A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA - Cambridge University Press

A HISTORY OFSAUDI ARABIA

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDUniversity of London

P U B L I S H E D B Y T H E P R E S S S Y N D I C A T E O F T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A M B R I D G E

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Contents

List of illustrations page ixList of tables xChronology xiGlossary xivMap Saudi Arabia, main regions and cities xviMap Saudi Arabia, main tribes xvii

Introduction

Society and politics, – and – The origins of Al Sacud (–) A fragile Sacudi revival (–) The Rashidi emirate in Ha

�il (–)

The Sharifian emirate in Hijaz Hasa in the nineteenth century Emirate formation in Arabia

The emerging state, – The capture of Riyadh () The First World War and Ibn Sacud (–) The capture of Ha

�il ()

The capture of Hijaz () The mut.awwaca of Najd The ikhwan An alliance not so holy: Ibn Sacud, the mut.awwaca and the ikhwan The collapse of the ikhwan rebellion

Control and loyalty, – Marginalising Sacudi collateral branches Consolidating Ibn Sacud’s line of descent Power and pomp in the pre-oil era: the majlis State affairs The oil concession ()

vii

viii Contents

Oil in commercial quantities Oil and society in the s and s Saudi Arabia and Britain The end of an era

The politics of dissent, – The reign of King Sacud (–) Saudi Arabia and the Arab world in the s Saudi Arabia and the United States in the s and early s The reign of King Faysal (–) Faysal and the Arab world

From affluence to austerity, – Affluence: the oil embargo () Vulnerabilities: Sacudi–American relations in the s The reign of King Khalid (–) Austerity: the reign of King Fahd (– ) Saudi Arabia and the Gulf context in the s Sacudi–American relations in the s

The Gulf War and its aftermath, – Sacudi responses to the Gulf War State responses: the reforms of March The Islamist opposition Succession

Narratives of the state, narratives of the people Official historiography Political speech The historical narrative challenged The centennial celebrations: the capture of Riyadh revisited The centennial celebration challenged

Conclusion

Appendix I: Al Sacud rulers in Dir ciyyah (–) Appendix II: Al Sacud rulers in Riyadh (– ) Appendix III: Ibn Sacud’s sons (–) Notes Bibliography Index

Illustrations

Street scene, Riyadh, circa . C© Popperfoto page King Faysal in the Regents Park mosque, . C© Popperfoto The Kacba, Mecca. C© Popperfoto US army tanks deployed in the Gulf War, .

C© AFP/Popperfoto Women shopping in downtown Jeddah. C© AFP/Popperfoto Invitation to the centennial celebrations, Advertising Ibn Sacud’s biography on CD-ROM Publicity literature from the centennial celebrations,

ix

Tables

Government revenues – page Volume of petroleum export and GDP – Volume of petroleum export and GDP in billion SA riyals

–

x

CHAPTER ONE

Society and politics, – and –

The Ottoman Empire maintained a nominal suzerainty over the terri-tory which is today part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after its majorexpansion eastward in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. WhenSalim I occupied Egypt in , he inherited the guardianship of Hijazas the last Mamluks gave him the keys of Mecca. The Ottoman Sultanissued a firman confirming the amir of Mecca, Sharif Barakat, in hisposition. The Sultans later appointed governors in Jeddah and Madina(al-Sibaci : ), and ruled in Hijaz for four hundred years in co-operation with the Sharifian family.

While the incorporation of Hijaz in the Ottoman Empire was anextension of their rule in Egypt, their authority in eastern Arabia was anextension of their occupation of the Euphrates valley that began in when Sulayman the Magnificent conquered Baghdad. Hasa submittedvoluntarily to theOttomans in (Anscombe : ). This first phaseof Ottoman occupation ended with the rebellion of the Banu Khalid in (ibid.). The Ottomans did not return to eastern Arabia until thetime of Midhat Pasha in the s.

TheOttomans, however, failed to extend their control into the interiorof Arabia, known as Najd. Without a formal Ottoman presence, Najditowns and oases were ruled by their own amirs, while tribal confedera-tions maintained their independence and autonomy. In the eighteenthcentury, leadership in Najd, namely the first Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate(–), challenged the authority of the Ottoman Empire in Hijaz,Iraq and Syria. This challenge resulted in the occupation of centralArabia by Muhammad cAli’s forces, on behalf of the Ottoman Empire,in . By , Egyptian troops retreated into Hijaz, leaving Najd inthe hands of its local rulers. A second unsuccessful attempt to penetratethe interior followed the more definitive Ottoman occupation of Hasain . Once again, Najd remained autonomous. Local politics in this


central part of Arabia came to play a major role in shaping the modernhistory of the country.

THE ORIGINS OF AL SA C UD ( – )

Local Najdi amirs enjoyed relative freedom to rule in the small settle-ments of Najd. Both the Sharifs of Mecca and the Banu Khalid rulersof Hasa tried to extend their control over Najd with the hope of extract-ing the meagre surplus produced by its agricultural communities (Fattah : ). However, neither theHijazi Sharifs nor the BanuKhalid chiefswere able to integrate Najd into their sphere of influence. Najd itself wasnot an attractive region as it produced little surplus in dates and live-stock. Its own population had always looked towards the coast of Hasaand beyond to survive. Its small merchants travelled as far as Basra andIndia, to supplement their limited resources.

In the eighteenth century Dirciyyah was a small settlement in Najdwith a mixed population of farmers, merchants, artisans, minor culamaand slaves. According to one source, the settlement did not have morethan seventy households (Abu H. akima : ). Since , a memberof the Al Sacud clan, Muhammad ibn Sacud, had been the local ruler.The descent ofAl Sacud is often attributed to theMas.alikh of BanuWa

�il,

a tribal section of the northArabian camel-herding cAniza tribe (Lorimer: ). TheAl Sacud’s associationwith the cAniza, however, remainssuspicious since nohistorical source suggests that this tribal sectionplayeda role in their later expansion in Arabia.

Most probably the Al Sacud were a sedentary group that founded thesettlement of Dirciyyah. The settlement recognised the authority of theSacudi amir as a result of a combination of factors: his residence in the oa-sis and his ownership of cultivated land and wells around the settlement.It seems that the Al Sacud were originally of the landholding mer-chant class of Najd. Muhammad ibn Sacud (died ) was a landownerand a broker, financing the journeys of long-distance merchants (Fattah : ). Political skills of mediation and the ability to defend the settle-ment against raids by other oasis amirs and tribal confederations wereimportant complementary attributes. In return for tribute frommembersof the settlement, the oasis amir became the defender of the inhabitantswho served as his military force, enhanced by his own slaves. Collectionof this tribute strengthened political leadership; it distinguished the amirand his lineage from that of other residents in the settlement.

A history of Saudi Arabia

Sacudi leadership in Dirciyyah is best described as a traditional formof rule common in many settlements in Arabia at that time. In thes, the amir of Dirciyyah enjoyed limited authority beyond his ownsettlement. With the exception of his ability to collect tribute, the exec-utive authority of an oasis ruler was fairly weak (al-Juhany : ).

It seems that the Sacudi leadership was lacking in two respects: first, itlacked an identifiable tribal origin that would have guaranteed a strongassociation with a tribal confederation, similar, for example, to that oftheir contemporaries, Banu Khalid of Hasa. Second, the Sacudi leader-ship lacked any great surplus of wealth. TheAl Sacudmay have had somedue to the collection of tribute from the settlement and involvement intrade, but this does not seem to have been a distinguishing characteristic.Their commercial interests at that time were not developed enough toensure an income sufficiently substantial to enable them to expand theirauthority over other settlements or control a large network of caravanroutes.

Given these limitations, it is not surprising that their authorityremained confined to the small settlement of Dirciyyah. The fortunes ofthe Al Sacud began to change with their adoption of theWahhabi move-ment, associated with the reformer Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab(–).

Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab belonged to Banu Tamim, a Najdisedentary tribe whose members were inhabitants of several oases inNajd (Abu H. akima : ). His family produced several religiousscholars, but was not distinguished by wealth. According to one source,Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab lived ‘in poverty with his three wives.He owned a bustan, date garden and ten or twenty cows’ (ibid.: ).Following the path of his ancestors, Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhabtravelled to Madina, Basra and Hasa to pursue religious education andprobably wealth (al-cUthaymin : –). He returned to cUyaynah,where his father was a judge, to preach a new message.

The reformer distinguished himself by insisting on the importance ofmonotheism, the denunciation of all forms of mediation between Godand believers, the obligation to pay zakat (Islamic tax to the leader of theMuslim community), and the obligation to respond to his call for holywaragainst those who did not follow these principles. Muhammad ibn cAbdal-Wahhab was concerned with purifying Islam from what he describedas innovations and applying a strict interpretation of the shari ca, both ofwhich needed the support of a political authority. He considered cultsof saints, the visiting of holy men’s tombs and sacrifice to holy men,


prevalent not only among the oases dwellers and the nomads of Arabiabut also among Muslims encountered during his travels in Hijaz, Iraqand Syria, as manifestations of bid ca. He formulated religious opinionsregarding several practical matters. Among other things, he encouragedpeople to perform communal prayers and abstain from smoking tobacco.Most important, Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab insisted on the pay-ment of zakat. He ruled that it should be paid on apparent wealth (suchas agricultural produce) and concealed wealth, stored in gold and silver(Abu H. akima : ). The reformer declared that the venerationof saints, trees and other objects led to kufr (unbelief ), blasphemy andpolytheism and that the doctrine of the oneness of God, tawh. id, shouldbe strictly respected.

Initially, the amir of cUyaynah, cUthman ibn Mucammar, endorsedthe reforms proposed byMuhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab, but later ex-pelled him from the oasis under pressure from the Banu Khalid chiefs ofHasa. The reformer’s severe punishment of those who were reluctant toperform communal prayers, his personal involvement in enforcing a rigidinterpretation of the sharica and his stoning in public of a local womanaccused of fornication antagonised the inhabitants of cUyaynah andtheir chief. It seems that the Banu Khalid chiefs of Hasa and overlordsof Najd at the time also resented the reformer and feared the spread ofhis message. They ordered cUthman ibnMucammar to kill Muhammadibn cAbd al-Wahhab, but cUthman decided to expel him rather thanrisk fitna (dissent) among the people who came under his authority.Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab and his family were asked to leavecUyaynah. The reformer arrived in Dirciyyah, forty miles away fromcUyaynah, with the hope of convincing its Sacudi amir to adopt hismessage.

Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab’s reputation had already reachedthis small oasis. Muhammad ibn Sacud received the reformer andgranted him protection. Descriptions of the encounter between the rulerof Dirciyyah and Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab indicate that a pactwas sealed between the two men in . According to one source:

Muhammad ibn Sacud greeted Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab and said,‘This oasis is yours, do not fear your enemies. By the name of God, if all Najdwas summoned to throw you out, we will never agree to expel you.’Muhammadibn cAbd al-Wahhab replied, ‘You are the settlement’s chief and wise man.I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform jihad (holy war) againstthe unbelievers. In return you will be imam, leader of the Muslim communityand I will be leader in religious matters.’ (Abu H. akima : )


According to this narrative, the Sacudi ruler agreed to support thereformer’s demand for jihad, a war against non-Muslims and those Mus-lims whose Islam did not conform to the reformer’s teachings. In returnthe Sacudi amir was acknowledged as political leader of theMuslim com-munity. Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab was guaranteed control overreligious interpretation. The reformer started teaching his religious mes-sage in a mosque, specially built for him. He insisted on the attendanceof men and children. Men who did not attend his special dars (teachingsessions) were required to pay a fine or shave their beards (ibid.: ).

It is difficult to assess why the reformer had success in Dirciyyah,although the Wahhabi reform movement certainly provided an alter-native source of legitimacy for the Al Sacud. Muhammad ibn Sacudadopted a religiousmessage that promised an opportunity to compensatefor the limitations of his rule.More specifically, Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab promised him wealth, in the form of zakat and expansion underhis religious guidance. It is also probable that rivalry between the amirs ofcUyaynah and Dirciyyah contributed to the success of a small settlementwithout particular political or economic significance. cUyaynah enjoyedfar more prestige and importance than Dirciyyah at that time.

The historical alliance between the Wahhabi religious reformer andthe ruler of Dirciyyah that was sealed in set the scene for the emer-gence of a religious emirate in central Arabia. Without Wahhabism, itis highly unlikely that Dirciyyah and its leadership would have assumedmuch political significance. There was no tribal confederation to sup-port any expansion beyond the settlement, and there was also no surpluswealth that would have allowed Muhammad ibn Sacud to assemble afighting force with which to conquer other settlements. The settlementitself did not have sufficient manpower to initiate conquest of other oasesor tribal territories.

From the early days of Sacudi–Wahhabi expansion, the crucial ele-ment was to gain submission to the tenets of Wahhabi Islam among thepopulation, both sedentary and nomadic. This submission led to thecreation of a quasi-tribal confederation with which to conquer furtherterritories in the absence of an identifiable ‘Sacudi tribal confederation’.

Wahhabism provided a novel impetus for political centralisation. Ex-pansion by conquest was the only mechanism that would permit theemirate to rise above the limited confines of a specific settlement. Withthe importance of jihad in Wahhabi teachings, conquests of new territo-ries became possible. The spread of the Wahhabi da cwa (call), the purifi-cation of Arabia of unorthodox forms of religiosity and the enforcement


of the sharica among Arabian society were fundamental demands of theWahhabi movement. The amir of Dirciyyah took theWahhabi reformer,recently expelled from cUyaynah, under his wing, and accepted thesedemands. Wahhabism impregnated the Sacudi leadership with a newforce, which proved to be crucial for the consolidation and expansion ofSacudi rule. Wahhabism promised this leadership clear benefits in theform of political and religious authority and material rewards, withoutwhich the conquest of Arabia would not have been possible. The resul-tant consolidation enabled the Sacudi leadership to rise to prominencein the region.

The expansion of the Sacudi–Wahhabi realm beyond Dirciyyah wasdependent on the recruitment of a fighting force ready to spread thereligious message of the reformist movement and Sacudi political hege-mony. The populations of the oases in southern Najd were the first toendorse Wahhabism and respond to its call for jihad against ‘unbeliev-ers’. Settled Najdis between the ages of eighteen and sixty were its firstconscripts, the backbone of the Sacudi–Wahhabi force. Some acceptedWahhabism out of conviction; others succumbed to it out of fear. Itseems that the Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate was based from the very begin-ning on the allegiance of the sedentary communities of Najd. Those whowillingly accepted Wahhabism were expected to swear allegiance to itsreligio-political leadership and demonstrate their loyalty by agreeing tofight for its cause and pay zakat to its representatives. Those who resistedwere subjected to raids that threatened their livelihood.

The same method of recruitment was used among the tribal confede-rations. Preaching and raids progressed simultaneously.While it was easytomaintain control over the oases, it provedmore difficult tomaintain theallegiance of the various Arabian tribes. The tribes generallymanaged toevade central authority due to their mobility and tradition of autonomy.However, once they had been subjugated, they proved to be an importantfighting force, spreading the message of Wahhabism. They providedmanpower with which to further the expansion of the Sacudi–Wahhabiemirate. Participation in Sacudi–Wahhabi expansion greatly appealed tothe tribal confederations as it promised a share of the booty that resultedfrom raiding disobedient oasis dwellers and other tribes.

Coercion alone would not have guaranteed the level of expansionachieved by the Sacudis by the end of the eighteenth century.Wahhabismpromised salvation, not only in this world, but also in the next: sub-mission to the teachings of Wahhabi Islam meant evasion of Wahhabiraids and promised spiritual rewards. Most accounts of the success of the


Sacudi–Wahhabi polity highlight the fact that raids were congruent withtribal practice, and as such they encouraged tribal confederations to takepart in the expansion of the Sacudi–Wahhabi realm with the promiseof material rewards. However, this emphasis completely overlooks thespiritual dimension, a strong motivating force behind the eager sub-mission of some sections of the population who had already been timidlybut persistently trying to develop a spirituality deriving from the simpleand austere message of Wahhabism. The Najdi population exhibitedan attraction to its teachings that were in line with the orientation ofsome of its religious scholars. Before the rise of the Wahhabi movement,and as in other parts of the Islamic world which were some distancefrom the traditional centres of learning, the Najdi culama travelled toSyria and Egypt to train with their intellectual mentors (al-Juhany ).Upon their return, these culama developed into ‘ritual specialists’, whosemain concernwas fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, a traditionwhich continuesamong the Sacudi culama of today, although for different reasons.

The specialisation of theNajdi culama in fiqh reflects the concerns of theinhabitants of the Najdi towns and villages, which centred on pragmaticissues relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, religious endowments,Islamic rituals and the Islamic legal codes. Najdi settlements had alreadyaspired towards finding solutions for their practical problems and showeda religious awareness that predated the call of Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab (al-Juhany : ). While the reformer was still concernedwith these practical issues, he distinguished himself from other Najdiculama of the time by developing his ideas on tawh. id. Religious awarenessin the Najdi settlements should not be overlooked as a factor facilitatingthe adoption of Wahhabism and the success of Sacudi expansion.

The regular payment of zakat to the Sacudi–Wahhabi leadership wasa token of political submission, but also of religious duty. While this reli-gious dutymight not have been felt particularly strongly among the tribalconfederations, it was definitely apparent among the oasis population ofsouthern Najd whose allegiance to the Sacudi leadership had rested onmore solid ground.

We can also point to the appeal of the doctrine of the oneness ofGod tothe tribal confederations, especially the nomadic sections. Such groupsmight not have had the same fascination as the sedentary populationwithIslamic rituals or jurisprudence (as they had their own tribal custom todeal with conflict and transgression), but it is certain that the doctrineof tawh. id did strike a nerve amongst them. The message of Muhammadibn cAbd al-Wahhab certainly did not fall on deaf ears. Even those tribal


confederations that fought against the Sacudi–Wahhabi political agendacould not resist the temptation of a simple Islam free of excessive ritualsandmediation. For instance, in spite of its ferocious resistance to politicalWahhabism, the Shammar tribe accepted the doctrine of tawh. id in theeighteenth century. A prominent Shammar shaykh declared that hisIslam remained faithful to the tenets of Wahhabism although his ances-tors had fought battles with the Sacudis since themiddle of the eighteenthcentury. It seems that Wahhabism achieved the ultimate religious sym-biosis between the nomads and the sedentary population by combiningan uncompromising unitarian and puritanical Islam with an obsessionwith ritual specialisation and fiqh, thus responding to the needs of boththe tribal confederations of the desert and the population of the oases ofcentral Arabia.

Under the military leadership of Muhammad ibn Sacud’s son, cAbdal-cAziz (–), the Sacudi leadership expanded intoRiyadh,Kharjand Qasim by . Towns in central Najd received Wahhabi judgesas representatives of the new religio-political order. Under the guiseof spreading the Wahhabi message, the Sacudi leadership subjugatedmost of the amirs in Najd. Those amirs were allowed to remain in theirsettlements as long as they paid zakat to the Sacudi leader, a token of theirsubmission to his authority.

After the completion of the campaigns in central Arabia, Sacudi forcesmoved eastward intoHasa and succeeded in terminating the rule of BanuKhalid. A substantial proportion of the population of Hasa consistedof Shicis, representing in the eyes of the Wahhabis an extreme case ofahl al-bidac (innovators). The subjugation of Qatif in opened theroad to the coast of the Persian Gulf and Oman. Qatar acknowledgedthe authority of the Sacudis in . Bahrain followed suit and paid zakatto Dirciyyah.

The expansion of the Sacudi forces to the west and in particular intoHijaz brought them into conflict with another religious authority, that ofthe Sharif ofMecca. In spite of the strong resistance of the Hijazis, Sacudibn cAbd al-cAziz (–) established temporary Sacudi hegemonyover Ta

�if in , Mecca in and Madina in . Sharif Ghalib

of Mecca became a mere representative of the Sacudis. The Wahhabiculama ordered the destruction of the domed tombs of the Prophet andthe caliphs in Madina in accordance with Wahhabi doctrine which for-bade the construction of monuments on graves. According to Wahhabiteachings, graves should remain unmarked to discourage later visits andveneration by Muslims.


Sacudi success in Hijaz encouraged southward expansion into cAsir,where local leaders adopted Wahhabism and for a while joined forcesto march on Yemen. The strong resistance of the Yemenis, coupled withthe unfamiliar geography of their mountainous country, prevented itsincorporation into the Sacudi–Wahhabi realm.

To the north-east Sacudi expansion reached the fertile regions ofMesopotamia, threatening vital parts of the Ottoman Empire. In the holy city of Karbala

�was raided and plundered. Raids on the cities

of Mesopotamia continued between and without resulting inthe establishment of a strong Sacudi–Wahhabi presence there due to thedistance from their power base in Arabia. Wahhabi preoccupations inMesopotamia revolved around gaining booty from these rich provinces.A similar pattern wasmaintained in Syria. Sacudi forces raided cities andpilgrimage caravans without being able to establish a permanent base.Expansion by raid reached its limits in the north as it did in Yemen.The sacking of Shica cities in Iraq angered its communities and re-sulted in the assassination of the Sacudi leader cAbd al-cAziz in by a Shica in the mosque of Dirciyyah in revenge for the plundering ofKarbala

�.

Four factors facilitated the process of expansion. First, disunity andrivalry among local oasis amirs in Najd meant that the Sacudis couldgradually defeat them one by one. Second, internal disputes amongmembers of the oases’ ruling groups weakened their resistance and en-abled the invaders to use dissidents for their purposes. Third, the mi-gration of some Arabian Peninsula tribes to more fertile regions in Iraqand Syria aided the conquest. Under Sacudi–Wahhabi pressure, severaltribal confederations fled toMesopotamia. Finally, the peaceful adoptionof Wahhabism by the sedentary population of Najd provided grassrootssupport for the expansion even before it took place (cAbd al-Rahim: ).

The expansion of the first Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate resulted in thecreation of a political realm with fluctuating boundaries. The descen-dants of the Al Sacud, legitimised by the Wahhabi leadership, provideda permanent political leadership in accordance with the oath of .However, there were no mechanisms other than raids to ensure thedurability of either the polity or its boundaries, and tribal confeder-ations retained their ability to challenge Sacudi–Wahhabi authority.Withdrawing the payment of zakat and organising counter-attacks ongroups and territories within the Sacudi–Wahhabi sphere of influencewere recurrent challenges. Although there were rudimentary attempts atformalising political, economic and religious relationswithin the emirate,


these were generally insufficient to hold the constituency together. Therewas a vague recognition of belonging to a Muslim community, but thisdid not preclude attachment to more specific tribal/regional identities.

Raids were rituals of rejuvenation, injecting fresh blood into the realm,especially when it was on the verge of disintegration. While these raidsinitially guaranteed expansion, they later proved detrimental to politi-cal continuity as the population began to resent the devastation theycaused. When the Ottoman Empire responded to the Sacudi–Wahhabichallenge by sending the troops of Muhammad cAli into Arabia in ,tribal confederations that had already suffered the punitive raids of theSacudis responded by switching allegiance to the foreign troops. Sacudibn cAbd al-cAziz died in , leaving his son cAbdullah to face thechallenge of the Egyptian troops. Muhammad cAli’s son Ibrahim Pashaled the invasion of Najd after Egyptian troops established a strong basein Hijaz. Ibrahim Pasha arrived at the gates of Dirciyyah with ‘,cavalrymen, ,Albanian andTurkish soldiers, ,Maghrebi caval-rymen, gunners with around guns, weapons technicians and sappers’ (Vassiliev : ). The Sacudis surrendered on Septem-ber after the total destruction of their capital and its fortifications.Ibrahim Pasha’s troops plundered Dirciyyah and massacred severalWahhabi culama. Those who survived were taken to Cairo together withcAbdullah (–). He was later sent to Istanbul where he was be-headed. The sacking of Dirciyyah marked the end of the first Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate.

A FRAGILE SA C UDI REVIVAL ( – )

After the withdrawal of Egyptian forces there was an attempt to re-establish Sacudi–Wahhabi authority in when Turki ibn cAbdullah,the son of the beheaded Sacudi ruler, returned to Riyadh, south ofDirciyyah. Turki (–) benefited from the partial retreat of theEgyptian troops from Najd under pressure from its local inhabitants. Hewas able to capture Riyadh with a small force gathered from among theinhabitants of several oases. After settling in Riyadh, Turki extended hiscontrol over cArid. , Kharj, H. ot.ah, Mah.mal, Sudayr and Aflaj (Vassiliev: ). His authority in Ha

�il and Qasim remained minimal, but he

was able to reinforce recognition of Sacudi authority in the Hasa regionin (Winder ).

Although Turki was a strict Wahhabi imam, he was careful not to anta-gonise the Ottoman–Egyptian troops who were still in Hijaz, guardingthe security of the pilgrimage caravans. However, the greatest challenge


to Turki’s authority came from internal dissension within his own family.In Turki faced the challenge of Mishari, a cousin whom he hadappointed governor of Manfuhah. In , Mishari successfully plottedthe assassination of Turki while the Sacudi forces were occupied in awar with Qatif and Bahrain. Turki was killed while coming out of themosque after the Friday prayers (Vassiliev : ). His son Faysalimmediately returned to Riyadh from Hasa to restore his claim overthe town. Faysal (–) was assisted by the amir of Ha

�il, cAbdullah

ibn Rashid (–), who ‘killed Mishari with his own sword’ (Lorimer: ). Faysal defeatedMishari in and became the imam of thesecond Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate.

Faysal’s rule was disrupted again in when he refused to pay tri-bute to the Egyptian forces in Hijaz. The Egyptians sent an expedi-tion to Riyadh. Faysal was captured and sent to Cairo. The Egyptiansappointed a member of the Al Sacud by the name of Khalid ruler insouthern Najd. The situation was maintained until a member of a col-lateral branch of theAl Sacud, cAbdullah ibnThunayan, rebelled againstKhalid, who fled fromRiyadh to Jeddah. cAbdullah ibn Thunayan ruledin Riyadh until Faysal managed to escape from his captivity in Cairoand return to Riyadh in . Faysal killed cAbdullah and started hissecond chieftainship, which lasted until his death in .

After Faysal’s death, his son cAbdullah (–) became ruler inRiyadh. His half-brothers Sacud, Muhammad and cAbd al-Rah.mancompeted with him for the leadership, which proved to be detrimen-tal for the Sacudis. When cAbdullah, the eldest son, became amir, hishalf-brother Sacud resented his exclusion from power and began a mili-tary campaign to undermine his authority. Sacud started a series ofcontacts with the rulers of cAsir and cArid. in the hope of gaining theirloyalty against his brother.He also negotiated an alliancewith theMurra,cAjman andDawasir confederations, whichwere trying tomaintain theirautonomyby allying themselveswith cAbdullah’s rival brother.The inter-nal struggle between the Sacudi brothers was fuelled by the desire of thevarious confederations to free themselves from Sacudi domination (AbucAliya : – ). Between and the Sacudi brothers werenot able to reach an agreement and continued to challenge each other.

Sacud died in , leaving his brothers cAbdullah and cAbd al-Rah.man in fierce competition for the leadership. Immediately afterSacud’s death, cAbd al-Rah.man became ruler in Riyadh while hisbrother cAbdullah and his nephews (Sacud’s sons) continued to chal-lenge his authority. In cAbdullah appealed to the ruler of Ha

�il,


Muhammad ibn Rashid, to help him against his nephews. The rulerof Ha

�il seized the opportunity to march on Riyadh. Sacud’s sons fled

to Kharj, leaving their uncle in jail. The amir of Ha�il freed cAbdullah

but took him as a hostage to his capital, leaving Salim al-Sibhan, oneof his most loyal commanders, as the new governor of Riyadh (Vassiliev: ).

The new Rashidi governor of Riyadh pursued cAbdullah’s nephewsand eliminated most of them in Kharj. cAbdullah and his brother cAbdal-Rah.man were allowed to return to Riyadh as cAbdullah was both illand old. cAbdullah died in , and cAbd al-Rah.man ruled as a vassalof Ibn Rashid under the general governorship of Salim al-Sibhan.

In an attempt to restore his family’s hegemony in southern Najd,cAbd al-Rah.man co-operated with the people of Qasim and sectionsof the Mut.ayr tribal confederation, as both resented the rising powerof the Rashidis. A Sacudi alliance against the Rashidis was beingformed.Muhammad ibn Rashid gathered all his forces, consisting of theShammar,Muntafiqand H. arb confederations andmarched intoQasim.The Rashidis and Qasimis met in Mulayda in , and Muhammadibn Rashid was victorious. With the defeat of his Qasimi allies, cAbd al-Rah.man fled Riyadh after an unsuccessful attempt to regain his power.He took refuge first among the Murra tribe of the Empty Quarter andlater settled in Kuwait in under the patronage of the Al Sabah andwith a stipend from the Ottoman government. The Ottoman govern-ment granted him amodest pension of gold liras (Vassiliev : ).His capital, Riyadh, was taken by ibn Rashid’s representative, cAjlan. Itwas the exile of the Al Sacud to Kuwait that allowed a friendship todevelop with the Al Sabah rulers of this port. This friendship provedcrucial for the return of the Al Sacud to Riyadh in the twentieth century.

While the disintegration of the first Sacudi realm was partially dueto the intervention of the Egyptians acting on behalf of the OttomanEmpire, the second realm collapsed for two reasons. First, the fragileSacudi leadership of the second half of the nineteenth centurywas furtherweakenedby internal strife amongmembers of theSacudi family. Second,the increasing power of a rival central Arabian emirate to the north ofthe Sacudi base was able to undermine Sacudi hegemony during thecrucial period when the Sacudis were struggling amongst themselves forpolitical leadership.

With the flight of cAbd al-Rah.man, the Sacudi capital, Riyadh, fellunder the authority of the Rashidis. The remaining members of theAl Sacud were taken as hostages to the Rashidi capital, Ha

�il.


Riyadh remained under the authority of the Ha�il amirs until

when cAbd al-Rah.man’s son cAbd al-cAziz, known as Ibn Sacud, re-turned fromhis exile inKuwait, killed theRashidi governor and declaredhimself amir of Riyadh: a third and final revival of Sacudi rule began totake shape. This revival marked the beginning of the third Sacudi statein the twentieth century.

THE RASHIDI EMIRATE IN HA�IL ( – )

The fragile second Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate (–) coexisted with anew regional power to the north of Riyadh.TheRashidi emirate of Ha

�il

rose to eminence during the second half of the nineteenth century at thetime when Sacudi hegemony in central Arabia was declining.

The Rashidi emirate was a polity deriving its legitimacy and powerfrom one of Arabia’s large tribal confederations, the Shammar. The im-petus for centralisation came from an oasis-based leadership, that of theRashidis, a tribal section already settled in Ha

�il, an oasis in northern

Najd (Al-Rasheed ). The Rashidis were the Shammar tribal nobi-lity, ruling as amirs over the mixed population of Ha

�il, which included

Shammar tribesmen, Banu Tamim sedentary farmers and merchants,and non-tribal groups of craftsmen, artisans and slaves. Shammar no-mads frequented Ha

�il for trade and regarded the oasis as falling within

their tribal territory. The presence of the Rashidis in the oasis was anextension of the tribe’s claim over it. Since the middle of the nineteenthcentury,Ha

�il had servedas abase fromwhich theRashidis had expanded

into north Arabia and southern Najd. While the Sacudi–Wahhabi emi-rates expanded under the banner of religious legitimisation, the Rashidisspread their influence over other oases and tribal confederations with thesupport of their own tribe.

The conquests of the Rashidi emirate were in fact a mechanismfor spreading Shammar hegemony over others. When this expansiongathered momentum in the middle of the nineteenth century, Shammartribesmen provided the military force. Shammar tribal sections were thebackbone of the force that conquered oases outside Shammar tribalterritory, and they also subjugated weaker tribal confederations andturned them into vassals. In the case of the Rashidis, the emirate andthe confederation were initially one polity. This was an important factordistinguishing the nature ofRashidi authority from that of the neighbour-ing Sacudis in southern Najd. The Rashidis did not have to ‘convert’the Shammar to their cause, but acted in conjunction with them to


spread the tribe’s hegemony. The Rashidi amirs were themselves drawnfrom the tribe and were tied into it throughmarital alliances. In contrast,the Sacudi leadership in Riyadh lacked tribal depth, which obliged it todepend on the alliance with Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Wahhab and hisfollowers.

Why the Shammar rallied behind the Rashidi leadership should beunderstood in the context of mid-nineteenth-century Arabia. It wouldbe simplistic to argue that tribal solidarity was the sole motivating forcebehind the confederation’s support of this newly emerging leadership.The tribe had witnessed the growth of the first Sacudi–Wahhabi emi-rate, which had defeated some Shammar sections and forced them tomigrate toMesopotamia towards the end of the eighteenth century. Fur-thermore, in , the Shammar were attacked by Ottoman Egyptiantroops whomistakenly regarded Shammar territory as part of the Sacudidomain. By supporting the Rashidis, the Shammar were seeking a lead-ership which would guarantee their security and autonomy vis-a-visboth local and foreign rivals. In backing the Rashidis who were con-nected genealogically to the Shammar, the tribal confederation laid thefoundations for organising its own defence and strengthening a unitywhich had previously been based upon the rhetoric of common ori-gin and tribal solidarity. The centralisation of power in the hands ofthe Rashidis stemmed from this context of political upheaval, militaryturmoil and foreign intervention in Arabia. Subsequently, the Shammarwere able to resist encroachments on their territory, not only by Egyptiantroops but also by the re-established Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate in Riyadh(Al-Rasheed : ).

With the consolidation of Rashidi leadership, the amirs began to relyless on the Shammar and more on a mixed force of slaves and conscriptsfrom the oasis. This was a development dictated by the inability of theleadership to control its own tribal sections. The partial shift towards apermanent non-tribal military force was an indication of a change in thepower of the amirs. Initially the amirs were tribal shaykhs comparableto other Shammar shaykhs, but later their power increased as they be-came a sedentary nobility with its own political ambitions. This patternwas consolidated with the leadership of Muhammad ibn Rashid (– ), whose domain extended from the borders of Aleppo and Damascusto Basra, Oman and cAsir (Musil : ). The Qasim region andthe Sacudi–Wahhabi capital, Riyadh, were incorporated into this do-main. Representatives and governors were appointed in the conqueredareas.


The Rashidi emirate relied on four groups for its expansionist cam-paign in Arabia. First, its leadership summoned the sedentary and no-madic Shammar to fight their rivals, who were designated enemies of thewhole tribe. Skirmishes against the Shammar sections acted in favour ofMuhammad ibn Rashid in his mobilisation of this tribal force. Second,other non-tribal confederations took part in his campaign as they weremotivated by the prospect of booty. Third, the amir’s slaves and body-guard formed the solid core of his military force. And fourth, conscriptsfrom the towns and oases of Jabal Shammar provided a reliable militaryforce which was used regularly for expansion. Their participation guar-anteed the predominance of Ha

�il, both economically and politically.

This expansion, however, did not lead to the establishment of control.The scanty resources of the region, coupled with the inadequacy of thetransport infrastructure, militated against the full integration of theseareas into a single unit. In this respect, the Rashidi emirate exhibiteda pattern similar to that predominant in the first and second Sacudi–Wahhabi emirates. Both the Sacudis and Rashidis engaged in raids andconquest without being able to hold the conquered territories for anextended period of time. While control over the core of the emiratewas relatively easy to maintain, the conquered territories represented aperiphery difficult to supervise regularly or integrate thoroughly. Whilein the Sacudi–Wahhabi emirates the payment of zakat was an indicationof a group’s submission to its authority, the payment of khuwwa (tribute)to the Rashidis expressed their control over other groups. Tribute wasa tax levied not upon the collector’s own community, but rather upona conquered group which remained more or less autonomous (Pershit: –). Both leaderships, however, resorted to regular raids as amechanism for ensuring the payment of either zakat or khuwwa.

While the Rashidi emirate was initially characterised by full inte-gration between the leadership and the Shammar tribal confederation,expansion brought about the recurrent tension between a central powerand its diversified and semi-autonomous constituency. At the height ofRashidi power, the constituency included other weakened tribal con-federations in addition to the Shammar and the population of oasesoutside its traditional tribal territory. While frequent raids against rebel-lious tribes continued, a redistributive economywas also put in place.Theamirs of Ha

�il collected tribute fromweakened groups to be redistributed

among others, as rewards for loyalty and participation in the leadership’smilitary campaigns. Tribal shaykhs visited the oasis and received hand-outs in cash and kind. The subsidy system functioned as a mechanism


for the circulation of wealth, thus promising loyalty in return for mate-rial gains. Subsidies from the centre to the periphery created economicintegration between the Ha

�il leadership and its constituency. More im-

portantly, they created dependency on the revenues of the amirs amongthe sedentary and nomadic populations, who became incorporated intotheir political realm.

Economic integration between the leadership and its constituencywas partially achieved in the Rashidi emirate, but military and politicalintegration were difficult to create andmaintain over an extended periodof time. Tribal confederations that paid khuwwa remained more or lessautonomous. The amirs of Ha

�il had no monopoly over the means of

coercion as it was difficult to break the military strength of the variousconfederations that came under their authority. The military strength oftribes was occasionally neutralised by frequent raids and subsidies, butin the long term these strategies failed to guarantee loyalty.

Control over the oases in Jabal Shammar was, however, a differentmatter.Ha

�il, the urban core of the emirate, remained loyal to theRashidi

leadership as long as this leadership was capable of defending the widerinterests of the emirate. The merchants, artisans and agriculturists sup-ported the leadership because it was able to guarantee the safe passageof trading and pilgrimage caravans, thus allowing the flow of trade be-tween Ha

�il and the outside world to continue. An amir who extended

his authority over the tribal confederations in the desert created secureconditions for travel in betweenArabia’s tradingmarkets, thus benefitingthe merchants and artisans of the sedentary communities. The loyaltyof the oasis population was highly dependent on this factor. The Ha

�il

population withdrew its support only when the Rashidi leadership of thefirst two decades of the twentieth century became incapable of extendingprotection outside the walls of the oasis.

After establishing themselves as the rulers of Najd towards the end ofthe nineteenth century, the Rashidis lost their control over Riyadh whenIbn Sacud, the son of the exiled Sacudi ruler in Kuwait, returned to hisnative town in . Ibn Sacud killed the Rashidi governor of Riyadhand declared himself the new ruler. Between and the Rashidisand Sacudis competed for control of central Arabia. This competitionweakened the Rashidi emirate and led to its demise.

The decline of the Rashidi polity can be attributed to several factors.Rivalry between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in Arabia upsetthe balance between local Arabian power centres. The Rashidi amirscontinued to be allied with the Ottomans even after several tribal


confederations and local amirs sided with Britain. After the Ottomandefeat in the First World War, the local Rashidi allies felt the risingpressure of the Sacudis, who had secured a firm alliance with Britain.This factor alone could not fully explain the demise of Rashidi powerin . But the instability of Rashidi leadership, which manifested itselfin internal rivalry between the various Rashidi branches, added to theiralready disadvantaged position in Arabia. A weakened leadership wasnot able to maintain the loyalty of the various tribal confederations,who shifted their allegiance to a more powerful centre – that of theSacudis. The emirate lost control over its tribal periphery; its leadershipwitnessed the shrinking of its territories without being able to reclaimthem. The Rashidis had no monopoly over the use of coercion. Thismeant that autonomous and semi-autonomous confederations retainedtheir ability to undermine the Rashidi leadership. These confede-rations remained a potential threat in the absence of any mechanismto contain their tendency either to challenge Rashidi authority directlyor passively resist by withdrawing support needed at times of externalthreat.

THE SHARIFIAN EMIRATE IN HIJAZ

In Hijaz, the homeland of the most sacred sites of Islam, the Najdipattern of emirate formation seems to have evolved with some strikingsimilarities (al-Sibaci ; Peters ). The population of Hijaz hadalways been distinguished from that of Najd by its heterogeneity. Hijazisociety included tribal confederations claiming unity through essentiallyeponymous genealogical links. H. arb, cUtayba, Billi, Hutaym, Shararat,Banu cAt.iya and H. uwayt.at were among the best known Hijazi tribalgroups (Hogarth : ; Admiralty : ). Descriptions of theHijazi confederations agree that they differed from those in Najd asthey had no overarching tribal leadership capable of claiming authorityover the whole confederation. It seems that the large Hijazi tribal groupswere fragmented into small units under the leadership of a prominentshaykh, who could not claim authority beyond his section. This politicalfragmentation could be interpreted as a result both of geography and ofthe presence of an overarching leadership in the person of the Sharif ofMecca (discussed below). Yet Hijazi tribes were territorial groups, sim-ilar to those in Najd. H. arb, for example, controlled the area betweenMecca and Jeddah: cUtayba dominated eastern Hijaz, with one sectionpredominate in Ta

�if and its environs (Hogarth : ).


Tribal confederations coexisted with other groups claiming holydescent from Quraysh and the Prophet Muhammad through hisgrandsons, H. asan and H. usayn, known as the Ashraf. Descendants ofthe Ashraf lived in Mecca and Madina, but were also scattered amongthe Hijazi nomadic population, as well of course as in other parts of theArab and Islamic world where they had been dispersed since the collapseof the cAbbasid Empire (Dah. lan ). The holy descent of the Sharifspredisposed them to play a prominent leading role in the emirates ofMecca and Madina from the eighth and ninth centuries, to the exclu-sion of other ‘non-holy’ descent groups. They also played a prominentrole as religious specialists, for example judges and preachers in the holycities and as heads of Sufi orders (ibid.).

In addition to Hijazi tribal confederations and Sharifian clans, thepopulation of the Hijaz included Muslims whose ancestors or them-selves had come from Turkey, Africa, India and Asia and who nowresided in the major towns and ports. This diversity was extended tothe religious domain as the various Islamic legal schools were recog-nised by the Ottomans. Sufi circles flourished in Mecca and Madina.Sharif H. usayn (–) and his sons were Shafici Sunnis. Equally im-portant was the presence of a Shica community, especially in Madinaand among some Sharifian clans. According to Ende:

For many Shicite authors, the Sharifs of Mecca and Madina themselves wereactually Shicites, who for obvious reasons, posed as Sunnites – an attitude consid-ered lawful, as taqiya, under Shicite Law. Some sections of the H. arb (the BanicAli) and Juhaina were also Shica, settled around the date palms of Madina,where another Shica group, the Nakhawla seem to have been living since thedays of the early Islamic empire. (Ende : –)

This Hijazi diversity was reflected in a sharper distinction between theurban and rural areas. In Hijaz, the urban–rural divide was more pro-nounced than in Najd. The cosmopolitan urban centres of Jeddah andMecca were not comparable in size, specialisation and sophistication toany settlement in Najd or elsewhere in Arabia. These were urban cen-tres where travellers did not fail to draw the boundaries between thedesert and the sown. At the beginning of the twentieth century, thissharp divide predisposed Hogarth to claim that ‘the Hejazi bedouinsare of exceptionally predatory character, low morale, and disunited or-ganisation’ (Hogarth : ).His negative remarkswere probably basedon views of the population of the urban centres such as Jeddah, whichwas distinguished from that of the surrounding tribal areas. In Najd the


rural–urban continuumwould not have justified such representations. InNajd the oasis population and the tribal confederations often belongedto the same social category.

In this diverse region, the Sharifian emirate maintained a rather pro-longed presence, predating that of both the Sacudis and Rashidis incentral Arabia. Sharifian authority had fluctuated since the sixteenthcentury depending ondevelopments outside the region,mainlyOttomanpolicies towards this vital area. While central Arabian emirates facedthe tension between their power and that of the tribal confederations,a further restraining agent burdened the Sharifian emirate, which wascapable of both empowering and disempowering its leadership. InHijaz,the amirs of Mecca were caught between the tribal confederations andthe Ottoman Sultan and his representatives. A system of dual authoritywas established; the Sultan’s urban-based representatives dealt with com-mercial, political and foreign relations: the Sharif dealt with the affairsof the Holy Cities and the tribal confederations, a dualism which wasoccasionally violated. The two authorities competed without one beingable to subdue the other.

This dual authority distinguished Hijaz sharply from Najd. TheOttomans were the official guardians of the holy places, but they couldnot exercise that privilege without the amir ofHijaz. According to Peters,this dualism provided a perilous equilibrium (Peters : ). Govern-ment in Hijaz differed from that in Najd, the latter being outside thedirect control of the Ottoman Empire, although the Ottomans regularlyinterfered in its affairs. The climax of this intervention was reached withthe invasion of Muhammad cAli early in the nineteenth century, whichwas an attempt both to prevent further Sacudi–Wahhabi expansion andto impose Ottoman rule.

In Hijaz, the Ottoman Sultan retained the power to appoint the amir,whose garrison was funded from the Ottoman treasury. The Ottomansalso paid the Hijazi culama their salaries (Dah. lan ). While Ottomanmilitary and administrative presence was pronounced in the cities, it wasvirtually non-existent outside them. The duty to control the territoriesand population in the regions between themajor urban centres was dele-gated to the Sharif. Prominent Sharifs were rewarded for demonstratingexceptional ability to restrain the tribal confederations, especially duringthe annual pilgrimage season. In return for guaranteeing the security ofthe pilgrimage caravan fromDamascus (using a military force consistingof the amir’s police force, slaves and an amalgamation of co-opted tribalgroups), the amir of Mecca received regular subsidies and his urban


constituency was exempt from Ottoman taxes. Hijaz as a whole wasexempt from military service in deference to its special and elevatedstatus among the various Ottoman provinces. Its ports and trade were,however, subject to taxation.

The Sharif of Mecca continued to execute Ottoman policies. Dah. lan,a nineteenth-century mufti of Mecca, commented on how after the with-drawal of Muhammad cAli’s troops from Hijaz in s, the Ottomansreplaced the Egyptians in the region. The Ottomans confirmed theSharif ’s subsidies that had already been put in place byMuhammad cAli.They also expected the Sharif to carry out their policies not only inHijaz,but also in the interior of Arabia. SharifMuhammad ibn cAwn (–)apparently went on an expedition with the Shammar tribe against Faysalibn Turki, the Sacudi ruler of the second Sacudi–Wahhabi emirate. TheSharif imposed an annual tax of , riyals on the Sacudi ruler, whocontinued to pay it until his death in (Dah. lan ). Again SharifcAbdullah, Muhammad ibn cAwn’s son, together with Ottoman troopsconducted an expedition in cAsir in , after Muhammad ibn cAid.rebelled against the Ottoman Sultan (ibid.: ). The Sharif seized theport of Qunfudah, which had been controlled by the cAsiri tribe theMughaydis (Bang : ).

Four major differences distinguished Hijaz from Najd: holy Shari-fian clans occupying positions of authority, a sharp rural–urban divide,cosmopolitan heterogeneous towns and ports, and an imperial powermaintaining a military presence in the major towns and holding theright to appoint the Sharif, who often had been raised and educatedin Istanbul under the control and patronage of the Ottoman Sultan(de Gaury : ). Once appointed in Istanbul, various Sharifs trav-elled to Mecca, often for the first time, if they had been held hostage inIstanbul. They were expected to rule in Mecca and among Hijazi tribeson behalf of the Sultan. The Sharifs used Ottoman subsidies to controland pacify the various tribal confederations that regularly underminedOttoman authority by raiding pilgrims.

The Sharifs relied on their prestigious Hashemite descent to extractrecognition of their authority both from city dwellers and tribal confede-rations; in addition their religious authority was sanctioned and backedby the Ottomans. This authority, however, was not sufficient to guar-antee obedience. Like the amirs of Ha

�il, Dirciyyah and later Riyadh,

the Sharifs of Mecca resorted to bribes and coercion in their effort topacify the tribal confederations. The inherent tension between the tribalconfederations and the emirates of central Najd was replicated in Hijaz.

Documents

A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA - Cambridge University Press