Fortnight Publications Ltd.

A New Conspiracy of Silence?Source: Fortnight, No. 97 (Jan. 24, 1975), pp. 4-5Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25545308 .

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4/FORTNIGHT i -

Paramilitary Problems

It is tempting to compare the ^^L\ $kmm\ recent split in the UDA with ^__^^\ IxJ^^mW the established division be- ^yn Kul^5 tween the Provisionals and *9^V\ ffl!9r Officials among the Repub- ja Q

Mc^\ licans, and the more recent 8 ^\ f?t_\ J division between the hawks and

^^""$L1 ^[^C*-^ the doves on the Provisional y^xJi m/>*n

Army Council. On this reading ^^^^^\mVA^?) the East Belfast contingent isT**^ Qsy-* ]^ under Andy Tyrie are the hard j*_Jo.?^_^^

/ men, and West Belfast under

Pfr\ It ,-n / J Charles Harding Smith and ^H-MO \^HJ

Tommy Lyttle are the politicos. ' ' *

But the whole business has probably got more to do with the

increasing pointlessness of paramilitary activity on either

side, after their brief period of dominance. The UDA is

probably suffering from the same sense of futility and boredom as the IRA as their once clear and simple strategies and objectives become less and less credible. The result is continual internal wrangling and a good deal of

gang warfare.

The UDA story is currently the more sordid of the two.

Uke the IRA it started with a clear objective and simple strategy?to defend the Protestant cause from its head

quarters in a tiny house in Woodvale. Its founding fathers were Charles Harding Smith and Ernie Elliott, but early in 1972 Harding Smith was arrested r,nd charged with arms

trading in England, and though he was subsequently acquitted and released, he returned to find others firmly in control of the now greatly expanded organisation, spanning the whole province. In the latter part of 1972 the

organisation under Tommy Herron and Jim Anderson saw its most gloriously straightforward days. Since then there

has been a gradual decline into profiteering and internal factional killings. Ernie Elliott was the first to fall, shot in the Shankill Road area by one of his own side. Harding Smith had a brief come-back when he returned late in 1972, but was soon overtaken as effective leader by Andy Tyrie, the strong and silent Glencairn man and his henchman

David Payne from North Belfast. These two were just getting into their stride when Tommy Herron was assassi nated in September 1973, allegedly over the misapplication of protection money in East Belfast. Tyrie's own day of glory came in the UWC strike but since then he has got into

deeper political water in which his strength and silence have not proved so effective. He burned his fingers in the Libyan episode last autumn, and since then has sought to return to the straight and narrow by taking a hard line on any negoti ations with the IRA over the current ceasefire. It was Tyrie's faction in East Belfast which put out the statement on

January 3 threatening further violence if there was any deal. This was followed by an immediate repudiation from

Tommy Lyttle and Harding Smith in West Belfast,

declaring their general support for peace moves and their

independence as the new 'official' UDA. There had been an

attempt to patch up the difference in private, but the East Belfast and North Belfast leaders boycotted the meeting which the West Belfast faction had set up for January 6, and called their own Inner Council together on January 7 in East Belfast. The only result of this was a further splintering of the organisation with the Mid-Ulster brigade declaring its

own independence of both the Belfast factions, and its desire to pursue what it euphemistically described as its

'welfare and community work* in the Portadown and Dungannon area, where bombings of Roman Catholic pubs and cafes have continued more or less unabated despite the much publicised Loyalist ceasefire. The Londonderry fc brigade declared its support for Andy Tyrie, but does not appear to have taken much further part in the dispute.

Meanwhile back in Belfast the internal wrangles were

building up, and culminated in the shooting of Harding Smith on January 14. Some commentators hare blamed this on a simple financial row over the distribution of protection money, but this seems unlikely, given the fact that Harding Smith has recently received a large payment in settlement of his libel action against the authors and publishers of "Political Murder". Most of those close to the UDA inner councils are attributing the attack to the opposing faction

which supports the Tyrie/Payne line. What it all adds up to is an absence of any credible and coherent policy on either side, and a return to the tactics of simple gangsterism in the resulting impasse.

Something the same is happening within the Provisional IRA. The easy interpretation is to line up a political and a

military faction on the Army Council, with the hard men coming down from the North to oppose any attempt at a political settlement by the Southern leadership. But the

more accurate reports of who is voting for what do not fit this simple pattern. Seamus Twomey who was for long billed as the leader of the military faction, is reported to have voted for the prolongation of the ceasefire. Two other erstwhile gunmen from the North, Billy McKee and Seamus Loughran, the Provisional Sinn Fein organiser in Belfast, are also in the front Una of the peace negotiations. The internal death rate among the IRA leaders, at least among the Provisionals, is a good deal less than among the UDA, but it is clear that the movement is losing its simple sense of purpose. It is no longer at all clear, even to the blinkered eyes of the IRA, what one more heave would produce. The IRA is not beaten. But it is beginning to lose faith in the

point of its operations. When it is reduced to blaming the failure of the ceasefire on an alleged British assassination in

Monaghan of the IRA escapee Francis Green which local Republicans attribute to an internal vengeance operation, and death notices recorded simply as a 'tragic death', there is clearly something wrong. Boredom and apathy are a more serious threat to the IRA than the assembled powers of the British Army and the courts.

Policing A New Conspiracy of Silence?

The SDLP have always been

strong on conspiracies of jdfi_k_ silence within the RUC. But

^^?Kiw^ last week at their annual con- ^K^jftOT^$^>^^k ference the party leaders were

^8^* $$8$: d^*$llft^ roundly condemned for their flmfeft I * N?3 J ** 383/ lt__ own silence about policing. The 4Qb?j$ ! $ W^ (\ $$$ MmQ pressure on the party began to

^ft | US' _$ J build up in the autumn after 4E^E^^525t the collapse of the Sunningdale Vf^^^Pr ^T idea of a joint North/South yXJlSul V^ Police Authority under the

\jll//| ^\s aegis of a Council of Ireland. V_X Lx

The NI Police Authority had been having discussions with all political groups and had been in correspondence with the SDLP for some time. But

they got nothing in reply beyond some vague statements to the effect that the time was not yet ripe, and eventually to

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FRIDAY 24th JANUARY 1975/5 ????^??i i i ???^

protect themselves from the allegation of not being interested in minority views went public on the matter in

November. The SDLP leadership was stung into producing a policy document for the party conference. But the little

glossy booklet which finally emerged, 'Policing?realities and responsibilities9 did little more than spell out the' John Hume line that a political settlement must come first. The North Belfast branch ofthe party lambasted this at the con

ference, with some strong support from Sean Hollywood of South Down, and won a close vote on the motion to refer the document back to the executive.

The debate at the conference did not itself produce many new ideas. The basic problem, as everyone knows but no-one mentioned, is one of recruitment from the minority community. The RUC never had more than about 10 per cent of Roman Catholics in its ranks, but since 1971 the intake has fallen far below even that figure, and though things have picked up a little in 1974,"there are still not

enough Catholics coming forward to maintain even that

figure. The Police Authority taices the line that it is not

supposed to know the figures on Protestant and Catholic

recruitment, but is clearly concerned to increase the figure. Total numbers in the force have now gone up to some

4,600, with an annual intake of up to 500 being offset by a

wastage rate of some 200, which in police terms is not a bad record. There has also been a huge spurt in recruitment for the RUC Reserve, which grew from a level of 2,500 to almost

4,000 in 1974. Once again the problem is that the vast

majority of these new men are Protestants. The story is the same in the UDR, which now boasts a strength of some 8,000. Overall the strategy of building up local security forces in the hope of a gradual run down in British Army strength is working well. The total of local men is now

creeping ahead of total Army strength. But all the forces are

predominantly Protestant.

What this adds up to is the simple fact that the longer the SDLP and other Catholic leaders delay before giving their

blessing to the RUC and the UDR the more difficult will it be to create a force which is broadly representative. There are some ways in which it could help. The Police Authority has embarked on a campaign to bring in Police Cadets from the schools, but find it difficult to gain access to many Catholic schools. If the SDLP could bring themselves to assist in this and if the Church leaders assisted, then a start could hie made in the right direction, even though cadet numbers are restricted to 200 a year. In return they could

pursue with the Police Authority some of the ideas for better local liaison and a more independent complaints system

which were raised at the SDLP conference. They are in a

strong bargaining position given the Authority's commitment to greater equality in recruitment, but the

longer the delay the more difficult it will be to create the kind of non-partisan and acceptable police force which

everyone wants.

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