A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina

8/7/2019 A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina

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MEMORANDUMRM-5271-PRMAY 1967

A : TRANSLATION FROM THE. FRENCHLESS'ONS OF THE. "WARIN INDOCHIN

VOLUMETranslated by V. J. Croizat~ Col. USMC (R

PREPARED FOR;UNITED STATES AIR FORCE" PROJECT" RAND

SANTA MONICA' C ...LIFOftNI ....----


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MEMORANDUMRM-5271-PRMAY 1913'7

\

A TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH:LESSONS OF THE WAR IN INDOCHINA,

VOLUME 2Translated by V. J. Croi2:at. Col USMC IRet..)

This rnlearch is supported by the United States Air Fore . . under Project RA1~D-Con.tract No. F14620.67C-0045-monitor ..d by the Directorate of Operational R"qllirl'"mt"'ntsand Dtovl"lopment Plans. Dl"puty Chil"( ot Staff. R~atch and Development, Hq USAF.Views or conclusions contained in this Mt'"morandum should not be interpreted asrl"prl'Sf'ntinf!;the official opinion or policy of the lTnilpd Statt'S Air Force.


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Published by T he R A ND C orpo ratio n


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PREFACE

While Mao Tae Tun g, Vo Nguyen Giap, and even Che Guevara areavidly ,read an d liberally quoted, the French, who were among the firstof the western n ation s to gain practical experien ce of modern revo-lutionary war, are seldom heard from outside of their own coun t~ y.Moreover, after the Un ited States began the rapid expansion of itsadvisory effort in South Vietnam in 1962, the British experience inMalaya was often cited by American s in Saigon as a model of how tohan dle an insurrection , but little if anything was ever said of theF ren ch experien ce in In dochin a.

This SeemS strange in deed, for in Malaya the Chin ese Terroristswere a separate ethn ic group, few in numbers, and without the privilegeof sanctuary across a friendly border. In contrast, in In dochin a theViet Min h were the same as all other Vietnamese people, an d they chal-lenged the French ,with a powerful political an d military organ izationgen erously supported by the n eighborin g Chin ese Commun ists.

What is of even greater significan ce is that today the UnitedStates is fighting essen tially the saIDe enemy that the French firstengaged more than two decades ago~ an d is doin g this over much thesame terrain an d un der the same climatic con ditions. Finally, andmost importan t of all, is the fact that the present leadership of NorthVietn am iE the very same whose determination and ten acity helped it toprevail over the French. The lessons that the French learn ed in thecourse of their prolonged conflict should, therefore, offer somethingmore than simple historical data.

The Lesson s of the War in Indochina, origin ally published inthree volumes, is an official documen t issued by the Commander in Chief,Fren ch Forces, Indochin a, in May 1955. Volume 1 is a Top Secretdocumen t concerned with high-level politico-military issues. Itwas distributed to a very small number of officials and is n ot avail-able. Volumes 2 and 3, origin ally published under Secret classifica-tion, have recen tly been made available in the United States ForOffi.cial Use On ly. These two volumes are complementary in that Volume 2


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lS con cern ed with a summary of the experien ce of the war an d Volume 3seeks to deduce guidan ce from this experien ce that might haveapplication for Fren ch forces in similar wars in the future. Becauseof this, Volume 2 is con sidered to be of greater in terest to Americanreaders. This volume was obviously in ten ded for a military audien cewith some prior gen eral kn owledge of Fren ch operation s in In dochin a,an d it was con sidered desirable that its tran slation in clude someexplan atory footn otes an d be preceded by an in troduction con tain in gan historical summary to serve as a frame of referen ce for thedetails described in the text.


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CONTENTS

PREFACE ......... i1iLIST OF FIGURES .. . .. . viiL1 ST OF TABLES . III .. III '" ~ III " .. .. .. ixMA P OF SOUTHEAST A SIA xTRANSLATOR IS INTRODUCTION 1

COMMANDERIN CHIEF IS PREFACE ...... 25CASUALTIES OF THE INDOCHINA WAR .. ...... .... 27Part I: THE WA R OF IDEAS

Section 1: Incipient Insurgency........................... 31Section 2: Psychological Aspects of the Struggle .... 38

Part II: THE WA R WITHOUT FRONTSection 3:Section 4:Section 5:Section 6 :Section 7:Section 8:Section 9;

IntJ;oduction .9 ~...... 51Essential Elemen ts ....... .. 56The Control of Communication Axes and

C ri ti ca l A re as . . . 63Area Contro 1 ............................ 83E mp l ay me n t of Mobile Forc e s . 94Pacification 110Fortifications .. 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . 116

Part III: UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF THE WARSection 10 :Section 11:Section 12:Section l3;Section 14:

Ope~ations in Remote Areas ........ 145Irregular Forces ..... 156Operations in the Jungle and Heavy Cover . 160Commando O pe ra ti on s . . . . . . 168River and Coasta L Actions..................... 173

Part IV: ADAPTATION OF 'I'RE ARMS AND SERVICESSection 15: Introduction ...... 193Section 16: The Manning of Units and Maintenance of

Personnel Levels .... 196


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Section 17: The Mobile Group ................ 206Section 18: The Lnf an tr y 216Section 19: The Airborne Troops ............. 244Section 20:Section 21 :Section 22;Section 23 :Section 24:Section 25:Section 26:Section 27 :Section 28 :Section 29:

Armored Forces .......................Arti 11ery .........................Army Aviation ..Helicopters ......................T he E n gi n ee rs . . . .. . . . . Th e Tr an spo rta ti on C or ps . .. . ... .. . ... . ...The Signal Corps .. III .. Ii Ii " " , '" '" ..Air Support ..........................The River ForcesF ema le P er so nn el

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " .. " . . . . . . .

25927 529l299306319328332348359

Section 30: Logistics ...................... 362Section 31: T he Q ua rt er ma st er Corps....................... 372Section 32: The Medical Services .................... 381Section 33: Petroleum Products Supply Service............. 390Section 34:Section 35:

The Ordnance CorpsR esearch and Developmen t Problems ...

394406


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LIST OF FIGURES

1. Schematic organization of the Trinh-Sat .............. 602. C at- Bi airfie ld .... ,............................ 773. Attack on a post (schematic) 824. Centers of resistan ce ........ ............ 895. Viet Minh d ep lo ym ~n t S ep te mb er 30, 1953 .......... 1076. Watch to ver s , 1 94 8- 19 50 . . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . ll87. Watch tower) "engineer type," South Vie tnam ." III .. 120

8. Tower with a metal observation post ..... III 'I :- . 1219. triangular military post for 60 men 12210. Diagram of a blockhouse ....... 12411. Two fir e plans .............. 12712. Types of pillboxes . . 12813. Evolution of the pillbox ........... 12914. Model floorplan ..., II " 1311 5 . Types of pillbox plans . ' . 13216. Double central pillbox and command post with a

1iving ar ea .................................. 13517. Example of the river convoy (North V ie tn am ) . . . 17618: Assault landing (North Vietnam) .......... 18119. Personnel strengths ~ friendly forces ....... 20420. Pe~sonnel st~engthsJ Viet Minh forces ... 20521. C ommun d c a cLoris w ithin the mobile group .......... 21522. Growth of major fire support weapons 29023. Comparison of total air activity for the years 1952-54 ... 33424. Types of river craft ..... 350


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LIST OF TABLES

1. S un un ar y o f T en O pe ra ti on s Can'ied Out in Tonkin ....... 1032. Pillbox R esistan ce . .. . . . . .. . 1373. A rtillery in the I n do ch in a W ar . . . . . . . . . .. 2754. Army Aviation Units in Each D ivision of the U. S. Army ... 3055. Cargo Movemen ts for 1953 ... , ............. 369


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the use of three airfields in Tonkin, permission to station 6000troops in the area, and authority to transit no more than 25,000troops through Tonkin into Yunnan. It was also agreed that theJapanese could evacuate one division from south China through Tonkin.

1

Mean while. in the United States there had been serious doubt overthe effectiveness of the July 26 embargo. largely because it affeccedonly highly specialized items. During the month of August 1940) forexample, licenses were granted for the export to Japan of $21 million

2of petroleum products and 300,000 tons of steel and iron scrap. Thus,by the time that the Japanese began to mOve into Tonkin, the UnitedStates was quite ready to react and extend its embargo to cover alltypes of iron and steel scrap. It should be noted that oil was notincluded in this extension, although certain members of the UnitedStates government were strongly in favor of the measure. The oppon-ents of the move, which included the British, Dutch. and Australians,based their position on the conviction that if Japan were to be deniedUnited States oil, it would take immedi-ateaction to seize the EastIndies. The merit of this thesis cannot be debated, but when an embargoupon oil was finally decided upon almost a year later, it did coin cidewith the final deterioration of the United States' relations ~ith theJapanese.

Thailand meanwhile looked upon these events as providing theopportunity to regain territories that had been ceded to Indochinaby the treaties of 1893 and 1907.3 Accordingly, Thai forces began aseries of probing attacks along the Cambodian border and t by December,

lIbid., p. 15. The Japanese division to be evacuated did n otawait the end of the negotiations, but launched an attack on September23 against the French at the border town of Langson. Losseswere heavy on both sides, and the si Cuation was only res tored wh.en theJ ap an es e a dv an ce was halted on the 25th.2Ibid., p. 18.3Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates, The State of Asia, AmericanInstitute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1951, p. 271.


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fighting w~s general along the whole of the frontier. At this timeit became evident that French ground forces could not hold, and torelieve the pressure against them, the French moved their naval unitsinto the Gulf of Thailand to seek out the Thai fleet. The engagementthat took place on January 17, 1941, off the Koh Chang Islands was adecisive defeat for the superior Thai naval forces.l T hi s p re ci pi ta te dJapanese intervention in the form of demands for an armistice. which theFrench were quick to accept. Hostilities were then terminated by theend of the month.

Having closed the back door to China by moving forces into Tonkin,the Japanese next turned to the task of exploiting Indochina's posi-tion as the gateway to Southeast Asia. For this purpose, the Japaneseg ov er nm en t a dd re ss ed a series of new demands to the French on July 14,1941. The French, pressed by the Germans at home and finding novisible means of support elsewhere, came to terms with the Japanesemore quickly than before. The agreements reached in late July per-mitted the Japanese to use eight airfields in south Indochina, then av al f ac il it ie s at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, and to deploy unspecified2numbers of troops into the country; in other words, Indochina wasset to become a Japanese base.

The United States' reaction to this development was conveyed tothe Japanese Ambassador in Washington by the Acting Secretary ofState, Mr. Sumner Welles, on July 23 in the following words:3

The movement now undertaken by Japan could only beregarded by the United States as having two probablepurposes, neither of which purposes this government couldignore: First, the United States could only assume thatthe occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice

1Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The F~ench Navy in World War II,U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1959, p. 195.2Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 642.3Ibid., p. 644.


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to the United States that the Japanese government intendedto pursue a policy of force and conquest, and second, thatin the light of these acts on the part of Japan, theUnited States, with regard to its own safety in the lightof its own preparations for self-defense, must 3ssume thatthe Japanese government was taking the last step beforeproceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in theSouth Seas through the seizure of additional territoriesin that region.Deeds then follo-wed u pon words, and on July 26 an executive order

freezing all Japanese funds and assets in the United States wasannounced. This was followed by notification to Japan that the PanamaCanal would be closed for repairs. Further, Philippine militaryforces were mustered into service with the United States Army. Finally,on A ugust 1 the Presideni issued an order ~rohibiting the shipment toJapan of a list of strategic materials to include petroleum productsSUitable for use as aviation fuels.1 Thus. positions hardened) andalthough negotiations between the United States and Japan were con-tinued, the course toward Pearl Harbor was set.

The opening moves of the war were a series of surprise attackslaunched by the Japanese within a few hours of one another over thefa r reaches of the Pacific world. The attack against Pearl Harborwas the task of Vice Admiral Naguwo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force,based in the home islands. The moves against: Guam and Wake were theresponsibility of Admiral Inouye's Fourth Fleet~ based at Truk. HongKong was the target of locally based Japanese forces. General Homma'sinvasion of the Philippines was a two-pronged operation with the 14thArmy striking from Formosan staging areas against northern Luzon, whileother elements from Palau landed on Mindanao and Jato. Finally,Indochina served as the springboard for the amphibious assault astridethe thai-Malay border by General Yamashita's 25th Army, and for theoverland inVasion of Thailand by the Imperial Guards Division. Thislast was followed shortly by General Iida's 15th Army, whose task was- h . f B 2t e ~nvas~on 0 urma.

lIbid., p. 65l.~asanobu Tsuji, Singapore, The J~panese Version, St. Martin'sPress) New York, 1960.


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As a con sequence of these events the 30,000 European civilian si n I nd oc hi na1 foun d themselves in the precarious position of livingin the midst of a native popu1atiQn that had on several occasions inthe past demonstrated its nation alist ten dencies, an d a Japanesemilitary commun ity that looked upon the area as its own. Moreover,the Fren ch in Indochin a were soon torn by the same doubts an d dissen -sion s over Vichy and Free Fran ce as their compatriots in Africa an din Europe. The combin ation of these factors, aggravated by the dis-tan ce an d isolation of Indochina from the stream of even ts in Europeand Africa, serves to explain in large part why there did not developan y immediate sign ifican t resistan ce movemen t in In dochin a.

For the Japan ese, Indochina was a source of supplies an d a wellsituated strategic base. And, sin ce these assets could be exploitedwith little difficulty, it served their purpose to allow the Fren chto retain the outward trappin gs of authority. This, however, wascompletely unsatisfactory to the Free Fren ch who, from the time thatthey had ren ewed their struggle against the Axis. en tertain ed thehope of an early liberation of In dochin a. These hopes began to takeform in the fall of 1943 when a decision was made to organ ize an

2Expedition ary Corps for operation s in the Far East. At the sametime Fren ch military personn el joined Force 136, an organization thathad been created by the British in India for covert an d commando typeoperation s in Southeast Asia. In similar fashion, another Frenchgroup had been established in Kunming in south China, in itially towain tain con tact with French elements in In dochin a; an d later to pro-vide the basis for an agen t net exten ding alon g the n orthern Indo-

3ch in es e b or de r a re as .

lC re at B ri ta in , Na va l I nt el li ge nc e D ivi si on , I nd oc hi na , G eog ra ph i-cal Handbook Series, 1942, p. 250. It should be n oted that thesefigures related to all perSOn s classed as European s regardless of race,color, Or nationality.Zu.S. Army in World War II, R earmin g the Fren ch, Office of theChief of Military History, Washin gton , D .C., 1957, p. 390.3Jean Sain teny, Histoire d'un Paix Manqute, Amiot-D umon t, Paris,

1953, p. 21.


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Liaison bet~een these t~o French groups in the Fa~ East wascomplicated by the fact that in accordance with Allied Command arrange-ments, Indochina was in the China theater. This, while technicallyunder Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Chek, was in fact an area of Americanstrategic responsibility. There was thus a wide difference in atti-tude toward the French serving in India under Admiral Mountbatten'ssympathetic South East Asia Command, and those forming Mission 5 inKunming, where the Americans, reflecting Presid@nt Roosevelt1s anti-colonial views, and particularly his reluctance to see the French

1return to Indochina, were cool and reserved.D es pi te a ll d if fi cu lti es , a resistance in In dochin a did develop,

and as the tide of war in the Pacific turned against the Japanese,the French became in creasin gly defian t. This s it ua ti on e ve nt ua ll ybecame in tolerable, an d on March 9, 1945, the Japan ese struck againstthe scattered French garrisons in the country. The French losses inthese actions were heavy, but by May some 6000 troops, mostly Europeans,had fought their way out and were regrouped in south China.2

The Japanese then turned to native political figures to establishthe forms of new government. On March 11, Baa Dai proclaimed theindependence of the Empire of Annam, uniting Tonkin and Annam underthe old name of Vietnam. Ihis was followed, on March 13, by thedeclaration of independence of the King of Cambodia; that of the Kingof Laos then followed on 20 April. Admittedly Cambodia and Laosenjoyed a considerable degree of freedom, since there were few Japan-ese in those countries. However, there was little self-rule in Viet-nam, and the weakness of the Baa Dai regime was emphasized by theunwillingness of many nationalists to support it, and by the fact thatthe Japanese had retained direct control of Cochinchina.

~.s.Army in World War II, op. cit., p. 393.2Charles de Gaulle, Salvation, 1944-1946, Simon and Shuster,New York, 1960, p. 191.


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The lack of popular support for Bao Dai is readily explained bywhat had been happening to nationalist groups in Indochina. In thecourse of the preceding years, several of these groups, including theCommunists in. 1940, had attempted uprisings that had all been put downby the French. As a consequence, many of the revolutionaries involvedhad then made their way to south China where, in 1941, they began toconsolidate under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh as the Vietnam Inde-pendence League. This association, called Viet Minh in abbreviatedform, was too far to the left to enjoy the confidence of GeneralissimoChiang Kai-Chek, and in late 1942 a more docile coalition group, theVietnam Revolutionary League, was formed under Chinese sponsorship.Ho Chi Minh had meanwhile been jailed by the Chinese as a French spy,and the Viet Minh had become a section of the League. Ho was even -tually released in 1943, an d the work of organizing Viet Minh guerrillaforces and infiltrating them into North Vietnam was undertaken in

1earnest.While the avowed purpose of the Viet Minh movements into North

Vietnam was to fight the Japanese, it was evident that the real objectwas to drive out the French. This is affirmed in handbills distributedin Moncay in March 1945 which said that the Allies would destroy theJapanese and that it was for the Viet Minh to destroy the French, whowere then in difficult straits.2 In any event, by May 1945 there weresix provinces in Tonkin under Viet Minh control, and shortly before thecollapse of Japan the Viet Minh had organized a People's NationalLiberation Committee to set up a n ew regime.

The opportunity to implement these plans came during the monthbetween mid-August, when the Japanese capitulated, and mid-September,when the first British and Chinese occupation forces arrived in Saigonan d Han oi respective1y.3 On August 25, Emperor Bao Oai signed the

lRosinger, op. cit., pp. 230-232.2Sain ten y, op. cit., p. 105.3In accordance with agreements reached during the Potsdam meeting(July 1945), Indochina was to be divided at the 16th parallel for pur-

poses of postwar occupation, with the southe~ n segment to be a Britishresponsibility, arid the northern one to be Chinese.


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decree of abdication which transferred "our authority to the DemocraticRepublican governmen t." This wa s followed on September 2 by the sign -ing of the declaration of independence in Hanoi by Ho Chi Minh and hisassociates. The Republic of Vietnam thus created claimed authorityover the whole of Vietn am to include Tonkin , An nam, and Cochin china.

Vo Nguyen Giap writes of these historic events in the following1words:

In August 1945, the capitulation of the Japaneseforces before the Soviet Army and the Allied forces, putan end to the world war. The defeat of the German andNippon fascists was the begin n ing of a g re at w ea ke ni ngof the capitalist system. After the great victory ofthe Soviet Union, many people's democracies saw the lightof day; The socialist system was no longer confinedwithin the f~ontiers of a single country. A n ew historicera was begin nin g in the world.In view of these chan ges, in Viet Nam; the Indo-chinese Commun ist Party and the Viet Minh called thewhole Vietnamese n ation to gen eral insurrection. Every-where, the people rose in a body. Demon strations an ddisplays of fo~ce followed each othe~ uninterruptedly.In August, the Revolution broke out, neutralising thebewi1de~ed Nippon troops, overthrowin g the pro-J&panesef eu da l a ut ho ri ti es , and in stal lin g people 's power inHanoi and throughout the country, in the towns as wellas in the countryside, in Bac Bo [No~th Vietn am] as wellas in Nam Bo [South Vietnaml. In Hanoi, the capital, in :sicjSeptember 2nd, the provisional gouvernment [sic] was formedaround President Ho Chi Minh; it presen ted itself to thenation, proclaimed the independence of Viet Nam, andcalled on the nation to unite, to hold itself in readi-ness to defend the country an d to oppose all attempts atimperialist aggreSSion. The Democratic Republic of VietNam was born; the first people's democracy in South-east Asia.At the time of the Japanese capitulation, the Fren ch had some

700 m ilitar y pe~ so nn el in In dia available to accompany the Common -wealth fo~ces ordered to occupation duties in Indochin a below the16th parallel. An initial detachment of 150 French landed with the

~o Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Arm,(, Frederick A. Praeger,New York, 1962, p. 13.


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Ghurka Brigade at Tan Son Nhut airfield on September 12. The remain derw er e e mb ar ked 00 the Fren ch warship Richelieu an d lan ded with the other

. 1two Commonwealth brigades at Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau) on October 2.The situatioo in SCligon had been ten se for some time, and when

clashes broke out between the Fren ch an d Vietn amese, Gen eral Gracey,the British comman der, imposed martial law. He also freed an d rearmedthe Fren ch troops ~ hom the Japanese had in tern ed a few mon ths before.On September 23, the rein forced Fren ch were en abled to regain controlof the public buildings in Saigon an d resume the admin istration of thecity. Resistan ce on the part of the Vietn amese again st the Fren chn ev er th el es s c on ti nu ed .

Gen eral Leclerc, who had represen ted France at the surren derceremon ies in Tokyo, soon arrived in Saigon to assume comman d of French

2forces. On October 15 he flew to Cambodia, arrested the pro-Japanesepremier, an d cleared the way for a new govern men t that would eventually

3(January 7, 1946) agree to a return of Fren ch con trol over the coun try.On October 22, the initial elemen t of the French Expeditionary

Corps proper, a combat comman d from the 2nd Armored Divisian ~ begandebarking in Saigon . This was followed in November by the 9th ColonialIn fan try Division , an d in D ecember by a brigade from Madagascar. Asthese additional forces lan ded, General Leclerc quickly formed themin to flyin g column s which he used to extend Fren ch con trol over thewhole of Indochin a south of the 16th parallel. He realized that thiscontrol was at best tenuous, since the Viet Min h quickly reformed oncethe French forces had passed on . Nevertheless, he was anxious to rein-troduce the Fren ch presence throughout the south to pave the way--psychologically, if nothing more- -for the far more difficult task await-in g him in the north.

lThe details that follow are based primarily upon a series oflectures prepa~ ed for the Ecole Superieure de Guerre (the Fren ch WarCollege) on the Indochin a War.

2The British formally relinquished con trol of south Indochin a tothe Fren ch in March 1946.3A similar agreemen t was reached with Laos in August 1946.


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The return of th~ French in the south was facilitated by thecooperation of the British and the lack of firm control by the newlyin depen dent Vietn amese govern men t over competin g n ation alist elemen ts.The situation in the north was; however, far different.

As soon as the word of the Japanese surrender reached Kunming,Jean Sainteny, the head of the French Mission there, made every effortto rush to Hanoi. Yet, when he did arrive on August 22, he foundthere was little that he could do, for the government of Ho Chi Minhwas firmly established in power, and the Chinese were expected toarrive momentarily to exercise their occupation functions. The returnof the French thus became conditional on two counts: first, there hadto be an agreement whereby French troops would replace Chinese forces,and second, there had to be SOme form of accord with the Vietnamesegovernment.

The advance elements of the approximately 200,000 troops that theChinese were to dispatch to. Indochina nOl"th of the 16th parallel toreceive the surrender of some 35,000 Japanese arrived in Ha~oi OnSeptember 15. There then began a period of systematic looting by theChinese which, according to French estimates, involved the transfer ofgoods to China valued at more than 250 million In dochin ese piasters.At this same time there retu~ned from exile certain Vietnamese nation-alists, notably the Dong Minh Hoi party, who enjoyed the support ofthe Chinese military, and who had sufficient strength so that theycould not be ignored by Ho Chi Minh.

The French undertook negotiations with the Chinese in Chungkingand, at the cost of major concessions, reached an agreement onFebruary 28~ 1946, permitting them to move military forces into Indochinanorth of the 16th parallel. In this the french were probably assistedindirectly by the fact chat Chiang Kai-Chek needed his troops foroperations against Chinese Communist forces in China. During thissame period there had been a series of conve~sations between the Frenchand Ho Chi Minh, in which it was evident there were compelling reasonsfor tolerance and compromise on both sides. Eventually this led to a"pre Limfnary agreement" which was signed in Hanoi' on March 6, 1946,


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whereby Fran ce recogn ized the D emocratic R epublic of Vietn am as a"free state of the In dochin ese Federation within the Fren ch Un ion ,"an d the Vietn amese govern men t declared itself " ... ~eady to welcomein frien dly fashion the Fren ch army when , in con forman ce with in ter-n ati on al ag ree men t, it would relieve the Chin ese forces .... "

The con clusion of the prelimin ary Fran co- Vietn amese agreemen t ofMarch 6 removed the last legal obstacle to the return of the Fren ch,an d On the very day it was sign ed, the first of the 15,000 Fren ch an d10,000 Vietn amese troops that were to be allowed n orth of the 16thparallel began lan din g in Haiphon g.l The Fren ch forces en tered Han oion March 18 an d soon thereafter there were Fren ch garrison s in Touran e(D an an g). Hue, an d Lan gson . Addition ally, the forces that had beenregrouped ~ n south Chin a return ed an d occupied Phon g 5aly an d Sam Neuain Laos, an d the Chin a bot"der- area town s of Laichau an d Mon cay. Insum, in a little more than six mon ths the Fren ch had reoccupied majorstrategic poin ts throughout In dochin a. Peace, however, had n ot beenrestored.

In A pril 1946, a Vietn amese delegation reached Paris to elaborateupon the prelimin ary agreemen t of March 6 con cern in g "the futurestatus of In dochin a" an d the "diplomatic relation s of Vietn am withforeign powers." These were issues that had been left pen din g despitethe fact that they were of major importan ce, sin ce they con stituted theessen tials of Vietn amese sovereign ty. This importan ce becameeviden t in the course of the prolon ged n egotiation s that en sued,wherein the divergen ce of views between the Fren ch an d Vietn amese an dthe firmn ess of their position s made an y satisfactory compromise

lAS the Fren ch ships moved up the river toward Haiphon g, theyreceived heavy fire from the 130th D ivision of the 53rd Chin ese Army.Gen eral Wan g Hu R uan , the comman der, later explain ed that while hekn ew of the February 28 agreemen t con cern in g the relief of the Chin eseby the Fren ch, he had n ot received implemen tin g in struction s. Thiswas but on e of man y in ciden ts that revealed the in depen den t attitudeof several Chin ese comman ders. It has been suggested that this in de-pen den ce was motivated by their desire to remain in Vietn am as lon gas possible an d con tin ue the accumulation of "tribute." In an y even t,the last Chin ese un it did n ot leave Vi~ tn am un til September 1946.


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impossible. However, while the Vietnamese delegation returned toHaiphong on October 3 empty handed, Ho Chi Minh, who had participa~edin many of the discussions during the previous months, remained inFrance to make 3 final effort co salvage something from this unhappyand inconclusive period. The result of this final gesture was 3"modus vivendi" signed on Sep tembe r 14, 1946, which p resc ribed inte rimmeasures intended to harmonize relations between the French andVietnamese pending the resumption of negotiations in January 1947.

The situation in Vietnam meanwhile had been deteriorating. andthere was little hope that policies of moderation and conciliationcould continue to be entertained. During the four months that Ho ChiMinh had been away f~om Vietnam, his deputy, Vo Nguyen Giap, had COn-solidated the power of the Viet Minh in the north, and had largelydestroyed the prospects for any adjustment of the basic differenceswith the French. Indeed there waa ~ven a period when Ho Chi Minhwas labeled a traitor to the cause of Vietnamese independencebecause of his dealings with the French. By the time that Ho ChiMinh returned to Vietnam aboard a French warship on October 21, thetwo final acts that were to lead to open warfare were only a fewweeks away.

The first of these occurred in November when the French Navyseized a junk preaumed to be loaded with contraband. This touchedoff the question of customs arrangements, which was already a sensitiveissue between the French and Vietnamese. In the violence that quicklyfollowed, the French unde~took operations to clear the city of Haiphongand caused heavy casualties among the civilian population. The secondact was 3 series of violent and surprise attacks launched by Viet Minhfo~ces against the French in Hanoi during the evening of December 19.Open fighting then broke out throughout much of Indochina and, despitelater attempts at negotiations, the rupture between the French andVietnamese was complete. The Indochina War had begun.

In the months that followed, the French were able to hold theirown, and by ~he spring of 1947, reinforced with elements from Franceand Africa, they held the area frDm Hanoi to HaiphDng, together with


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These events had their parallels in the north. First, theextension of Communist con trol over the whole of China in 1949 pro-vided Ho Chi Minh with a secure an d readily accessible supportin gbase immediately to his rear. Then , in early 1950 the govern ment offio Chi Minh was formally recognized by Commun ist Chin a and the USSR .Fin ally, in mid-year, the schism between the major opposing faction sin Indochin a an d cheir adherents throughout the world was deepenedan d widen ed by the outbreak of the Korean war.

In the military domain,' the Fren ch had decided to take advan tageof the dry season during the latter part of 1947 to seek out anddestroy the main Viet Minh forces in the Tonkin highlan ds. Theyestimated that the task would take six months and require 20,000troops. However, because of developmen ts in Madagascar, on ly 12,000troops, in cludin g four in fan try battalion s borrowed from Cochin chin a,could be assembled for offensive operation s in Tonkin , which, more-over, had to be terminated by the end of the year.

Operations began on October 8, 1947! with the drop of two parachutebattalions on Cao Ban g an d Bac Kan. This was followed by the sweepof two task forces advancing parallel to on e an other. The 1a~ gerforce of 8000 men moved overlan d out of Langson alon g Route 4 toCao Ban g, and as far west as Thai Nguyen . The smaller force of 4000men moved up the Clear River as far as Tuyen Quan g. These operationswere successful in that the Viet Min h were cleared out of the north-east border area and more of the frontier was brought un der Fren chcontrol. However, the main Viet Minh forces had been driven off ratherdestroyed) and the requirement to garrison addition al remote borderposts aggravaced what was already a preca~ ious position for the Fren ch.

Early in 1948 Cochinchina became increasingly in secure an d it wasn ecessary to return the battalions that had been borrowed. At thesame time the ground component of the Expedition ary Corps was graduallyreduced in strength to the poin t where, in May, it had dropped from115,000 to 108,000 men . Despite these ~ roblems, the Fren ch con sideredit essen tial to mak every effort to improve the cohesiven ess of theirdisposition s, which at the time in cluded n umbers of remote and separ-ated units. In Cdchinchina, this decision led to the establishmen t of


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an exten sive system of fortified military posts, which was to berepeated an d improved later in Tonkin . In the n orth, the limitedresources permitted on ly some min imum improvemen ts in the position salon g R oute 4, an d the in itiation of a campaign in ten ded to gain thesupport of the ethn ic min orities in the highlan d areas.

In mid- year, followin g upon the first moves to organ ize a govern-men t un der Bao D ai, there was a shift in the military emphasis fromthat of seekin g battle with the Viet Min h to that of en gagin g inpolitico- military activities for the purpose of en han cin g Fran co-Vietn amese solidarity in support of the n ew govern men t. The n ewcomman der of the Expedition ary Corps. Gen eral Blaizot, had suggestedwhile in Paris that this n ew mission still required substan tialforces, an d before leavin g had obtain ed approval for the deploymen tof 12 addition al battalion s to In dochin a. In the mean time, therecruitmen t of n ative In dochin ese personn el for service in auxiliarymilitary formation s had also begun .

As a con sequen ce of these action s the person n el situation beganto improve, an d it was possible durin g the mon ths that followed cooccupy Son tay, Vietri, Hun g Hao, an d adjacen t areas to the south.The Fren ch forces on the R ed an d Black R ivers were, then ceforth,firmly linked together, an d" could be resupplied by in lan d waterway.This in turn released substan tial airlift capacity for other purposes.These same operations also served to cut in two the vast Viet Min hcon trolled area that exten ded from Vin h, on the coast, clear up toHa Gian g on the Chin ese border.

As a result of all of these activities, the position s of theFren ch forces in the Tonkin delta had con siderably improved by thebegin n in g of 1949. In con trast, the Viet Min h was makin g it in creas-in gly costly fo~ the Fren ch to resupply their garrison s in the n orth-east border areas alon g R oute 4. The mon thly resupply effort hadbecome a major operation . In Cochin chin a, the situation gen erallywas favorable. The pacification was progreSSin g satisfactorily an dthe n umber of n atives en listin g with the Fren ch was growin g. Incen tral An n am, however, there were difficulties. The Fren ch had on ly


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six battalions to cover 300 km of coastal fringe. The VietMinh had moved well armed elements into the plateau area, and thesewere harassing the French and were infiltrating into the villages,where they were regaining control over the people. Moreover, Route 9from Dong Ha On the coast to Savannakhet on the Mekong Rive~ hadb ec om e q ui te h a~ ar do us .

At this same time, the flow of reinforcements and the recruitingof local perso'nnel had permitted the buildup of the ground forces to122,000 men. This was still far less than what was required, but itdid nevertheless represent a net gain coming at a propitious moment.

General Blaizot had been following developments in China closelysince the fall of 1948, and had concluded ~hat Chin ese Commun ist forcescould reach the In dochina border by mid-1949. Accordingly, he hadurged upon M. Leon Pignon, the High Commissioner, a plan calling fora major military effort in the n orth to weaken and disorganize theViet Minh to the maximum extent possible before Chin ese assistancecould be made available. The High Commissioner was, howeve~, deeplyinvolved in the delicate negotiations that were to return Bao Dai toVietnam in April 1949, and did not want to risk the possibility ofperturbations in the south that might adversely affect the forthcomingar~angements. In February 1949 he therefore rejected General Blaizot'sproposals for large-scale offensive operations in the north in favorof an exten sion of the pacification , particularly in Cochinchina andAnnam.

The decision was reversed in March whe~ the government in Paris,alarmed by the Chinese threat, directed the deployment of additionalforces to Indochina. In response to this new developmen t, the Frenchcommand proposed first to gain firm control over the rice-producingarea north of the general Hanoi-Haiphong line to deny the res~urcesto the Viet Minh. Following upon that, and as further reinforcementsbecame available, advance offensive bases were to be established atThai Nguyen, Phu Tho, an d Yen Bay_ These bases were to be used bymobile forces tasked with penetrating into the Viet Minh mountain~edoubt to effect the maximum destruction there. At the same time


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that these offen sive bases were bein g organ ized, the several exposedborder area garrison s were to be reduced an d con solidated. The forcesrecovered by this con solidation could then be used to rein force themobile formation s. Fin ally, the Tonkin delta was to be protectedagain st possible Chin ese in cursion s by coverin g forces deployed atthe southern exits of the highlan ds.

This plan was approved in Jun e 1949 an d, as the first rein force-men ts arrived from Fran ce, COn trol was exten ded to the n orth of Han oiby the occupation of Bae Nin h, Phu Lan g Thuon g, Vin h ,Yen , an d Phuc

1Yen . By the en d of the year, however, it had become in creasin glydifficult for the Fren ch to con tin ue to implemen t the plan , since thebulk of the reinforcemen ts were bein g diverted to the south.

The weaken in g of the Fren ch offen sive capabilities in the northhad permitted the Viet Min h to attack an d seize Pho Lu; SQme 30 kmsouthwest of Lao Kay where the Red R iver enterS Chin a. This n oton ly served to further isolate the Fren ch position at Lao Kay, butalso permitted the Viet Min h to reestablish their overlan d commun ica-tion s with n orth An n am. At the same time, the Viet Min h had in ten si-fied their efforts again st the Fren ch lin e of communication s in then ortheast. The losses they had in flicted upon the September an dOctober (1949) con voys were so heavy that the Fren ch had had to turnto their Air Force to en sure the delivery of the 500 ton s of suppliesrequired by the border garrison s each mon th. The Fren ch had hopedthat by relievin g their 12 battalion s in the n ortheast of the burdenof safeguardin g their commun ication s, they would have been able toimprove their offen sive capabilities again st Viet Min h commun ication swith the Chin ese. This hope did n ot materialize. In the course ofmost of 1950, the Fren ch were un able to un dertake an y sign ifican toperation s against the Viet Minh, an d in deed man y of the garrison sn orthwest of Lan g Son were con fin ed to their defen sive position s byViet Min h pressure. The on ly freedom of movemen t in the area was

1These moves were directed by Gen eral B1aizot shortly before hisfin al departure from In dochin a on September 2, 1949.


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enjoyed by the Viet Minh, who made full use of the opportun ity toaccumulate supplies from Chin a an d un dertake the systematic trainin gof thousands of recruits in base camps organ ized in Chin a near theborder.

The situation remained generally incon clusive until SepCember 16,1950, when the Viet Minh carried by assault the French-held post atDong Khe on R oute 4. Ihis was accompanied by ren ewed Viet Minh activ-ity in the vicinity of Lao Kay. As a con sequen ce of these eviden cesof Viet Minh o ff en s iv e s tr en g th , the French decided to consolidatetheir forces in the northwest border area aroun d Lao Kay, and to with-draw all garrison s alon g R oute 4 beyon d Lan gson . The consolidationaround Lao Kay was carried out without difficulty. However, the seriesof operations in the northeast that began with the evacuation of CaoBan g on October 3! 1950, had a disastrous outcome. The Viet Minh sen sedthe sign ifican ce of the French moves an d quickly assembled a forceaggregating 15,000 men . These were employed with such speed and skillthat in ten days the outnumbered French had lost seven battalions andt he ir e qu ip me n t.

These costly misfortun es, aggravated by a developing Viet Min hen circlemen t in the Lao Kay area, forced the Fren ch to un dertake furtherwithdrawals and consolidation s of their forces. When these movementswere completed in November 19Sq, the French held only the heart of theTonkin delca, togethe~ with a narrow coastal strip from Haiphon g toMoncay, plus the high groun d in the n orthwest between Than Uyea an dNghia La.

these events made it abun dan tly clear that Chinese aidl to theViet Minh had made the Fren ch posicion in Indochina highly precarious,and that the main Fren ch effort had to be made in the north. In

lThe exten t of this aid is difficult to ascertain. However, theFrench report that the following was furnished durin g the secon d halfof 1952: 20 howitzers, 10S-mm; 2000 machin e pistols; 80 heavy machineguns; 100 trucks; 130,000 pairs of shoes; 2 summer un iforms per man;800,000 liters of gasolin e; 10,000 roun ds, l05- rn m; 1 million rounds,.50 cal; 300 tons of medical supplies.


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violent Viet Minh reaction that eventually involved sOme 40,000 oftheir troops. In the course of the numerous engagements that ensued,the French were finally forced eo evacuate their forward positions.Nevertheless, when che campaign ended in March 1952, General Salan)the new Commander in Chief,l expressed general satisfa~tion with theoperation in that it had cost the Viet Minh 22,000 casualties) asagainst French losses of 1,588.

In October 1952, after having regrouped and rebuilt their forces,the Viet Minh launched a general offensive in the northwest. In thecourse of two months of violent combat in difficult mountain countrythe Viet Minh succeeded in confining the French into the two strong-holds of Na San and Lai Chau. These pOSitions were held despitevigorous Viet Minh attacks. The last of such attacks launched againstNa San during the night of December 1-2, 1952, cost the Viet Minh1,500 dead. In January 1953 the Viet Minh resumed their offenSive,but shifted the weight of their effort to upper Laos. The Frenchwere forced upon the defensive and weJ;'eonly able to hold, bases inthe Plain of Jars and Luang Prabang. By May, when the Viet Minhpaused again, they controlled all of upper Laos. In October 1953 theViet Minh resumed their offensive and threatened Lai Chau; Na San hadp re Vio us ly b ee n e vac ua te d by the French in August. General Navarre,who had assumed command in Indochina a few months before, consideredthat it was necessary to divert the Viet Minh from Lai Chau and coverLaos. He accordingly directed that a communication center near theLaos border be occupied for this purpose, and at 10:35 On the morningof November 20, 1953, the first French parachutists landed at Dien BienPhu. The final act of the Indochina War had begun.

IGeneral de Lattre left Indochina in November 1951.


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Commander in Chiefof the Far East

LESSONS OF THE WARIN IN DO CH INA

Volume 2


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Comman der in ChiefFar Ea s t

The en emy we fought for the past nin e years used, under the n ameof self- criticism, a time honored practice of our own a~ ed forceswhich we simply call the critique. This collective self appraisalwhich routinely followed upon our field exercises has been our bestmean s for studyin g an d Lmp rov'i.n gourselves.

The application of this same technique of in trospection to thebrutal realities of war may appear highly unusual. Yet, we mustreview the causes of our failures an d of our successes to en sure thatthe lessons which we bought so dearly with our dead n ot remain lockedaway in the memories of the survivors.

We can also admit that an a~ y with a long history is sufficientlywell en dowed to be able to hear the truth.

The lessons to be learn ed from the campaign in In dochina whichare presented here have been based for the most part upon narrativesof the partiCipants and upon 1400 after action reports submitted byofficers of all ranks. Referen ce has also been made to a variety ofdocuments such as information bulletin s, trainin g in structions, anddirectives issued by the High Command during the course of hostilities.Other sources of information in clude reports prepared at the en d ofmajor operation s, intelligen ce summaries, an d statistical dataassembled by the staff of the Comman der in Chief (CINe).

Admittedly, it has been difficult to bring together un der asin gle cover the experien ces of an entire war; a war whose naturean d in ten sity varied as to time, place, an d even season; an d whoselessons had to be organized to correspon d with the several echelon sof comman d to which they applied. To meet these several requiremen ts,it waS decided to organize the material into three separate documen ts;

o The first volume, of very limited distribution, covers thelesson s which, due to cheir importance and politico-military


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character, are of COn Cern on ly to the High Command. It con -tain s a summary of the problems en countered in the course ofoperation s which were primarily outside the domain of tactics.

o The secon d volume, in tended for wide dLstribution , groupstogether everything the Armed Forces learn ed durin g thecampaign which would still be relevan t if we were to becalled upon to coun ter a similar type of rebellion outsideof Europe.

o Fin ally, the third volume, with the same wide distributionas the second, seeks to group all the lesson s of a moregen eral character which have a bearing upon tacticalprinciples,

The fin e lin e drawn between the con tents of the secon d volumean d the third may seem at times debatable. The first deals main lywith the thousan d an d One fo rms of the Viet Min h guerrilla, whilethe other dQals mainly with European- style combat methods. But thisdivision , based on con ven ien ce, must n ot lead one to forget that thefortun es of war admit only of didactical classification .

Saigon ; May 31; 1955lsi P. ElyGeneral, French ArmyCommissioner General of Fran ce an dCommander in Chief, Indochina


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CASUALTIES OF THE INDOCHINA WAR

I. ARNY1. FALLEN FOR FRANCE

3 Generals8 Colonels

1 8 L ieutena nt-Co lo nel s69 Majors341 Captains

1,140 Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants2,683 French Non-Commissioned Officers6,008 French Soldiers

12,019 NCO and other ra.nks; North-African, Arican, andLegionnaires

14,093 Indigenous enlisted personnel of the Expeditionary Corps2 . M ISSING OR FA ILED TO RETURN FROM CA PTIVITI

1 Lieutenant~Colonel5 Maj ors60 Captains

13 4 Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants2,755 Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers5,791 NCO and other ranks; North-African, African, and

Legionnaires12,830 Indigenous enlisted personnel of the Expeditionary Corps

3. W O U N D E D20,899 French24,347 Legionnaires, North-Africans, and Africans26,924 In digen ous person nel

4. MED IC A L E VA C UE ES)1,291 Officers an d men

5 . PRISONERS LIBERA TED BY THE ENEMY16,118 Officers and men


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II. AIR FORCE1. LOST IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

1 Gen eral60 Officers160 N~ n- Commi$sion ed Officers49 Other ranks

2. DIED OF WOUNDS OR DISEASE OR MISSING, PRESUMED DEAD85 Officers

243 Non-Commissioned Officers52 Other ranks

III. NAVY1. LOST IN COMBAT OPER ATIONS

2 7 O ff ice rs39 Petty Officers

235 Seamen

ANNUAL LOSSES(all services)

Killed Woundedear

2,590 6,822

1947 (heaviest losses) 5,345 9,79019501953 2,8491954 (Vietnamese Army only)

6,4739,203


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FIRST PA RT*****

THE WA R OF IDEA S********

111 guerrilla war lacks a politicalobjective, it will fail. If it has a politicalobjective which is incompacible with ~heaspirations of che people it will fqil as well,for it will not receive from the people thesupport, the participation, the assistance,and the active collaboration that are essential.

'IIt is as if the .peopLe were the sea andthe anny a fish. How can it be difficult forthe fish to survive if it is immersed in thissea? But should the water recede or becomedry then the fish can not escape sure death."

Mao Tse Tung


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I. INCIPIENT INSUR GENCYA prein surgen cy period is difficul~ to define. However, it would

appear to begin when opposition to established law and order acquiressufficient in fluen ce over the population to provoke disturban ces.In I nd och in at such a period undoubtedlY began about 1925 and

waS highlighted by the grave incidents of 1930 in North An nam and inthe Tonkin delta area. It thus lasted Some twenty years and couldhave lasted longer had not events arising from the war, namely, theelimin ation of F ren ch authority by the Japanese in 1945, given theViet Minh Party the opportunity to fill the v oi d c re at ed .

The lessons to be drawn from this period only confirm severalwe 11- e st ab li sh ed r ul es . If those rules were ignored, it was becausethe incipient insurgency was not suspected, and the rebellion didnot follow a traditional pattern- -a development that took us bysurprise.S Y MPTOMS O F INCIPIENT INSURGENCY

The various reports relating to the prewar situation gave anoptimistic view of internal security and placed responsibility forthe incidents and disturbances upon lawless individuals against whomthe use of force was normal and adequate.

"One might wonder if the errors committed in estimating thesituation were not due in part to the ultra-conservative trainingof our administrators who were unable to discern evolutionary trends,and in part to their standards of living which kept them apart fromt he Vi etn am es e pe opl e. "l

Here is what a man supposedly well experienced in matters relatedto Indochina wrote in 1932 after the .epression of the Yen -Bairevolt which he blamed on too wide a diffusion of our ideas and onour excessLva Iy liberal policies. 2 "Rather than undermine tradition,

lColonel X, commanding a zone (territorial division) in theTonkin.2Mr. de Pouvou rv i .L l. a fr om t he co ll ec tio n I1How Th ey T hi nk."


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it would be wise to rely on it an d n ot do an ythin g which might becontrary or alien to it .... In this mann er, our successors willnot have to face too man y surprises as the future is revealed tDthem in the cou rse of time."

This future must be prepared for by o ur o ve rse as re pr es en tat iv es ,They must be more responsive tD the ideologies of native movemen ts,and stan d ready tD satisfy not on ly their material but also theire mo tio na l n ee ds.

Colonel N, who ha d followed these events, commented in 1954On the use of force relatin g to this same Yen- Bai incident: "Prewarrevolts were brought to heel: these were short- lived triumphs thatcost dearly! Force did more harm than good; the Ton kin . village ofX, which was shelled, was to remain a hotbed ot revolt, an d NorthA nn am, which was occupied by small elemen ts, was to see no moreFren chmen after 1945.,,1EVOLUTION OF THE INSURGENCY

An adversary animated by a racial patriotism an d a n ew set QfAideals based on Xarxism gradually replaced the "black flags" an d

Cochin chin ese pirates, who were most often motivated by personalambition, greed, or Some local patriotism. Leaders educated inParis or trained in Chin a or even Moscow were recruited from amongthe mass of the population . These, recogn ized as the natural leadersof the areaS frDm which they came, were able to in fluen ce opinionthrough the traditional appeals used to arouse n ative masses:xenophobia, an ti-colon ialism, etc. The Commun ist techn iques ofpropaganda an d indDctrin ation also helped them to qUickly gain thesupport of the less fortunate classes.

This ideologic dualism, i.e., nationalism and Marxism, wasparalleled by a dualism in the nature of the support frDm which therebellion benefited. On the on e hand, the Viet Minh made maximum

1CDlon el X, zon e comman der in North Vietn am.ASee tran slator's footn otes at the en d of each section.


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use of the local resources it had secured for itself by intimidationand terrorism; on the other hand, it had the outside support offoreign nations as well as some French circles. It found, in fact,a certain deg~ ee of sympathy of an official as well as clandestin ~nature from within elements of our public and government. Thiscombination of sympathy an d material aid quickly allowed the rebelsto pass beyond the phase of the armed bands which were characteristicof the year 1945. Due to these favorable circumstances and thepassage of time, they passed from regular formatiOns, to units ofcombined arms) an d finally to major units.PERMANENCE OF CENTERS OF AGITATION

What we have observed in Indochina confirms a fact alreadyknown in our African possessions: there exists a permanence orcontinuity in the canters of unrest. History and geography revealthat certain regions are traditional cradles of in sur gen t m ov eme nts ,and these later serve as preferred areas for the guerrillas.

It is in the provinces where the population has always shownitself to be proud, bold and independent that the ~evolt has takenon the most acute and intense forms (the Plain of Reeds, the regionof Vinn, the mountains surrounding Langson, etc.). It is strikingto compare some recent engagements with the history of certainbattles ~hich occurred during the conquest. The events were oftenthe same and even happened at the same places. Some of the writingsfrom Tonkinese Mandarins to our forces were written in the same veinas Viet M in h p am phl ets .

The modern era was to add its awn contributions to these tradi-tional factors. The existence of a proletariat in the cities hasfacilitated urban disturbances (in particular those of December 19,1946),6 and meanWhile the patience of the ru~al masses was rapidlyb~ing .exhausted. The very nature of these preinsurgency conditionsmade it impossible for the solution to the ?roblem to be found inthe use of force alone.


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The authorities responsible for law an d order have to in terven emore at the political, economic, and social level than at the policelevel. "Effectiveness requires that the task of maintaining law an dorder not be confused with that of coun terin g the cause of un r e s t ;!

As lon g as the leaders of the revolt must exercise pruden ceand caution, we must n ot resort to severe repressive measures. "Rebelleaders will always try to burn their bridges and become outlaws. Itis up to the authorities, therefore, to ensure that SOme lin k withthese people can be continued so that they can eventually rally with-out losing face or prestige."lPREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORGES

The vety structure of our Armed Forces makes them ill-suited tothe task of main tain in g law and order. C A period of in cipien t in surgen .cyis thus very useful in that it provides time to prepare the ArmedForces and to alert reinforcements which are to come from other terri-to r ie s ,

The In dochin a War provides us with few positive lessons On thisissue, but it does point up SOme of the deficien cies in our readin essmeasures. Man y officers expressed con cern that the Expedition aryCorps lacked a group of "area qualified" officers similar to "n ativeaffairs" officers available for North Africa.

A multiplicity of problems can on ly be resolved by qualifiedofficers assisted as n ecessary by civilian officials. These includeproblems relating to the collection of intelligence, the con duct ofspecial operation s by un dergroun d forces, counterin telligen ce; etc.,the recruitin g and train in g of local forces as well as the assemblyof' g eneral information, including local policies, as required bymilitary commanders. In In dochina such tasks were of n ecessity almostalways assigned to people who did n ot know the area an d who neitherspoke Vietn amese nor any of the local dialects, an d consequen tly couldnot establish effective liaison with the in habitan ts.

lComments of Major X on the pacification of South Vietn am.


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Specialists are indispensible from the very beginning of a pre-insurgency pe~iod; for it goes without saying that their recruitmentand training cannot be the work of several weeks or even severalmonths.

The preparation of the theater of operations is no less necessary.It should in clude in particular:

o General staff studies on command structure, territorialorganization, and initial operations. to be undertaken on thebasis of two or three simple assumptions.

o A complete documentation on every region, to include sectorarea folders an d tran sportation maps.

o Initial development of facilities as finances permit (linesof communication, naval and air bases, logistics installa-tion s, sign al commun ication s, etc).

The intelligence gathering activities should be organized by theiden tification of poten tial agen ts, the establishmen t of suitablecontacts, and the creation of agent nets in hostile zones. (InIndochina, the difficulty of introducing agents into a region alreadyunder Marxist control was confirmed.) Thus, the first steps toestablish agent nets must be taken (.ell in advance.COMMITMENT OF FOR CES

When Violence, sabotage, and rioting reach the stage whensuch acts can no longer be controlled by th e p ol ic e, it becomesnecessary to use the Armed Forces. But it would be well to avoidcertain mistakes, which Colonel Xl has emphasized as follows: "Thephysical presence of armed forces is neces$a~, but it does notfollow that these must be actively engaged. To do so precipitatelymay be the signal for the beginning of open hostilities, A rmed forces,most often used to protect critical areas and communications (these

1Zone commander in Tonkin, who had also traveled extensivelyi n I nd OC hi na .


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being the essential facilities required by the military, the govc rn-ment, and the local economy) may sssume either of two postures, theOn u selected being dependent upon the situation and not upon anyfixed rule. Either they Can reveal themselves, making a show offorce if necessary, or they can be discreet, securing their objectivesquickly but without ostentation. If it appears likely that the ArmedForces are to be actively engaged, it is absolutely necessary thatthis eventuality be anticipated:

a As to the selection of objectives: There is too often atendency to employ forces on secondary missions. Since forceis the final argument, its use must be decisive.

,0 Clearing, sweeping, and related types of operations oftenyield deceptive results not compatible with the effortinvolved. In these cases, they irritate the population anddemonstrate their relative ineffectiveness. Thus, they areto be undertaken in the preinsurrection period only whenthere is a certainty of obtaining significant results.

o As to duration; It must be strictly limited to the selectedaction and must not be unduly prolonged. This means thatthe precise nature of the mission and its purpose must becarefully defined as well as the results which are expectedfrom it.

o As to procedures: The seriousness of the psychologicalconsequences arising from the engagement of armed forcesare such that the procedures to be used and the magnitudeof the forces to be engaged must be adequate to the task.It is preferable to have short massive demonstrations ratherthan a series of weak operations. In short, the principleof economy of forces should be rigorously applied.

"While the engagement of forces under such conditions will createproblems for the commander, it must not be forgotten that what issought (beyond a definite but limited action) is a psychologicalimpact upon public opinion. All else are police actions and should


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not be given to the Army unless the services specialized :40 suchtasks are unab l e to aCCOmp lish chem ,"

In conclusion, from the momen t an incipien t in surgency can beidentified, it is essential to use the remaining time that may beavailable to prepare for eventual operations an d to set uP. if needbe, a corps of area specialists.

Wben the use of armed forces becomes inevitable, their commitmentmust be undertaken with great care, for the psychological effect onthe masses will be as importan t as any impact upon rebel un its,

Tran slator's Notes~"B1ac;:k flags" was a term originally used co design ate Chin esepirates who roamed the Tonkin highlands until 1910. It latercontinued in use as a term to identify oandit groups,6 The events of December 19, 1946, were more than "urban dis-

tu rb anc e s" in that this date marks the begin nin g of open warfarebetween French and Viet Minh forces.cFrench forces arriving in Indochina at the en d of World War IIwere organ ized an d equipped as were comparable U,S. un its.


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II. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASP ECTS OF THE STR UGGLE

Warfare always in volves a con flict between two wills. In addi-tion , civil war brin gs two doctrin es in to opposition . There is yetan other opposition when on e of the adversaries is in spired by Marxism- -that of differin g con cepts of world affairs.

The multiple causes which led to the triumph of the Vit:.tMin h ideology over the social rigidity an d over the govern men talweakn esses of tradition al Vietn am are on the whole too well kn own ;HOn e could n ot reestablish a n ew order where there ex i.s ed con stitn -tion al an d social disorder."l,2

There is n ot on e Fren ch fightin g man who has n ot expressed hisbittern ess an d often his an ger at the con tradiction s that he, as asoldier, WaS obliged to uphold. For in stan ce, the view expressedbelow is relatively mild: "In 1946, to carry out our duties, weembarked at n ight between two rows of guards as if we were male-factors. R eturn in g in 1953, we were searched by t he V ie tn am es eCustoms as if we wer~ tourists.,,3

The majority of the statemen ts are more bitter an d reflect theopin ion of these two officers: Captain P; .11 we were un able 1:0effectively fight Commun ist propagan da, it is because we did n otoffer a positive id~ ology as an altern ative to Commun ism fromwhich would have come a doc trLn e an d- a faith." Colon el N: "TheFran co- Vietn amese backed everythin g that was dyin g in this coun try:the tradition s, the old people, etc. The Viet Min h used all thatwas n ew an d emergin g: desires~ ideals~ youth, etc,"

1Commander x .2The Viet Min h made much of statistics such as these: 58 percen tof Vietn amese families do n ot own an in ch of lan d, 39 percen t ownless than 5 hectares; 2 percen t own from 5 to 20 hectare$~ an d 0.34percen t possess more than 50 hectares (tran slation of documen t No.953/FTNV/2 of April 6, 1955).3Lieuten an t Z of the F.T.S.V. [Groun d Forces, South Vietn am].


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The conduct of the war at the diplomatic and political levelwas beyond the responsibility of the Military Command. However, thefact remains that "ideology was one of if not the principal weaponin the struggle and could not be ignored, since the support of thepeople was the issue and our adversary was Communism."l

The Expeditionary Corps was unfortunately denied the right touse this ideological weapon axcept in certain domains and then onlyunder severe restrictions. Ihus, this section will simply recountour successes and failures in those areaS where the several Commandersin Chief were able to engage in psychological warfare with consider-able reservation s.IMPACT ON THE VIEINAMESE PEOPLE

In the zones that our units attempted to san itize or preservefrom Viet Minh contamination, it was normal to use propaganda as wellas arms.

But the troops and the cadres were, with rare exception, ratherpoor at persuasion and indoctrination. First of all, they lackedtraining: "Political action is not part: of our training .our cadreswere ill at ease and unhappy over problems concerned with making

. 2contacts with the population, of propaganda, etc.1I tiThemajorityof the cadres revealed again and again a profound ignorance on thesubject: o f civic action ...these destroyed what others had worked sohard to build. Take, for example, the Village of 0, on the Bassac.One of our platoon leaders had ,ucceeded by dint of much patience inwinning over and resettling 2,OQO inhabitants in what had been auabandoned area, This village waS the pride of my company. UnfortunatelY,upon our departure, an incompetent took charge and lost the confidenceof the people. It did not take more than 15 days for D to be entirelyabandoned and burned by the very people who had inhabited it, whopreferred to return to the Viet Minh zone rather than put up with the

1Lieutenan t N, compan y comman der in Nort:h Vietn am.2 Commander 0, commander of s/sector F.T.C.V. [Ground Forces, CentralVietn am] .


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ann oyan ces of an un satisfactory commander and of military person n elwho were ign oran t of the political aspects of their mission ."l

In attemptin g to un dertake civic action in thei~ sectors, numer-ou s officers saw: "All their efforts destroyed in a few day s by thepassage of a mobile un it that did n ot kn ow the local con dition s, an dleft without havin g killed a sin gle Viet, but havin g alienated fromus forever those who had been givin g us in formation an d fightin g withus again st the Viet Min h.,,2

In addition to a gen eral ign oran ce of political factors, very fewofficers kn ew the coun try and the language: "We often asked the localcomman der to use propaganda. But how can he? He does n ot speakVietnamese an d kn ows neither' the customs n or the coun try. For thesemission s, we n eed preparatory stages, but above all a large core of realspecialists.,,3 We will not pursue this poin t sin ce the n ecessity for acorps of officers qualified in n ative affairs has already been emphasized. A

The influen ce a comman der could expect his troops to have Onthe population was also handicapped by the very form of the operation s."I n ot ice d," w ri tes Commaride r P ( F.T .N. V. ), " th at p sy ch olo gi ca laction an d military action are closely intercon nected. When the Vietwiped out a po st, blew up a, train or vehicle, or carried out an ambush,our coun ter actions had little effect upon the population except forthe fin es imposed or our reprisals. When we moun ted an operation ona V iet e nt re nc hed ~n a village, however. the population was subjectedto the same destructive violen ce as was the Viet. In both cases,Viet Min h propagan da provided the masses with a reaSon to hate us.Thus~ we lost both recruits an d in telligen ce." These remarks applyto those zon es where we fought essen tially again st ~ hat may be calleddeterioration from within .

In the region s un der Viet Minh control, where we sometimes madeforays, We almost always had to pay for military advan tages by

lCaptain N, district comman der F .T.S.V.2captain R~ Laos.3 Commander L, F.T.N.V. [Ground Forces, North Vietn am].


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alien atin g the peopl~ . The peopl~ who in itially believed in thereturn of the Fran co- Vietn amese forces observed a ben evolen t n eutralitytoward us an d even gave us some token s of loya Lty , later foun d them-selves aban aon ed to Viet Minh reprisals. Therefore, a raid Dr aforay in to a noncontrolled ZOne should n ever be associated with anyattempt to rally the population.

Considering how unfavorable the condition s were, it is easy toexplain the mediocrity of the results obtained. The utilization ofmodern propaganda methods had not; however, been totally neglected.

From 1946 to 1952, a "propaganda section " was in cluded in thestaff of the Comman der in Chief and in those of the territo"ialcomman ders. This staff section prOVided both in struction al guidan cean d materiel support to the zon e an d sector intelligence officers.

In 1953 a "Bureau of Psychological Warfare" waS added to thestaff of the Commander in Chief. This organ ization received everi n cr ea si ng f un d s.

Courses for training propagandists were organized. All types ofp~ in ted matter, bulletin s, an d posters were distribut@d; exhibitionrooms were set up; mobile units were equipped with sound mnplifi~rs;million s of pamphlets were air- droppedl an d airplan es equipped withl ou ds pe ake rs w er e u se d f re qu en tl y.

This belated effort was~ however~ handicapped by the scarcity ofcompetent personnel. For "modern ideological wars reqUire personn eltrained in political action an d propagan da. Aside from questions ofdoctrin e, there is a techn ique with which the greatest possiblen umber of officers must be acquainted, an d in which a certain number- 2should specialize. II

lThirty-one million in the month of Jan uary 1951 alone,2 Comman der 5, commander of s/sector F.T.S.V.


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UIPACT ON ENEMY TR OOPS\Vhile direct propagan da on Viet Min h troops re su lte-' n on ly a

very small n umber of con versions or deserters because c ; the stron ghold of the political cadres on the soldiers, we did have con sider-able success with prison ers.

1The P.I.M. were han dled in several ways. Those who did n otbelon g to the regular Army were, after a probationary period, tran s-ferred to labor un its from which it was n ever difficult to recruitcoolies who willin gly served in our forces. These almost alwaysbecame devoted and extraordin arily faithful auxiliaries to our troops.Without an in tention al an d con cen trated psychological effort, lif~amon g our troops succeeded in the great majority of cases in makingof the former adversary a kin d of unarmed auxiliary who came to sharein the esprit de corps of their units.

"In my battalion,11 says Captain X (F.T.S.V.), "we rapidlyabsorbed our IP.I.M.' an d there were man y who gave positive eviden ceof loyalty (un derground searches, for example) an d asked to becomepartisans. IIB

In regard to P.I.M. who had to un dergo a deten tion period, thePsychological Action Service was able to make a significant impactfrom 1952 on wards. In the camps where this service operated, themajority of prison ers, on ce sorted an d separated from the diehards,showed themselves to be receptive to in doctrination (on Vietnam) theVietn amese governmen t, the Nation al Army, the prospects open to theyouth of Vietn am, etc.) l an d capable of receivin g techn ical an d. 11 1 .. 2Lnte ectua traLn Lng.

1These personn el, design ated under the general n ame of P.I.M.(In terned Military Prison ers), fell in to differen t categories accordin gto their origin s (regular, guerrilla, political cadre) an d theirdegree of con tamin ation .2For example, 2,000 P.I.M. were treated thus in Camp X; in theTonkin in 1952-1954, 900 served in the Vietn amese Army, where theyserved with hon or; 1,100 were able to be released.


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These two completely different kinds of results illustratethat political reeducation is possible. In addition, they condemna penal system that throws together, without distinction, allprisoners into the same camp. An effort to assure a ~egree of comfortto the captives and, of course, the suppression of all brutality, isessen tial for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to rehabilita-tion.VIET MINH INFLUENCE ON OUR TROOPS

With the exception of indigenous units recruited from ethnicminorities which were always hostile to the Viet Minh because ofracial differences, the enemy found a favorable ground for itspropaganda among nacive personnel in our units and, of course, inthe Vietn amese Army.

The Dich Van movement (literally, to approach the enemy) wascarefully nurtured by the Viet Minh National Defense Ministry.Abundant documentation proving this fell into our hands.

With regard to the Vietnamese nationals, the fallowing argumentswere used: liThe Vietnamese soldier is not an enemy; he is a Istrayl_-at the most, a . rebel.'t If he rallies he will be treated with con-sideration . Simultan eou$ly~ pressure- -in truth, blackmail- -was usedagain st his family.

The proximity of our forces to those of the enemy in the twodeltas and in the coastal zone. togethe~ with the responsiveness afthe popUlation to the Viet Minh -(either because of fear Or Simplybecause of a "Wait and see" attitude), all contributed to the effec-tiveness of the Dich Van program.

These conditions were the basic cause of the loss of most postswhere the garrison included natives. We should also note that allVietnamese units included a Dich Van cell either active Or dormant.

Insofar as the troops of the French Union were concerned, theViet Minh commanders acted through the intermediary of the FrenchCommunist party; they also employed leaflets and even, on occasion,


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women . There is n O question that the defeatist propagan da comin gfrom Fran ce was most demoralizin g even though it did n ot result ina pp re ci ab le d ef ec ti on s .l

With regard to other elemen ts of the Expedition ary Corps, theViet Min h made large use of tracts, issued in several lan guages an dwell suited to the circumstan ces. In certain cases they used in ter-preters as well, who, with loud speakers, haran gued the garriSOn Sof the post un der attack.

On the whole, this propagan da failed, for con dition s in theViet Min h prison er camps were too well kn own for our men to believe

2appeals sign ed by old comrades who had fallen in to en emy han ds.The Commun ist in doctrin ation which the en emy tried to in culcate

in to our prison ers had on ly superficial results; there was too greata disparity between the explan ation of the world situation made bythe political agen ts, an d what the captives themselves kn ew of it.There also was too great a gap between the words an d the crueltieswhich were the daily lot of our men . The hope of bein g freedoccasion ally in fluen ced in dividuals to respon d to Marxist propagan da,but the great majority of repatriates were usually quick to returnto our way of thinkin g.

The failure of Viet Min h preachin g again con firms the n ecessityto base all attempts of in doctrin ation on good treatmen t an d on agradual in crease in person al liberties.D E CE P TI ON O P ER A TI ON S

Sin ce the t.ime t hat the An glo- Saxon s made much of their "decep-tion operation s" durin g the period 1940- 1945, it has become the habit

1The n umber of Fren ch defectors in eight years of war did n otexceed a few dozen an d in most cases the defection was provoked bya Vietn amese woman . On the other han d, man y of these deserters latert .r ie d t o e sc ap e,2 The n umber of African , Legion n aire, an d North African desertersreached Several hun dred in eight years of war, but the great majorityof those won over later tried to escape.


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to define as "psychological war" activities which, since the siegeof Troy and the struggle between Horace and the Curiaces, have beencalled Ruses of War.

In effect, a deceptive action "whose goal is to win from theen emy a psychological victory by leading it to a false interpreta-tion of our intentions and in this way lessening the possibilitiesof a counterthrust,',l is always a fake


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the hoped fo r reac tion s. IfLike in a b ridge game, the adve rsa ry mus tbe in fluenced th~ oughout the course of the game by certain an noun ce-men ta, or certain defen ses, or by the man ner of clearing certain'long suits! to press him or to hide from him for as lon g as possiblethe decisive card, so that when he does see the light it is too latef c r him to react effectively."l This don e, On e could concurrentlyuse: "Spoken propaganda, written propaganda, whispered propagan da,the spectacular visit of important people, e tc . . .. , , 1

It goes without saying that a deception "must remain secret un tilthe end of its 'play' an d fool both frien dly as well as en emy fo rc es .""Its goal is only achieved when everyon e is taken in by the game.From the time the action is in itiated, everyone and all echelons mustplay the game, even if the scenario shocks them or if they do notun de rs tand it." 1

The rules which have just been stated were not completely upheldduring the campaign , but their empirical application gained us severalsuccesses, For example, the evacuation of Na Sam on August 12, 1953)was preceded by a campaign of false an noun cements which deceived allthe participants. Operations PELICAN and GERMAINE at the en d of thehostilities were examples of the opportunities offered by modernp ro pa ga nd a m et ho ds .

PELICAN, in October 1953, aimed at creatin g a threat on the coastsof Than h- aoa; while Operation MOUETTE was launched about SO kilometersin the in terior. A false naval action and a fortuitous in cidentresulted in complete success. "sin ce it permitted the deploymen t ofthe MOllETTE force again st the Viet Min h D ivision 320 while immobilizin gthe 304th. an d thus made it possible to deal with the former without

1bein g harassed by the latter."While the Geneva n egotiation s were in progress, Operation

GERMAINE had as its goal the "persuading of Fren ch, Vietnamese andinternation al as well as Viet Minh public opin ion that a seriousreinforcement of the Tonkin delta was in progress and would be completedbefore the 15th of Jun e."l

1Study of the gen eral staff of the Comman der in Chief Onoperation s of deception .


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We embellished certain facts; the arrival of a battalion ofparatroopers in the Tonkin was related to an announcement concerningthe i mmi nen t teconstitution of two mobile units; the arrival inSaigon of the c ru is er s G lo ir e and Montcalm was spoken of ~ s the leadelement "of a large squadron includin g other vessels and embarkedlan d forces, that would' disembark in the Haiphong region." A battalionleader captured at Diem Bien Phu reported that "accc rd Lng to thedeclarations of the spokesman for the Viet Minh commander in theofficers' prison camp~ the latter had really believed in a substantialr ein forc eme nt of our Expeditionary Corps. In the begin ning of July1954) this possibility seemed to worry him grear Iy ."

T ra ns la to r' s N ot esA The Colonial Army did n ot have "area specialized officers"because it-s personnel formed the major g a r rtson forces for all over-seas posseSSions except North Africa, and hence were rotated fromon e world area to another.a"Partisans" correspond to the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups( CI DG ) s po ns or ed by U.S. Army Special Forces. They did not, however,have an y s pec ific ge ogra phi cal ot' o rga niz atio nal af t"in iti es.


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SECOND PAR T******

THE WA R WITHOUT FRONT********

'IMateriel inferiority in front of theenemy is not serious. What is more importantis the mobilization of the people. The peoplemust be a great ocean in which the en emy willdrown i ts el f . ..

"What is the real bulwark? II; is thepeop l e . .. "

Mao Tse Tun g


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III. INTRODUCTION

On December 19, 1946, vast areas of Tonkin and An nam fell intoViet Minh hands and became, literally. provinces of a new state.The Ho Chi Minh government, even though it was condemned to livewith diffiCulty) nonetheless succeeded in slowly establishing adminis-trative and judicial systems and SOme public services, all the Whilederiving its sustenance from a rudimentary economy.

The boundaries of SOme of these territories stayed flexible dur-ing the eight war years, notably in South Vietnam. In the Ton kin ,however, the year 1951 was marked by a pOSitive demarcation of theViet Minh zone where, by constructing the fortified belt in the delta,we revealed our inability to reconquer the area. We tried n everthelessto retake certain fiefs from the enemy. Thus we went to Bac-Kan andto Cao-Bang in 1947. and we launched Operation ATLANTE in 1954 toattempt the reconquest of a portion of the coast of Annam.

Other operations led us to take the offensive in Viet Minh ter-ritory, either in the form of raids,l or by penetration into enemyareaS in the hope of attracting and destroying its forces.2

Such activities were but incidental. The real and continuousstruggle took place in the regions we wished to control, namely, thetwo deltas and certain portions of the central coast where there wasa high population densi ty and the most fertile lands. The "war wi th-out front" that was fought during eight years had as its basic goalthe support of a population most often found in villages.

Viet Minh influence varied from one area to another. It changedin the course of time, but an almost constant exchange continuedbetween Crnmmunist areas and disputed zones; a replenishment of arms--m un it ion s a nd ma te rie l- -tr ic kl ed in each night from the exterior to

1For e xa mpl e, O per at ion LORRAINE in 1952 and Operation MOUETTEin 1953.2 For example, the affair at Hoa-Binh in 1951, at Na-San andfin all

Documents

A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina