A Logistician’s Legacy Comes to ALU · Cold-Chain Management and the Use of TempTale Technology —Colonel Mitchell E. Brew ... document, track, and move moun-tains of critical

The Financial Management Campaign PlanBuilding “Log Nation” in the U.S. Central Command

Evolution of Petroleum Support in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2010

A Logistician’s Legacy Comes to ALU

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited. PB700-10-5Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

LogisticsOfficerCorpsUpdate:BlendingFunctional andMultifunctionalExpertise —LieutenantColonelMarshallN.Ramsey andLieutenantColonelTimGilhool

Building“LogNation”intheU.S.CentralCommand —MajorGeneralKennethS.Dowd

TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan:RaisingtheBar toAchieveSustainmentExcellence —LieutenantGeneralEdgarE.StantonIII

TheNewFM1−0,HumanResourcesSupport —ThomasK.Wallace,Jr.

MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgram —DavidJ.Sherriff

EvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheU.S.CentralCommand AreaofResponsibility —ColonelJeffreyB.CarraandChiefWarrantOfficer4 DavidRay,USMC(Ret.)

ExtractingArmyForcesFromtheField—ALogistician’s Perspective —LieutenantColonelJerryB.Steinke,MNARNG

FosteringaGoodRelationshipWithContractors ontheBattlefield —MasterSergeantArthurHarris,Jr.,USA(Ret.)

ConductingGlobalContainerManagementTrainingOnline —ThomasCatchings

InteragencyLogisticsTraining:Perpetuatingthe WholeofGovernmentApproachtoDisasterLogistics —Dr.BillyJ.Davis

GulfWarLogisticsRecordsDonatedtothe SustainmentCommunity —StaffFeature

“SupportatAltitude”foraMultifunctionalAviationTaskForce —CaptainMichaelR.Miller

PB700–10–05VOLUME42ISSUE5SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER2010www.alu.army.mil/alog

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Cover:LieutenantGeneral(Ret.)WilliamG.“Gus”PagonisposesamidthepersonalarchiveshedonatedtotheArmyLogisticsUniversity(ALU)Libraryon17May2010.GeneralPagoniswastheleadlogisticianduringthePersianGulfWarof1990to1991.HiscarefullypreservedrecordofhisroleinthatconflictwillallowALUstudentsandresearcherstostudyandbenefitfromhislessonslearnedinoneofthemostcomplicatedlogisticsoperationsinArmyhistory.Thearticlebeginningonpage32discusseshisdonation,whichwillbethefoundationofALU’snewSeniorSustainer’sCollection.(Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

EquippingtheCombatSupportHospital:ACaseStudy —LieutenantColonelCharlesH.Strite,Jr.

Cold-ChainManagementandtheUseofTempTaleTechnology —ColonelMitchellE.Brew,MajorMichaelRonn, andPettyOfficerFirstClassSummerWebb,USN

TheOrdnanceSchools’MovetoFortLee —GayleA.Olszyk

Coblenz1919:TheArmy’sFirstSustainmentCenter ofExcellence —AlexanderF.Barnes

Commentary:CollaborativeManagementWillImprove WeaponSystemSustainment —RickConlinandJimMcIntosh

Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition: TooManyEggsinOneBasket? —MajorMarkW.Siekman,USAR,Dr.DavidA.Anderson, andAllanS.Boyce

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1018707

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James L. HodgeCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Brian R. LayerChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY

Colonel Mark McCormickPresident

Barbara G. MroczkowskiVicePresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

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Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.

Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.

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Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.



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HEADLINES


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LogisticsOfficerCorpsUpdate:BlendingFunctionalandMultifunctionalExpertise

by Lieutenant CoLoneL MarshaLL n. raMsey and Lieutenant CoLoneL tiM GiLhooL

n1January2008,theLogisticsCorpsasabranchbecameareality.Longbefore2008,quartermaster(QM),ordnance(OD),andtransportation(TC)officershadservedforagenera-tioninmultifunctionallogisticspositionsinlegacyfor-ward,main,andcorpssupportbattalions.Today,afterapproximately9yearsofsustainingdeploymentsandcombatoperationsacrosstheglobe,theplanning,coor-dination,synchronization,andexecutionofmultifunc-tionallogisticsisdefinitelywellwithinthecomfortzoneforthiscurrentgenerationofofficers.

Withthatsaid,confusionseemstoaboundinthefieldastowhathappenstothefunctionallogisticsskillset(QM,OD,andTC)thatanofficerbringstothetable.Afterbeinginculcatedfortheirfirst3to5yearsasaproudmemberofoneoftheregiments—QM,OD,andTC—doesthatknowledgevanishaftergraduationfromtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse(CLC3)?

EveryLogisticsOfficerHasaFunctionalAreaTheanswertothatquestionisaresounding

“No!”DespitetheadventoftheLogistics(LG)branchandtheproliferationofforwardsupportcom-panies(FSCs)acrossourformations,arequirement,

codifiedinnumerousmodificationtablesoforgani-zationandequipmentandtablesofdistributionandallowances,stillexistsforfunctionalQM,OD,andTCofficersatthecaptain,major,lieutenantcolonel,andevencolonelranks.

WhatthismeansforcareerpathandprofessionaldevelopmentpurposesisthatLGofficersmustbeaggressiveinself-studyandlookfordevelopmentalopportunitiestosharpentheirfunctionalskills.HumanresourcesmanagersattheArmyHumanResourcesCommandandtheSeniorLeaderDevelopmentOfficecanhelpbyensuringthatofficershaveopportunitiestorotatebetweenmultifunctionaljobsandfunctionaljobsasmuchaspossiblethroughouttheircareers.Thisbecomesmuchhardertodothemoreseniortheofficeris,butbasedonanofficer’sowndesiresandtheneedsoftheArmy,itmustbeafactorinfutureassignments.

CareerPathsofLogisticsOfficersLogisticsofficers,regardlessofwhatregimentthey

wereaccessedfrom,becomeLogisticsCorpsofficersupongraduationfromCLC3—period.Theintent,asdevelopedbyLieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevensonduringhistenureasthecommandinggeneralofthe

O



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The Logistics Corps• Enlisted Soldiers (outer ring)Quartermaster (QM), Ordnance (OD),and Transportation (TC) branches

• Warrant officers and lieutenants (middle ring between dashed circle and inner circle) Three separate branches and partof the Logistics Officer Corps

• Captains to colonels (inner circle)Logistics branch of the Logistics Officer Corps. Officers also hold one specialty within the Logistics branch.

How officers are inducted into the Logistics branch: Lieutenants are accessed into one of three branches (OD, QM, TC). Upon graduation from Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CCLC3) or Reserve Component Captains Career Course (RC CCC) (as captains), they are inducted into the Logistics (LG) branch.

Logistics Officer Corps

QM Corps

TC Corps

OD Corps

Logistics Branch

continued on page 54

65%

43%57%

70%

ColonelL ieutenant C olonel

Captain Major

90A 88A/B/C/D 89E 91A 92A/D 92F

Current Logistics Officer Authorizations(Updated 2010)

The requirements for a multifunctional logistician increase as an officergains rank and have grown significantly at the captain level.

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91% of centralized selection list lieutenant colonel command and key billets availableto all Logistics officers

85% of centralized selection list colonel command and key billets available to allLogistics officers

SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 3

ervingattheU.S.CentralCommand(CENT-COM)asDirectorofLogistics(CCJ4)for36months(June2007toJune2010)hasbeenbothanhonorandapleasure.Inafast-pacedenvironmentwiththecombatantcommandatwar,thechallengeshavebeenhuge.MypreviouspositionastheU.S.PacificCommandDirectorofLogisticswasagreatbilletthatpreparedmewellfortheleadershipchal-lengesthatconfrontedmeatCENTCOM.Manyles-sonslearnedtheretranslateddirectlytoCENTCOM,butCENTCOMpresentedmanymoreuniquechal-lengestoovercome.

NothingiseasyaboutlogisticsinAfghanistan,Iraq,oranyofthe20countriesthatmakeuptheCENT-COMareaofresponsibility.Insurgentviolence,politi-calinstability,andcomplexethnicandreligiousissuesallcombinetochallengeeventhebestlaidplans.Conductinganeffectivelogisticsoperationintheseenvironmentswouldhavebeenimpossibleifnotforthecooperation,communication,anddedicationofcountlessprofessionalsacrossseverallargeandcom-plexlogisticsorganizations.

AsIlookbackovermy36monthsastheCCJ4,Iamoverwhelmedandhumbledbythesenseofteamwork,dedication,andpridethatIhaveconsistentlywitnessedacrossthelogisticsenterprise.FromtheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)rightdowntothetactical-leveltruckcompaniesandsupplysquadrons,theSol-diers,Marines,Sailors,Airmen,andDepartmentofDefense(DOD)civilianshaveallworkedtogethertodocument,track,andmovemoun-tainsofcriticalresources.AlongwiththededicatedpersonneloftheJointStaffandournationalpartnersoftheU.S.TransportationCom-mand(TRANSCOM),theDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),andourservicecomponents,allconstitutewhatIliketocall“LogNation.”

Inthisarticle,IwillattempttosharemypersonalinsightsintohowIsawthejointoperatingareasofIraqandAfghanistanaswellastheCentralandSouthAsianStates

progresstowardourcommander’sintentthroughthetirelesscollaborationandcooperationofLogNation.

TheSituationUponArrivalTrustinginmylongstandingbeliefthatthemost

effectivewaytosynchronizeplansandoperationsacrossseverallargeandcomplexorganizationsistocultivaterelationshipsanddialog,Isetouttodojustthat.Iestab-lishedaseniorlogisticsleaderforumtopulltogetherthekeyleadersfromthewarfightingsub-unifiedcombatantcommands,servicecomponents,andnationalpartners.Wemetbysecurevideoteleconferenceeverymonthandface-to-facetwiceayeartodevelopacommonsightpicture,discussupcomingchallenges,andbrainstormsolutions.Thisadhocvenuecreatedanetworkofwork-ingrelationshipsthatcontinuestogainmomentum,andtheinviteelistcontinuestogroweveryyear.Similarly,IformedagroupofseniorlogisticsleaderscomprisedofourcoalitionpartnersoftheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF).

Eachweek,IpublishedanupdatetotheCENT-COMcommander,whichIsubsequentlysharedacrossLogNation.Thisweeklyupdatebothinformedandstirreddiscussion,alwaysresultinginproductivecross-talkthatkeptusallsynchcronized.Establishingthesekeyrelationshipsearlyinmytenure,acrossalleche-lonsofcommand,provedtobeextraordinarilyvaluableinthedemandingtimestocome.

Building“LogNation”intheU.S.CentralCommand

by Major GeneraL Kenneth s. dowd

S

Major General Dowd visits with Afghanistan Na tional Police recruits.

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WhenIarrivedatCENTCOMinJune2007,ourmaineffortwasOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF).Thecommandhadover5yearsofexperiencesystemati-callyrotatingforcesintoandoutofIraqandsustainingthoseforceswithawell-oiledlogisticsnetworkhubbedoutofKuwait.The2007surgeofforcesinIraqwasunderway,andbySeptemberofthatyear,thedesiredeffectsofthesurgewerebeingrealized.GeneralDavidH.Petraeus,thenthecommandinggeneralofMulti-NationalForces-Iraq(MNF−I),recommendedtohischainofcommandinSeptember2007thatagradualdrawdownofU.S.forcesfromIraqbegin,withagoalofreachingpre-surgetrooplevelsbyJuly2008.Forthefirsttimeinyears,therewasapalpableoptimismaboutachievingademocraticandstableIraqand,sub-sequently,anopportunitytoconsiderareducedU.S.andCoalitionForcesfootprint.

OperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistanremainedaneconomy-of-forceeffort,withthevastmajorityofforcesandsustainmentreachingAfghanistanthroughthelandroutetraversingPakistan.Thiswasthegeneralstateofplayinthecommanduponmyarrival.

ResponsibleDrawdownofU.S.ForcesThesecurityachievementsof2007andearly2008

formedafoundationforthegradualestablishmentof

sustainablesecurityinIraq.U.S.partnershipshavebeenfundamentaltothisprogresssince2003.On27Feb-ruary2009,PresidentObamaconfirmedthatU.S.forceswouldbeoutofIraqbytheendof2011.ThetwomainimplicationsofthisforLogNationwereposturingforaresponsiblewithdrawalofU.S.forcesandsupportingthetrainingandequippingofIraqiSecurityForces(ISF).

ToassistMNF–Iinthemonumentalefforttodrawdownmillionsofpiecesofequipment,theArmydeployedteamsintoKuwaitandIraqtooverseetheprocessesandplansforredistributinganddisposingoftheexcess.DLADefenseReutilizationandMarketingServiceteamsledthewaywiththeresponsibleremov-alofhazardousmaterialandscrapfromIraq.DLAremovedmorethan400millionpoundsofscrapmetalin2009and2010.Armyteamsensuredthatequip-mentinIraqwasnotdeclaredexcessandavailableforredistributionuntilthecommanderonthegrounddeterminedthattheequipmentwasnolongerrequiredtosupportthemission.

ThepriorityforredistributionofexcessequipmentinIraqistopushittoU.S.forcesinAfghanistan.DODsponsoredaprogramtotransferequipmenttoIraq.Col-laboratively,withtheservicesinthelead,wedeterminedwhatequipmentwouldbetransferredtotheISF,whatwouldbetransferredtotheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF),andwhatwouldbeshippedbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS).EquipmentwasalsomadeavailabletoothergovernmentagenciesthroughtheNationalAssociationofStateAgenciesforSurplusPropertyforlocalgovernmentuse,shouldastateorlocalgovernmentdesiretopaythetransporta-tioncostforreturningittoCONUS.AsofDecember2009,over1.9millionpiecesofstandardArmyequip-mentinIraq,valuedat$12billion,werescheduledtoreturntoCONUS.Thiscomprisedapproximately63percentoftheequipmentinIraqtoday.

TheArmyestablishedtheEquipmentDistributionReviewBoardcochairedbytheViceChiefofStaffoftheArmyandthecommanderoftheArmyMaterielCommand.ThisboardfacilitatedthedistributionofequipmentbystreamliningexistingForeignMilitarySales(FMS)programpoliciesandprocesses.Muchoftheboard’sworktodatehasbeentosupportfillingAfghanNationalArmyrequirements.NATO[NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization]TrainingMission-Afghanistan/CombinedSecurityTransitionCom-mand-Afghanistan(NTM−A/CSTC−A)isanactiveparticipant,andtheboardrecentlyaccelerateddeli-veryofequipmenttomeetNTM−A/CSTC−AtrainingrequirementsfortheAfghanNationalArmy.

MNF–Iimmediatelybeganexaminingwhatmini-mumessentialcapabilitytheISFwouldneedinordertomaintainanacceptablelevelofsecurityagainstbothinternalandexternalthreats.MNF−Ideter-mineditwasimportantfortheISFtohaveatleast

Top 10 Highlights

1. Teamwork and development of Log Nation, from infancy to enduring partnerships.

2. Establishing the Northern Distribution Net work.

3. Developing a second route for Pakistan ground lines of communication (Chaman route).

4. Partnering with Jordan to increase materiel volume and velocity through that strategic location.

5. Spearheading “AFG & CASA First” [Afghan istan and Central and South Asian States] in itiatives.

6. Developing quarterly cost savings report for the CENTCOM commander.

7. Organizing biannual logistics general of ficer/flag officer (CENTCOM Senior Logistics Advisory Board) sessions in theater for all partners.

8. Developing a concept to expand our Joint Contracting Command to a theaterwide com mand.

9. Developing a multinational logistics section to synchronize foreign military sales and coali tion logistics efforts.

10.Developing a logistics forum with NATO general officer/flag officer partners.


afoundationalcapabilitytoprotectitsland,mari-time,andairsovereigntyanddeterminedthattheISFwouldnotfullyachievetherequiredcapabilitiesbeforetheendof2011withouthelp.

InJuly2009,MNF−IsubmittedalistofequipmentrequirementsfortheISFtoachievetheessential,sus-tainablecapabilitiesneededtomaintainsecurityafterU.S.forcesdepartIraqattheendofDecember2011.Oftheapproximately3.3millionpiecesofequipmentinIraq,Multi-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC−I)identifiedapproximately53,000pieces—thevastmajorityexcesstoserviceneeds—requiredbytheISFtomaintaininternalstabilityandsecurity.

TocontinuethemomentumandfurtherassistintheprogressoftheISF,withtheJointStaffinthelead,weworkedcloselywiththeservicestodevelopsourcingsolutionsfortheequipmentidentifiedbyMNSTC−I.Weappliedamixofauthoritiestofacilitatethetransferofequipment,property,andservicestotheboththeISFandtheANSF.ApplicableauthoritiesincludedtheFMSprogram,Section516oftheForeignAssistanceActauthorizingtransferofexcessdefensearticles,andSection1234oftheNationalDefenseAuthoriza-tionActof2010,knownastheLevinAmendment.AsofMarch2008,theIraqigovernmenthadpurchasedover$2billionworthofU.S.equipmentandservicesthroughFMS.SinceSeptember2008,deliveryhasimprovedastheFMSsystemstrivedtosupporturgentwartimerequirements.

MuchhardworkremainstobedoneinassistingtheISFtoassumefullresponsibilityforsecuritybyDecember2011,whentheSecurityAgreementcomestoanendandthedrawdownofU.S.forcesissched-uledtobecompleted.AchievingcriticalISFcapabili-tiesasU.S.forcesdrawdownisthebestwaytoensurethatweremainontracktodrawdownAmericanforcestoroughly50,000andendourcombatmissionbyAugust2010.

growthinAfghanistanThedecisiontoauthorizeanadditional21,500

U.S.forcesinAfghanistaninearly2009,followedbythePresident’scommitmentofadditionalforcesinDecember2009,settheconditionstoreverseAfghanTalibangains.Theseadditionalforcesarejoiningsome68,000U.S.forcesand30,000CoalitionForcesalreadyinAfghanistan,allofwhichhaveundertakenafundamentalshiftinhowtheyarebeingemployedacrossthecountry.

AsoflateJanuary2010,wehadalreadymovedsome5,000troopsandexpectedthat18,000ofthePresident’s1December2009commitmentwouldbeincountrybylatespring.Theremainderofthe30,000willarriveasrapidlyaspossibleoverthesummerandearlyfall,makingamajorcontributiontoreversingTalibanmomentumin2010.

AscomplexasthenewstrategyinAfghanistanwas,thelogisticsofgettingthetroopsandequipmentinplacewasanequallycomplexundertaking.Ourmainconcerngoinginwasensuringthatwesetthetheaterwiththeearlydeploymentofcriticalenablers.TheseenablersincludedDLA’spushofmorethan4,000con-tainersofconstructionmaterial,whichhelpedenabletheconstructionofcriticalforwardoperatingbases(FOBs);analysisofthefeasibilityofmovingforcesaccordingtothePresident’stimeline;andsuccessfullyexpeditingthefieldingofthemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)familyofvehicles.

Inearly2009,webegantorefineandfulfilllogis-ticsrequirementtosupportdeploymentoftheinitial21,500personnelintoRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.Mostcriticaltosettingthetheaterforsuccesswastheearlydeploymentofengineeringteamsandequipment.ThroughsignificantcoordinationandeffortwiththeArmyCorpsofEngineers,theservices,andothers,weexpeditedthedeliveryofthousandsofpiec-esofcriticalengineeringequipment.ByearlyAugust2009,eightbasecampswerecompleted,enablingacombataviationbrigade,Strykerbrigade,andMarineexpeditionarybattaliontobegincombatoperations.

Militaryconstructionprojectsscheduledforcom-pletionoverthenext12monthswilldeliver4newrunways,rampspacefor8C−17transports,andpark-ingfor50helicoptersand24closeairsupportand26intelligencesurveillanceandreconnaissanceaircraft.Thisrepresentsroughlyone-thirdoftheairfieldpavingprojectscurrentlyfundedintheAfghanistantheaterofoperations.Additionalminorconstructionplanscalledfortheconstructionofover12newFOBsandexpan-sionof18existingFOBs.

Afghanistanisalandlockedcountrywithverylittleinfrastructure.Thetaskofexecutingthedeploymentandsustainmentoftheadditionalforceswasviewedbymanyasperhapsthegreatestlimitingfactortotheplan.Myplanningstaffcalledtogetheramajorplanningefforttoidentifyandrecommendpossiblesourcingsolutionstosatisfyforcerequirements.IncoordinatingwithTRANSCOMandtheservices,weconductedaforceflowconferencetodeterminethefeasibilityofmovingtherequiredforcesintoAfghan-istaninaccordancewiththePresident’stimeline.Theanalysisshowedthatthemovementplanwasfea-siblebutcarriedhighrisks.Inotherwords,wecouldaccomplishthemissionaslongasadditionalemergentrequirementswerekepttoaminimum.Weknewtherequirementswouldgrow,sowehadtothinkoutsidetheboxtodevelopcreativesolutions.

Ourbusinessrulescallforallsensitiveorclassi-fiedcargotobeflownintoAfghanistanonmilitaryorcommerciallycontractedaircraft.Allothercargoisshippedviasurfaceroutes.OurprimarysurfacerouteusestheseaportofKarachi,Pakistan,wherewehave

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

noU.S.forcepresence.Equipmentisdisembarkedandthentransportedbycommerciallycontractedvehicles,knownas“jingletrucks,”alongtwoprimaryroutes.OneroutecrossesintoAfghanistanthroughtheCha-mangate,whiletheothercrossesintoAfghanistanalongtheKhyberPassthroughtheTorkhamgate.Bothoftheseroutestakeourcargostraightthroughtheheartofinsurgentterritory.DespitetheGovernmentofPakistan’stremendoussupportandpartnership,werecognizedtheneedtoexpandouroptionsforsurfacemovementintoAfghanistan.

NorthernDistributionNetworkWebeganinearnesttoestablishanortherndistribution

routeinearly2009.WedevisedastrategicengagementstrategythatleveragedleadershipfromCENTCOM,TRANSCOM,OSD,andtheDepartmentofState.Throughseniorleadervisitsandnegotiations,theNorthernDistributionNetwork(NDN)becameareality.

WenowhaveaseriesofrobustroutesthattraverseEurope,theCaucasus,andtheCentralandSouthAsianStatesintoAfghanistan.WehavealsoestablishedasurfaceroutetotransportmilitaryequipmentfromIraqthroughTurkeythatmergeswiththeNDNforonwardmovementtoAfghanistan.AsJune2010,theMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mandhasbookedover50percentofallsustainmentheadingtoAfghanistanontheNDNandhasdeliveredover11,00020-footcontainersofcargotoAfghanistanthroughthesenewnorthernroutes.

Atpresent,thetransitagreementswithmostofthecountriesthroughwhichtheNDNrunslimitthetypeofcargoeligiblefortheNDNtononlethalcargoonly.Asaresult,thelandroutethroughPakistanisstillusedfornearlyallunitcargo.Wehopetoexpandthecat-egoriesofcargopermittedontheNDNandtoretainandexpandlogisticshubsinCentralAsia.

ThesuccessoftheNDNisatestamenttothecoop-erationandcommitmentofseveralorganizations.We

allstayedsynchronizedthroughbiweeklyflagofficer-levelandO6-levelsecurevideoteleconferenceshostedbyTRANSCOMandCENTCOM.ExpansionoftheNDNthroughEurope,theCentralandSouthAsianStates,andTurkeylessensourrelianceonthesurfaceroutethroughPakistanandprovidesthelogisticsflex-ibilityneededtodeployandsustaintheincreasedforceinAfghanistan.Today,theNDNhasproventobefarmorethanalogisticsinitiative.Itis,infact,adiplo-maticengagementtool.

CentralandSouthAsianStatesOurrelationshipwiththeCentralandSouthAsian

StatescontinuestoimproveasaresultoftheNDN.WeareactivelyworkingtoexpandourpartnershipswiththesenationsbylocallyprocuringsuppliesforOEFforcesfromNDN-supportingcountries.Wesoughtspeciallegislation,Section831ofthe2010NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,toprovideenhancedauthoritytoacquireproductsandservicesproducedintheCentralandSouthAsianStatesthatsupportmili-taryandstabilityoperationsinAfghanistan.

ThislegislationdirectlysupportstheeconomicdevelopmentoftheCentralandSouthAsianregion.WithDLAservingasCENTCOM’sleadforthisinitiative,theeconomicimpactsinceJuly2008hasexceeded$400million.ThislevelofeconomicactivityrepresentsasubstantivecommitmentbytheU.S.Gov-ernmenttothecountriesofthisregion.

MRAPVehiclesSaveLivesIhaveseenMRAPvehiclesinIraqandAfghanistan,

battledamagedbeyondrecognition,fromwhichourtroopershavesafelywalkedaway.MRAPvehiclessavelives.Theyofferaprovencapabilitytoreducecombatdeathsandcasualtiesassociatedwithroadsidebombsandotherexplosives.TheSoldiers,Marines,Sailors,andAirmenwhousethesevehicleshavegreatconfi-denceintheMRAP’sabilitiestodefeatenemyattacks.

TheMRAPfamilyofvehiclesisthebestvehicleprotectionwehavetodate,withtheirV-shapedarmoredhullsandraisedchassis.Asof1March2010,25,561vehiclesintheMRAPfamilywereundercon-tractoutofanacquisitionobjectiveof26,882.Ofthose,17,457wereMRAPsand8,104werethelighter,moremaneuverableMRAPall-terrainvehicle(M−ATV).Asof1March2010,wehadfieldedjustover37percent(approximately5,338)oftheapproximately14,331vehiclesrequiredinAfghanistan.

Toexpeditedeliveryofthislifesavingweaponsys-tem,wehaveworkedwithTRANSCOM,OSD,andtheDepartmentofStatetoestablishamultimodalship-pingconceptofoperations.VehiclesaretransportedbyshiptoaseaportofdebarkationintheCENTCOMregionandthencross-loadedontoaircraftatanearbyaerialportofembarkationforfinaldeliverybyair

Major General Dowd signs a transit support agree ment with Jordan for support of the Iraq drawdown.


intoAfghanistan.Thecreativethinkingandproblem-solvingbymyverytalentedandpersistentstaffhaveensuredthatcargo,includingMRAPvehicles,isflow-ingintoAfghanistantosavelivesandmeetthePresi-dent’stimeline.

LeveragingNATOandISAFContractsIncontrasttooperationsinIraq,operationsin

AfghanistanarecommandedbyNATOandISAF.Wedeterminedearlyontheimportanceofleveragingsup-portwithourNATOpartners.Forexample,throughthecollaborationachievedduringourNATOseniorlogis-ticsleadersessions,wewereabletocommittosharingcontractsforfuelandreallifesupportatFOBswherewehadamultinationalpresence.SincethecapacityforsupportinAfghanistanwaslimited,wesharedwhereitmadesensetodoso.Thishelpedcontrolthecostofcon-tractedsupportandalsolessenedthenationalburdenoneachparticipantbylimitingthenumberofFOBsrequir-ingsupport.ThecollaborationwithNATOandISAFincreaseddramaticallythroughoutmytourastheCCJ4.

ContractorsontheBattlefieldThedeployedcontractorforceisakeycomponent

tothesuccessofthewarfightermissionandanindis-pensiblesourceforessentialtechnicalsupport,main-tenance,transportation,security,basesupport,andconstructioncapability.Accountingfortotalnumbersandlocationsofcontractorsallowsthecommandersthevisibilitytobetterforecastlogisticsandforcepro-tectionrequirements.

TheJointContractingCommandIraqandAfghan-istan(JCC−I/A)servesasthecentralizedmanagementandenforcementorganizationforcontractsinIraqandAfghanistan,butitawardsonly25to30percentofthecontractsinthetheater.Itdoes,however,veteachcon-tractinthetheatertoensurethatallapplicableclausesareincludedinthecontract.CENTCOMwillsoonexpandtheJCC−I/AintoaJointTheaterSupport

ContractingCommandtosynchronizecontractingeffortsinPakistanandKuwaitaswellasIraqandAfghanistan.

Athoroughoversightprogramensurescontractcompliancetomeetwarfighterrequirements.Thisbecomesespeciallyimportantwhenoverseeingprivatesecuritycontractorsonthebattlefield.Privatesecu-ritycontractorsprovideuniqueskillsandcanquicklymeettheincreasedneedsforsecuritywhenmilitaryforcesarestretchedthin.Severalhigh-profileincidentsinvolvingseriousmisconductbyprivatesecuritycon-tractorshaveledCongressandDODtomandateman-agementframeworksandstrictlegalaccountabilityspecificallyforthesecontractors.

TheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,theDODInspectorGeneral,andotherinspectingorganizationshaveincreasedtheirassessmentsofcontractingoper-ationsfrom6in2007to54in2009.Withthehelpoftheseorganizations,LogNationhasmadesignificantprogressintheareaofcontractoroversight.Itmustcontinuethattrend.

AstheDirectorofLogisticsatCENTCOM,Ihavehadthepleasureofworkingwitharemarkablytalentedgroupofofficers,noncommissionedofficers,Gov-ernmentcivilians,andcontractors.Theireffortsandsacrificeshavesustainedusthroughmy36monthsinthejob,butmorebroadly,overalmost9yearsofcontinu-ouswar.Thankstothem,wearepositionedtofinishwellinIraqandcanbegintoturnacornerinAfghanistan.Ourdeputycommander,MarineCorpsLieutenantGeneralJohnR.Allen,oftensaysthatthehistorianswillonedaywritebooksabouttheNDN.Iamconvincedtheywill.

Attheendoftheday,itisthejobofthelogisticiantoensurethatthewarfightingcommandersneverhavetolookbackforsupport.AsIdepartCENTCOMtotakecommandofthe1stTheaterSustainmentCommand,IampleasedtobeentrustedwithnewchallengesthatwillallowmetocontinuetoplayapartinthisuniquetimeinthehistoryofDODlogistics.Mostofall,IamtrulyhonoredbytheopportunitytoplayasignificantroleinLogNation’scontinuedfutureinthiscomplexregion.

Major General Kenneth S. DowD waS the Director of loGiSticS, j−4, U.S. central coM ManD, when he wrote thiS article. he iS ex ceptionally proUD of hiS part in the “loG na tion” teaM anD acroSS the reSt of the loGiSticS enterpriSe. he iS now the coMManDer of the 1St SUStainMent coMManD (theater) at fort BraGG, north carolina, where he looKS for warD to continUinG hiS Service alonGSiDe the DeDicateD perSonnel of loG nation.

General DowD thanKS colonel linDa MarSh, USaf, for her aSSiStance in the writinG of thiS article. colonel MarSh iS chief of Staff of Stra teGic coMMUnicationS for the U.S. central coMManD j−4 Directorate. She previoUSly ServeD at centcoM aS chief of the air Branch, DepUty chief of the MoBility DiviSion, anD aSSiStant Director of the loGiSticS Direc torate. She holDS an M.S. DeGree in StrateGic StUDieS froM the air UniverSity.

Bottom Line Up Front: My Top 5

1. Top priority: Understand senior leader intent and translate that into feasible courses of ac tion.

2. There are no “silver bullets.” Think big and allow solution creativity and operational lati tude.

3. Target an objective. Build broad joint consen sus to achieve it. Act decisively in pursuit.

4. Build a team. Leverage leaders and units to maximize unique experience and capabilities.

5. Pass praise freely. Quickly recognize and re ward contributions, especially from young leaders.

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

stheArmycontinuesthetransformationofouroperationalforces,9yearsofprolongedconflictandacontinuousdemandfortrainedandreadyforcesrevealacorrespondingneedtotransformourgeneratingforcestoeffectivelysupporttheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycleandmeettherequire-mentsofa21stcenturyArmy.

TheArmy’sFinancialManagement(FM)commu-nityisfullyengagedinadoptingArmy-wideend-to-endprocessesanddevelopingaculturethatencompassesenterprisemanagement,costandperformance,andleaderscapableofmakingresource-informeddecisions.Tomethodicallyreachtheseobjectives,theFMcom-munityrecentlydevelopedtheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan(FMCP).TheFMCPrepresentsthecommunity’srealizationthatourcurrentprocessesforsupportingtheARFORGENcyclerequirerevisiontomeetthesustainmentdemandsoftheOperationalForceengagedinfull-spectrumoperations.

TheFMCPprovidesamethodologyforimprovingfiveFMfocusareas:warriortrainingandeducation,forcedesign,FMsystemsrequirements,doctrine,andcommunication.EnhancingeachoftheseareasimprovesFMcapabilitiesembeddedwithintheaterandexpeditionarysustainmentcommandsandsustainmentbrigadesbyprovidinghighlyagileandadaptiveFMwarriorswhoaretrainedandreadytoexecutefull-spectrumoperations.

TheCatalystforChangeTwosignificanteventsjump-startedtheinitial

developmentoftheFMCP:adetailedwhitepaperandawell-plannedleaderstrainingsummit.InOctober2009,ColonelTroyA.Clay,whoisnowthecommanderoftheArmyFinanceCommand,wrote“StrategytoDevelopandSustainFinan-cialManagementCapabilityinSupportofOurExpeditionaryArmy.”ThiswhitepapersurveyedtheFMlandscape,definedtheFMcommunity’schallenges,andproposedsomepossiblesolutionstothosechallenges.

Toexplorethesepossiblesolutions,thecommandantoftheArmyFinancialManagementSchool,ColonelMiltonL.Sawyers,hostedanFMtrainingsummitinmid-December2009that

broughttogethermorethan60FMleadersfromkeyorganizationsthroughouttheFMcommunity.Duringthesummit,theparticipantsdevelopedandrefinedthefivefocusareasinaccordancewiththewhitepaper,theArmyCapstoneConcept,andemergingFMdoc-trine.ThesefiverefinedfocusareasservedastheunderpinningsfordevelopingtheFMCP.

TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlanAftersignificantcontributionsfromacrossthe

entireFMcommunity,theArmyFinancialManage-mentSchoolreleasedthecompletedFMCPinJanuaryofthisyear.The“MissionStatement”and“EndState”serveastheanchorpointsforalllinesofoperationandsupportingtasks.(Seechartbelow.)

TheFMCPemployslogicallinesofoperations(LOOs)tolinkmultipledecisivepointsandtaskstoachievethedesiredendstate.TheLOOsarebeingexe-cutedthrough14supportingtasks,whichareassignedtoFMresponsibleorganizations(ROs)thatdevelopedandarenowexecutingtheirimplementationplans.Each

TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan:RaisingtheBartoAchieveSustainmentExcellence

by Lieutenant GeneraL edGar e. stanton iii

A


theArmySoldierSupportInstituteandtheSustain-mentCenterofExcellence,contin-uestoserveastheoperationalele-mentformonitor-ingandreportingexecutionoftheFMCPtoseniorFMleaders.

Regardlessofwhichorganiza-tionsfulfillROresponsibilities,thesuccessofthecampaignplanreliesonthecoor-dinatedeffortsoftheentiresustain-mentcommunity.WiththeFMCPnowinfullswing,theArmyFMcommunityisbet-terposturedto

respondtothecontinuouscycleofadaptiveinnovation,experimentation,andexperiencewithinourArmy.

TheFMCPisalivingcampaignplanwiththepotentialtoexpandandcontractassupportingtasksarecompletedandnewsupportingtasksareidentified.Theplandemonstratesourcommitmenttomeettheneedsofthe21stcenturyArmyengagedinfull-spectrumopera-tions.TheFMCPrequirescontinuousassessmentoftheFMlandscape.Thechallengeistoanticipateandidenti-fythenextparadigmshift,whetherthatshiftemergesasaresultofanewsystem,avariationinstructure,oranyothersignificantchangeintheoperationalenvironment.

Regardlessofthechallenges,oursuccessdependsonourpartnershipwiththesustainmentcommunity.Work-ingtogether,wewillbuild,train,andsustainacampaignqualityforceabletoprovidefull-spectrumfinancialman-agementandsustainmenttowarfightingcommanders.

lieUtenant General eDGar e. Stanton iii iS the Military DepUty for BUDGet to the aSSiS tant Secretary of the arMy for financial ManaGeMent anD coMptroller. he previoUSly ServeD aS coMManDer of the 18th finance GroUp (airBorne) at fort BraGG, north caro lina; coMManDant of the arMy finance School at fort jacKSon, SoUth carolina; Dep Uty chief of Staff for reSoUrce ManaGeMent for the arMy traininG anD Doctrine coM ManD; coMManDinG General of the arMy Sol Dier SUpport inStitUte at fort jacKSon; anD coMManDinG General of the 336th finance coMManD in SUpport of operation iraqi free DoM at caMp Doha, KUwait.

implementationplanconsistsofachievable,results-driventasks.AsROsprogressontheirassignedsupportingtasks,theyarereachingouttothenumerousstakeholders,suchastheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService,U.S.ArmyCentralCommand,theArmyForcesCom-mand,andHeadquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy,toensurethatallconcernsareaddressedfullyandcommu-nicatedtotheFMleadership.ThechartaboveshowsthesupportingtasksforeachLOO.

AchievingthegoalsoftheFMCPisamonumentalundertakingthatrequirescollaborativeplanningandaresponsiveexecutionarchitecturewithintheFMcommu-nity.TheArmyFinancialManagementSchool,through

LegendARFORGEN =ArmyForceGenerationCP =CiviliancareerprogramC2 =CommandandcontrolDFAS =DefenseFinanceandAccountingServiceFM =FinancialManagementFMCP =FinancialManagementCampaignPlanHR =HumanResourcesLOO =LineofoperationsMILPAY =MilitarypayMTOE =Modificationtableoforganization andequipmentSRC =StandardrequirementscodeSSI =SoldierSupportInstituteTTP =Tactics,techniques,andproceduresUSAFINCOM=U.S.ArmyFinanceCommand

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

stheArmyproceedswithitstransformationtoamodularforcebuiltforexpeditionaryandjointoperations,ourvariousdoctrinalbuildingblocksmustbereviewedand,quitefrequently,revisedtomatchthenewoperationalreality.Aspartofthisprocess,inApril2010theArmyreleasedanupdatedFieldManual(FM)1–0,HumanResourcesSupport.Althoughthefundamentalsofthehumanresources(HR)disciplineremainthesame,signifi-cantchangesinorganizationsanddefinitionshavebeenincorporatedintothenewFMtoreflecttoday’s,andouranticipatedfuture,environment.TherevisedFMalsoconsolidatesFMInterim(FMI)1–0.01,S–1Operations,andFMI1–0.02,Theater-LevelHumanResourcesSupport,tocreateasingle-sourcedoctrinalpublicationforHRsupport.

HRsupportenduresasthebackboneoftheArmy.IftheSoldieristhecenterpieceoftheforceanditscapabilities,thensupporttotheSoldierconstitutesthemostbasic,yetmostessential,ofArmyactivities.Withthisinmind,theoverridingobjectiveofHRsupportistoexecutepersonneldecisionsthatmaximizetheoperationaleffectivenessofthetotalforceandsustainoptimalreadiness.ThisrequiresthatHRsupportbeintegratedacrossthestrategic,operational,andtac-ticallevels;thatittakeintoaccountthemissionsofsupportedandsupportingunits;andthatitaddresstheneedsofallcustomers.

FM1–0outlinesspecificfunctionsandtasksthattheHRprofessionalmustbecompetentinandknow-ledgeableabouttoensurereliable,responsive,andflexiblesupporttocommanders,Soldiers,Depart-mentofDefense(DOD)civilians,contractorsautho-rizedtoaccompanytheforce,andfamilies.TheFMcontainssixchaptersandfourappendices,whichthisarticlesummarizes.

MajorChangesinHRDoctrineChapter1highlightsthemajorchangesmadeinHR

doctrineandprovidesanoverviewofHRsupportatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.Italsoidenti-fiesHRobjectives,enduringprinciples,corecompe-tencies,keyfunctions,andthecommandandcontrolrelationshipswiththesustainmentcommunity.Signifi-cantchangestoHRdoctrineincludethefollowing:

Separating the task of personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR).ThisseparationwasnecessarybecausePASRisactuallytwodistincttasksthataremanagedorexecutedbydifferentelementsabovebrigadelevel.PersonnelaccountabilityisanHRunitfunctionexecutedbyS–1sandHRunits.StrengthreportingisacommandfunctionandisexecutedbyS–1sandG–1s.

Reducing the HR core competencies from 10 to 4 tasks.AllpreviousHRtasksarenowalignedunderoneofthefollowingfourcorecompetencies:mantheforce,provideHRservices,coordinatepersonnelsupport,andconductHRplanningandoperations.Thepreviouscorecompetenciesofcasualtyreporting,personnelinforma-tionmanagement,personnelreadinessmanagement,postaloperations,bandoperations,andPASRhavebeenchangedtofunctionsandalignedunderoneofthenewcorecompetencies.(Seethechartatright.)

Adding HR enduring principles. ThesixHRenduringprinciplesareintegration,anticipation,respon-siveness,synchronization,timeliness,andaccuracy.Eachoftheseprinciplesmustbeweightedandappliedduringtheplanning,execution,andassessmentofHRsupportforcurrentandfutureoperations.Whiletheprinciplesareindependent,theyarealsointerrelatedtobuildandsustaincombatpower.Theprinciplesofinte-gration,anticipation,andresponsivenessarealsosus-tainmentprinciplesoutlinedinFM4–0,Sustainment.

Eliminating the term R5 (replacement, reception, return to duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment). R5hasbeenreplacedwithpersonnelaccoun-tability(PA).R5waseliminatedbecauseitcausedconfusionintaskexecutionandPArolesandrespon-sibilities.

Redesigning the HR company. ThecompanyhasbeenreorganizedtoconsolidatethePAplansandoperationsteamandthepostalplansandoperations

TheNewFM1–0,HumanResourcesSupport

by thoMas K. waLLaCe, jr.

A

Postal operations is one of the functions of the HR core competency of provide HR services. (Photo by PFC Daniel M. Rangel)


teamatthecompanylevelundertheoperationssection.Thiscon-solidationstreamlinestheHRcompanyandmakestheoperationssectionmoreefficientinperform-ingfull-spectrumHRoperations.

Chapter1alsodescribeshoweffectiveandefficientHRsupportreliesonmultifunctionalHRleaderswhomustthinkstrategically,workcollaboratively,andbecapableofproducingandexecutingagileandclearHRpolicies.HRprofession-alsmustalsouseeffectivepracticestopursueoutcome-orientedactionsandhavethecompetency-basedskillsandknowledgerequiredandexpectedofthem.

Chapter1emphasizestheneedforHRprofessionalstounderstandtheimportanceofnotonlytheireffortsandunitmissionsbutalsothemissionsofsupportingandsupportedunits.SupportedunitsincludethedivisionandcorpsG–1s/adjutantsgeneral,battalionandbrigadeS–1s,andHRopera-tionsbranchwithinthesustainmentbrigadeorexpeditionarysustainmentcommand.Sup-portingunitsareHR-specificunitsandincludetheHRsustainmentcenter,militarymailterminal,theatergatewaypersonnelaccountabilityteams,andHRcom-panieswithsupportingpostalandmultifunctionalHRplatoons.

CoreCompetenciesandFunctionsHRsupportconsistsofthefourcorecompetencies,

eachofwhichincludessubordinatekeyfunctionsthatdirectlysupportthecompetency.Thecorecompeten-ciesandtheirsupportingkeyfunctionsareasfollows:

Man the force. Thiscompetencyincludesallfunc-tionsandtasksthataffectthepersonnelaspectofbuildingthecombatpowerofanorganization.Keyfunctionsarepersonnelreadinessmanagement,per-sonnelaccountability,strengthreporting,retentionoperations,andpersonnelinformationmanagement.

Provide HR services. HRservicescoversfunctionsconductedbyHRprofessionalsthatspecificallyaffectSoldiersandorganizations.Thesefunctionsincludeessentialpersonnelservices,postaloperations,andcasualtyoperations.

Coordinate personnel support.Personnelsupportencompassesthosefunctionsandactivitiesthatcon-tributetounitreadinessbypromotingfitness,buildingmoraleandcohesion,enhancingqualityoflife,andpro-vidingrecreational,social,andothersupportservicesto

Soldiers,DODcivilians,andotherpersonnelwhodeploywiththeforce.Personnelsupportencompassesthefunc-tionsofmorale,welfare,andrecreation(MWR)opera-tions,commandinterestprograms,andbandoperations.

Conduct HR planning and operations.HRplan-ningandoperationsarethemeansbywhichHRleadersenvisionadesiredHRendstatethatsupportstheoperationalcommander’smissionrequirements.PlanningcommunicatestosubordinateHRprovid-ersandunitleadersthecommander’sintent,expectedrequirements,anddesiredoutcomesintheformofanoperationplanororder.Planningalsoprovidesaprocessfortrackingcurrentandnear-term(future)executionoftheplannedHRsupporttoensureeffec-tivesupporttotheoperationalcommander.

HROrganizationandEmploymentChapter2discussesthemission,organization,and

employmentofHRorganizationsandHRstaffele-mentslocatedatthetheater,corps,division,brigade,andbattalionlevels.FM1–0identifiesanddescribestherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachHRorganiza-tionandHRstaffelement.TheFMincludeschangesresultingfromtherecentforcedesignupdate,whichconsolidatedtheHRandcasualtyplatoonintoamultifunctionalHRplatoon.Detaileddiscussionisincludedontheplatoon’scapabilitytoformpersonnelaccountabilityteamsandcasualtyliaisonteams.

C ore C ompetenciesand K ey F unctions

P rovide Human R es ourc es (HR ) S upport

Manthe F orc e

P ers onnel R eadines s

Management

P ers onnel Ac c ountability

S trength R eporting

R etention Operations

P ers onnel Information

Management

P rovide HR S ervic es

E s s ential P ers onnel S ervic es

P os tal Operations

C as ualty Operations

C oordinate P ers onnel

S upport

Morale, Welfare, and R ec reation

Operations

C ommand Interes t

P rograms

Army B and Operations

C onduc t HR P lanning and

Operations

HR P lanning and Operations

Operate HR C ommand and C ontrol Nodes

C oreC ompetenc y

K eyF unc tions

FM 1–0 reduces the number of HR core competen cies from 10 to these 4. Each competency is executed through several key functions.

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ThechapteralsoprovidesrecommendedperformanceindicatorsfortheHRoperationsbranch.Theseindicatorswillenablethebranchtoidentify,track,andsynchronizeHRsupportintotheoverallsustainmentplan.

MantheForceInchapter3,thecorecompetencyof“manthe

force”isdescribedasanyactionorfunctionthatimpactsthestrengthorreadinessofanorganization.Manningcombinesanticipation,movement,andskill-fulpositioningofpersonnelsothatthecommanderhasthepersonnelwiththerightskills,capabilities,andspecialneedsrequiredtoaccomplishthemissionandtomeetchangingoperationalneeds.

Thekeyfunctionofmantheforceispersonnelrea-dinessmanagementasitdirectlyrelatestotheotherkeyfunctionsofpersonnelaccountability,strengthreporting,andpersonnelinformationmanagement.TheFMsummarizestherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachman-the-forcefunctionbycommandlevel,fromthe-atertobattalion,andbyHRunits.

ProvideHRServicesChapter4discussesthecorecompetencyofprovide

HRservices,whichincludesthosefunctionsthatdirect-lyaffectaSolder’sstatus,assignment,qualifications,financialstatus,careerprogression,andqualityoflifeandthatallowArmyleaderstoeffectivelymanagetheforce.Includedarethekeyfunctionsofessentialperson-nelservices,postaloperations,andcasualtyoperations.

Essentialpersonnelservicesincludepromotions,awardsanddecorations,leavesandpasses,evaluationreports,citizenshipandnaturalization,andotherrelated

functionsthatareinitiatedbySoldiers,unitcommand-ers,unitleaders,G–1sandS–1s,orfromthetopofthesystem.CasualtyoperationsandpostaloperationsarediscussedindetailandincluderolesandresponsibilitiesbyeachlevelofcommandandbyHRunits.

CoordinatePersonnelSupportThecorecompetencyofcoordinatepersonnelsup-

portiscoveredinchapter5.Personnelsupportactivi-tiesincludethosefunctionsandactivitiesthatimproveindividualfitness,increasemoraleandcohesion,fosterabetterqualityoflife,andfurnishrecreational,social,andothersupportservicesforSoldiers,DODcivilians,andotherdeployingpersonnel.Alloftheseactivitiesareconductedwiththegoalofincreasingunitreadi-ness.TherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachcommandlevelandHRunitsforMWR,commandinterestpro-grams,andbandoperationsareidentified.

HRPlanningandOperationsChapter6discussesthecorecompetencyofHRplan-

ningandoperations.ItemphasizestoHRproviderstheneedtohaveacompleteunderstandingofthefullcapa-bilitiesofHRorganizationsanddiscusseshowtoplanandemployHRdoctrineincurrentandfutureopera-tions.Eachstepinthemilitarydecisionmakingprocess(MDMP)isclearlyidentified,alongwithspecificHRactionsthatmustbeconsideredwhendevelopinganoperationorderorplan.Theplanningprocessalsoiden-tifiestheneedforthecompositeriskmanagementpro-cesstobealignedwitheachstepoftheMDMP.

FM1–0containsfiveappendicesthatprovideplan-ningandmanagementtoolsforHRoperations.TheseincludeHRreardetachmentoperations,HRtheater-openingandredeploymentoperations,casualtyestima-tion,civiliansupport,andadivisionofHRlabortaskmatrix.Eachappendixidentifiesrolesandresponsibili-tiesforHRprofessionalsinHR-specificunitsandsup-portedorganizations.

FM1–0promotesacommonunderstandingofHRsupportfundamentals.Themanualdoesnotdictatepro-ceduresforanyparticularoperationalscenario,nordoesitprovidespecificsystemproceduresforHRenablers.Itprovidesthedoctrinalbasefordevelopingoperationplansandstandingoperatingprocedures.LeadersandHRoperatorsatalllevelsmustapplythesefundamen-talsusingArmyplanninganddecisionmakingpro-cesses.TheFMisanauthoritativeguidethatrequiresjudgmentinapplication.

thoMaS K. wallace, jr., iS chief of the Doc trine Branch, conceptS anD Doctrine Divi Sion, capaBilitieS DevelopMent anD inteGra tion Directorate, at the arMy SolDier SUpport inStitUte at fort jacKSon, SoUth carolina. he iS a retireD arMy noncoMMiSSioneD officer.

Major Changes in FM 1–0,Human Resources Support

l Reduces FM 1–0 from over 300 pages to 165.l Reduces core competencies from 10 to 4.l Establishes human resources (HR) enduring

principles.l Separates personnel accountability and strength

reporting (PASR) into two separate and distinct functions.

l Eliminates the term R5 (reception, replacement, return to duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment) and replaces it with personnel accountability.

l Incorporates HR force design updates for a multifunctional HR platoon.

l Incorporates fullspectrum operations.

FM 1–0 makes significant changes in human re sources (HR) doctrine to create a singlesource doc trinal publication for HR support.


ustainabilityisaconceptthatishavingamajoreffectonthecommercialfoodserviceindustry.Manufacturers,collegesanduniversities,foodservicedistributionandmanagementcompanies,andGovernmentagenciesarealltalkingabout“sustain-ability”andwhattheyaredoingtopromoteitwithintheiroperationsandbusinesspractices.TheArmyneedstoanswerseveralquestionsregardingsustain-ability:Aspartoftheoverallfoodserviceindustry,wheredoessustainabilityfitintotheArmyFoodPro-gram?Whatexactlydoessustainabilitymean?Shouldwebeusingsustainablepractices?Howdoweknowifwearebeingsustainable?Ifwearenot,howcanwestart?Whyshouldweevencare?

DefiningSustainableBeforeansweringthesequestions,weshoulddefine

theword“sustainable.”Merriam-Webster’s Diction-arydefinessustainableasawayof“usingaresourcesothattheresourceisnotdepletedorpermanentlydamaged.”Sustainabilityistypicallyusedtodayin

MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgram

S anenvironmentalorecologicalsense.Inthiscontext,Wikipediadefinesitasthe“abilityofanecosystemtomaintainecologicalprocesses,functions,biodiversity,andproductivityintothefuture.”

ThiscertainlyisnotaworkabledefinitionforArmypurposes.Theproblemisthatsustainabilityisacom-plextermthatcanbeappliedtoanyecosystemonEarth(suchasoceans,forests,orwetlands)andcanbeincludedinhumanendeavorssuchasagriculture,architecture,andenergyproduction.Furthermore,nodefinitionisuniversallyacceptedandtermslikesus-tainable,sustainability,sustainabledevelopment,andsustainablepracticesareoftenusedinterchangeably.Sustainabilityhasbeenregardedasbothanimportantbutunfocusedconcept,like“liberty”or“justice,”andafeel-goodbuzzwordwithlittlemeaningorsubstance.Howcansuchanebulousandvaguetermhavesuchanimpactonsociety?

ForthisdiscussionofsustainabilityandtheArmyFoodProgram,Iwillusethemostwidelyaccepteddefinitionofsustainabilityandsustainabledevelopment,

by david j. sherriff

The Army will purchase or lease neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs), like these being delivered to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to reduce the amount of fossil fuel being used by installation vehicles.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

providedbytheWorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment:“tomeettheneedsofthepresentwithoutcompromisingtheabilityoffuturegenerationstomeettheirownneeds.”

LivingSustainablyTolivesustainably,wemustusetheEarth’s

resourcesatareplenishablerate.However,scientiststellusthat,asawhole,humanbeingsarenotlivingsustainably.Instead,weareusingresourcesfasterthantheycanbereplenished.Sustainablepractices,developments,andconceptsarethoseactionstakenanddecisionsmadetoattempttoreversethistrend.

Moreimportantthanthetechnicaldefinitionofsustainabilityisanunderstandingofhowsustainabil-ityaffectstheArmyFoodProgramandgraspingthehowandwhyofoperatinginmoresustainableways.Let’sstartwiththewhy.

Youdonothavetobeacertifiedtreehuggerorcar-bon-creditspeculatortoseethevalueofsustainability.Infact,manyaspectsofsustainabilitymerelyinvolveusingbetterbusinesspracticesandhavemultipleben-efits.IseethreemajorcategoriesofreasonswhytheArmyFoodProgramshouldattempttooperateinmoresustainableways:environmental,social,andfinancial.

Environmental reasons. Regardlessofwhetheryouareaskepticoryoubelievethatmanmadeglobalwarmingandclimatechange,itshouldbeobviousthat,fromanenvironmentalstandpoint,usinglessenergyispreferabletousingmore.Changingambi-enttemperaturerequirestheuseofenergy—energythatmustbetransferredfromanothersourceorform,oftenpollution-creatingpowerplants.Busi-nesspracticesthatleadtoincreasedvehicletrafficusemoregasolineandcreatemoreexhaustpollution.Trashmustbetransferredanddiscarded,requiring

additionalvehicletrafficandlandfillspace.Certaincleaningandoperatingsuppliescanbeharmfultotheenvironment.Sustainablebusinesspracticesthatreduceenergyusageandtrashgenerationanduseless-damagingcleaningandoperatingsupplieswillreducenegativeeffectsontheenvironment.

Social reasons. Associetyplacesagreateremphasisonsustainability,theArmywillbeexpectedtofollowsuitorperhapseventakealeadingrole.SustainableoperatingpracticeswillhelptokeeptheArmyinapositivelight.SincetheArmytriestolooselymodelitsgarrisondiningfacilityoperationsaftercollegeanduniversityfoodserviceoperations,itfollowsthatastheyplacegreateremphasisonsustainability,theArmywoulddothesame.SincetheArmyandcollegesanduniversitiestargetthesamedemographic(18-to24-year-oldsawayfromhomeforthefirsttime),sus-tainablepracticeswillbeincreasinglyimportanttoboth.

Financial reasons.Manyoftheenvironmentalbenefitsofsustainablebusinesspracticesalsomakefinancialsense.Forexample,reducingfoodwasteisnotonlybetterfortheenvironmentbutalsoreducesfoodcosts,whichhelpsadiningfacilitymaintainitsaccountstatus.Reducingenergyandwaterusagerep-resentsacostavoidancetotheinstallation.Reusingitemsforsomeotherpurposeeliminatestheneedforpurchasingadditionalitems.

TheArmy’sMoveTowardSustainabilityTheArmyisalreadyembracingsustainability.Sev-

eralexamplesofhowtheArmyismovingtowardmoresustainableoperationsinclude—o TheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)StrategicPlan

forfiscalyears(FYs)2007to2013includesagoaltoincreaseDLA’sofferingof“green”productsby25percentthroughtheendofFY2011.AsamajorcustomerofDLA,theArmywillbegintopurchasemoregreenproductssimplyasaresultofchangesinthesupplysystem.

o InFY2007,78percentofArmymilitaryconstruc-tionprojectsweredesignedtomeettheU.S.GreenBuildingCouncil’snewconstructioncertificationstandards.

o AlmosteveryArmyinstallation(ifnotall)hasanactiverecyclingprogram.Thisisanimportantpartofsustainabilitythathasbeenaroundsolongthatitisoftenoverlooked.

o On12January2009,theArmyreceiveditsfirst6neighborhoodelectricalvehicles(NEVs)andplanstopurchase4,000morebyFY2012.Thesevehiclesarestreetlegalinnearlyall50statesonroadswithspeedlimitsof35milesperhourorlessandcantravelabout30milesononecharge.TheNEVswillreplacepartoftheArmy’sfleetofnearly68,000nontacticalvehiclesandwillreducetheArmy’sfuelconsumptionbyalmost2milliongallonsperyear.

Three primary overlapping factors—social, environment, and economic—identify sustainable operations. Any business or operational practice that is socially equitable, environmentally bearable, and economically viable is a sustainable practice and should be incorporated to the fullest extent possible.


o TheJointCulinaryCenterofExcellenceisworkingwiththeDefenseSupplyCenterPhiladelphiaandtheotherservicesthroughtheJointSubsistencePolicyBoardtodeterminethefeasibilityofpromotingtheuseofcertifiedhumanecage-freeeggsthroughtheSubsistencePrimeVendorprogram.

o TheArmyhasitsownwebsitededicatedtosustaina-bilityandsustainableoperations:www.sustainability.army.mil/.

FoodServiceIndustryPracticesHereareseveralexamplesofhowthefoodservice

industryisembracingsustainability.NotallofthesewouldbefeasibleinArmydiningfacilities,andinclu-sionoftheseideasinthisarticledoesnotmeananendorsementofthem.Thegoalistoidentifypotentialsustainablepracticesandproductsforconsiderationandpossibleadoption.

Divert food waste from a landfill tomoreenviron-mentallyfriendlyoptions,suchasdonationorcom-posting.Anestimated4to10percentofallfoodpurchasedendsupaspre-consumerwaste.Thefocusshouldthereforebefirstonreductionofwasteandnextondiversionsincereducingtheamountoffoodwastegeneratediscleanerandmorecosteffectivethanproperlydisposingofit.Onewaytodothisisthroughtheuseoffoodwasteaudits,whichinvolveidentifyingandanalyzingfoodwaste,bothpre-andpost-consumer,todeterminethevolumeandtypesoffoodbeingwasted.Thiswillhopefullyleadtowaystoreducefoodwastebothinthefrontandbackofthehouse.

Compost food wastetoreducewaste,cutwaste-han-dlingfees,andpotentiallyhelplocalgrowers.Manycompostingsystemsrecommendonlycompostingvegetabletrimmingsandavoidingmeatanddairyitemsandalsotablescrapstokeepoutunwantedfoodandnonfooditemssuchasstraws.Othercompostingsystemscantakeeverything,toincludetablescraps,bones,andcompostablewareallatonce.

Use compostable takeout containers and cups. Thesearebecomingmorepopular.Compostableglovesarealsoavailableforuseinthekitchen.

Use refillable water containers.Theseareslowlyreplacingbottledwater,whichhasbeenaprimetargetforenvironmentalists.Atleastonecompanyoffersacompostableplasticwaterbottlethatwillcompletelybreakdowninaslittleas60days,andanotherismar-ketingitsplasticwaterbottlesasusing50percentlessplasticthanthecompetition.(BottledwaterisnotauthorizedforpurchaseusingMilitaryPersonnel,ArmyappropriatedsubsistencefundsperArmyReg-ulation30–22,TheArmyFoodProgram.)

Switch to ecoclamshells,madeoutofsturdymela-mineandplastic,aswashable,microwavable,andreus-ablealternativestoStyrofoamtake-outcontainers.

Adopt trayless dining,whichisagrowingtrendincollegeanduniversityfoodservicesettings.Althoughcustomerdissatisfactionisakeychallenge,studieshaveshownthatgoingtraylesscanreducefoodwastebyasmuchas25percentsincedinersnolongerhavetraysonwhichtoconvenientlystackexcessfood.Goingtraylessreducestheamountofwaterandchemi-calsusedinthediningfacilitybyeliminatingtheneedtowashtrays.

Buy local.Anothergrowingtrend,thisconceptnotonlyreducestheamountoffuelusedtohaulproduceacrossthecountrybutalsoprovidesafinancialbenefittothelocalcommunity.

Reduce waste on the service line byusingsmallerservingvesselsatsaladbarsandforotherself-serveoptionsandrefillingthemmorefrequentlyorbystart-ingwithlargervesselsatthebeginningofthemealperiodandrefillingprogressivelysmallercontainersasthecrowdthins.

Use an employee reward programtorecognizethosewhoidentifysourcesoffoodwastereductioninthediningfacilityorwhodonottakeshortcutswhenusingestablishedwastereductionmethods.

Avoid preheating all food service equipmentjustbecauseitistimetostartcooking.Instead,carefullydeterminewhichpiecesofequipmentshouldbeturnedon(andoff)andatwhattimesothattheydonotrunlongerthannecessary.

Reduce energy consumptionbyensuringthatprop-ermaintenanceisperformedonfoodserviceequip-mentandinstallinglow-wattagelightingandlow-flowplumbingfixtures.

Install bulk cooking oil tankstoreducefoodcostsandpackaging.

Thefollowingwebsitecontainsmoreideasandinformationonhowtorunmoresustainablefoodser-viceoperations:www.sustainablefoodservice.com/.

SomeArmyfoodserviceoperationshavealreadybeguntoadoptsustainablepractices.IhopethatyouwillconsideradoptingsomesustainablepracticesofyourownandthatyouwillshareyourexperienceswithusattheJointCulinaryCenterofExcellence.ContactDavidSherriffbytelephoneat(804)734-4862(DSN687)orbyemailatdavid.sherriff@us.army.milformoreinformationonsustainablefoodservicepracticesortoshareyourideasandexperiences.

DaviD j. Sherriff iS the chief of the conceptS, SySteMS, anD policy DiviSion in the arMy center of excellence, SUBSiStence operationS Directo rate, at the joint cUlinary center of excellence at fort lee, virGinia. he holDS a B.S. DeGree froM the UniverSity of toleDo anD a M.B.a. DeGree froM coloraDo State UniverSity. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy ManaGeMent Staff colleGe’S SUS tainMent BaSe leaDerShip anD ManaGeMent proGraM.

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

incetheentryofU.S.forcesintoAfghanistan in2001andthroughthesimultaneoussupport oftwocampaigns—OperationsEnduringFree-domandIraqiFreedom(OEFandOIF)—since2003,theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)hasexpand-edair,land,andmaritimepetroleumsustainmentfrom300,000gallonsperdaytomorethan5milliongallonsperday.Ithasaccomplishedthisexpansionovercon-testedandundevelopedgroundlinesofcommunication(GLOCs)and,inthecaseofAfghanistan,inaland-lockedcountrywithlittlemoderninfrastructure.U.S.forceshavenotfacedsuchchallengessincetheirsup-portofthe“BurmaRoad”ofWorldWarII.

OEFandOIFpetroleumsustainmenthasreliedonanintricatenetworkofnationalandinternational

petroleum,political,andpolicystakeholders,includ-ingtheDepartmentofState,regionalcountrypartners,theDefenseEnergySupportCenter(DESC),theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),CENTCOM,combinedandjointcommands,servicecomponentcommands,andmilitaryservices.Thisworld-classpetroleumoperationhasleveragedcommercialenergymarketsandintegratedcommercialdistributionnet-workstosupportthemilitary’s“lasttacticalmile”hub-and-spokedistribution.Intheprocess,ithasdevelopedhistoriccapabilitiesandachievedhistoricresults.

TheStrategicPetroleumChallengeTheCENTCOMareaofresponsibility(AOR)is

131percentofthesizeofthecontinentalUnitedStates,

EvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheU.S.CentralCommandAreaofResponsibility

by CoLoneL jeffrey b. Carra and Chief warrant offiCer 4 david ray, usMC (ret.)

S

GLOC=Groundlineof communication

GPD=GallonsperdayIZ =Iraq

K =ThousandM=Million

Q = QayyarahTQ=Taqaddum

Legend


encompassing4.6millionsquaremilesand20coun-tries.Bycontrast,thecontinentalUnitedStatesconsistsof3.5millionsquaremiles.AfghanistanislargerthanthestateofTexasandhasnoorganicpetroleumrefiningcapability,whichmeansthatallpetroleumsupportmustbeimportedfromoutsideitslandlockedterritory.

OnanygivendayinitsAOR,CENTCOMreceivesmorethan5milliongallonsoffuelthroughacombinedfleetofmorethan2,000contractedcommercialfueltrucksandmanages200milliongallonsofcontractedpetroleumstoragespreadacrosstheAORinsupportofland,air,andmaritimeforces.CENTCOM,inpartner-shipwithitsstrategicnationalpartner,DESC,acquires99percentofitspetroleumrequirementsfromregionalcommercialsuppliersandrefineriesintheGulfandCentralAsianStates,Turkey,andPakistan.

Theseregionalcommercialenergyenterprisesareeitherownedorcontrolledbyhost-nationgovernments.Asaresult,political-militaryengagementwiththosegovernmentsisneededforDESCpetroleumregionalacquisitionsandforservices(distribution)contractsinsupportofCENTCOMrequirements.AprimeexampleistheestablishmentandmaturingofDESCcontractsforCENTCOMforcesinIraq.

OIFStrategicFuelInitiativesAttheonsetofOIFin2003,theonlysourceof

regionalpetroleumsupportwasthepost-OperationDes-ertStormlegacyarrangementwiththeGovernmentofKuwait.Underthissystem,DESCcontractedwiththeKuwaitPetroleumCorporationtoprovidepetroleumsup-porttoU.S.forces.ThecommercialmovementoffueldidnotextendbeyondtheKuwait-IraqborderbecauseofthesecuritychallengesposedbydrivinginIraq.AllinternaldistributionwithinIraqwasprovidedbyorganicmilitaryservicecapabilities,withU.S.ArmyCentralhavingTitle10inlandpetroleumdistributionresponsi-bilitiesfortheCombinedJointOperationsArea(CJOA).

By2006and2007,theIraqCJOApetroleumconceptofsupporthadevolvedintothreestrategicpetroleumGLOCsenteringIraqfromTurkey,Jordan,andKuwait.DESCcontractedcommercialfueltruckstodeliverup

to2milliongallonsoffuelperdayintoIraqasfarfor-wardasmilitarygeneralsupporthubs.

ToaccomplishthissamemissionwithArmyunitswouldhaverequired9,103SoldiersassignedtoatleastoneArmyquartermastergroup(petroleumandwater)with12transportation(truck)battalions,onequartermas-terbattalion(petroleumsupply),and46petroleum,oils,andlubricantstruckcompaniestoprovidetheneededthe-ater-levelfuel-handlinganddistributioncapabilities.Putanotherway,itwouldhaverequired2,760oftheArmy’s7,500-gallontankers—4timestheentireArmyinventory.

TheIraqCJOApetroleumconceptofsupportsetthestageforsuccessinthe2007OIFsurgeandremainsthebaselineforadjustingenduringsupportduringandaftertheresponsibledrawdownofU.S.forcesfromIraq.

Contractor-OwnedBaseOnebaseinsouthwestAsiaconsumes,onaver-

age,morethan1milliongallonsoffueleveryday,supportingairlift,aerialrefueling,reconnaissance,andstrikemissionsthroughouttheCENTCOMAOR.Until2006,allfuelhandlingatthisbasewaspro-videdbyU.S.AirForcesCentral(AFCENT)organictacticalcapabilities(receipt,handling,andstorageinfabricfuelbags).

InresponsetoaCENTCOM-validatedrequire-ment,DESCin2004contractedfor8milliongallonsofstoragecapacityatacommercial-standardDefensefuelsupplypoint(DFSP)ownedandoperatedbyacontractorandlocatednearthebase.TheDFSPbeganoperationsin2006,anditssuccessallowedthenumberofAirmendeployedtosupportAFCENToperationstobereduced.

In2009,throughasecondcontractor-ownedandcon-tractor-operated(COCO)initiative,DESCestablisheda22-milepetroleumpipelinetoconnecttotheDFSP.TheCOCODFSPreceivesaviationfueldeliveredtotheAORbycommercialtankerships(theaveragetankerloadis12milliongallons)fromregionalworldsuppli-ersunderDESCcontracts.Thepipelineincreaseddailyreceiptcapabilityatthebasefrom1milliongallons(alldeliveredbytruck)tomorethan1.5milliongallons.

ThesetwoCOCOinitiativesenabledAFCENTtoreducethetacticalfuelterminal’ssizeandassociatedmanpower(approximately65personnel),increasedthebase’sreceiptcapabilityby50percent,andcreatedamoredependable,dedicatedpipelineoperation.Sev-eralmonthsofnegotiationswithgovernment-ownedor

From a logistics perspective, Afghanistan may be the most challenging area [in which the] United States has ever conducted combat operations.

—Major General Kenneth S. Dowd, CENTCOM Director of Logistics, 2009

Fuel support in Iraq used three strategic petroleum ground lines of communication entering from Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait (at left). Contracted commercial fuel trucks delivered up to 2 million gallons per day in Iraq as far forward as military general support hubs.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

-affiliatedenergycompanieswererequiredtogainthepermissionstopursuethesestrategicinitiatives.

OEF—TheUltimateChallengeDefenseLogisticsAgencypersonnelbelievethat

AfghanistanisthemostchallengingCJOAtosupplywithfuel.NotonlydoesAfghanistanhavenoorganicoilproductionorrefiningcapability,butitisaland-lockedcountrywithanausteredistributioninfrastructure.Onaverage,theorder-shiptimeforpetroleumoriginatingfromCentralAsiansourcesis21to30days.

FuelentersAfghanistanbyrailtankcarsandisdeliveredtoaterminal6kilometersinsidetheborder;thisistheterminusofthecountry’sonlyrailline.Thefuelisthencarriedbycommercialtrucksoverunim-provedroads,wherethetrucksfaceexposuretobadweather(theSalangPassisnotoriousforsnow)andenemyattacksandmusthurdleashadownetworkoflocalandnationalcustomsandsecurityrequirements.

Since2002,CENTCOManditsstrategicpetroleumsupportpartners(DESCsince2002,NATOsince2007)haveincreasedfuelstoragecapacityinAfghanistanfromroughly100,000gallonstomorethan30milliongallons(withupto12millionofthosegallonsincontractedcommercialsteel-tankfacilities)tomeetademandthathasgrownfrom40,000gallonsperdayin2002tomorethan1.1milliongallonsperdayin2009.

PartneringWithDESCStartingin2007,CENTCOMpartneredwithDESC

toshiftmostpetroleumsustainmentinAfghanistanawayfromtheSouthernGLOC,whichentersAfghani-stanfromPakistan,towhatisknownastheNorthernDistributionNetwork(NDN),whichentersfromtheCentralAsianStates.ThischangeincreasedtheamountofpetroleumenteringbytheNDNfrom30percentto70percentofallpetroleumsustainment.CoupledwiththeshifttotheNDN,DESChadtheforethoughttoiniti-ateacontractprovisionwithitspetroleumsuppliersto

holdupto9milliongallonsofcontractor-ownedfuel(asa“commercialreserve”)withinAfghanistantomitigateanyebbandflowinregionalfueldistribution.

DESCalsoincreaseditsGovernment-owned“stra-tegicreserve”inandaroundKabulfrom2to5milliongallons.Thestrategicreserveandthecommercialreservetogetherprovideashockabsorbercapableofwithstand-ingmajordisruptionstopetroleumsustainment.

DESC’scontractorsestablishedacommercialfuelterminaloutsideofBagramAirBasein2007andbuilta2-milepipelinetostreamlineBagram’sfuelresup-ply;thisreducedfueltrucktrafficcomingontothebase.DESChasalsoinitiateddirectdeliverytomajordirectsupporthubsatforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)Fenty,Sharana,andShank,therebyreducinghub-and-spokefueldeliveriesfromBagramtotheotherFOBsinRegionalCommandEast.

Bagramisinthemiddleofaneight-phasepetroleummasterplanmilitaryconstructionefforttoreplacealltacticalbagstoragewithanindustry-standardsteel-tankfuelfacility.Thiseffort,whichbeganin2007andisscheduledtobecompletedin2012,willprovideBagramwith12milliongallonsofstoragecapacityandmodernfuelfacilities.

Finally,DESCissolicitinganadditional10milliongallonsofcontractedstorageandenhanceddeliveryservicesforRegionalCommandEastandformutualsupportofotherregionalcommands,basedonaCENTCOM-validated2009to2010requirement.ThecombinedeffectoftheseactionswillexpandCJOAfuelstorageanddistributioncapabilitywhilecontinuingtosupportcurrentcombatoperations.

NATOAllianceCooperationTheAfghanistanCJOAisaNATO-ledoperation

undertheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF).ThiscommandstructurerequiresanewlevelofstrategicpetroleumcoordinationandcooperationbyCENTCOMandU.S.stakeholderswiththealliance.

CENTCOM,incoordinationwithDESCandCJOAstakeholders,hasmetthegrowingOEFfuelrequirementsincethefirstarrivalofU.S.forcesatBagramAirBase.

QM P OLG roup

(90)

QM P OLS upply B N(T F S /B U)(615 pax)

S outhernG LOC

(2912 pax)

T C B N#1

(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)

(728 pax)

W es tG LOC

(2743 pax)

T C B N#2


(728 pax)

T C B N#3


(728 pax)

T C B N#4


(728 pax)

T C B N#5


(728 pax)

T C B N#6


(728 pax)

T C B N#7


(728 pax)

T C B N#8


(559 pax)

NorthG LOC

(2743 pax)

T C B N#9


(728 pax)

T C B N#10


(728 pax)

T C B N#11


(728 pax)

T C B N#12


(559 pax)

Impact of OIF C ontracted S olutions

A ll C ontrac ted

9,103 S oldiers13 B attalions

46 7.5K P OL Truck C ompanies2,760 7.5K Tankers

Delivering fuel without using contractors would have required the Army to use 9,103 Soldiers and 2,760 of its 7,500gallon tankers—4 times the entire Army inventory.

LegendBN =BattalionBU =BuehringGLOC =GroundlineofcommunicationOIF =OperationIraqiFreedompax =PersonnelPOL =Petroleum,oils,andlubricantsQM =QuartermasterTC =TransportationCorpsTFS =TruckfillstandTrkCo=Truckcompany


In2002,Bagram’sdailycon-sumptionwas40,000gallonsperday;today,Bagramaccountsforapproximately500,000gallonsperday.Tomeetthisgrowingdemandinamultinationaloperatingenvi-ronmentinoneofthehardestgeo-graphicallocationsforimportingfuel,CENTCOM,incooperationwithitsstrategicpartners,hasestablishedanAfghanistanpetro-leumcapabilitiesposture,mutuallysupportedbytheUnitedStatesandNATO,tomeetthesustainmentrequirements.

PartneringWithJFC-BrunssumIn2008,CENTCOMpartnered

withNATO’sJointForcesCom-mand-Brunssum(JFC−B)tolever-agetheNATO-contractedcapabilitytosupportU.S.forcesinRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.ISAF,asaNATOcommandelement,remainsthesenioroperationalcom-mandinAfghanistan.Thecountrywasthendividedintofiveregionalcommands(North,South,East,West,andCapital/Center).[RegionalCommandSouth-Westhassincebeenadded.]

WhenitestablishedISAF,NATOtaskedJFC−BtoestablishafuelsupportplanforNATOforcesinAfghanistan.InsupportofthedeploymentofadditionalU.S.forcestoAfghanistanin2009,theCENTCOMdirectoroflogisticsdirectedtheuseoftheexistingJFC−BcontractstosupportU.S.forcesinRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.Thisdecisionwasbasedonseveralfactors,including—oTheneedtodemonstrateU.S.supportofthealliance

effort.oTheneedtoprovideflexibilityinsustainment

(employingmultiplecommercialsuppliers).oTheinclusionofcontractor-providedstorageinthe

JFC−Bcontract.oThepre-existingNATOcontractorpresencein

RegionalCommandsSouthandWest.oTheofferoftheNATOcontractortodistributetobat-

talionFOBs,therebyreducingtherequirementformilitaryfueltrucks.Thisalliancerelationshipensuredthatthe300-per-

centincreaseinU.S.fuelrequirementsduring2008and2009wasmetwithoutaffectingtheverydynamicopera-tionalpostureforRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.CENTCOM’smutuallysupportingCJOApetroleumarrangementwithDESC(theU.S.nationalprovider)andJFC−B(theNATOprovider)combinedthebest

ofeachagency’scapabilitiestomeettheever-shiftingpetroleumrequirements.ThisnationalandinternationalstrategicpetroleumconstructwillcontinuetoevolveandchangeovertimetomeettheU.S.andNATO/ISAFcommanders’strategicgoalsandposture.

CENTCOMwillcontinuetoseekadditionalsemi-permanentandpermanentU.S.andcontractedfuelstorageinordertomitigaterisksfromdisruptionofthedistributionsystemandimprovequalitycontrolofstoredfuel.CENTCOMhasbegunthisprocesswithDESCandJFC−Bandwillcontinuetohoneitsbattle-fieldsupport.AstheresponsibledrawdownofU.S.forc-esinIraqcontinues,CENTCOMwillcapturelessonslearnedandapplybestpracticesinfuelsupply,storage,anddistributiontoensureoutstandingsupporttotheSoldiers,Marines,Sailors,andAirmeninAfghanistan.

colonel jeffrey B. carra waS the chief of the joint petroleUM office, j−4, U.S. central coMManD, when he cowrote thiS article. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy war colleGe anD holDS a MaSter’S DeGree in aDMiralty law froM tUlane UniverSity.

chief warrant officer 4 DaviD ray, USMc (ret.), iS the DefenSe loGiSticS aGency liaiSon to the U.S. Special operationS coMManD. he previoUSly ServeD aS a DefenSe enerGy SUpport center planner anD liaiSon aSSiGneD to the U.S. central coMManD j−4 anD the U.S. pacific coMManD j−4.

In 2007, U.S. Central Command partnered with the Defense Energy Support Center to shift most Afghanistan petroleum sustainment from the southern ground line of communication (GLOC), which enters Afghanistan from Pakistan, to the Northern Distribution Network, which enters from the Central Asian States.

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ieldManual3–0,Operations,definesretrogradeasan“organizedmovementawayfromtheenemy.”Inordertosettheconditionsforasuccessfulretrograde,Armyforcesmustreduce,ordrawdown,theiroperationsandlogisticsfootprintstothemaximumextentandasearlyintheprocessasfea-sible.Inastabilityoperation,whenArmyforcesleaveatheater,backfillbyacoalitionforcemaynotalwaysbepossible.Inthosecases,responsibilityforsecuritymaytransfertothehostnation’ssecurityforces,wheth-ertheyarearmy,police,orbordersecurityforces.Thistransferofsecurityresponsibilitymaytakeplaceinanunstableorfragilesecurityenvironment.

Withtheseconsiderationsinmind,Iwouldliketoaddressthelogistics-relatedtasksArmyforcesmustundertaketoconductasuccessfuldrawdownandretrograde.Specifically,Iwilldiscussthefollowingactionsfromalogisticsplanner’sviewpoint:avoid-ingnegativeimages;determiningwhattoretrograde;reducingcommodities,vehicles,andweaponssystems,both“white”and“green”;cleaningupbases;disposing

ofpersonalproperty;managingcontractor-controlledequipment;coordinatingtransportation,maintenance,andportoperations;disposingofbarriermaterials;andmanagingcontainers.Thebottomlineforthelogisti-cianisthattheconceptsdiscussedinthisarticleareeasytodescribe,buttheyareextremelydifficulttoimplementontheground.

AvoidingNegativeImagesThefirstandforemostconsiderationduringamili-

taryretrogradeistheriskofcreatingnegativeimages.Oneexampleofnegativeimagesgeneratedbyaretro-gradeoperationwastheabandonedvehiclesandwea-ponsystemsleftbehindinAfghanistanbytheSovietmilitaryattheendoftheiroccupationduringthelate1980sthatcontinuedtolitterthecountryside.

Toavoidsuchnegativeimages,logisticsplannersmustconsideramoreresource-intensiveretrogradeoperation.Theymustconsiderexpendingresourcestorecoverandretrogradeequipmentandsupplies,evenincaseswhereitisnoteconomicallyprudenttodoso,in

ExtractingArmyForcesFromtheField—ALogistician’sPerspective

by Lieutenant CoLoneL jerry b. steinKe, MnarnG

F

Spray foam is applied to the roof of a tent at the Contingency Operating Base Basra medical center in Iraq. Sprayfoamed tents are left in place upon base tranfer to the Government of Iraq. (Photo by SFC Jeffrey S. Mullet)


ordertoavoidleavingabandonedmilitaryequipmentandsuppliesstrewnacrossthecountrysidethatwouldprovideourenemieswithapropagandaopportunity.

DeterminingWhattoRetrogradeAnothercriticaltaskisidentifyingwhattoretro-

grade.Notwithstandingtheriskofnegativeimagescreatedbyabandonedequipmentandsupplies,theplannermuststillconsiderthecost,inresourcesandmanpower,ofacompleterecoveryandretrograde.

Tothemaximumextentpossible,unitsshouldcon-sumesuppliesandnotreplenishtheminthemonthsleadinguptothefinalretrograde,includingclassesI(subsistence),II(clothingandindividualequipment),III(petroleum,oils,andlubricants),V(ammunition),andIX(repairparts)andbottledwater.Leadersmustensurethattheirunitsareaggressivelyreducingstock-agelevelsandallowingnormalconsumptiontodrawdowntheremainingsupplies.

Whenunitsaremaintainingsupplysupportactivi-ties(SSAs),carefulconsiderationshouldbegiventoconsolidatingandclosingthem.LinesmaybedrawndowntozerobalancesandexcesssuppliesretrogradedduringthetimeleadinguptotheclosingoftheSSA.EvenasanSSAhasitslinesreducedtozerobal-ances,usingunitscanstillordertheirsuppliesandpartsthroughtheSSA’sStandardArmyRetailSupplySystemcomputer,withsuppliescomingfromacen-tralSSA.Insuchcases,theSSAcontinuestoactasarequisitionandturn-inpoint,acceptingnon-mission-essentialsuppliesandequipmentfromcustomerunitsforretrogradeandreceivingsuppliespushedfromthecentralSSAtotheusers.Thepolicyforturn-inofsup-pliesmustbeliberal—thatis,easytocomplywith—inordertoencouragecustomerunitstobringtheirexcesssupplyitemstotheSSAratherthanabandonthem.

Commandersmustbewillingtoacceptsomeoper-ationalriskduringthesupplydrawdown.Onesuchriskisacceptingalongerresponsetimeinreactingtoinsur-gentactivityorhost-nationrequestsforlogisticsassis-tancebecausefewersuppliesareontheground.Lowerstockagelevelsforcommoditiessuchasfuelandammu-nitionmaybeacceptable,providedthosecommoditiescanbepushedquicklyintheeventofanemergency.Toreducerisk,U.S.forcescanmaintainacentralizedlogisticsbaseinthevicinityoftheportofembarkationthatcanprovideemergencyairresupply.Thekeyistoreducestockagelevelstothemaximumextentpossibleandasearlyaspossiblebeforefinalretrograde.

Reducing“White”EquipmentThenextconsiderationisidentifyingwhatequip-

mentmaybeleftbehindbasedoneconomicconsider-ations.“White”(commercialoff-the-shelf)equipmentmaybemanageddifferentlyfrom“green”(specificallydesignedformilitarypurposes)equipment.Examples

ofwhiteequipmentincludecomputers,televisions,washingmachines,andnon-tacticalvehicles(NTVs).Becausewhiteequipmentdoesnothavedistinctmili-tarymarkings,itcanbetransferredtothehostnationwithoutcreatingthenegativepublicperceptioncausedbyleavinggreenequipmentbehind.

Plannersmustconductacost-benefitanalysisofwhiteequipment.ShouldU.S.forcesconsumetheirlimitedtransportationassetstoretrogradesuchequip-ment,whichmayalreadybeneartheendofitslifeexpectancy,tothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)oranothertheater?Orshouldtheytransferittothehostnation?Inadditiontothecostsofrepairing,pack-aging,andtransportingwhiteequipment,anotherfac-torisitscompatibilitywithU.S.electrical,safety,andenvironmentalstandards.InthecaseofNTVs,assum-ingthevehiclesmeetU.S.safetyandenvironmentalstandards,thecostofretrogradeandresetwillmostlikelyexceedthevehicles’fairmarketvalue.

Plannersneedtotakeahardlookatcostversusbenefitwhenitcomestodecidingwhatusedwhiteequipmentshouldberetrograded.Ifthecosttoretro-gradeapproachestheequipment’sresidualvalue,thenitshouldbetransferredtothehost-nationgovernment.Leaderscanworkwiththehostnationtocoordinatewherethisequipmentcanbestagedforsubsequenttransfer.Contractedlabor,drawntothemaximumextentfromthehostnation’slaborpool,canprovidesecurityandmaintenanceservicesforthesesystemsinstagingareastoensuretheyarefullymissioncapa-bleonthedateoftransfer.Thehostnationshouldberesponsibleforanymaintenanceaftertransfer.

Reducing“green”EquipmentInthecaseofclassV,unitsshouldconductinspec-

tionsforserviceability.Ifammunitionisunservice-able,itshouldbedisposedofinplaceratherthanretrograded.Ifthelocaldefenseforcesusethesametypeofammunitionandareconsideredreliable,transferringserviceableammunitiontothemshouldbeconsidered.RatherthanretrogradingserviceableammunitiontoCONUS,considerationshouldbegiventoestablishingatheaterammunitionholdingareaorretrogradingittoanothertheater.Finally,aswithotherclassesofsupply,theflowofclassVintothetheatershouldbeturnedoffasearlyaspossibleandammu-nitionconsumedtodrawdownstockagelevelsandavoidhavingtoretrogradelargequantities.

ClassVII(majorenditems)requiresspecialcon-siderationinretrogradeplanning.Forgreenequipment,caremustbetakentopreservesufficientcombatpowerthroughthecloseoftheretrogradeoperationinordertoprovideadequateforceprotection.ClassVIIsystemsthattheplannershouldconsiderkeepingintheateruntilthefinalechelonsdepartincludematerials-handlingequipment(MHE),transportationassets,andforce

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

protectionequipment.However,commandersmustbewillingtotakesomeoperationalriskinordertodrawdownthe“mountain”ofequipmentU.S.forcestypi-callyhavewiththem,aswasthecaseinIraqatthecloseof2009.

Sincewheeledweaponsystems,suchasmine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclesandM1151up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles,canmoveontheirown,plannersshouldconsiderret-rogradingthebulkoftheirheaviertrackedsystemsearlierintheoperation.Areserveofheavyweaponsystems,suchasAbramstanks,Bradleyfightingvehicles,andhowitzers,maybestagedinthevicinityoftheportofembarkationtomitigaterisks.Forthesesystemstobeavailableinanemergency,plannersmustensurethatadequateheavyequipmenttransportersareavailabletomovethem.

ClassVIIgreenequipmentcanbesortedforretro-gradebasedonwhetherornotitwillreturntohomestation(earlyretrogradeequipment)orenteranArmy-managedresetprogram.TheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)managesresetprogramsandmaybetaskedtoaccepttheseselectedsystemsintheater,takingthemofftheunit’spropertybook.ItisthenAMC’sresponsi-bilitytoretrogradethisequipment.

Unitscanturnintheater-providedequipmenttoanin-theater,AMC-operatedredistributionpropertyaccountabilityteam(RPAT)“yard”fordisposition.Forlargeunits,amobileRPATcantraveltotheunit’slocationandtakepossessionofthetheater-providedequipmenttobeturnedinonsite.AMCisthenresponsibleformaintenanceandretrograde.

Duringthisretrogradeprocess,leadersmustbeflex-ibleconcerningthemaintenancereadinessofequip-mentbeingturnedin.“Asiscomplete”shouldbeconsideredasthestandardforunitsturninginequip-menttoanRPATyardforretrograde.ClassIIIleaksshouldbeapriorityinordertogetequipmentthroughU.S.Customsandontosealift.

MHEiscriticaltoasuccessfuldrawdownandretrogradeandmustbekeptforwardtotheveryendofoperationsineacharea.Sincekeepingthisequipmentmissioncapablemaybedifficultbecauseofalackofrepairparts,unitsmayhavetoresorttocontrolledsubstitutionorcannibalizationtomaintainaminimumquantityoffunctionalMHE.Anotheroptioniscon-tractingforMHE,ifavailable.

Myfirsthandexperienceisthatwarfightersareloathtosurrenderanyoftheirrollingstockandweaponsystems.Theygenerallywanttokeepthisequipmentuntiltheirunitsredeployratherthanretrogradingittomeetaschedulethatdoesnottaxavailabletransportationassets.

However,classVIIitemscannotallbetransportedonthefinaldayofoperations;theymustbedrawndownoveraperiodoftimethatavailabletransportationassetscansupport.Logisticiansmustadvisetheirleadersof

theimportanceofenforcingaretrogradescheduleforclassVIIthatissupportable—whichmeansenforcingtimelyturn-inofequipmentbywarfighters.Leaders,withassistancefromplanners,mustsetbothnear-term(monthly)goalsandend-stategoalsforthedrawdownofequipmentandsuppliesandthenholdsubordinatecommandersresponsibleformeetingthosegoals.

ClassIXitemsrepresentachallengeforthelogis-ticsplannerduringretrogradeoperations.Itisimper-ativetodrawdownsupplies.However,asstockagelevelsaredrawndown,systemsthatbecomenotmis-sioncapable(NMC)awaitingpartswillremainNMCforlongertimeperiodsbecauseofthelongerleadtimesrequiredtoreceiverepairparts.

Threemethodsareavailabletomitigatethisprob-lem.First,atransportationprioritysystemcanbeimplementedthatallowsleaderstoplaceahigherprior-ityoncertainrepairpartsrequiredforcriticalsystems.Second,themaintenanceactivitycanbeauthorizedtomaintainalargeramountofshopstockforcertaincriti-calsystems,suchasMHEandtransporters.Third,thevarietyofsystemsthathavethesamecapability,suchasdifferentversionsoftheMRAP,canbedrawndown.

CleaningUpBasesAsapartoftheretrogradeprocess,logisticians

workcloselywiththeengineerswhohaveprimaryresponsibilityforbaseclosureandtransfer.“Baseclo-sure”occurswhenU.S.forcesrelinquishcontrolofthelandtothelandowner,withnohost-nationforcesoccu-pyingit.“Basetransfer”occurswhenU.S.forcesrelin-quishcontrolofthebasetohost-nationforces,whowillcontinuetooperatethebase.Itisprudenttoreturnabasethatisfullyfunctionaltothehostnation’ssecurityforces.Inthisway,thehost-nationforcescanimmedi-atelyconductoperationsinsupportoftheU.S.forces,whichareconcentratingondrawdownandretrograde.

Becauseofthenumberofstepsandthetimeinvolvedinclosingortransferringabase,plannersmustadoptaclosureortransferscheduleasearlyaspossible,givingthebattlespaceowner(BSO)timetoproperlycompletetheprocess.TheBSOshouldsched-ulebaseclosuresortransfersoveraperiodoftime—severalmonths,forexample—ratherthanconductingallofthematonce.Thisavoidstherequirementtosurgetransportationassets;availabilityoftransporta-tionisalwaysalimitingfactor.

Engineersleadthebaseclosureortransfereffort,andlogisticiansworkcloselywiththemtoprovidesupport.Baseclosureortransferrequiresthefollowingmajorstepso Determininglegalownershipoftheland.o Completinganenvironmentalsurveyofthesite.o Removinganddisposingofsolidwaste.o Closinganyhazardouswastewaterlagoons.o Closinganyincinerators.


o Closinganyfiringranges.o Conductinganinventoryofrealproperty

(permanentstructures).o Conductinganinventoryofpersonalproperty.o Accountingforandremovingcontainers.o Removingpersonalpropertythatwillnotbetrans-

ferredtothehost-nationgovernment.Theamountoftimeinvolvedincompletingthese

stepswillvarydependingonthesizeofthebaseandenvironmentalissues.U.S.policyistoturnoverabasethatmeetsapplicableenvironmentalstandards;anyenvironmentalremediationtakestimeandresources.Plannersshouldconsidergranting“amnesty”tounitsandindividualsduringthebasecleanupperiodtoencouragetenantunitstoturninallexcesssuppliesandequipmentthathavenotbeenbroughttorecord.

DisposingofPersonalPropertyLogisticiansmanagedispositionofpersonalprop-

ertyonbasesbeingclosedortransferred.Ifabaseistobeclosed,100percentofthepersonalpropertymustberemoved.Ifabaseisbeingtransferredtothehostnation,leadersmustdeterminewhatpersonalpropertywillbetransferredtothehostnationandwhatwillberetrogradedorotherwisedisposedof.Ifthebaseisbeingtransferred,itisprudenttotransferasufficientamountofpersonalpropertysothehost-nationforcescancontinuetooperatethebasewithoutinterruption.

Typicalexamplesofpersonalpropertytobeconsi-deredfortransferwiththebaseincludeconcretebun-kers,concreteT-walls,otherbarriermaterials,guardtowers,troophousingsuchastentsorcontainerizedhousingunits,latrines,showerunits,generatorsandpowerdistributionsystems,structuresandscannersusedatentrycontrolpoints,otherportablebuildings,heating,airconditioning,andventilationsystems,fueltanks,watertanks,waterdistributionsystems,waterheaters,andfurniture.

InIraq,itisimpracticalanduneconomicaltomovetentsthathavebeen“sprayfoamed”toaddinsula-tion,reduceenergyconsumption,andimprovetrooplivingconditions.Thesetentsareconvertedfromper-sonalpropertytorealpropertywhenthesprayfoamisinstalledandremainwiththebaseuponthebase’stransfertothehostnation.

Beforeconductingajointinventorywithhost-nationrepresentatives,theBSOresponsibleforbasetransfermustconductathoroughinventoryofthebaseandverifythatallpersonalpropertyisdocumentedontheBSO’spropertybook.Ifnot,theBSOmustbringallfound-on-installation(FOI)propertytorecord.

FOIpropertyrepresentsahugeproblemfortheBSOresponsibleforbaseclosureortransfer.Incasesofoperationsthathavebeenconductedforanumberofyears,asinIraq,largeamountsofunclaimedequip-mentmayneedtobebroughttorecord.Leadersmust

becomeinvolvedinthisissueandensurethatsubordi-natecommandersarebringingFOItorecord.

Oncethishasbeencompleted,leadersthencandeterminewhichpersonalpropertyshouldbenomi-natedfortransferwiththebasetothehost-nationforces.Thispropertymaybelabeledasforeignexcesspersonalproperty(FEPP).TheBSOmustthensubmithislistofnominatedFEPPthroughthechainofcom-mandandsecureapprovalforitstransfer.

Beforeconductingtheinitialjointinventorywiththehost-nationrepresentativebeforeabasetransfer,theBSOshouldretrogradeallpersonalpropertythathasnotbeenapprovedasFEPP.Inthecaseofexpen-sive,high-demandequipmentsuchasgenerators,theBSOshouldconductanyplannedexchange(replacingnewornearlynewequipmentwitholdersubstitutes)beforeconductingthejointinspection.

Itisimportanttonotcreateanexpectationintheeyesofhost-nationofficialsconductingthejointinspectionthattheywillbereceivingnewerequipmentthattheBSOplanstoreplacebeforetransfer.Leadersmustensurethathost-nationofficialsunderstandthatanyequipmentmaintenancerequiredaftertransferissolelytheresponsibilityofthehostnation.Ifthehost-nationentitythatwilltakeoverthebasehaslittleornoknowledgeorexperiencewithbasemaintenanceoperations,theBSOshouldoffertrainingonhowtomaintainthebaseaftertransfer.

Atthispoint,alloftheequipmentidentifiedasexcess—thatis,equipmentnolongerneededandnotnominatedasFEPP—mustbeeitherretrogradedordisposedofonsite.TheBSOthenwillhavetoundertakeafinancialliabilityinvestigationforprop-ertylosstodocumenttheFEPP,recognizeitslosstotheUnitedStates,andremovethoseitemsfromtheBSO’spropertybook.Duringonedeployment,com-mandersinIraqwereauthorizedtotransferupto$30millionworthofFEPPtotheGovernmentofIraqforeachbasebeingtransferred.Thisprocessisrepeatedoneachbaseasthedrawdowncontinuesandbasesaretransferred.Depreciatedvalue,notacquisitionvalue,isusedincalculatingthevalueofFEPP.

ConductingacompleteandaccurateinventoryofallofthepersonalandrealpropertyonabasemostlikelywillbebeyondthecapabilityofaBSO.Thelogisticsplannershouldconsiderorganizinganddeployingteamsofpropertybookandsupplysubject-matterexpertstothebasessubjecttoclosureortransfertoassisttheBSOwiththisprocess.InIraq,thiscapabilityhasbeencon-tracted.Theseteamshavebeenatremendousassetinthebaseinventoryprocess,speedinguptheprocessandprovidingaccurateandcompleteinventories.

ManagingContractorEquipmentOnepotentialproblemisdeterminingtheownership

ofequipmentcontrolledbycontractorsonabase.This


equipmentmaybeownedbythecontractor,oritmaybecontractor-managedGovernment-owned(CMGO)equip-ment.Toproveownership,thecontractorshouldmaintainpropertybookslistingequipmentownedbytheU.S.Gov-ernment(CMGO)andequipmentownedbythecontractor.Anycontractor-controlledequipmentnotappearingonthecontractor’spropertybookshouldbebroughttorecordasFOIpropertybelongingtotheU.S.Government.

Thelogisticsplannermustalsoexaminebaselifesupportservicecontractsonthebases,suchaslaundryandsecurityservices(ataskoftenoverlookedbytheBSO.)ThisistruewhetherthebaseisservicedthroughtheLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramorindi-vidualcontractsoriginallyinitiatedthroughthepur-chaserequestandcommitmentprocess.Ineithercase,theBSOmustidentifyallcurrentservicecontracts,includingtheunitmanagingthecontract,thescopeofservices,andtheserviceterminationdates.

TheBSOmustrevieweachcontracttodeterminethemethodfornoticeofterminationandthenpro-videthisnoticetothecontractors.ThepurposeofthisreviewistoavoidobligatingtheU.S.GovernmenttocontinuetopayforservicesonabasethattheUnitedStatesnolongercontrolsoruses.

Duringpreparationsforclosureortransfer,therelikelywillbeasurgeofwork,toincludepreparingandupload-ingequipmentthatwillberetrogradedandbasecleanup.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatcontractsareinplacetosupportthismanpowerandequipmentsurge.TheBSOmustensurethatanysolidwasteisproperlydisposedofbeforeclosureortransfer.Tosynchronizethethemesandmessagesofanorderlytransfer,thebasemustappearinacleanandorderlystateonthedateofclosureortransferinordertoavoidnegativemediaattention.

Tothisend,theBSOmustdocumentthefinalcon-ditionofthebasebytakingphotographsofthebuildingsandgroundsjustbeforetransferandeveninvitingmediatothebasetotakephotographsandviewitscondition.Then,ifthehostnationdoesnotcloselycontrolthebaseafterthetransferandthebase’scontentsareransackedbylocalnationals,U.S.forcescanprovethatthishap-penedafterthetransferandnotbefore.

Forforceprotectionreasons,itmaybenecessarytoevacuatecontractedlaborinphases,andinadvanceofU.S.forcesleaving,sothatonthedateoftransferorclosure,allcontractorshavealreadybeenevacuated.LogisticsplannersmustdevelopandexecutelogisticssupportplanstousemilitarypersonneltosupportthetroopsremainingonabasetotheverylastdayofU.S.occupation.Thiswillcauselogisticssupporttobecomeveryaustere(thatis,“expeditionary”)inthefinalstag-esofU.S.occupation.

CoordinatingTransportationTransportationisclearlythelimitingfactorforbase

closureandtransferandretrogradeoperations.The

closuresandtransferswilltakeplaceonlyasfastasthetransporterscanretrogradecontainersandequip-menttotheportsofembarkation.PlannersmustensurethatadequatetransportationandMHEassetsareavailablethroughtheconclusionofretrogradeoperations.Onthefinaldayofabase’soccupation,U.S.forcesmustbeabletomoveoutinasinglelift.

Leadersmustrequiretheirsubordinatecommand-erstoestablishandexecuteaggressiveplans,includingmonthlyandend-stategoals,forretrogradingexcessclassVIIequipmentandsuppliesasearlyaspos-sible.Waitinguntilthelastminutetoretrogradelargeamountsofrollingstockandheavypiecesofequip-mentinvitesmissionfailure.Commanderscanmiti-gatesomeoftheoperationalriskbymaintainingrapidreactionforcesandacloseairsupportumbrellaandbycoordinatingwithhost-nationforcestoprovideatleastsomeoftherequiredforceprotection.

Evenduringadrawdown,themaintenancemissionmustcontinue.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatade-quatemaintenancesupportisavailableinordertokeepequipmentmissioncapable.Self-containedmobilemain-tenanceteamscansetupintemporaryshelterswiththeirownpowersupply,tools,benchstock,andshopstocktoconductmaintenanceoperationsasrequired.Oneseri-ousissuewillbetheinabilitytosecurerepairpartsinatimelymanner.Controlledsubstitutionandevencanni-balizationmayhavetobeauthorized.

Becausethelogisticsplannermaybefacingavir-tual“mountain”ofsupplies,vehicles,weaponsystems,containers,andotherpiecesofequipmenttoretrogradebysealift,developingadequateportfacilitieswillbecriticaltoretrogradesuccess.Theplannerthereforemustidentifyallpotentialseaportsthatcanbeusedandthenrequestuseofthoseportsthroughthehostnation.Morethanoneportforretrogradewillimprovethroughputandreduceoperationalrisk.Afternegotia-tionsfortheseportsarecomplete,plannersthenmustallocatetimeandresourcestoimprovetheportsandstagingareas,includingsecurityinfrastructure,sterileyards,maintenancestructures,communications,powergeneration,washracks,andloadingequipment.

Plannersmaylooktousingcontractors,includinglocalnationalcontractors,formaintenanceofthestagedequipment,portsecurity,andportoperations.BecauseofthebottleneckU.S.forceswillfaceattheseaportsbecauseofalackofsufficienttransportationassetsandportfacilities,itmaytakeseveralmonthsorevenyearstoretrogradealloftheselectedequipmentandsuppliesbacktoCONUSforresetandredistribution.

DisposingofBarrierMaterialsDispositionofclassIVconstructionandbarrier

materialsisaspecialproblemintheretrogradepro-cess.Thesematerialsincludeprecastconcretebunkers,T-walls,andotherbarriermaterials.Thecostofhandling


andtransportingtheseitemswillfarexceedtheirfair-marketvalue;sufficienttransportationassetsmostlikelywillnotbeavailabletoretrogradethem;andbecauseofimportrestrictions,theseitemsprobablywillhavetoremainincountry.Themostpracticalcourseofactionistoturntheseitemsovertothehostnation,leavingthemintheircurrentlocationsorasclosebyaspossible.

Asanalternative,technologydoesexisttocrushprecastconcrete.Therebarfoundinsidecanberecycled,andthecrushedconcretecanbeusedforroadwaysandotherconstructionapplications.Themachineryforcrushingtheprecastconcretecanbemovedfrombasetobasetocompletethismission.Suchaneffortwilltakeasignificantamountoftimeandexpenseandwillhavetobeundertakenandcom-pletedbycontractorsafterthedepartureofU.S.forces.

Usinglocalnationallabortothemaximumextentpossibleforthistaskwillprovidejobsandhaveaposi-tiveimpactonthelocaleconomy.However,thiswillonlybefeasibleifthesecuritysituationallowsit.Con-sideringthecostofmanufacturingthesestructures,host-nationleadersmaywanttostageorstorethemforpossiblefutureuseinforceprotection.

ManagingContainersNodiscussionofretrogradeoperationswouldbe

completewithoutaddressingcontainers.Containerman-agementtakesconsiderablemanpowerandresources.Asbasescloseandtransfer,theBSOwillhavetodealwithallofthecontainersinhisbattlespace.TheBSOmusthaveproceduresinplace,alongwithadequatetrainedmanpower,toaccomplishthefollowingtasks:

Identify all containers on each base.Enterthisinformationintothecontainermanagementsystemtodeterminestatusandownership(militaryowned,leasedfromcontractor,contractorowned).Ensurethatleasedcontainershavepriorityforretrogradetoavoidorreducepenalties.

For containers with no discernable owner, open them and inventory the contents. Sort,package,andretrogradeallserviceablesupplyitemsforreturntotheArmysupplysystem.TurninallunserviceableitemstothedesignatedDefenseReutilizationandMarket-ingServicesite.InIraq,mobileredistributionteams(MRTs)visitbasestoassisttheBSOswiththismas-sivejob.Theteamsincludespecialistsintheareasofsupply,maintenance,andtransportation.Whencombinedwithanofferof“amnesty,”theMRTisanextremelyeffectivetoolforpolicingupandturninginexcesssupplies,equipment,andcontainers.

Inspect each container to determine its condition, including whether or not it is seaworthy.TeamstrainedinaccordancewiththeInternationalConventionforSafeContainerscarryoutthismanpower-intensivetask.Inthecaseofacontainerthatisnotseaworthy,theinspectorsdetermineifitcanberepaired.Ifitcannotbe

repaired,itisacandidateforlocaldispositionwhennolongerrequiredformilitaryuse.Ifthecontainercanberepairedeconomically,itmustberetrogradedtoacon-tainerrepairpoint.Thisrepairmissionmaybeaccom-plishedusinglocalnationalcontractedsupport.

Empty, serviceable containers must be retrograded to an empty container control point for further use.

ThesetasksareusuallymanagedbytheBSO’scontainercontrolofficer.Containersrequireintensivemanagement.Aswithrollingstock,theBSOmaynotbemotivatedtogooutintohisbattlespaceandidentifyandinventoryallofthecontainersfoundthere.ThemorecontainerstheBSOfinds,themoreworkhecre-atesfortheSoldiers—becauseallofthismaterielmustbeinventoried,sorted,packaged,anddisposedof.ThisiswhyemploymentofMRTsissoimportant.

TheBSOmustverifythatalltenantunitsonthebasehaveadequatenumbersofserviceablecontainerstoretrogradetheirequipment.ThelogisticsplannermustensurethateachBSOisgrantedtheauthoritytorequirealltenantunitsonthebasetofullyparticipateinthecontainermanagementprogram.Thisauthorityisneces-sarytoavoidgapsincoverageonthebaseandtoensurethatallcontainersareinventoriedandinspected.

Equipmentandsupplyretrogrademustbesynchro-nizedtopersonnelflow.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatlogisticsunitsandteamsareadequatelymannedtosupportongoinglogisticsservicesduringthedrawdown,includingmaintenanceassistanceteams,containerrepairteams,mobileredistributionteams,propertyaccountabilityteams,transporters,andU.S.Customsinspectionteams.

Plannersandleadersmustbeflexibleinhowtheyusethismanpower.Oneapproachistomovetheseteamsbasedonthebaseclosureortransferschedule.Plannersshouldconsiderusinglocalnationalcontractsupporttosurgealloftheseservices.

Thebottomlineisthat,inordertoensurethatthemaximumamountofArmymaterielispreservedandretrograded,transportationassetsarenotoverwhelmedinthefinalphaseoftheretrograde,andU.S.forcesprojecttotheworldaresponsibleandorderlyretro-grade,leadersatalllevelsmustaggressivelyexecutethedrawdownofmaterielinanorderlyanddisciplinedmannerandasearlyintheprocessaspossible.

lieUtenant colonel jerry B. SteinKe, MnarnG, waS the aSSiStant chief of Staff, G−4, of the 34th in fantry DiviSion, DUrinG hiS DeployMent to iraq. he iS a GraDUate of the arMor officer BaSic coUrSe, the coMBineD arMS anD ServiceS Staff School, the SUp port operationS coUrSe, anD the coMManD anD General Staff officer coUrSe. an attorney in private practice, he holDS a B.S. DeGree in eDUcation froM BeMiDji State UniverSity, a MaSter of ManaGeMent anD aDMiniStration DeGree froM Metropolitan State UniverSity, anD a jUriS Doctor DeGree froM williaM Mit chell colleGe of law.

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

incethebeginningofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)7yearsago,contractorshaveparticipatedasforcemultiplierstooffsetthelogisticsbur-dencreatedbycontinuousU.S.militaryoperations.Throughouttheoperation,skepticshavearguedthatcontractorsdonothingmorethanwastemoneyfromtaxpayersandourGovernment.Thismisconceptionandalackofproperunderstandingoftheroleofcon-tractorsultimatelyslowsdownandinterruptssupporttothewarfighter.TheArmyneedstheexpertiseofcontractorsmorethaneverduringtheOIFdrawdown.Thisarticleprovidesasnapshotoftherelationshipbetweenmilitarypersonnelandcontractorsandunder-scorestheimportanceofreconcilingtherelationshipbetweenthetwo.

AgoodWorkingRelationshipApartnershipisformedwhencontractorsaccompa-

nyU.S.forcesduringcontingenciesandhumanitarianmissions.FieldManual(FM)3–100.21,ContractorsontheBattlefield,states,“Whilecontractorsconsistentlysupportdeployedarmedforces,commandersneedtofullyunderstandtheirroleinplanningforandmanag-ingcontractorsonthebattlefieldandtoensurethattheirstaffistrainedtorecognize,planfor,andimple-mentcontractorrequirements.”Thisstatementistrue;however,maintainingagoodworkingrelationshipwiththecontractorshouldbekeptinmind,too.

Workingwithcontractorsisnotrocketscience,butunderstandingtheirpurposeandtreatingthemasiftheyarepartofamilitaryunitissignificant.Failingto

FosteringagoodRelationshipWithContractorsontheBattlefield

by Master serGeant arthur harris, jr., usa (ret.)

S


understandtheimportanceofcontractorsupportcanleadtopotentialproblems.

Intheir2005book,Resolving Conflicts at Work: Eight Strategies for Everyone on the Job,KenClokeandJoanGoldsmithoutline“unclearrolesandresponsibilities”asasourceofworkplaceconflict.ClokeandGoldsmithwritethatthefirststrategyinresolvingconflictistotransform“thecultureandcontextofconflict”intheorganization.TheArmyneedschangeagentstoalterthemindsetofSoldierstowardworkingwithciviliancontractors.Chang-ingthismindsetwillrequireSoldiersandleaderstounderstandtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesaswellasthoseofcontractedlogisticians.

UnderstandingRolesInorderforSoldierstoknowthecontractors’cur-

rentroleinatheaterofoperations,theymustunder-standthedifferencebetweenaugmentationsupportandoperationalcontrol(OPCON).Undertheaugmentationsupportrole,militaryfunctionalareasaresupplement-edwithciviliancontractorswhoperformfunctionsandservicesspecifiedbytheGovernment.However,thecontractormaintainssupervisionofallprimeandsub-

sidiarycontractedemployees.InanOPCONenvironment,thecontrac-torhastotaloperationalcontrolinperformingfunctionsandservicesspecifiedbytheGovernment.Thecontractorisresponsibleforalltechnicalaspectsofthemissionaswellasadministrativemattersforallcivilianemployees.

WhatSoldiersoftenfailtounder-standisthatcontractoremployeesaresupervisedbycontractorman-agersandnotbythemilitary.Thisadministrativecontrolofemployeesisprobablythemostsignificantmisunderstandinginmilitaryandcontractorrelationships.

WhiledeployedtoIraq,IfoundtheOPCONroleofcontractorsdif-ficultforSoldierstohandle.Theydidnotapproveofhavingcontrac-torsinchargeofmostsustainmentfunctionalareas.Egoshavenoplaceinanenvironmentthatsup-portsongoingcontingenciesand

combatoperationsbecausetheywillsurelycauseadelayinsupporttothewarfighter.Failuretocommuni-cateproperlywithcontractorsinOPCONrolescreatesadditionalworkandunwarrantedworkplaceconflicts.Theseactionscanalsocausethecancellationofgoodsandservices.

UnderstandingResponsibilitiesDuringOIF09–11,Isawmultiplechangestoa

LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP)requirementbecausemilitaryleadersrefusedtoaccepttheadviceofcontractorsinahighlyvisiblefunctionalarea.Failingtoallowcontractorstoper-formwithintheperformanceworkstatement(PWS)causedresistance,whichresultedinunfulfilledrequirementsformultipleunitrotations.Muchtime,money,andmanpowerwerewastedwhenmilitaryleadersrefusedtolistentocontractors.

Inordertoavoidmisunderstandingsthatcancauseproblemsincontractoversight,leadersshouldspendmoretimefamiliarizingthemselvesandtheirSoldierswiththecontractor’sPWS.FM3–100.21statesthataPWS“definesthegovernment’srequirementsinclear,conciselanguageidentifyingspecificworktobeaccomplishedandincorporatedintothecontract.The...[PWS]isthecontractor’smissionstatement.”AlthoughaPWScanbevague,unitsmustnotreadintocontractorperformancerequirements.Thecus-tomercannotdirectthatthecontractorperformtaskswithoutauthorizationfromawarrantedcontractingofficeroradministrativecontractingofficer.

ThebiggestchallengetheArmyfacesisgettingunitstoreadandcomplywiththelargestPWSintheater,LOGCAPTaskOrder159.Thetaskorderstatesthatthecontractorwillprovidebaselifesup-port,corpslogisticsservicessupport,andtheatertransportationthroughouttheMulti-NationalForce-Iraqareaofoperations.FailuretounderstandthePWScanleadunitstosubmitunfoundedviolationsthatstraintheirrelationshipswithcontractors.Thisstrainedrelationshipisamajorareaofconcerninthetheaterofoperations.

Educationisthefoundation;theprocessmustbeginwithcommandersandfilterdowntotheresponsiblepersonnel.Ascustomers,Soldiersshouldhaveasolidunderstandingofwhatservicesthecontractorprovides.WhereSoldiersgowrongiswhentheydecidetotellthecontractorhowtodothework.Theresultiscon-flictbetweentheparties.

ContractOversightandEvaluationSoldiersseekingcontractors’supportshouldnever

tellthecontractorhowtoperformaserviceorfunc-tion.However,ifthecontractorisnotperformingwith-inthePWS,toolsareavailabletoassistorganizationsinproperlyevaluatingcontractorperformance.

A KBR subcontractor with Prime Project International begins his shift at the main laundry facility at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. (Photo by Galen Putnam, 402d Army Field Support Brigade.)

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ImproperoversightofcontractperformancehascosttheGovernmentmillionsofdollars.Itisimperativethatcontractingofficer’srepresentatives(CORs)pro-videproperoversightforthecontractstheyarerespon-sibleforandthattheyevaluatecontractorsbasedonperformanceandnotpersonalfeelingsorbiasestowardaparticularcontractor.TheGovernmententrustsCORstoproperlyassessanddocumentcontractorperfor-mance.Propermilitaryoversightminimizesconflictandistheonlywaythatthecontractorbecomesfullyintegratedinsupportingthewarfighter.

ThekeytothissuccessistheCOR,whoshouldbeasubject-matterexpertinthefunctionalareathathascontractorsupport.WhatIhavefoundisthatleadersareplacingunqualifiedpersonnelasCORsinareasthatwarrantsomeonewithanunderstandingofthatfunction.WhyplaceamechanicinasupplysupportactivityastheCORtooverseetheperformanceofacontractorwhenhisskillsetdoesnotmatchthecon-tractedfunction?Thisisadisasterwaitingtohappen,whichusuallyleadstoconflictbetweenthemilitaryandthatcontractorandultimatelyslowsdownorevenstopscertainoperations.

Basedonmyexperiences,Ibelievetheunitfailswhenitdoesnotappointtherightpersonattherighttimetooverseethatparticularfunctionalarea.ThatfailureworsenswhenCORslackbasiccontractingknowledgeormisinterpretthePWS,whichleadstoevaluationsthatarenotproperlyconstructed.Ultimate-ly,failingtoproperlyevaluateperformanceplacesanadditionalstrainontherelationshipwithcontractors.Thishasproventruewhenindividualshavetheirownagendasandrefusetounderstandtheimportanceofproperoversight.

EducationTheoneresourcethatcanmitigatepotentialissues

inmilitaryandcontractorrelationshipsiseducation.

Inthecomplexworldofcontracting,educationisimperativetoeffectivecontractoversight.Under-standingcontractsandcontractingprovidesopera-tionalcommanderswiththeflexibilitytodeterminewhenandwherecontractingisaviablewaytosatisfyunitneeds.Havingafullyeducatedunderstandingofcontractingpreventsaleaderfromcreatingsituationsdetrimentaltotheunit’srelationshipswithcontrac-tors.Leaderswhofailtoeducatethemselvesonthecontractingprocessruntheriskoflogisticsfailure.Inacontingencyenvironment,properlogisticssupportcanbeadecidingfactorbetweenthelifeordeathofourSoldiers.

Incontracting,unknownrolesandresponsibilitiescandamagetheworkingrelationshipbetweenmilitaryunitsandcontractorsonthebattlefield.Withoutsomeformofresolution,organizationsmayfailtoreachtheirintendedgoals.Themisconceptionofcontrac-tors’rolesandresponsibilitieshasoverwhelmedcom-mandersandotherleadersforyearsandhascreatedunduestressonthecontractorsobligatedtosupportthem.Confusionhasalsocausedseriouscost-controlandoversightissues.However,ifmilitaryleadersandcontractorsmitigatepotentialproblemsthroughopencommunicationandeducation(technicalandPWS-specific),abetterworkingrelationshipwillresult.

MaSter SerGeant arthUr harriS, jr., USa (ret.), ServeD aS the operational contractinG SUpport Branch noncoMMiSSioneD officerincharGe for the 10th SUStainMent BriGaDe DUrinG operation iraqi freeDoM 09–11. he holDS an M.a. DeGree in procUreMent anD acqUiSition froM weBSter UniverSity anD iS a Doctor of BUSineSS aDMiniStration canDiDate with northcentral UniverSity anD a GraDUate of the SerGeantS Major acaDeMy. he iS DeSiGnateD aS a DeMonStrateD MaSter loGiStician By Sole—the international Society of loGiSticS anD holDS certificationS in lifecycle loGiSticS, proGraM ManaGeMent, anD pUrchaSinG anD contractinG.

A KBR convoy leaves the convoy support center at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. (Photo by SPC Michael Camacho)


nitiativesdevelopedbyMajorGeneralJamesL.HodgewhilehewasthecommandinggeneraloftheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistribu-tionCommand(SDDC)identifiedtheneedtoprovidedeployingSoldiersandunitswithcriticalcontainermanagementtrainingbeforedeployment.SDDC’sGlob-alContainerManagementDivisionlaunchedadistancelearningmoduleinAugust2009toprovide“justintime”containermanagementtrainingtodeployingunits.

ThemodulewasbuiltthroughacollaborativeeffortamongtheArmyMedicalDepartmentCenterandSchool’sProductionandDevelopmentDivisionCenterforDistributedLearningatFortSamHouston,Texas;theArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand’sTrain-ingSupportDirectorateatFortLee,Virginia;andSDDC.ItwaslaunchedontheArmyTransportationCenterandSchoolwebsite.

PuttingthetrainingontheTransportationCenterandSchoolwebsitemakesitavailableatalllevelsacrosstheArmyandallowstheprogramtobereachedbymoreSoldiersfromawidervarietyofmilitaryoccupationalspecialties.Web-basedtrainingalsoreducestheneedtosendoutglobalcontainermanagementtrainingteamsorbringdeployingpersonneltoFortEustis,Virginia,tomeetdeploymenttrainingrequirements.

ConductingglobalContainerManagementTrainingOnline

I LeadersassignedtotheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)areaofresponsibilityhavebeenusingtheprogramasatrainingtoolforSoldiersneedingaccesstotheIntegratedBookingSystem-ContainerManagementModule(IBS–CMM).IBS–CMMisaweb-basedtooldesignedforeasyentryandretrievalofcontainermanagementinformation.Itisalsotheprogramusedtoprovideleaderswithvisibilityofcon-tainersinthetheaterandthroughouttheirlifecycle.

“Inthefield,thosewhohavealreadyconductedthetrainingciteitasavaluabletoolintheirexecutionandmanagementofcontainerassetsinthetheater,”saidKennethQueensberry,atraininganalystfortheTrainingSupportDirectorate.“ItwillsaveSoldiersvaluabletimeinpreparingfordeployment,”saidRobertFriedman,formersupervisoroftrafficmanagementforSDDC.“Nowunitscanspendmoretimewiththeirfamiliesbeforetheydeploywhilestilllearningtheskillsneces-sarytosuccessfullymanagetheircontainerassets.”

Amobilitynoncommissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC)tooktheonlineglobalcontainermanagementcourseandnotedthelackoftrainingthathasbeengiventoSoldierswhohavedeployedtotheCENT-COMareaofresponsibilitybeforethistrainingwasavailable.TheNCOICalsocommentedontheuseful-nessandSoldierfriendlinessofthetrainingmodule.

TheContainerManagementCourse,551_CMC–101N,canbeaccessedthroughtheArmyTransportationCenterandSchoolBlackboardwebsitelocatedathttps://trans.ellc.learn.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp.UsersmusthaveanAKO/DKOusernameandpassword.Afterloggingintothewebsite,clickthe“Community”tabandthentype“Container”intothe“OrganizationSearch”boxtotheleftsideofthescreentoaccessthetraining.Toenroll,selectthe“Enroll”button.

Soldierswhoenrollmustcompletea40-hourseriesofmodulesthatculminateswithanexam.FurtherinformationabouttheonlineContainerManagementCoursecanbeobtainedbysendinganemailtothomas.catchings@us.army.mil.

thoMaS catchinGS iS the proGraMS anD SySteM proGraM ManaGer for GloBal container ManaGeMent with the Military SUrface DeployMent anD DiStriBUtion coMManD. he holDS a B.a. DeGree froM alaBaMa State UniverSity anD iS a lean Six SiGMa BlacK Belt. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe’S civilian aDvanceD coUrSe, anD the civilian eDUcation SySteM foUnDation anD BaSic coUrSeS.

by thoMas CatChinGs

The Container Management Course is now available online through the Army Transportation Center and School Blackboard portal. The course provides information on the management and tracking of all containers carrying Department of Defense cargo moving in or outside of the Defense Transportation System from origin to destination and the return of emptied assets to their owners.

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

uringtimesofnaturalandmanmadedisasters,effectiveandefficientlogisticsoperationsbecomethelifebloodofsurvivorsandservetodirectlymitigatepain,suffering,andcollateraldam-age.Inalogisticallyperfectworld,interagencylogisti-cianswouldarriveatthesceneofadisasterandworktogetherseamlesslytoprovidehumanitarianassistancetosurvivors.Unfortunately,thatisnotthecasebecauseeachresponderorganization(largeandsmall)hasitsownwayofdoingbusiness.Thesedifferencesinoper-atingproceduresoftenresultinredundancy,supply-chainbottlenecks,andreducedorexcessservicesandsuppliestosurvivors.Trainingandworkingtogetherbeforethedisastercanimprovelogisticsprocessesandmakeinteragencylogisticiansmoreeffectiveinaidingsufferingpopulations.

Toimprovetrainingfordisasterlogistics,theArmyLogisticsUniversity(ALU)andtheFederalEmergen-cyManagementAgency(FEMA)havecollaboratedtodeveloptheInteragencyLogisticsCourse(ILC).Thiscoursefillsamuch-neededtrainingvoidindisasterlogisticsbyembeddingthe“wholeofGovernment”approachintoalogistics-basedcurriculumdesignedtotrainkeylogisticianstoworktogetherbeforeaneventtakesplace.FEMAisthecoursesponsor,andtheJointStaffJ–4istheseniormentor.

ChallengesofAgencyInteractionDisasterevents,suchasHurricaneKatrina,this

year’searthquakeinHaiti,andtsunamisinthePacificislands,haveshowntheworldthatlogisticsismosteffectivewhenservedwithahealthydoseof“unityofeffort.”WhenmilitaryandciviliandepartmentsandagencieswithresponsibilitiesforreactingtoFederal,State,andlocalemergencies(naturalandmanmade)traintogetherbeforetheevent,theresultismoreeffec-tiveandefficientlogisticsoperations.

Inaninteragencyenvironment,understandingthecapabilitiesandpracticesofparticipatingorganiza-tions—bothgovernmentalandnongovernmental—istantamounttosuccess.Pasteventshaveshownthatfric-tionandmistrustamongorganizationscanbemitigatedintheinteragencyenvironmentthroughearlycommuni-cation,collaboration,andcooperation.ThisisaculturechangefortheDepartmentofDefense(DOD),whichisaccustomedtostrictcommandandcontrol.

ThisisespeciallytruewhenoneconsidersthatnongovernmentalorganizationsareoftenthefirsttoarriveonthesceneofaneventandhistoricallyhaveworkedseparatelyfromGovernmentagencies.Separa-tion,mistrust,andmisunderstandingofoneanother’scapabilitieshavecausedmassivewasteofresources,bottlenecksinthesupplychain,andgenerallogisticsdysfunctionamongagencies.Thatdoesnotmeanthatsurvivorshavenotbeensavedorrescued;itmeansthatoperationscouldhavebeenexecutedmoreefficientlyandpossiblemoreeffectively.

InteragencyLogisticsTraining:PerpetuatingtheWholeofgovernmentApproachtoDisasterLogistics

by dr. biLLy j. davis

D Key Disaster Response Authorities

l Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

l Homeland Security Act of 2002l Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

Act of 1996l Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002l Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform

Act of 2006l Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7, 8,

9, 10, 20, and 21l Executive Orders 12148, 12472, and 12656

The future of national and international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, international partners and non-governmental organizations.

—Admiral Mike Mullen


ImprovingInteragencyLogisticsPerhapsthemostimportantdynamicforimproving

interagencylogisticsisanopendialogbeforeaneventthatallowseachagencytoclearlyarticulateitscapabili-tiesandthebestpointofentryintoanevent.Dialogamongagencieswillidentifyoutdatedpolicies,overlapsinresponsibilities,andgapsinlogisticssupport.Opendialogsupportstheidealofinterdependencyandhelpsagenciestomoveawayfromstovepipesupportthatcanhampertheoverarchingmissionofsupportingsurvivors.

ILCprovidesatactical-throughstrategic-leveloverviewofinteragencydisasterlogisticsandidenti-fiesparametersforanationallogisticscoordinator.Thecourseoffersaforumandlogisticsexercisesfortheexchangeofbestlogisticspracticesfromtheinteragen-cycommunity.ILCprovidesparticipantswithinsightsthatareuniquetoresponsepartners.Throughinterac-tionbeforeadisaster,ILCcanestablishanunderstand-ingofthepracticesandpoliciesamonginteragencypartners.Thisunderstandingcanimproveandfacilitateamoreunifiedresponsetonationalandinternationaldisastersandemergencies—smallorcatastrophic.

ILChasproventhatwhenyoubringlogisticianstogetherfromGovernmentandnongovernmentalorga-nizations,theylearnfromoneanother.Theycollec-tivelyunderstandappropriatepointsofentrytosupportanevent,betterunderstandorganizationalcapabilities,andidentifylogisticspoliciesandpracticesthatcause

inefficienciesandredundanciesintheinteragencysup-plychain.

IfinteragencylogisticsisthefutureofDODlogis-tics,agenciesmustcollaboratebeforeaneventtobuildknowledgeandtrust.InHomelandSecurityPresidentialDirective–5,ManagementofDomesticIncidents,thePresidentdirectedthedevelopmentofaNationalIncidentManagementSystemandaNationalResponsePlantoalignFederalcoordinationstructures.Thismandatedcollaborativeapproachhelpselimi-nateseamsandtiestogetheracompletespectrumofincidentmanagement.InteragencylogisticstrainingthatbuildscooperationamongDOD,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,FEMA,andfirstrespondersbeforeaneventoccurswillhelpfurtherremovebarri-ersofmisunderstandingandmistrust.

ItisoftensaidthatDODisthethousand-poundgorillaofinteragencylogistics.However,despiteallitscapabilities,DODisseldomthefirstrespondertoarriveonthesceneofadisaster.Fornationalandstateemergencies,themissionoflogisticssupporttosurvivorsisgenerallyaccomplishedfirstbyvol-unteers,theNationalGuardBureau,andstate,local,andtribalorganizations.

Theinternationalprocessofsupportingdisastereventsissimilartothenationalprocess,exceptthattheUnitedNations,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,volunteerorganizations,andothernongovernmentalorga-nizationsarelikelythefirstatthescene.

ParticipantsinthefirstILCclassincludelogisti-ciansandoperatorsfromtheArmy,Navy,AirForce,CoastGuard,FEMA,J–4,ArmyCorpsofEngineers,DefenseLogisticsAgency,GeneralServicesAdminis-tration,U.S.NorthernCommand,AmericanRedCross,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,andstateandlocalemergencymanagementandvolunteers.

BeginninginNovember2010,theInteragencyLogisticsCoursewillbeofferedquarterlyinresidenceatALUoronsiteifrequired.DODandFEMApar-ticipantsmayregisterforthecoursethroughtheArmyTrainingResourceRequirementsSystem(ATRRS).OtherpersonnelshouldcontacttheILCcoursedirec-torbyphoneat(804)765−4503orbyemailatbilly.davis4@us.army.milforregistrationinformation.

Dr. Billy j. DaviS iS the chair of the loGiSticS operationS coMMittee at the arMy loGiSticS UniverSity. he holDS a B.S DeGree in BUSineSS aDMiniStration froM Saint leo UniverSity, an M.S. DeGree in SeconDary eDUcation froM olD DoMinion UniverSity, anD a ph.D. in eDUcation aDMiniStration anD policy DevelopMent froM virGinia coMMonwealth UniverSity.

The jumble of items in this container demonstrates how poorly executed logistics coordination hampers the mission of getting needed items to the survivors.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

uringOperationDesertStorm,LieutenantGeneralWilliamG.“Gus”Pagoniswasknownasthe“logisticspointman”fortheU.S.ArmedForces.NotonlywasheresponsibleforthelogisticsplanforDesertStorm,GeneralH.NormanSchwar-zkopf,Jr.,alsoputhiminchargeofexecutingthatplanontheground.GeneralPagonishelddailypressbriefingsduringoperationsandkeptnotes,after-actionreviews,andotherdocumentsfromthePersianGulfWar,creatingalargepersonalarchive.Duringarecog-nitionceremonyheldinhishonor,LieutenantGeneral(Ret.)PagonisdonatedhisarchivetotheArmyLogis-ticsUniversity(ALU)LibraryatFortLee,Virginia,on17May2010.HisdonationisthefirstadditiontoALU’snewSeniorSustainmentCollection.

PersiangulfWarLogisticsIntroducingGeneralPagonisattheceremony,Major

GeneralJamesE.Chambers,thecommandinggeneraloftheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand,citedPagonis’smostrecognizedaccomplishments.(GeneralChambersisnowtheJ–4fortheU.S.CentralCom-mand.)“Asthecommandinggeneralofthe22dSup-portCommand[theArmy’stheaterlogisticscommand],GeneralPagoniswasresponsibleforthereceptionandonwardmovementoftroopsandequipmentandtheir

sustainmentinSouthwestAsia,”saidChambers.“Itwasduringthisassignmentthathesuccessfullymastermind-edthelogisticsfortheGulfWar.Hislogisticsstrategyduringthewarhasbeenwidelyregardedasoneofthegreatestachievementsofmilitaryhistory.”

Pagonissharedsomeofhisexperiencesfromthistimeframe,outliningtheadaptabilityneededinthefirst4monthswhenthefewlogisticiansavailabletookchargeoflogisticsoperations.“Wehadsergeantsdoingthejobsofcaptains.Itwasatremendouseffort,”saidPagonis.HeseesDesertStormasthebeginningsofthelogisticsbranchthatistodayareality.“Itdidn’tmat-terwhatyourbranchwas;youwerealogistician,”saidPagonis.“Wetailoredonthebattlefieldtomeetthesitu-ation,andthelogisticalcorpsmadeallthedifference.”

DesertStormoperationsweremodeledonthereturnofforcestoGermany(Reforger)exercise—troopswereflownin,equipmentwasinplaceontheground,andotherequipmentarrivedbyship.Thegoalwastosus-taintroopsandequipmentandmovethemforwardonthebattlefield.

In“ObservationsonGulfWarLogistics,”anarticlethatGeneralPagoniswrotewithColonelMichaelD.KrauseintheSeptember–October1992issueofArmy Logistician,theauthorswrite,“Thecreationoflogis-ticsbaseswasessentialtosustainingthegroundcam-

paign.Thebaseswereintendedtoholdenoughfuel,food,water,andammunitiontosustaintheXVIIIAirborneCorpsandVIICorpsdur-ingtheirpunchintoIraq.”Theselogisticsbasesweresetaheadofcombatarmsforcesonthebattle-fieldandprovided,forthefirsttime,flexiblesupporttomodernmaneuveroperations.

DuringhisALUvisit,GeneralPagonisnotedanotherlogistics

gulfWarLogisticsRecordsDonatedtotheSustainmentCommunity

D

Major General James E. Chambers, the commanding general of the Army Combined Arms Support Command; Lieutenant General (Ret.) William G. “Gus” Pagonis; and Barbara Mroczkowski, the acting president of the Army Logistics University (ALU), unveil a painting honoring Pagonis for his donation to the ALU Library. (Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)


success—OperationDesertFarwell.“WealwaysforgetDesertFarewell,”saidPagonis.“Whenthewarwasover,Iwasabletosendpeoplehome,butIstayed.Theygaveme6,000individualreadyreserves[IRRs]whoneverdreamedthey’deverbecalledup.”ThoseIRRSoldiersworkedtofulfillanagreementmadebetweenPresidentGeorgeBushandtheKingofSaudiArabiathatallequipmentwouldbesentbacktotheUnitedStatesafterthewar.“Weweregiven2years,”saidPagonis.“Itwasdonein8months.Themottowas,‘Assoonasthisjunk’soutofhereyougettogohome,’andthat’sallthelogisticiansneededtoheartomakeitwork.”

PreservingandSharingKnowledgeDuringthePersianGulfWar,Pagonisconducted

about2,000interviewsandhadeverypressconfer-enceandinterviewvideotaped.Hekeptvideooraudiorecords,photographs,books,magazines,operationorders,after-actionreports,maps,monographs,andaplethoraofbriefingpapersandhistoricaldocuments.Theresultingcollectionisapproximately1,100linearfeet.“Theserecordsreallyweren’tmine,”saidGeneralPagonisduringthepresentationtoALU.“TheyweretheUnitedStatesArmy’sthatIheldandcollected.”

PagonishadalreadyreceivedauthorizationtodonatetherecordstoPennsylvaniaStateUniversityandtheArmyMilitaryHistoryInstituteatCarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania.HeinsteadchoseALU,wheretherecordscanbeputtocontinuedusebythesustainmentcommu-nity.“I’mhopingbybeing[stored]herewherelogisti-ciansaregoingtobecomingtogether,wewon’tmakethesamemistakesoverandover,”saidPagonis.

“Thisistrulyanexcitingdayforourlibraryandfortheuniversity,sincethisisthefirstcollectiontobeaddedtoournewlogisticslibrary,”saidBarbaraMroczkowski,theactingpresidentofALU.“Wethankyou[GeneralPagonis]verymuch,andknowthatwewilltakeverygoodcareofthematerialsthatyouhaveentrustedtous,whileatthesametimemakingthemavailabletothegreatercommunityasaprimarysourceoflogisticsinformationontheArmyandontheArmy’sinvolvementintheGulfWar.”

“Thegiftprovidesanessentialresourceforsus-tainmentSoldiers,historians,andourresearchersthatwillbroadentheirunderstandingofthisverypivotaltimeinourhistory,”saidGeneralChambers.“Theyarearchiveitemsthatweredonewithgreatdetailfromamanwiththeinsighttorecordwhatwashap-pening,knowingthatsomedaywewouldwanttorecallandlearnfromthoselessons.”

ChambersnotedthesignificancetherecordswillholdforstudentsatALU.“Forcesustainerswillhaveaccesstoimportantpapersthatilluminatethelogisti-calpushintoKuwaitduringOperationDesertShield/DesertStorm,”saidChambers.“Theywillbeabletoseewhatwastried,whatworked,whatdidn’twork,andthenwhatcorrectionsweremadetomakethemwork.ThesepapershaveasignificantplaceinourNation’shistoryandinourNation’smilitaryhistory,anditisamajorhonorforthislibrarytohousethem.”

JohnShields,referencelibrarian,formallyacceptedthePagonisdonationonbehalfoftheALULibrary,wherethecollectionwillbearchivedandavailableforofficialandresearchpurposes.Torecognizethedona-tion,abustofGeneralPagonishasbeencommissionedfromVirginiaStateUniversityfordisplayinthelibrary.

Donationsofpapersandotherarchivalmaterialsfromothersustainmentleadersarebeingsolicitedtoaddtothecollection.AnyoneinterestedinmakingadonationcancontacttheArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommandhistorianbyemailatsteve.anders@us.army.milorbytelephoneat(804)734–0082.

—Story by Julianne E. Cochran

General Pagonis signs a copy of Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, which he coauthored with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, for a Korean officer attending the Army Logistics University. (Photo by James Fortune, Fort Lee Visual Information Service Center)

Some of the many artifacts donated by General Pagonis to the Army Logistics University Library. (Photo by James

Fortune, Fort Lee Visual Information Service Center)

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

hedoctrinalmissionofaforwardsupportcompany(FSC)istoprovideagile,multifunc- tionallogisticssupporttoitsmaneuverbattalion.Whenthesupportedunitisageneralsupportaviationbattalion(GSAB)withorganicCH–47FChinook,UH–60BlackHawk,andmedicalevacuation(MEDE-VAC)helicopters,theFSCmustdemonstrateflexibilityandresponsivenessasitprovidesorganicgroundmain-tenance,fuel,anddistributionsupport.

Thatflexibilityandresponsivenessbecameexpo-nentiallymorecriticalwhenthealreadydiverse7thBattalion,101stAviationRegiment(7–101AviationBattalion),159thCombatAviationBrigade,trans-formedintoamultifunctionalaviationtaskforce3monthsbeforedeployingtoOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)09–11.TheformationandmissionexpandedsignificantlyastheorganicGSABabsorbedAH–64ApacheandOH–58KiowaWarriorhelicoptersandpreparedtosupportall15provincesofRegionalCommand-EastinAfghanistan.

Thefivemajormissionsetsthatthebattalionsup-portedwereairassault;aerialdignitarymovementsandaerialresupply;reconnaissance,security,andattack;quickreactionforce;andMEDEVAC.Throughoutthisdramatictransformation,ECompany,the7–101Avia-tionBattalion’sFSC,wasrequiredtodevelopcreative

solutionstoaccomplishitsdoctrinalmissionswhiletakingonadditionalmissionsnecessarytoprovideagile“supportataltitude”tothisnewformationknownasTaskForceEagleLift.

ECompanyAccomplishments

Inits12-monthOEFtour,ECompanysupportedTaskForceEagleLiftacrossthefullspectrumofavia-tionsupportastheunitexecutedover215airassaults,transportedover85,000personneland4,800tonsofcargo,launchedover1,200reconnaissanceandsecu-ritymissions,andsupportedover900MEDEVACcalls.Bytheendofitstour,ECompanyhadissued1.2milliongallonsofaviationfueland100,000roundsofammunitionandhadconductedover100sling-loadmissionswhilethetaskforceflewover4,500missionsand39,000combatflighthours.DueinnosmallparttotheagilesupportprovidedbyitsFSC,TaskForceEagleLiftflewmorehoursacrossamorediversemis-sionsetthananyotheraviationtaskforcepreviouslydeployedtoAfghanistan.

Tosupportitstaskforce’sdiversemission,ECom-panysuccessfullyrestructureditstaskorganizationtomeetnewchallengesduringitscombattour.Inaddi-tiontoitsnormalfuelandmaintenancemissions,thecompanyassumeddutiesasthetaskforce’sclassV

“SupportatAltitude”foraMultifunctionalAviationTaskForce

by Captain MiChaeL r. MiLLer

T


(ammunition)manager,wastaskedwithprovidingaconsolidatedarmsroom,andbecamethebattalion’sprimaryproviderforforceprotectionpersonnel.Thesenewmissionsrequiredthecreationofnewsectionswithinthecompany,intensivecross-trainingtofillnewpersonnelvacancies,andultimately,thedevelopmentofnewtactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP)foraccomplishingthemission.

AmodularapproachtotaskorganizationallowedECompanytopullSoldiersfromeachsectiontofillpersonnelrequirementsnotdoctrinallyorganictotheformation.Bycross-trainingtomeetthesepersonnelshortfalls,SoldiersinECompanycouldbesuccess-fullypluggedinandrotatedasneeded.Thisapproachpreventedmentalburnoutandfacilitatedmidtourleaveschedulingbyminimizingtheadverseimpactonmis-sionaccomplishment.ThedevelopmentofnewTTPgavetheSoldiersofECompanyownershipoftheirmis-sionswhilemaximizingflexibleandresponsivesupporttothetaskforce’smaneuvercompanies.

TaskOrganizationECompany’screativetaskorganizationenabledit

toaccomplishavarietyofnewtasksinadditiontoitsdoctrinalmissions.UnlikeFSCsinsupportofheavyorinfantrybrigadecombatteams,ECompanyisdoc-trinallyorganictothe7–101AviationBattalion.ThebattalionconsolidateditsformationatBagramAirfieldwhiledeployedandassumedageneralsupportmissiontogroundforcesinitsareaofoperations.

Despitebeingcentrallylocated,themissionofthebattaliontaskforcerequiredittooperatenearlyevery-whereineasternAfghanistananditsFSCtooccupytwooutlyingforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)topro-videclassIII(petroleum,oils,andlubricants)andVsupport.Todothisafterlosing10personneltoasistertaskforce,ECompanytransformeditsdistributionpla-toonbycreatingthreesquadsof10Soldierseach.

Thisplatoonorganizationallowedtwosquadstosupport24-houroperationsatitstwoforwardarmingandrefuelingpoints(FARPs),whilethethirdsquadremainedatBagramtosupportcontingency“jumpFARP”missionsandcoldfueloperations.[AFARPisusedbyaviationunitstoplacefuelforwardonabattlefieldinordertoextendahelicopter’srangeormaximizeitstimeoveranobjective.Byplacingfuelandammunitionasclosetothehelicopter’sobjectiveasthetacticalsituationallows,itsturn-aroundtimeforfuelandammunitionisreducedanditssupportoftroopsismaximized.AjumpFARPistemporaryinnatureandreferstoaFARPthatcanbesetupandtorndownquicklyandisableto“jump”fromlocationtolocation.]Squadsrotatedevery3to4weeksduringsteady-stateoperationsandasnecessaryduringperiodsofincreasedoperatingtempo(OPTEMPO).

ClassIIIWhileatthecompany’soutlyingFARPs,refueling

personnelwererequiredtoworkhand-in-handwiththeFOBlandowners,whichincludedbothU.S.groundunitsandNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationforces.RelationshipsatbothFARPsbecamemutuallysupport-ive.ECompanyrefuelersoftenprovidedgroundunitswithfuelandgroundmaintenancesupportinexchangeforlife-supportenhancements.

AH–64 Apache and OH–58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters from Task Force Eagle Lift await fuel and ammunition at one of E Company’s forward arming and refueling points in Afghanistan.

E Company Soldiers prepare to sling load 500gallon collapsible fuel drums on a CH–47F

Chinook. The fuel drums were prestaged to shorten response times during replenishment missions.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

AtoneECompanyFARP,locatedataFrenchout-post,refuelpersonneloftenrefueledFrenchaircraftand,becauseofitsausterelocation,assistedwiththepost’sforceprotectionbyestablishingfightingposi-tionsaroundtheFARPandtheFrenchtaskforce’sclassVstoragearea.ThesemutuallybeneficialrelationshipseffectivelydemonstratedECompany’sapproachtounitsupport.Bybuildingstrongpartner-shipsatoutlyingFARPsandhelpingunitsatthoseFOBsaccomplishtheirmissions,ECompanywasultimatelybetterabletoprovideagilesupporttoTaskForceEagleLift.

ClassVTofulfillitsclassVmission,ECompanyformedan

ammunitionsectiontoperformadministrative,storage,handling,andissuingfunctionsforclassV.Theammu-nitionsectionmaintainedday-to-dayaccountabilityofthetaskforce’sauthorizedbasicloadandreplenishedclassVstocksasneeded.Thesectionconsistedoffourschool-trainedmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)89-seriesammunitionpersonnel(oneMOS89Aammu-nitionstockcontrolandaccountingspecialistandthreeMOS89Bammunitionspecialists)whowereaug-mentedbytwoadditionalpersonnel(bothMOS91Bwheeled-vehiclemechanics).

LackingatraditionalclassIII/VplatoonandoperatingpredominantlyatBagram,theammunitionsectionwasassignedtotheheadquartersplatoonandwasdirectlysupervisedbythecompany’sexecutiveofficer,anord-nanceofficer.Thissubject-matterexpertisemitigatedtheeffectsofhavingnonammunitionpersonnelassignedtothesectionandstrengthenedthesectiontothepointthatammunitionoperationsbecamearelativestrength.

ECompanymaintaineditsmodularapproachtotaskorganizationwiththeconsolidatedarmsroom.Atotalof10Soldierswerepulledfromassignmentsinotherplatoonstoserveasarmorers.Withthreetoashiftandanoncommissionedofficer-in-chargetofloatbetween

shifts,thearmorerswereabletoprovide24-hoursup-port.Theyusedasign-outsystemtoaccountforthetaskforce’sweaponsandsensitiveitemsthatwereusedduringflightsandday-to-dayoperations.

ArmsroompersonnelofallMOSsweretrainedtoperformsmall-armsmaintenanceattheunitlevelandpost-flightweaponscleaning,effectivelyrelievingflightcrewsofthatchoreandallowingthemtofocusonmissionpreparationandpost-flightaircraftmain-tenance.Thissupportshortenedthe12-to14-hourdutydaysofcrews.ECompanyarmsroompersonnelmaintainedandcleaned426weaponsassignedtoTaskForceEagleLift’sflightcompanieswithoutasingleweaponmalfunctionwhenitcountedmost.

Byrotatingpersonnelevery3to4months,theconsolidatedarmsroomwasabletomaintainarobustsupportcapabilityduringrestandrecuperationleavesandperiodsofincreasedOPTEMPO,muchlikethedistributionplatoondid.

Cross-TrainingECompany’screativetaskorganizationwasmade

possiblebywidespreadcross-training.Thecompanyleaders’goalbeforedeployingwastotraineachSoldierinasecondMOS.Bydoingthis,personnelshortagescreatedbynewmissionscouldbefilledfromabroadpooloftrainedSoldiersandthelackof“appropriate”MOSsforthesenewmissionscouldbeovercome.

ThecompanyknewitwouldassumenewmissionsinAfghanistan,soleadersplacedastrongfocusontrainingSoldiersinsimilartasksinordertoachievetheclosestpossiblematchofskills.Forexample,oneFARPfunctionistoprovideclassVrearmament;withoutorganicMOS15Jand15Y(OH–58DKiowaWarriorandAH–64DApacheLongbowarmament,electrical,andavionicssystemsrepairers,respectively)Soldierstoperformthisduty,ECompanyreliedoncross-trainedpetroleumsupplypersonneltoaccom-plishthismission.

Trainingwasprovidedbyarma-mentpersonnelassignedtothebat-talion’sattackandreconnaissancecompanyandcertifiedbyapilotincommand(PC).Thetrainingresult-edinFARPpersonnelbeingcertifiedtohandleand“hot”load.50-caliber

An E Company Soldier with military occupational specialty (MOS) 88M, motor transport operator, is supervised while rearming an OH–58 Kiowa Warrior. E company’s 88M Soliders were crosstrained and worked alongside its 92F petroleum supply specialists at the company’s forward arming and refueling points.


rounds,30-millimeterrounds,and2.75-inchrockets.Bypairingcloselymatchedskillstogetherandcertifyingrefuelpersonneltoperformmultipletasks,noadditionalpersonnelwererequiredtomanthecompany’sFARPs.

Cross-trainingwasequallyemphasizedinthemain-tenanceplatoon.Recognizingthatmaintenanceperson-nelwouldmostoftenbepulledtofulfillothertaskswithinthebattalionandwereECompany’sprimarysourceofarmsroompersonnel,apremiumwasplacedonhavingawidevarietyofmaintenancecapabilitiesatalltimeswithasfewpeopleaspossible.RatherthanlimitingautomotivemaintenancetojustMOS91BSoldiers,allmaintenancepersonnelweretrainedtoperformwheeled-vehiclemaintenance.

Thissameapproachwasalsousedwiththecom-pany’s91Bs,whoweretrainedtoperformmaintenancetasksnormallyassignedto91Cs(utilitiesequipmentrepairers),91Ds(powergenerationequipmentrepairers),and91Js(quartermasterandchemicalequipmentrepair-ers).Thecompany’sMOS91Ws(metalworkers)and92As(automatedlogisticalspecialists)weretrainedtoperformmaintenancetasksonallgroundequipment.

Bycross-trainingallpersonnelwithinthemaintenanceplatoon,ECompany’smaintenancesupervisorsmaxi-mizedtheirsupporttothetaskforcewithlimitedperson-nelwhileavoidingincreasedrepairtime,nomatterwhattypeofvehicleorequipmentrequiredmaintenance.

NewTactics,Techniques,andProceduresECompanynotonlycreativelyreorganizeditselfto

accomplishnewmissionsbutalsodevelopednewTTPtoaccomplishdoctrinalmissions.Aircraftrefuelingisadoctrinalmission,butitwasbyfarECompany’smostrobusttaskanddemandedthemostcreativeTTPtobeaccomplishedsuccessfully.

FARPsoperatedbyECompanywereoriginallytem-poraryinnature.Fuelwassling-loadedasnecessaryusing500-galloncollapsibledrumsforadesignatedtimeandpumpedintoaircraftusingtheadvancedaviationfor-wardarearefuelingsystem.Thismethodoftenrequiredadditionalfueldrumsonshortnotice.Toremedythisburden,ECompany’sdistributionplatoonensuredthatadditionaldrumswerefilledandriggedforslingloadatalltimes.Asoperationsincreased,sodidthenumberofdrumsthattheplatoonstaged.Abattledrillwasdevel-opedtoquicklyalerttheplatoon’ssling-loadteamswhenadditionaldrumswererequiredonshortnotice.

ThedistributionplatooneventuallytookthisbattledrillastepfurtheranddevisedawaytoprepackageitsjumpFARPequipmentinaJohnDeereGatorandaccompanyingtrailer.Thisroll-on,roll-offcapabilityensuredthatminimaltimewasdedicatedtopack-ing,loading,andoffloadingtheaircraftduringtime-sensitivesupportmissions.OnceloadedaboardtheChinook,preriggedfueldrumswerepickedupandtheentirepackagewasenroutetoitsobjective.Thebattle

drillforthissupportcapabilityincludedfuelsamplingandtesting,equipmentchecks,andpersonnelnotifica-tioninadditiontoequipmentupload.Byconfiguringallnecessaryequipmentintoareadilyavailablepack-age,theplatooncouldquicklyloadaChinook,deploytothesiteofitsjumpFARP,andbeoperationalinaslittleas12hoursfollowingnotification.

Atonepointduringitsdeployment,fueloperationsexceededECompany’sabilitytomaintainenoughfueldrums.Toovercomethisshortfall,thecompanyobtainedthenecessaryequipmentandemplacedaper-manentfuelsystemsupplypoint(FSSP)atoneofitsassignedFARPs.TheFARPretaineditsrearmamentcapabilityandremainedapredominantlyKiowafuelpoint.However,theFSSPgaveitthecapabilitytosup-portallU.S.aircraftandmanycoalitionaircraftwithoutthedangerofoperationaldemandsexceedingresources.

Thisincreasedfuelcapacityandtheavailabilityofarobustammunitionpackageenabledreconnaissanceandattackaircrafttomaximizestationtimeinsupportofgroundforcesandreducetheirturnaroundtimewhenfuelandammunitionwereneeded.Byexpandingcapabilitiesbeyonditsdoctrinalmission,ECompanydirectlyandpositivelyaffectedTaskForceEagleLift’stacticalmission.

ExpandedSupportMissionECompanyassumeditsclassVsupportmission

becauseoftheaviationtaskforceconfigurationthebat-talionassumedbeforedeploying.Bynecessity,themis-sionnormallyexecutedentirelybythebrigade’saviationsupportbattalion(ASB)felltoFSCsindirectsupportoftheirlinebattalions.DuringTaskForceEagleLift’sOEFrotation,itsApachesandKiowaswereheavyconsumersofclassV(specifically30-millimeterand.50-caliberroundsand2.75-inchrockets)andconstantattentionwasrequiredtoensurethatsufficientstocksofthesemunitionswereavailableatalltimes.

ECompanyensuredthatammunitionhandlerswereonsiteatpeakhourstokeepthereadyammunitionstorageareastockedwiththreefullloadsofclassVforeachaircraftinadditiontotheammunitionthatwasalreadyplacedateachaircraft’sparkingpad.Ammuni-tionpersonnelindirectsupportoftheseaircraftworkedwithcrewchiefstorestockparkingpadseachmorningandidentifywhichammunitiontypeswererequiredingreaterquantities.

AmmunitionpersonnelconductedroutinepickupsfromBagram’sammunitionsupplypointbasedoncon-sumptionratesduringsteady-stateoperations.WhenOPTEMPOspeakedduringAfghanistan’snationalelections,havingpersonnelandsufficientammunitionstocksonhandbecameparticularlyvital.

UrgentresuppliesofclassVwererequiredatECompany’soutlyingFARPs.Workingonsitewiththetaskforce’sApacheandKiowaWarriorhelicoptersandmaintainingclosecontactwiththetaskforce’s

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

tacticaloperationscenterenabledammunitionper-sonneltoquicklyloadwaitingaircraftwithadditionalclassVformovementtoECompany’sFARPs.TheammunitionpersonnelsuccessfullyrestockedoneFARPinunderanhour,allowingattackaircraftintheareatomaintainvaluablesupporttoagroundunitincontactwiththeenemy.

Tomorecompletelymeettheneedsofitsflightcompanies,specificallyduringrearmingandrefuelingstopsatitsFARPs,ECompanycreatedclassI(sub-sistence)sustainmentpacksthatcouldbequicklyandeasilyhandedtopilotsandcrewswhiletheywereontheground.These“brownbaglunches”usuallycon-sistedofconsumableitemsthatcouldbeeatenquicklyorstowedawayforconsumptionduringflight.Duringthecolderseasons,sustainmentpacksincludedther-mosesofcoffeeorhotchocolate.Duringnightopera-tions,theyusuallyincludedRip-Itcaffeinatedenergydrinks.ECompany’sgoalinprovidingthese“creaturecomforts”atitsFARPswastomakeitsbattalion’scombatmissionthesolefocusofitspilotsandcrewswhiletheywereinthecockpit.

BecauseoftheruggedterrainandtheresultingisolationofsomecoalitionFOBs,Afghanistanisanair-centrictheater.ThisrealitymadeitessentialthatECompanypersonnelbecomeexpertsatslingload-ingduringtheirOEFdeployment.ManyECompanySoldierswerealreadyair-assaultqualified,butbecausepreviousdeploymentstoIraqdidnotrequirearelianceonsling-loadmovements,manyofECompany’sper-sonnelrequiredadditionalsling-loadtraining.

PathfinderSupportECompanyoftenworkedwithTaskForceEagle

Lift’spathfinderplatoontorigloadsfororganicandsupportedunits.Manyloads,suchastriplecontainers

(TRICONs)andBobcatearthmovers,wereconsid-erednonstandardandrequiredextraattentiondur-ingrigging.Duringhookupoperations,ECompanyreliedonair-assaultqualifiedpersonneltoattachriggedloadstoChinooksformovement.Thesling-loadpersonnelandthepilotsmovingtheloadsdevel-opedacloserelationshipandalevelofcomfortbyworkingtogetherdaily.

ECompanyapplieditscreativesupportapproachtopathfinderoperationsaswell.TheprimarymissionofTaskForceEagleLift’spathfinderswastherecoveryofflightcrewsandpassengersinthecaseofadownedaircraft.Thesemissionsusuallyaccompaniedadownedaircraftrecoveryteamandwereoftenlonginduration.

Tosupportthesecontingencymissions,ECompanyusedthe“speedball”conceptandbuiltasustainmentpackagethatcouldbeloadedaboardaBlackHawkhelicopterbyabuddyteam.Thepackageconsistedofwaterandmeals,readytoeat,tosupport20Soldiersfor24hours,sunscreen,workgloves,andadditionalradiobatteries.

Abattledrillwasdevelopedinwhichthepath-finderteamleaderwouldcallbacktothetaskforce’stacticaloperationscenterandrequestthepackage.ECompanywouldbenotifiedandcouldloadthepackageontoawaitingaircraftfordeliverytothepathfindersontheground.This“speedball”reducedtheamountofclassItakenbythepathfinderteam,effectivelyreducingtheSoldiers’combatloadandincreasingtheirmissionreadiness.

ECompany’ssuccessinprovidingflexibleandresponsivesupportduringOEF09–11waslargelyduetoitscreativeproblem-solving.Itsapproachtotaskorganization,cross-training,andmissionsupportulti-matelymaximizedECompany’ssupportcapability.

ReorganizingitsformationtomeetnewtasksinadditiontoitsdoctrinalmissionsenabledECom-panytoprovideflexiblesupport.ThisreorganizationrequiredECompanytocross-trainitspersonneltofillgapscreatedbythesenewandexpandedmissions.Thecompanyleaders’originalgoalwastogiveeachSol-dierinECompanyasecondMOS,andthisprovedtobeasuccess.NewapproachestomissionsupportandthedevelopmentofnewTTPcompletedtheirapproachtoresponsivesustainmentforthe7–101AviationBat-talionwhiledeployed.

captain Michael r. Miller iS aSSiGneD to the arMy hUMan reSoUrceS coMManD at fort Knox, KentUcKy. he waS the coMManDer of e coMpany, 7th Battalion, 101St aviation reGiMent, 159th coMBat aviation BriGaDe, DUrinG itS operation enDUrinG freeDoM 09–11 DeployMent. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in exerciSe Science froM MarqUette UniverSity anD iS a GraDUate of the arMy orDnance officer BaSic coUrSe anD the coMBineD loGiSticS captainS career coUrSe.

An E Company Soldier refuels an OH–58 Kiowa Warrior at one of the company’s FARPs. In the foreground, 2.75inch rockets are staged for rearming attack and reconnaissance aircraft.


heU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielAgency(USAM-MA)atFortDetrick,Maryland,issubordinatetotheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandandservesastheArmy’slife-cyclemanage-mentcommandforclassVIII(medicalmateriel).ThemissionofUSAMMAistoplan,synchronize,andprovidemedicallogisticsforhealthservicesupporttoforcesconductingjointandfull-spectrumopera-tionsbymanagingmedicalmateriellife-cycleprojects,equippingandsustainingthemedicalforce,managingmedicalstrategiccentralizedprograms,andadvancingperformanceexcellence.

USAMMAperformsitsmissionwiththeArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)inareassuchasArmypre-positionedstocks(APS),left-behindequipment(LBE),andreset.Asthelife-cyclemanagementcommandforclassVIII,USAMMAisresponsibleforequippingandsustainingmedicalunits,whichmustbedoneusingtheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)model.TheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandandUSAMMAmakeupthemedicalgeneratingforceasitrelatestoequippingunitsundertheAFRORGENmodelformedicalunits.

Toaccomplishthistask,USAMMAhasdevelopedtheMedicalMaterielReadinessProgram(MMRP)tosupporttheArmy’smostcomplexmedicalunit,thecombatsupporthospital(CSH).TheMMRPsolu-tionforaddressingARFORGENCSHequippingissuesfocusesonthreetenets:o DefineaCSHbaselineequip-

mentsettobemaintainedathomestation.

o Equipthegeneratingforcemedi-caltrainingbase.

o Controlequipmentnotathomestationthroughawell-defined,centralizedmedicalequipmentmanagementprogrammaintainedbyUSAMMAbyapplyingmanyoftheconceptsassociatedwiththeAPSprogram.

EquippingtheCombatSupportHospital:ACaseStudy

T ThisarticlewilldiscussmanagingmedicalmaterielinaCSHandtheMMRPsolutiontoassistinaddress-ingmedicalmaterielreadinessissuesinARFORGEN.

EquippingChallengesOnanygivenday,USAMMAmustbalancethe

equippingrequirementsofdeployingunit,reset,LBE,modernizationofequipmentandsets,kits,andoutfits(SKO),andtheaterdemands.Theresourcesrequiredtomeettheseequippingdemandsareoverwhelmingatbest,buttheArmy’sTitle10responsibilitiesmustbemet.Iftheycannotbemet,stepsmustbetakentomitigatetherisksassociatedwithunitmaterielrequire-mentsnotbeingfullysatisfied.

DuringtheearlydaysofOperationIraqiFreedom,USAMMAandHeadquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy(HQDA),realizedthatthemandatetoequipallunitsto100percentwasnolongerviableunlessmil-lionsofdollarswerepouredintotheequippingandsustainmentaccounts.Notonlywouldfundinghavetoincrease,sowouldtheforcesmaintenanceandsustain-mentprograms,asdemonstratedbytheLBEprograminitiatedinfiscalyear2008.

AsUSAMMAjoinedhandswithAMCtoassistwiththeLBEprogram,bothorganizationsfoundthatthe

by Lieutenant CoLoneL CharLes h. strite, jr.

This operating room suite in a combat support hospital (CSH)

demonstrates the complexity of the equipment required for the CSH.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

forces’equipmentwasnotbeingmaintainedproperly.Infact,USAMMAlearnedoveraperiodofmorethan2years(2008to2010)thatin6Activecomponent248-bedCSHs,approximately50percentofthemedicalequip-mentwasnotmissioncapable.ThisvalidatedalreadyperceivedanecdotalevidenceandcameasnogreatsurprisetoUSAMMA.ItprovidedthefactsUSAMMAneededtomoveforwardwithitsMMRPinitiative.

ReducingUnitEquipmentOvertheyears,theArmyMedicalDepartmenthas

foundthatattainingunitreadinessuponmobilizationcreatesmanychallenges.DuringtheearlydaysofOperationDesertStorm,medicalprophylaxesmedica-tionssuchastheMARKI(nerveagentantidote)kitwerefoundtobeexpiredormissing.Similarly,medi-calexpendableitemswithashelflifeandexpirationdatewerefoundtobeexpiredornotonhanduponmobilization.TheOfficeofTheSurgeonGeneral(OTSG),alongwithUSAMMA,madethecasetoHQDAinthemid-1990stocentralizethestorageandmaintenanceofMARKIkitsandexpendablemedi-calitems.Generally,unitswerenolongerrequiredtomaintaintheseitemsathomestation;USAMMAwouldtakeonthisresponsibility.

DuringtheearlydaysofOperationsEnduringFreedomandIraqiFreedom,thosedecisionsproved

tobeinvaluable.NotonlydidUSAMMAdelivertothedeployingunits,thesecentralizedprogramssavedtensofmillionsofdollarsandallowedforrapidunitdeployment.Mostimpressive,manyoftheproblemsthatwereidentifiedfrommedicalunitdeploymentsforOperationDesertShieldwerenotrepeated.Simplystated,medicalcentralizedstorageprogramsareeffi-cientandeffective.

Thefiscalyears2008to2013ProgramObjec-tiveMemorandum(POM),whichwasdevelopedin2006,appliedlessonslearnedandmitigatedtheissuesassociatedwithunitmaintenance,withthegoalofequippingunitsto100percentoftheirmodificationtablesoforganizationandequipment(MTOEs).Thisdevelopedaradicalparadigmshiftinequippingmedi-calunits.Specifically,USAMMAfocusedonitsmostcomplexorganization,theCSH,whichincludesover1,700medicalequipmentitems.AnActivecomponentCSHincludesan84-bedcompanyattheunit’slocationanda164-bedcompanylocatedatSierraArmyDepot,California.Thisparadigmincludedaconcepttodelib-eratelyreduceunit-ownedequipmentwhileincreasinguseoftheunit-leasedconceptthroughprovenbusinessprocesses,suchasAPS.

Alongwithreducingunit-ownedequipment,USAMMA’sconceptincludedimprovingthegen-eratingforce’strainingbaselocationsandcentrally

These containers at Sierra Army Depot, California, store an MMRP combat support hospital.


managedmedicalequippingprograms.ThisconceptwouldbecomeoneofUSAMMA’skeyinitiativesintheirstrategicplan—theMMRP.Formanyreasons,USAMMAwasnotpermittedtoincludetheMMRPinitiativeinits2006POM,butitwasaskedtofurtherdeveloptheconceptwiththeArmyForcesCommand(FORSCOM),HQDA,OTSG,andotherstakeholders.

RefiningMMRPTenetsInfiscalyear2006,USAMMAparticipatedina

studywiththeArmyProgramManagementOfficeStudyProgramCoordinationCommitteeWorkingGrouptofurtherdevelopitsMMRPinitiative.ThisstudyservedasthecatalystforthefundingthatallowedUSAMMA,inconcertwithOTSG,toprogramsomeofUSAMMA’sMMRPinitiativeintotheequippingPOMsforfiscalyears2010to2015and2012to2017.The2010POMrecognizedthethreeMMRPtenets.

In2007and2008,USAMMAmetwithanumberofstakeholderstodeveloptheMMRPconceptandquick-lyrealizedthedifficultyofdefiningthefirstMMRPtenet:Whatshouldbemaintainedathomestation,andwhatisthepurposeofthisequipment(trainingonlyortrainingandmissionsupport)?

Anothermajorchallengewastoestablishthesec-ondtenet:Whataretheorganizationsinthemedicaltrainingbase,andwhatequipmentisneededtoappro-priatelymeetthetrainingrequirements?Forexample,forhospitalization,USAMMAismandatedtosup-porttheArmyReservegeneratingforceregionaltrainingsites-medical(RTSs–MED)locationsatFortGordon,Georgia;FortMcCoy,Wisconsin;andCampParks,California,alongwiththeU.S.ArmyMedicalCommand’s(USAMEDCOM’s)hospitaltrainingsitelocatedatCampBullis,Texas.Additionalundocu-mentedrequirementswerenoted,withthelargestonebeingtheFirstArmy,whichneededequipmentforvalidatingunitsbeforemobilization.Unfortunately,formanyreasons,USAMMAcouldnotgainanytrac-tionondevelopingaholisticmulticomponentmedicaltrainingbase.

ModernizingCSHsAsabridgingstrategytoequipthethirdMMRP

tenet,theArmyprovidedapproximately$30millionforequipmentandoverheadcoststomodernizefourCSHsunderOTSG’sandUSAMMA’scontroltosup-portU.S.ArmyReserveCommand(USARC)hospi-tals.ThesefourCSHsbelongtotheUSARCReserveComponentHospitalDecrement(RCHD)programlocatedatSierraArmyDepot.Essentially,USAMMAmodernized4antiquated248-bedCSHswithintheRCHDprogramtothelatestMTOEauthorizationandSKOavailableforanydeployingCSH,regardlessofcomponent.USAMMAalsopartneredwithSierraArmyDepottoupdatealargewarehousetofacilitate

themaintenance,storage,andsustainmentoperationsofthesehospitals,whichreplicatestheirAPSfacilitiesandprocessesaroundtheworld.

Thedecisionin2007tomodernizefourhospitalsintheUSARCRCHDprogramastheintroductiontothethirdMMRPtenetmanagedbyUSAMMAprovedinvaluablebecauseaCONUS-basedCSHwasdirectedtodeploytoAfghanistaninOctober2009.ThedeployingCSH’sequipmentwaslessthanadequatefromamodernizationandsustainmentperspective.Attheunit’srequest,OTSGsupportedtheuseofaMMRPCSHfromthemedicalcentral-izedstorageprogramfortheCSH’sdeploymenttoAfghanistan.HadtheMMRPCSHnotbeenavail-able,thedeployingCSHwouldhaverequiredmonthsofpreparations,includinginventories,maintenanceservices,equipmentpurchases,modernizations,andupgrades,beforedeployingtoAfghanistan.HavingtodothiswouldhaveputtheCSH’sarrivaldateinjeopardy.Thisisnotanindictmentoftheunitbutanindicationoftheequippingmodelcurrentlyestab-lishedforCSHs.

MergingHospitalAssetsAlthoughitwassuccessfulinmodernizingthefour

CSHsandtheinfrastructureatSierraArmyDepot,USAMMAstillneededadecisiononreducingunit-assignedequipmentathomestation—MMRP’sfirsttenet,theCSHbaselineequipmentset.USAMMA’srecommendationonreducingunit-assignedequip-mentincludedreexaminingwhatwasathomestationandwhatbelongedtotheunitbutwasstoredatSierraArmyDepotintheFORSCOMHospitalOptimiza-tionStandardizationProgram(HOSP).TheHOSPwasdesignedtotakethe164-bedCSHsatFORSCOMlocationsandcentralizethematSierraArmyDepot,usingamemorandumofagreementwithAMC.ThememorandumofagreementbetweenFORSCOMandAMCprovidedforthestorageandmaintenanceoftheunits’164-bedCSHsonareimbursablebasis,whiletheunitsmaintainedtheir84-bedCSHsathomestation.

Specifically,USAMMArecommendedthattheUSARCRCHDandtheFORSCOMHOSPassetsatSierraArmyDepotbemergedintooneprogramman-agedbyUSAMMAtocreateefficienciesandreducethemaintenanceburdenonowningunits.Ultimately,manyfeltthisbridgingstrategytomergethetwodisparateprogramswouldprovideamoreresponsivehospitalsettodeployingforces,bothathomeandabroad.Infact,thecommanderofthe18thMedicalCommand(MEDCOM)andthe121stCSHinKorearequestedthatUSAMMAmaintainitsCSHbasedonUSAMMA’ssuccesswithsimilarunitswithintheAPSprogramlocatedatCampCarroll,Korea.USAMMAacceptedthisrequest,andthereadinessofthe121stCSHhasimprovedimmensely.The121st

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

CSH’smaintenanceservicesarenowontrack,dozensofequipmentitemshavebeenreplaced,andtheunitwasfullymodernizedinfiscalyear2010.

AddressingMMRPConcernsDuringaFORSCOMCSHcommanders’meetingin

2008,USAMMAbriefedonthethreetenetsofMMRP,themergingofHOSPandRCHD,anditspartnershipwiththe18thMEDCOMandthe121stCSHinKorea.Thisbriefingreceivedmixedreviewsbythoseinattendance;however,everyoneagreedthatthediscus-siontopicshadtobeaddressed.FORSCOMleadersattheconferencewereopposedtoreducingunit-ownedassetsathomestation,whileUSARCapplaudedtheconcept.FORSCOMleaderswereconcernedthatiftheydidnothaveadequateequipmentonhandathomestation,theirtrainingwouldsufferandtheirabilitytorespondtoalocalneedwouldbechallenged.

Toaddresstheseissues,OTSGandUSAMMAaskedtheRANDCorporationtostudythetenetsoftheMMRPconcept.Inthisstudy,RANDexploredmanyofFORSCOM’sconcernsandUSAMMA’srec-ommendationsingreatdetailwiththestakeholders.In2009,USAMMAandRANDrepresentativesattendedanotherFORSCOMCSHconferenceandprovidedanupdatedMMRPconceptbriefthatwascommendedbymostoftheconferenceattendees.AlthoughthedetailsontheCSHbaselineequipmentsetwerenotfullysolved,theFORSCOMG–3organizationintegratorandG–4medicallogisticsplanneragreedtoexploretheconceptindetail.TheCSHcommandersunani-mouslyagreedtomergeRCHDandHOSP,butthisconceptstillrequiredtheapprovaloftheUSAMED-COMandFORSCOMcommanders.ThecommandersofUSAMEDCOMandtheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandgavetheirstaffsandUSAM-MAapprovaltoworkcloselywithFORSCOMtofullydeveloptheMMRPinitiative.

TheArmyEquippingStrategyInSeptember2009,theDeputyChiefofStaff,

G–8,DepartmentoftheArmy,publishedawhitepapertitled“TheArmyEquippingStrategy,”whichdescribedhowtheArmyplanstoachieveequippingbalancebytheendof2011.ThisstrategyseeksanendstateinwhichSoldiershavetherightamountandtypeofmodernizedequipmenttomeettheirmissionrequirements,whetherincombat,trainingathomestation,orsupportingthehomeland.

LikeUSAMMA’sMMRPinitiative,thewhitepaperstatesthatunitswillbeequippedtoaccomplishthemis-sion.GiventherealitiesoffundingandthecomplexitiesoftheCSH,USAMMA’sconcepttodevelopastandardmedicalbaselineequipmentsetiscritical.UnitsgoingintotheARFORGENresetphasewillbeequippedtoapercentageoftheirMTOEbasedonbasicindividualand

limitedcollectivetrainingrequirementssotheywillbepreparedtoentertheirtrain/readyphase.

TheMMRPconceptworksinparallelwiththeArmyARFORGEN“waysmodel”discussedinthewhitepaper.OnceaunitreceivesitsmissionintheARFORGENtrain/readyphase,theCSHwillreceivetheequipmentrequiredforitsmission.ThemedicalequipmentforthedeployingCSHcouldbesourcedfromvariousstockpiles,toincludeUSAMMA’ssug-gestedmedicalcentralizedmanagementequipmentprogramatSierraArmyDepot(whichwouldultimate-lycombinetheUSARCandFORSCOMCSHsets)orothersourcingprograms(suchastheater-providedequipmentandAPS).Usingthe“ways”toequipCSHsisverychallengingbutgenerallyfollowsthespiritofthemodeldiscussedintheG–8whitepaper.

Ultimately,theG–8whitepaperdiscusses“friction”pointsintheArmy’sprocessforequippingunits.“Fric-tion”inthiscontextreferstoinadequateequipmentinventoriesavailabletoequiptothefullAcquisitionAuthorityObjective(AAO).InthecaseofaCSH,thecontinuousandunfundedrequirementsofrapidtechnologyturnoverandinadequatetimetomaintainhundredsofequipmentitemsmakeequippingindi-vidualCSHstothefullAAOwastefulandultimatelyburdensometoCSHleaders,users,andmaintainers.Unitsrarelydeploywithalloftheirequipment.Theydonotneeditorhavethecapabilitytomaintainit.USAMMAandRANDsuggestamodelthatequipsunitsinitiallytowhatisminimallyneededtotrainand,iftheyhavereceivedthemissiontosupportquick,localthreats(homelanddefenserequirements),theywouldbetrainedaccordingly.

ImprovingEquipmentforTrainingAsunitsmovethroughtheARFORGENphases,the

MMRPconceptsuggeststhatadditionalequippingbeprovidedfromvariousinventoriesasdiscussedear-lier.TomitigatethetrainingrisksassociatedwithlessthanfullAAOequipping,USAMMAwouldincreasethepriorityplacedonequippingthegeneratingforcemedicaltrainingsites,suchastheRTSs–MEDman-agedbytheUSARCbutavailabletobothActiveandUSARCunits.TheselocationswouldreceiveadequatemodernizedmaterielandSKOstomeetlarge-scalecol-lectivetrainingrequirementsnotavailableathomesta-tion.ThismodelworksverywellwithUSARCCSHsbecausetheytrainattheRTSs–MEDduringtheirannualtrainingandonlymaintainasmallamountofequipmentathomestation.

Inmanycases,ActivecomponentCSHstrainattheRTSs–MEDaswell,basedontheexpertiseandcapabilitiesoftheRTSs–MEDstaffs.Otherefficien-ciestheUSAMMACSHequippingmodelprovidesaretransparencyandassetvisibilityofcentrallyman-agedmedicalequipmentsets,basedontheday-to-day


controlandmanagementUSAMMAwouldprovide,similartotheAPSprogramUSAMMAmanagesalongwithAMC.

TheLBEprocessthatUSAMMAconductswithAMChasrevealedthat50percentofmedicalequip-mentinCSHswasnotfullymissioncapable.Theequippingwhitepaperinsiststhatunitsmustfindwaystofostermoreeffectivestewardshipofunit-ownedequipment.USAMMAfullysupportsthiswithonecaveat:Realistically,thevolumesofCSHmedicalequipment(thisincludesover1,700medicalequipmentitemsandthousandsofsuppliesandpharmaceuticalitems)andtechnologiesareoverwhelming.Granted,theCSHscouldimprovetheirsustainmentprograms,butwithoutadditionaltrainingtoaddressthecom-plexitiesoftheequipmentassignedtoaCSHandmoremedicalequipmentrepairersassignedtoaCSH,unitreadinesswillalwaysbelessthanacceptable.

USAMMAsuggeststhatthebasis-of-issueplansbereducedearlyintheARFORGENprocessandprudentequipmentdecisionsbemadeasaCSHreceivesitsmissionintheARFORGENtrain/readypool.UndertheMMRPmodel,unitleaderswouldhavemoretimetofocusonactualtrainingandnottheburdensomemaintenancetasksassociatedwiththelargequantitiesofmedicalequipmentitems.

ThesuggestionsoftheMMRPconceptanditstenetsastheyrelatetoequippingCSHsareanobvi-ousparadigmshiftandrequirethereexaminationofdecades-oldequippingprogramsandpolicies.Lead-ersmustopenthemselvestothe“Armyowned,unitleased”equippingconcept.TheArmymustalsorecon-siderhowbasis-of-issueplansareappliedandhow

unitsreportreadinessaspartoftheirmonthlyunitstatusreports.ManywouldarguethatUSAMMA’ssuggestedequippingstrategyforaCSHinvolvesmanyrisks;however,abetterargumentwouldsuggestthatfailuretoexploreUSAMMA’sMMRPequipmentstrategyisevenriskier.WiththelessonslearnedbytheLBEprogramandthedecisiontodeployaCSHtoAfghanistan,theMMRPconceptfostersamoreavail-able,lesscostly,andlessburdensomeequippingsolu-tionforourunits.

TheArmyshouldconsiderthesuggestedUSAM-MAMMRPequippingstrategyforCSHsbecausethecurrentwaysofequippingtheArmy’sCSHsarestruggling.CSHsdeservesmalleronhandequipmentinventories.Theyneedonlythetechnologiesandequipmentitemsminimallyrequiredfortraining,withtheunderstandingthatthemedicalgeneratingforcetraininglocationswillbeequippedtomitigateanyrisksfromreducedequipmentathomestation.Finally,astheCSHreceivesamission,USAMMAmusthavemedicalSKOsavailabletomeetunitmissionrequire-mentsastheyprogressthroughtheARFORGENphas-es.OncetheUSAMMAMMRPmodelisvettedanddemonstratesitsvaluetoaCSH’sreadiness,itcouldbeappliedtoothermedicalunitsandbeyond.

lieUtenant colonel charleS h. Strite, jr., iS the DepUty coMManDer for operationS of the arMy MeDical Materiel aGency at fort DetricK, MarylanD. he holDS a Bachelor’S DeGree froM MoUnt St. Mary’S colleGe in MarylanD anD a MaSter’S DeGree in BUSineSS aDMiniStration froM reGiS UniverSity.

the viewS expreSSeD in thiS article are thoSe of the aUthor anD May not Be enDorSeD By the U.S. arMy.

A combat support hospital employed in Iraq.

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

hippingclassVIII(medicalmateriel)suppliesoverseascanbeatrickyoperation.Sendingthemoverseasandrequiringthattheybemain-tainedattherighttemperaturethroughoutthejourneyisanevengreaterchallenge.Tryingtogettemperature-controlledshipmentsofclassVIIItoIraq,Afghanistan,ortheHornofAfricainthedeadofsummeristhegreatestchallengeofall.

AttheU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielCenter,Europe(USAMMCE),theDistributionandTransportationDivi-sion(D&T)receives,repackages,andshipshundredsofthousandsofrefrigerateditemsperyear,includingvaccines,pharmaceuticals,andlaboratoryandimagingreagents.RefrigeratedpackagesrangefromassmallasanofficetelephonetoaslargeasaXeroxprinter.Specificguidelinesdictatehoweachpackageistobepacked,dependingontheestimatedoutsidetemperaturethatthepackagewillbesubjectedtoandtheamountoftimethepackageislikelytobeintransit.

EachpackageisloadedwithaTempTaleRF[radiofrequency]monitor.(Themonitorisproducedby

Sensitech,abusinessunitofCarrierCorporation.)Thesemonitors,whichareslightlysmallerthanadeckofcards,periodicallyrecordthetemperatureinsidethepackage.Whenaproductarrivesatitsfinaldestination,therecipientisabletoseeifthetemperatureinsidethepackagehasremainedwithinthetemperaturerangesetforrefrigerateditems.Ifapackagearrives“outofrange,”theinformationissenttoUSAMMCE’sClinicalAdvisoryDivision(CAD)whoseclinicalstaffdetermineswhetherornottheproductisstillviableforuse.Theprocessishighlyeffectiveandhasbecomeamechanismforconfidentlymanagingthecold-chaincontinuityrequiredtosuc-cessfullyshiptemperature-controlleditems.

WithhundredsofTempTalemonitorstravellingtodestinationsthroughouttheworld,asystemhadtobedevelopedthatwouldcomprehensivelytrackandrecordthereadingsanddispositionofeachtem-perature-controlledpackagethatwasshippedfromaUSAMMCEdock.LeadersfromD&TandCADmetwithUSAMMCE’swebsitedesignerandlaidouttherequirementsforaTempTaleMonitorControlsystem.Inshortorder,thedesignerproducedacomprehensiveprogramthatwasintroducedtoUSAMMCE.

TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemisaMicro-softAccess-basedprogramthatallowsUSAMMCEtomonitor,track,andprovideclinicaldispositiononallcold-chainmaterialreceivedbyandshippedfromtheUSAMMCEdistributioncenter.Themainmenuofthedatabaseisdividedintothreesections:thereceivingsection,refrigerationsection,andCAD.Thougheachsection’sportalcontainsdifferentdata,theyinteracttoprovideanoverallpictureoftheshippingandstoragetemperatureoftemperature-managedmaterialwhileenroutetoandfromUSAMMCEfacilities.

Theabilitytomonitoratransportationorsupplyvendor’sandUSAMMCE’scold-chainmanagementsuccessrateisnowonlyamouse-clickaway.Thiscapa-bilityallowsD&Ttotracktheamountoftemperature-controlledpackagingmaterialitneedstomaintainthe

Cold-ChainManagementandtheUseofTempTaleTechnology

by CoLoneL MitCheLL e. brew, Major MiChaeL ronn, and petty offiCer first CLass suMMer webb, usn

S

TempTale is a monitor used to record the temperature of coldchain supplies as they travel to their customer. Once the supplies arrive at their destination, the customer can determine if the proper temperature was maintained throughout the trip. The device is distributed by Sensitech, a business unit of Carrier Corporation.


properenvironmentandtoadjustpackagingforfutureshipmentstosimilarareaswithsimilarweathercondi-tions.TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemprovidesUSAMMCEwiththecapabilitytoanticipatepackagingneedsbylearningfromthehistoricaldatacollectedandempowersittofurtherbenefititscustomers.

Whenaskedabouttheimportanceofensuringthattemperature-controlleditemsarrivewithinthecor-recttemperaturerangeattheirdestination,LieutenantColonelJohnBailey,USAMMCE’sD&Tchief,stated,“USAMMCEshipsover25,000poundsofcold-chainmedicalproductsandvaccinesannuallythatmustbedeliveredtoourcustomerswithin72hours.Forrefrig-eratedandfrozenmedicalproducts,itisimperativethatourpackingandshippingprotocolsarefollowedexactlytoensureourcustomersarereceivingviableproducts.USAMMCEhasalwaysbeenonthefore-frontofdevelopingcold-chainpackingprotocols.”

TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemprovidesamechanismtomeasureandreporttemperaturedatatoensurethatpackagingprotocolsareeffective.Asmedicalmaterieladvancesinsophistication,itoftenrequiresgreaterenvironmentalcontrol,andtheimpor-tanceofaccuratelytracking,recording,andprocess-ingdatafortemperature-sensitiveitemscontinuesto

increase.TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemisessentialtomanagingthislogisticsrequirement.

Futureupdatesandaddedfeatureswillcontinuetokeepthissystemoperatingasadynamicresourcethataddsanewcomponenttothetransportoftemperature-controlledmedicalmateriel.Itgivestheuserconfi-dencethattheproducthasbeenpackaged,shipped,andreceivedinanenvironmentthatmeetsthestrictrequirementsofthemanufacturersothattheproductcanbeusedtohelpthefightingforcedownrangeandbeneficiariesservingoverseas.

colonel Mitchell e. Brew iS the coMManDer of the U.S. arMy MeDical Materiel center, eUrope (USaMMce), in pirMaSenS, GerMany. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in BUSineSS ManaGeMent froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at BUffalo, an M.S. DeGree in inforMation SySteMS froM the UniverSity of SoUthern california, an M.h.a. DeGree froM Baylor UniverSity, an M.B.a. DeGree froM GeorGe waShinGton UniverSity, anD an M.S. DeGree in national reSoUrce StrateGy froM the inDUStrial colleGe of the arMeD forceS. he iS a MeMBer of the coUncil of SUpply chain ManaGeMent profeSSionalS anD a fellow in the aMerican colleGe of healthcare execUtiveS.

Major Michael ronn iS the chief of the clinical aDviSory DiviSion at USaMMce in pirMaSenS. he holDS a Doctor of pharMacy DeGree froM the Mercer UniverSity SoUthern School of pharMacy.

petty officer firSt claSS SUMMer weBB, USn, iS a hoSpital corpSMan firSt claSS aSSiGneD to the naval MeDical loGiSticS coMManD DetachMent at pirMaSenS. She ServeS aS the noncoMMiSSioneD officerincharGe of the clinical aDviSory DiviSion at USaMMce. She iS a GraDUate of the navy pharMacy technician School anD waS honoreD aS the navy’S Senior pharMacy technician of the year in 2008.

Employees at the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Europe, reice and box up H1N1 vaccine for shipment to the U.S. Central Command. Delivering pharmaceutical supplies requires coldchain management to monitor the temperature of sensitive medical materiel.

The TempTale Monitor Control system is a Microsoft Accessbased program that manages the radio frequency data gleaned from TempTale monitors. These data are analyzed to ensure the safety of coldchain medical materiel.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heChiefofOrdnanceandCommanding GeneraloftheArmyOrdnanceCenterand Schools,BrigadierGeneralLynnA.Collyar,andtheRegimentalCommandSergeantMajor,CommandSergeantMajorDanielEubanks,presidedoverthecas-ingoftheregimentalcolorsattheoriginalHomeofOrdnanceatAberdeenProvingGround,Maryland,attheconclusionoftheOrdnanceWeekactivitiesinMay2009.ThisfinalceremonywasfittinglyconductedinfrontoftheOrdnanceHeadquarters,affectionatelyknownas“theStones.”InSeptember2009,theunfurl-ingceremonywasheldinconjunctionwiththe9/11memorialserviceatFortLee,Virginia,notonlyestab-lishingthenewHomeofOrdnancebutalsocallingattentionto,andreflectingon,ourfallenOrdnanceSoldiers.

Manyarticleshavebeenwrittenaboutthestate-of-the-artfacilitiesonthenewOrdnancecampus.Thisarticlefocusesonthepeopleandorganizations,espe-ciallytheschoolbaseclosureandrealignment(BRAC)teams,thatforthepast5yearshavebeendesigning,building,equipping,andmovingtomakethenewOrd-nanceSchoolcampusareality.

PreparingtoMovetoFortLeeTheOrdnanceCenterandSchoolsbeganpreparing

forthemovetoFortLeeaftertheBRACCommission

announceditscongressionallymandateddecisionsinMay2005.ThecommissiondirectedthattheOrdnanceMechanicalMaintenanceSchoolatAberdeenProvingGroundandtheOrdnanceMunitionsandElectronicMaintenanceSchoolatRedstoneArsenal,Alabama,consolidateintooneOrdnanceSchoolandmergeatFortLeeby15September2011.

Whenthemovewasannounced,MajorGeneralVincentBoleswastheChiefofOrdnance.Underhisdirection,eachschoolquicklyorganizedteamstoimplementtheBRACdirective.TheBRACteamsrespondedtohundredsofdesigndetailsandrequestsforinformation;designedandpopulatedequipmentspreadsheets;designedroomdatasheetsdetailingend-userrequirementsfromsquarefootagetoaudio-visualdetails;andmanagedequipmentinventories,movements,anddeliveries.WhiletheycontinuedtotrainSoldiers,instructorsdevelopedcoursemovementstrategiesbasedontheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)mandatethatschoolscontinuetotraintheirannualloads.

Inadditiontotheschoolteams,MajorGeneralBolesassignedmetoleadtheOrdnance“torchparty,”whichstartedwithonepersonbutovertimegrewwiththeassignmentofseveralwarrantoffi-cers,noncommissionedofficers,andcontractors.ThetorchpartyworkedatFortLee,teamingwithNorfolk

TheOrdnanceSchools’MovetoFortLee

by GayLe a. oLszyK

T

This aerial photo shows the north range at Fort Lee, where recovery training and ammunition training will be conducted. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)


DistrictCorpsofEngineersrepresenta-tives,ArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommand(CASCOM)BRACcon-structionandsynchroniza-tionteams,FortLeegarrisonstaff,TRADOCandAssistantChiefofStaffforInstallationManagementBRACrepre-sentatives,andsevenconstruc-tioncompanies.Muchofoursuccesscanbeattributedtotheendlesshoursofdedicatedeffort,constantandfrequentcommunication,andattentiontodetailsoftheseteamsthatallworkedwiththegoalofrepresentingend-userrequirementsandensuringthenewfacilitiesmeetOrdnanceCorpsmissionsforthenext50years.

In2006,withnomanualsinhandonhowtoexecuteBRAC,thenewlyarrivedChiefofOrdnance,BrigadierGeneralRebeccaS.Halstead,directedmetobuildastrategyaroundlinesofoperation.Theselinesofoper-ation—construction,funding,personnel,transportation,andequipment—continueastheareaswetrackandbrieftotheOrdnanceSchoolleadersduringmonthlyBRACin-processreviews.

In2006,thefocuswasonthe“charrette”process.Duringthesemeetings,representativesfromeveryorganizationimaginable,includingutilities,firedepart-ments,forceprotection,environmental,theNationalParkService,informationtechnology,architects,engi-neers,andendusers,mettotranslateandvalidateuserrequirementsintoindividualbuildingdesignsandacampuswithmorethan20facilities.WhilelookingatthedayinthelifeofaSoldierandstandardizingclass-roomsandbaystructures,wecompiledlessonslearnedthatquicklybecamethefoundationsofthecharrettesthatfollowedourworkthroughthedesignreviews.Fromthesecharrettes,architectureandengineeringfirmsproducedrequestsforproposals,architectural

renderings,andfloorplans,givingusthefirstglimpseofthebuildings,theschools,andthefuture.

PreparingforConstructionIntheearlysummerof2007,treeswerefelledasthe

infrastructure,utilities,androadgridsbegantakingshapeonthe300-acrecampus.InNovember,ColonelMichaelT.McBride,OrdnanceCenterchiefofstaff,plantedtheregimentalflag,establishingtheOrdnanceCenter’spres-enceatFortLee.Duringthissameperiod,theBRACteams,workingwiththeCorpsofEngineersandColonelEdwardGully,specialassistanttotheCASCOMcom-manderonBRAC,beganthecontractawardprocess.ThefirstcontractwasawardedfortheTacticalSupportEquip-mentDepartment(TSED)facility,thefirstthreeofsixbarracks,andthebattalionandbrigadeheadquarters.

ThenextawardwasforthesecondlargestdiningfacilityintheArmy,withacapacitytofeed3,600Sol-diersin90minutes,followedbytheawardofthenorthrangevehicle-recoveryrangefacilitiesandfiveweld-ingandtrainingclassroom-and-bayfacilities.Con-structionawardscontinuedthrough2010.AsofMay2010,theonlyremainingawardswerefortheexplosiveordnancedisposalrangeandclassroomcomplex,theclimate-controlledstoragefacility,thechapel,andthefitnesscenter.

Brigadier General Lynn A. Collyar and Command Sergeant Major Daniel Eubanks case the Ordnance Center and School colors at the original Home of Ordnance at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in May 2009.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

At left: In September 2009, the Ordnance Center and School commanding general and command sergeant major unfurled the Ordnance Center and School colors at the Sustainment Center of Excellence headquarters at Fort Lee. (Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)

Above: The new Army Ordnance School has 15 training facilities, like these, with training bays. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)

At Right: In 2007, Army Ordnance Center and School staff planted the Ordnance Center and School flag to establish the Ordnance Center’s presence at Fort Lee. (Photo by Gayle Olszyk)


Thecampuslandscapecontinuedtochangeascon-structioncompaniesestablishedtheirpresencewithtemporaryofficestructuresandlay-downareasfortheirconstructionequipmentandbuildingmaterials.Soonafterconstructionwasunderway,theBRACteamsre-engagedwithreviewsandawardsoffurnishingandequipmentpackages.

BeginningInstructionattheNewCampusInJune2009,theTSEDfacilitywasthefirstbuild-

ingtoreachitsbuildingoccupancydate.Thispresent-ednewchallengestotheBRACteams,whichhadonly90daystofurnishandequipthebuildingfortrainingaccordingtoschool-developedcoursemoveschedules.Theoutcomewasathumbs-upforallastheTSEDtrainingstartedinAugust,rightonschedule.Sincethen,wehavecontinuedtorefineouroccupancypro-cess.On6July2010,trainingbeganinthefivecentralcampusphase-1buildings,withSoldiersbeinghousedinbarrackstwoandthree.

Fromthestart,theBRACstaffsatbothAberdeenandRedstonehavebeeninvolvedinaccuratelyiden-tifyingrequirements,design,contractreviews,equip-mentmovements,andestablishingnewproceduresfortheconsolidatedOrdnanceSchool.

Specialthanksmustgotothemilitaryandcivilianteamassignedtotheschool—thosewhochangeddutylocationandjobsandeventhosewhoretiredinlieuofmovingtoFortLee.Throughouttheseyears,withBRACasanadditionalduty,theOrdnanceSchoolcadreandinstructorshavedemonstratedtrueprofes-sionalismbycontinuingtoremainengagedthroughoutthelengthyprocessandworkingtoensurethefacilitiessupportedthedesiredendstate.

Savingthebestforlast,IwouldberemisswithoutofferingaveryspecialthankstoColonelDanReilly,commanderofthe61stOrdnanceBrigadeandOrd-nanceMechanicalMaintenanceSchool,whoforthepast2yearshasbeentherightleadertoexecutethefirstmoves,establishingthebrigadepresenceforcom-mandandcontrolandthefirsttrainingdepartment.Hisleadershipandmanagementskills,aswellashiscan-doattitude,areclearlythereasonswhythetrainingatthenewOrdnanceSchoolcontinuesonschedule.

Gayle a. olSzyK iS the DepUty to the coMManDer at the arMy orDnance School at fort lee, virGinia. She holDS a MaSter’S DeGree in eDUcation anD iS a GraDUate of the arMy ManaGeMent Staff colleGe anD the continUinG eDUcation coUrSe for Senior leaDerS.

An M1A2 Abrams tank arrives at the Ordnance School at Fort Lee, where it will be used to train ordnance Soldiers to maintain this weapon system. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nOctober2009,theArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommandatFortLee,Virginia,wasdesignatedastheSustainmentCenterofExcellence(SCoE),bring-ingtogetherallaspectsoftheOrdnance,Transportation,andQuartermasterCorpsandtheirassociateddoctrine,concepts,andtraining.Althoughthisisaninterestingconcept,itishardlyoriginal.In1919,inCoblenz,Ger-many,andthesurroundingareas,theU.S.ThirdArmy,outofnecessity,developedacompletemultifunctionalsustainmentoperation.ItnotonlysupportedalargeU.S.combatforcebutalsofoundcreativewaystotrainitsSoldiers,commonlyknownas“doughboys,”inlogisticsoperations.

EveryoneintheArmytodayisawareofthelong-standingdeploymentofU.S.militaryforcestoGer-many.SincetheendofWorldWarIIin1945,U.S.

ArmyandAirForcepersonnelandtheirfamilieshaveworked,traveled,andlivedinGermany.WhatmostpeopledonotrealizeisthatfromDecember1918toJanuary1923,anotherU.S.occupationforcewasinGermany,anditslittle-knownstoryisequallyascom-pellingasthestoryofthepost-WorldWarIIforce.

WorldWarIArmisticeThearmisticeof11November1918wasnotactu-

allytheendofWorldWarI;itwasmerelyatrucethatallowedthepeacenegotiationsneededtoendthewartotakeplace.Thoughvictorious,theU.S.,British,French,andBelgianarmieswerenotallowedtorestinplace.

Thetermsofthearmisticewereclearandfairlyprecise.ConditionVofthearmisticeagreementof11November1918stated,“Theareasoftheleftbankof

theRhineshallbeadministeredbythelocalauthorities,underthecon-troloftheoccupationtroopsoftheAlliesandtheUnitedStatesArmiesofOccupation.”ThismeantthattheAmericanExpeditionaryForces(AEF),commandedbyGeneralJohnJ.Pershing,stillhadworktodo.GeneralPershingknewthathehadtobuildtheU.S.portionoftheoccupyingforcefromtheforcesunderhiscommandandthatthisforcewouldhaveamissionunlikecurrentcombatoperations.

Granted,thismissionwasonetheyhadallbeenwaitingforbecauseitsassignmentsignifiedtheendofthefighting.Italsomeant,however,thatthedoughboysinselectedunitswouldbestayinginEuropewhiletheirbuddieswenthome.

ThirdArmyEstablishedDecidingthat,becauseofopera-

tionalconstraints,itwouldnotbe

Coblenz1919:TheArmy’sFirstSustainmentCenterofExcellence

by aLexander f. barnes

I

Soldiers prepare bread in the 90th Division’s quartermaster bakery in Bernkastel, Germany, in January 1919. (Photo courtesy of the Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania)


possibletouseeithertheFirstorSecondArmyasthearmyofoccupation,Pershinghadanotheroption.WiththerapidinfluxofdoughboysfromtheUnitedStatestothefrontlinesinFrance,planshadbeenmadebeforethearmisticetoorganizeathirdArmy.On14Novem-ber1918,thisarmywasdesignatedastheThirdArmywithMajorGeneralJosephT.DickmanascommanderandbecameknownastheArmyofOccupation.Today’sThirdArmyshoulderpatch,withitssymbolicAinsideanO,reflectsthatheritage.

Tostructurethenewarmy,Pershingchosethe1stDivision,the2dDivision(whichhadonebrigadeofMarinesandoneofSoldiers),the3dDivision,andthe4thDivisionfromhisActiveArmyunits.FromtheArmyNationalGuard,heselectedthe42dDivi-sionandthe32dDivision.FromhisNationalArmydivisions,headdedthe89thDivisionandthe90thDivision.[TheNationalArmywasavolunteerArmy(almostanalogoustotoday’sArmyReserve)thatwasestablishedin1917anddisbandedin1920.]Alltogether,theseeightdivisionswouldmakeupthemaincombatstrengthoftheThirdArmy.(Mostreaderswillbemorefamiliarwiththeseunitsasinfantrydivisions,suchasthe1stInfantryDivision,butduringtheperiodinquestion,theArmyhadonlyinfantrydivisions;therefore,theywerecalledthe1stDivision,2dDivi-sion,andsoforth.)

Pershinglateraddedthe5thDivisionandthe33dDivisiontosecurethelineofcommunicationthatwouldrunfromFrancethroughLuxembourgandintoGermany.Healsoincludedanumberofpioneerinfan-tryregiments,corpssupportunits,truckcompanies,andaviationunitstoroundouthisforce.[Pioneerinfantryregimentsperformedanumberofvaluabletasks,suchasequipmentrecoveryandsalvageoperations.Theyalsodidengineer-typework,suchasroadrepair.]

Intotal,Pershingsentover250,000doughboysintoa2,500-square-milesectionofGermanyinhabitedbyslightlylessthanamillionGermans.Healsodeployedalmost50,000ofhistroopstoLuxembourg.Sendingaforceofthissizeintoarelativelysmallareahadseri-ousimplicationsforThirdArmylogisticians.

ThirdArmy’sMissionTheThirdArmy’smissionwasquitecomplexand

evolving.ThefirstphaserequiredtheselectedunitstoleavetheirpositionsintheMeuse-ArgonneareaofFrance,movebyroadthroughLuxembourg,crosstheGermanborderon1December1918,andtakecontroloftheRhineRiverbridgesinthedesignatedU.S.occu-pationsectorofGermany.Forsomeunits,thismeanta300-kilometerhiketotheoccupationsites.ThebridgesinquestionincludedapontoonbridgeandarailroadbridgeatCoblenzandtherailroadbridgesatEngersandRemagen.TheThirdArmyhadtomaintainsecureaccesstoallofthesebridgesonbothsidesoftheRhine.

TheBritishArmytothenorthandtheFrenchArmytothesouthhadsimilarmissionsandtheirownbridgestoseizeandguard.TheBelgianArmy,farthestnorthoftheAlliedArmies,occupiedtheareaaroundAachen,Ger-many,butdidnothaveabridgeheadacrosstheRhine.

Thesecondphaseoftheoperationwastousetheoccupationsectorsasadministrationzonesforacceptingandprocessingthewarmateriel(guns,machineguns,aircraft,andvehicles)thatGermanywasrequiredbythearmisticetohandovertotheAllies.Thedeliveryofthismaterielwasamajorprojectthatwasnotcompleteduntillateinthesummerof1919.Afterallmaterielwasdelivered,themissionfocuswasensuringthatGer-manyprovidedtheAllieswiththefinancialreparationsrequiredbythearmisticeandsubsequenttreaties.

TheAllieswerekeenlyawarethattheGermanArmyhadmovedacrossthesesamebridgesenroutetotheirstartingpointsfortheinvasionofBelgiumandFrancein1914.Shouldpeacenegotiationsbreakdown,theAlliescouldusethesestronglydefendedbridgeheadsacrosstheRhinetoquicklymovetheirforcesintotheheartofGermanyandcontinuethewar.

Allthiswasinthefuture,though,becausePershingfirsthadtogethistroopstotheiroccupationsitesonbothsidesoftheRhineRiver.

MarchFromFranceThelongmarchthroughtherainandmudofa

EuropeanwinterfromFrancethroughLuxembourgtoGermanywasadifficultone.MostofPershing’sdivisionshadcomestraightoutofcombatandwereinseriousneedofrefurbishingandresupply.TheArmyof1918stilldependedheavilyondraftanimalsfortransportation,andtheyhadsufferedasmuchastheSoldiershadintheOctobertoNovembercam-paignintheArgonneForest.

ThirdArmylogisticianshadlessthan2weekstopreparetheselectedunitsforthemovetoGermany.However,thelogisticiansweregiventheauthoritytotakewhateverwasavailablefromnon-ThirdArmyunitstomakeupequipmentshortagesforthedeploy-ingunits.Keepinginmindthatmanyofthetroopswerestillwearingthesamesinglecombatuniforminwhichtheyhadstartedthecampaign,thesizeofthetaskwasdaunting.

Fortunately,towardtheendofthewar,theU.S.ServicesofSupplyhadmadesomeimprovementsinitsabilitytosupplythefrontlineSoldierwithwhatheneeded.Nonetheless,asthe250,000doughboyscrossedtheGermanborderon1DecemberandheadedtotheRhine,theirequipmentandphysicalconditionstillleftmuchtobedesired.Notonlywereboots,rifles,gasmasks,artillerypieces,signalcarts,andkitchentrailerswornout,atleast90percentofthetroopswereinfestedwithlice.SpanishfluandmumpsepidemicsalsowreakedhavoconindividualSoldiers.

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Tomakemattersworse,Pershing’sSoldierswereheadedintoenemyterritorythatpromisedlittleinthewayoffood,supplies,ormedicaltreatment.Germanyhadbeenblockadedfor4years,andtheinhabitantsoftheareastobeoccupieddidnothaveenoughfoodandmedicineforthemselves,muchlessforanoccupyingforce.Sustainingtheforcewasgoingtorequirecre-ativity,anditwasgoingtohavetobefast.

SustainingtheTroopsTheinitialplanforlogisticssupporttotheThird

ArmyhadcalledformovingsuppliesandequipmentbyroadandrailfromthedepotsinFrancethroughLux-embourgandthenintoGermany.However,theFrenchrailsystemhadbeenthoroughlywornoutduringthewarandrequiredsignificantrepair.Francedesperatelyneededtheavailablerollingstocktogetitsindustrialbasebackonapeacetimefooting.Therefore,theFrenchGovernmentaskedtheAEFtoconsideranothermeansofmovingsuppliestotheoccupationzone.

Thisrequestmeantthatshortlyafterarrivingintheoccupationzone,theThirdArmyhadtocompletelyredoitslogisticssupportplan.Afterashortstudy,theArmydecidedtobringwhatitcouldbytruckfromtheAEFdepotsinFranceandtohavethebulkoftheirsuppliesshippedfromtheUnitedStatestoeitherAntwerp,Belgium,orRotterdam,TheNetherlands.Fromtheseports,thecargowouldbeloadedontoriverbargesandtoweddowntotheRhineriverportsintotheU.S.occupationzone.Bendorf,Germany,ontherightbankoftheriver,wasusedtosupportthe1st,2d,and32dDivisions.

AndernachandCoblenz-LützelontheleftbankoftheRhinewereselectedtosupporttheotherunits.Intime,largerationdumpswereestablishedatAnder-nachandBendorfandaquartermasterdepotwassetupatCoblenz-Lützel.AllofthesedepotsiteswerechosennotonlyfortheirproximitytotheRhineforreceivingtheinboundcargobutalsoforthenearbyroadjunctionsandrailheadsthatallowedeasyonwardmovementtothetroopsites.

Armylogisticiansalsolookedaroundtoseewhatwasavailablelocallytosupporttheforce.WorkingintheThirdArmy’sfavorwasthefactthattheareaaroundCoblenzhadbeenahubofsupporttotheGer-manArmy,sowithalittleinnovation,somelogisticsfunctionscouldgetafaststart.Thelogisticiansfirsthadtoworktheirwaythroughthegreatpilesofaban-donedGermanwarmaterielstillinthearea.Inonewarehouse,theyfound140,000blankets,whichtheyplacedonbargesandshippeduptheRhinetoRotter-damforusebyrefugeesinwar-tornBelgium.BalesofclothformakingGermanArmyuniformswerefoundinaCoblenzfactoryandsentbacktoFrancetohelpmakeandrepairtheuniformsofthethousandsofGer-manprisonersofwarbeingheldthere.

AmongthefacilitiesfoundinLützel,atownonthenorthsideoftheMoselRiver,acrossfromCoblenz,wasacompleteshoeanduniformmanufacturingplant.OwnedbytheGermanGovernmentandpreviouslyamajorsupplierofuniformsandshoesfortheGermanArmy,theplantwaswelllaidoutandequippedwithelectricallypoweredmachines.Operatingthefacility,ThirdArmyquartermastersrepaired13,348pairsofshoesinJanuaryandFebruary1919.Bymid-February,thedailyoutputwasbetween800and1,000pairs.

Afterthelong,muddymarchtotheRhine,theThirdArmymovedquicklytoprovidelaundryservicestotheU.S.forcesintheoccupationzone.TheArmytookoverseveralGermanlaundriestowashandcleanthetroops’uniforms.Armymobilelaundryunitsthathadmadethemarchsoonjoinedintoaugmentthisdes-peratelyneededservice.AlargeGermanlaundrywithsixwashingmachineswaslocatedclosetotheLützelshoefactory,soitwasalsoappropriated.AstheThirdArmylaterreportedontheoperation,“BythemiddleofFebruaryanoutputof30,000piecesadaywasbeingmaintainedwithaforceof45Germanciviliansworkingintwoshifts,andthesystemwasworkingsowellthatlaundryreceivedinthemorningwaswashed,repairedandironedbynight.”ThesalaryforeachoftheseGermanemployeeswaspaidforbytheGermanGovernmentaspartofthecostofoccupation.

AmmunitionStoresDuringthefirstdaysoftheoccupation,inaddition

tosalvagingGermanmilitaryequipmentandmonitor-ingthewarreparationefforts,theThirdArmylogisti-cianshadanotherequallyimportant,andpotentiallymoredangerous,mission.WhentheThirdArmySol-diersarrivedintheirdesignatedoccupationzone,theyfoundlargequantitiesofammunitionthathadbeenleftbehindbytheGermantroopswhentheyevacuatedRhineland-Pfalz.MostofthisammunitionwasfoundatTrier;Neuwied;Mülheim(nearCoblenz),wheretheGermanshadmaintainedaplantforassemblingammunitionofvariouscalibers;andattheold19th-centuryfortssurroundingCoblenz.

ThestocksincludedGermanammunitionandammu-nitionthathadbeencapturedfromtheAlliedarmies.Theyfoundshellsofeverycaliberandlargenumbersoffuses,aerialbombs,grenades,emptyshellcases,andsmall-armsammunition.Theyalsofoundlargequanti-tiesofgunpowder,zinc,lead,andbrassusedintheman-ufactureofammunition.MuchoftheammunitionwasunserviceableandtoodangeroustojustifycontinuedstorageorshipmenttotheUnitedStates.

ThirdArmyordnancespecialistsquicklydemili-tarizedordismantledthedangerousmaterials.Theywereabletosalvagesomeofthemunitionsforfutureuse,experimentation,andstaticdisplaysandman-agedtorecover135,000artilleryshells,400,000


fusesforartilleryshells,morethan22millionroundsofsmall-armsandrifleammunition,3,000heavyartillerybrasscartridgecasings,36,000navalshells,and2,000tonsofGermangunpowder.MuchofthisammunitionwaslaterusedinannualArmyofOccu-pationwargamesthattookplaceeachautumnandinvolvedlargenumbersoflive-fireexercises.

WhiletheThirdArmywasworkingtosolvemanylogisticsissueslocally,thedistributionpipelinecomingfromtheUnitedStatesslowlystartedtomovemate-riel.Suppliesforthedoughboyswerefirsttoweddowntheriveron23March1919andcontinuedtoarriveatanaveragerateof1,216tonsperweekatAndernachand1,912tonsperweekatBendorf.ThenewdepotatCoblenz-Lützelreceived977tonsofquartermasterstorestobemaintainedastheThirdArmy’sstocks.Inaveryshorttime,theRhineRiver,controlofwhichwasthemainreasonfortheArmytobeinGermany,hadbecomeitssupportlifeline.

MeetingOtherSoldierNeedsTheneedforsomeofthesesupplieswascritical.

Theliceinfestationofapproximately90percentofthedoughboyshadtobeaddressed.Oncethetroopswereintheirbilletsintheirassigneddivisions’sectors,themedicsstartedamassivecampaigntodelousethetroopsandfreethecommandofvermin.

Atfirst,onlyonetruck-mountedsteamsterilizingmachinewasavailableandthebathingfacilitiesinthesmallertownswereinadequate.Inresponse,theThirdArmymedicsandmechanicsworkedtogethertobuildseveralsteam-powereddisinfectingmachines.Withthisequipmentandsomestandardsteamdisin-fectorsandportableshower-bathsthatarrivedinthezone,thelicemenacewasrapidlyreduced.By31May1919,theliceinfestationratewasdowntolessthan1percent.

TheThirdArmyalsobeganaprogramofschoolstotrainthedoughboysinmilitaryandciviliansubjects.Soontherewereunit-levelanddivision-levelschoolsinanumberoflocations.The33dDivision,stillinLuxembourg,evenfoundtimetosendallofitscooksandmesspersonnelbacktoclassforrefreshertraininginmesshalloperations.

AmericanForcesingermanyInJuly1919,theThirdArmyfurleditsflagandwas

replacedbytheAmericanForcesinGermany(AFG).MajorGeneralHenryT.Allen,theAFGcommander,wasafirmbelieverinbothfieldtrainingandclass-roomtraining,andunderhisguidance,theschoolsys-temsflourishedevenmore.Heestablishedaregimeninwhichclassattendancewasexpected,ratherthanjustencouraged.

TheschoolsystemsoonincludedaMechanicalSchoolfeaturingformalinstructioninautomobileand

motorcyclerepair,blacksmithing,welding,anddriving.TheQuartermaster’sSchooltaughtcooking,baking,andshoerepair.TheOrdnanceSchoolfocusedonweaponandgeneralequipmentrepairatthecompanyorbatterylevel.TheSignalCorpsandEngineerCorpsalsoranschoolsthattaughteverythingfromradiooperationandrepairtomapmakingandmechanicaldrafting.EventheAFG’s“provisional”cavalrysquadronranaschooltoteachstableoperationsandsaddlerepair.

ThecrownjeweloftheArmyschoolsystemwasasmallfarmthattheAFGquartermasterssetupnearMülheim.Usedasateachinglaboratoryforagriculturalsciences,itprovidedclassesonsuchtopicsasanimalhusbandry,gardening,andgeneralagriculture.Usingstudentlabor,thefarmprovidedfreshmeat,vegetables,eggs,milk,andflowersfortheSoldiersanddependentfamiliesofAFG.BecauseofthescarcityofgoodmilkintheU.S.zone,thefarmbecamethesourceforallthemilkusedforpatientsinthelocalArmyhospitals.ThequartermasterfarmalsoprovidedmilkforthechildrenofU.S.servicemenassignedtoAFG.

The Army authorized unit shoulder patches just before the World War I armistice. In this example from the occupation, a doughboy has sewn a small Third Army patch into the center of his 4th Division patch. After General Allen assumed command, only the Third Army patch was authorized for wear by Soldiers in Coblenz. (Photo courtesy of Alison Hutton)

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

AFgDrawdownIntheUnitedStates,the1920swerestartingto

“roar,”andwiththepost-wareconomicboomandthegrowingsenseofisolationism,noonereallycaredmuchabouttheGermanRhineland.TheU.S.congres-sionalenthusiasmtomaintainaforceontheRhinedwindledwithtime,causingthesizeoftheAFGtoshrinkastheoccupationranitscourse.

Withthecontinueddrawdown,everymonthbroughtmoresalesofexcessequipmentnolongerneededbytheAFG.AllAFGaviationactivitiesshutdowninApril1922,andallaviationequipment,including24Dehavi-landDH–4aircraft,severalbrandnewLibertyengines,andothersparepartsattheairfieldnearWeissenthurm,wassold.AlsoincludedintheauctionwereallofthegardeningtoolsandlivestockthattheAirServicedoughboyshadaccumulatedtosupplementtheirdietandasapastimefortheiroff-dutyhoursattheairfield.

InJanuary1923,withitsstrengthdownto1,000men,theAFGreceivedorderstofolditsflagandreturnhome.Faithfultotheveryendtothecauseofinnovationandself-sufficiency,allmaterielthatcouldnotbecarriedawaywasdisposedofthroughlocalauc-tionsandsales.EventheAFG’sunofficialnewspaper,supportedcompletelybylocalsubscriptionsandadver-tising,soldoffallitsofficeequipmentanddonatedtheproceedstobuymilkforthechildrenofpoorGermanfamiliesinCoblenz.

ByFebruary1923,alloftheU.S.forcesweregoneandtheFrenchArmyhadmovedintoCoblenztomain-taintheoccupation.WhocouldhaveknownthenthattheU.S.ArmywouldreturninforceagaintothispartofGermanyinMarch1945?ThecaptureoftheLudendorff

RailroadBridgeatRemagen,theverysamebridgeonceproudlyguardedbytheSoldiersandMarinesofthe2dDivisionafterWorldWarI,wouldsignalthattheendofWorldWarIIinEuropewasnearandthesecondoccu-pationofGermanywouldsoonbegin.

Inretrospect,thereisalottobeadmiredabouttheArmy’s“firstsustainmentcenterofexcellence”atCoblenz.Thoughtheywouldnotrecognizethatname,thelogisticiansoftheThirdArmyandAFGcertainlyearnedthetitle.Providingsupportunderunusualconditionsinaforeignland,theyshowedacreativestreakthatensuredthattheUnitedStateshadaviableforcetomeetavariedmission.Whiledoingso,thoselogisticiansalsomanagedtorunavarietyofschoolandtrainingsitesthatpreparedthedoughboysnotonlytobebetterSoldiersbutalso,inmanycases,preparedthemforcivilianoccupationsaftertheirser-vicewascomplete.

Whethersupportingthe250,000menoftheThirdArmyin1918orthelast1,000doughboysoftheAFGin1923,theassignedlogisticianscertainlyearnedaplaceofhonoraspartofthefirstU.S.“watchontheRhine.”GeneralPershingputitmoresimply:Theywerepartof“thebestunitintheArmy.”

alexanDer f. BarneS iS a loGiSticS ManaGeMent SUperviSor for the enterpriSe SySteMS Directorate of the arMy coMBineD arMS SUpport coMManD. he iS a forMer enliSteD Marine anD arMy warrant officer. he holDS a Bachelor’S DeGree in anthropoloGy froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at cortlanD anD a MaSter’S DeGree in archeoloGy froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at BinGhaMton.

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CombinedArmsSupportCommand(CASCOM),isfortheofficertothinkofhimselffirstandforemostasamultifunctionallogistician.ToquoteGeneralStevenson,whoisnowtheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,DepartmentoftheArmy(DA),“Otherwise,whywouldwehavebotheredtogothroughallofwhatwewentthrough?”

Thechallengeisthatwealsohaveanobligationasaunifiedcorpstonourishandsustainourindividualareasoffunctionalexpertise.Futuredivisiontrans-portationofficers,chiefsoftheOfficeoftheQuar-termasterGeneral,andchiefsofordnancehavetobedeveloped.

LogisticsofficersarestronglyencouragedtoreadDAPamphlet600−3,CommissionedOfficerProfessionalDevelopmentandCareerManagement,andbecomeacquaintedwithrecentupdates,includinganexpandedlistofkeydevelopmentalpositionsformajorsandanupdatedcareerpathchart.Ifofficershavefurtherques-

tions,theyshouldtalktotheirsustainmentchainofcommand,humanresourcesmanagers,orthechiefoftheLogisticsBranchProponencyofficeatCASCOM.

ThebottomlineisthatasanLGofficer,onemustbereadytodoitall—fight,support,andsurvive.TheLGofficermustbebothafunctionalexpertandcompletelyfamiliarwithmultifunctionalsustainment.Ifitwereeasy,theywouldnotcallitlogistics.

lieUtenant colonel MarShall n. raMSey iS cUrrently ServinG aS the chief of Staff for the arMy coMBineD arMS SUpport coMManD anD SUStainMent center of excellence at fort lee, virGinia. he previoUSly ServeD aS the chief of the loGiSticS Branch proponency office anD aS coMManDer of the 842D tranSportation Battalion, Military SUrface DeployMent anD DiS triBUtion coMManD.

lieUtenant colonel tiM Gilhool iS en roUte to Be the coMManDer of the 782D BriGaDe SUpport Batta lion, 4th BriGaDe coMBat teaM, 82nD air Borne DiviSion, at fort BraGG, north carolina. he recently ServeD aS the coMManDer of the 71St StUDent Battalion at the arMy loGiSticS UniverSity at fort lee.


T heUH−60BlackHawkhelicopterisfamiliar totheAmericanpublic,butfewoutsidethe U.S.Governmenthavethoughtmuchaboutwhatitcosts.SikorskyAircraftCorporationsellstheBlackHawktotheArmyatanaveragecostofapproxi-mately$14million(includingplatformprocurementandinitialspares).Thefleetcurrentlyconsistsofabout1,800BlackHawks,eachwithanaveragelifespanof25years.Duringeveryyearofitslife,aBlackHawkrequiresabout$800,000ofrepairandsparepartspur-chases.Thesepurchasesfallintothecategoryofsus-tainment.

Whileattentionistypicallyfocusedontheinitialcostofprocuringaweaponsystem,sustainmentspend-ingactuallyaccountsformostofthetotallifetimecostofownership.Sustainmentiscriticalfromamissionandreadinessperspective.Whensustainmentisopti-mized,weaponsystemsperformbetter,spendlesstimeunderrepair,andremaininuselonger,thusdelayingtheneedfortheirreplacement.Foreveryadditionalyearthatahelicopterremainsinuse,theArmysavesover$4million.

Atatimeofdefensecost-cutting,acquisitiontrans-formation,andemphasisonresponsibleuseoftax-payerdollars,abipartisanperceptionhasgrownthattheFederalprocurementsystemhasproblemsbuy-ingandmaintainingbig-ticketweaponsystemsfromtheaerospaceanddefenseindustry.Thecurrentwayofdoingbusinessintheweaponsystemsmarketisprimedforamajoroverhaul.GiventhattheDepart-mentofDefense(DOD)budgets60percentmoreforoperationandmaintenancethanforprocurement,theUnitedStatesfacesanopportunitytoimprovehowitacquiresweaponsystemsustainment.

Thisarticleoutlinesamajorparadigmshifttowardamorecollaborativemanagementapproach:aligninglogisticsandacquisitionactivityamongthemilitaryservices,theDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),andprivateindustry.Intheidealfuturestate,DODwouldbridgethegapbetweensupplychainandprocurementmanagementthroughadisci-plinedoperationalstrategyofcollaborativemanage-ment.Thisstrategywouldincludecollaboration

COMMENTARY

CollaborativeManagementWillImproveWeaponSystemSustainment

withinbothindividualandjointweaponsystemportfolios,providingseamlessintegrationofsupplychainmanagement(includingsourcing)bytheser-vices,DLA,andindustry.

ANewEnvironmentCallsforChangeWeaponsystemsustainmenttodayfailstotake

advantageofopportunitiesforgeneratingefficien-ciesandsavings.LegacypracticeshavepreventedDODfromoptimizinglifecyclecosts.Theservicesbuyindividuallyfromthesamesuppliersand,insomecases,purchaseidenticalsystems,parts,andservices.

Furthermore,theseparationofsupplychainandacquisitionactivitiesmeansthattotalsystemportfoliocostsarehardtocapture.Keydecisionsaremadeinisolation,resultinginsignificantsustainmentcostandreadinessimpactsthatshouldhavebeenaddressedinacquisition.Theservicesalsohavebeenunabletopartnereffectivelywithindustrytoensuretop-notchservice.

Weaponsystemsustainmentiscurrentlyundergo-ingrapidchange.Whileseveraleffortsareunder-waytoimprovesustainmentthroughoutDOD,theenvironmentsurroundingsustainmentisrapidlyandfundamentallychanging.Inordertomakelastingimprovements,wemustfirstunderstandthesechangesandtheirimplications.

AnEmphasisonPrecisionOverBruteForceTheDODmissionisshiftingfrombruteforce

topersistentprecision.DOD’smissioncontinuestoevolvefromtheColdWargarrisonmodeltoonethatcanconducttheGlobalWaronTerrorismwithasmall-er,moreprecise,moreresponsive,andmorepersistentfootprint.DODforcesandtheirsupportingsupplychainsmustbeabletodeploy,reconstitute,andrede-ployonamoment’snotice.Weaponsystemsmustbeabletomoveandmaintainreadinessinthisrapid-fireenvironment.Thesedemandsleavelittleroomforpro-cessinefficiencies,especiallythosethataffectsupplychainperformance,byeitherDODoritssustainmentprovidersinindustry.

by riCK ConLin and jiM MCintosh

The environment in which weapon system sustainment takes place is changing fundamentally. The authors believe these changes will require the Department of Defense and industry to transform the way they do business.

T


56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

InternalDODChangesAffectSustainmentTheapproachtosustainmentreflectsinternalDOD

changes.JustasDOD’smissionhasshifted,thefunda-mentalapproachtosustainmentsourcinghasadaptedtokeychangeswithinDOD,includingbaseclosureandrealignment(BRAC),DLA’sevolvingrole,andseveralOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)-ledinitiatives.

BRAClegislationhasforcedDODtofurtherrethinkthemanagementofinventoryandsupplychains.DODischangingthecurrentdistributionchannelsforparts,commercializingsignificantpiecesofthedefensesup-plychain,andbringingDLAintoorganicdepotopera-tions.OneparticularlyimportantDODimperativedealswithlogistics—inparticular,sustainmentsourc-ingwithcommercialproviders.ThiscurrentBRACimperativehasraisedconcernamongtheservicesthatsustainmentsourcingwillhaveaneffectonoverallmissionperformance.Whensustainmentsourcingisdonewell,commerciallogisticsofferingsproperlyalignwithDODproducts,services,assets,andcapa-bilities.Whensustainmentisdonepoorly,ithampersDOD’squick-strikecapability.

DLA,incoordinationwiththeU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM),OSD,andtheservices,hasbeenavocalleaderinthetransitiontoanenterprisesupplychain.DLAhasimplementedmanystrategicsourcinginitiativesthatrelatedirectlytoweaponsys-temsustainment.Theagencycreatedmultifunctionalstrategicsourcingmaterialgroupswithinitseightcross-servicesupplychains(aviation,land,maritime,constructionandequipment,clothingandtextile,med-ical,subsistence,andenergy).

ThisexpandedDLArolehasproducedabroadersourcingportfoliothatincludesclassIX(repairparts)andcross-servicepartneringintireacquisition(amongtheArmy,Navy,andAirForce),theIndus-trialPrimeVendorprogram,andtheFleetAutomo-tiveSupportInitiative.However,thereisstillroomforsignificantimprovementnotonlywithinDLAbutalsothroughoutDOD.

ThetransitiontothinkingjointlyacrossDODisstillfarfromcomplete.Theservicesanddefenselogisticsprovidersunderstandtheclearneedforajointsupplychainapproach.Theyknowthattheyusemanycom-monparts,components,subsystems,platforms,andrepaircapabilitiesandhaveintegratedsomelow-levelareasofcommonsupply.However,themajorweaponsystemsandplatformspresentasignificantchallenge.Theservicesfearthatindiscriminateleveragingwilloverlooktheuniqueserviceandproductneedsofcom-plexweaponsystemsorplatforms,andtheymaintainastrongdesiretoretainownershipofsustainment.

Tomoveforwardcomfortably,theservicesmustfeelconfidentthataweaponsystemsustainmentportfoliohasclearlyarticulatedbusinessandper-formancerequirements tailored to their own needs

thatcanbeforwardedtoindustry,bidon,andexe-cuted.However,atthispointtheservicesrecognizethattheydonotfullyunderstandwhatisuniqueabouttheirrequirementsversuswhatelementsarecommontoalltheservices.Itisabsolutelyessentialthattheservicesbeabletocommunicatewhatdifferentiatestheirownmajorweaponsystems.Otherwise,theycannotmakeeducateddecisionsonwhattokeepinhouseandwhattoshare.

HiddenOwnershipCostsSeparatingsupplychainandacquisitionactivities

hidestotalownershipcosts.Historically,inventoryprocurement,commercialrepair,andorganicrepairforweaponsystemshavebeencontractedseparately,sub-jecttotheuncoordinatedinvolvementofprogramman-agementofficers,line-itemmanagers,andcontractingofficers.Asaresult,itisdifficulttounderstandandquantifytheportfolioofsparepartsandrepairrequirementsforagivennationalstocknumber.Thischallengehasbecomemoreprofoundwiththeexpand-ingroleofDLA.Moreimportantly,thiscomplexitytranslatesintolimitedvisibilityofpurchasingacrosstheseactivities,atremendouspotentialforredundancywithinanenterpriseportfolio,andlostopportunitiestoleveragebuyingpowertoreducecosts.

IndustryPartnershipsAreEvolvingIndustrypartnerships,whileanimportantelement

ofDOD’stransformation,arealsokeyelementsoftheunderlyingchallengeofsustainingweaponsys-tems.Whilemanyapproacheshavebeentriedwithvaryingdegreesofsuccess,thebestmodelforthesepartnershipshasyettobedefined.Overthepastsev-eralyears,thenumberofindustrypartnershipshasincreaseddramatically;DODrepairdepotsalonehave348.Althoughthenatureoftheagreementshasalsoevolvedaspartnershipshavebecomebroaderandmorecomplexinscope,depotpartnershipsarestillprimarilyfocusedonblue-collaractivitiesandhavenotencour-agedsubstantialinvestmentfromtheindustrialbase.

UsingPerformance-BasedAgreementsUseofperformance-basedlogistics(PBL)agree-

mentsisgrowing.Aparticularlysuccessfulformofindustrypartnership,PBLisasustainmentsupportstrategythatalignsincentivesforlogisticsperformancewiththedesiredoutcomesforweaponsystemperfor-mance.WhilePBLhasbeenimplementedsuccessfullywithindustrialsuppliers,DODisexploringopportuni-tiestoapplyitwithintheorganicrepaircommunity.

PBLagreementsusuallyincludesomelevelofbaseline,award,orpenaltypaymentsassociatedwithprenegotiatedsupplychainorweaponsystemper-formancemetrics,suchason-timedelivery,materielavailability,orsystemuptime.Moreimportantly,PBL

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT


agreementscreateincentivesforsustainmentproviderstocontinuouslyimprovetheirlogisticsefficiencyandperformance,resultinginimprovedweaponsystemperformanceatlowersupportcosts.

Themostprogressive(orinclusive)PBLsoutsourcesignificantelementsoftheDODweaponsystemsup-plychain,suchasdistribution,maintenance,andinventorymanagementorownership.Theleastpro-gressivePBLssimplyoutsourceasinglefunction,suchasdistributionorsupply.

DOD’sexperiencewithPBLshasshownthatcertainperformance-basedapproachesaremoreappropriateinspecificsituations.Platform-levelprograms,suchastheAirForce’sC−17transport,alignallaspectsofsustain-menttotheoverallgoalofplatformreadiness.However,commonsubsystems,suchasauxiliarypowerunitsandaircraftengines,areusedjointlyandacrossplatforms.Inthosecases,thekeyperformanceobjectiveissimplytheavailabilityofthesubsystem.Similarly,commod-itypartsprovidershaveenteredintoPBLagreementsfocusedprimarilyonpartsavailabilityanddeliveryper-formance.ThePBLcontractforNavyaircrafttiresisaleadingexampleofacommodity-levelPBLagreement.

ThecriticalfactorforPBLeffectivenessisbalanc-ingtheamountofriskthatDODwilltransfertoanindustrypartneragainsttheamountoffinancialliabil-itythattheindustrypartneriswillingtoaccept.Failuretoachievethisbalancetranslatesintoinadequateandcostlysupplychainperformanceorfinancialdam-agetothecompanyenteringintothePBL.Thesearrangementsmustbe“win-win”scenariosthatdeliverrequiredperformanceatacceptablecosttotheGovern-mentandensurethatthecommercialpartnercanmeettheperformancerequirementprofitably.

Withexperience,DODisgettingbetteratdraftingPBLagreements.InrecentPBLprogramsandsecond-generationnegotiations,DODisaskingindustrytodeterminethecostsoftheircontractedperformancelev-els.DODisalsoaskingindustrytomeetperformancetargetsbymakingrepairsratherthanpurchasingexces-siveinventory.ThisapproachreducestheGovernment’slevelofinventoryownershipandrisk.Someprogramshavetransferredasignificantportionofinventoryown-ershiptoindustryproviders,encouragingindustrytobalanceinvestmentsininventorywithinvestmentsinoptimalinventoryplanning,systemdesign,andcom-ponentquality.Suchinvestmentsleadtoloweroverallcosts,asmallerlogisticsfootprint,andgreaterreliability.

DLAisbecomingalargerplayerinweaponsystemsustainmentandindustrypartnershipswithmajortier-1vendors.DLAhaslongmanagedtheacquisitionofconsumables.Itsexpansionintomanagingcontractsfordepot-levelreparableshasforcedprogramman-agementoffices(whichmaintainlogisticsandsupplychainrequirements)tocoordinatetheirsustainmentbuyingrequirementswithbothservice-ownedand

DLAcontractingofficesaswellasindustrialsuppliers.Nowthatindustryhasshiftedtowardcomplexcontrac-tualsustainmentrelationships(whichincludespares,repair,andothersupplychainoutsourcingelements),suppliers,DLA,andDODarenowintegralsustain-mentplayersandpartners.

Inrecentyears,anumberofPBLagreements,manyofwhichdealonlywithpartsdistributionandareapplicableacrossplatforms,havebeentransitionedfromtheservicestoDLA.Theservicestendtokeepatightergrasponmoreprogressiveweaponsystemagreements.Infact,PBLinclusivenessisthedefactoboundarylinefordecidingwhichcontractsaretransi-tionedtoDLAmanagement.Thispracticehasledto“inclusivenessinflation.”Somelargeweaponsystemsustainmentcontractshavebecomeunnecessarilyinclusive,withtheresultthattheservicesretaincontrolofmanysustainmentfunctions.Thedownsideislostopportunitiestobenefitfromcross-serviceandcross-platformsupplychainmanagement.

TheFuture:CollaborativeManagementAgainstabackgroundoffragmentedprocessesand

soloorganizations,weaponsystemsustainmentwillevolvetowardatightlymanaged,integratedsupplychain.Itshouldbegovernedunderjointmanagementthatseamlesslyintegratestheservices,DODlogisticsproviderssuchasDLAandTRANSCOM,andindus-try.Thesustainmentportfoliomustbetightlycon-trolledbytheservices’programmanagementoffices.

Atthetacticallevel,contractingofficersmustbeabletotranslatelogisticsrequirementsintocontractswithcommercialvendorsthatdelivertopsupplychainandcostperformanceacrosstheentireportfolio.Contractingofficersthereforemustfullyunderstandallaspectsofasystem’ssustainmentportfolio.Businessrequirementsmustbeappropriatelydrafted,negotiated,executed,andmanagedbyacohesiveDODcontractingteam.Finally,industryandGovernmentmustestablishwin-winrela-tionshipsforlogisticsandcontractmanagementandforsupportingadynamicanddemandingcustomerbase.

Currently,theGovernmenthasbegunintegratingtheprimaryplayers,butthatintegrationisfarfromfinished.DLAmustcementtheboundariesofsustain-mentcontrolinthefaceofconsiderableuncertainty.ShouldDLAownPBLagreements?ShouldDLAbeintherepairbusiness?Substantialworkbylogisticsandacquisitionpersonnelwillbeneededtohammeroutthebestcontractualrelationshipbetweencostandperformance.TheservicesandDLAmustfirstbuildaneffectiveintegratedrelationshipandthenworkwithindustrytoformawell-functioningteam.

Byfullyadoptingthefollowingcompetenciesandpractices,DODanditssupplierscandramaticallytransformthewaytheyinteractandcollaborativelymanagetheirrelationships.


58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

UseEnd-to-EndSupplyChainManagementBeforespendingmoneyonweaponsystemsustain-

ment,particularlyinafixed-priceenvironment,theGovernmentmustfirstunderstandexactlywhattheend-to-endsupplychainisexpectedtodoandhowitshouldperform.Eachsystem’ssupplychainisunique,asareitsperformancemetrics.OnceDODidentifiestheappropriateperformancecategories,itcanthendeterminetheoptimallevelsofperformance.

Forexample,ifDODdecidesthatsystemuptimeiscriti-cal,thenextquestionishowmuchuptimeisoptimal.Thisprocessinvolvescombiningadeepunderstandingofthesystemsupplychainwithbenchmarkedanalyticsforthechosenmetricsthatcarefullybalanceperformanceandcost.

ArticulateUniqueSustainmentRequirementsOnceweaponsystemperformanceoutcomesare

set,theymustbetranslatedintouniquesustainmentrequirements.Programmanagementofficesmustcare-fullystatesustainmentrequirementstocontractingofficerssotheycanappropriatelybidandawardthework.Programmanagementofficesneedtoknownotonlywhatperformancelevelsarerequiredbutalsohowthoselevelscanbeachieved.

Forexample,systemuptimecanbeachievedthroughrepairturnaroundorinventoryprocurement.Aclearlyarticulatedbusinessrequirementwouldpre-scribeuptimelevelsandspecifyhowthecontractormustachievethatmetric.Anexamplewouldbe,“Iwanttoachieve95-percentuptimebymaintainingnomorethan75inventorydaysofsupplyandnomorethana7-dayrepairturnaroundtimeoncriticalitems.”

EngageCustomersDLAandtheserviceshavealreadydefinedthe

distinctivesupplychainsandbegunintegrationacrosstheircustomers.Toachieveoptimallystructuredsupplychains,theymustengagecustomersincollaboratingtoeliminatestovepipethinking.DespiteDOD’smandatetodriveintegration,thedifferentservicesandevenindividualcommandscanpresentobstacles.DrivingchangerequiresconvincingDODclientsoftheneedforchangeandofDOD’scompetencetoleadthatchange.Akeyelementofchangemanagementwillbelisteningcloselytofullyunderstandthecustomers’perspectivesandthendemonstratingthattheproposedstrategieswilladdresstheirneedsandconcerns.

ModelLifecycleCostsDOD’sabilitytomodellifecyclecostsshouldhelp

convincecustomersoftheneedtochange.Typically,customerssimplycannotseeallelementsofthesupplychainacrossDOD,andtheirdecisionssolelyreflecttheirowninterests.Withitsanalyticalcapabilitiesandviewoftheentiresupplychain,DODcanbringaholistic,fact-basedperspectivetotheconversation.The

servicesandDLAhavealreadytransitionedfrommea-suringcosttomeasuringservice.Thelogicalnextstepinvolvesunderstandingthestrategictradeoffsbetweencostandservicebasedonrigorousanalysis.

MaketheMostofWhatIsinHandAweaponsystem’send-to-endsupplychaincontains

millionsofdollars’worthofinventory.Whetherthesesparepartsinventoriesareatthedepotorforward-deployedinthefield,theycontainthepiecesandpartsthatoftendictatehowfastadownedsystemwillbereadytouseagain.Historically,DODhasreliedonmountainsofinventorytomaintainreadiness.Withincreasedinterestincostreductionandtheleanerandmoreprecisemissionrequirementsoftoday’swars,DODmustsustainitssystemswithlessinventory.

Programmanagerswillultimatelyhavetorelyheav-ilyonrepairtoreplenishdepletedinventory.Theywillalsoneedtounderstandexactlywhereinthesupplychainrepairdecisionsmustbemade.Industry,whichmayownprogressivelylargerpartsofsustainmentsup-plychains,mustbeequallysavvy.Themorevendorsdelivercontractedperformancelevelsthroughrepair-ingratherthanpurchasing,thebettertheirbottom-linemarginswilllook.

BuildIndustryPartnershipsDOD’sshiftfrommanaginginventoriesinternallyto

relyingmorebroadlyonindustryhaslaidthefoundationforthenextshift:abalancedpartnershipwithindustry.WhiletheJapanesemodelofsupplierpartnershipscanremoveuntoldwaste,DODmustbuildpartnershipsthatbalanceacommitmenttocooperativerelationshipswithacommitmenttocompetitivepricing.

Manycommercialorganizationshavefoundthem-selvesrelyingon“partnersuppliers,”onlytodiscoverthatthesupplierwascapturingmostofthevaluefromtherelationship.EmergingdisciplineswithinDOD,suchassupplierrelationshipmanagement(SRM),helptoalleviatetheseconcerns.UndertheSRMframe-work,industrybestpractices,suchasdemandforecast-ing,assetvisibility,andtotallifecyclemanagement,areintegratedseamlesslywithinDODpartners.Thesetypesofpartnershipsarebuilttoevolveovertimeandcreatelong-termvalueforbothparties.

DifferentiateSupplierRelationshipsBuildingonthefoundationofthestrategicsupplier

alliancesandtheSupplyChainAlliancemodelshouldresultinabroaderarrayofdifferentiatedrelation-ships.Bylookingatneedsholistically,theservicesandDLAcancreatethemostadvantageoussupplierrelationshipsratherthanfocusingonthelargestDODsuppliers.

Insomecases,theoriginalequipmentmanufacturerwilltakeonalargerroleinmanagingthetotalsupply

58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT


chainfromdevelopmenttosustainmentandevendis-posalofaweaponsystem.Butinothercases,thesup-plychainwillbebrokendownintoitspartsandrolesassignedalongdifferentdimensions,suchasgeogra-phyoractivity.Thesedifferentiatedroleswillhelptoclarifyprioritiesandaccountabilities.

MaximizeLeverageWithSuppliersTheroleofindustrywillonlygrowlargerinfuture

weaponsystemsustainment.DODwillrepeatedlybuyfromthesameprimaryvendorsforbothrepairandspares(particularlyforjointweaponsystems).Thismassivelevelofspendingcanbeleveragedformaxi-mumcostdiscountsandperformancelevelswhencon-tractsareawardedincombinationwithmultiserviceandinterservicebuys.Withstreamlined,multifunction-alcontractsformultiserviceorinterserviceprograms,vendorscanstreamlineinventory,distribution,andrepaircapacity.

MaximizeOrganicCapabilityBRACisalreadyreconfiguringorganiccapability

andcapacity.DOD’sorganiccapacitythroughoutthecountryisshiftingdramaticallythroughtheclosingofsomedepotsandtheexpansionofothers.DODmustperformabalancingactbyselectingindustrialsuppli-erswhilemaintainingitsownproductionandrepaircapacitiesinaccordancewithTitle10(whichmandatesa50−50commercial-to-organicworkload).Inthisrealignment,itisimportanttounderstandwhatcapa-bilitiesshouldbepreservedinhouseandwhatshouldbecontracted.Collectively,theportfolioofdepotworkshouldmakemaximumuseofdepotcapabilities.

ReduceRedundancyWithsomuchspendingbeingdistributedamong

bothcommercialvendorsanddepots,thepotentialforcapabilityredundancyissignificant.Whilesomeredundancyensuresbandwidthandscalabilitywhendemandishigh,toomuchredundancycancreatemajorcostandperformanceinefficiencies.TheGov-ernmentoftendouble-buys:Itpaysindustrytoperformworkorbuyinventory,butitcontinuestoactaswell.DODshouldreduceredundancywhilemaximizingitsorganiccapability.

TheBenefitsofCollaborativeManagementAglimpseintothefutureshowsnumerousbenefits

fromcollaborativemanagement.Nolongerwillessen-tialknowledgeandbusinessrequirementsforapur-chasegetlostintransitionbetweenfunctions.Contractingcentersofexcellencewillprovidebestpracticesandintellectualcapitaltohelpcontractingofficerscreatemoreadvantageouscontracts.Abet-termanagementphilosophywillalleviateinefficien-ciesandmaketheprocesseasierbyautomatically

buildingthemostcriticalsupplychainbusinessandperformancerequirementsintobest-in-class,lifecycle-focusedcontracts.

Furthermore,thesecontractualagreementswillrelieveovertaxedGovernmentresourcesoftheburdenofintensivecostandperformancemanage-ment.Managementwillplaceskilledpeoplewheretheyarerequiredandmakefulluseoftheirexper-tise.Thisisnottosaythatroleswillremainstatic:Today’srolesmaycallforadditionalskills,andnewrolesmaywellbeinstituted.ThevisionisoneofsmoothlymeshinggearsamongpartnerswithinandoutsideGovernment.

Althoughinstillingthedisciplineandrequiredcompetenciesofcollaborativemanagementintoweaponsystemsustainmentisalong-termprocess,DODisbeginningthejourney.Programmanagementoffices,includingthatoftheBlackHawkhelicopter,arealreadybuildingthefoundationforcollaborativemanagement.AstheBlackHawkprogrammanage-mentofficerationalizesitsvendorbase,itisalsoestablishingmoreprogressivecompetenciesoutlinedinthisarticle:formalizedSRMprogramswithstrate-gicvendors,progressiveperformance-basedcontractdevelopment,collaborativedepotpartnershipsbetweentheGovernmentandindustry,andcontinuedcoordina-tionwithDLA,OSD,andtheservicesinthedesignofajointsupplychainarchitecture.Muchworkremainstobedone.Nonetheless,BlackHawksustainmentisamongmanyexamplesthatshowthatDODrecognizestheimportanceofweaponsystemsustainmentandthecollaborativemanagementpracticesthatoptimizeit.

Thefuturestateofweaponsystemsustainmentwillultimatelydependonhowtheprogressiontowardcollaborationcontinues.Collaborativemanagementinsustainmentwillemergethroughcarefulplanningandexecutiongroundedinrigorousduediligenceandtacticaldiscipline,oftenonaplatform-by-platformorsystem-by-systembasis.Thoughtheprocessmaylackdrama,thefuturestateseemsworththeeffort.Itwillonedayclosethegapamongacquisition,logistics,andcommercialindustryleaderssothatallpartiescanworktogethertosupportthewarfighterinacombatenvironmentthatisdemanding,dynamic,andhistori-callyunique.

ricK conlin iS a Senior aSSociate at cenSeo conSUltinG GroUp. a forMer naval SUpply corpS officer, he iS a GraDUate of the UniteD StateS naval acaDeMy anD holDS an M.B.a. DeGree anD an M.S. DeGree in ManaGeMent froM the UniverSity of MarylanD.

jiM McintoSh iS a Director at cenSeo conSUltinG GroUp. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in coMpUter Science froM harvarD UniverSity anD an M.B.a. DeGree froM the MaSSachUSettS inStitUte of technoloGy.



heUnitedStatescontinuestoconductoperationsintwomajortheaterswhilesimul-taneouslyengagingincontingencyoperationsaroundtheworldandtrainingtheremaining,undeployedforcesforsubsequentoperations.Inlightofthischallengingenvi-ronment,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushin2007requestedandreceivedanauthorizationfromCon-gresstoincreasetheArmybyapproximately75,000Soldiers.1Thisgrowth,coupledwiththecontinuedhighoperatingtempooftheoperationalforce,requiresadditionalresources.Attheheartoftheseincreasingrequirementsaresmall-armsmunitions.

ThispaperexaminestheUnitedStates’small-armsammunitionacquisitionstrategyformeetingtheArmy’scurrentoperationalandtrainingrequirements,aswellasfortheincreaseinthefutureforcestructure.Itcomparesthecurrentoperationalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionwithpresentproductioncapabilitiesandlimitationsinordertodetermineifthedefenseindustrialbaseneedstomakechangestotheacquisitionstrategy.

LakeCity:ProductionandSourcesTheacquisitionstrategyforsmall-armsammunitionisbasedontheGovernment-owned,

contractor-operated(GOCO)ammunitionplantatLakeCity,Missouri.AlliantTechsystems,Inc.(ATK),operatesthisGOCOfacilityfortheGovernment.AsaGOCO,thefacilityiscommandedbyanArmylieutenantcolonel,butATKisresponsibleforproductionoperationsandoutputcapa-bilities.ThisrelationshipallowstheGovernmenttoreduceitsmanpowercostsandinviteprivate-sectorbusinessinitiativestopromoteefficiencyandimproveproduction.2

Over99percentofallsmall-armsbullets(5.56-millimeter[mm],7.62-mmand.50-caliber)consumedbytheArmyunderitsTitle10responsibilitytosupplyandequipitsforcesaremanu-facturedattheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant.Productiondemandisdrivenbycurrentopera-tionalrequirements;anyproductionshortfallsatLakeCityareoutsourcedtoprivatecompanieswithintheUnitedStates.3Logisticianswillarguethatthisstrategylacksadequateredundancyandresponsiveness,especiallywhenoneconsidersthattheLakeCityfacilitywasbuiltin1941.

TheArmy’ssmall-armsammunitionproductionisaffectedbymorethantheoutputoftheLakeCityfacility.Aswithanymanufacturingsystem,thesupplychainisanintegralpieceinthepro-ductionoutputprocess.Eachsmall-arms-ammunitioncartridge(singleround)containsseveralcomponents.ThemainammunitionusedbyvirtuallyeverySoldierandMarineisthe5.56-mmcartridge.Itsdesignincludesthecartridgecase,thebulletorshot,propellant,andprimer.Eachofthesecomponentsisfabricatedfromdifferentcommodities.TheArmyrequiresATKtomaintainaminimumofthreesuppliersforeachofthecomponents.4

Theleadandsteelforthebullet’spenetratorareobtainedfromsourceslocatedintheUnitedStates.5Thebrassforthecartridgecaseisprimarilysuppliedfromcompanieswithinthecontinen-talUnitedStates(CONUS).LakeCitypurchasesbrassintheformofbrasscasecupsandbulletjacketcupsfromaU.S.-basedsource.Duringthemanufacturingprocess,thesecupsarepulledfromtheiroriginalconfigurationandreconfiguredintotheappropriatesmall-armsammunition

Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition:TooManyEggsinOneBasket?

by Major MarK w. sieKMan, usar,dr. david a. anderson, and aLLan s. boyCe



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

T

1Grow The Army,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,2007,www.army.mil/growthearmy,accessed4May2009.2Ibid.3RichardG.Palaschak,DirectorofOperationsfortheMunitionsIndustrialBaseTaskForce,beforetheHouseArmedServicesSubcommitteeon

TacticalAirandLandForces,24June2004.4Ibid.5Ibid.


cartridgetype.Alternativesuppliershavebeenidentified;however,theyaccountforlessthan5percentofthetotalpurchased.6LakeCityhastakentheinitiativetorecycleunusedandwastebrassduringthemanufacturingprocesstoreducecosts.

Themainingredientusedinallsmall-armsammunitionpropellantsisnitrocellulose.TheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantinVirginiaisthesoleproducerofthisessentialingredientforallpropellantsusedthroughouttheArmy’sammuni-tionindustrialbase.Radfordhasanacid-concentratorfacilitythatproducesthenitricandsulphuricacidsthat,whencombinedwithcellulose,makenitrocellulose.Ninety-ninepercentofallsmall-armsammunitionusedinAfghanistanandIraqcontainsnitrocelluloseproducedatthisfacility.

Finally,theprimerinmostcartridgesismadefromover13differentchemicals,whicharemixedattheLakeCityplant.LakeCitymanufacturestheprimersforallsmall-armsammunitionproducedatitsfacility.ATKcon-tinuestoseekadditionalsourcesofsupplyfortheprimermixchemicals.AllsuppliersarebasedintheUnitedStates.However,theU.S.suppliersobtainthesechemi-calsfromCanada,Europe,Mexico,India,Brazil,andChinaaswellastheUnitedStates.7

Onefinalcomponentuniquetomachinegunammuni-tionislinkagebelts.BeforeOperationIraqiFreedom,LakeCityreliedonsuppliersforlinkagebeltsusing5.56-mm,7.62-mm,and.50-caliberammunition.Becauseofthelargeincreaseindemandforthisammunition,theplantinvestedinupgradingitsfacilitiesandmanufacturingequipment.Thisincludedpurchasing,moving,andinstall-ingthesolesurvivingproductionlineforlinkagebeltsfor5.56-mm,7.62-mm,and.50-calibermachineguns.

ProductionCapabilitiesandRequirementsThechartaboveshowsthelevelsofproductionbythe

LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantoverthelastdecade.TheArmyalmostdoubleditstotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionfrom2003to2004.TheresultingincreaseinLakeCity’sproductionrequirementscaused

ATKandtheArmytoinitiateamodernizationandpro-cessimprovementprogramtoincreaseefficiencyandproductioncapabilities.8

Initially,theneedforgreateroutputwasaddressedbyincreasingtheoperatinghoursoftheplantandaddinganotherworkshiftforproduction.ATKnowusesaprocessimprovementmanagementtechniquemodeledafterwhattheToyotaCorporationuses.9Despitethecurrentmodern-izationandprocessimprovementeffortsbytheArmyandATK,theplant’sproductioncapabilityisphysicallylimitedto1.6billionsmall-armsammunitionroundsannually.10

ThreeScenariosforAnalysisCanthedefenseindustrialbasesupportsmall-arms

ammunitionproductionforcurrentandfutureoperations,aswellastheincreaseintheArmy’sforcestructure?Inordertoanswerthisquestion,weappliedgapanalysistotheArmy’ssmall-armsammunitionrequirementsanditsproductioncapabilities.

Wefirstidentifiedthetotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionasdeterminedbytheJointMunitionsCommand.Therequirementsdepictedrepresentarangeofthreeexistingandpossiblesituations.Next,thecurrentdefenseindustrialbase’ssmall-armsammunitionproduc-tioncapabilitywascomparedtothedifferingsituationalrequirements.Finally,theLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant’ssupplychainwasanalyzedtodeterminepotentialpointsoffailureandpossibleshortfalls.Theinterpreta-tionandimplicationsoftheseresultsareofferedattheendofthisarticle.

Thechartonpage62summarizesthetotalsmall-armsammunitionrequiredbytheArmyforthethreeexistingandpossiblesituations.Thefirstsituationrepresentsrequirementsforpeacetimeoperationsandtrainingoccur-

349232

588

375559

1192 12691348 1375

1262

273205

532

316

463

1035 1048 1093 1098956

63 23 38 46 70 120 168 198 217 243

13 4 18 13 26 37 53 57 60 630

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Mill

ion

ro

un

ds

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

.50-c aliber 7.62-millimeter 5.56-millimeter Total

Levels of production by the Lake City Army Am mu nition Plant in Missouri.

Note that the Army almost doubled its total requirements for smallarms

am munition from 2003 to 2004. (Source: Thomas Blose, Production

Base Realities, Briefing, Joint Muni-tions Command, Picatinny Arsenal,

New Jersey, 13 Febru ary 2002.)

6Ibid.7Ibid.8LieutenantColonelChristopherDay,LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantcommander.BriefingtoauthorduringLakeCitytours,MayandOctober2009.9Ibid.10Ibid.

62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ringaftertheendoftheColdWarandbeforetheterroristattacksof11September2001.Thistimeperiodreflectsaforcestructuresimilartotoday’sArmy,butduringaperiodinwhichnomajorcombatoperationsoccurred.

Thesecondsituationisfiscalyear2005,whichrepre-sentsrequirementsbasedonthe“1−4−2−1forcesizingconstruct”andthe“simultaneitystack”developedaspartoftheTotalArmyAnalysis(TAA).TheTAAisabiennialprocessthatdeterminestheforcesneededtoexecutethenationalstrategybasedonhigher-levelplanningguidanceliketheQuadrennialDefenseReview.Underthe1−4−2−1force-sizingconstruct,theUnitedStatesplanstodefendtheNation(“1”);maintainforcesthatcanfightinfourcrit-icalregions(“4”);maintaintheabilitytodefeatopponentsintworegionssimultaneously(“2”);anddecisivelywinoneofthoseconflictsattheU.S.initiative(“1”).

The1−4−2−1force-sizingconstructproducedasimul-taneitystack(resourcingpriorities)insixmajorcatego-ries:homelandsecurity,deteraggression,majorcombatoperations,small-scalecontingencies(non-critical),trans-formation,andgeneratingforcestructure.11

Fiscalyear2005wasselectedfortworeasons.First,webelieveitprovidesavalidrepresentationofcurrent,andlikelyfuture,operationssincefiscalyear2005requiredthemostsmall-armsammunitionunderthecurrentforce-sizingconstruct.Second,currentsmall-armsammunitionrequirementscouldnotbereleasedbytheJointMunitionsCommandbecauseoftheirsensitivity.ThisbaselineisalsopredicatedontheassumptionthatArmyrequirementsfortwomajorcombatoperationswillremainconstantdespitetheannounceddrawdownofforcesinIraq.

Thethirdsituationselectedisthesmall-armsammuni-tionrequirementsduringWorldWarII.

Thetotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionrepresentedbythesethreetimeperiodsclearlyreflectthe

typesofoperationsoccurringateachtime.Thefirsttimeperiod,pre-11September2001,reflectsthe“peacedivi-dend”broughtaboutbytheendoftheColdWarandthereductioninforcesfollowingtheGulfWar.U.S.militaryleadersandpolicymakersclearlybelievedinasmaller,moretechnologicallyadvancedforcethatcouldendcon-flictsrapidly.Therequirementfortheproductionoflargeamountsofsmall-armsammunitionnolongerseemedtobegreat.

However,thesimultaneousoperationsinAfghanistanandIraq,classifiedintheforce-sizingconstructastwosimultaneousmajorcombatoperations,changedtherequirementsforammunition.Althoughthedatadonotreflecttheuseofeachtypeofsmall-armsammunition,muchofitwasusedintrainingbeforedeploymentstoAfghanistanandIraq.Sofiscalyear2005wasusedtorepresentthehighestannualrequirementunderthecur-rentforce-sizingconstruct.

WechosetorepresentdatafromWorldWarIItohigh-lightworst-casescenariorequirements.Thesedatarepre-senttotalmobilizationoftheforceduringwar.Althoughthis“blackswan”12isnotnecessarilyprobablebasedonthecurrentthreatpicture,webelieveitisvalidtocom-pareitsdemandsagainstsmall-armsammunitionproduc-tioncapabilities.

SourcesofSupplyTheproductioncapabilityrepresentedonlyaccounts

forthesoleGOCOfacilityattheLakeCityArmyAmmu-nitionPlant.Itdoesnotrepresentoutsidecontractedsourcesofproduction.Thesecontractedsourcesaccountforapproximately300millionroundsannually.TheJointMunitionsCommandhasawardedcontractstoGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemsasthesecondsourcesupplier.13GeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTactical

This chart shows the total smallarms ammunition required by the Army for three existing and possi ble situations: for peacetime operations and training after the Cold War and before the terror ist attacks of 11 September 2001, during fiscal year 2005, and during the “total war” scenario of World War II. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Al liant Techsys-tems Purchasing De partment, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)

Ammunition TypePre-11

September 2001 Annual Requirements

Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Requirements

World War II Annual Requirements

5.56-millimeter 626.2 million rounds 1.353 billion rounds n/a

7.62-millimeter linked 47.2 million rounds 282 million rounds n/a

.50-caliber linked 20.4 million rounds 74 million rounds n/a

Total 693.8 million rounds 1.709 billion rounds 21.6 billion rounds

11Total Army Analysis (TAA) Primer 2009,ArmyForceManagementSchool,FortBelvoir,VA,www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/pages/primers/TAAPrimer24April2009.pdf,accessed16December2009.

12Theterm“blackswan”representsaworst-casescenarioinwhichthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesauthorizestotalmobilizationofthemilitary,includemobilizationoftheindustrialbase.

13LaurieVanBrocklin,General Dynamics Awarded Small Arms Ammunition Contract,www.pressmediawire.com/article/Investor_Relations/Contracts/General_Dynamics_Award-ed_109_Million_by_US_Army_for_SmallCaliber_Ammunition/18371,accessed22October2009.


Systemshasprocuredcontractsthroughvarioussources,includingOlinCorporation’sWinchesterDivision.

Beforethecurrentcontract,theJointMunitionsCom-mandhadacquiredsmall-armsammunitionfromforeignsources,suchasIsraelMilitaryIndustriesLtd.,forsimi-laramountsin2005.14Membersoftheacquisitioncom-munity,alongwithATK,areactivelypursuingastrategyinvolving100-percentcontractedsourcesforsmall-armsammunition.15ThiswasreinforcedwhentheDeputySec-retaryofDefenseorderedthat“tothemaximumextentfeasible,[theArmywill]transitionGovernment-ownedammunitionproductionassetstotheprivatesector.”16

TheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantiscurrentlyoperatingatmaximumproductioncapacityandcannotsignificantlyincreasemunitionsproduction,evenafterthecurrentmodernizationeffortendsinfiscalyear2011.Thechartbelowdepicts,byammunitiontype,LakeCity’stotalproductioncapability.

LakeCitycannotsignificantlyincreaseitsproductionofanammunitiontypebyrefittinganotherammunitiontype’sproductionline.Forexample,theplantcannotshutdownthe7.62-mmproductionline,reconfigureittoproduce5.56-mmammunition,andthenproduce230millionadditional5.56-mmrounds.Theonlyoptiontosignificantlyincreasingsmall-armsammunitionproduc-tionatLakeCitywouldbetoconstructadditionalfacili-tiesandproductionlines.17However,nocurrentorfutureplansexisttoconstructadditionalfacilitiesatLakeCity,oranywhereelseforthatmatter.

WealsoanalyzedLakeCity’ssupplychainforeachsmall-armsammunitioncartridgetype.Eachcomponentusesthesamekeycommodities,butdifferentsourcesofsupplyareusedforeachofthesecommoditiesforeachcartridgetype.Thechartonpage64depictseachkeyinputcommodityinvolvedinmanufacturingthecar-tridgecomponentsandthesourcesofsupplyusedbyATKatLakeCity.

Eachsmall-armsammunitiontypeusesbrassforthecartridgecasing.ATKpurchasesover95percentofitscasingbrassfromtheOlinBrassCompanyintheformofbrasscasecupsandbulletjacketcups.Thispurchaseisafixed-price,fixed-timeagreement.OlinBrassalsosuppliesU.S.-basedcommercial

ammunitionmanufacturerswithbrasssheetmetalforcartridgecasings.18Duringthefiscalyear2005produc-tionsurge,OlinBrassmettheincreaseddemandswithoutcausinganydisruptionofsmall-armsammunitionpro-ductionatLakeCity.

ATKalsopurchasesthebrassfortwocartridgetypesfromNDPressTecGmBH,whichislocatedinGermany.AnotheralternatesupplierforbrassisLuvataBuffalo,Inc.,inNewYork.ATKrecentlysolicitedLuvatafora4-yearproposal,butLuvatadidnotbid.19ResearchonthiscommoditydidnotfindanyissueswithsupplyingATKwiththematerielneededtoproducethecasecom-ponentforeachsmall-armsammunitioncartridgetype.

ATKidentifiesSt.MarksPowder,Inc.,astheprimarysourceofsupplyforthepropellantusedineachtypeofsmall-armsammunition.BasedinCrawfordville,Florida,thisdivisionofGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemsisthesinglesourceofpropellantforLakeCity.ATKcontinuestoseekalternativesuppliers,butithasyettofindaqualifiedsourcingcandidatebecauseofU.S.Governmentriskmitigationpoliciesandproductionqual-ityandquantitystandards.

Researchdataonpropellantdidrevealanissuewithoneofthekeycommoditiesanditssourceofsupply.Thiscommodityisnitrocellulose,anditisfoundineverypropellantandexplosiveusedbytheU.S.military,fromsmall-armsammunitiontobombs.Asnotedbefore,theonlymanufacturercapableofproducingthequantityandqualityofnitrocelluloserequiredbythemilitaryistheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantinVirginia.Radfordisconstructinganewacidconcentratorandnitrocellulosefacilityin2011to2013toreplacetheexistingfacil-ity,whichwasbuiltin1941.20Thenewfacilitywillnotexpandtheproductioncapacityfornitrocellulose.

Thenextkeycommodityforeachcartridgeistheleadusedinmanufacturingthebullet.ATKidentifiestwosuppliersoflead,bothofwhicharelocatedinCONUS.Theprimarysupplierusesaproprietarytech-niquetoextractleadfromusedvehiclebatteriesandthenreformulatesittobesold.Theleadispurchasediningots

14AndrewBuncombe,The Independent,2005,www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0925-02.htm,accessed21October2009.15Day.16DepartmentofDefenseDirective5160.65,SingleManagerforConventionalAmmunition(SMCA),1August2008,p.4.17Day.18LarrySmith,LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantpurchasingmanager(ATK).BriefingtoauthorduringLakeCitytour,October2009.19Ibid.20JustineBarati,“RadfordLookstoNewPlant,”www.army.mil/-news/2009/01/22/15990-radford-looks-to-new-plant,accessed4September2009.

Ammunition TypeTotal Annual

Requirements (Fiscal Year 2005)

Maximum Government- Owned Contractor-

Operated Annual Production

5.56-millimeter 1.353 billion rounds 1.2 billion rounds

7.62-millimeter linked 282 million rounds 230 million rounds

.50-caliber linked 74 million rounds 85 million rounds

Total 1.709 billion rounds 1.515 billion rounds

The total production capability of Lake City Army Ammunition Plant by ammunition type. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Alliant Tech systems

Purchasing Department, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)

64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

thatareconfiguredatLakeCityforeachcartridge.Nosupplyissuesexistinthepurchasingofleadforthebulletcartridgecomponent.

Anotherkeycommodityforthebulletisthesteelpenetratorforeachcartridgetype.ATKhasidentifiedthreeprimaryU.S.sourcesofsupplyforthiskeycom-modity.Thesesuppliersacquiresteelfromvariousloca-tionsaroundtheworld.ThisparticularcommoditydoesnotpresentasupplyissueforLakeCity.However,ATKhasidentifiedothersourcesofsupplyforthesteelpen-etratorifneeded.21

Thefinalkeycommoditiesinmanufacturingcar-tridgesaretheprimerandtheprimermix.Allsmall-armsammunitionmanufacturedattheLakeCityArmyAmmu-nitionPlantreceivesprimersfromanon-sitemanufactur-ingfacility.Over40ATKfacilitiescanprovideprimerstotheLakeCityplant.

Thechartonpage65identifiestheprimermixchemi-cals,thesupplierstoATK,andthecountryoforigin.All13chemicalsforprimermixareformulatedbyU.S.-basedcommercialcompanies,but10chemicalshaveoriginsoutsideoftheUnitedStates.Ofthese10identi-fiedchemicals,4haveoriginssolelyinChina,2othersareonlyfoundinMexico,and1isonlyfoundinBrazil.ThreeotherchemicalsshareoriginsamongtheUnitedStates,Europeancountries,India,China,andMexico.

DespitethechemicalshavingoriginsoutsideofCONUS,ATKhasnotidentifiedanyofthesechemicalsaspresentingasupplyproblemfortheformulator.22How-ever,wefindpotentialissueswiththecountriesoforiginforsomeoftheidentifiedchemicals.Thesepotentialissuesareprimarilypoliticalinnature.AlthoughtradeagreementsdoexistwithChina,India,andBrazil,thesecountriesmaybecometradeadversariesinthefuture.

AnadversarialrelationshipmayverywellbecomearealityinlightofthegrowingprotectionistpoliciesenactedbyCongress.Recently,aminortradedisagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinabeganoveranincreaseinthetariffontiresimportedfromChina.23AlthoughthismeasurebytheOfficeoftheUnitedStatesTradeRepresenta-tivewasmeanttoprotecttheU.S.

tireindustry,itpushedChinatoreciprocatetariffaction.Furthermore,obtainingthechemicalsfoundinMexicomaybecomeproblematicasthegovernmentofMexicostruggleswithnativeindigenousgroups,drugcartels,anddisillusionedcitizens.

ChallengesandVulnerabilitiesSo,canthedefenseindustrialbasesupportsmall-arms

ammunitionproductionforcurrentandfutureoperationsaswellasanincreaseintheArmy’sforcestructure?Theanswertothisquestionis,yes.However,thesmall-armsammunitionrequirementsfortheArmyexceedthecapac-ityofproductionattheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant.Government-ownedcapacitywaslostthroughthesystematicdeactivationofmunitionsplantsthatbeganshortlyafterWorldWarII.AlthoughamodernizationprogramhasbeenimplementedatLakeCity,itwillnotincreasetheplant’sproductioncapacityenoughtomeetArmyrequirements,leavingtheUnitedStatesvulnerabletoa“blackswan”total-wartypeofscenario.AndthisdoesnotevenaccountfortheMarineCorps’ammunitionrequirementsmetbyLakeCity.

ShortfallsinproductioncapabilityhaveforcedtheJointMunitionsCommandtoawardadditionalsourcingcontractstoGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystems.Despitetheeffortsofthecommand,LakeCityandthecontractwithGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemswillnotbesufficienttodeliverenoughsmall-armsammunitiontomeetaworst-casetotalwarscenario.Iftotalwarweretooccur,theUnitedStateswouldbevulnerableifithadtodependonforeignsourc-estomakeupthetotalmunitionsshortfall.

TheresearchonATK’ssupplychainoperationsatLakeCityshowsastrongandstablesupplyofmost

Component Commodity

Primary Source of Supply

Alternate Source

wof Supply

Alternate Source of Supply

Casing brass Olin Brass ND PressTec Luvata Buffalo

Propellant St. Marks Powder n/a n/a

Bullet leadMetalico-

Granite CityGopher Resource

CorporationExide

Technologies

Bullet steel penetrator

Michigan Rod Products

G.G. Greene n/a

PrimerAlliant

Techsystemsn/a n/a

Primer mixThere are 17 chemicals involved in the primer mix,

all of which have different suppliers.

The key commodities involved in manufacturing cartridge components and the sources of supply used by ATK at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Al liant Techsystems Purchasing Department, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)

21Ibid.22Ibid.23DouglasA.McIntyre,“USImposesBigTariffsonChineseTires,Beijing,”Daily Finance,12September2009,www.dailyfinance.com/story/us-imposes-big-tarriffs-on-chinese-

tires/19159125,accessed2November2009.


commoditiesneededforthemanufacturingofeachtypeofsmall-armsammunition.However,afewkeycartridgecommoditieshavesourcingvulnerabilities.Sole-sourceprovidersofnecessarychemicalmaterialsfromcountriessuchasChina,India,andMexicomayproveproblematic.Thesmall-armsammunitionsupplychaindoesnothavealternativesforthesekeychemicals.Anydisruptionofsupply,whetherinducedbyeconom-ics,politics,orphysicaldislocations,wouldhaveasignificantadverseeffectontheabilityofLakeCitytoproducesmall-armsammunition.

Thedefenseindustrialbasemustprepareforapos-sibledisruptioninthesupplychainbyeitherstockpiling

theidentifiedkeychemicalsorbydesigningacartridgethatdoesnotrelyonchemicalsfoundoutsidetheUnitedStates.ATKshouldalsorequireitssupplierstoidentifytheirtotaldedicateddemand-surgecapacity.ThiswouldindicateinadvancethepotentialbottleneckstoLakeCityreachingitsfullproductioncapability.

OffurtherconcernisthefactthatallammunitionroadsleadthroughtheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantbecauseitisthesoleGovernment-gradeproducerofnitro-cellulose.Althoughmodernizationprogramswillsupplanttheagingfacilitycurrentlyusedthere,theArmyanditssisterservicescannotaffordtolosethisplant’sabilitytoproducenitrocellulose.

Inapaperhedeliveredin2009attheDefenseAcquisitionUniversity,ColonelJohnFerrarifocusedonreversingthetrendtowardprivatizationbasedonhistoricalprivate-sectorbehaviorindecliningindus-tries.24Hearguedthatthemunitionsindustrialbasefitsthedefinitionofadecliningindustryinthatrevenueshavedeclinedbyalmost80percentandmorethan70percentofthecompaniesdisappearedfrom1985through2001.25Althoughrevenueshavetemporarilygrownbecauseofcurrentoperations,thisincreaseisonlytemporary.Sincethisdecliningindustryissubjecttonationalpolicythatblocksoverseasoutsourcing,themilitary’stotalrelianceontheprivatesectorishighlyproblematicanddangerous.26

Webelievethatthecurrentammunitionproductionandacquisitionstrategyhasplacedtoomany“eggsintoonebasket.”Thedefenseindustrialbasemustenhanceitsownproductionandsupplychaincapacityinordertocircum-ventforeigndependenceandensureagainstanyproductiondegradationatLakeCity.OnlybytakingthesestepswilltheArmyensurethatitcanprovidealltherequiredammu-nitiontowarfightersnowandinthefuture.

Major MarK w. SieKMan, USar, iS an active GUarD/reServe officer aSSiGneD aS a planner in the SUpport operationS office of the 310th expeDitionary SUStainMent coMManD. he holDS a B.S. DeGree froM Ball State UniverSity anD an M.M.a.S. DeGree froM the arMy coM ManD anD General Staff colleGe.

Dr. DaviD a. anDerSon iS a retireD Marine corpS loGiSticS officer. he iS a profeSSor of StrateGic StUDieS at the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe anD an aDjUnct profeS Sor at weBSter UniverSity.

allan S. Boyce iS an aSSiStant profeSSor of loGiSticS anD reSoUrce operationS at the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe. a re tireD arMy lieUtenant colonel, he holDS an M.S. DeGree in loGiSticS ManaGeMent froM floriDa inStitUte of technoloGy anD an M.S. DeGree in pUBlic aDMiniStration froM central MichiGan UniverSity. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe.

The primer mix chemicals, the suppliers of those chemicals to ATK, and the country of origin of the chemicals. All 13 chemicals for primer mix are for mulated by U.S.based commercial companies, but 10 chemicals are imported from outside of the United States (Source: Created by authors based on data from Alliant Techsystems Purchasing De part ment, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)

24ColonelJohnFerrari,“TransferringConventionalMunitionsIndustrialBaseCapabilitiestothePublicSector,”DefenseAcquisitionUniversity,2009.25Ibid.26Ibid.

Chemical Supplier Country of Origin

Barium nitrateBarium and Chemicals

China

Calcium silicide Perkins Rouge Brazil

Magnesium oxide Matrixchem Mexico

Calcium resinate-fused

Barium and Chemicals

United States/China/ Europe/India

Potassium perchlorate

Hummel Crouton China

Strontium nitrateBarium and Chemicals

China

Strontium oxalateBarium and Chemicals

United States/China/ Europe/India

Strontium peroxide Hummel CroutonMexico/

United States

Magnesium aluminum alloy

Reade Manufacturing United States

Calcium resinate- peripiated

Hummel Crouton Mexico

Magnesium carbonate

Matrixchem United States

Barium nitrateBarium and Chemicals

China

Ammonium nitrate Dyno Nobel United States

66 ARMY SUSTAINMENT



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

SustainmentSymposiumHighlightsChangestoArmySupplyStrategiesandPriorities

TheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy,Insti-tuteofLandWarfare,helditsArmySustainmentSymposiumandExpositionfrom22to24JuneattheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Thisyear’seventcameinthemidstofthedrawdownoftroopsandequipmentinIraqandthebuildupofresourcesinAfghanistan.Sustainmentleadershigh-lightedtheimpactthesechangesarehav-ingonArmysustainment.

LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,DeputyChiefofStaff,G–4,DepartmentoftheArmy,notedareaswherethesustainmentcommunityisstrug-gling—specificallypropertyaccountabilityandassetvisibility.GeneralStevensonsaidthatbecausetheArmyhasbeensobusy,keyaccountabilityconceptshavebeenshovedaside.

Assetvisibilityisanotherissue,especiallywithnewequipment.GeneralStevensonnotedthat,inAfghani-stan,1,700mine-resistantambush-protectedall-terrainvehicleshavebeenissued,butonly1,020havebeenrecordedintheStandardArmyMaintenanceSystem(SAMS).TheG–4ishopingthatupcomingchangestotheGlobalCombatSupportSystem-Armywill

improvemanagementbytransferringpropertybookdatadirectlyintoSAMS.

TheG–4alsonotedthattheArmyisworkingonmodifyingLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP)policy.LOGCAPhascosttheArmyapproximately$37billionsince2001.“Inthecourseofthoselast9years,wehavelearnedalotofles-sons,”saidtheG–4.“Thatoughttotranslateitselfintoourpolicy.”

GeneralAnnE.Dunwoody,commandinggeneraloftheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC),saidthatGeneralRaymondT.Ordieno,commanderofU.S.Forces-Iraq,wascomplimentaryofthe“LogNation”and“itsincrediblemissionofdrawingdown”anArmythathasbeeninIraqfornearly8years.Gen-eralDunwoodynotedthattheworkoflogisticianshas“enabledandallowedhim[GeneralOrdieno]tomeetthePresidentialmandate”todrawdownto50,000troopsbySeptember2010.

“ItisabusytimeforourArmy,”saidGeneralDun-woody.“[These]nextcoupleofyears[are]goingtobeequally,ifnotmore,challenging.”PartofthechallengeisthebuildupinAfghanistan,whichreceived40per-centofitssurgeequipmentoutofIraq.“ThatisprettyincredibleifyouthinkbacktoDesertStorm/DesertShield,withtheironmountainswherewedidnotknowwhereeverythingwas,”saidGeneralDunwoody.“NowwehaveassetvisibilitytoseethestuffthatisinIraq,moveittoAfghanistan,whichmeanswearenotgoingtoshipitagain,wearenotgoingtobuyitagain,andwehavebeenabletosupportthesurge.”

GeneralDunwoodypraisedtheresilienceofthesustainmentforceforalsoservinginhumanitarianassistancemissionsduringthistime.“WewereabletosetupcontractingandLOGCAPwithin72hoursofarrival,”shenotedofOperationUnifiedResponseinHaiti.“Theentire‘LogNation’strategicpartnershelpedsortoutandprovidereliefandthenstartedredeploying.”Dunwoodysaidthatthoughthemis-sioninHaitiiswrappingup,contractingsupportassetsarestillhelpinginChile,whichsufferedamassiveearthquakeinFebruary.

“Ontopofeverythingelsethatisgoingon,ourArmyisinmotionthroughBRAC[baseclosureandrealign-ment],”saidDunwoody.Allfourmajorheadquarters—ArmyForcesCommand,ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,AMC,andArmyInstallationManagementCommand—willbemovinginfiscalyear2011.

AlongwiththeorganizationalchangesofBRAC,GeneralDunwoodyisplanninglife-cyclemanagementimprovement.“Wehavemultipleowners,andthatcre-atesseamsinthiswholelife-cyclemanagementpiece,”saidGeneralDunwoody.“Itcreatesalackofaccount-abilityandresponsibility,andthatiswhatwearetry-ingtogetourarmsaround.”

ArmyOperationsResearchSymposiumTheCenterforArmyAnalysiswillhosttheArmy

OperationsResearchSymposium2010from13to14OctoberattheArmyLogisticsUniversityatFortLee,Virginia.Thisyear’sthemeis“FullSpectrumOperationsinaComplexEnvironment.”Anyoneinterestedinattendingmustpreregisterbefore24September.Formoreinformationortopreregister,gotothewebsite,www.alu.army.mil/AORS/aorshome.htm.

MilitaryLogisticsSummit2010TheInstituteforDefenseandGovernment

Advancement(IDGA)willholdMilitaryLogisticsSummit2010from13to16SeptemberinVienna,Virginia.Thesummitwillbringtogetherleadersanddecisionmakersfromthelogisticscommunitytodiscussthelatestinitiativesandimplementationstrategiesthatensurefuturemilitaryflexibilityandpreparedness.Thesummitwillfeatureinformationonsupportingmajordeployment,redeployment,anddistributionoperationsbasedonupdatedDepartmentofDefensemissionpriorities.Formoreinformationortoregister,visitthefollowingwebsite:www.MilitaryLogisticsSummit.com.

UpCOMING EVENTS


GeneralDunwoodysaidthatwhiletheArmyhasgot-tengoodatbuyinganddeliveringequipment,75percentoflife-cyclecostsresideinthesustainment,mainte-nance,andeventualdisposalofequipment.“Wearepayingstoragecosts,wearepayingmaintenancecosts,andwehavegottogetafterthetailendofthelife-cycle....WiththehelpoftheDepartment[ofDefense],we’reidentifyingequipmentasexcessdefensearticles,whichmakesitavailableforForeignMilitarySales.”

GeneralDunwoodylaidoutthreechangesthatwillimproveAMC’sservicetofutureoperations.First,AMCwillattempttomanagematerielsourcesofrepairbytakingoperationalcontrolofdirectoratesoflogistics(DOLs)tomanagetheirworkloads.Accord-ingtoLieutenantGeneralJamesH.Pillsbury,deputycommandinggeneralandchiefofstaffofAMC,the77DOLsintheArmyhad83contractswithmorethan40differentcontractors.“Nobadactors,butyoucanseetheinefficienciesinthat,”saidGeneralPills-bury.“Ithinkthatyouwillseesomegreatefficienciescomedownthispathintheyearstocome.”

Second,AMCplanstooptimizethewayitman-agesmaterielbyactingasthecentralmanagerforallArmymateriel.Apilot,beginninginJuly2010,istestingtheconceptofusingtheArmySustainmentCommandasthecentralmanagerofallstakeholders’materielinsupportoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycle.

Third,AMCwantstomanagethepilesofequip-ment—theater-providedequipment,theatersustain-mentstocks,prepare-to-deploytrainingpiles,andleft-behindequipment—thathaveaccumulatedovertime.GeneralDunwoodynotedthatmanyofthesepilesdidnotexistbefore11September2001.Nowitneedstobedecidedwhowillmanagethisequip-mentinsupportofARFORGEN.

17thFiresBrigadeDrawsDownEquipmentAsU.S.forcesredeployinaccordancewiththe

securityofforcesagreementwiththeIraqigovern-ment,the17thFiresBrigade,basedoutofJointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington,isdrawingdownequip-mentthatwillnotbeneededbytheunitsreplacingit.

ThebrigadedeployedinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedominJuly2009andhasmaintainedalargefootprintinBasraprovincewiththehelpofmilitarytransitionteamsandothersmallerunitsattachedtothebrigade.Theseunitshavereliedonthe17thFiresBri-gadetosupportthemlogisticallyastheyhaveconducted

operationsaroundBasra.Thebrigadealsoisresponsibefortrackingtheexcessequipment,includingvehicles,computers,andradios,theunitshaveastheydrawclos-ertotheSeptemberdeadline.

SincebrigadesdesignatedtoadviseandassisttheIraqiSecurityForceswillhavesignificantlylessper-sonnelthantheunitstheyreplace,thedrawdownto50,000U.S.troopsintheIraqby1Septemberulti-matelyrequiresequipmenttobeturnedinformainte-nanceandreallocation.

Overthepast7years,U.S.forceshaveestablishedbasesinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom.Thesebasesarehometobillionsofdollars’worthofequip-mentthatnowneedstobereturnedtotheUnitedStatesorreallocatedtoothertheaters.

WhilegeneralequipmentispulledoutofbaseshandedovertotheIraqiArmy,basiclifesupportequipment,suchasshowers,tents,andfurniture,willremaintosupporttheirsecuritymission.

PentagonExhibitShowsSustainersatWorkInApril,theOfficeoftheDeputyChiefofStaff,

G–4,DepartmentoftheArmy,unveiled“ArmyLogisticsAroundtheWorld”atthePentagon.ThedisplayhonorsArmylogisticiansworkingworldwidebyshowcasingvideoclipsandphotosofcurrentsustainmentoperationsoversixlargevideomonitors.Thedisplaycanbefoundonthe1stfloor,inthe4thcorridoroftheAring.

TheDeputyChiefofStaff,G–4,LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,isencouragingunitstosubmitvideosandphotosofSoldiersperformingsustainmentmissionstotheG–4staffforthedisplay.

In March, Soldiers from the 1314th Civil Affairs Company conducted a final inspection of radio

and camera equipment at Contingency Operating Base Basra, Iraq, before turning it in as part of the responsible drawdown. (Photo by SPC

Maurice A. Galloway, 17th Fires Brigade PAO).

68 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Photosshouldbesubmittedinastandardfileformat,suchas.jpg.Theyshouldbelargerthan720by480pixelsandatleast72dotsperinch.Thephotosmustnotbeeditedoraltered,andnocaptionsortextshouldbeembeddedwiththephotos.However,submittersshouldincludeadescriptionoftheactioninthephotointhefile’smetadataorinaseparateMicrosoftWorddocument.Thiscaptionshouldincludethephoto’s“who,what,when,andwhere.”

Acceptablevideofilesincludehighresolutionfilesina.wmv,.mov,or.mpegformat.Ifthevideohasnonarration,itshouldincludeadescriptivecaptionliketheonedescribedforphotos.Thecaptionsubmissionsguidelinesforvideosarealsothesameasguidelinesforphotos—theyshouldbeinthemetafileorinaseparateMicrosoftWorddocument.Allphotos,videosandcaptionsneedtobeapprovedforpublicreleasebythesecurityofficeofthesubmitter’sunitororganization.

Furtherguidelinesandanupdatescheduleforthedisplaycanbereceivedbysendinganemailtodevon.hylander@us.army.mil.

ChiefofStaffHonorsLogisticsProfessionalsTheChiefofStaffoftheArmypresentedthe2010

CombinedLogisticsExcellenceAwards,honoring82Armyunitsfortheiraccomplishmentsinsupply,main-tenance,anddeploymentlogistics,ataceremonyon24JuneinRichmond,Virginia.

TheDeployment Excellence Awardwinnersare—Operational Deployment

Small Category. 66thEngineerCompany,2dStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam,25thInfantryDivision,SchofieldBarracks,Hawaii.

Large Category. 72dInfantryBrigadeCombatTeam,TXARNG,Spring,Texas.

All Army InstallationFortHood,Texas.

Active ArmySmall Category.HeadquartersandHeadquarters

Company,391stCombatSustainmentSupportBattal-ion,Bamberg,Germany.

Large Category.72dExpeditionarySignalBattal-ion,Mannheim,Germany.

Supporting Category.39thTransportationBattalion(MovementControl),Kaiserslautern,Germany.

Army National GuardSmall Category.BCompany,3dBattalion,20th

SpecialForcesGroup(Airborne),RoanokeRapids,NorthCarolina.

Large Category.1stBattalion,125thInfantryRegi-ment,Flint,Michigan.

Supporting Category.FortSillMobilizationandDeploymentBrigade,FortSill,Oklahoma.

Army ReserveSmall Category.Detachment2,304thSustainment

Brigade,Riverside,California.Large Category.1184thDeploymentandDistribu-

tionSupportBattalion,Mobile,Alabama.Supporting Category.FortSillMobilizationand

DeploymentBrigade,FortSill,Oklahoma.

TheMaintenance Excellence Awardwinnersare—Active Army

Small Category Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).BCompany,307thBri-gadeSupportBattalion,AlAsadAirBase,Iraq.

Small Category Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).BusanStorageCenter,U.S.ArmyMate-rielSupportCenter-Korea,Busan,Korea.

Medium Category MTOE.528thQuartermasterCompany,JointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington.

Medium Category TDA.HeadquartersandHead-quartersCompany,206thMilitaryIntelligenceBattal-ion,FortGordon,Georgia.

Large Category MTOE.BCompany,615thAviationSupportBattalion,FortHood,Texas.

Large Category TDA.U.S.ArmyMaterielSupportCenter-Korea,CampCarroll,Korea.

Army National GuardSmall Category MTOE.BCompany,634thBase

SupportBattalion,Champaign,Illinois.Small Category TDA.FieldMaintenanceShop6,

Evansville,Indiana.Medium Category MTOE.3622dMaintenance

ComponentRepairCompany,FortIndiantownGap,Pennsylvania.

Medium Category TDA.ManeuverAreaTrainingEquipmentSite-NewYork,FortDrum,NewYork.

Army ReserveSmall Category MTOE.ForwardSupportCompany,

321stEngineerBattalion,Boise,Idaho.

The new Pentagon exhibit, “Logistics Around the World,” honors logisticians at work through photos and videos of them on the job. (Photo by Leroy Council, Jr., Army Multimedia and Visual Information Directorate, HQDA).


Small Category TDA.AreaMaintenanceSupportActivity57(Ground),NewCentury,Kansas.

Medium Category MTOE.238thMaintenanceCompany,SanAntonio,Texas.

DepotLetterkennyArmyDepot,Chambersburg,Pennsylvania.

Army Installation Management CommandSmall Category.U.S.ArmyGarrison-Benelux,

Chievres,Belgium.Medium Category.InstallationMaterielMainte-

nanceActivity,FortMcCoy,Wisconsin.Large Category.MaterielMaintenanceDivision,

DirectorateofLogistics,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.

TheSupply Excellence Awardwinnersare—Active Army

Unit Level MTOE.Headquarters,ADetachment,176thFinanceManagementCompany,Yongsan,Korea.

Unit Level TDA.7thArmyNoncommissionedOffi-cerAcademy,Grafenwoehr,Germany.

Property Book Level MTOE.69thAirDefenseArtilleryBrigade,FortHood,Texas.

Property Book Level TDA.WomackArmyMedicalCenter,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.

Parent Level MTOE.30thSignalBattalion,Wheel-erArmyAirfield,Hawaii.

Parent Level TDA.7thArmyJointMultinationalTrainingCenter,Hohenfels,Germany.

Supply Support Activity MTOE.5thBattalion,7thAirDefenseArtilleryRegiment,Kaiserslautern,Germany.

Supply Support Activity TDA.498thCombatSus-tainmentSupportBattalion,SupplyPoint60,CampCarroll,Korea.

Army National GuardUnit Level MTOE.BBattery,1stBattalion,148th

FieldArtilleryRegiment,Rexburg,Idaho.Unit Level TDA.Headquarters,209thRegional

TrainingInstitute,Ashland,Nebraska.Property Book Level MTOE.347thRegionalSup-

portGroup,Roseville,Minnesota.Property Book Level TDA.771stTroopCommand,

Charleston,WestVirginia.Parent Level MTOE.Headquarters,1stBattalion,

201stFieldArtilleryRegiment,Fairmont,WestVirginia.Parent Level TDA.JointForcesHeadquarters,Mad-

ison,Wisconsin.Supply Support Activity TDA.U.S.Propertyand

FiscalOffice,Indianapolis,Indiana.Army Reserve

Unit Level TDA.Headquarters,108thTrainingCommand,Charlotte,NorthCarolina.

Property Book Level TDA.SoutheastMedicalAreaReadinessSupportGroup,Nashville,Tennessee.

Supply Support Activity MTOE.Headquarters,RegionalSupportCommand,StandardArmyRetailSupplySystem-1Site,FortMcCoy,Wisconsin.

Training Circular (TC) 4–11.46, Convoy Protection Platform Gunnery,waspublishedinApril2010andprovidesthefirstArmy-widestandardizedtableforgunnerytraininginsustainmentunits.Thecircu-larwasdevelopedinresponsetotherecognitionthattoday’ssustainmentunitsarelikelytodefendthem-selves,theirconvoys,andtheirsustainmentbasesbyengagingopposingforceswithdirectfire.

TC4–11.46providestheguidanceforcom-mandersofsustainmentunitsontraininganddeployingconvoyprotectionplatformsandconvoyescortteams.Italsoprovidesguidancetosustain-mentelementsattached,assigned,orundertheoperationalcontroloftheatersustainmentcom-mands,expeditionarysustainmentcommands,andsustainmentbrigades.ThisTCisalsoapplicabletobasesupportbattalionsandforwardsupportcom-paniesorganictofires,combataviation,maneuverenhancement,andbattlefieldsurveillancesupportbrigadesforthepurposesoftrainingseniorgun-ners,vehicleguncrews,andvehiclecrewevalu-atorsontheemploymentofcrew-servedweaponsinoperations.Thetasksoutlinedinthemanualshouldbeusedtoevaluatetheproficiencyofvehi-cleguncrews.

ThesupportingtrainingammunitionstrategyforTC4–11.46hasbeenapprovedbytheArmymuni-tionsrequirementscouncilofcolonelsandwillavailableintheupcomingversionofDepartmentoftheArmyPamphlet350–38,StandardsinTrainingCommission.

Field Manual (FM) 3–35, Army Deployment and Redeployment,publishedinApril2010,com-binesdoctrinepreviouslypublishedin5differentFMstoalignArmydeploymentdoctrinewithjointdeploymentdoctrine.ThenewFMistheArmy’snewdoctrineforplanning,organizing,executing,andsup-portingdeploymentandredeployment.Includedinthedoctrinearesectionsonforceprotectionandthedeploymentprocess,activitiesunitsengageinpriortoalertofdeployment,andproceduresforthemove-mentofunitsandreception,staging,onwardmove-ment,andintegration.

Newappendiceshavebeenaddedcoveringinstal-lationsupport,unitmovementplans,thedutiesofthemobilityofficerandtheunitmovementofficer,andtheinfluenceofseniorleadersondeployment.Additionalappendicesaddressspecialcargo(suchashazardousmaterial,ammunition,andclassifiedandsensitiveshipments),automaticidentificationtech-nology,andautomatedmobilitysystems.

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PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES

ISSN 2153–5973DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705

Official Business

o LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctionalMedicalBattaliono TheCurrentBurdensomePayProcesso ContractOversightintheOperationalEnvironmento SustainingtheBCTinSouthernIraqo NaturalFire10:U.S.ArmyAfrica’sFirstMajorExerciseo NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCantheAFSBDoforMe?o PreparingtheIraqiFederalPoliceSustainmentBrigadeo WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagemento AdvicetoaNewSustainmentPlannerattheBCPo AfghanSupplyDistributiono TerrainAnalysisfortheNon-Engineer

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