GEN
cwuui-lularound-ACC
ton-ta.turn-DEC
(Intended) ‘If you are hungry, the earth revolves round the sun.’
b. paykophu-myen,hungry-if
pakwunibasket
an-eyinside-at
peyigulbagel
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry, there are bagels in the basket.’
c. %paykophu-myen,hungry-if
naI
5-si-ey5-CL-at
cangpo-leshopping-to
ka.go
‘If you are hungry, I am going to market at 5.’
In order to explain the difference between (96b) and (96c), we should first understand
more precisely what it means to be relevant. As already noticed in Davis (2009), the con-
cept of ‘relevance’ relation is found in one of the Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims, the
Maxim of Relation (i.e., be relevant). According to Grice, the following dialogue satisfies
the maxim of relation:
(97) (B is walking toward A who is standing by an immobilized car)
A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner.
(from Davis 2009, pp.344 (16); Grice 1975, pp.51 (1))
In (97), B’s utterance appears indirect, but it is still relevant with respect to the prob-
lem that A faces. By letting A know the location of the gas station, B helps A to find the
solution to his/her problem, i.e. lack of fuel. In his analysis of the Japanese relevance marker
84
yo, Davis (2009) argued that A’s problem in (97) can be understood as van Rooy’s (2003)
contextually salient decision problem. According to van Rooy (2003), the agent has a deci-
sion problem in the context in which there is a set of possible actions, A(C) = {α1, α2, ...
α}, and the agent should select the best action out of those possible actions (van Rooy 2003,
pp.733). Davis (2009) further claimed that van Rooy’s decision problem can be seen as an
expanded conception of Roberts’s (1996) Question Under Discussion (QUD) which is driven
not by the question ‘what is the way things are?’ but by the solution-seeking question ‘what
should I do?’ (i.e., ‘Which one is the best action to resolve the agent’s decision problem?’)
(Davis 2009, pp.347). Thus, we can say the utterance is ‘relevant’ when its content helps the
agent to choose the optimal action so that s/he resolve his/her decision problem.
Given the meaning of being relevant, the antecedent clause of a Type 1 BC is now
seen to provide the context of the addressee having some sort of decision problem, and the
consequent clause is understood as an indirect but relevant solution to the addressee’s prob-
lem. In other words, (98a) expresses the same idea as the dialogue in (98b) in the form of a
conditional.2
(98) a. If you are hungry, there are bagels in the basket.
2 It should be noted that Korean Type 1 BCs are acceptable even if the addressee doesn’t think there’s aproblem. In other words, the Type 1 BCs are allowed as long as the speaker believes there’s a possibility thatthe addressee has a decision problem. For instance, (i) can still be uttered in the context in which the addresseedoesn’t feel cold at all, as long as the speaker believes the addressee is cold or will be cold.
(i) A: chwu-umyen,cold-if,
yeppang-eynext.room-in
poilaheater
thuleturn.on
noh-ass-e.keep-PAST-DEC
‘If you are cold, I kept a heater on in the next room.’
B: Oh, I’m okay. Actually I’m a little warm.
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b. A: I’m hungry.
B: There are bagels in the basket.
To be more specific, the antecedent of (98a) provides the context in which the ad-
dressee has a decision problem which is formulated as a partially ordered set of possible
actions such as ‘to eat bagels in the basket’, ‘to stay as it is (to stay hungry)’, or ‘to go out
for food’, as in (99), where Ad refers to the addressee in the context.3
(99) A(C) = {FOODSTAY (Ad), FOODOUT (Ad), NFOODSTAY (Ad)} <c {FOODEAT (Ad),
NFOODOUT (Ad)}
(where FOOD = the worlds in which there’s something to eat at home, NFOOD =
the worlds in which there’s nothing to eat at home. STAY(Ad) = to stay as it is (= to do
nothing/to stay hungry), OUT(Ad) = to go out for food, EAT(Ad) = to eat food at home)
Taking into account the practicality and desirability of each action, the action ‘to stay
as it stands/to stay hungry’ (i.e., STAY(Ad)) would be considered worse than the other actions
regardless of the existence of food. Thus, the addressee needs to determine which one is
the best of the remaining possible actions, i.e., FOODEAT (Ad) and NFOODOUT (Ad). The
utterance of the consequent informs the addressee of the existence of bagels. In doing so, it
3 The formalization in this section comes from Davis (2009) with my own modifications. For convenience, Isuppose that there’s a finite number of possible actions.
86
indirectly helps the addressee to select ‘eating food (= bagels) at home’ rather than ‘going
out for food’ by eliminating the worlds without food (i.e. NFOOD worlds). In this way, the
set of actions in the context is updated as in (100).
(100) A(C) = {FOODSTAY (Ad), FOODOUT (Ad) } <c {FOODEAT (Ad)}
Since there’s only one optimal action in the updated context, the addressee can easily
decide to perform the action of ‘eating bagels’, which gives her the best result (i.e., she can
satisfy her hunger without wasting time or money). In this case, we can say the consequent
clause is ‘relevant’ to the addressee’s decision problem.
It should be noted that the agent who has a decision problem is either the addressee
or the speaker, but not a third party, as shown in (101). (101b) is odd because it means that
the addressee (i.e. the husband) is the one who will need to know where the snacks are to
feed the hungry kids. In other words, (101b) can be used just in case the addressee will go
on the trip with the kids and will give the kids the snacks when they get hungry. In this case,
the agent who has a decision problem is the addressee (i.e. the husband), not the third party
(i.e. the kids). As we can see in the English translation, English allows BCs which include
a third party’s decision problem. Unlike Korean, the corresponding English sentence can
be used in the situation where the speaker is asking the addressee (= father) to let their kids
know where the snacks are before kids leaving for the picnic.4 This is another difference that
4 Prof. Muffy Siegel (p.c.)
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distinguishes Korean BCs and English BCs. This suggests that the relevance relationship be-
tween the two clauses in a Type 1 BC must correlates with the contextually salient decision
problem.
(101) a. Husband: Honey, the kids will go on a school field trip today. Are they wellprepared for the trip?
b. Wife: ung.Yes.
#aytulkids
nacwungeylater
paykoph-umyen,hungry-if,
kapang-eybag-in
kwacasnacks
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘Yes. If they get hungry, there are snacks in their backpacks.’
We will see cases in which the speaker has a decision problem in 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Type 1 BCs involve a solution-seeking question
Based on Davis’s (2009) assumption that the decision problem is a QUD which is
driven by the solution-seeking question ‘what should I do?’, I assume that a Type 1 BC in-
volves a pragmatically reconstructed solution-seeking question in its antecedent:
(102) paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
(ettehkey(how
hay-yado-should
ha-lcido-INT
molu-kess-umyen,)not.know-if)
pakwunibasket
an-eyinside-at
peyigulbagel
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry, (if you wonder what to do,) there are bagels in the basket.’
= ‘If you are hungry (and wonder what to do), there are bagels in the basket.’
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When we interpret the antecedent of a conditional sentence ‘if p, then q’, all the
contextual information associated with p is also included. In other words, a conditional
sentence if p, then q can be seen as ‘if p (and r), then q’ or the logically equivalent form ‘if
p, (if r,) then q’, where r is contextual information associated with p. In a Type 1 BC, the
antecedent clause provides the context in which the addressee (or the speaker) has a decision
problem. Since the decision problem is a special kind of QUD which is driven by a solution
seeking question, the solution seeking question ‘what should I do?’ is added as part of the
antecedent. Then, the consequent clause is understood as giving a response to that question.
This addition of an implicit solution-seeking question is not limited to the BCs. A
solution-seeking question can also be included in an ordinary conditional when giving ad-
vice or suggestions, as in (103).
(103) pay-kastomach-NOM
kophu-myen,hungry-if,
siktahk.wi-eytable.above-at
iss-nunexist-ADN
ppang-ulbread-ACC
mek-ela!eat-IMP
‘If you are hungry, eat bread on the table!’
In (103), just like Type 1 BCs, the antecedent clause gives the context in which the
addressee has a decision problem, and the consequent clause gives the solution. The dif-
ference is that while BC sentences indirectly leads the addressee to choose the solution, the
consequent of (103) directly gives the solution (i.e. eat bread!). In this case, we can assume
that a solution-seeking question is involved as contextual information associated with the
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antecedent clause. Also, the consequent clause can be seen as an answer to that solution-
seeking question.
3.3.2.1 Dynamic semantics for conditional questions
In the current analysis, the antecedent clause of a Type 1 BC involves an implicit
solution-seeking question. Isaacs and Rawlins (2008) provided explanation of how to in-
terpret a conditional sentence which involves a question. In this subsection, I will briefly
explain Isaacs and Rawlins’ (2008) dynamic analysis and then I will show how to apply their
analysis to Type 1 BCs.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in dynamic semantics, the meaning of an uttered sen-
tence is treated in terms of its Context Change Potential (CCP), a function from contexts
to contexts, i.e., a type of <c,c>. Also, from the dynamic view, conditional sentences are
construed as a “two-step update procedure” (Stalnaker 1968, Heim 1982, Isaacs and Rawl-
ins 2008, Hara 2013, and many others). In a conditional if p, then q, the antecedent clause
updates the initial context creating a derived context (i.e., the worlds in which p is not true
are eliminated), and then the derived context is updated by the consequent clause (i.e., the
worlds in which q is not true are removed from the derived context). Heim (1983), for in-
stance, provides the CCP of a conditional in (104), where X∖Y = X ∩ (W - Y):
(104) For any context set c, clause A, and clause B:
c + If A, B = c ∖ (c + A ∖ c + A + B)
(Isaacs and Rawlins 2008: pp.289 (37))
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In this approach, the resulting context, c + A + B, is discarded, and so no information
from the conditional remains in the main context. However, Isaacs and Rawlins (2008),
following Frank (1996) and Kaufmann (2000), proposed an analysis that keeps the temporary
contexts even outside the sentence that creates those temporary contexts. Isaacs and Rawlins
(2008), adopting Kaufmann’s (2000) stack-based model, assumed that an if -clause copies
the main context creating a temporary context, and then the assertive/inquisitive update of
the consequent clause is done with respect to the temporary context. Since the if -clause
only modifies the temporary context, the worlds eliminated by the if -clause still remain in
the main context. In other words, the worlds eliminated by the if -clause are left aside for a
moment and then rise to the surface again after the computation of the conditional sentence is
done. In the stack-based model, this procedure is explained in terms of stacks and push/pop
operations.
In Kaufmann (2000), utterances are interpreted with respect to stacks of contexts, not
to single contexts (Isaacs and Rawlins 2008: pp.14). In Kaufmann (2000) and Isaacs and
Rawlins (2008), a stack of contexts is a macro-context, which is defined as in (105). Note
that a macro-context can be empty.
(105) Definition: macro-context
a. <> is a macro-context.
b. If c is a (Stalnakerian) context and s is a macro-context, then <c,s> is a macro-
context.
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c. Nothing else is a macro-context.
d. If s is a macro-context, then sn is the nth context (counting from 0 at the top) and
∣s∣ is its size (excluding its final empty element).
(Isaacs and Rawlins 2008: pp. 291 (43))
Push operator is used to add to a macro-context, and pop operator is used to remove
from a macro-context. The definitions are shown in (106).
(106) a. Definition: push operator
For any macro-context s and context c:
push(s,c) =def <c,s>
b. Definition: pop operator
For any macro-context s and context c:
pop(s,c) =def <c,s′> if s′ = <>, s′ otherwise
(modified Isaacs and Rawlins 2008: pp.292 (44)-(45))
The assertive update of the consequent clause modifies the uppermost (temporary)
context set first, and then it percolates all the way down to the bottom of the stack. Formally,
this process is captured by the ⊢ operator (i.e. support in Kaufmann 2000). The definition of
the ⊢ operator and the assertive update are shown in (107) and (108), respectively (modified
from Isaacs and Rawlins 2008: pp.293 (46)-(47)).
92
(107) For any context c and c′, and c′′:
⊢ (c, c′, c′′) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
¬∃ ∈W s.t. < w1,w >∈ c′ or < w,w2 >∈ c′
or < w1,w2 >∈ c′′
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(108) For any macro-context s and clause φ
s + [ Assert φ ] := s′ where ∣s′∣ = ∣s∣ = n
and s′i = ⊢ (si, s0, s0 ⊕ φ) for all i, 0 ≤ i < n
Let us now consider the following example and see how to compute the meaning of
a conditional question in Isaacs and Rawlins (2008):
(109) If Mary pays for dinner, will John pay for movie tickets?
Suppose that Mary pays for dinner in w1 and w2, and in w3 and w4 she does not pay
for dinner. John pays for movie tickets in w1 and w3, and in w2 and w4 John does not pay for
movie tickets. The worlds in the context are connected to each other. The relations between
worlds are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, and they are expressed as a set of pairs of
worlds. Given this, the initial input macro-context s = <c, < >> is schematized as follows5:
5 Diagrams in this chapter come from Isaacs and Rawlins (2008: pp.20-21 (56)-(60)) with my own modifica-tions for Korean examples.
93
(110) s = s0 : c =
s0: c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w2,w1 > < w3,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w2 > < w2,w2 > < w3,w2 > < w4,w2 >
< w1,w3 > < w2,w3 > < w3,w3 > < w4,w3 >
< w1,w4 > < w2,w4 > < w3,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
The if -clause inserts a temporary context at the top of the stack through the push op-
eration. This procedure involves two steps: the first step is to copy the main context yielding
a temporary context, and the second step is to eliminate the worlds in which its proposition is
not true. Only the uppermost macro-context is activated, and as a result the worlds in which
Mary does not pay for dinner, w3 and w4, are removed from the temporary context:
(111) s′ = s + [ if Mary pays for dinner, ] =
s′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w2,w1 >
< w1,w2 > < w2,w2 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
s′1 : c c
Next, the question in the consequent clause is interpreted relative to the temporary
context. Isaacs and Rawlins (2008) assumed that the meaning of a question is the set of
propositions, i.e., the set of possible answers to the question. Thus, the inquisitive update
94
of the consequent clause of (109) is to partition the context set into two cells based on the
possible answers. As a result, the worlds in which John pays for movie tickets and the worlds
in which John doesn’t pay for movie tickets are disconnected from each other.
(112) s′′ = s′ + [ ( will John pay for movie tickets? ) ] =
s′′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
<w1,w1 >
< w2,w2 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
s′′1 : c c
If the answer is “yes”, the cell that includes w2 is eliminated. In contrast, the negative
answer eliminates the cell that involves w1. This assertive update of the answer percolates
down to the main context. Let’s suppose the answer is affirmative.
(113) s′′′ = s′′ + Yes =
s′′′0 : { < w1, w1 > }
s′′′1 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w3,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w3 > < w3,w3 > < w4,w3 >
< w1,w4 > < w3,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
95
After the percolation process, the uppermost stack is popped off.
(114) s′′′′ = POP(s′′′) =
s′′′′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w3,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w3 > < w3,w3 > < w4,w3 >
< w1,w4 > < w3,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
In the resulting context, we can see that only the world in which John doesn’t pay for
movie tickets even if Mary pays for dinner (w2) is removed from the main context.
3.3.2.2 Interpreting Type 1 BCs
Returning to BCs, the current analysis assumes that a Type 1 BC involves an implicit
solution-seeking question. This implicit question leads to the additional inquisitive update
of the temporal context. After the temporary context is updated by the proposition of the
antecedent clause, it is additionally updated by the implicit solution-seeking question, i.e. the
temporary context is partitioned. Even though the implicit question is an indirect question,
it can also be understood as an inquisitive update (e.g., Isaacs and Rawlins, 2008).
Following Groenendijk (1999), I assume that the meaning of a question is a set of
possible answers. In terms of CCP, a question partitions the set of possible worlds into cells
based on its possible answers. As we have seen, however, the possible answers to a solution-
seeking question are (possible) actions. Then, the question is: Can possible actions partition?
96
According to van Rooy (2003), just like a question, the set of alternative actions can lead to a
set of propositions (van Rooy 2003: pp.732). He further claimed that this set of propositions
partitions the context set when it meets the condition in (115), where U is a utility function
which reflects the agent’s desires, and U(a,w) > U(b,w) roughly means that doing a is strictly
better than doing b in w.
(115) For each world w there is always exactly one action a ∈ A such that
∀b ∈ ( A - {a}) : U(a,w) > U(b,w).
(from van Rooy 2003, pp.733, 737)
In what follows, I will show how to compute a Type 1 BC in the current analysis.
Consider the following example:
(116) paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
(ettehkey(how
hay-yado-should
ha-lcido-INT
molu-kess-umyen,)not.know-if)
pakwunibasket
an-eyinside-at
peyigulbagel
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry, (if you wonder what to do,) there are bagels in the basket.’
Let’s suppose that in w1 and w2 the addressee is not hungry, and in w3 and w4 she
is hungry. Also, in w1 and w4 there’s something to eat at home, and in w2 and w3 there’s
nothing to eat at home. Based on the utilities and probabilities of the possible actions, the
97
addressee’s decision problem is formulated as follows:
(117) A(C) = {FOODSTAY (Ad), FOODOUT (Ad), NFOODSTAY (Ad)} <c {FOODEAT (Ad),
NFOODOUT (Ad)}
The input context set is illustrated as a set of paired worlds as in (118).
(118) s = s0: c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w2,w1 > < w3,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w2 > < w2,w2 > < w3,w2 > < w4,w2 >
< w1,w3 > < w2,w3 > < w3,w3 > < w4,w3 >
< w1,w4 > < w2,w4 > < w3,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
First, the antecedent of the conditional copies the main context and creates a tem-
porary context. The temporary context is inserted at the top of the stack. Since only the
uppermost macro-context is activated, the antecedent clause modifies not the main context
but the temporary context. As a result, the worlds where the addressee is not hungry, w1 and
w2, are all eliminated from the temporary context, s′0:
(119) s′ = s + [ if you are hungry ] =
98
s′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w3,w3 > < w4,w3 >
< w3,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
s′1 : c c
Next, the contextually reconstructed solution-seeking question ‘if you wonder what
to do’ partitions the current temporary context (s′0) into two cells: one cell includes the
worlds in which eating bagels is strictly better than other possible actions and the other cell
includes the worlds in which going out for food is strictly better than any other actions. Note
that since in each world there is only one optimal action a and there’s no other action that is
better than a, the context set can be partitioned. As a result of the inquisitive update, w3 and
w4 are disconnected from each other, as seen in (120).
(120) s′′ = s′ + [ (if you wonder what to do) ] =
s′′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w3,w3 >
< w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
s′′1 : c c
The consequent clause ‘there are bagels in the basket’ functions as a response to the
preceding solution-seeking question. More specifically, it removes the worlds without food
(w3) from the context set. Because it is an assertive update, its interpretation percolates down
99
to the main context (s′′′1).
(121) s′′′ = s′′ + [ there are bagels in the basket ] =
s′′′0 : { < w4, w4 > }
s′′′1 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w2,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w2 > < w2,w2 > < w4,w2 >
< w1,w4 > < w2,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
By eliminating the worlds without bagels, the addressee easily chooses the action of
eating bagels as the optimal action in this given context. The possible actions in the updated
context are shown in (122).
(122) A(C) = {FOODSTAY (Ad), FOODOUT (Ad)} <c {FOODEAT (Ad)}
After computing the consequent clause, the temporary context is not needed any
more, and so it is popped off. The resulting context is shown in (123).
(123) s′′′′ = POP(s′′′) =
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s′′′′0 : c =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< w1,w1 > < w2,w1 > < w4,w1 >
< w1,w2 > < w2,w2 > < w4,w2 >
< w1,w4 > < w2,w4 > < w4,w4 >
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
In (123), the world in which the addressee is hungry and the action of going out for
food is ranked higher than the other alternative actions (w3) is eliminated from the main
context. By bringing back w1 and w2, the possibility of not being hungry still remains in the
main context.
3.3.3 Explaining data
When we interpret type 1 BCs, there are two steps where things can go wrong. The
first step is to partition the temporary context with a clear decision problem. The second
step is to resolve the decision problem with the consequent clause update. In what follows, I
will show that whether or not a Type 1 BC is acceptable is determined by the following two
conditions: first, the antecedent clause must provide a clear decision problem. Second, the
consequent clause must resolve the decision problem.
Let’s first consider the examples in (124). If the decision problem is clear and the
proposition of the consequent clause can easily be connected to the best action, the Type 1
BC sentence is judged acceptable. (124a) is considered relatively natural because the ad-
dressee’s decision problem is clear, and it is pretty obvious that the speaker is suggesting the
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action of medicating the child as the best solution.
(124) a. (A mother is talking to the babysitter before going out)
(?)wuliour
ai-kachild-NOM
kichim-ulcough-ACC
manhia.lot
ha-myen,do-if,
kichimyak-uncough.medicine-TOP
selapcangdrawers
an-eyinside-at
iss-e-yo.exist-DEC-HON
‘If my child coughs a lot, the cough medicine is in the drawers.’
(The best action: to take the medicine from the drawers and give it to the child)
b. (Jane is staying at her friend’s house. Jane’s friend is talking to Jane before goingout)
(?)nacwungeylater
paykopu-myen,hungry-if
cwungkwukcipchinese.restaurant
cenhwapenho-nunphone.number-TOP
nayngcangkofridge
mwun-eydoor-at
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry later, there’s the phone number for Chinese food delivery onthe fridge door.’
(The best action: to call the Chinese restaurant and have Chinese food delivered)
When someone is sick, it is natural to consider medication or a hospital visit. The
addressee’s decision problem can be illustrated as in (125a) (where MED = the worlds in
which there’s medicine at home, NMED = the worlds in which there’s no medicine at home,
NOTH(Ad) = to do nothing, DOC(Ad) = to go to the doctor’s, PHMC(Ad) = to go to the
pharmacy, TAKE(Ad) = to medicate the child). In this context, informing the addressee of
the location of the medicine is a clear message that medication is the best option. Formally,
the content of the consequent clause leads the addressee to eliminate NMED worlds from
the context set. By doing so, the medication (i.e. TAKE(Ad)) becomes the best action, as in
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(125b).
(125) a. A(C)={MEDNOTH(Ad), MEDDOC(Ad), MEDPHMC(Ad), NMEDNOTH(Ad)} <c
{MEDTAKE(Ad), NMEDPHMC(Ad), NMEDDOC(Ad)}
b. A(C)={MEDNOTH(Ad), MEDDOC(Ad), MEDPHMC(Ad)} <c {MEDTAKE(Ad)}
As shown by the parenthesized question marks, some native speakers do not accept
the sentences in (124). We can understand why these sentences are less acceptable by look-
ing at the following minimal pair.6
(126) a. (?)nacwungeylater
paykophu-myen,hungry-if,
sikthaktable
wi-eyabove-at
ppangbread
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry later, there’s bread on the table.’
b. paykophu-myen,hungry-if,
sikthaktable
wi-eyabove-at
ppangbread
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry (now), there’s bread on the table.’
(126) shows that the sentence with the future-oriented expression nacwungey ‘later’
sounds a bit odd compared to the one without nacwungey ‘later’. Since whether or not bread
will be available is not fully guaranteed, learning that bread exists in the present time may not
be enough to resolve the decision problem the addressee may come across in the future. In
6 Another way to improve the sentences in (124) is to utter them with a particular rising tone (i.e. LH%) at theend of the sentence. The relation between Type 1 BCs and a rising tone will be discussed in 3.3.5.
103
(126b), by contrast, since bread is ready to eat right away, learning of the bread’s existence is
quite relevant to the hungry man. This explanation is supported by the sentences in which the
consequent clause involves an unchangeable property. In the following example, since pass-
words do not change that often, knowing a password is considered relevant even in the future.
(127) nacwungeylater
intheneysinternet
ssu-kouse
siph-umyen,want-if
pimilpenho-nunpassword-TOP
7942-ya.7942-DEC
‘If you want to use the internet later, the password is 7942.’
Let us now look at the sentences suggesting that the antecedent clause of a Type 1
BC should involve a clear decision problem. (128a) is not acceptable even though the con-
sequent clause is somehow related to the summer vacation. This is because the addressee’s
decision problem is not clear. Since there was no clear decision problem in the first place,
there’s no point in thinking whether the consequent is relevant or not. Compared to (128a),
(128b) is natural, because it clearly gives a situation in which the addressee has a decision
problem.
(128) a. #nayil-pwuthetomorrow-from
panghak-i-la-myen,vacation-COP-DEC-if
haeundaeHaewundae
hayswuyokcang-unbeach-TOP
cinancwu-eylast.week-at
kaycangha-yss-tay.open-PAST-EVID
(Intended) ‘If your vacation begins tomorrow, (I heard that) Haeundae beachopened last week.’
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b. nayil-pwuthetomorrow-from
panghak-i-ci?vacation-COP-SUP
thukphyelhiespecially
kalgo
tey-kaplace-NOM
eps-umyen,no.exist-if
haeundaeHaewundae
hayswuyokcang-unbeach-TOP
cinancwu-eylast.week-at
kaycangha-yss-tay.open-PAST-EVID
‘If your vacation begins tomorrow, (I heard that) Haeundae beach opened lastweek.’
A Type 1 BC is degraded if it is hard to figure out what action is actually being sug-
gested. In other words, if the consequent clause cannot resolve the decision problem, the
sentence is judged unacceptable.
(129) (A waitress is talking to her customer)
#nacwungeylater
philyohanneed
keyNML
iss-usi-myen,exist-HON-if,
ceymy
ilum-unname-TOP
kim.yugine-ipni-ta.Kim.Yugine-HON-DEC
‘If you need something later, my name is Yugine Kim.’
(The best action: ??) (translated, Siegel 2006: pp.168 (4))
In (129), the waitress Yugine is giving her name to her customer as a solution to the
customer’s decision problem. Speakers in the U.S. would be able to understand that they
will have to call her name to get what they want. Since giving the waitress’s name is relevant
in the situation where the customer needs something, English speakers judge this sentence
to be felicitous. However, to get the waitress’s attention, Koreans do not call the waitress’s
name. Instead, Korean patrons would consider raising their hands or saying yekiyo! ‘here!’
105
as an option.7 Thus, the set of possible actions for Korean patrons can be illustrated as in
(130) (where IN = the worlds in which the waitress is within sight, OUT = the worlds in
which the waitress is out of sight, NOTH(Ad) = to sit doing nothing, HAND(Ad) = to raise
his/her hand, HERE(Ad) = to say “here!”). Since giving one’s name to the customer does not
lead to any action, the sentence is judged unnatural.8
(130) A(C) = {INNOTH(Ad), OUTNOTH(Ad)} <c {INHAND(Ad), OUTHERE(Ad)}
The mismatch between possible actions and suggested solutions can also be found in
the following example:
(131) (The speaker is giving a hint to help the addressee solve geometry problem)
??xx
kap-ulvalue-ACC
alkoknow
sip-umyen,want-if
samkakhyeongtriangle
motunall
kak-uyangle-GEN
hap-unsum-TOP
180-i-ya.180-COP-DEC
‘If you want to know the value of x, the sum of all the angles of a triangle is 180degrees.’
When we want to know the answer of the math problem, we have to consider the
following actions: asking a teacher/friend, consulting a book, or Internet searching. The
7 Oliveira (2000) had very similar results for her judgments test of Japanese speakers. Just like Koreans,Japanese also do not call a waitress/waiter’s name to get their attention.
8 In a few limited cases, this sentence may be allowed. In some night clubs, the waiters are called by theirnicknames. In that situation, calling the waiter’s nickname can be a possible solution to the problem, and givingone’s nickname can leads the addressee to choose calling the waiter’s name as the optimal action.
106
consequent clause in (131), however, does not help the addressee to figure out what action
s/he should perform. The content of the consequent clause does not lead to any possible
action.
If the consequent clause leads to one of the contextually salient possible actions, the
sentence becomes more natural. In (132), the consequent clause leads addressee to choose
the action of consulting geometry formulas on page 52.
(132) xx
kap-ulvalue-ACC
alkoknow
sip-umyen,want-if,
samkakhyeng-eytriangle-to
kwanha-nabout-ADN
kihahakgeometry
kongsiktul-unformulas-TOP
5252
ccok-eypage-on
nao-aappear
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you want to know the value of x, geometry formulas for triangles are given onpage 52.’
Interestingly, Type 1 BCs with greetings are not acceptable in Korean, as in (133).
This is also related to the unclear solution.
(133) a. #nayiltomorrow
nay-kaI-NOM
samwusiloffice
annot
nao-myen,come-if,
sayhayNew.Year
pokgood.luck
manhimuch
pat-use-yo!receive-HON-DEC
(Intended) ‘If I am not coming to the office tomorrow, Happy New Year!’
b. #taumcwu-eynext.week
neyou
mosnot
po-myen,see-if,
sayngilbirthday
chwukhahay!congrats
(Intended) ‘If I can’t see you next week, happy birthday!’
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(translated, Siegel 2006: pp.180)
In this case, the decision problem is something like ‘there’s no chance to say Happy
New Year’ and the solution action for this decision problem should be something like ‘to
say it in advance’ or ’to say it when I (= the speaker) see the addressee later’. Thus, saying
‘happy new year’ itself cannot lead to the best action among these alternative actions.
There are also examples whose judgment varies from speaker to speaker. Such di-
versity between judgments can be explained by the fact that in such examples the optimal
resolution of the decision problem may vary depending on the circumstances. In order to re-
solve the addressee’s decision problem, the consequent clause must provide a clear message
that leads the addressee to choose the optimal action among the possible actions. In (134a),
however, even after the addressee knows that the speaker will stay home, there still remain
more than two possible actions. Thus, the information in the consequent clause of (134a)
does not resolve the addressee’s decision problem. The diversity of judgments reflects the
difficulty of pinning down exactly what action should be chosen.
(134) a. %nacwungeylater
nay-kaI-NOM
philyoha-myen,need-if,
na-nI-TOP
haluchongilall.day
cip-eyhome-at
iss-ulke-ya.exist-will-DEC
‘If you need me later, I’ll be home all day.’
(The best action: ‘to call the speaker at home,’ ‘to go over to the speaker’s house’or something else)
(translated, Scheffler 2008b: pp.99 (205))
108
b. %onultoday
ohwu-eyafternoon-at
halilwork.to.do
eps-umyen,not.have-if,
caymissnuninteresting
yenghwamovie
sangyengcwung-i-ya.on.show-COP-DEC
‘If you don’t have anything to do this afternoon, there is an interesting movieplaying.’
(The best action: ‘to go to the movies together (= with the speaker)’, ‘to see themovie (alone)’, or something else)
(translated, Oliveira 2000: pp.98)
Formally, the addressee’s decision problem in (134a) is illustrated in (135): where
HOME = the worlds in which the speaker is home, NHOME = the worlds in which the
speaker does not stay home, STAY(Ad) = to stay as it is/to do nothing, CALL(Ad) = to call the
speaker at home, VISIT(Ad) = to come to the speaker’s house to see him, OFFICE(Ad) = to
come to the speaker’s office to see him.
(135) A(C) = {NHOMEV ISIT (Ad), HOMESTAY (Ad)} <c
{HOMECALL(Ad), HOMEV ISIT (Ad), NHOMECALL(Ad), NHOMEOFFICE(Ad)}
After learning of the speaker’s being home, the addressee can eliminate the NHOME
worlds from the set of actions, as shown in (136).
(136) A(C) = {HOMESTAY (Ad)} <c {HOMECALL(Ad), HOMEV ISIT (Ad)}
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However, as shown in (136), there are still two optimal actions the speaker can take.
While some might choose one optimal action based on common sense or at random, some
might hesitate to make a selection. Since visiting one’s house is possible only with the
owner’s permission, it would be a bit hard for the addressee to choose to visit the speaker’s
place on his own authority. For the similar reason, it is not easy to choose to call the speaker’s
home phone. For those who hesitate to make a decision, the consequent clause does not
resolve the addressee’s problem and so it is not relevant. This results in the split of the
acceptability judgments in (134).
If the addressee can make a selection on his own authority, the sentence becomes
more natural, as in (137).
(137) khemphwyuthe-eycomputer-at
ttoagain
mwuncey-kaproblem-NOM
sayngki-myen,occur-if
swulicem-unrepair.shop-TOP
onultoday
nuckey-kkacilate-until
yel-e-yo.open-DEC-HON
‘If your computer doesn’t work again, the computer repair shop stays open until late
tonight.’
In (137), the addressee’s decision problem can be illustrated as in (138). Just like
(136), even after the addressee knows that the repair shop is open, there are still two optimal
actions the addressee can take, i.e., visiting or calling the shop. In this case, however, the
sentence is judged more natural than (134a). This is because unlike (134a) the addressee can
110
choose one optimal action as s/he likes.
(138) A(C) = {CLOSEV ISIT (Ad), OPENSTAY (Ad)} <c
{CLOSESTAY (Ad), OPENV ISIT (Ad), OPENCALL(Ad)}
The addressee’s best action can be indicated with not only verbal remarks but also
nonverbal information. A Type 1 BC with a demonstrative expression such as yeki ‘here’
or ceki ‘there’ is always judged to be felicitous, as in (139). The utterance of a Type 1 BC
with a demonstrative must be performed with an action that gives a clear message about the
solution. For example, (139a) involves the action of handing over a business card that leads
the addressee to remember the speaker’s phone number and call the speaker when she needs
something.
(139) a. nacwungeylater
mwesomething
mwulepo-lask-ADN
keNML
iss-umyen,have-if
naymy
cenhwapenhophone.number
yekihere
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you need to ask me something later, here’s my phone number.’
(Best action: to have this number and call the speaker)
b. nacwungeylater
philyohanneed
keyNML
iss-umyen,exist-if
annayso-nuninformation.office-TOP
paloright
cekithere
iss-e.exist-DEC
111
‘If you need something later, the information office is right over there.’
(Best action: to go to the information office and ask them)
Based on the examples in this section, we can see that the Type 1 BC sentences
are acceptable just in case the consequent clause guides the addressee to the best action that
resolves the decision problem the addressee (or the speaker) may face in the context provided
by the antecedent clause. In addition, the Type 1 BCs are not acceptable if there’s no clear
decision problem. In order to figure out what action is suggested, the addressee needs to
know what the decision problem is in the first place.
3.3.4 The speaker’s decision problem
Under the current analysis, it is assumed that a Type 1 BC includes a covert solution-
seeking question asking what action the addressee should perform. There are also examples
in which the antecedent clause includes the speaker’s decision problem instead of the ad-
dressee’s decision problem. In such cases, the consequent clause may include a question
asking what the speaker should do.9 Examples are shown in (140).
9 If the antecedent clause involves an addressee’s decision problem, the following consequence clause cannotbe a question. This is because asking a question cannot be a relevant reaction to the addressee’s decisionproblem. Since the addressee is the one who has a decision problem, the speaker’s relevant reaction shouldbe a statement which gives a solution to the addressee’s problem. In contrast, if the speaker has a decisionproblem, it is natural to ask what should s/he do to solve the problem.
(i) #nacwungeylater
neyou
simsimha-myen,be.bored-if
chaykcang-eybookshelf-at
ilk-ulread-ADN
chak-tul-ibook-PL-NOM
iss-ni?exist-INT
‘If you get bored later, are there books on the bookshelf?’
(ii) nacwungeylater
naI
simsimha-myen,be.bored-if
chaykcang-eybookshelf-at
ilk-ulread-ADN
chak-tul-ibook-PL-NOM
iss-ni?exist-INT
‘If I get bored later, are there books on the bookshelf?’
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(140) a. onultoday
hoyuymeeting
11-si11-CL
ihwu-eyafter-at
kkuthna-myen,finish-if,
wilmingtonWilmington
ka-nungo-ADN
bes-kabus-NOM
iss-ni?exist-INT
‘If today’s meeting ends after 11pm, is there a bus to Wilmington?’
b. nwu-kasomebody-NOM
internetinternet
comlittle
ssu-kouse
siph-takowant-COMP
ha-myendo-if
networknetwork
pimilpenho-kapassword-NOM
ettehkeyhow
toy-nayo?PASS-INT
‘If somebody wants to use the internet, what is the password?’
In (140a), for example, the antecedent provides a context in which the speaker has
a decision problem. Let’s suppose that there’s no train after 11 and the speaker is already
aware of it. If possible, he wants to take a bus; otherwise he will have to call a taxi. Given
this situation, the decision problem the speaker faces is formalized as (141), where Sp is
the speaker in the context c. In order to make a selection between the two possible actions,
NBUSTAXI(Sp) vs. BUSBUS(Sp), the speaker is asking whether there’s a bus after 11.
(141) A(C) = {BUSWLK(Sp), BUSTAXI(Sp), NBUSWLK(Sp)}
<c {NBUSTAXI(Sp), BUSBUS(Sp)}
(where BUS = the worlds in which there’s a bus after 11, NBUS = the worlds in
which there is no bus after 11, WLK(spkr) = to walk home, TAXI(spkr) = to take a
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taxi, BUS(spkr) = to take a bus )
Here, the question of the consequent clause of (140a) is understood as a solution-
seeking question asking about relevant information that can help the speaker to resolve
his/her decision problem. For this reason, the answer in (142c) can also be used as well
as the answers that give the required information, (142a)-(142b).
(142) a. ung,yes
bes-nunbus-TOP
11-si11-CL
ihwu-ey-toafter-at-also
tany-e.run-DEC
‘Yes, buses run even after 11.’
b. ani,no
11-si11-CL
ihwu-ey-nunafter-at-TOP
pes-kabus-NOM
ups-ulke-ya.not.exist-will-DEC
‘No, there will be no buses running after 11.’
c. amamaybe
kuttay-nthat.time-TOP
thayksi-lultaxi-ACC
tha-yatake
ha-lke-ya.have.to-will-DEC
‘Maybe you will have to take a taxi at that time.’
The answer in (142a), for instance, eliminates the worlds in which there is no bus
after 11, as in (143), and so it helps the speaker of (140a) to choose the action of taking a bus
as the best action.
(143) A(C) = {BUSWLK(Sp), BUSTAXI(Sp) }<c{ BUSBUS(Sp)}
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3.3.5 Marking relevance
As we have seen above, Type 1 BCs with the future-oriented expression nacwungey
‘later’ shows a slight oddity. In (144), for instance, even though the consequent clause leads
to the optimal solution (i.e. eating bananas), some native speakers still feel slightly odd about
this sentence. This is because the existence of bananas may not be available in the future.
(144) (A mother is talking to her son before going out)
(?)nacwungeylater
paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
sikthak-wi-eytable-above-at
pananabanana
myechsome
kayCL
iss-e.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry later, there are some bananas on the table.’
In this case, the sentence becomes natural if it is used with the sentence-final rising
tone:10
10 Some native speakers suggest that the causal connective -nikka ‘because’ makes Type 1 BC sentencesnatural. More strictly speaking, however, those sentences are not complete. The complete version of thosesentences would look like the following examples, where the imperatives are omitted in the main clauses.Thus, the causal connective -nikka helps the addressee to infer that some action is suggested in the omittedpart.
(i) nacwungeylater
paykophu-myen,hungry-if
thakca-wui-eytable-above-at
khukhicookie
iss-unikkaexist-because,
(kukethat
mek-e/mek-etoeat-IMP/eat
toy)may
‘If you are hungry later, because there are cookies on the table, eat them/you may eat them.’
(ii) onultoday
ohwu-eyafternoon-at
halilwork.to.do
eps-usi-myen,not.have-HON-if,
caymissnuninteresting
yenghwamovie
sangyengcwung-i-nikkaon.show-COP-because
(poleto.see
ka!)go
‘If you don’t have anything to do this afternoon, because there is an interesting movie playing, see themovie!’
115
(145) nacwungeylater
paykoph-umyen,hungry-if
sikthak-wi-eytable-above-at
pananabanana
myechsome
kayCL
iss-e↗.exist-DEC
‘If you are hungry later, there are some bananas on the table.’
I assume that this sentence-final rising tone contour (i.e. ↗) corresponds to the LH%
IP final boundary tone in Jun’s (2000) K-ToBI system. In Jun’s system, LH% is a rising
final boundary tone which sharply rises within the final syllable of the intonation phrase
(IP). According to Jun (2000), LH% is different from H% which begins to rise before the
final syllable. Jun (2000) claimed that a LH% rising tone is used primarily for questions,
continuation rises, and explanatory ending.
In order to understand what the sentence final rising tone does in a Type 1 BC, it is
necessary to understand its role in a simple sentence. Let’s consider the following sentence.
(146) a. Context: The last one out must turn off all the lights in the office. Jane is talkingto the colleague who is still working in the office.
b. Jane: ceI
pwullight
annot
kku-koturn.off-and
ka-pni-ta↗go-HON-DEC
‘I am leaving without turning off the lights.’
(146b) is naturally used in the context in which the addressee will need to know
whether the light is on (i.e., whether or not the light is on matters to the addressee). In order
words, using↗ in (146b) expresses its propositional content is relevant to the addressee.
Given this, I claim that the sentence rising tone, ↗, indicates the relevance of its
propositional content with respect to the addressee’s decision problem. This idea is inspired
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by Davis (2009). In his analysis of the Japanese particle yo, Davis claimed that using yo with
a rising tone, yo↑, marks its propositional content as relevant to the addressee. I assume that
the sentence-final rising tone in Korean has a very similar meaning to that of Japanese yo↑.
Although Korean does not have a particle like yo, the sentence-final rising tone indicates
that the consequent clause includes relevant information with respect to the addressee’s de-
cision problem.11 The semantic representation of the sentence-final rising tone is illustrated
in (147), which is adapted from Davis’ (2009) semantics for yo↑.
(147) ∣∣↗∣∣ = λFλpλc. F(p)(PBaddr(C) + p ): ∃a ∈ A(C’) ∀ wi, wj ∈ ∩ CG(C’)
[(a(Ad)(wi) & wi <c′wj) → a(Ad)(wj) ], where C’ = CCP(C)
(Davis 2009: pp.337 (10a), pp.347 (23))
Roughly speaking, (147) means that ↗ is semantically vacuous, but it is only used
in the context in which there’s a contextually salient action such that doing the action a is
strictly better than not doing a. Returning to (146), the addressee’s decision problem can be
illustrated as a set of contextually salient possible actions:
(148) A(C) = {LOLEAV E(Ad)} <c {LOOFF (Ad), LFLEAV E(Ad)}
(where LOLEAV E(Ad) =‘to leave the lights on in the worlds in which the lights are
on.’, LOOFF (Ad) =‘to turn off the lights and leave in the worlds in which the lights
11 Following Gunlogson (2003) and Davis (2009), I treat a sentence-final tone contour as a morpheme.
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are on.’, LFLEAV E(Ad) =‘to leave without turning out the lights in the worlds in
which the lights are off’)
(146b) leads the addressee to eliminate the worlds in which the action of leaving
without turning out the lights is strictly better than other actions, i.e., the worlds in which the
lights are already off. In other words, the utterance of (146b) leads the addressee to perform
the optimal action in the given context, i.e., turning off the lights before leaving.
Going back to the Type 1 BC in (145), the sentence-final rising tone explicitly indi-
cates that the content of the consequent is relevant with respect to the addressee’s decision
problem. Thus, even when it is a little unclear whether the consequent clause is giving rele-
vant information to the decision problem, the speaker can explicitly express that the content
of the consequent clause is relevant by using the sentence-final rising tone.
As shown in (149), when the consequent clause provides clear message that leads to
the best solution, the rising tone can be optionally used.
(149) chwu-umyen,cold-if
yeppang-eynext.room-in
tamyoblanket
iss-e(↗)exist-DEC
‘If you are cold, there’s a blanket in the next room.’
In the previous sections, we have seen that a Type 1 BC is allowed when it meets the
following two conditions: the antecedent clause involves a clear decision problem, and the
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consequent clause gives relevant information that leads to the optimal solution to the deci-
sion problem. Since the sentence-final rising tone expresses the relevance of the consequent
clause, only the BCs that do not satisfy the second condition can be improved by using the
rising tone. The Type 1 BCs that are unacceptable because of the lack of the clear decision
problem cannot be improved even if it is used with the rising tone.
(150) #nayil-pwuthetomorrow-from
panghak-i-la-myen,vacation-COP-DEC-if
haeundaeHaewundae
hayswuyokcang-unbeach-TOP
cinancwu-eylast.week-at
kaycangha-yss-tay↗open-PAST-EVID
(Intended) ‘If your vacation begins tomorrow, (I heard that) Haeundae beach openedlast week.’
3.3.6 Cross-linguistic comparisons
As we have seen in the previous sections, English BCs are acceptable as long as the
consequent clause is relevant relative to the antecedent in any way, whereas Korean BCs are
allowed just in case they satisfy the following two conditions: i) the antecedent includes an
addressee’s decision problem and ii) the consequent clause gives an action that can resolve
the addressee’s problem in the antecedent clause. In English BCs, the antecedent clause
provides the context, and if the proposition of the consequent clause is somehow ‘relevant’
in that context, the sentence is acceptable. However, in Korean BCs, whether or not the
consequent is relevant is determined by whether it belongs to a certain type of relevance
relation, which is expressed as the best solution to the addressee’s decision problem. If we
look at the judgment test in Oliveira (2000), Japanese BCs seem to show a very similar
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distribution to that of Korean. This tells us that ‘relevance’ relations permitted in the English
BCs is much wider than that of Korean/Japanese. In Korean/Japanese, the consequent clause
has to be a clear hint to the addressee’s decision problem, whereas the consequent clause of
a English BC does not have to be a hint to the solution. In other words, in Korean BCs only
a certain type of relevance relation is permitted. In English BCs, by contrast, not only that
particular type of relevance relation, but other relevance relations are also permitted. For
example, the BCs with greetings are not acceptable in Korean/Japanese. This is because the
consequent clause does not lead us to the solution of the decision problem (i.e. having no
time to greet). In English, by contrast, the BCs with greetings are allowed. This is because
the performing precautionary act itself can be the solution to the decision problem: saying
‘happy birthday’ can be a solution to the decision problem.12
Another difference between English and languages like Korean or Japanese is that
while Korean and Japanese have a grammatical way to express relevance relations in BC
12 Although concept of relevance in Korean BCs is narrower than English BCs, it does not mean that Koreanspeakers only allow relevance relation relative to decision problems in general. For example, while the BC in(i) is not allowed, the sequence of sentences in (ii) is acceptable in Korean:
(i) #ce-lulme-ACC
calwell
molu-si-myen,not.know-HON-if
ceymy
ilum-unname-TOP
Kim.Gina-ipni-ta.Kim.Gina-HON-DEC
‘If you don’t know me, my name is Gina Kim.’
(ii) ce-lulme-ACC
calwell
molu-si-ci-yo?not.know-HON-SUP-INT
ceymy
ilum-unname-TOP
Kim.Gina-ipni-ta.Kim.Gina-HON-DEC
‘You don’t know me, right? My name is Gina Kim.’
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sentences, English does not.13 In Korean and Japanese, a BC sentence is used with a rele-
vance marker. In Japanese, the relevance marker yo indicates that its propositional content is
relevant to the addressee’s decision problem when it is used with a rising tone ↑. Similarly,
in Korean, the sentence final rising tone ↗ expresses that its proposition is relevant with
respect to the addressee’s decision problem. The difference between Korean and Japanese is
that the Japanese relevance marker yo↑ is obligatory, while the Korean relevance marker,↗,
is needed only when the relevance relation is indirect.
(151) a. If you are out of gas, there’s a gas station at the corner. (English)
b. nanikasomething
tabe-taieat-want
nara,if
reezooko-nifridge-at
tabemono-gafood-NOM
aru-wa-*(yo↑).exist-PAST-yo
‘If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’ (Japanese)
c. nacwungeylater
pi-o-myen,rain-come-if
oscangan-eycloset.inside-at
wusanumbrella
iss-ta?(↗).exist-DEC
‘If it rains later, there’s an umbrella in the closet.’ (Korean)
3.4 Type 2: Explicitly Spelled out Speech-act Rules
Let us now turn to Type 2 BCs. Unlike Type 1, the antecedent clause of a Type 2 BC
must include a speech act word such as yaksokha- ‘promise’ or cilmwunha- ‘ask a question’.
13 In his analysis of Japanese relevance marker yo, Davis (2009) claimed that in English relevance relations donot have to be expressed in the syntax. Although the data in this dissertation does not show whether Englishhas an explicit way of expressing relevance relation in general, we can see that at least English BCs do notrequire an explicit marker.
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More specifically, the antecedent clause of a Type 2 BC introduces a speech act and the con-
sequent clause performs that speech act. Typical examples are shown in (152).
(152) a. hanaone
yaksokha-ca-myen,promise-EXH-if,
celtaynever
ne-lyou-ACC
soki-cideceive
anh-ulke-ya.not-will-DEC
‘If I may make a promise, I will never deceive you.’
b. cilmwun-ulquestion-ACC
hana-manone-only
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if
etisewhere
naylyeyaget.off-must
ha-nayo?do-INT
‘If I may ask a question, where do we have to get off?’
In (152a), for example, the antecedent includes a speech act expression yaksokha-
‘promise’ and then the consequent clause performs that PROMISE act. Similarly, the con-
sequent clause of (152b) performs the QUESTION act which was introduced by the word
cilmwun-ul ha- ‘ask a question’ in the antecedent. In (152), we can see that Type 2 BCs
are all judged felicitous. This uniformity of judgments is another crucial difference that
distinguishes Type 2 BCs from Type 1.
If we think about the semantic relation between two clauses, the antecedent of a
Type 2 BC functions as a kind of declaration of the upcoming utterance in the consequent
clause. Such preliminary announcements let the addressee prepare for the upcoming utter-
ance. Based on this, I claim that the antecedent of a Type 2 BC is an explicitly expressed
essential condition as in Searle (1965, 1969). The essential condition is one of Searle’s con-
stitutive rules of speech acts, which says the utterance will count as a commitment to doing
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the act. For example, the antecedent of (152a) expresses the speakers intention that the fol-
lowing utterance will be presented as committing the speaker to do the PROMISE act. When
we utter a sentence, the essential condition for the utterance is assumed to be satisfied even
if it is not spelled out on the surface. By explicitly expressing the essential condition, the
speaker makes his/her upcoming utterance sound more polite and courteous.
Since the antecedent in Type 2 is interpreted relative to the speech act of the conse-
quent clause, any kind of mood can appear in the consequent clause, as shown in (153).
(153) a. nay-kaI-NOM
chwungkoadvice
hana-manone-only
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if
chwungpwunhienough
sayngkakhanthink
hwu-eyafter-at
kyelcenghay-la.decide-IMP
‘If I may give you some advice, make a decision after much thought.’
b. cey-kaI-NOM
cilmwun-ulquestion-ACC
hanone
kaci-manCL-only
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
ithis
an-iplan-Nom
sengkonghalsuccess
kanungseng-ichance-NOM
iss-takoexist-COMP
po-sipni-kka?see-HON-INT
‘If I can ask one question, do you think this plan has any chance of success?’
c. ceyan-ulsuggestion-ACC
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
ceyin-hanteyJane-to
ettehkeyhow
sayngkakha-nuncithink-COMP
mwule-po-ca.ask-see-EXH
‘If I may suggest, let’s ask Jane what she thinks of it.’
Also, the idea of modifying a speech act leads us to assume that the consequent clause
has its own illocutionary force, and this turns out to be true. For example, the consequent
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clause of (154) performs a QUESTION act, and it is natural to answer that question. Simi-
larly, the addressee in (155) accepts the consequent clause ‘don’t go near him’ as an order.
(154) A: cilmwun-ulquestion-ACC
hanaone
ha-myen,do-if,
makamil-undue.date-TOP
encey-ipni-ka?when-HON-INT
‘If I may ask you a question, when is the due date?’
B: The deadline is the 24th.
(155) A: coen-uladvice-ACC
comlittle
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
kuthe
salamperson
kakkainear
ha-ci-ma!do-not-IMP.
‘If I may give you some advice, don’t go near him!’
B: Don’t push me around!
It should be noted that although we assume that the antecedent clause is modifying
the speech act of the consequent clause, this doesn’t mean that the performance of the con-
sequent speech act is determined by whether the antecedent is true or not. For example, in
(156), the consequent question is performed regardless of whether the speaker is allowed to
perform the act: the QUESTION act of the consequent clause is performed anyway. However,
there still remains a possibility that the addressee does not accept the act. In that case, the
addressee knows that the speech act of the consequent is performed already, but expresses
her objection to it.
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(156) A: cilmwun-ulquestion-ACC
hanaone
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
uywennim-kkeyse-nuncongressman-HON-TOP
cengpwu-uygovernment-GEN
kamseycengchak-ultax.deduction.policy-ACC
ciciha-sipni-ka?support-HON-INT
‘If I may ask you a question, do you support the government’s tax deduction policy?’
B: I’m sorry, but you are not allowed to ask a question. We’ll have a question periodlater.
In the present analysis, what the antecedent clause modifies is a speech act but not a
clausal type. In (157), for example, the consequent clause is an interrogative and its speech
act is a REQUEST act. In this case, the antecedent clause must include the speech act word
pwuthakha- ‘asking a favor’, but not cilmwunha-‘asking a question’.
(157) pwuthak/#cilmwunfavor/#question
hana-manone-only
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
changmwunwindow
comlittle
yele-cwu-lopen-give-ADN
swuchance
iss-e?exist-INT?
‘If I may ask a favor/#question, can you open the window for me?’
Given that the if-clause of a Type 2 BC is attached to the phrase that is responsible
for the speech act of the consequent clause, the syntactic structure for the Type 2 BC in (157)
can be illustrated as follows:
(158)
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ForceP
if-clause
If I may ask a favor
ForceP
MoodP
IP
...
Mood
-e?INT
Force
REQUEST
In truth, the idea of modifying speech acts is very similar to the conclusion of Isaacs
and Rawlins (2008). In their analysis, the “if”-clause of a conditional question is understood
as modifying the phrase whose head is the speech act operator (i.e. Question operator). The
difference is that in Isaacs and Rawlins (2008) there’s only one projection where a speech
act or mood operator can go. In the current analysis, by contrast, speech act operators and
mood operators are located in two different projections. As we can see in the examples
like (157), the speech act word in the antecedent clause does not refer to the form of the
consequent clause, but the act of the consequent clause. This means that speech acts have
to be distinguished from moods. Thus, I assume that there is a separate syntactic projection
representing the illocutionary force of the sentence above the mood phrase.
Here, we can see the difference between conditionals and causal clauses. The con-
ditional clause can modify the speech act of the consequent clause even when it appears
sentence-initially. In contrast, the causal clause can modify the speech act of the main clause
only when it comes after the main clause (i.e. sentence-finally). In Chapter 2, we have seen
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that the causal clause is sensitive to where it occurs. If the because-clause comes before the
main clause, it only modifies the (modalized) proposition of the main clause. In contrast, if
the because-clause comes after the main clause, it can also modify the speech act of the main
clause. In Korean, since the two typical because-clauses (i.e. ese-clause and nikka-clause)
always come before the main clause, they cannot modify the speech act. Unlike ese or nikka-
clause, ketun-clauses can occur after the main clause, and so they can be used to modify the
speech act. The relation between because-clauses’s location and its modification target was
also observed in English (Krifka, to appear).
3.4.1 Type 2 BCs and exhortative mood indicator -ca
As you may already have noticed, the antecedent clause of a Type 2 BC includes an
exhortative mood indicator -ca followed by the conditional -myen ‘if’. (159) shows that Type
2 BCs require a certain type of antecedent; having a speech act word is not enough in Type
2 BCs.14
(159) a. pyenmyeng-ulexcuse-ACC
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
pesu-kabus-NOM
nuckeylate
wass-upni-ta.came-HON-DEC
‘If I may make an excuse, the bus was delayed.’
b. #pyenmyeng-ulexcuse-ACC
ha-kodo
sip-umyen,want-if,
pesu-kabus-NOM
nuckeylate
wass-upni-ta.came-HON-DEC
‘If I want to make an excuse, the bus was delayed.’
14 In Korean, the mood markers -ta ‘DEC’, -la ‘IMP’, and -ca ‘EXH’ can appear in the conditional clause (i.e.-tamyen, -lamyen, and -camyen). Historically, these are known to be derived from the quotative expressions.For example, p-camyen was derived from p-ca-ko ha-myen ‘if you say let’s p.’ However, as noted in Kim andChoi (2012), I assume that at least some -camyen, including the -camyen in BCs, are not an abbreviated formof ca-ko ha-myen.
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c. #pyenmyeng-ulexcuse-ACC
ha-lye-myen,do-in.order.to-if,
pesu-kabus-NOM
nuckeylate
wass-upni-ta.came-HON-DEC
‘In order to make an excuse, the bus was delayed.’15
Similarly, the examples in (160) show that if the exhortative marker is missing, the
sentence is degraded.
(160) a. kopayk-ulconfession-ACC
ha-?(ca)-myen,do-(EXH)-if,
naI
neyou
cohahay.like
‘If I may make a confession, I like you.’
b. naymy
calang-ulboast-ACC
ha-?(ca)-myen,do-(EXH)-if,
na-nI-TOP
swuhak-ulmath-ACC
calwell
hayss-e.did-DEC
‘If I may blow my own horn, I was good at math.’
In order to understand why the exhortative mood marker -ca is needed in Type 2 BCs,
it is necessary to see what the exhortative marker means. In Korean, the morpheme -ca is
used with a first person plural subject (e.g., wuri ‘we’) to mark the exhortative mood of a
sentence. A typical example is shown in (161).
(161) onulpam-eytonight-at
(wuri)we
yeonghwamovie
po-lesee-to
ka-ca.go-EXH
‘Let’s go to the movie tonight.’
15 Actually, (159c) is not acceptable in English, because the clause in order to x cannot specify the conditionsfor the relevant utterance (Prof. Muffy Siegel p.c.).
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However, as in (162) -ca can also be used with the first person singular na ‘I’. Such
sentences are naturally used in the context in which the speaker is asking for the addressee’s
help or permission, as in (162).
(162) (Yuri’s sister is listening to loud music on the radio.)
Yuri: naI
swukceyhomework
comlittle
ha-ca.do-EXH
‘Let me do my homework please.’
Given the meaning of -ca in (162), the existence of -ca in Type 2 BCs is naturally
explained. The antecedent of a Type 2 BC functions as a kind of preliminary announcement
of the upcoming utterance. Informing the addressee about the upcoming utterance in advance
is seen as asking for permission to perform the speech act. In the antecedent clause, the
speaker asks permission to perform the speech act, and then she puts her plan into action in
the consequent clause. Thus, using -ca, which indicates the speaker’s attempt to ask for help
or permission, makes the sentence natural.
Since the antecedent clause is asking the addressee’s permission, the ORDER act can-
not appear in Type 2 BCs. According to Lee C. (1970), since the ORDER or COMMEND act
is performed just in case the speaker has the authority, it is not compatible with the modal
expression ‘May I ...’, which indicates that the addressee has the authority.
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(163) #myenglyeng-ulorder-ACC
comlittle
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
yeki-sehere-from
naka!get.out
‘#If I may order, get out of here!’
Another reason for the presence of -ca in Type 2 is related to the forward shifting
effect of Korean conditionals. According to Yeom (2004), myen-conditionals in Korean may
have the forward-shifting effect. If the event of the antecedent is interpreted in the future, the
reference time for the consequent clause is shifted to the future. As a result of the forward-
shifting, the conditional sentence If p, then q is interpreted as the event of q occurs shortly
after that of p (Yeom 2004: pp.147, 158).
In the normal predictive conditional (164), for example, the verb form of the an-
tecedent clause is ‘non-past’, and the event of the antecedent is understood as an unsettled
future event. This satisfies the condition of the forward-shifting effect. Due to the forward-
shifting, (164) is interpreted as the event of the consequent clause (i.e. the cancelation of the
game; e2) occurring shortly after the event of the antecedent clause (i.e. rain; e1).
(164) pi-karain-NOM
o-myen,come-if
kyengki-nungame-TOP
chwuiso-toy-n-ta.cancel-PASS-PRES-DEC
(e1 > e2)
‘If it rains, the game will be canceled.’
Going back to Type 2 BCs, we can explain why -ca is obligatory in Type 2 BCs by
assuming that the forward shifting effect applies to the utterance level as well as the propo-
sitional level. Given the forward shifting effect, (165a) is interpreted as the antecedent event
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(i.e. making an excuse; e1) precedes the consequent event (i.e. the utterance of ‘the bus
was delayed.’; e2). In other words, after the speaker makes an excuse, the speaker performs
an excuse act. However, this is contrary to common sense. Since the utterance of ‘the bus
was delayed’ is making an excuse, the two events must happen simultaneously. In contrast,
(165b) is correctly interpreted as the antecedent event (i.e. getting permission to make an
excuse; e1) occurs shortly before the event of the consequent (i.e. performing an EXCUSE
act; e2).16 In other words, the speaker is given permission to perform an EXCUSE act, and
then she performs the EXCUSE act by uttering “the bus was delayed.”
(165) a. #pyenmyeng-ulexcuse-ACC
ha-myen,do-if,
bes-kabus-NOM
nuckeylate
wass-e.came-DEC
‘If I make an excuse, the bus was delayed.’
b. pyenmyeng-ulexcuse-ACC
ha-ca-myen,do-EXH-if,
bes-kabus-NOM
nuckeylate
wass-e.came-DEC
‘If I may make an excuse, the bus was delayed.’
Thus, using an exhortative marker in Type 2 BCs indicates that the antecedent targets
the speech act of the consequent by asking for a permission to perform the speech act, which
corresponds to the speech act of the consequent. The exhortative marker also helps to get a
correct interpretation under the influence of the forward shifting.
16 As shown below, the declarative marker seems to be able to occur in the antecedent of a Type 2 BC.
(i) kopayk-ulconfession-ACC
ha-n-ta-myen,do-PRES-EXH-if,
naI
neyou
cohahay.like
(e1 < e2)
‘If I may make a confession, I like you.’
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3.4.2 Discourse markers in Type 2 BCs
Given the examples above, the exhortative mood marker -ca appears obligatory in
many Type 2 BC sentences. As shown in (166), however, that does not always seem to be
the case. The exhortative marker -ca is optional in sentences in which a discourse marker,
e.g., han(a) ‘one’ or com ‘little’, appears.
(166) a. (cikum)now
nay-kaI-NOM
hanmati-manone.word-only
ha-(ca)-myen,do-(EXH)-if,
kuthat
pangpep-unmethod-TOP
silhyoseng-ieffectiveness-NOM
upsnunnot.exist
keskes
kath-a.like-DEC
‘If I may say something now, that method seems useless.’
b. ceymy
calang-ulboast-ACC
comlittle
ha-(ca)-myen,do-(EXH)-if,
ce-nunI-TOP
swuhak-ulmath-ACC
calwell
hayss-upnita.did-DEC.
‘If I may blow my own horn a little, I was good at math.’
The discourse markers han(a) ‘one’ and com ‘little’ are typically used in the con-
text in which the speaker is asking the addressee for help or permission. Using discourse
markers, the speaker asks the addressee for a favor or help in a polite manner. Examples are
shown below:
(167) a. polpheynball.pen
comlittle
pillyeborrow
cwu-e.give-DEC
‘Please let me use your ball pen.’
b. polpheynball.pen
pillyeborrow
cwu-e.give-DEC
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‘Lend me your ball pen.’
Given the usage of the discourse markers in (167), the antecedent clauses in (166) can
be seen as asking for permission to perform the upcoming speech act, and then the conse-
quent clause puts the planned speech act into action. For example, in (166b), the antecedent
clause is asking for permission to make a boast, and the consequent clause performs the
BOAST act. Just like the exhorative marker -ca, a discourse marker indicates that the speech
act of the consequent clause is modified. Since discourse markers play a similar role to that
of the exhortative marker -ca, -ca doesn’t need to appear in the BC sentences that already
include a discourse marker.
Optional -ca is also found in the BCs with a speech act modifying adverb. Type 2
BCs with speech act modifying adverbials such as solcikhakey ‘honestly’ or tantocikipcekulo
‘directly’ are judged felicitous without the exhortative marker -ca.
(168) a. solcikhakeyhonestly
malha-(ca)-myen,say-(EXH)-if,
ne-langyou-with
sakwi-kigo.out-to
silh-e.hate-DEC
‘Honestly speaking, I don’t want to go out with you.’
b. tantocikipcekulodirectly
malha-(ca)-myen,say-(EXH)-if,
na-nunI-TOP
ithis
ceyan-eysuggestion-to
tonuiha-ciagree
anh-supni-ta.not-HON-DEC
‘Directly speaking, I don’t agree with the suggestion.’
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c. macimakulolastly
malssum-tuli-(ca)-myen,say-give-(EXH)-if,
ithis
kyeyhoyk-unplan-TOP
sengkong.kanunseng-isuccess.chance-NOM
eps-supni-ta.not.exist-HON-DEC
‘Lastly, this plan does not have a chance of success.’
Using a speech-act modifying adverb signals that the conditional clause targets the
speech act of the following clause. Therefore, even if there’s no exhortative marker, the
antecedent clause is construed as modifying the speech act of the following clause.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the semantic and pragmatic properties of Korean BCs and
provided an analysis that explains their judgment discrepancies. I divided Korean BCs into
two types. In Type 1, I showed that the acceptability is greatly influenced by the context.
This is because the acceptability of the Type 1 BCs depends on how easy it is to infer a
relevance connection between the utterance of the consequent clause and the addressee’s
decision problem in the antecedent clause. I also showed that if the relevance connection
is not direct, the sentence-final rising tone can help the addressee to capture the relation.
Otherwise, the addressee must infer the relevance connection based solely on the context, and
that causes the diversity in judgments. In Type 2, I showed that a speech-act verb like allyi-
‘inform’ or yaksokha- ‘promise’ must appear in the antecedent clause, and the consequent
clause performs the speech act of that verb. I claimed that the antecedent in a Type 2 BC
modifies the speech act of the consequent by explicitly spelling out the essential condition,
one of the constitutive rules of speech acts in Searle (1965, 1969).
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Formally, Type 1 BCs are understood as involving a pragmatically reconstructed solu-
tion seeking question ‘what should I do?’, which introduces an additional inquisitive update.
In contrast, Type 2 BCs can be understood as modifying the speech act level phrase. Thus,
Korean BC sentences show that if -clause modification can target a non-propositional object
such as interrogative mood or speech-act of the main clause.
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Chapter 4
EMBEDDING MOOD PHRASES
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we have seen that adjunct clause modification can target
something above a proposition (i.e. Mood or Speech act phrases). We have also seen that a
higher level phrase can be embedded under other clauses. For example, Chapter 3 showed
that an exhortative mood marked phrase can be embedded under a if -clause (i.e. Type 2 BCs)
and in that case the exhortative mood of the embedded clause plays a key role in interpreting
the entire sentence. In this chapter, I will discuss another case of an adjunct clause embed-
ding a mood phrase: tamyen-conditionals. Morphosyntactically, the conditional connective
-tamyen consists of the declarative mood marker -ta and the conditional marker -myen. Thus,
a tamyen-clause is construed as a conditional clause embedding a declarative mood marked
phrase as in (169). By studying the semantic properties of tamyen-conditionals, we will
get a better understanding of the semantic function of mood marked phrases when they are
embedded under adverbial clauses.1
(169) [[[ pi-karain-NOM
o-ncome-PRES
] -ta-DEC
] -myen-if
], keyngki-nungame-TOP
yenki-toy-lpostpone-PASS-
ke-ya.will-DEC
1 Although -tamyen is a combination of -ta and -myen, I will gloss it as ‘if’ for convenience. Many otherresearchers also treated -tamyen as a conditional connective (e.g. Yeom, 2004; Noh, 2009; etc.).
136
‘If it rains, the match will be postponed.’
In what follows, I will first compare -tamyen to another conditional marker -myen,
which lacks a declarative mood marker ‘-ta’. Then, I will show that the function of the if -
clause determines which of the two conditional markers to use. An if -clause performs two
different functions. First, an if -clause updates temporary contexts. By updating temporary
context, a conditional sentence can convey its suppositional meaning. There’s also another
understanding of what the if -clause does in a conditional sentence. According to Kratzer
(1977, 1979), an if -clause functions as a domain restrictor. In her analysis, a conditional
sentence involves an epistemic modal operator, and if -clause restricts the domain of that
modal operator. In this chapter, it will be claimed that while a myen-clause can be used
to update a temporary context or functions as a domain restrictor, -tamyen is used only to
update a temporary context set because of the meaning of -ta.
4.2 Tamyen vs. Myen
In Korean, the two connectives -myen and -tamyen are both used to mark a condi-
tional relation. In many cases, either can be substituted for the other without a noticeable
change in their meaning. However, it has also been widely observed that -tamyen cannot be
used everywhere -myen can occur. (Lee C., 1979; Jun, 1984; Lee, 1996; Yeom, 2004; Park,
2006; Noh, 2009; and many others). In other words, -tamyen has a more limited distribution
than -myen. The distributional differences between the two conditional markers are briefly
137
illustrated in the following table:
(170)Conditionals Characteristics -myen -tamyen Ex#Hypothetical The antecedent hypothe-
sizes an event/state: Pre-dictive, Epistemic condi-tionals, and Counterfactu-als
∨ ∨ (171)
Anaphoric The antecedent describeswhat was said immedi-ately before the present ut-terance.
∨ ∨ (172)
Generic Generic information is ex-pressed. (e.g. a law of na-ture, a habit, a matter ofcourse, a repeated event,etc.)
∨ × (174)
Deictic The antecedent representswhat the speaker is look-ing at with his/her owneyes in the immediate con-text.
∨ × (175)
Temporal The antecedent describesan event the speakerbelieves would definitelyhappen. (translated aswhen in English)
∨ × (176)
Let us first look at the examples where the two conditional markers can be used inter-
changeably. As shown in (171), both conditional connectives can be used in the hypothetical
conditionals. The antecedent clause of a hypothetical conditional assumes an event or state,
and the consequent clause is interpreted under that assumption. Hypothetical conditionals
138
include predictive conditionals like (171a), epistemic conditionals like (171b), and counter-
factual conditionals like (171c).2
(171) Hypothetical Conditionals
a. nwun-isnow-NOM
manhia.lot
o-myen/o-n-tamyen,come-if/come-PRES-if,
censihoy-nunexhibition-TOP
yenki-toy-lpostpone-PASS-will
ke-ya.-DEC
‘If it snows a lot, the exhibition will be postponed.’
b. Jenny-kaJenny-NOM
phathi-eyparty-to
o-ass-umyen/tamyen,come-PAST-if
kicha-katrain-NOM
ceyright
sikan-eytime-at
tochakhanarrived
ke-ya.NML-DEC
‘If Jenny came to the party, her train must have arrived on time.’
c. nay-kaI-NOM
NewNew
York-eyYork-at
iss-umyen/tamyen,exist-if
kuthat
kongyen-ulconcert-ACC
po-lesee-to
ka-lgo-ADN
thentey.would
‘If I were in New York, I would go to the concert.’
The interchangeability of the two conditional markers can also be found in the fol-
lowing examples:
(172) Anaphoric Conditionals
2 Unlike -myen, if the complement of -tamyen is present tense, it should be marked with the present tensemarker -(nu)n. This is because the morpheme -ta of -tamyen is a declarative mood marker, and the overt tensemarking (e.g., -ess ‘PAST’, -(nu)n ‘PRESENT’) is obligatory in declarative marked clauses in Korean.
139
a. A: Look at this! The suspect’s vehicle was captured by a surveillance camerapositioned on Route 9.
B: kuleh-kwun-yo.right-APE-HON
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
kwu-pen-tolo-lo9-CL-route-to
cinaka-ss-umyen/tamyen,pass-PAST-if
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
pataska-ccokcoast-direction
swusayk-ulsearch-ACC
kanghwaha-kess-supni-ta.reinforce-will-HON-DEC
‘Right. If the suspect passed Route 9, it is very likely that he is in hiding nearthe beach. I will reinforce the search near the beach.’
b. A: Sera likes thriller movies.
B: sulillethriller
yenghwa-lulmovie-ACC
cohaha-myen/n-tamyen,like-if/PRES-if
HitchcockHitchcock
yenghwa-nunmovie-TOP
taall
po-ass-kess-ta.see-PAST-would-DEC
‘If she likes thriller movies, she must have seen all of Hitchcock’s movies.’
I call these conditional sentences anaphoric conditionals, because their antecedent
clause refers to what was said (almost) immediately before the present utterance. One might
want to classify them as Iatridou’s (1991) factual conditional, which is exemplified in the
following:
(173) A: This book that I am reading is really stupid.
B: I haven’t read it but if it is so stupid you shouldn’t bother with it.
(Bhatt and Pancheva 2006: pp.671 (97))
140
The factual conditional in (173) looks very similar to the conditionals in (172) in the
sense that the antecedent of B’s utterance refers to what A just told B. However, the sentences
in (172) are different from Iatridou’s factual conditionals because they can be used regardless
of whether the speaker believes the content of the antecedent. According to Iatridou (1991), a
factual conditional conveys the message that “someone (other than the speaker) believes the
proposition expressed by the if -clause to be true” (from Bhatt and Pancheva 2006: pp.671).
It means that factual conditionals can be used just in case someone believes the antecedent
except for the speaker. Iatridou further argued that “the person who holds the content of the
if-clause to be true cannot be the speaker.” (Iatridou, 1991: pp.61)
In contrast, the speaker of an anaphoric conditional may believe the content of the
antecedent. In (172a), for instance, the speaker is looking at the scene taken from the secu-
rity camera, and the expression kulehkwunyo ‘Right’ indicates that the speaker accepts the
suspect vehicle’s passing Route 9 as true.
So far, we have seen that both conditional markers can be used in hypothetical con-
ditionals and anaphoric conditionals. Now let us turn to the examples where -myen can be
used, but -tamyen cannot. First, only -myen can appear in generic conditionals like (174)
(e.g., Jun 1984; Bak 1988; and many others). For instance, (174a) expresses generic infor-
mation that does not change with the times (i.e., whenever you push the button, the power
is turned on), and using a tamyen-clause is not allowed. (174a) with -tamyen is infelicitous
because it expresses that the event of the antecedent clause is something that may or may not
happen.
141
(174) Generic Conditionals
a. (in a user guide)
pethun-ulbutton-ACC
nwulu-myen/#n-tamyenpush-if/PRES-if
cenwen-ipower-NOM
khye-ci-pni-ta.turn.on-PASS-HON-DEC
‘If you push the button, the power is turned on.’
b. pi-karain-NOM
o-myen/#o-n-tamyencome-if/come-PRES-if,
kutul-unthey-TOP
wain-ulwine-Acc
masi-n-ta.drink-Pres-Dec
‘If it rains, they drink wine.’
Secondly, as Bak (1988) pointed out, only -myen is compatible with the conditional
sentences like (175). Bak (2003) named these sentences deictic conditionals, because their
antecedent clause describes what the speaker is looking at with his/her own eyes in the im-
mediate context.3 For example, (175) can be used in the context in which the speaker is
looking at the man who is standing in the middle of the road.
(175) Deictic Conditionals
kekithere
sestand
kyeysi-myen/n-#tamyen,exist-if/PRES-if
wihemha-pni-ta.dangerous-HON-DEC
‘If you stand there, it is dangerous.’ (Bak 2003: pp.29)
3 In Park (2006), conditionals like (175) were classified as Speech act conditionals, in the sense of Sweetser(1990). In a speech act conditional, the antecedent clause specifies the condition in which the utterance of theconsequent is relevant. However, sentences like (175) are different from Sweetser’s speech act conditionals inthat they involve a clear causal relation between two propositions.
142
Another type of conditional which only allows a myen-clause is temporal condition-
als. In Korean linguistics, the conditional sentences in (176) have been called temporal
conditionals, because their antecedent clauses are translated as “when”-clause in English
(Bak 2003; Yeom 2004; and others). In this case, the antecedent clause describes the event
the speaker believes would take place in the future (e.g., schedule, itinerary, age, etc.). For
instance, (176a) can be used in the situation in which Hyunwoo is supposed to join the mil-
itary: as a Korean, he is under obligation to serve in the army. Intuitively, (176a) with the
tamyen-clause is odd because it means that Hyunwoo’s entering the army is an assumption,
and so there’s possibility that he is not going to join the military. Similarly, (176b) with
the tamyen-clause is infelicitous, because it is just less likely to consider the possibility that
Mina will not get old.
(176) Temporal Conditionals
a. (Hyunwoo is supposed to enter the military service.)
Hyunwoo-kaHyunwoo-NOM
kwuntay-eymilitary-to
tuleka-myen/#n-tamyenenter-if/PRES-if
phyenciletter
cacwuoften
ponay-ya-kess-ta.send-have.to-will-DEC
‘When Hyunwoo enters the military service, I’ll have to send him letters often.’
b. (Mina is 6 years old.)
Mina-kaMina-NOM
naynyen-eynext.year
ilkop-sal-iseven-CL-NOM
toy-myen/#n-tamyen,become-if/PRES-if
143
chotunghakkyo-eyelementary.school-to
tuleka-yo.enter-DEC
‘When Mina becomes 7 next year, she will enter the elementary school.’
There is one more thing to consider with respect to the difference between the two
conditional connectives. In (171), we have seen that both -myen and -tamyen can be used in
hypothetical conditionals. Although in many cases both markers can be used interchange-
ably, under certain conditions, the two conditional connectives behave differently. Yeom
(2004) observed that only -tamyen is permitted in the context in which the antecedent clause
event is future-oriented and its event time is preceded by the event time of the consequent
clause, as in (177).
(177) nayiltomorrow
ciku-kaearth-NOM
mangha-#myen/n-tamyen,end-if/PRES-if,
na-nunI-TOP
kacoktul-kwafamily-with
hamkkeytogether
cenyek-uldinner-ACC
mek-kess-ta.eat-will-DEC
‘If the earth is ending tomorrow, I will have dinner with my family.’
In (177), the event time of the antecedent clause (i.e. the end of the world) is in the
future, and it is preceded by the event time of the consequent clause (i.e. having a family
dinner). In this case, only -tamyen is allowed. Intuitively, (177) with -myen is infelicitous
because it is interpreted as the speaker is making an impracticable plan for having a family
dinner after the world ends.
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Another difference was observed in Jun (1984). Jun (1984) claimed that the two
conditional connectives show different behaviors in the conditional sentences including the
morpheme -ess. In the literature, it has been claimed that -ess is ambiguous between past
tense and perfective aspect (e.g. Sohn 1995). According to Jun (1984), while this ambiguity
of -ess holds in a myen-clause, as in (178a), it disappears when -ess is used with a tamyen-
clause, as in (178b).
(178) a. swukcey-lulhomework-ACC
taall
ha-ess-umyen,do-PERF/PAST-if,
phathi-eyparty-to
ka-lgo-Adn
swucan
iss-e.-DEC
‘You can go to the party, if you have finished your homework (this afternoon).’
or ‘You can go to the party, if you finished your homework (already)’
b. swukcey-lulhomework-ACC
taall
ha-ess-tamyen,do-PAST-if,
phathi-eyparty-to
ka-lgo-Adn
swucan
iss-e.-DEC
*‘You can go to the party, if you have finished your homework (this afternoon)’
‘You can go to the party, if you finished your homework (already)’
In this section, we have seen that -tamyen only appears in hypothetical and anaphoric
conditionals, whereas -myen can appear in any kind of conditional. We also saw that the two
connectives may have different meanings when they are used in hypothetical conditionals.
Some previous studies have attempted to account for such differences. In the following
sections, I will first give a brief overview of the two previous analyses, Bak (1988) and
Yeom (2004), including their problems. I will then suggest that the differences between -
tamyen and -myen is attributed to the fact that -tamyen, as a hypothetical conditional marker,
145
strictly requires a suppositional meaning. My analysis is similar to Bak’s in that -tamyen
indicates the content of the antecedent clause is the speaker’s supposition, but different from
Bak in that -tamyen does not require the speaker to have an irrealis attitude.
4.3 Previous Approaches to -tamyen
4.3.1 Bak (1988): -tamyen as an irrealis conditional marker
There has been a common assumption that conditionals are allowed only in the irre-
alis domain (Stalnaker, 1975; Givon, 1984; Akatsuka, 1985; Fillmore, 1990a, 1990b; and
others). For instance, Akatsuka (1985) claimed that the human conceptual worlds can be
classified as in (179), and the conditionality can only be expressed relative to the irrealis
worlds, i.e., hypothetical worlds and counterfactual worlds. This means that conditional sen-
tences cannot be used when the speaker knows that the content of the antecedent clause is
actually true:
(179) Akatsuka’s categorization of the conceptual world (Bak, 2003: pp.28)
a. Factual World: KNOW(TRUE(p))
“I know that this is the case.” (the Realis world)
b. Hypothetical World: ∼KNOW(TRUE(p))
“I don’t know that this is the case.” (the Irrealis world)
c. Counterfactual World: KNOW(∼TRUE(p))
“I know that this is not the case.” (the Irrealis world)
146
However, it has also been observed that conditionals can also be used with the speaker’s
realis attitude. In his analysis of Hua conditionals, Haiman (1978) claimed that conditionals
can be compatible with the speaker’s realis attitude (i.e. the positive epistemic stance in his
term). Simlarly, Bak (1988, 2003) claimed that Korean uses conditional sentences whose
speaker has the realis attitude. According to Bak (2003), generic, deictic, and temporal con-
ditionals belong to the realis domain. In those conditionals, the speaker knows/believes that
the actual occurrence of the antecedent clause.
Given this, Bak (1988) argued that while -myen can be used regardless of the speaker’s
attitude, -tamyen, as an irrealis conditional marker, can only be used with the speaker’s irre-
alis attitude (i.e. Hypothetical conditionals and Counterfactuals).4 Bak (1988) also claimed
that the irrealis meaning of -tamyen is attributed to the fact that -tamyen is an elliptical form
of -ta-ko ha-myen ‘if someone (including the speaker) says/thinks/assumes’. In this subsec-
tion, I will first show how Bak’s analysis explains the unacceptability of tamyen in deictic,
generic, and temporal conditionals. I will then show that Bak’s analysis makes wrong pre-
dictions for anaphoric conditionals. In Section 4.4.1, I will also show that -tamyen is not
simply an elliptical form of -ta-ko ha-myen.
According to Bak, a tamyen-clause is not permitted in deictic conditionals, because
the speaker believes the antecedent event to be true. The antecedent of a deictic conditional
is something that is happening in front of the speaker’s eyes, and so the speaker accepts the
4 In Bak (2003), the term ‘Hypothetical conditional’ is used to refer to indicative conditionals that includepredictive and epistemic conditionals. In this dissertation, following Yeom (2009), I use the term ‘Hypotheticalconditionals’ to refer to both indicative conditionals and counterfactuals, because both conditionals involve thespeaker’s hypothetical/suppositional attitude in any way.
147
antecedent event as true. For instance, the speaker of (180) is looking at the addressee who
is making noise.
(180) tosekwan-eselibrary-in
ttetul-myen/#tamyen,talk.loudly-if,
an-toy-yo.not-possible-DEC
(lit.) ‘If you talk loudly in the library, it is not permitted.’
(= Talking loudly in the library is not permitted.)
Under the Bak’s analysis, the unacceptability of a tamyen-clause in a temporal con-
ditional is also due to the speaker’s realis attitude. The speaker of a temporal conditional is
(almost) 100% sure about the actual occurrence of the antecedent clause. For instance, the
speaker of (181) is pretty sure about her arrival in Tokyo based on the facts at speech time.
Using a tamyen-clause is not acceptable, because it conveys the meaning that the speaker
does not know whether s/he will arrive in Tokyo.
(181) (Waiting for the flight to Tokyo in the airport)
tongkyeng-eyTokyo-at
tochakha-myen/#n-tamyen,arrive-if/PRES-if,
Momoko-eykeyMomoko-to
kacangmost
mencefirst
yenlakha-lke-ya.contact-will-DEC
‘When I arrive in Tokyo, I will contact Momoko first.’
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Bak (1988) provided a similar explanation about the unacceptability of a tamyen-
clause in generic conditionals: -tamyen is not permitted in generic conditionals because of
the speaker’s realis attitude. Because they express some sort of law of nature, as in (182a),
or generalizations about the repeated events in the actual world, as in (182b), the speakers
believe that the antecedent event will definitely happen at some time in the future.
(182) a. onto-katemperature-NOM
yengha-losubfreezing-to
tteleci-myen/#n-tamyen,drop-if/PRES-if,
mwul-iwater-NOM
en-ta.freeze-DEC
‘If the temperature drops below zero (Celsius), water freezes.’
b. Gina-nunGina-TOP
cwungyohanimportant
yaksok-iappointment-NOM
iss-umyen/#tamyen,exist-if
pes-pota-nunbus-than-TOP
cihachel-ulsubway-ACC
tha-n-ta.take-PRES-DEC
‘If Gina has an important appointment, she takes a subway rather than a bus.’
Although Bak’s (1998) irrealis marker analysis appears quite plausible, it seems to
make incorrect predictions for the anaphoric conditionals, as in (183). In anaphoric condi-
tionals, a tamyen-clause can be used even when the speaker is absolutely sure about the fact
expressed by the antecedent.5 For instance, (183a) can be used in the context in which the
5 Park (2006) and Noh (2009) also provided examples where using a tamyen-clause is natural with thespeaker’s realis attitude. Park’s (2006) example is shown below:(i) A: Mr. K attended at college in the 70’s. (Park 2006: pp.125 (38))
B: 70nyentay-ey tayhak-ey tanyess-tamyen, yepikosa-seytay-kess-ney.70’s-in college-to-attend-if, preliminary.exam-generation-must-APR‘If he attended at college in the 70’s, he must have the preliminary examination.’
Under the current analysis, this example can also be classified as anaphoric conditional.
149
speaker believes that the suspect’s vehicle was captured by the security camera while passing
through Route 9.
(183) a. A: (Looking at the video screen) Look at this! The suspect vehicle was capturedby a surveillance camera positioned on Route 9.
B: kuleh-kwun-yo.right-APE-HON
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
kwu-pen-tolo-lo9-CL-route-to
cinaka-ss-umyen/tamyen,pass-PAST-if
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
pataska-ccokcoast-direction
swusayk-ulsearch-ACC
kanghwaha-kess-supni-ta.reinforce-will-HON-DEC
‘That’s right. If the suspect passed Route 9, it is very likely that he is in hidingnear the beach. I will reinforce the search near the beach.’
b. A: I’m going to a movie with Mina tonight.
B: kuleh-kwun-a.so-APE-DEC
Mina-langMina-with
yenghwa-po-lemovie-see-to
ka-myen/n-tamyen,go-if/PRES-if
kongpho.yenghwa-nunhorror.movie-TOP
po-ciwatch
ma.not.IMP
Mina-nunMina-TOP
mwusewunscary
yenghwamovie
acwuvery
silhehay.hate
‘I see. If you are going to a movie with Mina, don’t watch a horror movie. Shehates scary movies very much.’
As the speaker believes the antecedent clause to be true, the speaker has a realis
attitude toward the antecedent clause. If it is the case that -tamyen can only be used with
the speaker’s irrealis attitude, we should expect that -tamyen is infelicitous in anaphoric
conditionals like (183). However, that is not true.
In Bak (1988), there was another reason to think that -tamyen is an irrealis marker.
It has been observed that the irrealis adverb manyak and -tamyen pattern together, and this
150
seems to reflect the tamyen’s irrealis meaning. According to Lee (2001), the adverb manyak
can only be used with the conditional clauses that express the speaker’s irrealis attitude to-
ward the propositional content of the antecedent clause.6 For example, the adverb manyak
can appear in (184a), whose speaker has an irrealis attitude. In contrast, as in (184b), if the
speaker has a realis attitude toward the antecedent clause, manyak cannot be used.
(184) a. (manyak)in.case
nay-kaI-NOM
taythonglyeng-ipresident-NOM
toy-myen,become-if
sahyengceyto-luldeath.penalty-ACC
pheyyciha-labolish
ke-ya.will-DEC
‘If I become a president, I will abolish the death penalty.’
b. (#manyak)in.case
pom-ispring-NOM
o-myen,come-if,
hamkkeytogether
paynangyehayng-ulbackpacking-ACC
ka-ca.go-EXH
‘When spring comes, let’s go backpacking together.’
The same pattern seems to hold true in tamyen-conditionals. In (185a), the speaker
has an irrealis attitude, and a tamyen-clause is allowed. In this case, the adverb manyak can
optionally appear. In contrast, the speaker of (185b) has a realis attitude and a tamyen-clause
6 Lee (2001) also noticed that manyak can also appear in the exhortative or imperative sentence, as in (i), butin this case he assumed that there is an unpronounced conditional connective kulehtamyen ‘If that is so’.
(i) manyakin.case
tolsoy-kaTolsoy-NOM
ton-ulmoney-ACC
hwumchi-ess-ta-kosteal-PAST-DEC-QUOT
chi-ca.assume-EXH.
(kuleh-tamyen)(so-if)
ku-nunhe-TOP
10nyenccay10th.year
kamok-eyprison-in
sal-kolive-
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kes-i-ta.NML-COP-DEC
‘Let’s assume Tolsoy stole money. (If that is so), he must have lived in the prison for ten years.’ (translatedLee, 2001: pp.118 (42))
151
is not allowed.
(185) a. (manyak)in.case
nay-kaI-NOM
taythonglyeng-ipresident-NOM
toy-n-tamyen,become-PRES-if
sahyengceyto-luldeath.penalty-ACC
pheyyciha-labolish
ke-ya.will-DEC
‘If I become president, I will abolish the death penalty.’
b. #(manyak)in.case
pom-ispring-NOM
o-n-tamyen,come-PRES-if,
hamkkeytogether
paynangyehayng-ulbackpacking-ACC
ka-ca.go-EXH
‘When spring comes, let’s go backpacking together.’
If we consider the anaphoric conditionals like (183), however, we can see that they do
not pattern together. As shown in (186), while using a tamyen-clause is allowed in anaphoric
conditionals, adding the adverb manyak is not allowed.
(186) a. A: (Looking at the video screen) Look at this! The suspect’s vehicle was cap-tured by a surveillance camera positioned on Route 9.
B: kuleh-kwun-yo.right-APE-HON
(??manyak)in.case
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
kwu-pen-tolo-lo9-CL-route-to
cinaka-ss-umyen/tamyen,pass-PAST-if
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
pataska-ccokcoast-direction
swusayk-ulsearch-ACC
kanghwaha-kess-supni-ta.reinforce-will-HON-DEC
‘That’s right. If the suspect passed Route 9, it is very likely that he is in hidingnear the beach. I will reinforce the search near the beach.’
b. A: I’m going to a movie with Mina tonight.
152
B: kuleh-kwun-a.so-APE-DEC
(??manyak)in.case
Mina-langMina-with
yenghwa-po-lemovie-see-to
ka-myen/n-tamyen,go-if/PRES-if
kongpho.yenghwa-nunhorror.movie-TOP
po-ciwatch
ma.not.IMP
Mina-nunMina-TOP
mwusewunscary
yenghwamovie
acwuvery
silhehay.hate
‘I see. If you are going to a movie with Mina, don’t watch a horror movie. Shehates scary movies very much.’
In (186b), for instance, using the adverb manyak indicates the irrealis attitude of the
speaker, and as a result it conveys the message that the speaker does not believe what was
said (i.e. the fact that Mina and the addressee are going to a movie tonight), which may sound
a bit rude. Unlike manyak, the tamyen-clause is permitted in this sentence, without showing
a feeling of doubt or uncertainty. If a tamyen-clause indicates the speaker’s irrealis attitude,
it is hard to explain why -tamyen can be used without showing a feeling of uncertainty or
doubt.
To summarize, although Bak’s (1988) analysis of -tamyen as an irrealis conditional
marker seems to explain the distributional differences of the two connectives in many cases, it
cannot explain why -tamyen can also appear in the conditionals in which the speaker believes
the actual occurrence of the antecedent event. In Section 4.4, I will provide a new analysis
which claims that -tamyen indicates that the speaker’s public belief is temporally updated
with the content of the antecedent clause. In truth, the new analysis is quite similar to Bak’s
analysis in the sense that -tamyen expresses the speaker’s hypothetical attitude. Departing
from Bak, however, the current analysis will claim that the acceptability of -tamyen is not
determined by the speaker’s actual belief: even when the speaker believes the content of
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the antecedent clause to be true, if the speaker needs to express his/her belief state has been
updated, tamyen-clause can be used (e.g. anaphoric conditionals).
4.3.2 Yeom (2004): -ta as a settledness operator
Yeom (2004) claimed that -tamyen expresses that the propositional content of the
antecedent clause is settled. Yeom (2004) further claimed that this settledness comes from
the fact that the semantic denotation of -ta involves a settledness operator. In this subsection,
I will provide a brief review of Yeom’s (2004) settledness operator analysis. I will then show
that Yeom (2004) makes incorrect predictions for temporal conditionals.
Unlike Bak (1988), Yeom (2004) focused on the temporal interpretations of the two
conditional connectives. Yeom (2004) argued that while a myen-conditional has an epistemic
reading only when the event time of the antecedent clause is in the past or overlapping with
the utterance time (i.e. in the present), a tamyen-conditional can have an epistemic reading
even when the event time of the antecedent clause is in the future.
Let us first consider the examples in (187). The sentences in (187) are epistemic
conditionals, whose antecedent event is interpreted in the past or present. For example, the
speaker of (187a) infers the previous raining event, based on her knowledge about the current
state, i.e. the ground’s being wet. In this case, both -myen and -tamyen are allowed.
(187) a. (cikum)(now)
ttang-ioutside-at
cec-eiss-umyen/tamyen,wet-PROG-if,
eceypam-eylast.night-at
pi-karain-NOM
nayli-nfell-ADN
ke-yNML-COP
thullimeps-ta.must-DEC
‘If the ground is wet, it must have rained last night.’
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b. chelswu-kachelswu-NOM
kippeha-ess-umyen/ta-myenhappy-PAST-if/DEC-if
sihem-eyexam-at
hapkyekha-ess-ulpass-PAST-must-ADN
kes-i-ta.NML-COP-DEC
‘If Chelswu seemed happy, he must have passed the exam.’
(modified from Yeom, 2004)
According to Yeom, there are two basic assumptions about epistemic conditionals: i)
The first assumption is that epistemic conditionals require the proposition of its antecedent
clause to be settled at speech time; ii) The other assumption is that only epistemic condition-
als allow the reversed event time. This is because epistemic conditionals are concerned with
a knowledge or information state of an agent: “in the information state, we can speculate a
previous state/event from a later state of affairs.” (Yeom, 2004: pp.146).
Here, it is necessary to understand the notion of ‘settledness’, which is originally
introduced in Prior (1967). Taking into account the conception of time, the context is con-
strued as consisting of a set of worlds associated with times (i.e. T × W ). In this model, the
truth value of the proposition is determined with respect to both the possible worlds and the
times. Kaufmann (2001), for instance, introduces the function V for the interpretation of the
language LA in a T × W-frame worlds, which is defined in the following way:
(188) V : LA ↦ {0,1}WT (Kaufmann 2001: pp.68)
Given a T × W-frame worlds, Yeom (2004) defines the settled proposition as follows.
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(189) A sentence φ is settled at a world w and a time t iff it is true at all historical alterna-
tives of w at t. (Yeom 2004: pp. 153 (46))
The settledness of (189) is based on the assumption that the structure of time looks
like a tree structure (e.g., Thomason, 1984; Condoravdi 2002; Arita, 2004, 2007; Werner,
2006; and many others). In Warner’s (2006) branching time model, for example, there’s
only one path up to one point t and from the point t the branches spread towards the multiple
distinct futures (Note: in many cases, t is considered as a speech/utterance time ts). This
illustrates the idea that “the past is determined; the future is undetermined.” (Reichenbach
1956: pp.23, from Arita 2004: pp.2). In the branching time model, each complete path from
the root to the end of a branch is considered a distinct history h. In terms of possible worlds,
a history is understood as a possible world associated with a different time path. Under this
branching time model, if the truth value of the proposition is evaluated in the past (including
the utterance time ts), that proposition is construed to be settled.
Returning to conditional sentences, since their antecedent clauses are all settled, the
sentences in (187) can be interpreted as epistemic conditionals. Also, by virtue of their
epistemicity, they allow the order of the events to be reversed (i.e., the event of the consequent
clause precedes the event of the antecedent clause).
Let us now look at the sentence in (190). The antecedent clause of (190) is future-
oriented, and so its proposition is not settled. For this reason, (190) cannot be interpreted as
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an epistemic conditional, but instead it is construed as a predictive conditional.
(190) #nayiltomorrow
ciku-kaearth-NOM
mangha-myen,end-if,
na-nunI-TOP
kacoktul-kwafamily-with
hamkkeytogether
cenyek-uldinner-ACC
mek-kess-ta.eat-will-DEC
‘If the earth is ending tomorrow, I will have dinner with my family.’
Also, since its antecedent clause describes the event of the future, (190) becomes
subject to the forward shifting effect, which “shifts the reference time to the future” (Yeom,
2004: pp.147).7 As a result of the forward-shifting, the conditional sentence ‘if p, then q’ is
interpreted as the event of q occurs shortly after that of p. In this way, (190) is interpreted as
the speaker is planning to have a dinner with his family after the world ends. Because this
sequence of events is not possible, the sentence is judged to be infelicitous. Interestingly, if
we replace -myen with -tamyen, (190) becomes good:
(191) nayiltomorrow
ciku-kaearth-NOM
mangha-n-tamyen,end-PRES-if,
na-nunI-TOP
kacoktul-kwafamily-with
hamkkeytogether
cenyek-uldinner-ACC
mek-kess-ta.eat-will-DEC
‘If the earth is ending tomorrow, I will have dinner with my family.’
7 The detailed explanation for the forward-shifting effect of Korean conditionals can be found in Section 3.4.1.
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(191) is interpreted as the event of the consequent clause (i.e. the family dinner)
precedes the event of the antecedent clause (i.e. the world’s end). This means that, unlike
(190), the order between the two events is reversed. Given this, Yeom (2004) treated (191) as
an epistemic conditional, and claimed that while a myen-clause allows an epistemic reading
just in case the event time of the antecedent is in the past or overlapping with the utterance
time, a tamyen-clause allows an epistemic reading even if the event time of the antecedent is
in the future. Yeom (2004) explained this by assuming that -tamyen introduces a settledness
operator in its denotation. According to Yeom, the settledness can be achieved either by
past/present tense or by the settledness operator. By virtue of its settledness operator, a
tamyen-clause always satisfies the settledness requirement of the epistemic conditional. As
a result, a tamyen-conditional can have the epistemic reading even if its antecedent clause’s
event time is in the future. This directly explains why -tamyen allows the reversed event time
regardless of the event time of the antecedent.
Yeom’s analysis, however, does not seem clear about how the settledness meaning
of -tamyen can be compatible with future-oriented events. According to the settledness in
(189), a settled proposition at the world w and the time t is true at all historical alternatives
of w at t. If this is the case, the proposition of the tamyen-clause in (191) should mean
something like ‘if for all historical alternatives at speech time it is true that the world will
end tomorrow, ...’ However, it is not clear how to evaluate the truth value of a future tensed
proposition based on the historical facts.
To answer this question, some might want to replace the definition of the settledness
in (189) by Kaufmann’s (2001) definition (where, L is the settledness operator, and [w]≈t is a
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set of historical alternatives of w at t):
(192) VT (Lφ)(t)(w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if for all w′ ∈ [w]≈t ,VT (φ)(t)(w′) = 1
0 otherwise
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(Kaufmann 2001: pp.70 (3.10))
(192) is roughly interpreted as the proposition at the world w and the time t is settled
if its truth value is determined in the historical alternatives of w at t. According to Kaufmann
(2001), the future tensed sentence can also be settled, and in this case the settledness “guides
our judgments as to whether the assertion of a prediction is supported by the facts” (Kauf-
mann 2001: pp.71). Thus, the settledness in the future tensed sentence means something
like ‘given the facts we have at speech time (i.e. our history), the proposition of the sentence
will be the case’. In this way, (191) can be interpreted in the following way: ‘If tomorrow’s
destruction of the earth will be the case based on the facts we have at speech time, I will have
a dinner with my family.’8 This paraphrase, however, doesn’t seem to express the meaning
of (191) correctly. (191) can be used even when there’s no historical facts that lead us to
judge that the world will be destroyed tomorrow.
Also, if -tamyen has a settledness meaning and it can be used with future tense, we
should ask why its settledness meaning is missing in many of predictive conditionals, as in
8 If this paraphrase is correct, (191) is not an epistemic conditional, which contradicts to Yeom’s claim. In-stead, (191) is a normal predictive conditional which follows the forward-shifting effect.
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(193).
(193) a. nay-kaI-NOM
taythonglyeng-ipresident-NOM
toy-n-tamyen,become-PRES-if
sahyengceyto-luldeath.penalty-ACC
pheyyciha-labolish
ke-ya.will-DEC
‘If I become president, I will abolish the death penalty.’
b. nayiltomorrow
pi-karain-NOM
o-n-tamyen,come-PRES-if
yuna-nunYuna-TOP
pakk-eyoutside
nakacigo.out
anhulnot-will
ke-ya.-Dec.
‘If it rains tomorrow, I will not go out.’
Yeom (2004) claimed that the tamyen’s settledness meaning does not prevent the
sentence from having a predictive reading because the following entailment relation holds:
(194a) entails (194b) 9 (Yeom 2004: pp.156).
(194) a. It is settled that it will be the case that φ.
b. It will be the case that φ.
However, it still remains unclear why many of the predictive conditionals allow the
entailed meaning, (194b), but not the settledness meaning, (194a). For example, (193a) only
has a normal predictive reading, and it does not have a settledness meaning, which is roughly
paraphrased as ‘if it will be the case that I become a president based on the facts we have at
9 Kaufmann (2001) also assumes that the settled future tensed sentence LFφ entails Fφ.
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speech time, ...’: this sentence can be used even if there’s no historical facts that guide the
speaker to consider being a president.
The loss of the settledness is also found in temporal conditionals. Recall that tamyen-
clauses cannot be used in temporal conditionals. I repeat the examples in (195).
(195) a. Hyunwoo-kaHyunwoo-NOM
kwuntay-eymilitary-to
tuleka-myen/#n-tamyenenter-if/PRES-if
phyenciletter
cacwuoften
ponay-ya-kess-ta.send-have.to-will-DEC
‘When Hyunwoo enters the military service, I’ll have to send him letters often.’
b. Mina-kaMina-NOM
naynyen-eynext.year
ilkop-sal-iseven-CL-NOM
toy-myen/#n-tamyen,become-if/PRES-if
chotunghakkyo-eyelementary.school-to
tuleka-yo.enter-HON
‘When Mina becomes 7 next year, she will enter the elementary school.’
The antecedent clauses of these temporal conditionals convey the message that their
propositional contents will be the case at some point in the future given the facts we have at
speech time. This is exactly what the settledness means when it is used with the future-
oriented event. However, as shown in (195), tamyen-conditionals are not permitted. If
tamyen-clause has a settledness meaning, the unacceptability of tamyen in temporal con-
ditionals cannot be explained.
Apart from this, there’s another issue the settledness analysis needs to explain. If
-ta introduces a settledness operator in conditionals, it is hard to explain why its settledness
is not revealed when it appears sentence-finally. As shown in (196), the declarative mood
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marker -ta doesn’t seem to have settledness meaning when it appears in the sentence final
position. In (196a), for instance, the proposition of the main clause is not true in any his-
torical alternatives at speech time, and also there is no evidence to predict rain. Thus, the
proposition of (196a) is not settled both in Yeom (2004) and in Kaufmann (2001).
(196) a. hanul-eysky-at
kwulumcloud
hanone
cemCL
eps-ciman,not.exist-but
eccencisomehow
pi-karain-NOM
o-lcome-ADN
kesNML
kath-ta.like-DEC
‘Even though the sky is cloudless, somehow I feel like it will rain.’
b. cip-eyhome-to
ka-sego-and
pap-ulmeal-ACC
mek-eyaeat-have.to
kess-ta.will-DEC
‘I will have to go home and eat.’
If someone wants to keep the settledness analysis, they will have to assume that while
the declarative marker -ta in the sentence final position does not show its settledness, for
some reason it exposes its settledness when it is embedded under a conditional. However,
the problem of this idea is that it requires two separate lexical items: -ta which serves as a
settledness marker and -ta which serves as a declarative mood marker. In what follows, I
will provide a new analysis which treats -ta as a normal declarative mood marker. Under the
new analysis, the acceptability of tamyen in temporal conditionals can be easily explained.
Also, we do not have to have an additional lexical entry for -ta.
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4.4 Tamyen as a Hypothetical Conditional Marker
4.4.1 If x assumes p
In his analysis of -tamyen as an irrealis marker, Bak (1988) claimed that while -myen
simply indicates a logical conditional relationship between two clauses, -tamyen expresses
that the antecedent clause is somebody’s assumption as well as the conditional relation. In
this way, the conditional sentence “p-myen, q” simply means ‘if p, then q’, whereas “p-
tamyen, q” is paraphrased as in (197):
(197) if [ someone (including the speaker) assumes [ that p ]], q. (Bak 1988: pp.9 (31))
Bak claimed that this paraphrase well reflects the irrealis meaning of a tamyen-
conditional: if somebody assumes something, it is natural to think that they do not believe
the actual occurrence of it. Bak also claimed that a -tamyen has this irrealis meaning because
it is syntactically an elliptical form of -ta-ko ha-myen ‘if x says/thinks/assumes’, where -ko
is a quatative marker and ha- is a verb whose meaning can differ depending on the context.
In many cases, ha- is interpreted as ‘say’, but it can also mean ‘think’ or ‘assume’ as shown
in (198) (Jun, 1984; Kim and Choi, 2012).
(198) a. ku-kahe-NOM
sicangsenke-eymayor.election-in
chwulmahan-ta-korun-DEC-QUOT
ha-myen,do-if
malli-lke-ya.dissuade-will-DEC
‘If he says that he will run for mayor, I will dissuade him.’
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b. ciwenca-kaapplication-NOM
kyeysokcontinuously
kamsohan-ta-kodecrease-DEC-QUOT
ha-myen,do-if,
2015-nyento2015-CL
kyengcaynglyul-uncompetition.rate-TOP
44
tayto
11
cengto-kaaround-NOM
toy-lbecome-ADN
kes-i-ta.NML-COP-DEC
‘If it is assumed that the number of applicants continues to decrease, the compe-
tition rate will be about 1 out of 4 in 2015.’
Given the assumption that -tamyen is an elliptical expression of -ta-ko ha-myen mean-
ing ‘if x assumes’, the conditional sentence in (199a) is paraphrased as (199b).
(199) a. Anna-kaAnna-NOM
pathi-eyparty-TO
o-cicome
anh-nun-tamyen,not-PRES-if,
salamtul-ipeople-NOM
silmangha-lke-ya.disappointed-will-DEC
‘If Anna doesn’t come to the party, people will be disappointed.’
b. If it is assumed that Anna does not come to the party, people will be disappointed.
However, as Noh (2009) pointed out, there are also examples that suggest that -
tamyen is not simply an abbreviated form of -tako hamyen ‘if x assumes’. If -tamyen is
a contracted form of -tako hamyen, it would be hard to explain why the two components
have different meanings in the examples like (200). (200a) expresses that Yuna will be com-
ing if someone (including Mina) says she will come: the attendance of Yuna depends on
whether or not somebody makes a remark. It doesn’t involve any assumptions. In (200b), by
contrast, the speaker makes a judgment that Yuna will be coming to the party, based on the
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assumption that Mina is coming.
(200) a. Mina-kaMina-NOM
o-n-ta-kocome-PRES-DEC-QUOT
ha-myen,do-if,
Yuna-toYuna-also
o-l-ke-ya.come-will-NML-DEC
‘If Mina says that she is coming, Yuna is coming, too.’
b. Mina-kaMina-NOM
o-n-tamyen,come-PRES-if,
Yuna-toYuna-also
o-l-ke-ya.come-will-NML-DEC
‘If it is assumed that Mina comes, Yuna is coming too.’
Examples like (201), where the two expressions, -ko ha- and -tamyen, co-occur, also
show that -tamyen is not simply a contracted form of -tako hamyen. If -tamyen includes -ko
ha-, there’s no reason to use another -ko ha- in the same sentence.10
(201) ku-kahe-NOM
10-si-ey10-CL-at
il-ulwork-ACC
sicakhayss-ta-kostarted-DEC-QUOT
ha-n-tamyen,do-PRES-if,
kotsoon
il-iwork-NOM
kkuthna-lke-pni-ta.finish-will-HON-DEC
‘If it is assumed that he started working at 10, he will be done in a minute.’
Although I accept neither the analysis of -tamyen as an irrealis marker nor the idea
of -tamyen as an abbreviated form of -tako hamyen, I agree that the paraphrase in (197)
well reflects the intuitive meaning of a tamyen-conditional. In this dissertation, I follow
10 Bak (1988) claimed that -tako hantamyen is preferred over -tamyen when the speaker is more curious aboutthe antecedent. However, many native speakers could not find a distinct difference between the two expressions.
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Bak’s (1988) idea that a tamyen-clause has a hypothetical/suppositional meaning which is
paraphrased as ‘if x assumes’. Departing from Bak, however, I argue that the speaker of a
tamyen-conditional does not necessarily have an irrealis attitude toward the proposition. I
further claim that the hypothetical meaning of the tamyen-conditional results from the fact
that -tamyen is a combination of the declarative marker -ta and the conditional connective
-myen. This means that the -tamyen’s hypothetical meaning is gained compositionally.
4.4.2 Declarative mood and tamyen’s hypothetical meaning
On the current analysis, I argue that -tamyen is a hypothetical conditional marker. In
what follows, I will show that the meaning of the declarative mood contributes to the hypo-
thetical meaning of -tamyen. As I mentioned in the previous two chapters, the effect of a
declarative sentence on a context is to update the discourse agent x’s public belief. I repeat
the CCP of a declarative sentence in (202), where x is one of the discourse participants and
PBc′x is the public belief of x in the context c′:
(202) ∣∣ DEC(φ) ∣∣ = λx. { <C,C′> ∣ ∣∣ φ ∣∣ ∈ PBc′x }
(modified Davis, 2011: pp.44 (23))
Following Gunlogson (2001), Davis (2011) assumed that sentence-final rising/falling
intonational morphemes determine whose public belief is updated. In other words, whose
public belief is updated with the proposition is not determined by the declarative mood. This
is expressed by the variable x in (202). Given the CCP of (202), the declarative mood marker
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-ta roughly means that the conversation participant x publicly commits him/herself to the
belief to the proposition it takes:
(203) ∣∣ -ta ∣∣ = λp.λx. { <C,C′> ∣ ∣∣ p ∣∣ ∈ PBc′x }
Although the identity of x is determined by the rising or falling tone in the matrix
sentence, in an embedded clause, x is not bound by any particular conversation participant.
Thus, I assume that in the case of embedded clause the agent x refers to a generic person,
which is similar to the pronoun “one” or the generic “you” in English. In this way, the sen-
tence in (199a) ( = (204a)) can be paraphrased as in (204b).
(204) a. Anna-kaAnna-NOM
pathi-eyparty-to
o-cicome
anh-nun-tamyen,not-PRES-if,
salamtul-ipeople-NOM
silmangha-lke-ya.disappointed-will-DEC
‘If Anna doesn’t come to the party, people will be disappointed.’
b. If one publicly commits him/herself to believing that Anna does not come to the
party, people will be disappointed.
Let us now look at how to derive a suppositional meaning from the combination of the
declarative mood -ta and the conditional connective -myen. As many researchers observed,
the content of the antecedent clause of an indicative conditional is temporarily considered
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as true to evaluate the truth value of the consequent clause (Adams 1965; Stalnaker 1968;
Isaacs and Rawlins 2008; and many others). In other words, the speaker of a conditional
sentence “supposes” the propositional content of the antecedent clause.
This is how to evaluate a conditional: First, add the antecedent (hypotheti-cally) to your stock of beliefs; ... consider whether or not the consequent is thentrue. (Stalnaker, 1968: pp. 169)
Recall that, in dynamic semantics, this suppositional meaning is expressed by adding
a temporary context.11 As mentioned in Chapter 3, in Isaacs and Rawlins (2008), this tem-
porary context update is formalized in terms of stacks and push/pop operations in Kaufmann
(2000). The temporary context update of an if -clause in the stack model is formalized as
follows:
(205) For any macro-context s and “if”-clause [if φ]:
s + if φ := push(s, s0 ⊕ φ)
Admittance conditions: “If φ” is admissible in a macro-context s iff
s0 ⊕ φ ≠ ∅
(modified from Isaacs and Rawlins, 2008: pp.294 (54))
11 According to Isaacs and Rawlins (2008), since the antecedent clause of a counterfactual is not compatiblewith the main context, it is clearly not the case that a counterfactual conditional updates the temporary contextthat has been copied from the main context. They claimed that in order to interpret counterfactual conditionals,we may need an expanded version of context (e.g., von Fintel’s (2001) modal horizon). Even if counterfactualsare interpreted with respect to the expanded version of context, it still involves a temporary context update.
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According to (205), the if -clause introduces a push operator, which adds a new con-
text to a macro-context. Adding a new context at the top of a macro-context is understood as
the creation of a temporary context. Then, the if -clause updates the temporary context with
its proposition (i.e. s0⊕φ). The admittance conditions are needed for the presupposition of a
(indicative) conditional that the propositional content of the antecedent is “possible” (Isaacs
and Rawlins 2008: pp.294).
Given the fact that the if -clause updates the temporal context, the paraphrase in
(204b) can be understood to express that the agent x’s public belief is “temporally” updated.
Here, since the agent of the update is the generic person “one”, the antecedent clause is con-
strued as the temporal update of the general belief. In most cases, the update of the general
belief is equivalent to the update of the global/universal belief, which includes the speaker’s
belief. Thus, in many cases, the antecedent of a conditional sentence is construed to tempo-
rally update the speaker’s public belief. The temporary update of the speaker’s public belief
indicates that the speaker is assuming the proposition.
This directly explains the distributional differences between the two conditional con-
nectives, which is illustrated in the following table: (where, + means that the conditional
involves a supposition, − means that the conditional does not involve a supposition)
(206) Distributions of -myen and -tamyen
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-myen -tamyen Supposition Speaker’s attitude
Hypothetical ∨ ∨ + Irrealis
Anaphoric ∨ ∨ + Irrealis/Realis
Generic ∨ × − Realis
Deictic ∨ × − Realis
Temporal ∨ × − Realis
According to (206), whether or not the conditional involves the supposition is impor-
tant in determining where -tamyen can appear. Since -tamyen can be used when the speaker
has a realis attitude in anaphoric conditionals, the speaker’s epistemic attitude is not a crucial
condition for using -tamyen.
Like the name suggests, hypothetical conditionals involve a supposition. The an-
tecedent clause of a hypothetical conditional sentence “p-myen, q” means that the context
set is temporally updated with the proposition p. Given this, the function of -myen in a
hypothetical conditional is clear: a myen-clause introduces a push operator which creates
a temporary context and then updates the temporary context with its propositional content.
Using a tamyen-clause in a hypothetical conditional is also naturally captured. By embed-
ding a declarative mood marked phrase under a conditional -myen, a tamyen-clause expresses
that the public belief(s) of the conversation participant(s), including the public belief of the
speaker, is temporally updated with the proposition p. This suppositional meaning is exactly
the same as the suppositional meaning of a hypothetical conditional sentence with -myen.
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This suggests that while both myen-clause and tamyen-clause have the same suppositional
meaning, only a tamyen-clause overtly expresses that meaning. To be more specific, in a
myen-clause, the suppositional meaning is implicitly expressed by the temporary context up-
date of the push operator. By contrast, in a tamyen-clause the same suppositional meaning is
explicitly expressed by adding -ta.
Since its suppositional meaning is overtly expressed on the surface, the temporary
context update is strictly required when using a tamyen-clause. In the next section, I will
show that a tamyen-clause cannot be used if the conditional does not involve a temporary
context update, whereas a myen-clause can also be used in conditionals that do not involve a
temporary context.
4.5 Explaining Data
4.5.1 Non-hypothetical conditionals
Although many conditional sentences involve a supposition, there are also condition-
als that do not have a suppositional meaning. Generic, deictic, and temporal conditionals are
examples of such “non”-hypothetical conditionals.
(207) a. Generic Conditional
onto-katemperature-NOM
payk-to-ka100-degree-NOM
toy-myen/#n-tamyen,become-if/PRES-if,
mwul-iwater-NOM
kkulh-nun-ta.boil-PRES-DEC
‘If the temperature reaches 100 degrees Celsius, water boils.
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(modified from Park 2006)
b. Deictic Conditional
(to the man who is standing in the middle of the street)
kekithere
sestand
kyeysi-myen/n-#tamyen,exist-if/PRES-if
wihemha-pni-ta.dangerous-HON-DEC
‘If you stand there, it is dangerous.’
c. Temporal Conditional
(On the way back home from dropping Hyunwoo off at the airport)
Hyunwoo-kaHyunwoo-NOM
NewNew
York-eyYork-to
ka-myen/#n-tamyengo-if/PRES-if
Gina-lulGina-ACC
kacangmost
mencefirst
manna-lke-ya.meet-will-DEC
‘When Hyunwoo goes to New York, he will meet Gina first.’
Unlike ordinary conditional sentences, the antecedent clause of a non-hypothetical
conditional does not include the speaker’s assumption. First, generic conditionals like (207a)
express generic information such as a law of nature, a matter of course, or a habit in the form
of conditionals. Since the dependency between the two events is a kind of generalization
which is gained from the repeated events in the actual world, the content of the antecedent
clause cannot be understood as the speaker’s assumption. Second, the antecedent clause of
a deictic conditional depicts the scene the speaker is looking at with his/her own eyes in the
immediate context.12 For instance, (207b) can be used in the situation where the speaker is
12 It should be noted that the notion of deictic conditional in Bak (2003) is different from that of the currentpaper. The following examples are all called deictic conditionals in Bak (2003).
172
looking at a man who is standing in the middle of the street. Since the antecedent simply
describes an affair which already turned out to be true in the actual world, it cannot be seen
as involving the speaker’s supposition. Lastly, temporal conditionals also do not involve a
suppositional meaning. Based on the fact he knows at the utterance time, the speaker is 100%
sure that the antecedent event will happen in the near future. This means that the speaker
does not consider the possibility that the antecedent event does not take place. For instance,
the speaker of (207c) is absolutely sure that Hyunwoo will be in New York in the near future
based on what s/he knows at the time of the utterance. Since the speaker drove Hyunwoo
to the airport, s/he is sure that Hyunwoo will be in New York. When somebody suppose
something s/he must consider the possibility that it will not happen, but temporal conditionals
cannot be used in the situation where the speaker believes that there is a possibility that the
content of its antecedent will not happen. This means that the antecedent clause of a temporal
conditional does not involve the speaker’s assumption.
(i) ttelecimyenfall-if
tachinta.get.hurt
‘If you fall, you will get hurt.’
(ii) ilehkeylike.this
pi-karain-NOM
o-myen,come-if
cip-eysehome-at
swi-ca.rest-EXH
‘If it rains like this, let’s take a rest at home.’
Under the Bak’s analysis, a conditional sentence is classified as a deictic conditional as long as its antecedentclause is somehow related to the scene the speaker is looking at. However, in the present analysis, both (i)and (ii) are not deictic conditionals for the following reasons: (i)’s antecedent clause describes something thathas not happened yet. (ii) involves the expression ilehkey ‘like this’, which indicates that the antecedent clauserefers to the abstract rain scene which is very similar to the current scene. For more details, see the examplesin (212).
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So far we have seen that the three conditional sentences do not involve a suppositional
meaning. Since the suppositional meaning of a conditional sentence is expressed by the tem-
porary context update, the lack of suppositional meaning indicates that there is no temporary
context update in their interpretations. Then, the question arises: what is the function of an
if -clause in those non-hypothetical conditionals? I claim that the antecedent clause of a non-
hypothetical conditional functions as a domain restrictor, in the sense of Kratzer. According
to Kratzer (1977, 1979, 2012), epistemic conditionals involve an implicit or explicit modal
operator in its left periphery, as illustrated in (208), and a if -clause restricts the domain of
the modal operator.
(208) (if .... ...), (necessarily ... ...)
(if .... ...), (possibly ... ...)
(if .... ...), (probably ... ...)
(from Kratzer 2012: pp.64)
Under her analysis, bare conditionals which do not have an overt modal operator are
also understood as being “implicitly modalized” (Kratzer 2012: pp.98). According to her,
bare conditonals include an implicit modal MUST, which is very similar to the explicit modal
operator must but differs from its explicit counterpart in its evidentiality. For example, the
logical form of the sentence (209a) is illustrated in (209b).
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(209) a. If the lights in his study are on, Roger is home.
b. (MUST: if the lights in his study are on), (Roger is home).
(from Kratzer 2012: pp.98 (34))
The semantic operator is not limited to the implicit/explicit epistemic modals. Ac-
cording to Kratzer, the if -clause functions as a domain restrictor for any kind of operator,
which includes epistemic necessity modal operator, adverbs of quantification, and many oth-
ers.
In (207), we can see that -myen can be used in the non-hypothetical conditionals,
whereas -tamyen cannot. In truth, the reason is very simple. Because of the hypotheti-
cal/suppositional meaning of -ta, -tamyen strictly requires a temporary context update. How-
ever, the temporary context update is not involved in the interpretation of a non-hypothetical
conditional. In contrast to -tamyen, the temporary context update is not obligatory for using
-myen. Thus, conditionals which lack temporary context update only allow a myen-clause.
In such cases the myen-clause does not introduce a push operator, which creates temporary
contexts, but functions as a Kratzerian domain restrictor:
(210)
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Types of Conditionals Functions of if -clause
Hypothetical i) Domain restriction -tamyen/myen
ii) Temporary Context Update
Non-hypothetical i) Domain restriction -myen
First, in a generic conditional, the antecedent clause restricts the domain of the ad-
verb of quantification. Given that generic conditionals express “timeless dependencies”
(Schachter, 1971; from Reilly 1986, pp.312), it can be assumed that a generic conditional
includes a semantic operator which has a similar meaning to that of the adverb always, which
can be expressed as a universal quantifier. Thus, the antecedent clause of a generic condi-
tional does not introduce the temporary context, but simply functions as a domain restrictor
for the universal quantifier which quantifies over situations or events.13 14
13 This is also true in the conditionals with an overt adverb of quantification (e.g., generally, usually, etc.)The following examples show that only myen-clause is permitted in the sentences that contain an adverb likepothong ‘generally’ or taypwupwun ‘mostly’ quantifying over the situations.
(i) pothong,usually,
umsik-ulfood-ACC
ccakeysalty
mek-umyen/#nun-tamyen,eat-if/PRES-if,
hyeap-iblood.pressure-NOM
nop-aci-n-ta.high-become-PRES-DEC
‘Usually, if one eats salty food, his blood pressure will go up.’
(ii) hankwuksalamtul-iKoreans-NOM
yulep-uloEurope-to
yehayng-ultrip-ACC
ka-myen/#n-tamyen,go-if/PRES-if,
taypwupwunmostly
phali-eseyParis-at
haluone.day
isangmore
mwuk-nun-ta.stay-PRES-DEC
‘Mostly, if Koreans travel Europe, they stay in Paris for more than a day.’
14 The logical representation in (211) is based on Kratzer’s (2012) logical representation in (209b).
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(211) (∀s: if it rains in s) (Hyunwoo drinks wine in s)
Like the case with generic conditionals, the antecedent clause of a deictic condi-
tional functions as a Kratzerian domain restrictor for the semantic operator of the conse-
quent clause. In this case, there is an implicit epistemic necessity operator MUST and the
antecedent clause restricts the domain of MUST.
Interestingly, using ilehkey ‘like this’ or celehkey ‘like that’ seem to make the deictic
conditionals with -tamyen sound better:
(212) a. (Looking out of the window)
ilehkeylike.this
pi-karain-NOM
o-myen/n-tamyen,come-if/PRES-if,
yakwusihap-unbase.ball.game-TOP
milwu-eci-lpostpone-PASS-AD
ke-ya.NML-DEC
‘If it rains like this, the baseball game will be postponed.’
b. (Looking at the next door house)
celehkeylike.that
pang-eyroom-at
pwul-ilight-NOM
khye-cy-eon-PASS
iss-umyen/tamyen,PROG-if
cipan-eyhome.inside-at
nwukasomeone
iss-nunexist-ADN
keyNML
pwunmyenghay.sure
‘If the light is on in the room like that, there must be someone in the house.’
In this case, I claim that the antecedent clause does not refer to the particular scene
that is happening before the speaker’s eyes at the utterance time. For example, in (212a), the
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antecedent clause does not refer to rain falling before the speaker’s eyes at utterance time.
Rather, it assumes an event of rain which is very similar to the current scene. Together with
the hypothetical meaning of conditional, (212a) roughly means ‘If I assume that it keeps
on raining at the same (rate) as it is now, the baseball game will be postponed.’ Thus, the
sentence is interpreted as a normal predictive conditional whose antecedent clause involves
a kind of equal comparison.
Lastly, the antecedent clause of a temporal conditional also functions as a domain
restrictor. For example, the temporal conditional in (213) expresses that Gina will make a
call anytime after her arrival. Given this, I assume that a temporal conditional involves a
quantification over the alternatives with different times, and the antecedent clause restricts
the domain of that quantification.
(213) Gina-kaGina-NOM
yehayng-eysetrip-from
tolao-myen,come.back-if,
tansin-eykeyyou-to
cenhwaha-lkey-yo.call-will-HON
‘When Gina gets back, she will call you.’
If we assume the branching time model, the temporal interpretation of (213) can be
illustrated as follows: (modified, Portner 2009)
(214) Branching time model
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According to (214), there are different alternative historical possible worlds (i.e. his-
tories) depending on the time of Gina’s phone call. Thus, the antecedent clause of a temporal
conditional restricts the alternative histories. The historical modal base is defined in (215).
(215) For any world w and time t, ⋂ f (w,t) = the set of worlds which are identical to w up
through time t.
(from Portner 2009: pp.233 (299))
In this way, the temporal conditional in (213) can be roughly paraphrased as fol-
lows:15
(216) (∀h: if Gina arrives in h) (Gina will call you in h).
15 The logical representation in (216) is based on Kratzer’s (2012) logical representation in (209b).
179
There’s another interesting fact we need to consider with respect to the temporal con-
ditionals. Many researchers claim that, in hypothetical conditionals, -tamyen is preferred
over -myen when the antecedent event is not feasible (e.g., Lee C., 1980; Lee K., 1980; Jun,
1984; Lee, 1996; and many others) (examples are from Lee C. 1980 and Jun 1984: pp.250
(30)). For examples, (217a) with a myen-clause does not sound natural because the speaker
talks about the unification as if it will be realized very soon.
(217) a. naynyen-eynext.year-at
hankwuk-iKorea-NOM
thongil-iunification-NOM
toy-n-tamyen/??toy-myen,achieve-PRES-if/achieve-if
na-nunI-TOP
kumkangsan-pwutheKumkang.mountain-from
kapo-kess-ta.go.and.see-will-DEC
‘If the two Koreas are unified, I will go to Kumkang mountain first.’
b. nay-kaI-NOM
taythonglyeng-ipresident-NOM
toy-n-tamyen/??toy-myen,become-PRES-if/become-if,
sahyengceyto-lulthe.death.penalty-ACC
phyeyci-sikhi-lke-ya.abolish-cause-will-DEC
‘If I become president, I will abolish the death penalty.’
I argue that preferring -tamyen over -myen in (217) is due to the fact that these sen-
tences with a myen-clause are ambiguous between the temporal reading and the hypothetical
reading. Using a myen-clause may lead the hearer to interpret the sentence as a temporal
conditional, and that results in the unnecessary implication that the antecedent event will
definitely happen in the near future. In order to avoid the temporal interpretation, native
speakers prefer to use -tamyen, which explicitly indicates that the sentence is hypothetical.
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4.5.2 Anaphoric conditionals
On the current analysis, -tamyen has the hypothetical meaning that the speaker is as-
suming its proposition. This, however, may encounter a problem with respect to anaphoric
conditionals. In anaphoric conditionals, tamyen-clauses are acceptable even when the speaker
believes the antecedent to be true, but it is not natural for someone to suppose/assume some-
thing that s/he already believes. In this section, we will look at the examples of anaphoric
conditionals, and see how the present analysis explains the occurrences of -tamyen in those
anaphoric conditionals.
As shown in (218)-(221), anaphoric conditionals allow a tamyen-clause regardless of
whether its speaker believes the content of the antecedent clause. For instance, the speaker of
(218) accepts what was said as true, and this is expressed by kulehkwuna ‘I see.’ In (220) and
(221), the speakers have direct evidence to believe the actual occurrence of the antecedent
clause.
(218) A: I’m going to a movie with Mina tonight.
B: kuleh-kwun-a.so-APE-DEC
Mina-langMina-with
yenghwa-po-lemovie-see-to
ka-n-tamyen,go-PRES-if
kongpho.yenghwa-nunhorror.movie-TOP
po-ciwatch
anh-nunnot-ADN
ke-yNML-COP
coh-a.good-DEC
Mina-nunMina-TOP
mwusewunscary
yenghwamovie
acwuvery
silhehay.hate
‘I see. If you are going to a movie with Mina, you’d better not watch a horror movie.She hates scary movies very much.’
(219) A: Jenny has 5 cats.
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B: kulay?Really?
koyangi-lulcat-ACC
tases-mali-na5-CL-even
khiwun-tamyen,raise-if,
kyayher
namphyen-ihusband-NOM
alleyluki-ttamwuneyallergies-because
kosayngsuffering
comlittle
ha-kess-ney?do-would-APR
‘Really? If she raises 5 cats, her husband must be having a hard time because ofallergies, right?’
(220) Patient: I have hives along with fever after eating this.
Doctor: yey,yes
kuleh-kwun-yo.so-APE-HON
twutuleki-kahive-NOM
na-kooccur-and
yel-ifever-NOM
iss-tamyen,exist-if
sikcwungtok-eyfood.poisoning-IN
kelli-si-ntaken-HON-ADN
ke-yNML-COP
pwunmyengha-pni-ta.certain-HON-DEC
‘Yes, that’s right. If you have hives and fever, it is certain that you got food poison-ing.’
(221) A: Look at this! The suspect vehicle was captured by a surveillance camera posi-tioned on Route 9.
B: kuleh-kwun-yo.so-APE-HON
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
kwu-pen-tolo-lo9-CL-route-to
cinaka-ss-tamyen,pass-PAST-if
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
pataska-ccokcoast-direction
swusayk-ulsearch-ACC
kanghwaha-kess-supni-ta.reinforce-will-HON-DEC
‘Right. If the suspect passed Route 9, it is very likely that he is in hiding near thebeach. I will reinforce the search near the beach.’
In (218)-(221), B gets to know new information from what A said immediately before
the current utterance. In B’s utterances, B repeats or paraphrases the content of the previous
utterance in the antecedent clause, and then, in the consequent clause, s/he gives his/her
conclusion or inference based on the content of the antecedent.16 In (218), for instance, B
16 Since repeat exactly the same content does not sound natural, the conjunctive expression kulehtamyen ‘ifso/if it is the case’ makes the sentence sound more natural. Morphologically, kulehtamyen consists of theanaphoric expression kuleh(a)- ‘so’ and the conditional connective -tamyen.
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didn’t know A’s plan to go to a movie with Mina. After hearing A’s utterance, B became to
know that plan. Based on the new information, which is repeated in the antecedent clause, B
gives his/her judgment in the consequent clause.
Given this, I argue that the acceptability of a tamyen-clause in anaphoric conditionals
is due to the speaker’s need to indicate that his/her belief state has been changed. In other
words, tamyen can be used in an anaphoric conditional when the speaker needs to show that
his judgment or inference of the consequent clause is based on the newly updated informa-
tion.
In order to understand what the function of the antecedent clause is in an anaphoric
conditional more accurately, let us compare B’s utterance in (221) with the following.
(222) B′: kuleh-kwun-yo.so-APE-HON
?yonguica-nunsuspect-TOP
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
...
‘That’s right. It is very likely that he is in hiding near the beach. ...’
As shown in (222), removing the antecedent clause results in the slight oddity. Al-
though the expression kulehkwunyo ‘that’s right’ indicates that the speaker does not object
(i) B′′: kuleh-kwun-yo.so-APE-HON
kuleh-tamyenso-if
yonguica-nunsuspect-TOP
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
...
‘Right. Then, it is very likely that he is in hiding near the beach. ...’
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the content of the addressee’s previous remark, it is still unclear that the content is updated as
the speaker’s public belief. Thus, (222) sounds odd because the speaker gives a judgement
or inference based on the newly updated information without publicly committing himself
to believing that information (i.e. the suspect vehicle passed Route 9).
Under the current analysis, conditionals explicitly express that the content of the an-
tecedent clause is in the speaker’s public belief. Given this assumption, one might want to
ask if we can replace the antecedent clause of an anaphoric conditional by a causal clause
(i.e., nikka-clause), and if so, what is the purpose of using a conditional clause instead of a
causal clause. As shown in (223), we can replace the conditional connective with the causal
connective -nikka:
(223) B′′′: kuleh-kwun-yo.so-APE-HON
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
kwu-pen-tolo-lo9-CL-route-to
cinaka-ss-unikka,pass-PAST-because
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-pni-ta.large-HON-DEC
...
‘Right. Because the suspect passed Route 9, it is very likely that he is in hiding nearthe beach. ...’
Both (223) and (221) express that the addressee’s previous utterance caused the
speaker to conclude that the suspect is in hiding near the beach. The difference is that,
unlike a nikka-clause, a tamyen-clause indicates that the speaker first became aware of the
content of the antecedent and this new information led the speaker to the (new) conclusion
of the consequent. The difference becomes more clear in the following examples:
(224) A: Hyunwoo must have gone out fishing today.
B: But, it is raining outside.
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A: kulay?really
pi-karain-NOM
on-tamyen/?nikka,come-if/because
yenghwa-po-lemovie-see-to
ka-ss-ulke-ya.go-PAST-must-DEC
‘Really? If/because it is raining, he must have gone to a movie.’
(225) A: The suspect was last seen near Market St., so, I think he can be hiding near thebeach or in the village.
B: Look at this! The suspect’s vehicle was captured by a surveillance camera posi-tioned on Route 9.
A: a,oh
kuleh-tamyen/?nikka,so-if/because
yonguica-kasuspect-NOM
pataska-ccok-eycoast-direction-at
unsinhayhide
iss-ulPROG-ADN
kanungseng-ipossibility-NOM
khu-kess-ney-yo.large-would-SUP-HON
...
‘Oh, if/because it is the case, it is very likely that the suspect is in hiding near thebeach. ...’
In (224), A originally thought that Hyunwoo must have gone fishing. After A found
out that it is raining, A made a new prediction that Hyunwoo must have gone to a movie. In
this case, a tamyen-conditional sounds natural, but a nikka-clause is slightly odd.
The difference between -tamyen and -nikka seems related to the logical meaning of a
conditional sentence. The truth-conditional meaning of a conditional sentence ‘if p, then q’
can be illustrated as follows:
(226)
185
p q p → q
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
Since the antecedent clause of an anaphoric conditional is actually true, there’s no
need to consider the cases in which the antecedent is false:
(227)
p q p → q
1 1 1
1 0 0
According to (227), the entire sentence is true only when the consequent clause is
true. Thus, the speaker of an anaphoric conditional asserts that its consequent clause (i.e.
q) is true, and at the same time denies all other alternatives. In (224), for instance, the
speaker originally considers the possibility that Hyunwoo has gone fishing. Because of the
new information (i.e. the rain), the speaker came to a new conclusion that Hyunwoo must
have gone to a movie. By doing so, the speaker denies all other possibilities including
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the previous prediction (i.e. Hyunwoo must have gone out fishing). Unlike conditionals, a
causal clause does not clearly show the denial of other possibilities. This results in having
two contradictory predictions, which gives rise to a slight oddity.
4.5.3 Temporal Interpretation of tamyen
Let us now consider the differences between the two conditional connectives that are
found in their temporal interpretations. According to Yeom (2004), while a myen-conditional
has the reversed event time only when the event time of the antecedent clause is in the past
or overlapping with the utterance time, a tamyen-conditional allows the reversed event time
regardless of the event time of the antecedent clause. Examples are repeated:
(228) a. nayiltomorrow
ciku-kaearth-NOM
mangha-n-tamyen,end-PRES-if,
na-nunI-TOP
chinkutul-ulfriends-ACC
manna-lmeet-will
ke-ya.-DEC
‘If the earth is ending tomorrow, I will meet my friends.’
b. #nayiltomorrow
ciku-kaearth-NOM
mangha-myen,end-if,
na-nunI-TOP
chinkutul-ulfriends-ACC
manna-lmeet-will
ke-ya.-DEC
‘If the earth is ending tomorrow, I will meet my friends.’
As we have seen in 4.3.2, Yeom (2004) explained this by assuming that -tamyen has
a settledness operator in its denotation. Even though the event time of the antecedent clause
is in the future, by virtue of its settledness operator, (228a) can be interpreted as an epistemic
conditional, which allows the reversed event time.
187
Departing from Yeom (2004), however, I argue that there is no difference between
the two conditional connectives with respect to the temporal order of events. Just like -myen,
-tamyen also does not allow the reversed event time when the antecedent clause event is
future-oriented. For example, in (228a), at first glance -tamyen seems to allow the interpre-
tation of the reversed event time (i.e., the meeting event precedes the world’s end). However,
if we consider the time of the realization or awareness, we can see that the two events in
(228a) are not inverted. Just like (228b), the speaker of (228a) cannot have a family dinner
after the destruction of the world. Instead, (228a) is interpreted as the speaker is planning to
have a family dinner if he/she becomes aware of the world’s end (i.e., the time when the agent
gets to know the world’s end must precedes the time when the agent meets his/her friends).
In this way, both (228a) and (228b) are construed as ordinary predictive conditionals.
Since the antecedent clauses are interpreted as the future event, both sentences are
subject to the forward shifting effect. In (228b), due to the forward shifting effect, the conse-
quent clause event is interpreted as taking place shortly after the antecedent clause event: the
speaker will meet his friends after the world’s end. Since the speaker is making an infeasible
plan, the sentence is judged to be infelicitous. The sentence in (228a) is also the subject
to the forward shifting effect, because the antecedent clause is future-oriented. In this case,
however, the sentence sounds natural. This is because the time when the agent becomes
aware of the world’s end precedes the meeting event.
In order to explain the difference between the two connectives, I suggest that the
declarative marker -ta in -tamyen introduces the time of realization as a reference time. This
is correlated with the semantic meaning of the declarative marker -ta. As mentioned above,
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the declarative mood -ta denotes that the agent x commits him/herself to the belief to the
proposition it takes, and updating one’s belief world can be understood as a recognition
process. In other words, the declarative marker of -tamyen guides us to consider the agent’s
recognition or realization of the proposition.
Under the current analysis, the agent’s consiousness is very important in the inter-
pretation of tamyen-conditionals. Consequently, if the agent of the sentence lacks cognitive
abilities, the present theory would predict the sentence to be infelicitous. As shown in (229),
that turns out to be true.
(229) a. ??nayiltomorrow
cicin-iearthquake-NOM
na-n-tamyen,happen-PRES-if,
meyki-tul-uncatfish-PL-TOP
mom-ulbody-ACC
pithu-ltwist-will
ke-ya.-DEC
(Intended) ‘If there will be an earthquake tomorrow, catfish will twist.’
b. nayiltomorrow
cicin-iearthquake-NOM
na-n-tamyen,happen-PRES-if,
na-nI-TOP
salam-tul-ulpeople-PL-ACC
ancenhansafe
kos-uloplace-to
tayphi-siki-levacuate-make-ADN
kes-i-ta.NML-COP-DEC
‘If there will be an earthquake tomorrow, I will evacuate people to safety.’
In (229a), catfish are believed to twist before the earthquake hit. Although this is a
kind of indicator of the earthquake, catfish themselves do not really know what will happen.
Because catfish do not recognize the earthquake, the tamyen-conditional sounds a bit odd.17
17 In (229a), myen is also not allowed because it means that catfish twist their bodies after the earthquake.
189
In contrast, since the agent of (229b) is able to recognize that the earthquake will hit, the
tamyen-conditional is allowed.
In comparison with Yeom (2004), the current theory has the merit of being simple.
Under the current analysis, the morpheme -ta in tamyen-clause is considered as a normal
declarative marker. Thus, there’s no need to stipulate that -ta in conditionals is different
from -ta in other contexts: the particle -ta in all different contexts can be understood as the
same thing.
Regarding the two connectives’ temporal interpretations, there’s one more thing to
consider. Recall that the ambiguity of -ess disappears when -ess is used with a tamyen-
clause, as shown in (230) (Jun, 1984).
(230) a. swukcey-lulhomework-ACC
taall
ha-ess-umyen,do-PERF/PAST-if,
phathi-eyparty-to
ka-lgo-
swucan
iss-e.-DEC
‘You can go to the party, if you have finished your homework (this afternoon).’
or ‘You can go to the party, if you finished your homework (already)’
b. swukcey-lulhomework-ACC
taall
ha-ess-tamyen,do-PAST-if,
phathi-eyparty-to
ka-lgo-
swucan
iss-e.-DEC
‘*You can go to the party, if you have finished your homework (this afternoon)’
‘You can go to the party, if you finished your homework (already)’
Under the current analysis, -tamyen expresses the propositional content is the speaker’s
supposition. This directly explains the lack of ambiguity in (230b). Since the speaker’s sup-
position must take place in the utterance time, the proposition of a tamyen-clause is construed
190
as something happened before the utterance time. For this reason, -ess loses its perfective
aspect meaning which may relate to the future event.
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4
In this chapter, we have seen that a myen-clause can be used either in a hypothetical
conditional which involves a temporary context update or in a non-hypothetical conditional
in which the if -clause functions as a simple domain restrictor. By contrast, a tamyen-clause
morphologically includes hypothetical meaning, and so it can only be used in conditionals
involving a temporary context update. Since generic, temporal, and deictic conditionals do
not involve a temporary context update in their interpretations, tamyen-clauses are not per-
mitted in those conditionals. We also saw that -tamyen can be used in anaphoric conditionals
when there’s a need to explicitly express that the speaker’s public belief has been updated.
I further claimed that a tamyen-clause is only allowed in a conditional with a tem-
porary context update because of the meaning of the declarative marker -ta. Formally, -ta
expresses that its proposition is updated to the agent x’s public belief. By embedding the
declarative marked phrase under the conditional, the antecedent clause conveys the implied
message that the generic person’s public belief is temporarily updated with the proposition
of the antecedent clause. As a result, the tamyen-clause can convey the message that the
generic person (including the speaker) is assuming its proposition.
191
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