A Spiral of Silence for Some

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DOI: 10.1177/00936502103626852010 37: 774 originally published online 16 June 2010Communication Research

Jörg Matthes, Kimberly Rios Morrison and Christian SchemerPolitical Minority Opinions

A Spiral of Silence for Some: Attitude Certainty and the Expression of

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Communication Research37(6) 774 –800

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DOI: 10.1177/0093650210362685

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A Spiral of Silence for Some: Attitude Certainty

and the Expression of Political Minority Opinions

Jörg Matthes, 1 Kimberly Rios Morrison, 2 and Christian Schemer 1

Abstract

Spiral of silence theory does not assume a simple relationship between opinion climateand opinion expression. In fact, the notion of hardcore individuals (who express theiropinions regardless of the climate) embraces the idea that there are some people forwhom this relationship does not hold true. However, this idea has not been put to a directempirical test. In this article, the authors propose that attitude certainty is a key variablein identifying the hardcore. Data from three surveys demonstrate that the climate of

opinion only determines opinion expression when individuals hold their attitudes withlow or moderate attitude certainty. For individuals with high attitude certainty, no sucheffect can be found. Thus, there is a spiral of silence only for some but not for all membersof the public.

Keywords

spiral of silence, opinion climate, opinion expression, attitude certainty

The freedom to express one’s political opinion is one of the fundamental principles of modern democracy. Ideally, political opinion expression is a process that excludes no onein a society, no matter how prominent or marginal a particular issue position is. The ques-tion of who chooses to speak out and who remains silent is thus of fundamental relevanceto mass communication and public opinion research. In answering this question, Noelle-

Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence theory has played a very prominent and influential role.

C

1University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland2Ohio State University, Columbus

Corresponding Author: Jörg Matthes, University of Zurich, Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research,Andreasstrasse 15, 8050 Zurich, SwitzerlandEmail: [email protected]








Matthes et al. 775

According to spiral of silence theory, individuals who perceive their opinions to be in amajority position are more likely to express their views than those who feel that their opin-ions are not shared by most other people. The proposed reason for this process is a fear of

social isolation, which leads the former group to speak out and the latter group to fall silentin spite of their actual distribution in a society.

Although a meta-analysis of spiral of silence studies reveals a significant relationship between perceived majority status of one’s opinion (i.e., opinion climate) and willingness toexpress that opinion, this relationship is rather small in magnitude (Glynn, Hayes, & Shana-han, 1997; for a discussion, see Scheufele & Moy, 2001). There are a number of possiblereasons for that, such as the failure to control for fear of social isolation (Ho & McLeod,2008; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007), the neglect of other individual difference vari-ables that might be at work (e.g., Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005; Miller & Morrison, 2009;

Willnat, Lee, & Detenber, 2002), or the lack of consonance in media coverage (Peter, 2004).Another explanation for why the relationship between opinion climate and opinion

expression is rather weak has been addressed by Noelle-Neumann (1974) herself: Some people (the hardcore) choose to speak out regardless of the climate of opinion. The hard-core appear to be those individuals who hold strong opinions. As a consequence, they arenot afraid of expressing minority views. As several scholars have argued, attitudestrength—in particular, attitude certainty—is a key variable in identifying the hardcore(e.g., Glynn & McLeod, 1984; Lasorsa, 1991; Neuwirth et al., 2007, Oshagan, 1996;Salmon & Oshagan, 1990). More specifically, those who are certain of their opinions will

always speak out no matter how hostile the climate of opinion is. In contrast, those who arerather uncertain fall victim to the spiral of silence. Surprisingly, this idea has not beendirectly tested in previous research. Although we know that attitude certainty and relatedconstructs predict opinion expression (e.g., Baldassare & Katz, 1996; Lasorsa, 1991), wedo not know whether and how the relationship between opinion climate and willingness tospeak out depends on attitude certainty.

The aim of this article is to introduce attitude certainty as a moderator of the spiral of silence. First, we review previous studies that have included attitude certainty and relatedmeasures to predict the willingness to speak out. After that, we discuss the role of attitude

certainty in spiral of silence theory. We then present the results of three independent studiesthat support the claim that attitude certainty moderates the relationship between the climateof opinion and opinion expression.

Explaining Willingness to Speak OutThe willingness to express one’s opinion is the primary dependent variable in spiral of silence research. In explaining opinion expression, the perceived climate of opinion servesas the major independent variable. However, the climate of opinion may not be the only

variable that impacts opinion expression. For instance, a number of scholars have arguedthat attitude strength , defined as the extent to which an attitude is resistant to change and

predictive of behavior (Krosnick & Petty, 1995), influences the readiness to speak out.







776 Communication Research 37(6)

Specific dimensions of attitude strength include but are not limited to extremity, intensity, personal interest or importance, and certainty (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, &Carnot, 1993).

In a study about the issue of abortion, Salmon and Neuwirth (1990) asked Wisconsinresidents “how concerned they were about the issue” and “how strongly they held their opinion” (p. 572). An index of these two items significantly predicted both willingness togive an interview to a TV reporter and likelihood of entering a discussion with a stranger who disagrees. In a similar vein, Moy, Domke, and Stamm (2001) found that perceivedissue importance is a significant predictor of the willingness to speak out on affirmativeaction. Likewise, Kim, Han, Shanahan, and Berdayes (2004) found that personal interestin the issue of Korean unification was the strongest predictor of the willingness to expressone’s views about the unification in a hypothetical TV interview.

In addition to issue interest and personal importance, one’s willingness to express anopinion can be influenced by the extremity or self-reported intensity of that opinion. For example, Baldassare and Katz (1996) found that people with extreme political orientationswere more willing to speak out than people with more moderate political orientations.Using similar measures, Shamir (1997) showed that attitude extremity was significantlyrelated to the willingness to publicly express an opinion about Israeli territories. Yetanother measure of attitude strength (specifically, intensity) was applied by Neuwirth et al.(2007), who asked respondents how strongly they felt about the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Thismeasure was found to be a significant predictor of opinion expression.

Taken together, the studies reviewed above have embraced the notion that opinionexpression does not only depend on opinion climate but also on how strongly one feelsabout an issue. Although the results of these studies are fairly consistent, they all treatattitude strength as a direct predictor of opinion expression, regardless of opinion climate.What can be derived from spiral of silence theory, however, is that attitude strength—in

particular, attitude certainty—moderates the relationship between opinion climate andopinion expression. That is, spiral of silence theory actually posits that for the hardcore(i.e., people who are certain of their attitudes), opinion climate should have no impact onopinion expression. In contrast, for the rest of the public (i.e., people with low or moderate

attitude certainty), opinion climate should be a crucial determinant of opinion expression.Thus, examining the moderating role of attitude certainty can shed light on when opinionclimate will and will not affect expression and as such on why the direct relationship

between climate and expression is relatively small (see Glynn et al., 1997).

Attitude CertaintyThe construct of attitude certainty, as an indicator of attitude strength, is based on the ideathat people hold their attitudes with varying levels of conviction (Tormala & Rucker,

2007). It is well established that attitude certainty is conceptually and empirically distinctfrom other dimensions of attitude strength, such as importance (Krosnick et al., 1993) or extremity (Prislin, 1996). Although these dimensions are correlated, they load onto sepa-rate factors (see Krosnick et al., 1993).








Matthes et al. 777

The Origins of Attitude Certainty

Numerous studies have demonstrated that attitude certainty is increased by factors, such as

accessibility of the attitude (e.g., Bassili, 1996), direct experience with the attitude object(e.g., Krosnick et al., 1993), subjective ease of recalling attitude-relevant information (e.g.,Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999), online attitude formation (e.g., Bizer, Tormala,Rucker, & Petty, 2006), subjective impressions of successfully resisting compelling per-suasive messages (e.g., Tormala & Petty, 2002), or the amount, cognitive elaboration, andstructural consistency of attitude-relevant knowledge (e.g., Smith, Fabrigar, MacDougall, &Wiesenthal, 2008). Other research suggests that intensive elaboration of attitude-relevantinformation—which is associated with high attitude certainty—is more likely when indi-viduals are able and motivated to process the information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie

& Asuncion, 1990). Still other studies suggest that individuals high in the trait need toevaluate are more likely to hold their attitudes with certainty (Britt, Millard, Sundare-swaran, & Moore, 2009; Matthes, Wirth, & Schemer, 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2001).

It is important to note that attitude certainty is bound to specific attitude objects. Onecan be certain about one object, yet feel uncertain about another. Although there is trait-

based variance—for instance, in the need to evaluate—attitude certainty need not be stableover time. It can decrease or increase depending on the antecedents discussed above (seeTormala & Rucker, 2007).

Attitude Certainty and Hardcore IndividualsAccording to previous spiral of silence research (e.g., Lasorsa, 1991; McDonald, Glynn,Kim, & Otsman, 2001), hardcore individuals can be identified primarily by their convic-tion that the attitudes they hold are correct, which is a key component of attitude certainty(Krosnick et al., 1993; Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). We argue that—compared toother attitude strength measures—attitude certainty may be a more accurate way of capturingthe difference between those individuals who constitute the hardcore and those who do not.

Taking attitude extremity, for example, one could hold a moderate attitude toward

health care reforms but feel certain that this is the right way to think about the issue(Tormala & Rucker, 2007). Similarly, one could be highly interested in a recent issue (e.g.,the world financial market crisis of 2008 and 2009) but not yet be certain of what opinionis the correct one to have. According to spiral of silence theory, it is not necessarily beinginterested in an issue or having an extreme attitude that makes hardcore people voiceminority opinions. Instead, it is the conviction that their opinion on the issue is correct. Inthe one study to date that has examined the relationship between attitude certainty andopinion expression, Lasorsa (1991) found that attitude certainty did indeed predict respon-dents’ willingness to express their opinions on several different issues (e.g., AIDS, the

economy), though the moderating role of opinion climate was not tested.Like in Lasorsa’s (1991) study, most studies have looked at the main effect of attitude

certainty (and related measures) on opinion expression and not at its interaction with opinionclimate. To our knowledge, there are only two exceptions to this. In an experimental









Matthes et al. 779

interaction between attitude certainty and opinion climate when explaining opinion expres-sion. In Study 1, opinion climate was operationalized as the congruency between respon-dents’ own opinion and perceived public opinion. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study

1 with a direct and thus more precise measure of opinion climate. Furthermore, Study 2explored the role of importance as an alternative moderator. Study 3 was designed to rep-licate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 using a multi-item measure of opinion climate and ameasure of dangerous public opinion expression as a theoretically more precise test of spiral of silence theory. All three studies dealt with issues that have a moral component, a

prerequisite for spiral of silence research (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).To avoid underspecified regression models (for this argument, see Hayes, Scheufele, &

Huge, 2006), and to make the studies comparable, we included the same list of controls inall three studies. By doing so, we followed Salmon and Neuwirth (1990) who stressed the

importance of including multiple controls “to determine whether the relationship betweenopinion climates and expression is spurious or [ . . . ] actually stronger than has been dem-onstrated in previous bivariate research” (p. 571).

Besides demographics, we controlled for TV and newspaper use, respondents’ ownissue attitudes, and their general frequency of discussion. Media use, as a central variablein spiral of silence research, has been found to be a direct predictor of opinion expressionin numerous studies (see Baldassare & Katz, 1996; Moy et al., 2001; Neuwirth, 2000;

Neuwirth et al., 2007; Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun, 2006; Scheufele, 1999). As Baldassare andKatz (1996) argue, people who follow the news are more confident in their political deci-

sions and are better able to recall their opinions compared to people who do not follow thenews (see also Moy et al., 2001). Likewise, Scheufele (1999) and Noelle-Neumann (1993)

point to the articulation function of mass media: “The media provide people with the wordsand phrases they can use to defend a point of view” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 173). Thus,it can be expected that media use has a positive impact on opinion expression.

Similarly, controlling for a person’s own opinion appeared warranted because the effectof opinion climate on opinion expression should be independent from one’s actual positionon an issue (see e.g., Baldassare & Katz, 1996; Shamir, 1997). It is important to ensure thatit is not the actual opinion of respondents but their perceived minority or majority status

that leads them to speak out or to fall silent (see also Neuwirth et al., 2007; Neuwirth &Frederick, 2004).

Finally, general interpersonal discussion frequency was included in all three studies.The key dependent variable in spiral of silence theory is opinion expression under situa-tions of social pressure. This variable, however, must be carefully separated from politicaltalk or general discussion (Scheufele, 1999). Spiral of silence theory, in fact, does notassume an effect of opinion climate on general discussion. Thus, it is important to ensurethat the effect of opinion climate on opinion expression is independent from people’s gen-eral tendency to engage in discussions (Scheufele, 1999). It can be expected that general

discussion frequency has a positive impact on opinion expression, as people who talk morefrequently about politics are also more likely to explicitly express their views (for evi-dence, Neuwirth, 2000; Pan et al., 2006; Scheufele, 1999).









Study 1 Method

In Study 1, data were gathered by a standardized Web-based survey conducted in Januaryand February 2005. The survey dealt with attitudes toward the bilateral relations betweenSwitzerland and the EU. In particular, respondents answered questions about the pros andcons of Switzerland joining the EU. At the time, this was a major and controversial topicin Switzerland leading to a political and public debate. Switzerland was (and still is) not amember of the EU. Under the Swiss system of direct democracy, joining the EU wouldentail a national referendum with a majority of Swiss residents approving the membershipapplication.

Participants in the study ( N = 688, 47.8% female, age range: 18-81 years, M = 33.69,

SD = 13.85, nationality: German-speaking Swiss residents) were contacted by e-mail withthe help of mailing lists. Care was taken to produce variability in education and age. Nev-ertheless, younger people (70% were under 40 years of age) and people with higher educa-tional degrees were overrepresented (26% college degree, 40% high school degree that isnecessary to go to a college).

MeasuresThe dependent variable, willingness to express one’s opinion, was measured by several

questions. Regarding the question of Switzerland joining the EU, respondents were askedwhether (a) they express their opinion among friends, family, or colleagues; (b) they par-ticipate in discussions in public; (c) they participate in demonstrations; and (d) they take

part in collections of signatures. These four items were summed up to an index rangingfrom 0 to 4 ( M = 1.40, SD = 0.73). Attitude certainty was assessed with a standard itemasking, “How certain are you in your opinion about Switzerland joining the EuropeanUnion?” ( M = 3.70, SD = 1.01), ranging from 1 ( very uncertain ) to 5 ( very certain ). Thisitem has been successfully used in psychological research and is generally regarded as areliable measure of the construct (to name a few, Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick &

Schumann, 1988; Petrocelli et al., 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2002).As is common in many spiral of silence studies (e.g., Neuwirth, 2000; Scheufele,

Shanahan, & Lee, 2001; Willnat et al., 2001), majority opinion climate was operational-ized by combining two measures: First, respondents were asked how they would vote if there was a referendum about joining the EU the next day (1 = oppose to 5 = in favor ; M =3.07, SD = 1.68). Second, they were asked how likely they thought it was that Switzerlandwould be joining the EU—in other words, that the Swiss people would vote in favor of

joining in a referendum (1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely ; M = 2.66, SD = 1.17). Thesetwo items were used to compute a majority/minority index: If respondents opposed joining

the EU and felt that the public would decide the same way or if they were in favor of join-ing and thought this was going to happen, they were given the code majority climate (2 =majority , n = 284). In contrast, when they opposed but saw the public in favor or whenthey were in favor but thought the public would oppose, they were given a minority position code







Matthes et al. 781

(1 = minority , n = 212). Respondents that chose the middle category were excluded becausethey could not be assigned to a majority or minority group.

As controls, we measured sex (2 = female , 1 = male ), age, and education. Frequency of

TV use ( M = 3.43, SD = 1.33) and newspaper use ( M = 4.34, SD = 1.00) in regard to poli-tics were measured on a 5-point scale. Issue attitude was assessed by asking how peoplewould vote if there was a referendum next Sunday about joining the EU or not (1 = in favor to 5 = against ; M = 3.07, SD = 1.68). General discussion frequency was gauged with theitem, “How often do you talk with other people about Switzerland joining the EuropeanUnion?” (1 = very seldom to 5 = very often ; M = 2.72, SD = 1.03).

Finally, to explore the role of other (noncertainty) attitude strength measures, we opera-tionalized attitude extremity as the absolute value of the difference between participants’own attitude and the scale’s midpoint (see Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 2000). Scores

could range from 0 to 2, with higher scores reflecting more extreme attitudes ( M = 1.26,SD = 0.71).

Data AnalysisData were analyzed by a blockwise hierarchical multiple regression. Sex, age, and educa-tion were included in the first block; TV and newspaper use in the second; issue attitudeand general discussion in the third; attitude certainty and majority climate in the fourth;and finally, the interaction term in the fifth block. To compare our two attitude strength

measures, we ran the identical model with attitude extremity instead of attitude certainty.Because both concepts were highly correlated in this study ( r = .49, p < .001), they couldnot be included in one model. Multicollinearity would lead to an overfitting of the regres-sion model.

In order to probe and interpret the interaction, we used the modprobe macro to apply theJohnson-Neyman technique (Bauer & Curran, 2005; Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Preacher,Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The Johnson-Neyman technique identifies regions in the range of the moderator variable where the effect of the focal predictor on the outcome is statisticallysignificant and not significant. This way, it can be precisely determined at which levels of

attitude certainty there is a positive, negative, or no relationship between climate and opin-ion expression. The Johnson-Neyman technique is superior to the more common pick-a-

point approach that merely picks representative values (e.g., high, moderate, and low) of the moderator variable (Bauer & Curran, 2005). A difficulty of the pick-a-point approach isthat there are no nonarbitrary guidelines for picking the points at which to probe the interac-tion (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). Independent variables were not mean centered (see Hayes,2005). When an interaction was present, the (conditional) main effects of the predictorswere not interpreted. These effects were probed with the Johnson-Neyman technique.

ResultsThe results of the blockwise multiple regression are depicted in Table 1. As can be seen,age (β = .11, p < .05), TV (β = .20, p < .001), newspaper use (β = .12, p < .05), and overall








discussion frequency (β = .28, p < .001) are significant predictors of opinion expression.Contrary to our second hypothesis, we find no significant effect of attitude certainty. There

is also no effect of opinion climate.In the last block of the regression model, however, there is a significant interaction

between opinion climate and attitude certainty (β = −.44, p < .05). The negative sign of thisinteraction signals that an increase in attitude certainty leads to a decrease in the relation-ship between opinion climate and opinion expression. It is crucial to note that attitudecertainty and opinion climate are uncorrelated ( r = −.04, ns). Thus, there are no grounds toargue that attitude certainty serves as a mediator (i.e., a majority climate leads to attitudecertainty, which in turn leads to opinion expression) or that opinion climate is a mediator for the relationship between attitude certainty and opinion expression (i.e., attitude cer-

tainty leads individuals to believe they are in a majority, which in turn impacts opinionexpression). Thus, our first hypothesis can be confirmed.

In order to probe this interaction, the Johnson-Neyman technique was applied includingthe same list of predictors (producing the same effects and explaining variance as block-wise regression). The Johnson-Neyman technique indicates the regions of the moderator

Table 1. Regression Coefficients for Predicting Opinion Expression (Study 1)

Predictors

UnstandardizedCoefficients

StandardizedCoefficients

p Value

Block 1: DemographicsAge .01 .11 **Sex −.05 −.03Education −.01 −.01Incremental R2 = .01

Block 2: Media useFrequency TV news .11 .20 ****Frequency newspaper use .10 .12 **Incremental R2 = .06***

Block 3: Issue attitude and discussionIssue attitude .01 .01Overall discussion frequency .20 .28 ****Incremental R2 = .07***

Block 4: Majority and certaintyPerceived majority climate .03 .02Attitude certainty .05 .08Incremental R2 = .00

Block 5: Focal predictorsPerceived Majority Climate × AttitudeCertainty

−.13 −.44 **

Incremental R2

= .01**

Total R2 = .16Total R2

Adjust= .14

**p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.











explained by the fact that the effect of attitude certainty is moderated by opinion climate.Hence, attitude certainty does only enhance opinion expression when people feel they arein the minority.

Some control variables were also significant. Older people were more likely to expresstheir opinions than younger people. This might be explained by a higher amount of politi-cal sophistication and a higher issue-specific knowledge that older citizens have comparedto younger citizens. The positive effects of TV and newspaper use suggest that the newsmedia provide the content that is discussed (Moy et al., 2001; Noelle-Neumann, 1993;Scheufele, 1999). The more people read, see, or hear about politics in the news, the morelikely it is that they will form opinions that can be expressed. The opposite is also plausi-

ble: The more people anticipate that they will be expressing their views, the more they turnon the news or read the newspaper to prepare themselves for that. Finally, overall discus-

sion frequency was significantly related to opinion expression. The more frequently indi-viduals discuss political issues, the more often they are given the opportunity to expresstheir views. Another explanation could be that frequent discussions of politics enhance

people’s subjective feeling of practice or experience in opinion expression.Taken together, the findings of Study 1 confirm the hypothesized moderating role of

attitude certainty. However, some caution is warranted in drawing this conclusion. On thetheoretical side, we have argued that attitude certainty is the key variable in identifying thehardcore. Indeed, attitude extremity did not moderate the relationship between climate andopinion expression. However, we were not able to test the effects of other dimensions of

attitude strength, such as importance (see Krosnick et al., 1993). Thus, more evidence isneeded for the claim that attitude certainty—and not a related construct—explains thehardcore phenomenon.

On the methodological side, the operationalization of majority climate was not opti-mal. Respondents were split into two groups based on their own attitudes toward the EUand their estimation of the likelihood of Switzerland joining the EU. Therefore, thestudy needs to be replicated working with a more refined measure of climate percep-tion. Moreover, the explained variance of the interaction effect was rather small, raisingquestions about the robustness of this effect. As has often been noted (e.g., Kelly, Chase,

& Tucker, 1979), no single study can be considered definitive with respect to someresearch issue or question. Nevertheless, replicating the findings of Study 1 with thesame list of predictors would lend more confidence to our line of reasoning. Therefore,the aim of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a different context usingmore refined measures, and to assess perceived importance as an additional dimensionof attitude strength.

Study 2

Method The second study was administered through a Web survey pertaining to the World Eco-nomic Forum’s (WEF) annual meeting, a major global event that took place in Davos,







Matthes et al. 785

Switzerland, from January 23 to January 27, 2008. Respondents were solicited by placingannouncements on a variety of newsgroups, blogs, text, and banner ads on high-trafficnational newspaper Web sites, homepages of politicians and political activists, and on offi-

cial sites by the local state government. Special attention was paid to recruiting both oppo-nents and proponents of the WEF. The survey was available online from January 23 toFebruary 14, 2008. In order to increase data quality, respondents who did not complete thesurvey from beginning to end and respondents who completed the survey more quicklythan pilot testing suggested was possible were excluded (cutoff was 15 minutes; a begin-ning and ending time stamp was provided for each record by the Web survey software).Furthermore, an automatic Internet protocol check reduced the likelihood that an individ-ual could respond to the survey more than once. The final sample included 1,096 respon-dents (26% female, M age = 41.33, SD = 17.26, range = 18 to 86 years). Respondents with

higher educational degrees were overrepresented (35% college degree, 27% high schooldegree that is necessary to go to a college).

MeasuresWillingness to express one’s opinion was measured by asking respondents whether theyhad voiced their opinion about the WEF (a) in front of other people, (b) in front of closefriends, (c) in front of neighbors, and (d) in front of spouse/boyfriend/ girlfriend. Thesevariables were summed up to an index ranging from 0 to 4 ( M = 1.76, SD = 1.26). Attitude

certainty was again measured with a standard item asking, “How certain are you in your opinion about the WEF?”, ranging from 1 ( very uncertain ) to 5 ( very certain ; M = 3.92,SD = 0.93). As alternative measures of attitude strength, we included issue importance andattitude extremity. Again, extremity ( M = 2.55, SD = 1.36) was operationalized as the abso-lute value of the difference between participants’ own attitude (“How positive or negativedo you think about the World Economic Forum?”; 1 = do not agree at all , 10 = fully agree ;

M = 4.62, SD = 3.23) and the scale’s midpoint. For perceived issue importance (see Kimet al., 2004; Moy et al., 2001), participants responded to the item, “The issue is very impor-tant to me personally” (1 = do not agree at all , 5 = fully agree ; M = 2.74, SD = 1.36).

(Minority) opinion climate was assessed with the item, “Most people in Switzerlandthink differently about the WEF compared to me,” ranging from 1 ( strongly disagree ) to 5( strongly agree ). The rationale behind this item was to assess opinion climate in a moredirect and precise way, rather than combine two measures as done in Study 1 and previousresearch (e.g., Scheufele et al., 2001; Willnat et al., 2001). The content of this item refersto the difference between own opinion and perceived public opinion. Thus, it expressesexactly the same content as the combination of the two measures in Study 1. In order todenote majority opinion climate as in Study 1, the item was recoded (high value = majorityclimate; M = 3.23, SD = 1.06).

The same controls as in Study 1 were included. Similar to the first study, sex (2 = female , 1 = male ), age, highest education, and frequency (1 = very seldom to 5 = very often )of TV use ( M = 3.47, SD = 1.32) and newspaper use ( M = 4.16, SD = .96) were measured.Furthermore, attitudes toward the WEF were also controlled. Issue attitude was measured








with one item (“How positive or negative do you think about the World Economic Forum?”;see above), and general discussion frequency was gauged with the item, “How often doyou talk with family and friends about political issues?”(1 = never to 5 = very often ; M =

4.40, SD = 0.76).

Data AnalysisData analysis was similar to Study 1. The interaction terms (certainty × climate and impor-tance × climate) served as the last block in a moderated regression. When an interactionterm was nonsignificant, it was left out of the final model (see Hayes, 2005). Since attitudecertainty and extremity were highly correlated ( r = .48, p < .001) signaling problems of multicollinearity, attitude extremity was exchanged for attitude certainty in an additional

analysis. Importance, however, correlated only moderately with both certainty ( r = .19, p < .001) and extremity ( r = .15, p < .001), and was thus left in the model.

ResultsTable 2 shows the results of Study 2. Among the statistical controls, only frequency of TVnews (β = .14, p < .001), issue attitude (β = −.20, p < .001), and overall discussion fre-quency (β = .28, p < .001) exert a significant influence on opinion expression. The morecertain individuals are in their attitudes toward the WEF, the more they are willing to

express their views publicly (β = .18, p < .001). Also, issue importance has a significanteffect on opinion expression (β = .13, p < .001).

As in the previous study, there is no direct evidence for an unmoderated spiral of silence: The perception of opinion climate is unrelated to opinion expression (β = .04, ns).In the last block of the regression, however, a marginally significant interaction effect of attitude certainty and opinion climate can be observed (β = −.29, p = .06). A graph of theinteraction is shown in Figure 2. The negative sign of the interaction term denotes that therelationship between climate perception and opinion expression decreases when attitudecertainty increases. Because attitude certainty is not positively related to the perception of

a majority climate, it cannot be argued that attitude certainty causes a majority perceptionor that a majority opinion climate leads to more certain attitudes. In fact, the correlation isvery small and surprisingly even negative ( r = −.08). Thus, confirming our hypothesis,attitude certainty moderates the relationship between opinion climate and opinion expres-sion. It does not mediate this relationship, nor does it predict one’s perception of the opin-ion climate.

The interaction term of importance and majority climate was not significant (β = −.04,ns) and was left out of the model (see Hayes, 2005). In an additional analysis, we includedattitude extremity instead of attitude certainty. Like attitude certainty, attitude extremity is

significantly related to opinion expression (β = .21, p < .001). However, there is no interac-tion between extremity and opinion climate (β = .13, ns).

Thus, only attitude certainty interacts with majority climate perception. In probing thisinteraction with the Johnson-Neyman technique, it can be shown that opinion climate is a







Matthes et al. 787

significant predictor of opinion expression for individuals with relatively low and moder-

ate attitude certainty. Up to an attitude certainty of 3.82, the relationship between bothvariables is statistically significant ( p < .05). When attitude certainty is higher than 3.82,opinion climate has no effect on opinion expression. Finally, the other possible direction of the interaction was probed: A significant main effect of attitude certainty on opinionexpression can be found across all levels of opinion climate (see Figure 2). However, thiseffect is weaker ( p < .05) for very high levels (i.e., scoring 5 on the scale) compared to low,moderate, or high levels ( p < .001) of majority climate perception.

DiscussionThe aim of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1 with a more precise measurement of opinionclimate and with issue importance as another potential moderator. Results largely con-firmed the findings of Study 1. Consumption of TV news and overall discussion frequency

Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Predicting Opinion Expression (Study 2)

Predictors



p Value

Block 1: DemographicsAge −.00 −.06Sex .01 .00Education .02 .02Incremental R2 = .00

Block 2: Media useFrequency TV news use .12 .14 ****Frequency newspaper use −.09 −.07Incremental R2 = .02***

Block 3: Issue attitude and discussionIssue attitude −.08 −.20 ****Overall discussion frequency .46 .28 ****Incremental R2 = .12****

Block 4: Focal predictorsPerceived majority climate .04 .04Attitude certainty .24 .18 ****Importance .13 .13 ****Incremental R2 = .05****

Block 5: InteractionPerceived Majority Climate × AttitudeCertainty

−.07 −.29 *

Incremental R2 = .01*


Adjust= .13

*p = .06. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.









were again related to opinion expression. In addition, having a negative issue attitudetoward the WEF predicted the expression of opinions. This might be explained by the factthat being against something may involve negative emotions such as anger and threat.These emotions increase evaluations of importance and concern (e.g., Marcus & McKuen,1993), thereby enhancing the likelihood of joining discussions.

Also in line with Study 1, there was again no unmoderated spiral of silence: The minor-ity opinion climate did not lead to a decrease in opinion expression per se. However, for individuals with low or moderate attitude certainty, clear evidence for an influence of theclimate of public opinion was found. No moderated effects were found for issue impor-

tance and attitude extremity. These findings underscore the unique relevance of attitudecertainty to the relationship between opinion climate and opinion expression. In line withour second hypothesis, there was a main effect of attitude certainty on opinion expression.However, this effect was smaller for a minority compared to a majority climate.

Despite this compelling evidence for our argument, the results of both studies shouldstill be interpreted with caution. There are essentially three drawbacks. First, the perceivedopinion climate was measured by a combination of questions in Study 1 and with a singleitem in Study 2. Although the results of both studies are consistent, the use of single itemsto capture this key independent variable is troublesome. 2 Thus, Study 3 aims to replicate

the findings of Studies 1 and 2 using a multiple item measure of opinion climate.Second, the indicators we used in Studies 1 and 2 measured overall opinion expression,

not dangerous opinion expression (see Eveland & Hively, 2009; Eveland, Morey, & Hively,2008). Dangerous opinion expression, that is, expressing an opinion to people who tend to

Figure 2. Willingness of opinion expression as a factor of majority opinion climate andattitude certainty (Study 2).








Matthes et al. 789

disagree with this opinion, is more closely at the heart of spiral of silence theory (seeSalmon & Neuwirth, 1990). It encapsulates the tendency of individuals to silence them-selves in presence of a hostile climate. It can be expected that dangerous opinion expres-

sion should be strongly affected by a hostile opinion climate. In other words, when a personholds a minority opinion, the likelihood of falling silent should be higher in a dangeroussetting compared to a safe setting. Thus, an indicator of dangerous discussion should pro-vide a stricter test of spiral of silence theory.

Third, Studies 1 and 2 can potentially be criticized for their sample and sampling meth-odology. Although Web-based surveys are largely accepted in the scientific community, itis fair to say that representative telephone surveys working with random sampling providemore reliable and more valid results. Thus, another aim of Study 3 was to replicate our findings with a representative, national sample.

Study 3 Method

Data from the third study were collected as part of a representative survey on a nationalreferendum about the naturalization of Swiss immigrants. This issue deals with the appli-cation process and decision procedures for immigrants who want to attain national citizen-ship. The sample was recruited by random digit dialing (random quota) in June 2008 ( N =

1,201, age M = 48.29, SD = 16.71; 50.6% female; nationality: German-speaking (78.4%)and French-speaking Swiss residents). The questionnaire was programmed for an applica-tion of Computer Assisted Telephone Interview. To ensure high data quality, the study wasconducted by a major global polling company that adopts internationally established poll-ing standards.

Measures and Data AnalysisRespondents were asked about their opinions toward naturalizing immigrants. Opinion

climate was measured with an index of two items (α = .54, M = 3.14, SD = 0.94; 1 = do not agree at all to 5 = fully agree ; “My opinion on the issue of naturalization equals mostopinions I hear in my surroundings,” “In the place where I live, most people think the sameway about the issue of naturalization than I do”). 3 Attitude certainty was again gauged byasking how certain people felt in their opinion (1 = very uncertain to 5 = very certain ; M =4.25, SD = 0.95), and dangerous discussion was assessed by asking how often respondentsdiscussed this issue with people who have a different opinion (1 = very seldom to 5 = veryoften ; M = 2.21, SD = 1.20). Personal importance (see Kim et al., 2004; Moy et al., 2001)was gauged with the item, “The issue of naturalization is very important to me personally”

(1 = do not agree at all to 5 = fully agree ; M = 4.14, SD = 1.11). Attitude extremity ( M =1.45, SD = 0.92) was computed by taking the absolute value of the difference between

participants’ own attitude (see below) and the scale’s midpoint. This time, attitude certaintyand extremity were only moderately correlated ( r = .29, p < .001), signaling no concernsabout multicollinearity. Both measures were thus left in the model.









As controls, we included sex (2 = female , 1 = male ), age, and education. Importance of television ( M = 3.83, SD = 1.24) and newspaper ( M = 3.89, SD = 1.22) for being informedabout politics (1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important ) and a measure of general dis-

cussion (average score of the amount of interpersonal communication with family/peopleone lives with, spouse/partner, and friends; 1 = very seldom to 5 = very often ; α = 71; M =2.54, SD = 1.17) were measured. Issue attitude was measured with a reliable index of threeitems (α = 72; M = 3.98, SD = 1.71, “I approve stricter naturalization rules in Switzerland,”1= not agree at all to 10 = fully agree ; “There are already too many foreigners in Switzer-land”; and “Mass naturalizations must be stopped,” 1 = not agree at all to 5 = fully agree ).Data analysis was equivalent to the two previous studies.

ResultsSeveral controls exert a significant effect on dangerous discussion (see Table 3). Sex (β =−.12, p < .001), education (β = −.09, p < .01), and newspaper use (β = .08, p < .05) aresignificant predictors. The strongest predictor of all controls, however, is the amount of overall discussion that our respondents reported (β = .50, p < .001). There is no effect of attitude certainty and opinion climate on dangerous opinion expression.

More importantly, however, there is again a significant interaction of attitude certaintyand opinion climate (β = −.29, p < .05). This is in line with our first hypothesis that attitudecertainty moderates the relationship between opinion climate and opinion expression.

Although attitude certainty is weakly related to the perception of a majority climate ( r =.06, p < .05), this correlation disappears if the same controls are included as in Table 3. Itfollows that alternative explanations can be ruled out: Attitude certainty is neither a media-tor between climate and opinion expression nor is it a predictor of opinion climate.

As Table 3 reveals, there is no effect of personal importance or attitude extremity ondangerous discussion. The interactions of importance (β = −.09, ns) and extremity (β =−.08, ns) with majority climate are not significant and thus left out of the model.

Hence, only attitude certainty moderates the effect of opinion climate; attitude extrem-ity and importance do not. Results for probing and interpreting this interaction effect with

the Johnson-Neyman technique are as follows (see Figure 3): When attitude certainty islow (below a value of 1.8), a significant effect ( p < .05) of opinion climate perception ondangerous discussion can be observed. Above that value, there is no relationship whatso-ever. Interestingly, for very high values of attitude certainty, the sign of the relationshipturns negative but does not reach statistical significance. Finally, probing the interactionreveals that there is a significant positive effect ( p < .05) of attitude certainty on opinionexpression for low levels of perceived majority climate (values below 1.64).

DiscussionStudy 3 shows that dangerous discussion depends on a variety of factors. It is not surpris-ing that men prefer dangerous discussion more than do women, as men are more willing toexpress dissent (Maslach, Santee, & Wade, 1987). Higher educated individuals are less







Matthes et al. 791

willing to express their opinions than less educated ones, possibly because less educated people are more concerned about negative effects of immigration (e.g., fewer job opportu-nities for Swiss citizens). As before, the importance of some news media can be explainedeither by the fact that news media provide the information to engage in dangerous discus-sion or by the argument that dangerous discussion increases news media use in an attemptto stay informed. As in the previous two studies, overall discussion frequency is a strong

predictor: Individuals who generally discuss their opinions more than others do are alsomore likely to join dangerous discussions.

More importantly, as in the previous studies, there is no unmoderated effect of opinion

climate on dangerous discussion. In fact, the Johnson-Neyman technique revealed that for individuals who hold attitudes about the naturalization of immigrants with low certainty,majority climate is a significant predictor of dangerous discussion. In other words, peoplein the minority position are likely to withhold their opinions, whereas people who feel theyare in the majority are more likely to express their views. However, when attitude certainty

Table 3. Regression Coefficients for Predicting Dangerous Discussion (Study 3)

Predictors



p Value

Block 1: DemographicsAge −.00 −.04Sex −.29 −.12 ***Education −.03 −.09 **Incremental R2 = .02****

Block 2: Media useFrequency TV news .04 .04Frequency newspaper use .08 .08 ***Incremental R2 = .01***

Block 3: Issue attitude and discussionIssue attitude .00 .01Overall discussion frequency .52 .50 ****Incremental R2 = .25****

Block 4: Focal predictorsPerceived majority climate .00 .00Attitude certainty .02 .02Importance −.02 −.02Attitude extremity −.04 −.03Incremental R2 = .00

Block 5: InteractionPerceived Majority Climate × AttitudeCertainty

−.07 −.29 **

Incremental R2 = .002**


Adjust= .27

**p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.









is moderate or high, no such relationship can be found. These individuals will always voice

their opinions no matter how friendly or hostile the opinion climate is. Attitude certainty,extremity, and personal importance are unrelated to dangerous discussion, which points tothe unique moderating role of attitude certainty in this process.

General DiscussionSpiral of silence theory does not assume a simple relationship between opinion climate andopinion expression. The notion of hardcore individuals embraces the idea that there aresome people for whom this relationship does not hold true. However, previous research has

treated this notion as an assumption and has not attempted to measure the hardcore phe-nomenon empirically. In this article, we have proposed that attitude certainty is a key vari-able in identifying hardcore individuals.

In three independent surveys, we have provided clear evidence for our first hypothesisthat the climate of opinion only determines opinion expression when individuals hold their attitudes with weak or moderate attitude certainty. Importantly, the opinion climate had nomain effect on opinion expression. In other words, without including attitude certainty asa moderating variable, no support for a spiral of silence would have been found in any of the three studies. Furthermore, the moderating effect of attitude certainty was even present

after several other variables were controlled for, variables that have been shown to relateto opinion expression in previous research.

All three surveys demonstrated that attitude certainty, but not attitude extremity or issueimportance, moderates the spiral of silence. In terms of spiral of silence theory, the findingssuggest that it is not enough to have an extreme attitude or to find the attitude object

Figure 3. Willingness of dangerous discussion as a factor of majority opinion climate andattitude certainty (Study 3).











certainty on others. We argue that this is more appropriate for the highly issue-specific phenomenon of opinion expression than measuring general (i.e., trait) certainty. Of course,there are some traits that predict individuals’ tendencies to voice their opinions in a hostile

opinion climate. For example, Hayes et al. (2005) defined the willingness to self-censor as“a person’s general reticence to express an opinion to an audience that is likely to disagree”(p. 319). Hayes and colleagues demonstrated that the climate of opinion affects opinionexpression only among dispositional self-censors. In line with Hayes et al., we assume thatthere are some individuals who will always voice their opinions when they face a minoritysituation, no matter what the issue or context. Thus, the hardcore phenomenon may be bothgeneral and issue specific. However, attitude certainty should explain more variance inspecific situations where the influence of general dispositional tendencies is weak. It canalso be expected that high self-censorers are especially likely to break the spiral of silence

when they hold very certain attitudes. Clearly, further research is needed to disentangletrait and issue-specific influences on minority opinion expression.

Third, and closely related to this, the results of the present research suggest that thehardcore people might be a larger group than commonly thought. Additional descriptiveanalysis shows that approximately only one third of our samples had uncertain or moder-ately certain attitudes. This, in fact, means that the spiral of silence is only relevant to arather small part of the public. In contrast, previous research, and especially Noelle-

Neumann (1993) herself, has assumed that the hardcore are a small minority in a societyand not actually a prevailing majority. Although we have to be very careful about the gen-

eralization of these descriptive findings to other issues or contexts, it may be worthwhileto reconsider the argument that hardcore individuals are the exception to the rule, that is,assuming a spiral of silence for all. At least in our studies, the majority of all respondentschose to speak out although they were facing a hostile opinion climate. A spiral of silencecould only be observed for some.

Fourth, our findings also implicitly challenge Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) theoreticalargument that the spiral of silence only works for moral or value-laden issues. On the con-trary, it can be speculated that value-laden issues are those issues that polarize opinions,that is, those that lead to rather certain attitudes. Put differently, when an issue has a moral

element, there should be a higher likelihood that individuals get deeply invested in thoseissues. This in turn would lead to high attitude certainty, which eventually would weakena spiral of silence. In preliminary support of this idea, Hornsey et al. (2003) found thatindividuals with a strong moral basis for their attitudes were somewhat more likely toexpress their minority than majority opinions (i.e., they exhibited counterconformity). Oneexplanation is that these individuals—relative to their counterparts with a weak moral

basis for their attitudes—felt more certain that their attitudes were correct, thus causingthem to voice their opinions more freely. In other words, attitude certainty may mediate therelationship between moral basis for one’s attitude and (lack of) spiral of silence effects.

However, issues that lack any kind of moral component are also unlikely to elicit a spiralof silence, simply because people might not even care what others think. Following thisline of reasoning, one could argue that a spiral of silence is most likely to be found for moderately value-laden issues. Again, future research is needed to test these speculations.








Matthes et al. 795

Limitations

There are some drawbacks of our studies that are worthy of careful consideration. To begin

with, although we included the same list of controls in all three studies, there were slightdifferences in item wordings for those controls. Nevertheless, the effects were largely con-sistent across all three studies.

Another drawback is that we used single item measures for some variables, including:(a) attitude certainty, (b), opinion climate, and (c) opinion expression. To measure attitudecertainty, we used a standard item that has been established in previous research and byleading experts in research on attitude certainty (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Petrocelliet al., 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2002). Because this item has been validated in such a large

body of scholarly work and we are not aware of an equally prevalent measure of attitude

certainty, we included it in the present studies.When it comes to perceived opinion climate, however, there is no equally established

single-item measure available in the literature. Many studies have used single items, butmost of them are rather different from one another (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; Moy et al.,2001). In Study 1, we operationalized opinion climate by combining two measures as has

been done in numerous spiral of silence studies (Neuwirth, 2000; Scheufele et al., 2001;Willnat et al., 2001). Study 2 was designed to replicate Study 1 using a direct assessmentof opinion climate. Because the single-item operationalizations in both studies are poten-tially troublesome, we used a two-item measure of opinion climate in Study 3. Despite

these differences in operationalization, however, results were consistent across all threestudies and provide convergent evidence in support of our hypothesis.

Finally, the key dependent variable was operationalized as an index based on severalitems in Studies 1 and 2, rather than by using single items tapping hypothetical scenarios.This is an established procedure in spiral of silence research (e.g., Perry & Gonzenbach,2000; Petrič & Pinter, 2002; Salmon & Oshagan, 1990). In Study 3, a single-item measurewas used to capture dangerous discussion. More refined measures should be used for thatconstruct in future studies.

Taken together, while there are problems with single-item measures in some studies, all

key dependent and independent variables were appropriately measured in at least onestudy. While a particular study can be criticized for certain operationalizations, the cumula-tive evidence across all three studies lends credence to our theorizing.

Future ResearchAlthough we were able to observe the very same effect in three independent studies, work-ing with different issues and sometimes different measures, more research is needed to

prove the causal influence of attitude certainty. One useful future direction would be to

conduct a panel study that demonstrates the moderating influence of attitude certainty over several points in time. This would allow us to actually speak of true spirals (for the sameargument, see Neuwirth et al., 2007).










Matthes et al. 797

people who are always certain of their opinions. In other words, when they hold opinions,they hold them with certainty. To account for this variance, we added the personality traitneed to evaluate (NTE; Jarvis & Petty, 1996) as a focal independent variable and moderator.

NTE has been shown to be a very strong trait component of certainty (Britt et al., 2009). NTEwas measured in Study 1 with four items (α = .74; 5-point scale, M = 3.20, SD = 0.79; “It’svery important for me to hold strong opinions,” “I like to have strong opinions even when Iam not personally involved,” “I form opinions about everything,” and “I would rather have astrong opinion than no opinion at all”). Items were selected based on their high factor load-ings in Jarvis and Petty (1996). As a result, NTE has a main effect on opinion expression(β = .15, p < .001), but there is no interaction with opinion climate (β = −.23, p = .35). Thus,the issue specific variance in attitude certainty, not the general tendency to hold opinions withcertainty across several issues, is responsible for the moderator effect we have observed, not

the general tendency to hold opinions with certainty across several issues.2. Attitude certainty was also measured with a single item. However, this item is a standard

measure in psychological research and as such is generally accepted and widely used (Fazio& Zanna, 1978; Petrocelli et al., 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2002).

3. In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, this measurement refers to reference groups rather than the opin-ion climate present in the whole country. The measure was chosen because it is more appropri-ate to explain the dependent variable dangerous discussion compared to opinion expression invarious public settings. Dangerous discussion is likely to happen in people’s close surround-ings, as it is rather unlikely that people start to argue with complete strangers who hold dif-

ferent views. Thus, one’s immediate opinion climate is more relevant to explaining dangerousdiscussion than is the opinion climate prevalent in the whole country (e.g., Oshagan, 1996).

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Bios

Jörg Matthes (PhD, University of Zurich, 2007) is an assistant professor at the Institute of

Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich. His research focuses on public opinion formation, media effects, and empirical methods.

Kimberly Rios Morrison (PhD, Stanford University, 2008) is an assistant professor in theSchool of Communication at the Ohio State University. Her research focuses on the roles of theself-concept and social identity in public opinion expression and perception.

Christian Schemer (PhD, University of Zurich, 2009) is a postdoctural student at the Instituteof Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich. His research focuses on

public opinion formation, media and emotions, and empirical methods.

Documents

A Spiral of Silence for Some