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A more efficient and secure dynamic ID-A more efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemebased remote user authentication scheme
Yan-yan Wang, Jia-yong Liu , Feng-xia Xiao, Jing Dan
in Computer CommunicationsVol. 32, issue4, 4 March 2009, p.p 583-585
1
IntroductionIntroduction
• Remote authentication– a mechanism to authenticate remote users over insecure
communication network
Introduction (Lamport)Introduction (Lamport)
4
)(PWhn
UserUser ServerServer
)(PWhn
)(PWh
stroren
)(PWh in
Registration
Login &
Auth
)(?))(( PWhPWhh nin
IntroductionIntroduction1981: Lamport proposed one-time password remote
authentication scheme
2000: Hwang and Li proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards (based on Elgamal)
2004: Das et al. proposed a dynamic id-based remote user authentication scheme (based on One-way hash)2005: Liao et al proposed an improved scheme by Das
2007: Liao and Wang’s scheme (verify on smart card)
2009: Wang et al.'s scheme (modify Das’s scheme)
Review of Das et al’s scheme(1/3)Review of Das et al’s scheme(1/3)• Registration phase
pwUserUser
ServerServer
PW)}, (h,yNcard{ Smart i ,
)()( xhPWhNi
Review of Das et al’s scheme(2/3)Review of Das et al’s scheme(2/3)• Login & verify phase
)(
))((
)()(
yBNThC
PWhCIDhB
TyNhPWhCID
iii
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ii
UserUser ServerServer
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)()(
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'
''
'
yBNThC
PWhCIDhB
yTNhCIDPWh
TIDverify
ii
ii
ii
1
TCNCID iii ,,,
Review of Das et al’s scheme(3/3)Review of Das et al’s scheme(3/3)• Password Change phase
newPWPW ,UserUser
Smart cardSmart card
)()( newii PWhPWhNN
8
Security Flaw (1/3)Security Flaw (1/3)• The user’s authentication is independent of password.
)(
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)()(
yBNThC
PWhCIDhB
TyNhPWhCID
iii
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ii
ServerServer
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)()(
yBNThC
PWhCIDhB
yTNhCIDPWh
Tverify
ii
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ii
1
TCNCID iii ,,,
Security Flaw (2/3)Security Flaw (2/3) • In Registration phase, sending of PW to the user is redundant.
pwUserUser
ServerServer
PW)}, (h,yNcard{ Smart i ,
)()( xhPWhNi
Security Flaw (3/3)Security Flaw (3/3)• Impersonate server attack
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PWhCIDhB
TyNhPWhCID
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TIDverify
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1
TCNCID iii ,,,
Wang et al’s scheme(1/2)Wang et al’s scheme(1/2)• Registration phase
ID
UserUserServerServer
PW)}, (,card{Smart y,hN i
IDxhPWhNi )()(
12
Wang et al’s scheme(2/2)Wang et al’s scheme(2/2)• Login & verify phase
IDTyNhPWhCID ii )()(
UserUser ServerServer
IDID
PWhxhNID
IDTyNhCIDPWh
T
i
ii
?
)()(
)()(
verify
'
'
TNCIDID ii ,,,
',TaaTyPWhh
Tverify
?))(( '
'
))(( 'TyPWhha
compute
Security analysisSecurity analysis
14
Overcome an user authentication is independent of password:
IDxhPWhN i )()(
Withstand replay attack:
IDTyNhPWhCID ii )()( ))(( 'TyPWhha
Withstand impersonation server attack:
))(( 'TyPWhha ),( 'Ta
When the user wants to change the password PW to new password PW new
without taking any assistance from the remote system.
ConclusionsConclusions
• A remote user authentication method that removes all those security flaws.
• Provide a more secure and efficient scheme to be applied to password authentication.
15
Remark (password guessing & impersonation attack)Remark (password guessing & impersonation attack)
IDNPWhxh i )()(
If a valid user determine the hash of the secret value h(x) by intercepting Ni and obtain the value y, then he can impersonate server/user.
IDTyNhPWhCID ii )()(
UserUser ServerServer
IDID
PWhxhNID
IDTyNhCIDPWh
T
i
ii
?
)()(
)()(
verify
'
'
TNCIDID ii ,,,
',TaaTyPWhh
Tverify
?))(( '
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))(( 'TyPWhha
compute