1

A New Era of Shared Leadership and Burden-Sharing?

US Allies in Libya and Mali1

Last modified: July 20, 2014

Articlesmustnotexceed10,000words(includingfootnotesandbibliography)

Wordcount:13,473

Justin Massie (UQAM)

Jonathan Paquin (Laval)

Philippe Beauregard (Laval)

Keywords: conflict management; burden-sharing; leadership; NATO; Libya; Mali.

Introduction

According to many observers, NATO’s military intervention in Libya has exemplified a new

transatlantic dynamic where key US allies played a major role in crisis management.2 For some,

this new dynamic is the result of president Obama’s relative foreign policy retrenchment and lack

of leadership.3 For others, president Obama is not favoring drastic retrenchment from world

affairs but is rather doing selective engagements.4 Walt argues for instance that president Obama

understands that ‘the United States is already remarkably secure and just doesn’t have that much

1 The authors would like to thank Marion Guay-Arcand for her excellent research assistance. They are grateful to Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for research funding. 2 Fabbrini, S. (2014). "The European Union and the Libyan crisis." International Politics 51(2): 177-195. Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge University Press 2013); Michael Clarke, Malcolm Chalmers, Jonathan Eyal, Shashank Joshi, Mark Phillips, Elizabeth Quintana and Lee Willett, ‘Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation’, The Royal United Services Institute (September 2011); Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy’ New Yorker 87 (May 2, 2011). 3 Gelb, L. H. (2012). "The Elusive Obama Doctrine." The National Interest 121. Daniel S. Morey, Clayton L. Thyne, Sarah L. Hayden and Michael B. Senters, ‘Leader, Follower, or Spectator? The Role of President Obama in the Arab Spring Uprisings’, Social Science Quarterly 93/5 (2012), 1185-1201; MacDonald and Parent define retrenchment “as a policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a decline in relative power.” Parent, J. M. and P. K. MacDonald (2011). "Wisdom of Retrenchment-America Must Cut Back to Move Forward, The." Foreign Aff. 90: 32. 4 On selective engagement as a US grand strategy, see Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).

2

to gain by interfering in the world’s trouble spots’.5 As a result, Washington is ‘happy to let local

partners bear the main burden and to back them up as necessary’.6

This leads us to wonder how allies behave when the United States does not want to be in

the driving seat anymore. Critics of president Obama’s foreign policy who have pointed to its

lack of leadership in international affairs maintain that, ‘without U.S. leadership, nothing

happens’.7 But a quick look at recent events suggests that US allies, and more specifically France,

took proactive policy stances toward foreign crises. In Libya, for instance, president Sarkozy

unilaterally recognized the Libyan rebel government in Benghazi. In Syria, where the US and its

allies refrained from intervening militarily, France has arguably been the most ardent supporter of

the Syrian rebels: it was the first Western nation to recognize the Syrian National Coalition as the

sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and it favored a Western-led military

operation. These examples of French proactivity notwithstanding, many have emphasized that US

participation remains necessary to the existence and success of a collective military intervention8

and that the Europeans lack the means, cohesion and will to act independently.9

This article attempts to help make sense of the current transatlantic dynamic by asking the

following questions: Are we really observing a new kind of transatlantic leadership and burden-

sharing dynamic under the Obama administration? More specifically, have US allies been

excercising more leadership and responsibility under the current US administration than they

have in the past? And to what extent were allied contributions dependent on a US willingness to

support a military intervention? To answer these questions, our analysis compares the response of

the United States to those of three of its main allies, namely Britain, Canada and France during

the recent wars in Libya and Mali, which generated both diplomatic responses and military

5 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Barack the buck-passer’, Foreign Policy, (2013) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/08/barack_the_buck_passer>. 6 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Barack the buck-passer’ (2013). 7 Richard Cohen, ‘The price of Obama’s leading from behind’, Washington Post (September 17, 2012); Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind’, Washington Post (April 28, 2011); Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). 8 Engelbrekt, K., M. Mohlin, et al. (2013). The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign, Routledge, Weitsman, P. (2013). Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence, Stanford University Press. Philippe Gros, ‘“Leading From Behind”: contour et importance de l’engagement américain en Libye’, Politique américaine 19/1 (2012). 9 Anand Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival 53/3 (2011), 75-90; Michaels, J. H. (2011). "NATO After Libya." The RUSI Journal 156(6): 56-61, Fabbrini, S. (2014). "The European Union and the Libyan crisis." International Politics 51(2): 177-195.

3

interventions. These states are, by all accounts, core US allies and they were quite active during

both the Libyan and Malian interventions.

The research is conducted in three steps. First, we discuss three broad understandings of

the evolving state of transatlantic dynamics, and operationalize their respective comprehension of

leadership and followership. Second, through content analysis and the study of aggregated data,

we examine whether these expectations were met during the transatlantic management of the

Libya and Mali crises. Finally, we compare these recent instances of transatlantic burden-sharing

to allies’ interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan in order to see whether we are really

witnessing a departure from previous burden-sharing relationships among transatlantic allies.

In light of our analysis, the article suggests that a new alignment and burden-sharing trend

is emerging under the Obama administration. That said, this finding comes with two main

limitations. First, this dynamic nevertheless rests on the ability of US allies to convince

Washington to support militarily their conflict resolution initiatives. Second, we believe it is still

too early to claim with confidence whether this is a durable trend.

Transatlantic Leadership, Followership and Burden-Sharing

In trying to understand the current dynamics of transatlantic crisis management, one is struck by

the dearth of scholarly analysis on US allies’ leadership, alignment and intervention choices.10

Perhaps it is not worth examining followership in the context of US retrenchment because US

leadership remains a necessary condition for followership. This is at least the central claim of

hegemonic stability theory: international security can only be provided and sustained by a

dominant “burden bearing” state because of the collective action problem.11 Smaller states have

strong incentives to ride free by getting the security benefits provided by the dominant power

without contributing proportionally to the military and financial burden that make the benefit

10 For a similar critique, see Jonathan Paquin and Philippe Beauregard, ‘Shedding Light on Canada’s Foreign Policy Alignment’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 46/3 (2013), 617-643; Jonathan Paquin and Philippe Beauregard, ‘US Transatlantic Leadership After Iraq’, Cooperation and Conflict Forthcoming, (2014). Auerswald, D. P. and S. M. Saideman (2014). NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 11 Drezner, D. W. (2013). "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)." International Security 38(1): 52-79.

4

possible.12 As a result, in the face of president Obama’s foreign policy retrenchment or selective

involvement, we should expect cooperation failure and inaction among transatlantic allies,

notably with regards to foreign crisis management.

This logic is consistent with what we call the ‘US primacy perspective’. Some argue that

the United States ‘continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic

size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military

technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains

the capacity to meet key objectives’, including the capacity to ‘play a leading world role’.13 In

short, the magnitude of US power would remain unrivaled and precludes counterbalancing.14

If this enduring US primacy perspective is correct, we should see clear US transatlantic

leadership in international crisis management, as it is the greatest benefactor of international

security public goods. In this context, European and Canadian allies would be good followers.

They would avoid antagonizing Washington, for they have no alternative option but to follow or

opt out of a US-led initiative. And in terms of economic and military burden-sharing, we should

see asymmetrical distribution of the costs between the US and its allies, with the latter free riding

on US power. In other words, US primacy is expected to induce European and Canadian

followership or inaction, and US military contribution is expected to represent a necessary and

sufficient condition for transatlantic collective action.

A second school of thought opposes this understanding of leadership and burden-sharing

by asserting the end of US primacy. US ‘declinists’ see in the Great Recession, the rise of new

great powers, and military overextension, the illustration of the end of US dominance and

preponderant power.15 Consistent with hegemonic stability theory, the decline of US power

12 Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (1966), 266-79; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, ‘Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War’, International Organization 48/1 (1994), 39-75. Sandler, T. and K. Hartley (1999). The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 13 Lieber, R. J. (2011). "Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy." Journal of Strategic Studies 34(4): 509-530. On why US primacy endures, see also Eric S. Edelman, Understanding America’s Contested Primacy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), chap. 3. 14 Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). "The stability of a unipolar world." International security 24(1): 5-41, Norrlof, C. (2010). America's global advantage: US hegemony and international cooperation, Cambridge University Press, Beckley, M. (2011). "China's century? Why America's edge will endure." 15 Gideon Rachman. ‘American Decline: This Time It’s for Real’, Foreign Policy 184 (January/February 2011), 59-65; Layne, C. (2012). "This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana." International Studies Quarterly 56(1): 203-213.

5

inevitably constrains its ability to provide public goods, such as maintaining regional and

hegemonic stability and guarding the global commons.16 But US declinists disagree on whether

Europe represents one such counterbalancing force. Those who insist on the limits of European

power concentrate on European cohesion and military capability. They point to Europe’s limited,

disjointed and unreliable contribution to crisis management (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya).

Optimists provide an alternative view. They maintain that the European Union has progressively

developed an autonomous military capability allowing it to act independently in security matters,

and that the EU – or some of its foremost powers – is increasingly (soft) balancing US power and

interests 17 Indeed, France and the UK, most notably, maintain global power projection

capabilities. As consequential states, they are said to adopt autonomous-seeking behavior not

necessarily against the United States, but as a result of the imbalance of power and a lack of trust

that the US will protect Europe’s security interests. In short, Europe is conceived as an aspirant

counterweight to US hegemony.18

In this ‘declinist’ perspective, the emerging multipolar balance of power will either lead to

greater European activism in providing international security public goods, or to greater

European assertiveness and resistance to US leadership and initiatives. This entails substantial

European leadership and consequent burden-sharing in matters of conflict management. We

should expect European states to act independently from the United States, as well to express

different points of view, even to disagree and oppose Washington’s positions. There should be no

NATO-led transatlantic cooperation in international crisis management. Instead, we should see

US and European independent military initiatives and competing diplomatic leadership. While

coalitions of the willing may be put together, these should occur outside the NATO framework,

and not include all three greatest transatlantic powers (the United States, Britain, and France).19

16 Posen, B. R. (2003). "Command of the commons: the military foundation of US hegemony." International Security 28(1): 5-46, Posen, B. R. (2014). Restraint: A New Foundation for U. S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press. 17 Pape, R. A. (2005). "Soft balancing against the United States." International Security 30(1): 7-45, Posen, B. R. (2006). "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" Security Studies 15(2): 149-186. 18 As Barry Posen (2006) argues, the Europeans are not threat balancing, but power balancing. As US power declines, Europe is expected to increase its power and progressively take on the United States’ fading hegemony. Posen, B. R. (2006). "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" Security Studies 15(2): 149-186. 19 This is consistent with the type of transatlantic cooperation dynamics witnessed during the 2003 Iraq crisis. See Judith Kelley, ‘Strategic Non-Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was Not Just About Iraq’, International Politics 42/2 (2005), 153-173; Gordon, P., J. Shapiro, et al. (2004). Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Split Over Iraq, London: McGraw-Hill Professional. For critiques of this line of thought, see Brooks, S. G. and W. C.

6

A third school of thought, that we call the ‘shared leadership’ perspective, offers a middle

ground between the US primacy and the declinist schools of thought. It argues that common

security institutions, perceptions of US benevolence, and shared values and interests amongst

NATO allies ensure the endurance of Pax Americana despite the relative decline of US power.20

Common institutions, in particular NATO in matters of international security, are said to enmesh

and spread US power, provide legitimacy to Western hegemony, reduce the transactional costs of

collective action, increase strategic and operational efficiency, and ensure lasting Western

dominance beyond unipolarity. As Patricia Weitsman argued, Western powers no longer manage

international crises alone, let alone intervene militarily unilaterally.21 Partnerships, including

those formally institutionalized in NATO, are the foundation of the projection of power and the

use of force. As such, NATO represents a conduit of US power, furthering Western dominance.

In this perspective, US decline is an opportunity to revitalize the Western-led liberal

international order through more symmetrical burden-sharing in terms of public goods provision,

as well as through stronger institutional frameworks. Indeed, neoliberal institutionalists

emphasise the United States’ ability to create incentives and institutions that change the

cost/benefit calculations of secondary states, thereby fostering greater public goods provisions by

the latter and sustaining the West’s hegemonic position in the international system.22 This logic is

consistent with what some observers called the ‘leading from behind’ approach adopted by

president Obama, which let key European allies step up to the plate and take the lead in managing

regional crises.23 More precisely, it epitomizes the White House’s doctrine of shared leadership,

articulated in a blueprint for US foreign policy produced in 2008 by influential advisers to

Wohlforth (2005). "Hard times for soft balancing." International Security 30(1): 72-108, Howorth, J. and A. Menon (2009). "Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(5): 727-744. 20 Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars, Princeton University Press, Lieber, K. A. and G. Alexander (2005). "Waiting for balancing: why the world is not pushing back." International Security 30(1): 109-139, Brooks, S. G. and W. C. Wohlforth (2008). World out of balance: international relations and the challenge of American primacy, Princeton University Press, Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order, Princeton University Press. This perspective remains consistent with the zero-sum nature of burden-sharing, where the more some allies contribute to a collective action, the less required from others. But it expects less competition amongst allies, less exploitation of the US, and less free-riding on the part of capable NATO allies. 21 Weitsman, P. (2013). Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence, Stanford University Press. 22 Ikenberry, G. J. and C. A. Kupchan (1990). "Socialization and hegemonic power." International organization 44(03): 283-315, Kupchan, C. A. (2010). How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace, Princeton University Press. 23 Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy’ (2011)

7

president Obama. The document, called “Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century

National Security Strategy,” affirms that US leadership ‘recognizes that in a world in which

power has defused, [the United States’] interests are best protected and advanced when others

step up and at times lead alongside or even ahead of us’.24 We thus prefer the concept of “shared

leadership” because it better reflects president Obama’s doctrine and conveys both the nature and

underlying conditions of the cooperation dynamic: mutually agreed distribution of diplomatic

leadership and followership, and military interdependence.

In this perspective, a more or less formal regional division of responsibility may be

crafted, where the US concentrates its attention on the rising BRICs powers (as exemplified by

the US ‘pivot’), and where Europe strengthens its ability to manage security issues on the

European continent and MENA region. This should lead to greater transatlantic coordination,

consultation, and joint actions, as well as greater ‘outsourcing’ on the part of the United States.

NATO, for its part, represents in this view not only a military alliance, but an institution and a

security regime. It is the foremost locus of transatlantic cooperation and it should be given

priority over more exclusive institutions (such as the European Union) or informal coalitions of

the willing during transatlantic crisis management. No overtly competitive behavior (such as soft

balancing) between the EU and the US should be displayed; instead, consultation, cooperation

and coordination should govern transatlantic crisis management where perceived common

interests meet. This is well captured by what Deudney and Ikenberry call ‘co-binding’ security

practices, whereby allies mutually constrain one another by locking themselves into common

institutions.25 Allies will prefer bridging each other’s positions in an effort to maintain good

relations, narrow differences, minimize conflict, and foster cooperation.26

In sum, the shared leadership perspective expects capable US allies to take a great portion

of the lead in crisis management, without acting independently from the United States, and to

intervene militarily through NATO. In addition to US allies highly valuing NATO as a core

security institution (such as Canada), France and the UK are expected to contribute substantially

to the intervention. The United States, in turn, should follow or coordinate closely with its allies

on the diplomatic front, and contribute military, if minimally, to the joint action. This is not

24 Henninger, D. (2011). The Collapse of Internationalism. Wall Street Journal. 25 Deudney, D. and G. J. Ikenberry (1999). "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order." Review of International Studies 25(2): 179-196. 26 Rhodes, M. (2004). "Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge?" Orbis 48(3): 423-436.

8

because the United States does not have the capacity to contribute more (as the declinist school

would have it), but because it does not have the will to take the lead of a collective action where

it has few national interests at stake and where its allies are expected to lead the joint effort.27 US

military participation thus represents, in this view, a necessary but insufficient condition for

transatlantic collective action.

Table 1 about here

Measuring Leadership and Followership

Which of these three perspectives best make sense of the current transatlantic cooperation

dynamic in matters of crisis management? To answer the question, one must ascertain the nature

of leadership and followership. We measure both phenomena in two ways. First, using the QDA

miner software, we conduct a computer assisted content analysis and chronological analysis of

the 482 official statements released by Washington, Ottawa, London and Paris on the crises in

Libya and Mali to identify the diplomatic leaders and followers for each critical moment in the

development of each crisis (see Table 2).28

(Table 2 about here)

For the sake of our study, the Libyan diplomatic crisis began on February 15, 2011 when

popular uprisings emerged in several Libyan cities against the Gaddafi regime, and it ended on

March 18 of the same year with the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution

1973, which gave the green light for a military intervention in Libya. As for the Malian case, it

began with the military coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré on March 21, 2012 and it

ended with the decision of the French National Assembly to extend the French military mission

27 Signaling such intent, president Obama asserted that “The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it—when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger.” Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 May 2014. 28 For content analysis, official declarations were coded using the QDA Miner software in cooperation by two coders. See http://provalisresearch.com/products/qualitative-data-analysis-software/ Content analysis is an empirical method that is increasingly used in foreign policy analyzes. See for instance Jonathan Paquin and Philippe Beauregard, ‘US Transatlantic Leadership After Iraq’ (2014)

9

in Mali on April 22, 2013. Within these timeframes, all official declarations made by the four

transatlantic allies were collected, imported into our content analysis software and coded.29

We first identified a basis for comparison within and between each case by isolating 23

key positions (i.e. critical developments) for which at least three out of the four allies issued

official statements to signal their positions.30 We then performed a chronological analysis of

these key positions to identify the ‘speaking order’ of the allies. Table 3 shows selected key

positions. A content analysis was performed through the codification of the 45 different themes

that were identified in the 482 statements.31 These themes were coded 9,451 times, which gives

us a good idea of the transatlantic cooperation dynamics during these two crises.

(Table 3 about here)

We measured leadership by identifying which government issued its statement first. A

government is said to exert diplomatic leadership if it initiates diplomatic positions by issuing its

statements before its allies, while its allies update their own positions accordingly. Followership

(or alignment) appears when a government publicly adopts the diplomatic position of another

government later in the crisis. Absence of followership occurs when a government speaks second,

third or fourth and emphasizes a different or contrary position.

This method does not take into account private discussions between the allies. However,

since it is difficult to know exactly what really happened behind the scenes, and that the archives

are not yet available, we believe that this analysis of official statements provides valuable

indications concerning who leads and who follows. That being said, it is possible that

transatlantic allies issued their statements at the same time and with one voice, which would

make it hard to call the leader and the followers. If governments announce the same position at

the same time (that is, for the purposes of our study, on the same day), then leadership and

followership will be indeterminate.32 This concordance in the statements would simply suggest

29 We aimed at collecting all official statements, speeches, interviews, and letters issued by the chiefs of diplomacy and presidents or prime ministers for the four countries. Official readouts of phone calls and meetings were also included. Moreover, the archives of the Élysée (the French presidency) were not available for President Nicolas Sarkozy in the first months of the Malian crisis. Though we were able to retrieve some declarations, this is the only instance where some official statements may be missing. 30 The selection of key positions where three out of four allies issued statements is a reasonable criterion that assures a certain degree of importance for the positions without being too exclusive. 31 For more information on the coding manual, please contact the authors. 32 The issue of the time zones was taken into account in the chronological analysis of the key positions and was found to have little or no effect on our results.

10

coordination and/or a high level of interest convergence between the allies. In other words,

instances of diplomatic concordance will tend to support the shared leadership perspective.

Second, we examined the financial and military efforts of each ally to assess whether

transatlantic allies were actually ‘walking the talk’, that is, if public statements and concrete

actions coincided. This is an important step since a government may very well be active on the

diplomatic front without necessarily contributing to the same height to the burden-sharing of a

military intervention, or vice versa. Hence, a government that exerts diplomatic leadership and

disproportionately contributes to the coalition war effort will be identified as the transatlantic

leader. Transatlantic followers will align their diplomatic positions with those of other allies

(chronologically and thematically), and contribute proportionally or less to the burden sharing of

a military operation than what collective action theory predicts. Transatlantic resisters will refuse

to diplomatically align and contribute militarily to the intervention, and such non-cooperation

will be consequential for the collective action.33

The Diplomatic Response to Libya

The chronological and thematic analysis is quite revealing as it shows that France led most of the

diplomatic ball in Libya, and that allies followed each other’s leadership. Indeed, there was no

single instance of disagreement or opposition between the US, Canada, and Europe. The

transatlantic allies spoke with a same voice, which tends to support the shared leadership

perspective.

(Table 4 about here)

The French government issued its statements before its allies more than 46 % of the time.

As for the United States, it ranked as a good second and spoke first for 30.8 % of the key

positions. When they were not leading on a key position, Paris and Washington aligned

themselves on each other at a similar rate by issuing very similar declarations. The United States

33 Germany’s refusal to support and take part in the war in Libya, for instance, was inconsequential for the joint action since Berlin neither used its seat at the North Atlantic Council to prevent NATO from taking military action, nor its seat at the UN Security Council to prevent a UN mandate under Chapter VII. It rather sought to remain on the side-line to allow NATO to appear united, and chose to “overcompensate” for its non-participation. See Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya’, European Journal of International Relations (published online January 29, 2014).

11

aligned on the positions expressed by France in 53.8 % of the cases, and the reverse was observed

46.2 % of the time. This tends to demonstrate that there was close coordination between France

and the United States. Indeed, as French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé declared the day before

NATO’s intervention in Libya, ‘I had Hillary Clinton on the phone at several occasions (during

the crisis) and she met with the President of the Republic on Monday. We have been permanently

in touch with our allies’.34 Such statements were frequent in the allies’ declarations, and tend to

illustrate the close coordination amongst allies regarding key positions, especially in the

beginning of the crisis.35

Despite strong coordination, allies rarely spoke on the same day, which makes it easier to

identify leaders and followers. Even by taking into account the time difference, Washington and

Paris never issued a statement on the same day. The rare cases of statement overlaps were

between Washington and London (for 7.7 % of their statements) and between Ottawa and Paris

for the same small percentage. Statements released by the allies during the crisis in Libya thus

clearly reflect that coordination was done through a leader-follower type of dynamic.

Interestingly, Libya shows that Washington exerted greater leadership on less committing

issues, notably by calling Gaddafi to respect the right of Libyans to protest, by condemning the

regime’s repression, and by demanding that humanitarian aid be allowed to reach the people of

Libya. As the crisis evolved and became more acute, Washington withdrew in the background to

let France exert more leadership. President Sarkozy initiated crucial key positions that had

serious consequences. He was the first leader to recommend sanctions against the Gaddafi

regime, to demand for Gaddafi to leave the country, and to call for a no-fly zone over Libya to

“prevent the use of that country's warplanes against [its] population.”36 French leaders also stood

first in calling for the suspension of Libya from the UN Human Rights Council, by recognizing

the National Transition Council, and by calling for targeted strikes against the Gaddafi regime

and for a ceasefire between Gaddafi’s military and the rebels.37 US acceptance of France’s

34 Here is the exact French quotation : ‘J’ai eu à plusieurs reprises Hillary Clinton au téléphone, et elle a été reçue par le président de la République lundi. Nous avons été en permanence en relation avec nos alliés.’ See Alain Juppé, ‘Conférence de Presse du Ministre d’État, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et Européennes’, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 17, 2011). 35 Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention, 29-30. 36 Chris Jones and Patrick Wintour, “Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron's backing,” The Guardian, 23 February 2011. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/libya-nofly-zone-david-cameron (accessed July 10, 2014). 37 Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye (Paris : Fayard, 2012), 88.

12

leadership was particularly telling when President Obama sent Secretary Hilary Clinton to a Paris

meeting, on the eve of war, as a way to underscore Washington’s lesser role.38

Our findings indicate no similar leadership exerted by the British or the Canadians.

Britain and Canada were good followers. Britain led on only one key position, when it

emphasized the importance of respecting in Libya the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a norm, while

Canada initiated not a single diplomatic position. Prime Minister Cameron followed President

Sarkozy 53.8 % of the time, while it followed President Obama for 38.5 % of the key positions.

Consistent with the shared-leadership perspective, London aligned more with France than with

the United States during the Libyan crisis. This suggests that France was regarded as the leading

transatlantic actor, and that Britain was not overly concerned by not being in sync with

Washington. In fact, Prime Minister Cameron came around to the French view on the need for a

military intervention two weeks before President Obama rallied to the idea. Cameron however

wanted to secure US participation before committing Britain to military action. He and Sarkozy

had nevertheless agreed on three conditions for military action, which gave momentum to the

possibility of military strikes: a demonstrable need on the ground, a UN resolution, and support

from the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council.39

Followership was more pronounced in the case of Canada. Prime Minister Harper aligned

the country’s positions with those of France and the United States for an equal share of 61.5 % of

the cases and did the same with Britain 30.8 % of the time. Canada thus represented the most

ardent follower of all states examined in this paper. This confirms France’s, and to a lesser extent

the United States’ leadership during the Libyan crisis. This is worth emphasizing since it shows

that Canada was not purely aligned on US positions. Ottawa’s alignment with Paris suggests that

Canada adopted a co-binding strategy. Indeed, on the eve of the adoption of Resolution 1973,

which authorized the aerial use of force in Libya, Ottawa refused to state whether military action

was necessary. Justifying Canada’s hesitancy, Foreign Affairs minister Lawrence Cannon

mentioned the absence of a transatlantic consensus on the issue of military action beyond

humanitarian aid. A desire to bridge Washington, Paris and Britain’s positions clearly determined

38 Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention, 69. 39 Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention, 41; Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye, 97.

13

Canada’s public stance on military action against Gaddafi. As soon as a consensus was reached,

Ottawa proved an enthusiastic follower.40

In sum, the leadership-followership dynamic pertaining to the diplomatic management of

the Libyan crisis tends to demonstrate the prevalence of the shared leadership perspective. There

was no instance of opposition amongst the allies, and every ally seemed eager to follow France’s

overall leadership during the crisis. In all, France, the United States, Britain, and Canada came

around to common positions through close coordination, joint leadership, and enthusiastic

followership.

The Diplomatic Response to Mali

The crisis in Mali shows even stronger French leadership as France led 70 % of the diplomatic

statements. Not only did the United States align itself on Paris for 90 % of the ten cases

examined, Paris never aligned itself on Washington. Moreover, the French government spoke

first on all of the important key positions: the condemnation of the March 22, 2012 military coup,

the need to uphold Mali’s territorial integrity in the face of the Tuareg fighters and Islamic forces

in the North of the country, the need to intervene militarily in Mali to combat the Al-Qaida-linked

terrorist cells that threatened to takeover Bamako, the backing to the African-led International

Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), and on the support to UN Resolution 2085, which

authorized the deployment of AFISMA. As for Britain and Canada, once again, they were good

followers. They both followed France on 60 % of the key positions.

Moreover, London and Washington never initiated a diplomatic statement during the

Malian crisis, which once again confirms the quasi unidirectional French leadership. Interestingly

enough, the Canadian government spoke first on 20 % of the key positions, and spoke on the

same day as France for one other key position. The Harper government was first to support the

idea of a transitional government for Mali and was first to condemn the destruction by Islamists

of religious sites in the historic city of Timbuktu. This finding seems to suggest that in addition to

40 Massie, J. and D. Brizic (2014). "Rupture idéologique et redéfinition de l’identité internationale du Canada: Harper et Chrétien face aux guerres en Libye et au Kosovo." Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20(1): 18-27.

14

transatlantic diplomatic followership, Canada also displayed noticeable leadership within the

Francosphere.41

The followership dynamic is also consistent with this conclusion. Numbers show that,

most of the time, the United States spoke after France and Canada, which clearly suggest that the

Obama administration was tagging along its transatlantic allies. Moreover, it is interesting to note

that most of the time, the Canadian government did not wait for Washington to express its views

before issuing its statements. This fact counters the argument that for economic and security

reasons, Ottawa will systematically follow Washington’s positions on foreign crises.42 Moreover,

both Canada and Britain aligned themselves on France on 60 % of the key positions, which is a

smaller proportion than the US alignment on France. Finally, as in the case of Libya, the allies

almost never spoke on the same day and never expressed opposite views, which makes it easier to

distinguish leaders and followers in the transatlantic cooperation dynamic. Indeed, official

statements released by the Obama administration explicitly attributed the leadership over the

Malian crisis to France, before and after the French military intervention.43 The fact that we find

such clear and open expressions of support and recognition of French leadership in US official

declarations is revealing and fully coherent with the shared leadership perspective on transatlantic

cooperation. France’s initiatives were welcomed by its allies, whom aligned themselves on its

leadership and offered support to its actions.

The analysis of US declarations further indicates that the Malian crisis was not a top

priority of the Obama administration, thereby illustrating US willingness to outsource leadership

For instance, several significant developments in the course of the Malian crisis were barely

addressed by the Obama administration. The military coup against the government, which

happened in March 2012, was publicly addressed in a US official statement on August 1, four

months after the event. This tends to confirm Stephen Walt’s assertion that Washington was

happy to let its partners ‘bear the main burden and to back them up as necessary’.44 This is

significant given the instability in the Sahel region and the growing influence of Jihadist groups 41 On the Francosphere, see Massie, J. (2013). Francosphère: l'importance de la France dans la culture stratégique du Canada. Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec. 42 This idea is referred to as “continentalism” by Canadian foreign policy analysts. Nossal, K. R., S. Paquin, et al. (2010). International policy and politics in Canada, Pearson Education Canada. 43 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at a UN Secretary General Meeting on the Sahel’, U.S. Department of State (September 26, 2012); Barack Obama, ‘Readout of the President’s Phone Call with President Hollande of France’, The White House (January 25, 2013). 44 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Barack the buck-passer’ (2013)

15

affiliated to Al-Qaeda in the Northern part of the country, which was acknowledged by both

Britain and Canada. In fact, by December 2012, the northern half of Mali had become ‘the largest

territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world’, according to the chairman of the U.S.

Senate subcommittee on Africa.45 This was in great part the result of the regional spillover of the

war in Libya.46

As for the allies’ coordination, the Malian crisis is a more ambiguous case than Libya. By

looking closely at the content of the official statements, it is unclear whether there was close

coordination. In the allies’ official statements, only the two following quotes suggest that the

French government was coordinating its positions and actions with the Americans in Mali.

French Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius indicated, ‘we are discussing with all our

partners at the United Nations, including of course with the Americans, for the adoption of the

second phase’ of the crisis management in Mali.47 A few weeks later, after having sent French

troops to Mali, President François Hollande declared, ‘from our British friends and our American

allies, we were loaned aircraft for transport and refueling’.48 Since France was the only ally to

significantly intervene militarily in Mali in January 2013, the coordination dynamic seemed to

have been more the result of US logistical and informational support to the French operation

rather than a multilateral coordination in order to prepare for a common military operation as in

the case of Libya.49

To sum up, the chronological and content analysis draws a picture of shared leadership in

the Libyan and Malian crises, with greater US and British alignment in the latter than the former.

Our results clearly hint at growing French transatlantic leadership from one crisis to another.

(Figure 1 about here)

45 Craig Whitlock, ‘Pentagon Helping Organize Multinational Operation in Mali’, Washington Post (December 6, 2012); Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, ‘Al-Qaeda in Africa Is under Scrutiny’, Washington Post (October 2, 2012); Edward Cody, ‘Restive Mali Is Ripe for al-Qaeda’, Washington Post (June 8, 2012). 46 Kuperman, Alan J., ‘A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign’, International Security 38/1 (Summer 2013), 128-132. 47 Laurent Fabius, ‘Entretien du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Laurent Fabius avec «TV 5 Monde - RFI - Le Monde»’, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 16, 2012). 48 François Hollande, ‘Point de presse conjoint avec M. Donald Tusk, Premier Ministre de la République de Pologne’, French Presidency (January 28, 2013). 49 It is true that NATO was not involved in the Mali intervention. But this was not due to resistance on the part of some allies, as the declinist perspective would expect. It is rather because of the limited scale of the military operations, and the fact that the UN Security Council had mandated an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012, which gave place to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in April 2013.

16

Did US allies ‘Walk the Talk’ in Libya?

Shared diplomatic leadership must be looked at in conjunction with allies’ burden sharing in

order to have a full circle understanding of the transatlantic dynamic. Did France, Britain and, to

a lesser extent, Canada walked the diplomatic talk? The short answer is yes. US allies

demonstrated much greater will to share the collective war effort than during the wars in Kosovo

and Afghanistan. In particular, France’s relative contribution to the Libya and Mali missions was

quite significant and relatively disproportionate when compared to those of Britain and the

United States. Table 4 presents the relative contribution of troops, aircraft, and sorties during the

war in Libya.

(Table 5 about here)

Overall, the United States contributed for more than 50 % of the troops deployed by the

four allies, 38 % of the aircraft engaged, and accounted for close of 30 % of the sorties during

the Libyan intervention. This may seem highly substantive given the purported ‘leadership from

behind’ approach. But it is in sharp contrast with the distribution of the burden during the war in

Kosovo in 1999. The United States was by far the highest contributor aircrafts (74 %) and sorties

(75 %) during that war.50 It is also in contrast with the US disproportionate share of the burden in

the war in Afghanistan, especially its counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist missions.51 The

Libyan intervention displays evidence of a more symmetrical military burden-sharing than the

last two major wars NATO led, which tended to reflect US primacy. In other words, some US

allies did step up to the plate in Libya.

France’s military leadership in Libya is particularly striking. It was notably exemplified

by the French air force opening the allied campaign in the afternoon of March 19, 2011, before

US and British forces had even begun to take down Libya’s integrated air defence system, a

highly unconventional practice for Western air power doctrine.52 Moreover, the war in Libya was

the first allied air campaign since the end of the Cold War where European allies shouldered a

50 John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (Rand Corporation, Project Air Force, 2001) 23-24. 51 Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-tier powers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 52 Anrig, C. F. (2011). "Allied Air Power over Libya: A Preliminary Assessment." Air and Space Power Journal 25(4): 89-109.

17

substantial portion of the collective war effort. Indeed, Paris contributed 25 % of the troops, more

than 20 % of the aircraft, and conducted 21 % of the air sorties. In Kosovo, France had deployed

merely 7.8 % of the aircraft and took part in only 6.7 % of the sorties.53 Moreover, compared to

Britain, a similar ally in size and military power, France contributed disproportionally to the

burden-sharing effort in Libya. Overall, French pilots flew close to 43 % more sorties than their

British counterparts, and only 33 % less than the Americans. France also deployed 700 more

troops and personnel to run the operation than Britain, and about half the amount deployed by the

United States. Considering the size of their respective military and the fact that the French

military was at the same time engaged in Afghanistan, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, and

elsewhere, it is clear that France went the extra mile and demonstrated noticeable military

leadership.

The Obama administration took more time than its French and British allies to decide on

the use of force in Libya. Some attribute to French and British pressures President Obama’s

March 15 decision to support military action.54 In addition to the moral imperatives to intervene

and the regional support afforded by the Arab League, the White House was concerned that

France and Britain might act on their own, launching a war that could potentially drag the United

States under unfavourable conditions. Franco-British leadership was thus a necessary, if

insufficient condition for Obama’s decision. The White House emphasized early in the crisis that

it would lead only temporarily, letting its allies take over after the first few days of the military

operation.55 Because of a dire financial situation, the US sought to limit its role to enabling and

creating the conditions favourable for a European-enforced UN mandate.56 As Tony Blinken, US

53 Youngs, T., M. Oakes, et al. (1999). Kosovo: Operation" Allied Force". London, United Kingdom's House of Commons Library. RESEARCH PAPER 99/48, Peters, J. E., S. Johnson, et al. (2001). European Contributions to Operation Allied force. Implications for transatlantic cooperation. Santa Monica, CA, Rand Cordporation. 54 Chivvis, C. S. (2014). Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention. New York, Cambridge University Press. 55 Service international, « La pression s'accentue sur l'armée du colonel Kadhafi », Le Monde, 22 mars 2011, p. 4 ; David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Erlanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces in Libya’, New York Times (20 March 2011). 56 Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye, 31. Sanger, D. E. (2012). Confront and conceal: Obama's secret wars and surprising use of American power, Random House LLC, Chivvis, C. S. (2014). Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention. New York, Cambridge University Press.

18

vice president’s national security advisor put it: ‘We did lead – we cleared the way for the allies

… But real leadership is successfully encouraging others to step up to their responsibilities’.57

That being said, the Libyan operation, as undertaken by NATO, could not have been

successful without US support. Its contribution was nothing less than vital to the mission. This

was recognized by France and Britain, which pleaded the US not to withdraw its forces in early

April on the argument that they did not possess the necessary capabilities for sustained operations

in Libya.58 Furthermore, the total cost of the US operation in Libya was estimated to 1.1 billion,

compared with 300-350 million euros for France and 250 million euros for Britain. 59 This

discrepancy is mostly explained by the extensive use of cruise missiles and the deployment of

specialized military capabilities on the part of the United States. In just a few days following the

French initial air attack on Libya on March 19, 2011, the US navy destroyed almost all of Libya’s

air defence systems. It fired a total of 221 Tomahawk cruise missiles (at 1.3 million dollars

apiece), and a hundred of them were launched in the first 24 hours of the operation. In

comparison, the British fired seven cruise missiles during the entire mission.60 The United States

also distinguished itself by its unique capabilities in the field of surveillance, electronic warfare,

and aerial refuelling aircrafts.61 The US was in charge of blocking the communications of the

Gaddafi regime and controlled the electronic warfare.62 It also launched many offensives with its

combat and bomber aircrafts, before pulling them back at the end of March 2011.

57 Sanger, D. E. (2012). Confront and conceal: Obama's secret wars and surprising use of American power, Random House LLC. 58 Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye, 276, 293; Michaels, J. H. (2014). Able but not Willing: A Critical Assessment of NATO's Libya Intervention. The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin and C. Wagnsson. New York, Routledge 17-37. 59 Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stravridis, ‘NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention’, Foreign Affairs 91/2, (March/April 2012) 3; Philip Hammond, ‘Delivering on the Frontline: Operational Success and Sustainable Armed Force’, The Royal United Services Institute, (Whitehall, London, 8 December 2011); Thomas Vampouille, ‘Guerre en Libye: La France a dépensé 300 millions d’euros’, Le Figaro (October 21, 2011), United Kingdom, ‘Cost of operations’, Defense Committee – Ninth report: Operation in Libya, Defense Committee, United Kingdom House of Commons (25 January 2012). 60 Lee Willett, ‘The Maritime Contribution’, in Clarke et al., ‘Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation’, 8; Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. Gives Its Air Power Expansive Role in Libya’, The New York Times (March 28, 2011); Thomas Harding, ‘Libya: Navy running short of Tomahawk missiles’, The Telegraph (March 23, 2011); Mark Townsend, ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn commences to end Gaddafi onslaught on Benghazi’, The Guardian (March 19, 2011). 61 Joanne Mackowski, ‘Table of Military Assets’, in Adrian JOHNSON and Saqeb MUEEN (ed.), Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign (Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Report 1-12, March 2012) xii. Anrig, C. F. (2011). "Allied Air Power over Libya: A Preliminary Assessment." Air and Space Power Journal 25(4): 89-109. 62 AFP, ‘New air missions attack Kadhafi troops: Pentagon’, AFP (March 28, 2011)

19

Table 6 further details the allied contributions by type of sorties. The overall picture of the

military burden-sharing that emerges from the war in Libya is of a truly shared leadership

amongst the three great powers, coupled with a significant contribution by Canada. This is the

result of Washington’s deliberate decision to lead by forcing its allies to make up for its

unwillingness to shoulder more of the burden.

(Table 6 about here)

Britain was an overall second-tier follower, though its contribution was substantial and,

indeed, instrumental to the mission’s success. In addition to the contributions outlined in tables 5

and 6, it must be pointed out that British Intelligence officers and Special Forces operatives were

sent to act as liaison to the Benghazi rebels in order to train and coordinate them and prevent

NATO from hitting them by accident as well as to observe the effects of the allied strikes on

Kaddafi’s forces.63 Similarly to France, the UK also deployed attack helicopters and increased its

deployment of Tornados to compensate for the withdrawal of US military equipment. Britain’s

fire of seven submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in the first days of the operation,

while tactically small when compared with those fired by the US, proved a valuable asset not

held by France.64

Canada’s contributions were also significant and illustrate its status as a key second-tier

follower. Even if the Harper government followed the diplomatic leadership of Paris and

Washington, once the NATO operation began, Canada’s role in the intervention was

disproportionate to its small number of aircrafts deployed.65 The Canadians flew 11 % of the

strike sorties with only 5.5 % of the aircrafts deployed by the coalition. This contribution in

offensive operations is greater than that of Italy, which nevertheless took part in more air sorties

and deployed more aircraft to its Libyan neighbour. Canada also played a key role in AAR. We

should also note that the commander of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was

Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, a Canadian. Moreover, Canada’s contribution to the

mission was estimated at $347 million and its military effort was considered by observers has

63 Mark Urban, ‘SAS on ground during Libya crisis’, BBC (January 18, 2012); Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘SAS troopers help coordinate rebel attacks in Libya’, The Guardian (August 23, 2011). 64 Gros, P. (2011). "De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector: Bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de l’engagement en Libye." Note de la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 04(11): 25. 65 Tom Blackwell, ‘Canada contributed a disproportionate amount to Libya air strikes: sources’, The National Post (August 25, 2011).

20

being its ‘biggest gambit in decades’.66 As a NATO official noted, ‘the burden of the strike

sorties fell on the shoulders of predominately the Canadians, the British and the French. I must

say that, Canada in particular, being the smallest of the three air forces, once again punched well

above its weight’.67 Canada’s disproportionate military contribution is also worth noting given

the fact that almost every scholarly analysis of the war in Libya fail to discuss it.

In sum, the war in Libya clearly illustrates a shared leadership amongst NATO allies, and

more specifically between France, Britain and the United States. France’s autonomous military

capabilities and considerable willingness to step up to the plate are indicative of a new era of

burden-sharing. The United States’ capacity to enable, yet refrain from disproportionally

contribute to a transatlantic military intervention is also remarkable. Its military contribution

exceeded its diplomatic engagement, but was consistent with its leadership at the beginning of the

crisis. While France and Britain’s diplomatic engagements were proportional to their respective

military efforts, Canada’s disproportionate military contribution surpassed its minimal diplomatic

activity.

Did France “Walk the Talk” in Mali?

In Mali, France’s strong diplomatic leadership in the crisis was later met by President Hollande’s

financial and military involvement in the country. France was the only Western state to contribute

boots on the ground. The United States, Britain and Canada provided instrumental yet minimal

help through aerial means. On January 11, 2013 President Holland ordered the deployment of

880 troops in Mali, as well as in military bases in the region, to stop the terrorist offensive

moving southward, with the apparent intention of capturing Bamako, Mali’s capital. He was

acting under Article 51 of the UN Charter following a formal request from Mali’s interim

president Dioncounda Traoré. France’s Operation Serval’s objectives were the elimination of the

jihadist threat that had seized 60 % of Mali’s territory, as well as the restoration of complete

territorial integrity.68 By the end of January, 3,500 troops were on the ground and 4,500 troops

66 However this amount includes the cost that would have been spent if Canada had not participated (ex. Pilot salaries, etc.). Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Libya Mission final cost reach $347M’, CBC (May 11, 2012); Paul Koring, ‘Canada’s role in Libya its biggest gambit in decades’, The Globe & Mail (June 21, 2011). 67 Tom Blackwell, ‘Canada contributed a disproportionate amount to Libya air strikes: sources’ (2011) 68 François Heisbourg, ‘A Surprising Little War : First Lessons of Mali’, Survival : Global Politics and Strategy 55/2 (2013), 7-18.

21

overall were involved throughout February and March 2013, in addition to five C130 and C160,

eight Mirage, four Rafale, five C135, Tigre and Gazelle helicopters, and one ISR aircraft. French

forces were helped by an equivalent number of African troops operating in the African-led

International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) as well as by an unspecified number of Malian

forces. In mid-April, Paris initiated a partial retreat by starting to pull out troops. When the

French National Assembly extended the French mission in late April, 3,850 soldiers were still in

Mali.69 Paris gradually let the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

in Mali (MINUSMA, created in April 2013 to replace the AFISMA) and the EU-led training

mission (EUTM) in Mali take over the military operations, committing forces in both missions,

as well as maintaining an independent force within Serval to continue the anti-terrorist operations

in the country.70

In the initial phase of the French intervention, the Obama administration provided

aircrafts for the transport of French troops and equipment, and collaborated with intelligence

sharing. A spokesman for French President Hollande referred to this ‘joint intelligence-gathering

efforts and the sharing of information’ as ‘essential’ to Mali’s campaign. On January 27, the US

also agreed to provide air-refuelling capabilities for French aircrafts involved in the operation.71

For the African forces, the US help took the form of the dispatch of 100 military trainers to six

countries that were to contribute to the AFISMA.72 Another important element to mention is

Obama’s announcement on February 22 that about 100 American troops had been sent to Niger

to set up a new drone base for surveillance in the region.73 Though important, US military

support seems not to have been, as in Libya, a necessary condition to the coalition war effort

though Washington’s diplomatic support was essential to France’s intervention. Given the limited

nature and mandate of the operation, France did not condition its military operation on US

assistance, though it did solicit its help to sustain its operations.

69 French Ministry of Defence, ‘Opération au Mali - Actualités’, French Ministry of Defence <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/mali/actualite>. 70 For a detailed examination of the French military intervention, see Flichy, T. (2013). Opération Serval au Mali: L'intervention française décryptée, Lavauzelle-Graphic Editions. 71 The Guardian, ‘US military sending air tankers to refuel French jets over Mali’, The Guardian (January 27, 2013), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/27/us-military-tankers-french-mali>. 72 Anne Gearan, ‘U.S. sends trainers for Mali-bound force’, Washington Post (January 18, 2013). 73 Eric Schmitt and Scott Sayare, ‘New Drone Base in Niger Builds U.S. Presence in Africa’, New York Times (February 22, 2013).

22

The United Kingdom’s Defense secretary declared from the onset of the French military

operation that no British troops would be directly involved on the ground. London limited its

contribution to logistical help (transport airplanes and surveillance aircraft). 74 The Cameron

government also allowed the United States to operate British air refuelling flights. Canada also

joined the effort to support the French intervention but did not intervene on the ground. Canada

agreed to provide a C-17 military-transport aircraft to help France transport material to

Bamako.75

The war in Mali was thus truly a transatlantic collective effort. In fact, 75 % of the

refuelling was provided by allies, including 30 % of AAR; and allies also transported 75 % of

France’s equipment and troops during the first three weeks of the operation. The Germans flew

the greatest amount of allied sorties with 193 AAR and tactical airlift sorties, followed by the

Belgians (184 medevac and tactical airlift sorties), the Americans (120 AAR, drone, and strategic

airlift sorties). Canada and Britain were respectively the 6th and 7th greatest contributors in terms

of aircraft sorties.76

By the end of April 2013, the French operation in Mali had cost 200 million euros.77 The

US financial contribution was important but secondary. President Obama announced $50 million

in a memorandum to help France and Chad in their endeavours in Mali.78 As for Britain, we were

unable to find information on the cost of its military support to the French intervention. However,

London announced in January that it would ‘provide £5m to assist in the training of West African

forces through two UN funds - £3m directed to AFISMA (the African-led International Support

Mission to Mali) and £2m to support political processes in Mali’.79 Canadian defence ministry

74 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘UK intervention in Mali is strategy for future, says defence secretary’, The Guardian (January 29, 2013); British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Mali crisis: 330 UK military personnel sent to West Africa’, BBC (January 29, 2013). 75 National Defence and The Canadian Forces, ‘La contribution des Forces Armées canadiennes au Mali’, Canadian National Defence (February 2, 2013). 76 Chenèvement, J.-P. and G. Larcher (2013). Rapport d'information. C. s. d. a. é. d. l. d. e. d. f. armées, France's Senate. 513: 135. 77 Le Monde, AFP and Reuters, ‘Mali : feu vert du Parlement pour le prolongement de l'opération militaire’, Le Monde (April 22, 2013). 78 Le Monde and AFP, ‘Mali : Washington débloque 50 millions de dollars d'aide militaire’, Le Monde, (February 12, 2013). 79 British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Mali crisis: 330 UK military personnel sent to West Africa’ (2013)

23

estimated at $18.6 million the total cost for providing help to the French by the end of January

2013.80

Paris maintains the capacity to lead such a low-cost, light footprint intervention of short

duration with the help of key allied assets and African boots on the ground. The limited scale of

the military operations in addition to France’s perception that its national security interests were

directly challenged in a region of high importance for Paris most certainly explain its willingness

to have led both diplomatically and militarily. The assistance provided by the US, Britain and

Canada is probably linked to the fact that in Mali, France was combatting Islamic terrorists. It

further suggests that the burden-sharing trend exposed by the Malian and Libyan crisis

management strategies was different in character and kind than previous French interventions in

Françafrique, 81 as well as truly transatlantic in nature rather than the expression of an

autonomous and self-serving strategy on the part of France. In fact, French officials severely

criticized the lack of EU willingness to commit forces in Mali. As a French Senate Report stated:

‘This collective mobilization deficit paradoxically makes Canadians and Americans, alongside

naturally of the British and the Belgians, our principal partners in Mali today’.82

(Figure 2 about here)

Conclusion: A New Era of Shared Transatlantic Burden-Sharing?

Is France’s ascendant leadership in the Libyan and Malian crisis a truly new phenomenon? Have

US allies done more in Libya and Mali than they did during previous crises? The short answer is

yes. Comparisons with the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, which have been the two main

transatlantic operations prior to Libya, clearly show a new trend. The trickier question, however,

is how durable this new trend truly is, in particular with regards to the US Asia-Pacific pivot.83

80 Stephanie Levitz, ‘Mali Intervention: Canada's Bill At $18.6 million, Top Soldier Says’, Huffington Post (January 31, 2013). 81 François Gaulme, ‘Intervenir au Mali : Le Retour du Politique’, Études : Revue de Culture Contemporaine 418 (2013) 583-594. 82 Chenèvement, J.-P. and G. Larcher (2013). Rapport d'information. C. s. d. a. é. d. l. d. e. d. f. armées, France's Senate. 513: 135. 83 See Barry Pavel and Jeff Lightfoot, ‘The Transatlantic Bargain after the Pivot’, Atlantic Council Issue Brief (March 2012); Philippe Gros, ‘“Leading From Behind”: contour et importance de l’engagement américain en Libye’, (2012); Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Toward a “Post-American” Alliance? NATO Burden-sharing after

24

The sustainability of the shared leadership witnessed in both diplomatic and military

burden-sharing in Libya and Mali rests on several elements. Principal among them are US allies’

ability to convince Washington to diplomatically and militarily support their conflict resolution

initiatives, and the United States’ felt need not to assume credits and shoulder a disproportionate

amount of the burden in every fight and at each corner of the globe. Furthermore, US allies, and

in particular France and Britain, must remain willing to compensate – both financially and

politically – for the relative retrenchment of the US military. They must be able to convince

smaller allies to significantly take part in allied military operations, which in great part rests on

their acceptance to deploy their forces under NATO command. And finally, a demonstrable need

for military action and regional support for a Western-led action must also be present to

legitimize the use of force under a shared transatlantic leadership. That being said, it remains too

early at this stage to determine with relative confidence whether shared leadership is nothing

more than an anecdotal new model of transatlantic burden-sharing.

Libya’, International Affairs 88/2 (2012) 313-327; Johnson, A. and S. Mueen (2012). Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign. London, Royal United Services Institute, Niblett, R. (2013). "Obama II : quel avenir pour l'alliance transatlantique ?" Politique étrangère Eté(2): 13.

25

Tables and Figures Table 1. Theoretical Expectations

Theoretical Perspectives Expected Diplomatic dynamic

Expected Burden-sharing Conditionality of US military role

US Primacy European and Canadian alignment on US lead

US disproportionate burden-sharing

Necessary and sufficient

US Declinism Competition for leadership

Transatlantic disagreement and opposition

Autonomous initiatives

Coalitions of the willing

Unnecessary and insufficient

Shared Leadership US-Europe-Canada coordination

Transatlantic alignment on European lead

Equitable burden-sharing within NATO

Necessary but insufficient

26

Table 2. Number of statements released by each state

United States France Britain Canada

State Dept.

White House

Dept. Foreign Affairs

Élysée Foreign and

Commonwealth Office

10 Downing

Street

Dept. Foreign Affairs

Prime Minister’

Office Total

Libya 31 8 30 11 19 8 11 4 122

Mali 32 4 151 132 13 10 14 4 360

Total 63 12 181 143 32 18 25 8 482

27

Table 3. Key positions Crisis Key positions Libya (2011)

1 – Call for respect of the freedom of assembly/protest. 2 – Condemn the repression of the Gaddafi regime. 3 – Support the self-determination of the Libyan People. 4 – Call for responsibility and accountability on part of Libyan government. 5 – Support sanctions against the Gaddafi Regime. 6 – Allow humanitarian aid to reach the people of Libya. 7 – Support the Libyan People or their demands. 8 – Call for suspension of Libya from the HRC. 9 – Call for Gaddafi to be referred to the ICC. 10 – Gaddafi must go. 11 – Consider a no-fly zone. 12 – Responsibility to Protect 13 – Call for a ceasefire.

Mali (2012-2013) 14 – Support for Democracy in Mali 15 – Willingness to aid people of Mali directly 16 – Condemnation of the Coup 17 – Suspension of Aid to Mali 18 – Supporting territorial integrity 19 – Positive Considerations for the idea of a Transition government 20 – Destruction of religious/cultural sites 21 – In favor of UN Resolution 2085 22 – Support for AFISMA 23 – Decision to intervene or support/help for French intervention

28

Table 4. Percentage of Leadership, Concordance and Alignment.

Leadership

US FR UK CA

Libya 30.8 46.2 7.7 0

Mali 0 70 0 20

Total 17.4 56.5 4.3 8.7

Concordance

Full US-FR US-UK US-CA FR-UK FR-CA UK-CA

Libya 0 0 7.7 0 0 7.7 0

Mali 0 0 0 0 0 10 0

Total 0 0 4.3 0 0 8.7 0

Alignment

US on FR FR on US US on UK UK on US US on CA CA on US

Libya 53.8 46.2 7.7 38.5 15.4 61.5

Mali 90 0 10 40 80 0

Total 69.6 26.1 8.7 39.1 43.5 34.8

FR on UK UK on FR FR on CA CA on FR UK on CA CA on UK

Libya 30.8 53.8 23.1 61.5 23.1 30.8

Mali 0 60 20 60 40 10

Total 17.4 56.5 21.7 60.9 30.4 21.7

Legend: US: United States, FR: France, UK: United Kingdom, CA: Canada

29

Table 5. Number of allies’ military personnel, aircraft, and airplane sorties in Libya

United States France

United Kingdom

Canada Total of Entire

Coalition

Troops and Personnel

8,500 4,200 3,500 630 16,830/?

Aircrafts 104 56 30 15 272

Sorties 7,225 5,600 3,220 1,539 26,223

% of T&P 50.5 25.0 20.8 3.7 ?

% of Aircraft 38.2 20.6 11 5.5 75

% of Sorties 29.5 21.4 12.2 5.9 67

30

Table 6. Types of sorties during the war in Libya84

France UK Canada US

Air-to-air refueling (AAR) 580 400 389 2,000

Combat air patrol (CAP) 340 300 181 439

Close air support (CAS) and Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) 3,100 600 572 594

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 400 1,500 374 1,472

Reconnaissance, Airborne Early Warning, Electronic Intelligence (ISR) 1,200 210 23 3,220

Total 5,600 3,220 1,539 7,725

84 A final analysis of the Libya experience. [En ligne]. UK Armed Forces Commentary, 2011, Disponible à l’adresse : http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.ca/2011/12/final-analysis-of-libya-experience.html; Garamone, Jim, 2011. Situation Fluid, But Gadhafi Regime Nears End, Obama Says. [En ligne]. American Forces Press Service, Disponible en ligne : http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=65104; Lamb, Franklin, 2011. Return to Sorman: Anatomy of a NATO War Crime. [En ligne]. Foreign Policy Journal, Disponible à l’adresse : http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/12/18/return-to-sorman-anatomy-of-a-nato-war-crime; Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord, 2011. NATO and Libya: Operational Media Update for 1 SEPTEMBER. Bruxelles : Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord, 1er septembre ; Royaume-Uni, 2012. Operations in Libya. Chambre des communes : Comité de défense. Londres : The Stationary Office Limited; Taylor, Claire, 2011. Military Operations in Libya. Londres : House of Commons Library.

31

Figure 1. Allies’ leadership rates by crisis.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Libya Mali

United States

France

United Kingdom

Canada

32

Figure 2. Transatlantic Burden-Sharing from Kosovo to Mali.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Aircrafts share inKosovo

Troops averageshare in

Afghanistan

Personnel share inLibya

Troops share inMali

United States

France

United Kingdom

Canada

33

References

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in Practice: Negociating the International Intervention in Libya’, European Journal of International Relations (published online January 29, 2014).

AFP, ‘New air missions attack Kadhafi troops: Pentagon’, AFP (March 28, 2011)

Anrig,C.F.(2011)."AlliedAirPoweroverLibya:APreliminaryAssessment."AirandSpacePowerJournal25(4):89‐109.

Auerswald,D.P.andS.M.Saideman(2014).NATOinAfghanistan:FightingTogether,FightingAlone.Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress.

Beckley,M.(2011)."China'scentury?WhyAmerica'sedgewillendure."Brooks,S.G.andW.C.Wohlforth(2005)."Hardtimesforsoftbalancing."International

Security30(1):72‐108.Brooks,S.G.andW.C.Wohlforth(2008).Worldoutofbalance:internationalrelationsand

thechallengeofAmericanprimacy,PrincetonUniversityPress.Chenèvement,J.‐P.andG.Larcher(2013).Rapportd'information.C.s.d.a.é.d.l.d.e.d.f.

armées,France'sSenate.513:135.Chivvis,C.S.(2014).TopplingQaddafi:LibyaandtheLimitsofLiberalIntervention.New

York,CambridgeUniversityPress.Deudney,D.andG.J.Ikenberry(1999)."TheNatureandSourcesofLiberalInternational

Order."ReviewofInternationalStudies25(2):179‐196.Drezner,D.W.(2013)."MilitaryPrimacyDoesn'tPay(NearlyAsMuchAsYouThink)."

InternationalSecurity38(1):52‐79.Engelbrekt,K.,M.Mohlin,etal.(2013).TheNATOInterventioninLibya:LessonsLearned

fromtheCampaign,Routledge.Fabbrini,S.(2014)."TheEuropeanUnionandtheLibyancrisis."InternationalPolitics

51(2):177‐195.Flichy,T.(2013).OpérationServalauMali:L'interventionfrançaisedécryptée,Lavauzelle‐

GraphicEditions.Gelb,L.H.(2012)."TheElusiveObamaDoctrine."TheNationalInterest121.Gordon,P.,J.Shapiro,etal.(2004).AlliesatWar:America,Europe,andtheSplitOverIraq,

London:McGraw‐HillProfessional.Gros,P.(2011)."DeOdysseyDawnàUnifiedProtector:Bilantransitoire,perspectiveset

premiersenseignementsdel’engagementenLibye."NotedelaFondationpourlaRechercheStratégique04(11):25.

Henninger,D.(2011).TheCollapseofInternationalism.WallStreetJournal.Howorth,J.andA.Menon(2009)."StillNotPushingBack:WhytheEuropeanUnionIsNot

BalancingtheUnitedStates."JournalofConflictResolution53(5):727‐744.Ikenberry,G.J.(2001).Aftervictory:Institutions,strategicrestraint,andtherebuildingof

orderaftermajorwars,PrincetonUniversityPress.Ikenberry,G.J.(2011).Liberalleviathan:Theorigins,crisis,andtransformationofthe

Americanworldorder,PrincetonUniversityPress.Ikenberry,G.J.andC.A.Kupchan(1990)."Socializationandhegemonicpower."

Internationalorganization44(03):283‐315.Johnson,A.andS.Mueen(2012).ShortWar,LongShadow:ThePoliticalandMilitary

Legaciesofthe2011LibyaCampaign.London,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute.

34

Kupchan,C.A.(2010).Howenemiesbecomefriends:Thesourcesofstablepeace,PrincetonUniversityPress.

Layne,C.(2012)."ThisTimeIt’sReal:TheEndofUnipolarityandthePaxAmericana."InternationalStudiesQuarterly56(1):203‐213.

Lieber,K.A.andG.Alexander(2005)."Waitingforbalancing:whytheworldisnotpushingback."InternationalSecurity30(1):109‐139.

Lieber,R.J.(2011)."StayingPowerandtheAmericanFuture:ProblemsofPrimacy,Policy,andGrandStrategy."JournalofStrategicStudies34(4):509‐530.

Massie,J.(2013).Francosphère:l'importancedelaFrancedanslaculturestratégiqueduCanada.Québec,Pressesdel'UniversitéduQuébec.

Massie,J.andD.Brizic(2014)."Ruptureidéologiqueetredéfinitiondel’identitéinternationaleduCanada:HarperetChrétienfaceauxguerresenLibyeetauKosovo."CanadianForeignPolicyJournal20(1):18‐27.

Michaels,J.H.(2011)."NATOAfterLibya."TheRUSIJournal156(6):56‐61.Michaels,J.H.(2014).AblebutnotWilling:ACriticalAssessmentofNATO'sLibya

Intervention.TheNATOInterventioninLibya:LessonsLearnedfromtheCampaignK.Engelbrekt,M.MohlinandC.Wagnsson.NewYork,Routledge17‐37.

Niblett,R.(2013)."ObamaII:quelavenirpourl'alliancetransatlantique?"PolitiqueétrangèreEté(2):13.

Norrlof,C.(2010).America'sglobaladvantage:UShegemonyandinternationalcooperation,CambridgeUniversityPress.

Nossal,K.R.,S.Paquin,etal.(2010).InternationalpolicyandpoliticsinCanada,PearsonEducationCanada.

Pape,R.A.(2005)."SoftbalancingagainsttheUnitedStates."InternationalSecurity30(1):7‐45.

Parent,J.M.andP.K.MacDonald(2011)."WisdomofRetrenchment‐AmericaMustCutBacktoMoveForward,The."ForeignAff.90:32.

Peters,J.E.,S.Johnson,etal.(2001).EuropeanContributionstoOperationAlliedforce.Implicationsfortransatlanticcooperation.SantaMonica,CA,RandCordporation.

Posen,B.R.(2003)."Commandofthecommons:themilitaryfoundationofUShegemony."InternationalSecurity28(1):5‐46.

Posen,B.R.(2006)."EuropeanUnionSecurityandDefensePolicy:ResponsetoUnipolarity?"SecurityStudies15(2):149‐186.

Posen,B.R.(2014).Restraint:ANewFoundationforU.S.GrandStrategy,CornellUniversityPress.

Rhodes,M.(2004)."CentralEuropeandIraq:Balance,Bandwagon,orBridge?"Orbis48(3):423‐436.

Sandler,T.andK.Hartley(1999).ThePoliticalEconomyofNATO:Past,Present,andintothe21stCentury.Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress.

Sanger,D.E.(2012).Confrontandconceal:Obama'ssecretwarsandsurprisinguseofAmericanpower,RandomHouseLLC.

Weitsman,P.(2013).WagingWar:Alliances,Coalitions,andInstitutionsofInterstateViolence,StanfordUniversityPress.

Wohlforth,W.C.(1999)."Thestabilityofaunipolarworld."Internationalsecurity24(1):5‐41.

35

Youngs,T.,M.Oakes,etal.(1999).Kosovo:Operation"AlliedForce".London,UnitedKingdom'sHouseofCommonsLibrary.RESEARCHPAPER99/48.