A Retrospective and Prospective Overview ofU.S.-PRC-ROC ...A Retrospective and Prospective Overview of U.S.-PRC-ROC Relations 3 lukewarm opposition to the ChineseAnti-Secession Law

A Retrospective and Prospective Overview of U.S.-PRC-ROC Relations 1

A Retrospective and ProspectiveOverview of U.S.-PRC-ROC Relations

Edward I-hsin ChenProfessor

Graduate Institute of American StudiesTamkang University, Taiwan (ROC)

AbstractPrior to the passage of Anti-Secession Law in China, the Bush

administration’s position on that law was, interestingly, somewhatambiguous and quite weak. Apparently, since then the U.S. policytoward China and Taiwan no longer remains on a balanced basis. Onthe other hand, Washington has requested Beijing to change manypolicies since the summer 2005, not only demanding China to takemore responsibility in co-managing global affairs but also promotingthe reform of China’s economic and domestic policies. While Chinadoes not think it should co-manage global affairs with the UnitedStates and other great powers, Beijing does not conceal its interestin co-managing Taiwan Strait affairs with Washington. During histrip to Asia, President George W. Bush simply wanted to assure thatthe largest say and dominant voice on the issue of Taiwan Straitremain with the United States, whereas China is reluctant to acceptthe U.S. dominant position. Given the fact that the U.S.-China-Taiwanrelations have evolved since the turn of the century and that the U.S.policy toward China and Taiwan is no longer on a balanced basis, itwould be prudent for Taiwan in this new era to develop a majorityconsensus in response to the post-Anti-Secession Law era.

2 Views & Policies Vol.2 No.2

Keywords: Public Goods, Quid Pro Quo, Responsible Stakeholder,Status Quo of Taiwan Strait, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue

The Unbalanced U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan

The Bush administration’s position on the Chinese Anti-SecessionLaw, one may note, was somewhat ambiguous and quite weak. Actually,the tone of its opposition to that law was even weaker than that ofJapan. The Anti-Secession Law is by no means the first indicator thatthe U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan is no longer on a balancedbasis. When Vice President Richard Cheney paid a visit to China inApril, 2004, American and Chinese leaders reached a consensus onthe maintenance of the Taiwan Strait status quo.1 Due to Taipei’s pro-vocative policy toward Beijing after the presidential election in March 20, 2004, Washington and Beijing decided to start a joint U.S.-Chinacooperative mechanism in late April 2004, which reached its peak inthe last quarter of 2004 with the harsh criticism against Taiwan inde-pendence from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Deputy Secretaryof State Richard L. Armitage.2 Therefore, the main reason behind U.S.

Edward I-hsin Chen, “Cheney’s Visit Will Inevitably Have Impact on US-China-Taiwan Relations,” Zhongguoshibao (China Times) (Taipei) (in Chinese),April 18, 2004, p. A15. For Vice President Richard Cheney’s remarks, see “Re-marks by the Vice President at Fudan University Followed by Student Q & A,”White House, April 15, 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/rea-lease/2004/04/20040415-html>.Colin L. Powell, “Press Briefing in Beijing, China,” Department of State,

October 25, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37360.htm>; Colin L.Powell, “Interview with Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV,” Departmentof State, October 25, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37366.htm>; Ri-chard L. Armitage, “Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS,” Department of State,December, 10, 2004 (Released on December 20, 2004), <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/39973.htm>.


lukewarm opposition to the Chinese Anti-Secession Law is that therewas an understanding between the two countries.

On the other hand, Japan seems more concerned over Taiwan’ssecurity than the United States does. Although Japan continues toadhere to the Japan-China joint declaration and their anti-Taiwan in-dependence stance, it expressed concerns over repercussions of theAnti-Secession Law. Therefore, Japan made it clear that Tokyo opposedall means other than peaceful resolution, worrying that the Chinesereference to “non-peaceful method” might have a negative impacton the stability of Taiwan Strait. That was also why, in their jointstatement of the security consultative committee on February 19,2005, Tokyo decided to cooperate with Washington to incorporatethe peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and constant encouragementof Cross-Strait peaceful resolution on the issue of the Taiwan Straitas two of their strategic objectives.3

While it is easy to explain why Washington and Tokyo can easilyshare their views on the issue of the Taiwan Strait, it is quite difficultfor us to explain why Washington and Beijing can reach a consensuson the same issue. The United States and Japan cooperated on theissue of the Taiwan Strait because they have security alliance treatybetween them. On the issue of the Taiwan Strait, probably only theinternational cooperation theory can simultaneously help accountwhy Washington and Beijing can reach a consensus on the one handand why Washington and Tokyo can cooperate with each other onthe other.

Richard Boucher, “Joint Statement of the U.S. -Japan Security ConsultativeCommittee,” Department of State, February 19, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm>.


Washington and Beijing are determined to maintain the statusquo of the Taiwan Strait largely because they regard the peace andstability of the Taiwan Strait as the so-called “public goods.” In orderto keep their public goods intact, they have developed a cooperativerelationship by reaching a consensus on the maintenance of the statusquo of the Taiwan Strait on a quid pro quo basis.4 Likewise, Tokyoand Washington view the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait as theirpublic goods. In order to keep their public goods intact, they havedeveloped a cooperative relationship by incorporating Taiwan’s peaceand the promotion of Cross-Strait relations as two of their strategicobjectives on a quid pro quo basis.5

In order to maintain the Taiwan Strait status quo, the UnitedStates demanded Taiwan’s leader not to incorporate his provocativepolicy in his inaugural address on May 20, 2004 and took the punitivepolicies toward Taiwan when he mixed the peaceful message withanti-China remarks in his National double Tenth Celebration speechin 2004. If Washington can exert its pressure on Taipei to keep thestatus quo of Taiwan Strait intact, it cannot act in its own capacityto demand Beijing not to use the Anti-Secession Law to suppressTaiwan independence. Therefore, although the United States mayhave been reluctant simply to remain passive and watch the passageof Anti-Secession Law, it could not take any strong actions to opposeit. Beijing sent its delegates to Washington to explain why it had tohave that law during a period from December 2004 to March 2005.U.S. officials, when asked what the position of Washington was onthat law, consistently took a lukewarm attitude toward that law. Theyeither refused to give comments due to the absence of the law’s content

Bruno S. Frey, The International Political Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1984), pp. 126-127.Boucher, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.”


or expressed their wish to promote Cross-Strait dialogue. A coupleof weeks prior to the passage of Anti-Secession Law on March 14,2005, the Bush administration only demanded of Beijing to take legalaction into re-consideration, and to compensate Taipei for promotingcharter flight and for granting Taiwan with a seat in the annualmeeting of World Health Assembly. A spokesman of State Departmentexpressed U.S. hope that neither side of Taiwan Strait should takecountermeasures or counter-countermeasures against each other.6

State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, who was scheduled to travel toAsia, pointed out that neither of the two sides should be allowed toprovoke each other or take advantage of the Cross-Strait tensions todo anything else.7 In appearance, Washington exerted pressure onboth sides of Taiwan Strait. But the problem with such a measurewas that Beijing was more provocative than Taipei in early 2005.Therefore, the Bush administration’s policy toward China and Taiwanhas remained unbalanced since April 2004.

Despite some negative repercussions on Taiwan, some positivedevelopments emerged after the passage of the Chinese Anti-SecessionLaw. First, the law at least helps set restraints on the political remarksand behavior of politicians in Taiwan. For example, prior to its passageChen Shui-bain pointed out that he no longer wanted to mislead thepeople because he could neither change the nation’s name nor writea new constitution for Taiwan. Such a frank political remark shouldhelp ameliorate Cross-Strait relations in the long-run. Second, althoughthe Chinese Anti-Secession Law mentions the use of non-peaceful

Richard Boucher, “Daily Press Briefing,” Department of State, March 14, 2005,<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43404.htm>.Condoleezza Rice, “Interview on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos,”Department of State, March 13, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43342.htm>.


method in the event that Taiwan claims independence, it states thatChina will use peaceful means to realize the goal of reunification.This, together with the announcement of U.S.-Japan’s security allianceto include the peace and security of Taiwan peace as one of theirstrategic objectives on a quid pro quo basis, Taiwan’s national securitywill be not in danger so long as Taiwan does not declare independence.Third, the Chinese Anti-Secession Law is designed to ameliorate theCross-Strait relations. At the same time, Washington has shown itsinterest in promoting the resumption of Cross-Strait dialogue. There-fore, it is prudent for Taiwan to grasp the opportunity to improve itsrelations with China.

U.S.-China Co-management of Global Affairs

Washington has requested Beijing to change many policies sincethe summer of 2005, not only demanding China to take more respon-sibility in co-managing global affairs with the United States and othergreat powers, but also promoting China’s economic and domestic re-forms.

Militarily and strategically, Beijing has subjected to the increasingpressures from Washington. When Donald H. Rumsfeld paid a visitto China from October 18, 2005, one of his purposes was to makeBeijing accountable for its strategy and military build-up.8 Actually,Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick raised similar concernswhen he delivered a speech in New York on September 21, 2005.9

Although the Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) refused to grant

Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks En Route toChina,” Department of Defense, October 17, 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20051017-secdef4101.html>.Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”


the permission to Rumsfeld to pay a visit to China’s Military Commandin Xisan, the two countries’ discussion on the establishment of hotlines and Rumsfeld’s visit to China’s Missile Defense Headquarterindicated a degree of development and breakthrough in exchanges be-tween the U.S. military and the PLA.10 In response to Rumsfeld’s sus-picious attitude concerning the transparency of PRC’s defense budget,Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan contended that the figureof RMB 30.2 billion or an equivalent amount of US$ 241.6 was 100%authentic.11

The United States had some basis for not implicitly trustingCao’s arguments, but at least he was forced to confess that the de-velopment of aerospace enterprises was not an item under the militarybudget. To be sure, in the face of U.S. skepticism and requests, thePLA will continue to hedge at U.S. skepticism and requests in thefuture. However, exchanges concerning the military between the twocountries will be incrementally intensive and more open. Beijing mayalso make its defense white paper more transparent than ever beforeso that the United States will not asses China’s military rise accordingto its own way of calculation.12

Department of State, September 21, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>.Philip P. Pan, “In China, Rumsfeld Urges Greater Global Role, Freedom,

Military Candor,” The Washington Post, October 19, 2005, p. A18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/18/AR2005101800182.html>; Paul Eckert, “Rumsfeld To Meet Chinese Military Leaders,”Reuters, October 18, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/18/AR2005101800196.html>.“Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Cao Gangchuan, ViceChairman of the Central Military Committee and Minister of Defense to China,”Department of Defense, October 19, 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/tran-scripts/2005/tr20051019-secdef4121.html>.


Diplomatically, China has also come to feel that Washington isstarting to find fault with Beijing. Rumsfeld suspected that Beijingwas trying to develop a regional organization in which the UnitedStates and some other Pacific countries were excluded.13 Althoughhe did not mention the organization by name, almost everybody knewthat he had in mind the Six-country Cooperative Organization. Infact, to ask why China and Russia had undertaken moves to expelU.S. armies from military bases in Central Asia was one of the mainreasons for Rumsfeld’s trip to China.

Washington was not only very concerned about being excludedfrom China-dominated regional organizations and forums, but it alsopaid much attention to the nature and quality of Beijing’s friends.In his September 2005 speech, Zoellick suspected China’s intentionof making overtures to Sudan, Burma and other rogue states. Hesuggested that China’s diplomatic moves should not only serve thenational interest. Instead, China should devote more of its time andenergy to the promotion of peace, such as helping to solve the nuclearcrisis in the Korean Peninsula, supporting the dismantling of Iran’snuclear weapon program, and aiding the democratization process inAfghanistan and Iraq.14 So far, China has extended its helping handto the United States by urging North Korea to return to the negotiatingtable and reaching a tentative agreement in the Six-Party talks.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has requested China and Russia

Thom Shanker, “Gingerly, U.S. and China Plan to Strengthen Military Ties,”The New York Times, October 20, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/20/international/asia/20rumsfeld.html>.Philip P. Pan, “Rumsfeld Chides China for ‘Mixed Signals,’” The WashingtonPost, October 20, 2005, p. A18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/19/AR2005101902311.html>.Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”


to help put a halt to Iran’s nuclear weapon program withoutreceiving a very positive response. But Washington has to makea greater effort to persuade Beijing if such a diplomatic plan isto be successful.

Economically and Domestically, Beijing has become increasinglyuncomfortable with Washington’s criticism. During his China trip,Rumsfeld said that the United States would welcome China’s rise asan economic powerhouse. However, as he pointed out, while Chinais attracting foreign investments, new ideas and thoughts also enterthe Chinese mainland, which makes Chinese leaders nervous. Thus,he suggested that China should be more open and let informationflow in a faster pace so as to cope with transformations taking placeover the world.15 In his speech in New York, Zoellick advised Chineseleaders that Beijing should wisely adjust the exchanges rates of theRenminbi (RMB), effectively implement intellectual property rights(IPRs), and promote timely elections at the municipal and provinciallevels.16

To echo Rumsfeld’s call for introducing more new ideas andthoughts into China, World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz proddedChina to give people more power for the sake of sustaining strongeconomic growth. Since China has the largest unpaid debt to theWorld Bank, it will accommodate the U.S. in its request concerningthe RMB and IPRs issues one way or another.17 Nevertheless, on the

Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Warns Young Chinese on Isolationism,” The NewYork Times, October 19, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/19/international/asia/19rumsfeld.html>; “Rumsfeld Talks to Chinese Students,” CNN, October19, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/10/19/china.rumsfeld/index.html>.Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”


issues of democratic reform, China will in all likelihood continue todisappoint Western democratic countries for the foreseeable future.

As early as mid-November 2004, the successfully re-electedPresident Bush invited members of his national security team, includingthen National Security Adviser Rice, Deputy National Security AdviserStephen J. Hadley, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Deputy Secretaryof State Richard L. Armitage, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rum-sfeld, and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, to the White House,and hosted a meeting to discuss whether the second-term administrationshould regard China as a potential adversary or as a cooperativepartner. The meeting came to a conclusion that the United States andChina should co-manage world affairs with other great powers.18

When the two countries had their first round of strategic dialogueunder the Bush administration on August 2, 2005, Zoellick requestedChina to become a “common stakeholder” with the United Statesand other great powers.19 During his trip to Beijing, Rumsfeld alsoasked China to be a more responsible player in the economic and se-curity affairs.20 Chinese leaders have not as yet positively respondedto such a request.

Alan Wheatley, “Wolfowitz Urges China to Give Citizens More Say,” Reuters,October 18, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-ticle/2005/10/18/AR2005101800187.html>.“2005 Q & A,” Eurasia Group, 10 January 2005, <http://www.eurasiagroup.net/publications/050110_Q & A.pdf>.Robert Zoellick, “Remarks at U.S. Embassy Beijing,” Department of State,August 2, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/50498.htm>.Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Strikes Less Severe Tone in China,” The New YorkTimes, October 18, 2005,<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/18/interna-tional/18cnd-rumsfeld.html? hp&ex=1129694400&en=267ad3b26c5d201d&ei=5094&partner=homepage>.


It is worthy to note that when Cao Gangchuan discussed theTaiwan problem with Rumsfeld, he expressed his hope that the UnitedStates could fulfill its commitment to oppose and restrain Taiwan in-dependence.21 When Chinese leader Hu Jintao met with Rumsfeld,he also pointed out that China would be willing to develop relationswith the United States on the basis of three communiqués and expandmutual cooperation in implementing this important consensus.22 WhileChina doest not think that it should co-manage global affairs withthe United States and other great powers, Beijing has not concealedits interest in co-managing Taiwan Strait affairs with Washington.

Bush Assures U.S. Dominance on the Problem ofTaiwan Strait

U.S. President George W. Bush visited Japan, South Korea,China and Mongolia in his trip to Asia during the period of November16-22, 2005. Judging from the talk he had with Chinese PresidentHu Jintao and him, it is clear that China has made some concessionsto the United States in the protection of IPRs, reform of RMB exchangerates, and improvement of trade practices.23 Hu also accepted Bush’sinvitation to pay a visit to America early next year.24 According to

“Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Cao Gangchuan, ViceChairman of the Central Military Committee and Minister of Defense to China.”Shanker, “Gingerly, U.S. and China Plan to Strengthen Military Ties.”“Hu: China, US to Seek Win-Win Economic Cooperation,” People’s Daily (Eng-lish), November 20, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/eng20051120_222754.html>; “China, US Have “Extensive” Common Interests,Chinese Premier,” People’s Daily (English), November 20, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/eng20051120_222748.html>.“President Meets with President Hu of the People’s Republic of China,” De-partment of State, November 20, 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051120-6.html>.


past practices, if Hu positively responded to what Bush had expected,Bush supposedly should have given Hu something in return, somekind of feedback on the issue of Taiwan in particular. The problemis that Bush did not give any remarks on the issue of Taiwan at thepress conference on November 20, reflecting the new U.S.-China re-lations in which contradictions would have had the upper hand overconsensus since the summer of 2005.

It was expected that the Sino-U.S. trade imbalance could surpass200 billion U.S. dollars in favor of Beijing in 2005. Therefore, Bushfaced strong pressures from domestic business circles to obtain sig-nificant concessions during his trip in Beijing. China abandoned itsfixed exchange rate of the RMB to allow an increase of 2.1% of theRMB in June 2005, and adopted a floating exchange rate system toreform its currency. Bush praised Beijing’s move and pointed outthat it was a good start. In the subsequent rounds of negotiations,Washington urged Beijing to take further measures to promote amechanism in which the exchange rate of the RMB would be deter-mined by the demand and supply of the market rather than by politicalmanipulation. However, many experts, including Bush’s national se-curity adviser Stephen J. Hadley, believed that China would not makeconcessions on the issue of the RMB exchange rate during Bush’svisit to Beijing, much less the more complicated problem of Sino-U.S. trade imbalance.25

Although Hu made some concessions, it seemed that Bush didnot appreciate what his counterpart had done for him. Hu announcedthat he had reached a consensus of making further efforts to improve

Peter Baker & Philip P. Pan, “Bush’s Asia Trip Meets Low Expectations,” TheWashington Post, November 21, 2005, p. A1, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/20/AR2005112000827.html>.


the imbalanced trade between the two countries, saying such a goalcould be achieved through a series of consultations. He also agreedto buy 150 Boeing passenger jets at the price of US$ 9 billion. Inaddition, he promised to press ahead with a plan for the reform ofRMB exchange rate and to cooperate with the United States on theprotections of IPRs. Obviously, Beijing’s response to Washington’srequests seemed to be rather remote for Bush who, on behalf of U.S.business circles, which were anxious to have much firmer commitmentsfrom Hu in terms of solving the economic problems between the twocountries than what he had in fact obtained in the course of this trip.26

It is not surprising that Bush was not satisfied with Hu’s lip service.

Moreover, since June 2005 the U.S.-China relations has beenwhat Bush has refereed to as a “complicated relationship” markedby cooperation and competition on the one hand and rises and fallson the other. For example, Beijing has supported Washington’s globalant-terrorist campaign. It has also assisted the Washington to urgeNorth Korea to reach a preliminary agreement in the Six-Party talks.Furthermore, it has promised the Americans to help stop Iraniannuclear weapon program. At the same time, China has cooperatedwith Russia in requesting the U.S.’s withdrawal of its troops frommilitary bases in Central Asia at the annual meeting of Shanghai Six-country Cooperative Organization. The big-country diplomacy Huplayed in the summit of economic leaders at the Asian-Pacific Econ-omic Cooperation (APEC) on November 17-18, 2005, seemed evenbetter than the performance of Bush, who suffered significantly fromhis low approval rate at home brought on in large part by his refusalto a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. China played a dominant

David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Leader Gives Bush a Mixed Message,”The New York Yimes, November 21, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/21/international/asia/21prexy.html>.


role behind the scene in the East Asian Summit (EAS) held in KualaLumpur in early December, but the superpower United States waseven denied access to the summit.

Both the United States and China are aware that they will benefitfrom cooperation and suffer from division. At the press conference,Bush pointed out that U.S.-China relations were very important, andhis trip was expected to help strengthen their relationship.27 Hu re-sponded by saying that both sides had agreed to work toward theircommon interests in promoting the development of a constructiveSino-U.S. relationship.28 Their remarks echoed the keynote of streng-thening mutual cooperation between the two countries in their firstround of strategic dialogues on August 2, 2005.29

On the issue of Taiwan Strait, the United States has reached aconsensus with China. At her press conference, Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice quoted Bush in his talks with Hu as saying thatthat neither side of the Taiwan Strait shall unilaterally change thestatus quo, hoping that both sides could engage in more exchangesthan ever before.30 Hu reiterated China’s policy toward Taiwan, de-claring that Beijing will show its sincerest willingness and make itsgreatest efforts to realize the goal of peaceful reunification, but itwill never tolerate Taiwan independence.31 All these indicate that

“Bush Says US-China Relations Important,” People’s Daily (English), November20, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/eng20051120_222757.html>.“Hu: China, US to Seek Win-Win Economic Cooperation.”Zoellick, “Remarks at U.S. Embassy Beijing.”“Press Briefing by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on the President’s Visitto China,” Department of State, November 20, 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051120-8.html>.“Hu: Opposing ‘Taiwan Independence’ In interest of China, US,” People’sDaily (English), November 20, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/


maintaining the status quo of Taiwan Strait and promoting the re-sumption of Cross-Strait dialogues are in the interest of both Wash-ington and Beijing.

Nevertheless, there still remain a number of contradictionsbetween the United States and China on the issue of Taiwan Strait.For example, Bush praised Taiwan’s democracy when he delivereda speech in Kyoto, Japan on November 16, 2005.32 Ostensibly, whathe was trying to do was to take the Taiwan’s experience in the processof democratization as an example to urge China learning somethingfrom Taiwan. But people with logical training will not fail to notethat Bush had something else in mind when he praised Taiwan’sdemocracy. It was evident that something was going to take placeduring Bush’s visit, particularly when careful attention was focusedon a remark made by General Brent Scowcroft, the former NationalSecurity Adviser in the Senior Bush administration, in Beijing.Scowcroft, who participated in a seminar in Beijing in mid-November2005 — just a few days prior to President Bush’s visit to China, said:“The Taiwan issue is especially difficult because it is a domesticissue in both China and the United States. Most Chinese don’t under-stand that the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue in the United States,too. There is strong support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress.” “Theissue of Taiwan also involves fundamental U.S. interests,” the generalstressed.33

eng20051120_222749.html>; “Hu Stresses Peace, Stability, Opposes ‘TaiwanIndependence’ in Talks with Bush,” People’s Daily (English), November 20,2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/eng20051120_222755.html>.“President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Kyoto, Japan,” White House,November 16, 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051116-6.html>.Allen T. Cheng, “China Won’t Compromise in Its Claim over Taiwan, GeneralSays,” The China Post, November 15, 2005, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/i_


Judging from Bush and Scowcroft’s remarks, it is clear that theUnited States strongly feels that if Washington does little or nothingnow, its dominant position on the issue of the Taiwan Strait will beincrementally replaced by Beijing, particularly after the latter’spassage of the Anti-Secession Law in April 2005. It is interesting tonote that China paid much attention to Bush and Scowcroft’s remarksin Kyoto and Beijing. Bush played the card of Taiwan democracycard during his trip to China, but Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, who attended an APEC ministerial meeting in Busan, promptlyrebuffed what Bush had said in Kyoto by saying: “Taiwan is a partof China, an inseparable part of China, and China does not brookany intervention in its internal affairs.”34 In short, Bush simply wantsto assure that the largest say and dominant stance on the issue ofTaiwan Strait belong to the United States, whereas China is reluctantto accept such a U.S. position.

Nevertheless, the Taiwan problem should not constitute a barrierto the amelioration of U.S.-China relationship. The elder GeorgeBush, former U.S. president, made it clear that no matter how difficultthe relationship will be in the coming years, the United States andChina should endeavor to overcome their problems as he noted duringa visit to Beijing in mid-November 2005. He pointed out: “Therehave emerged many episodes and twists and turns in the course ofthe development of Sino-U.S. relations, but the future is bright forties between the two countries. Our efforts would defuse misunder-standing, and we both believe that bilateral relations would definitelyhave a very broad prospect. History also tells us that China and

latestdetail.asp? id=32567>.“China Rebuffs Bush over Taiwan,” AFP, November 16, 2005, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051116/wl_asia_afp/apecsummitusbushchinataiwan_051116064501>.


America should not become foes, but rather should be friends.”35 Ap-parently, the elder Bush has set the tone for his son who would followin the footsteps of his father.

How Does the U.S. Gain the Upper Hand in Asia?

The bright prospect of U.S.-China cooperative relations doesnot necessarily suggest that the two countries are free of contradictionsand competition. While witnessing President Bush’s visit to Asia inNovember 2005, many Asian leaders have begun to feel that Chinais rising and taking advantage of U.S. diplomatic and strategic focusin the Middle East to expand its sphere of influence. If the UnitedStates does not adjust its policy in Asia, then many Asian countriesare likely to develop a sense of alienation from the United States.

The United States has put too much stress on the Middle East,but the region is destined to be the one without any immediate effectin terms of democratization and peaceful breakthrough.36 Meanwhile,a power vacuum has emerged in some parts of Asia. China, as men-tioned above, cooperated with Russia to request the U.S. withdrawalof its troops from military bases in Central Asia at the annual meetingof Shanghai Six-country Cooperative Organization. China played adominant role behind the scene in the East Asian Summit held in

George Bush, “China’s Rise Is Conducive to World Peace,” People’s Daily(English), November 16, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/16/eng20051116_221720.html>.When Derek J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia, International Security Program,Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Dan Ewing fromMckinsey & Company visited the College of International Studies of TamkangUniversity on December 13, 2005, this author exchanged views with them onwhether Washington has put too much emphasis on the Middle East, and whetherit would be difficult for the United States to press ahead on its plan for democracyand peace in the region.


Kuala Lumpur in early December 2005, but the United States wasdenied access to the summit.

Although the United States has made a series of mistakes in itsconduct of foreign policy, it remains the strongest power in the post-Cold War era. As long as it starts to adjust its relations with its Asianallies and make good use of its diplomatic and economic resources,it will gain the upper hand in Asia soon.

First of all, the most important allies of the U.S. in Asia areJapan, South Korea, and Australia. The U.S. seems to have made aserious mistake in its determination to support Japan in revising itspost-war constitution, changing the nature of Japanese self-defense,becoming a normal country, and struggling for a permanent seat onthe Security Council of the United Nations. This is a mistake in theeyes of Asian people because Tokyo has never formally apologizedfor its errors and guilt in the Second World War.37 In addition, Japanhas been hostile toward its neighboring countries for claiming sov-ereignty over the fisheries, isles, and maritime economic resources.Given the fact that the Japanese are not welcomed in Asia, it is notsurprising that U.S. support of Japan is regarded as an unfriendlymove in Asia.38 No wonder that many Asian countries are morewilling to see China’s peaceful rise and are unhappy with Japan’sarrogant rise in Asia. Therefore, Washington should counsel Tokyo

“China: War Shrine ‘Urgent’ Issue: Beijing Envoy Says Japan Must Take Stepson Painful Past,” CNN, November 24, 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WOR-LD/asiapcf/11/24/china.japan.ap/index.html>.“Honeymoon Japan-US Alliance Faces Test: Media,” People’s Daily (English),November 17, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/17/eng20051117_222067.html>; “Japan Shuns Diplomacy,” People’s Daily (English), December9, 2005, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/09/content_501898.htm>.


on how to exercise considerable restraints in its behavior in Asia,understanding that the U.S.-Japanese security alliance is intended tohelp Japan to take more responsibility in the region, but is not intendedto help Japan provoke its neighboring countries.39 In recent years,Seoul has been at odds with Washington in dealing with the issuesof North Korea and military command in South Korea. After an initialagreement was reached in the Six-Party talks on September 19, 2005,the expectation arose that the goal of non-nuclearization would beachieved in the foreseeable future.40 Once such a goal is realized,the United States should take into consideration its own role in theSouth-North Korea dialogue.41 It may also consider whether it shouldpress on with its plan for an upgrade from the Six-Party talks to aNortheast Asian security mechanism to further promote the peaceand stability in the Korean Peninsula. Australia has long been themost reliable ally of the United States in the Asian Pacific region.The United States should figure out how to help Australia to walkout of South Pacific and transform Australia from what I call “a shypower” into a real power in Asia.42 Only in this way, will Australia

When Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS paid a visit to theCross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation (CSIPF) on December 14, 2005,this author exchanged views with him on why and how the United States shouldadjust its policy toward Japan. Dr. Gill agreed with what I said, adding that myviews would be strongly taken.“President and President Roh Discuss Strong U.S.-Korean Alliance,” WhiteHouse, November 17, 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea-ses/2005/11/20051117.html>.“Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,”White House, November 17, 2005,<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea-ses/2005/11/20051117-6.html>.When Dr. William T. Tow, Professor, Department of International Relations,the Australian National University visited the CSIPF on December 14, 2005and College of International studies of Tamkang University on December 15,2005, this author exchanged views with him on how the United States should


not only say something diplomatically, but also extend its assistanceto the United States economically and militarily.

Second, the most important problem for the United States is itsrelationship with China. In his visit to Beijing, Bush demanded Huto protect IPRs, reform the exchange rate of the RMB, and improvetrade imbalance. Hu responded positively to Bush’s demands inwords, but Hu’s commitment has so far turned out to be only lipservice at least for the time being. On the other hand, Bush told Huthat the United States hoped China could be a “responsible stakeholder,”but Hu was reluctant to co-manage global affairs with the UnitedStates with other great powers. It is interesting to note that Chinahas hoped to return to the old good days when the two countriesagreed to move towards a strategic partnership during the Clintonadministration. Nonetheless, when Washington invites Beijing to bea “responsible stakeholder” with other great powers to co-manageglobal affairs, China starts to feel too much responsibility on itsshoulders and hesitates to respond positively.

Last but not least, if the United States wishes to gain the upperhand in Asia, it will not be a matter of capability, but a matter ofpolitical will. China has seemingly gained the upper hand in theShanghai Six-country Cooperative Organization, the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations plus 3 (ASEAN + 3), and East Asian Summit.Nonetheless, the Shanghai Six-country Cooperative Organization hasput is focus on Central Asia, ASEAN plus 3 is still dominated byASEAN countries, and the EAS is essentially only a forum. Unlike

assist Australia to walk out of South Pacific and transform Australia from whatI called “a shy power” into a real great power in Asia. Dr. Tow disagreed withwhat I said, pointing out that Australia preferred to remain “a moderate power”rather than a real great power.


the EAS, the APEC has gone beyond the level of economic forumto become a semi-international organization discussing political,economic and anti-terrorist military cooperation since the 911 terroristattacks. With absolute advantages in the World Bank, InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and withrelative advantages in the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organ-ization (WTO), and the APEC, it is surprising that the United Statesis facing challenges from China in various dimensions. The reasonsbehind that are by no means due to shortcomings of U.S. capability,but its lack of effort.

Two Rounds of U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue

On August 1-2, 2005, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B.Zoellick and his counterpart in the Chinese Foreign Ministry DaiBingguo met in Beijing to engage in a strategic dialogue—the firsttime this had occurred in the Bush administration.43 In an effort tomaintain the momentum of improved bilateral relations, China andthe United States completed the second round of high-level strategicdialogue in Washington on December 8, 2005, with Washingtonurging Beijing to become more of a global player. In the two-daysession, Zoellick hosted Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai.

At a press conference in the State Department on December 2,2005, Zoellick said: “Both the United States and China are importantstakeholders in the international system of agreements, institutions,and cooperative arrangements. As China’s influence grows, it canhelp support and adapt that system to meet new challenges. I lookforward to meeting again with Executive Vice-Minister Dai to advanceour discussion of how the United States and China can cooperate in

Zoellick, “Remarks at U.S. Embassy Beijing.”


promoting a peaceful and prosperous world,” adding that “We aretrying to employ the dialogue to consider the strategic implicationsof policies in a variety of areas, so as to better guide cooperation butalso manage differences.”44

To be sure, the purpose of the U.S.-China senior dialogue,as Zoellick pointed out in a statement on conclusion of the secondU.S.-China senior dialogue on December 8, 2005, is to look over thehorizon and discuss the strategic framework of U.S.-China relations.Following an initial round of discussions in Beijing in August 1-2,2005, he outlined the U.S.’s approach to Sino-American relations ina speech in New York on September 21, 2005.45 He said that formore than thirty years the United States worked with others to drawChina out of isolation and into the international system. As Chinabecomes a major global player, as he put it, the United States is nowencouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder.”

In September, Zoellick urged China to become a “responsiblestakeholder” during a policy speech, and he repeated the phrase againon December 8, 2005. Beijing could become more active in regionaland global issues, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and in urging Iran togive up its nuclear ambitions.46 This concept of encouraging Chinato become a “responsible stakeholder,” as Zoellick put it in his stat-ement, has spurred a useful debate in China about its role in theworld and, in particular, China’s relations with the United States.Why is the United States so anxious to encourage China to become

“Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick to Host Second U.S.-China Senior DialogueDecember 7-8, 2005,” Department of State, December 2, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57597.htm>.Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility.”Ibid..


a “responsible stakeholder?”47

First, the United States is encouraging China to become a “re-sponsible stakeholder” because it hopes that Beijing will work withWashington and other great powers to sustain, adapt, and advancethe peaceful international system that has enabled its success.48 Thiswas also why Zoellick led Dai Bingguo on December 9, 2005 totravel to Hyde Park to visit the home of President Franklin D.Roosevelt, one of the architects of the international system afterWorld War II. The visit was designed to highlight why and how alliedleaders created new global political, economic, and security systemsduring 1944-1945.49

I discussed the problem of a “responsible stakeholder” with the followingscholars in Taipei during the period of December 13, 2005. I would take theopportunity here to express my gratitude to them for their time and contribution.These scholars include Derek J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia, InternationalSecurity Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) (December13, 2005); Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS (December14, 2005); Franklin D. Kramer, Committee, Chairman, Asia & Global SecurityCommittee, The Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS) (December 15,2005); Banning Garrett, Director, Asia Program, ACUS (December 15, 2005);Ambassador Julia Chang Bloch, President, attended US-China Education Trust(December 15, 2005); Prof. Ni Shixiong, Professor and Director, Center forAmerican Studies and Professor of School of International Relations, FudanUniversity, Shanghai, China on (December 20, 2005); Li Jingzhi, Professor andDean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (December21, 2005).“Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-ChinaSenior Dialogue,” Department of State, December 8, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57822.htm>.“Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick to Host Second U.S.-China Senior DialogueDecember 7-8, 2005.”


Obviously, the main goal of such a visit is to make Dai have asort of direct experience to comprehend the important role that alliedplayed by allied leaders during and after World War II in creatingthe global, political and economic security systems that formed thebasis of the international system that the United States and othernations are working in and that Washington is seeking to work withBeijing and others to strengthen and to cooperate in ways that aremutually beneficial.50 Roosevelt’s former house is a living symbolof the kind of thinking and history that lies behind the internationalinstitutions and the international system that form the basis of enhanceddialogue. When Zoellick and Dai talked about working together tomeet common challenges and manage differences through existingstructures and in the context of international system, it is illustrativeto go to a place like Hyde Park, the home of Franklin Roosevelt, tosee what is behind those systems and to understand better the historyand one of the creative forces that helped define the system that theUnited States and other countries are working in today.

In the international system, both the United States, China andother great powers, as stakeholders, have a responsibility to work to-gether, to uphold and improve the norms that defines the system,whether it is in the economics sphere, in the security sphere, in thepolitical sphere. In short, the United States will continue to take ad-vantage of the U.S.-China strategic dialogue to have broad discussionsbetween the two countries at a senior level with respect to the inter-national system and the roles that each of them can play in supportof that system and in order to strengthen that system.

Second, the United States wants China to become a “responsible

Adam Ereli, “Daily Press Briefing,” Department of State, December 7, 2005,<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57782.htm>.


stakeholder” because it believes that the two countries can share theirresponsibility in their bilateral ties in a strategic context. Throughthe U.S.-China strategic framework, Zoellick believes that the twocountries can discuss a number of bilateral, security, and economic-related issues in a strategic context with the aim of exploring the re-sponsibility that both countries share to make the international systemmore secure and more prosperous in the long run. In his opinion,they will also look to the long term, over the horizon, to the futureof U.S.-China relationship and what the United States hopes the re-lations will look like.51 According to him, the United States andChina discussed a number of issue areas of cooperation, ranging fromIraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, fighting terrorism, preventingthe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, building energy se-curity, to reducing the risks of pandemic diseases. After discussingmutually interested problems including those areas where they mightnot agree each other, he believed that both the United States andChina could advance their mutual interests and manage their differ-ences. They also reviewed a number of issues on how the UnitedStates and China could better cooperate in Africa, and on the dangerousmix of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They agreed toconduct similar discussions about Latin America and South andCentral Asia.52

In all of these discussions, the United States urged China to con-sider how it can contribute to positive development. For example,Zoellick told Dai that Beijing could become more active in regionaland global issues, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and in urging Iran togive up its nuclear ambitions.53 In their talks, the Chinese side

“Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-ChinaSenior Dialogue.”Ibid..


explained China’s peaceful development strategy and clarified theposition that China could develop in a way both responsible andbeneficial for the Chinese people and the world. The U.S. side agreedwith the Chinese position.54 Yin Chengde, a researcher with the ChinaInstitute of International Studies on Sino-U.S. relations, said the stra-tegic dialogue focused on issues of “strategic, overall and long-standing importance” to the two countries, such as trade, securityand energy. He said Sino-U.S. relations have gained a sound momentumthis year thanks to frequent high-level visits and expanding com-munication channels.55 It is important for China to take responsibil-ities for a peaceful international system in the context of Sudan,North Korea and Iraq, as well as counterterrorism, Iran, and a broadrange of issues.

Third, the United States wants China to become a “responsiblestakeholder” because it thinks that if China becomes a common sta-keholder with the United States, it will behave well or at least betterthan it used to do domestically. The United States believes that onlyby allowing its people to enjoy more freedom and human rights, willChina’s fast economic development be sustained. When PresidentBush paid a visit to China in mid-November 2005, he discussed withChinese leaders about the importance of freedom and human rights.When Zoellick discussed with his Chinese counterpart on the sameissue on December 7-8, 2005, he explained that the United States

“U.S. to China: Become More Active,” CNN, December 9, 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/12/08/us.china/index.html>.“China, US Conclude Second Round of Strategic Talks,” People’s Daily (English),December 9, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200512/09/eng20051209_226819.html>.“China, US Continue High-level Dialogue,” China Daily, December 8, 2005,<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/08/content_501522.htm>.


was not raising these issues to threaten or destabilize China, butrather because it believed that expanded freedom was a natural andintegral part of China’s peaceful development. He told his counterpartthat even China itself has recently stressed that forming a foundationbased on the rule of law is central to its development strategy.56

Fourth, the United States wants China to become a “responsiblestakeholder” because it thinks that if China is willing to be astakeholder, it will also be a responsible player in dealing with theirmutual economic problems. Zoellick discussed his Chinese counterpartthe problem of persistent trade imbalances, financial relationship,and areas of friction such as the protection of IPRs. Once Chinabecomes a responsible stakeholder of the United States, it will sharean interest in maintaining an open international trading system,while ensuring an open, fair two-way economic exchange betweenthe two countries.57

Nevertheless, for the time being, there are at least six reasonsto account for China’s lukewarm attitude toward co-managing globalaffairs with the United States and other great powers.58 First, Beijing

“Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-ChinaSenior Dialogue.”Ibid..Edward I-hsin Chen, “To Co-manage Global Affairs with the United StatesMay Be Too Heavy A Burden for Beijing,” Pingguoribao (Apple Daily) (Taipei)(Chinese), October 28, 2005, p. A25; “Bush Wants to Win Back U.S. LargestSay on the Issue of the Taiwan Strait,” United Daily (Lienhebao) (Chinese) (Ta-ipei), December 21, 2005, p. A15. I also discussed the problem whether Chinawould be willing to be a “responsible stakeholder” together with the UnitedStates and other great powers with the following scholars in Taipei during theperiod of December 11, 2005. I would take the opportunity here to express mygratitude to them for their time and contribution. These scholars include Wang


has long pursued an independent and autonomous foreign policy, andis therefore unwilling to bind itself with the United States and othergreat powers and behave as an ally of the United States in globalaffairs. Second, in keeping with Deng Xiaoping’s instructions of“taking a low-profile stance and never going first hastily,” Chinadoes not intend to co-manage global affairs with the United Statesand others. Third, the Chinese differ from the Americans in their per-spective on the nature of international system, thus making it difficultfor them to share common values with each other while co-managingglobal affairs. Basically, Beijing regards the globe as a multipolarsystem, whereas Washington views it as a uni-multipolar system. Fo-urth, China has now pursued its policy of “peaceful rise” or “peacefuldevelopment,” stressing the importance of peaceful international en-vironment. Had Beijing agreed with co-managing global affairs withWashington, it should have inevitably gotten involved in manyoverseas wars such as the Persian Gulf wars, which in turn wouldhave had a negative impact on its development in the so-called “periodof strategic opportunity.” Fifth, China has its own long-term plan topursue the socialist democracy. If Beijing’s acceptance of Washington’sinvitation to be a “responsible stakeholders” suggests a process ofdemocratization that may be out of control as it was in the former

Gong Long, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Taiwan Studies, Shanghai,China (December 1, 200); Derek J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia, InternationalSecurity Program, CSIS (December 13, 2005); Dr. Bates Gill, Freeman Chairin China Studies, CSIS (December 14, 2005); Franklin D. Kramer, Committee,Chairman, Asia & Global Security Committee, ACUS (December 15, 2005);Banning Garrett, Director, Asia Program, ACUS (December 15, 200); AmbassadorJulia Chang Bloch, President, attended US-China Education Trust (December15, 2005); Prof. Ni Shixiong, Professor and Director, Center for AmericanStudies and Professor of School of International Relations, Fudan University,Shanghai, China (December 20, 2005); Li Jingzhi, Professor and Dean, Schoolof International Studies, Renmin University of China (December 21, 2005).


Soviet Union, Beijing will definitely decline such an invitation. Sixth,Chinese leaders have their own long-term plans to reform the exchangerate of the RMB, ameliorate the international trading system, andprotect the IPRs. In short, they will not put all these reforms intoeffect overnight because of U.S. pressures. If China’s participationin the club of “responsible stakeholders” implies the shadow of thefuture or economic loss that China cannot afford, China will put asidesuch an invitation.

In the wake of the two rounds of U.S.-China strategic dialogue,it is interesting to consider whether the Taiwan question has lost itsprevious significance in the U.S.-China relations. Yin Chengde, a re-searcher with the China Institute of International Studies on Sino-US relations said that, the Taiwan question, although still veryimportant to Sino-U.S. relations, is gradually dwindling in its sig-nificance in bilateral ties.59 When Washington and Beijing start tolook over the horizon and discuss the strategic framework of U.S.-China relations, the problem of Taiwan may no longer be as importantas it used to be. As long as the Sino-U.S. consensus on maintainingthe status quo of the Taiwan Strait remains intact, the issue of Taiwanwill not be that important in the U.S.-China relations. To be sure,the United States has repeatedly insisted that neither side of theTaiwan Strait shall unilaterally change the status quo, hoping thatboth sides could make more exchanges than ever before.60 Meanwhile,Beijing has stated that it will try its best to realize the goal of peacefulreunification, but it will never tolerate Taiwan independence.61 In a

“China, US Continue High-level Dialogue.”“Press Briefing by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on the President’s Visitto China,” White House, November 20, 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051120-8.html>.“Hu: Opposing ‘Taiwan Independence’ in Interest of China, US;” “Hu Stresses


sense, the Taiwan question has lost its previous significance in theU.S.-China relations.

Nevertheless, some serious contradictions remain between theUnited States and China on the issue of the Taiwan Strait. For example,Bush praised the democracy in Taiwan when he delivered a speechin Kyoto, Japan in mid-November 2005.62 At the same time, GeneralBrent Scowcroft, his father’s national security adviser pointed outthat the issue of Taiwan also involves fundamental U.S. interests.63

Apparently, the United States strongly feel that if Washington doeslittle or nothing now, its dominant position on the issue of the TaiwanStrait will be incrementally taken over by Beijing, particularly afterits passage of the Anti-Secession Law in April 2005. Bush playedthe card of Taiwan democracy before his trip to China on November16, 2005, whereas Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxin promptly re-buffed what Bush had said in Kyoto on the same day, insisting thatTaiwan is a part of China, an inseparable part of China, and Chinawill not tolerate any intervention in its internal affairs.64 Judgingfrom the interaction between the United States and China, the problemof Taiwan seems to continue to have its place in the U.S.-China re-lations.

While China attempts to regard Taiwan as part of its internalaffairs, the United States will not take a hands-off policy toward

Peace, Stability, Opposes “Taiwan Independence” in Talks with Bush,” People’sDaily (English), November 20, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/200511/20/eng20051120_222755.html>.“President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Kyoto, Japan.”Cheng, “China Won’t Compromise in Its Claim over Taiwan, General Says.”“China Rebuffs Bush over Taiwan,” AFP, November 16, 2005, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051116/wl_asia_afp/apecsummitusbushchinataiwan_051116064501>.


Taiwan, especially now when it thinks that the issue of Taiwan isalso relevant to U.S. national interest. Moreover, Hu and his predecessorJiang Zemin have established a principle of policy toward Taiwan,i.e., a short cut Beijing can take to influence Taipei is by way ofWashington. Furthermore, the Cross-Strait peace cannot rely onBeijing alone, while at the same time Washington cannot maintainthe stability in the Taiwan Strait by itself. Only through the cooperationof both the United States and China, will the status quo of the TaiwanStrait continue to be maintained.

The New Change of Nature in the U.S.-China-TaiwanRelationship

U.S. State Department spokesman Adams Ereli said on April29, 2005 that the recent development of Cross-Strait relations hasno longer been in the control of the United States.65 Apparently, whileboth the Department of State and White House continue to urgeChinese leaders to resume the dialogues with the duly elected leadershipin Taiwan, recent development of Cross-Strait relations have transpiredwhich went beyond the expectations of Washington. On the other hand,in the face of U.S. pressure to promote Cross-Strait talks, China’spassage of the Anti-Secession Law, and the visits of opposition leadersto China, the Taiwan government has found it increasingly difficultto deal with these problems.

Both Washington and Taipei have started to feel that they cando little to shift the momentum of Cross-Strait relations, whereasChinese president Hu has shown much confidence in the Cross-Straitrelationship. A very important reason behind that is that the U.S.-

Adam Ereli, “Daily Press Briefing,” Department of State, April 29, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/45441.htm>.


China-Taiwan relations have changed in nature again since the turnof the century.

To be sure, U.S.-China relationship changed in nature after theend of the cold War era due to the collapse of the Soviet Union andthe Tiananmen Incident. As a result, in the eyes of the United States,China’s status in the international community was in decline. Never-theless, thanks to Beijing’s low-profile stance and its fast economicdevelopment, their relations have changed once again. Their relationshave changed in nature as a result of the 9-11 terrorist attack andBeijing’s effective maneuvering of big-country diplomacy.

While China has not yet surpassed many of the other greatpowers such as Russia, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japanin terms of hard and soft powers, it has surpassed them in terms ofinternational influence.66 To be sure, Beijing has become increasinglyinfluential in global affairs, second only to Washington. As China’sinfluence grows, the United States has to develop some kind of co-operation on a quid pro quo basis. This was also why the UnitedStates failed to stop the passage of the Anti-Secession Law.

At the same time, a change in the nature of the relationshipbetween the United States and Taiwan has taken place. One of themost important changes is that Washington’s accumulated mistrustin Taipei turned out to be its dissatisfaction with Taiwan. In the lastquarter of 2004 former Secretary State Colin L. Powell and formerDeputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage harshly criticized Ta-iwan independence.67 This indicates that the more Taipei maneuvers

“Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-ChinaSenior Dialogue.”Powell, “Press Briefing in Beijing, China;” Powell, “Interview with Mike Chinoy


the Taiwan independence-related issues, the deeper the United Stateswill get involved in Taiwan’s domestic politics.

Judging from the meeting between Chen Shui-bian and PeopleFirst Party chairman James Soong, the deliberate postponement ofthe anti-“Anti-Secession Law” demonstration, Deputy KuomintangChairman Chiang Bin-kun’s visit to China, and the telephone con-versation between Chen Shui-bian and Kuomintang Chairman LienChan, it would not be difficult to find the role-playing of Washingtonbehind these moves. As a matter of fact, the United States has notonly gotten involved in Taiwan’s domestic politics, but it has alsochanged its long-held position of not mediating in promoting Cross-Strait talks.

As a result of the changes of relationship between Washingtonand Beijing on the one hand and between Washington and Taipei onthe other, the nature of Cross-Strait relations has changed in nature.With the frequent visits to China by opposition leaders and the U.S.clarification of its role-playing in the Cross-Strait relationship, it isexpected that Cross-Strait relations will improve one way or another.It should be pointed out that those who spoke in advocacy of takingsteps to ameliorate Cross-Strait relations were labeled as pro-Chinaor pro-communist Taiwanese in the past decade. Nevertheless, sucha “red cap” tactics will no longer be effective in the future as it usedto be.

More importantly, the change in nature of the Cross-Strait rela-tionship together with the maneuvering of Anti-Secession Law has

of CNN International TV;” Armitage, “Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS.”Boucher, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,”February 19, 2005, op.cit.


allowed Beijing to evolve into an active player from a passive player.If Taiwan fails to face the challenges as a result of the change ofnature in the Cross-Strait relations, it will regard the so-called “1992consensus” as an evil monster. Paradoxically, the more Taipei findsit difficult to meet the challenges that come its way, the more likelyit will provide Beijing with the opportunity it seeks to interfere inTaiwan’s domestic politics.

But if Taiwan can appreciate the subtle change in nature ofWashington-Beijing-Taipei relations, it may well reach a majorityconsensus at home first and then adjust its policy toward the UnitedStates and China. Only in this way, will it win back its partial initiativeand appropriate say in the agenda-setting of issues.

Conclusion

Given the new situation in which the U.S. policy toward Chinaand Taiwan is no longer on a balanced basis, it would be prudent forTaiwan to express our position and policies toward the United States.

First, we will assure the United States that it is our long-standingposition to maintain the sovereign status of the Republic of China.Any citation like “Taiwan is sovereign, independent country” is onlypolitical language, not our official position.

Second, we will assure Washington that we will not seek anychange in Taiwan’s status quo unilaterally. Meanwhile, we can askWashington to assure us that China will not change the status quoof Taiwan Strait on a unilateral basis.

Third, we will let Washington know that it is our right to maintainand develop our country’s international space, hoping that the United


States can extend its helping hand if necessary.

Fourth, we will assure the United States that it is our long-standing policy to promote Cross-Strait exchanges and peace. Whentime is appropriate and opportunity is available, we are willing toresume the Cross-Strait dialogue.

Fifth, we will assure Washington that it is our long-standingpolicy to strengthen our self-defense capabilities in the face of China’spossible use of force against Taiwan. We are willing to introducehigh-tech, sophisticated weapon systems and strengthen our militaryexchanges with the United States as long as such a move does notendanger the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

Last but not least, given the fact that the U.S.-China-Taiwanrelationship has changed in nature again since the turn of the centuryand that the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan is no longer on abalanced basis, it would be prudent for Taiwan to develop a majorityconsensus in response to the post-Anti-Secession Law era. The bestthing for Taiwan to do is to maintain a low profile position in cross-strait relations and develop our own economy, trade and technologyso that we can keep the U.S. security commitment in place on theone hand, while finding our own place in the Chinese marketplaceon the other.


Documents

A Retrospective and Prospective Overview ofU.S.-PRC-ROC ...A Retrospective and Prospective Overview of U.S.-PRC-ROC Relations 3 lukewarm opposition to the ChineseAnti-Secession Law