A New European Order?

8/9/2019 A New European Order?

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P A P E R S E R I E S

A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER?

INCLUDE RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

HOW TO MOVE TOWARD A COMMON SECURITY SPACE

ROBERT LEGVOLDCOLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THE WRONG ANSWERWHY THE MEDVEDEV PROPOSAL IS A NON-STARTER

DAVID J. KRAMER AND DANIEL P. FATA

THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES


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A new European order?

Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2010

I R NHow to Move Toward a Common Security Space

R LC U

T W AWhy the Medvedev Proposal is a Non-Starter

D J. K D P. FT G M F U S

I R N : H M T C S S . . . . . . . .

T W A : W M P N -S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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Include Russia and its NeighborsHow to Move Toward a Common Security Space


March 2010

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The German Marshall Fund of the United States6

NATOs new Strategic

Concept may or may not

rescue NATOs shaken identity

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Obstacles to a New European SecurityOrder2


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From the start, thefocus should be

on launching andthen nurturing a process that

encouragespositive

reciprocity.

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Aiding the processoperationally entails bringing order and thenenergy to whatis already anelaborate andextensive agenda.

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eliminate or reduce threats rather than balancing against them. Economists would call this a risk-averting strategy. I

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The Wrong AnswerWhy the Medvedev Proposal is a Non-Starter


March 2009

D J. K D P. F *

T G M F U S

* D J. K G M F U S (GMF). M . K U.S. S D ,

. D P. F G M F U S W , DC. P , U.S. E NATO

S 8.

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Ex O z N B F x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3


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A q C S , NATO C O S P P , R , D . 7, .

R k F E S , P F , J . , . :// . .

/ / / 36 73. .

Introduction1


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21

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we must seriously think about the

architecture of global security. ( )3

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_ & _ 7 .

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4 I .

Russian Complaints with ExistingStructures2

To Russianleaders, NATOis a relic of theCold War; itscounterpart, theWarsaw Pact,dissolved with thecollapse of theSoviet bloc yetno modifications,Russian leadersargued, weremade in NATO.


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NATO has alsofailed so far to

give new purposeto its existence,

Medvedev explained. It is

trying to find thispurpose today by globalizing

its missions,including to the

detriment of theUNs prerogatives,

which I mentioned just before, and

by bringing in new members. But

this is clearly stillnot the solution.


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23

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OSCE .T , ,

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25

A , K N , , x

E S T , OSCE NATO . B

x OSCE NATO ,

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/ /3 737. .

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. / /R _U _P _F _E _S _T / 8 6 . . A x G , M G E S T ,The Moscow Times, D .

5, , :// . . / / //3 6 46.

I J , ES P , C j M :

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H k F A NATO-RF A .However, we believe that these

common goals are best pursued in the context of existing institutions, such as the OSCE and theNATO-Russia Council, rather than by negotiating new treaties, as Russia has suggesteda very long and cumbersome process. (emphasis added) 6

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/ / / 36 73.

Finally, Russia Presents3

In late January,during a speechon EuropeanSecurity in Paris,Clinton weighedin with a firmrejection of the Medvedev proposal.


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q .7

The texts shortcomings

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Russian motivations

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E NATO. I

The Russiandraft makes no

reference tohuman rights

standards anddemocratization,

key issues for theOSCE and NATO.

Given the internaltrends in Russia

toward greater authoritarianism,

this omission should not come

as a major surprise.


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27

F , R F M , S

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4 853 85 65 6/K _ . .

I .

Replacing NATOand halting the alliancesenlargementappear to be atthe root of theRussian proposal.


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R , F 5, . I , NATO x

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x q :If Russia does not abide by these

S M D R F , ://.k . / _ /46 . F E ,

J R L , -#35, F . , .

3M B J . 5, 8 :// . . ./ _4. / /C 8 DC FF8D 36 C3 5746 34 6C4.

agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to newarrangements? I , R

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If Russia does notabide by these

agreements,on what basis

can there be sufficient trustand confidencethat Russia willadhere to new

arrangements?


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31

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M , NATO EU G k-T k -C

z . S

z NATO

E U x k .

A OSCE, , R . R k ODIHR

, M OSCE

k S O , R x

, T , Rk z . I

Uk , ,ODIHR . O , R

, ODIHR z

. T OSCE R j

OSCE ODIHR . O

z . A

k OSCE ;

k x (OECD,

EBRD, .) . OSCE

E B k , M , C ,

k R k x S O .

(T R OSCE C .) A

z E U S C ,

OSCE

k .

OSCE missionsin varioustroublespots inEurope havecontributed toimproving stability and security inthe Balkans,Moldova, and theCaucasus, making Russias decisionto block extensionof the missionin South Ossetiaparticularly regrettable.


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N j , M R E . B

k xz

- . A G -R x ,

NATO, EU, OSCE k z

. S , NATO-R C ,

M q ,

, A .

I , ,

, NATO NATO

R . S k

k , , NATO

R ;

. H ,

x , x R A ( , ,

R ) K z P B k k k U S

M ( R )

R E z ,

NATO, EU, OSCE

z

-E E

. NATO

k R ,

R , ; q . A ,

MM R ;

, 8 NATO j M

I M

E z . ., ,

,

E .

Conclusion5

If Moscow wereactually to adhereto the principles itargues a new pan- European security

organizationmust be founded

uponi.e., respectfor sovereignty,

territorial integrity,and international

law as well asthe peaceful

settlement of disputesthen

not only pan- European but

also transatlantic security would be greatly improved.


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Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest

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