A VIEW ON ETHIOPIA

OR

THE ETHIOPIAN VERSES

Marie-Paule VERLAEfEN

JUNE 1991

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1 thank M. CHA UVIN, our secretary,for its competence andpatience.Errors remain mine.

M-P. VERLAETEN

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A VIEW ON ETHIOPIA

OR

THE ETHIOPIAN VERSES

SUMMARY:

This note presents briefly the Ethiopian long run (1968-91) major trends. The emphasis put on trends

is deliberatcd for the Ethiopian macro performances are sketched in another publication from D.LA.L.

(covering the period 1968-88). But also and maybe more fundamentally because that permits a focus

on what appears to be the relevant channels how to reconstruct the Ethiopian economy after the war.

As such an answer to the E.E.C. question: how to pass from a war to a peacc economy may be

gradually shaped. So, this paper submitted to people expected to work in a tcam on the E.E.C.

qucstion will help to define a working programme on "Ethiopia after the war".

Il is worth indicating thatall statistical data relating to Ethiopia must be viewed with caution. owing

to the unreliability of local information. Available data on Ethiopia are resumed in an annex while key

oncs introducc the paper. Data coming from different sources may differ. This may be due to datcs of

publication, methods of computation, mix of estimates and data but not only. At this preliminary state

of DIAL's investigation on Ethiopia it has not yet becn possible (if ever) to indicate where are the

relevant data.

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Introduction: A rather poor African country

1 - A war economy

II - Ethiopian Applied Ma.croeconomics

A) An agriculture crisis

B) An environment degradation

C) A misleading agriculture policy

1. View on the agriculture sector

2. Links between agriculture and ideology

i) The agriculture managing scheme

ii) The new land tenure system

3. Outcome for the economy

4. Outcome on the environment

III - The Ethiopian Refonns

IV - Concluding remarks

Annex

Bibliography

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2S

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19. Structure of govemment revenue (% of total revenue)1. Taxes on incorne and profits (1986-87)2. Domestic taxes on goods and services3. Taxes on international trade and transactions

importsexports

4. Non fax revenue

20. Government expenditure (% of total expenditure - 1987)

by function1. General public service2. Defense3. Education4. Health5. Economie serviees6. Agriculture

by economic category1. Wages and salaries2. Other goods and services3. Interest payments4. Subsidies and current transfers5. Capital

21. Total external debt - outstanding at end year 1988 (millions $ US)ofwhich: Central government

22. Dcbt ratio (1987)Debt/GDP : concessional

non concessionalDebt service/X : ex-ante(l)

ex-post

Sources: African Economie and Financial Data, UNDP and the World Bank, 1989.

excepted for:

(3) : Estimations based on the 1984 census

(7): UNDP

(8)(11) D.M. Etherington and Alasebu Yainshet (bibliography)(16)

(9)(10) DIALstaffmembers' computation(17)

(21) World Table -1989190 Edition, World Bank, 1990

1 Concept explained by differences between results and later estimates contained by used World Bankfiles.

28.620.220.713.27.5

28.2

2.430.6 (-V)10.73.635.1 (1')12.1

27.323.75.2 (1')7.836.0 (~)

2977.62278.0

37.813.339.934.0

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INTRODUCflON : A RATHER POOR AFRICAN COUNTRY

1. On the basis of G.D.P. per capita Ethiopia is a rather poor Arrican country. Indeed, in

.l.2B1(2) each Ethiopian enjoyed an average income of 130 current US doUars. This figure has to be

compared to African ones which are 561 and 330 current US dollars respectively for Africa as a

whole and its sub-Saharan part.

2. In 1986 a) population living standard summarized by total consumption per capita reaches

a level slightly below 100 (1980) US dollars compared to nearly 480 and 400 respectively for Africa

and its sub-Saharan part. Since the beginning of the 1980s up to 1985 total consumption per capita

decreased by 0.7 per cent on average. However the African figures were worse i.e. a decrease of 2.6

per cent on average for both the already mentioned areas. Figures for 1986 and 1987 (maybe) were

slightly positive for Ethiopia while they remained strongly negative for Mrica (-3.9 and -7.1 per

cent) and its sub-Saharan part (-5.1 and -9.4 per cent). The contrasting evolution between Ethiopia

and Africa is mainly due to government consumption (which is accounted for in total consumption)

whose share in GDP increased more than in Africa (2 points of GDP more from 1980 onwards). This

is a reflection of civil war but not only. The way how economics was managed i.e. through a

command economy matters also. Indeed, it increased mainly the shares of economic serviees and

agriculture in government expenditure by function and that of capital in these expenditure by

economic category.

3. Government consumption includes capital expenditure on national defense and security.

Their weight may be proxied by the share of defense in government expenditure for current .QI capital

purposes. In 1987 it amounted to 30.6 per cent i.e. more than three times the related ratio for Africa

(about 10 per cent). It was nevertheless decreasing strongly since 1984 (38.7 per cent). War related

government expenditure may also be proxied by the share of capital in these expenditure by economic

category (instead of by function). As such they amounted to 36.0 per cent i.e. ten poin~s more than

within Africa. The comparison between both proxied shares revealed that by 1987 nearly all capital

expenditure fmanced by the Ethiopian govemment were for military purposes. As far as regulation

was concemed the share of economic services (35.1 per cent) was more than ten points higher than

within Africa (about 23 per cent), that of agriculture (12.1 per cent) doubled the African standards and

socialist accumulation increased (agaln) the capital share.

4. Private consumption ratio to G.D.P. (at current priees) depicts also poverty comparatively

to Africa. In 1987 it had a value of nearly 80 per cent of G.D.P. while it reached the levels of 64 and

71 per cent for the two already mentioned areas. Private consumption per capita (about 100 current

US dollars in 1987) amounted less than one third of the African level and one half of the Sub-Saharan

one. At the exception of 1984-5 (severe drought) it was more or less stabilized since the beginning of

2 Last year on the basis of whieh il is possible to compare Ethiopia to Afriea given the availability ofpublished Data

(African Economie and Financial Data, UNDP and the WB, 1989).

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the 1980s (upswing from 1976 to 1980). Other social indicators also point out a specifie poverty

position of Ethiopia within Africa. For exemple, the life expeetancy at birth was 47 years in 1987

while it reaehed 53 and 51 respectively for Africa and ifs sub-Saharan part. As far as school

enrollment (Le. the ratio Qf ehildren Qf ail ages enrQIJed in primary (secondary) school to the

population Qf children of primaxy (secondary) school age.) was concemed the figures for Ethiopia

were that of 36 and 12 fQr the primary and secQndary Qnes cQmpared tQ 75 and 66 fQr Africa and 29

and 12 for the sub-Saharan Qne. Concerning schoQI enrQlIment it is worth indicating that the data hid

a favorable eVQlution for the population which was elementary and secondary education expanded at a,

rapid rate compared with the prc-revolutiQnary periQd At the light of the UNDP human develQpment

index (varying between zero and one) which summariscs bQth real GDP per capita, life expectancy

and educatiQnal attainment, Ethiopia .lli a lQW human develQpment country. Its index has a value of

0.282 Le. belQw the Banglagesh's one (0.318). As such EthiQpia has been put in the sampIe Qf low

sQcial progress countries [IQwer value index: 0.116 (Niger), higher Qne 0.489 (MQrocco)].

5. Living standard can also be appreciated via fQQd supply. In EthiQpia more than in other

developing CQuntries excess demand prevailed on the fOQd market. At the end Qf the 1980s per capita

food availability was approximately 20 per cent below its value at the end Qf the 1970s the latter one

being on a dccreasing trend since 1960 at the exception Qf upswings occuring frQm 1977 tQ 1979, in

1982, 1985 and 1986. Nevcrtheless until1973 Ethiopia was mQre Qr less suffieient in food production.

Food excess demand from this date up to nQW may be explained through extemal and internaI factors,

i.e. decreasing terros of trade (mid-1970s and 1977-81), recurrent drQughts (1972-3 ; 1981 ;

1984-5 ; 1989-90) arroed insurrection since the beginning Qf the 1960s becQming civil war (not yet

ended at the mQment) and the logic how macroeconQmics has been applied since the revQlution in

september 1974.

6. The drought of 1984-85 was particularly severe. By april 1985 about 11m. peQple in 11 of

Ethiopia's 14 Administrative Regions were reported to be drought-affected, but the WQrst of the

famine was cQncentrated in the north, especially in the regiQns of Eritrca, Tigre and Wollo. UN

agencies were estimating famine deaths up tQ that date at a minimum Qf 300,000 compared with

200,000 for the whole of the 1974 famine which led to the Qverthrow of Raile Selassie. The high level

of fatalities was attributable at least in part tQ the government's reluctance tQ publicize the famine at a

time when it was celebrating the tenth anniversary of the EthiQpian revolutiQn. In 1989 the main rains

failed in much Qf northcrn Ethiopia, imrncdiately raising the spectre of further famine and a prQbable

food aid requirement of mQre than lm. tQns in 1990 (ncarly as much as in 1985 1.3m tQms). The

capture of Massawa in february 1990 by the Eritrean rebells clQsed the pQrt which has been the main

staging-post fQr relief supplies to Eritrea and nQrthern Tigre, and bombing by the Ethiopian air force

subsequently destroyed grain stocks which had aIready arrived there. FQIlQwing these develQpments,

which left mQst of the famine-affected areas Qf northern EthiQpia under the control of the insurgent

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movements, international aetivity conccntratcd on seeuring an "open roads" poliey in order to

guarantee the supply of food to these areas. The Ethiopian government agreed to this poliey in march

1990 and the first convoy was despatehed in the middle of that month. Despite international food aid

earlier this year the World Food Programme was reckoning that sorne Sm. people were at risk of

famine in the north of the country(3).

I-A WARECONOMY

7. The Ethiopian state has been nearly continuously ehallenged since the beginning of the

196Os. First this was due to Eritrca whieh was incorporated in 1962 into the Ethiopian state after

beeing federated to it in 1952 (before it was an Italian Colony) through a United Nations resolution.

The incorporation as an Administrative Region ruled bya governor appointcd by Addis Ababa created

resentment and armed insurrection increased during the 1960s. It worsened during the Ethiopian

revolution for the related government was not prepared to give Eritrea a special status. As a

consequence the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) emerged as the major organization

representing the independenee movement. It ehallenged the Ethiopian army in Eritrea. It eompeted

also with the govemment civil administration by the establishment of an administration in arcas

outside government control. It is for secession.

8. The Ethiopian authorities also have been challenged from the Tigre People's Liberation

Front (l'PLF). Tigre was a region with an autonomous status since 1987(4) which resisted the

hegemony of the Central government in the past. This was particularly true in 1975 when signs of

extending direct control appeared. The TPLF became gradually not only the major resistance

movement but also the arrncd force in Tigre. In 1989, the Ethiopian government lost its last

strongholds in the region. The TPLF also operates in the northern part of Gondar and Wollo

provinces. It was not for secession. It maintained that the central govemment in Addis Ababa lacked

legitimacy. The TPLF until recently profcsscd an even stricter Marxism than Mr Mengistu. Since

1989, the insurgency has expanded southward in Wollo and spilled into Shoa. It appcarcd that the

TPLF joined hands with another Tigre's resistance movement the Ethiopian People's Democratic

Movement (EPDM) to form a military front callcd the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic

Front (EPRDF) which was taking over control of the countryside throughout Wollo in northern Shoa.

9. The Ethiopian state also has been challenged by other groups which are:

- the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) operating in Hararge and Wollo Administrative Regions;

3 Notes fromAfrica South ofthe Sahara - 1991, Europa Publications limited 1990, pp. 465-6,476.4 Fo//owing the adoption ofa new constitution in 1987 the 15 Ethiopian existing regions were replaced by 24Administrative

Regions and/ive Autonomous ones. The latter ones were Eritrea, Tigre, Dire Dawa, Assab and Ogaden.

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9

- the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) operating among the Oromo (or Galla) people in Shoa

Administrative Region, receiving Somali military assistance (at least in the past) ;

- the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) operating in BaIe Administrative Region, receiving

Somali military assistance ;

- the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) al~ing to unite the Ogaden region with Somalia and

receiving support from the latter ond3).

10. The Ethiopian state lost the power in may 1991. President Mengistu Haile Mariam fled on

may 21st to Zimbabwe where his retreat was prepared. He handed over the reins, ad interim, to

lieutenant-general Tesfaye qebre Kidan (fGK). Under western pressure TGK called for a ceasefire

and invited the Ethiopian opponents to peace talks in London at the end of may 1991. The peace talks

failed to reconcile the parties. Several days after the opponents (The Tigre's soldiers mainly)

occupated Addis Ababa. Up to now war has not yet been stopped. Nevertheless one can reasonably

expect that would be the case within a short period of time. So, the Ethiopian economy as Ethiopia

itselfs maybe in case of an Eritrean secession (if alone) would have to be reconstructed i.e. a peace

economy would have to be substituted for a war one.

II - ETHIOPIAN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS

11. "The junta that overthrew the old Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 brutally eliminated the

tiny, rich and grecdy elite around him. That left nobody who could run anything. Soviet ministries

were ordered to fill the gaps and sent their discards. Ethiopia became a punishment station for rejects

from one the world's most incompetent bureaucraties. Under that influence the Ethiopian soldiers

tried, literally to imitate Stalin : to jump a multi-ethnic feudal state, with no transition, into

communism. They slaughtered kulaks, and transformed vast, unproductive private estates into vast,

unproductive state farms. Farrners who stored food from a good harvest were shot for hoarding.

Merchants who bought food in surplus areas for sale in drought districts were shot for profiteering.

Provincial discontent, however justified, was met with reprcssion. Soviet aid for the army was not

matched by aid for civilian development. By the end the regime was spending more than 70% of its

revenue on weapons, and practically nothing on roads, water supplies, schools and the rest. Pressure

from western governments, unwilling to contemplate another famine (than that of 1984-5) on their .

domestic television screens, forced the junta last year to loosen up control of farms and trade (reform

of march 5th, 1990) ; but too late"(5). In this framework Ethiopia had to cope with an agriculture crisis

appeared in the beginning of the 1960s and which wQrsened after the revQ!utiQn Qf 1974.

5 Notes directly extractedfrom the Economise, may 27th 1991, p. 59.

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A) An Agriculture crisis

12. Per capita agricultural production has fallen down rapidly since 1960 and consequently

gave rise to increased imports of food to Ethiopia even during non-drought years. This was rather

obvious after the drought of 1972-3 when Ethiopia ceased to be more or less sufficient in food

production. This appears to he rather paradoxal given that the country was often regarded as having

great potentials to be self-sufficient in food and even to be net exporter of agricultural products.

Indeed, Ethiopia's meadows, pastures and crop lands account for over 60 per cent of its territory of

which only 15-16 per cent is under cultivation. Much of the country lies on high plateaus, crisscrossed

by large river systems where the c1imate is temperate and rainfall adequate. In many places however,

the terrain makes transport difficult and sorne arcas are practically inaccessible. In this respect one has

to point out the influences of environment degradation and the agriculture PQlicy carried on by

EthiQpian applied macroeconQmics.

B) An Environment degradation

13. PQpulatiQn growth in the twentieth century(6), enhanced by the partial control of

epidemics and by the relative peaceful period of Haile Selassie'reign after WQrld War II, has given a

new dimension tQ the pressure Qn land. Its impacts have been severe. Long fal1Qw periQds can no

lQnger be maintained and arable land cornes under cQntinuQus cultivatiQn. SQil fertilization through

organic manuring has becQme less frequent because the scarcity of firewQQd fQrces peQple to use

cow-dung as hQusehQld fuel. As a result erosiQn due to natural factors (wind, rainfall) has wQrsened

Qr more precisely has been exacerbated by agricultural practices. It features mainly the highlands

(lands above 1.500 metres) where the majority of Ethiopia' pQpulation and agricultural productiQn is

concentrated (semi-arid northem highlands). A detailed study of the land degradation process in

Ethiopia which was carried Qut in the mid-1980s indicated that erosiQn is heaviest Qn slQping

agriculturalland (Ministry of Agriculture and FAO, 1984). Parts of Eritrea and Tigre (i.e. the major

rcbellion regiQns) have already bcen badly eroded while the densely PQPulated and intensively

cultivated regions of Gondar, WQllo and northem Shoa are now in the frontline of environmental

degradation. It was estimated that soil erosion in these areas reduced crop yields by 1 per cent per

annum. while biolQgical degradation (Le. a decline in organic matter) might cause a further 1 per cent

reduction. Eroded land has progressively shifted tQ less prQductive uses as crQP yields decrease and

nutritional composition of grasses deteriorate, providing poor grazing for livestQck. Eventua1ly, the

land produces neither crops nQr feed for cattle.

6 Estimates based on the 1984 Ct!1lSUS give apopulation's growth rate of3.1 per cent per annllln at long fUn. To know wetherthe late figure accounts for famine and refllgees ronains apertinent ljIlestion.

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14. The Ethiopian governrnent took mesures or programmes to combat degradation. They

included the building of terraces, the closure of hillsides, the planting of trees and the construction of

irrigation schemes, as weIl as the relocation of people on a local level (villagization) and on a regional

or national lever (resettlement). Several organizations co-operate in the implementation of these

programmes (the World Food Programme or the European Economie Community for instance).

Although being aware of thci gravity of the degradation for agriculture production and so their welfare

it seems that the peasants' responses to the govemin~nt's mesures have been weak. Apart from the fact

that the pesants are poor and lack the neccssary tools and seeds to do something substantial to arrest,

erosion, the rcason behind such a behaYiour has likely to be found in the relations between the

gQvemment Le. its delegates and/Qr mandating bodies and the private farmers in the framewQrk Qf the

fQnner's agriculture policy.

C) A misleading Government agriculture policy

1. Yiewon the agriculture sector

15. Despite a market Qf food excess demand Ethiopia remains in the long run a country

oriented towards agriculture prQduction viewed by African standards. Indeed, although being Qn a

decreasing trend (both in real (1980) and current priees) since the 1960s, the weight of agriculture in

G.D.P. (at current priees) in 1987 is 40.0 per cent for a share of around 22 per cent in Africa and 32

per cent in its sub-Saharan part. The industry and services shares are 17 and around 37 per cent

cQmpared to African figures Qf around 31 and 26 for industry and 39 and 36 per cent for services.

Agriculture is particularly relevant for industry for the majQr manufacturing subsectors depend all

directly on the agriculture one. The latter one matters also strongly for exports for it accounts for

SQme 90 per cent Qf the related receipts. The dominant export commodity is coffee (73.2 1000 mt in

1987) which accounts for 60 per cent of exports at normal rainfall. The other ones are cottQn (2.1

1000 mt), groundnuts (8,200.0 mt), sugar (10.7 1000 mt) and meat (0.5 1000 mt)(7J. Coffee exports

are vital for the Ethiopian econQmy. But unlike other coffee exporters most of the coffee is consumed

dQmesticaIly. MQreover, with consumption Qf about 3 kg per capita Ethiopia is on parity with many

high-income countries(BJ. Coffee export eamings (i.e. income terms of trade fQr coffee) account fQr 8

per cent of natiQnal income Qn average. It has an instability index (measured as 100 (SEF/mean»

averaging the value of 41 per cent in the IQng run (1961-80). As such and compared to the world

coffee market value (14 per cent) they are particularly unstable. Furthermore they depend more upon

export priee. Indeed the instability index for the latter is 49 per cent while for the quantity of coffee

exports it has the value of 16 per cent. World coffee market values are respectively that of 12 and 10

per cent. Given the links between coffee exports and the rest of the economy fluctuations from the

7 mt is the symbol for metric tons8 This may he the reflection ofrecording disturbances between coffee demand and supply.

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first one'market are transmitted to the modem sector of the economy through variation in capital­

goods imports (elasticity of about 0.42 one year lag) and domestic-capital formation (three years

lag)(9). At the light of its sharc in the labour force Le. 90 (more than within Africa) per cent comparcd

to that in G.D.P. (43 per cent in real prices) it seems that the Ethiopian agriculture productivity is

rather low within Africa. Further it incrcases more slowly. Both may be an explanation for its food

excess demand problem but not only. It has also something to do with the government's agriculture

poliey and more precisely with its managing schemc in the framework of a constant environment

degradation (net deforestation rate of 0.4 per cent for annum, for instance).

2) links between agriculture and ideology

16. BefQre the refonn Qf march 5th. 1990 and as a follQw-up of the 1974 revolution Ethiopia

became a command economy using central planning as in USSR rather than market forces to allocate

resource and tQ pay for production factors(lO). As far as organization was concemed it put the

emphasis on idcQlogy rather than efficiency. From this viewpoint private rural ownership was

abolished as weB as the rigbt to hire rural labour (march 1975). New structures for official markets

werc shaped in conjunction. They would benefit from government's financial support so as to become

the nucleus for Qfficial markets. For the agriculture one these nucleus were Pcasant Associations

~(Jl). The P.As were IQcal clectively-Icd associations which were intended ultimately to

organize themselvcs into co-operatives and communal or state farms, in addition to being responsible

for tax collection and judicial matters.

17. The expansion of state farms was particularly rapid, with the area under cultivation rising

to 2% of total cultivatcd land in 1982. Many of thesc farms were iII-planned and uneconomic and by

1984 their total area had been reduced to the same level as in 1975 from which it has expanded again

to less than 2% Qf total cultivated land by 1988. Growth in the co-operative farming sector, which

was planned to encompass more than one-half of total agricultural land by 1994 was slow, raising

only to 5.3% of tQtal cultivated land by 1988. From 1985 onwards the govemment undertook a large­

scale effort to grQUP peasant households into centralized villages instead of the isolated homes tcads

which characterized most agricultural arcas in the Ethiopian higblands. Starting in the Hararge region

in the south-cast, this programme involved massive rebuilding and relocation througbout much of

central and southem Ethiopia, which by 1988, had resulted in the "villagization" of sorne 12.2m

peQple rcpresenting about 33% of the total rural population. Although peasants continued to farm

individual plots, this process was widely regarded as a prelude to the collectivization of agriculture.

9 Resrdts due to D.M Etherington and Alasebu Yainshet : "1ne Impact of Income Temls of Trade for CofJee on CapitalGoods Imports and Investment in Ethiopia ~ Eastern Africa Economie Review, voL 4, nO 1, 1988.10 Ethiopia was declared a socialist state on 20 december 1974.11 Apart {rom the PAs the Ethiopian people were also "enrolled" in the cilies via residential basisllrbandwellers'associations after the abolition ofprivate urban ownership (four months after that ofthe nuai one).

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18. In the framework of govemment's supporting nucleus, the free markets or structures were

tolerated bccause it was recognised that it was beyond the power of the state to obliterate it. This was

nevertheless truc at short terro only. In the long run different forms of crowding out were organised by

the governroent's mandating bodies. In this respect private farming (90 per cent of crop output) was

discriminatcd vis-à-vis state farms and co-operative farroing through lower output priees in the

framework of binding delivering quotas. higher interest rates, less agricultural adviso[)' support and

high taxation of cash sales production in excess ôf the quotas. And furthermore through a new land

tenure system.

(i) The Agriculture Marketing Corporation (A.M.C.)

19. Up to mid-l99q agriculture production had to be sold to the Agricultural Marketing

Corporation (A.M.C.) through a compulsory delivering quota system at pre-determined priee levels.

The quota was divided proportionately among the members of the P.As. The peasant's quota had to be

deliver whatever the produccr's situation was. In case of a too low level of production the peasant was

required to do his dutY by purchasing from the market. His reward was a moral one. But at the

opposite his punishment was a real physical one. In case of a surplus he was allowed to sell to

licensed traders only. In this respect the latter ones were required to deliver 50 per cent of what they

procured to the A.M.C. As such A.M.C. enjoyed a monopolistic position both in terms of purchase

and distribution. It had also a supply monopolistic position vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Oilseeds and

Pulses Export Corporation to whom it was the only seller of pulses and oilseeds.

20. The mandates of the A.M.C. were such as to permit the Ethiopian govemment to control

food supply and reduce shortage and to pursue an output price policy. While the former ones were

attempts to solve food excess demand, the latter acted in a way to cure an endemic inflation (as

measured by the Addis Ababa consumer price index). In this framework one would normally assume

that the A.M.C. would bcnefit from sufficient financial and infrastructural capacity to purchase, store

and distribute the marketable surpluses (vis-à-vis the amounts consumed by the peasants) in the

country. Practically this was not the case. In the best of years the A.M.C.'s purchase share does not

approach 10 per cent of the eereals produeed in the country. Furthermore its bureaucratie management

hampered him to move the agriculture production where it was required. So shortage remained

endemic in several areas (districts or regions). Furthermore food transport was hampered by armed

insurrection bccoming civil war. This not only because of land destruction but for political reasons

also. For instance Eritrea and Tigre werc not only regions were drought was recurrent and food excess

demand endemic but also rebcllion ones.

21. The low level of purchase by the A.M.C. is a consequenee of its output priee policy which

was counterproductive and biased the resource allocation against the dominant produeers i.e. the

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private ones. As such unrecorded trade increased with as a resuIt a reinforced inflationary trend given

private traders'constraints and their responses to the latter ones. As far as the output priee is

concemed, the AM.C. discriminated strongly between private, cooperatives and state produeers. On

average the second ones received priees 10-20 per cent above the private producers'levels while the

state farms reeeived 20 per eent more than the co-operative farming sector{l2). Furthermore it is

worth mentioning that both reeeived less than on the free markets and below their production cost the

gap being particularly high for state farms were less productive than the private ones. In terms of

nominal protection Le. the ratio of the producer priee to the world one and for coffee the major cash

crop the producers received no more than 40 per eent of the latter at long ron. Although being rather

normal in the African context{l3) this figure was rather severe for the Ethiopian producers given the

share of coffe in the exported production. It may explain why coffee export eamings account only for

8 per cent of national income. After cach drought (1981 and 1984-5) nominal protection increased a

little showing the govemment was aware of the constraints of its output price policy on the producers.

22. Given the preccding the incentives to private producers to deliver their quotas to the

AM.C. were low even if the latter one was also mandated to deliver them fertilizers and improved

seeds{l4). This was especially true when production was too low to reach the compulsory quota. In

this case the peasant had to purchase on free markets at a higher cost given the free traders' strategy.

Free traders also enjoyed constraining output price. Indeed they had to agree to deliver their purchases

to the AM.C. at the latter's priee no matter how much they have paid to the producers to be granted

the license to transport their stock to a market of their choiee. As a resuIt private traders invoiced high

priees to the consumers.

23. At the light of the preceding one understands why the output delivered by the AM.C. to

the Oilseeds and Pulses Export Corporation did not exceed 60 per cent of the pre-revolutionary

period on average. As such coffee became the main exported commodity{l5). Its production benefitted

strongly from international assistance for improvement (EEC, WB). Indeed, since 1971 nearly 20 per

cent of production had been lost through coffee berry disease. The growth of coffee production also

benefitted from govemment support in a framework which was not favorable for the peasants and

12 This was shawn on the basis ofa study conducted at the Central Committee for National Planning.

13 The figures for other African producers were as fo//ows :

· Ugandn less than 20per cent· Tanzania : from 30 ta 80 per cent ofworldprice· Ivairy Coast, Zaïre, Cameroon, Rwandn, Madagascar: less than 40per cent

· Kenya: [rom 50 ta 100per cent~ : DIA!. s staffmembers camplltation.

14 This task was later transfered ta the Ministry ofAgriculture.15 War alsa afJected the export by commodities. For instance, althallgh in 1974 Ethiopia had been one ofthe wor/ds leadingexporters ofsesame seed, the main area of cllitivation bordering the S/ldan has since been /ost ta government control andproduction has co//apsed.

14

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furthermore uneconomic. Coffee production was almost totally in peasant hands. But to increase

output further (50% over ten years), the government chose the establishment of plantations. So the

latter ones became the nucleus for the coffee market. This was economically unsound in view of the

relatively high costs of plantation production compared with the peasant system Le. the cultivation of

essentially wild bushes.

(U) The new land tenure system

,24. At the light of abolished rural ownership private producers were also discriminated vis-à-

vis the co-operative farming. Indeed, each new member of a cooperative was allowed to get acces to

land held by an individual peasant whose chose to stay outside the cooperative. As such not only

private farmers lost envy to p!oducc but also and maybe more dctrimentally to the country at long run

that to take care of the soils to combat degradation. In this framework moral incentives and finally

coercion were not enough to rnodifiy the trends to low output level and productivity.

3) Outcowe for the ecoDomy

25. The outcorne of the Ethiopian agriculture policy were not only severe for the agriculture

sector but also detrimental to the economy as a whole given ilS agriculture sharcs. They were as

follows:

1] an increascd cost of agriculture in tenns of govemment's expenditure to P.As for their productivity

levels were below thcse of the private fanns but they piped relatively more. For instance, since 1982

state farms received 43% of aIl invcstment in agriculture for an output share of only 6% ;

Nevertheless their production accounted for 65% of urban needs ;

2] a low level of agriculture productivity in the long run for

i) the P.As' performances were poor the private seètor being (likely) twice as much productive

as the ideology agriculture nucleus;

ii) the private fanners more productive were strongly discriminated ;

iii) the continuous environment degradation ;

iv) the agriculture~ underfunding given the govemment's ambitious projects ;

15

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16

v) the agriculture sharc in government's expenditure. The sector received only 50 per cent of

its budget allocation share.

3] a low level ofregistered production given the productivity rcsults, the quota system, the production

surplus taxation and the increascd black market. Therefore there was a structural need to import food

given the high demographic growth. As a result the import penetration ratio increased (whatever its

definition would be) at the opposite of the export one directly dependent upon agriculture production;

Il is also worth mentioning that it increased given the need to import to socialize the economy. In the

long run the import component of Ethiopia's gross domestic capital formation indeed averagcd about

33 per cent. It reached a maximum value in 1979 with 76 per ccnt(l6) ;

4] a decrease of agriculture rentability through the discrimination against private farmers and the

private traders'reaction to their price constraints. For instance while priees for output remained

constant betwecn 1981 and 87, the cost of living increased by 4.3 per cent per annum. As a result

private savings decrcased strongly contrasting the post revolutionary period from the pre­

revolutionary one (1967-74);

5] a decreasc of agriculture share in GDP (both in real and CUITent prices) with a defavorable

multiplier effect on growth ;

6] a persistent consumption inflationary trend (except for consumers being allowed to purchase in

subsidized shops) ;

7] an incrcase of unregistered trade which revealed throught an decrease of government's goods

taxation revenue dcspite incrcascd marginal rate of taxation;

8] a decreasc of the export to import ratio in rcal tenus since 1973 giving birth to a increased

structural resource imbalance whatever the terms of trade would be ; this to be taken into account in

conjunction with private and public savings decrease meant that Ethiopia became a structurally two­

gap country (trade plus savings one). This explains why in feb. 1985 the government introduced

tighter controls on imports, particularly relating to luxury items and petroI. In its austerity programme

compulsory contributions were also introduced to assist in funding the famine relief programme with

wage earners expected to contribute the equivalent of one month's wages, and peasant farmers one

month's income. Similar campaigns were introduced in an attempt to deal with the military events in

1988 and 1989.

16 Reslllts dlle to D.M. Etherington and Alasebll Yainshet : "The Impact ofIncome Tenns of Trade for Coffee on CapitalGoods Imports and Investment in Ethiopia", Eastern Africa Economie Revicw, vol. 4, n° l, 1988.

1111111111111

9] a persistent food shortage becoming dramatic i.e. issuing famine and starvation in case of drought;

In this framework, it is worth mentioning that the decline in food production had started to be reduccd

bcfore the effects of the renewed drought began to be felt after 1983 ;

10] an incrcase of public consumption i.e. of agriéulture expenditure and economic services ones(l7)

given the necd to employ people to manage and control the command agriculture policy. This

increase became part of a general government expenditure'one linked to the development of a socialist

accumulation (capital), to national defense and sccurity investments.(growing up to 1984), the

covering of losses of uneffieient state entreprises(l8) and the external debt payments. To what degree

defensc expenditurc includ~ purchases of military equipment was unknown but US govemmcnt

statistics cited Ethiopia as the largest purchaser of weapons in sub-Saharan Africa during the period

1979-83 spending a total of $ 1,900m of which purchascs from the USSR accounted for $ l,800m.

11] a decrease of government receipts from the agriculture sector when it had to cope with increased

expenditure and defiGit. This happened dcspite the peasants' low nominal protection rate, austerity

measures supported by civil servants, increased marginal rate of taxation and increased transfers of

state enterprises profit (when any) to the government. In this framework the Ethiopian govcrnment put

pressure on the country's Central Bank to increase the quantity of money. This contrasted the post­

revolutionary period from the pre-one for which the aim of monetary poliey had been priee stability

through austcrity monetary policy. In this respect real interest rates were often negative which

negatively affected the "remaining" savings.

17

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26. The agriculture policy outcome were rcinforeed i.e. became more detrimental to growth

and welfare in the context of the civil war. The latter one increased production losses and food

shortage not only because of the destruction of productive resouree and transport problems but

because the second i.e. shortage and its outcome were used as political tools. In this respect every one

remember of food rotten on the ground i.e. not being conveyed to populations dying from starvation.

17 V/eir both share in govemment expenditure was at the end of1987 near/y lwice as big as il was for Africa (47.2 per centcompared to 29.3). FurthemlOre it was growing.18 For instance in 1984-5, 73.4 per cent of industries undcr Ministry of Indl/stry wcre reporting losses. Thcse ones were

approaching 30 per cent of losses reported by ail public entreprises. Results from Befekadu Deguefe : "Profile of theEthiopian Economy~ Perspective Study ofSllb-Saharan Africa by the World Bank. It is worth indicating that subsidies andcl/rrent transfers in Ethiopian govemment expenditure got a lower share (8.4 per cent in 1986) than for Africa as a whole(11.7 per cent). Further the share tended to decrease since 1983 while it more or less stabilized for Africa.

111111111111111111111

27. The agriculture policy outcome were not compensated by the performances of the non­

agriculture sectors even when their shares in GDP increascd meaningfully at the opposite of

agriculture. This had something to do not only with the adverse effect of agriculture multipliers but

also the efficiency of industrial and services investments to create value added. For example, the share

of manufactured goods in total exports remained very low particularly for high processed

manufactured goods (sugar preparations, leather and skins, textile fabrics, cement, ...). Nevertheless

their export share (about 4 per cent) was higher than those of the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon,

Ghana and Zaïre(l9). The low level of efficiency explained why capital output ratio on average (2.5)

was rather high compared to other African economy(20). Efficiency was affected by government

practices which increascd constraints for the private investors under the forms of limitations to needed

capital, allocation of bank credit, foreign exchange and increased capital cost. It was also affected by

government policy of absorbing skilled workers at any levels, the latter one being consistent with

government's efforts to increasc school enrollment training and re-training of the labour force. As a

rcsult private invcstors (when any) turned to the underground economy, to low risk invcstment and

high return activities. AlI this explaincd why the share of services in GDP increased more

meaningfully than that of manufacturing. This also explaincd a low level of capacity utilization rate in

the late sector. The preceding given it is also worth mentioning that Ethiopia lost 40 per cent of its

manufacturing sector because of the war with Eritrea a region weIl "endowned" with industry.

Efficiency likely was also affected by governmcnt support to large-scale enterpriscs often with aid

from the late Eastern bloc. This was cconomically unsound given their comparative production costs

but also biased again the allocation of resource against the small-scaie and handicraft industries

which accounted for about 50 per cent of the industry output.

28. As a global outcome welfare (i.e. GDP per capita) deteriorated strongly in Ethiopia and

gross domcstic savings ratio to GDP decrcased(21). As rcsult investment had to be financed more and

more via external rcsourcc. At the end of 1987 gross domcstic savings ratio to GDP approached a zero

value indicating a high level of dependance vis-à-vis external financing at the opposite of the pre­

revolutionary period. The savings share contrasted strongly the post-revolution period from the pre­

one for which it was meaningfully above ten per cent. External resource being reduced comparatively

to Africa because of the political choicc of Ethiopia(22) external debt increased continuously from

19 Resultsfrom: "Analyse Structurelle des Echanges C.E.E.IA.C.P. " by J. Leonard, K. Behnia, Cl. Jedlicki and 1. Monsalve,LS.M.EA., sept. 1988, p.46.20 But it is worth mentioning that the depreciation rate also l'las relatively lower which increases the capital output ratio byreducing the capital efficiency.21 This also in tenns ofgross national savings

GDS =GDP - Total consumption (i.e. the private and public ones) ;GNS =GDS + net factor income and net private transfers from abroad.

22 Cessation of aid from a number of major lending agencies followed the 1975 nationalization and subsequentcompensation problems. This l'las even true after november 1977 when Ethiopia received help from the USSR and Cuba tocombat regional political activism and Somalia. Progress on this issue at the beginning of the 1980s led the World Bank toreSlune lending by february 1981.

18

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1980 onwards with as a result a further increase of govemment expenditure duc to interest payments

for borrowed money. External debt reached the level of nearly US $ 3 billion at the end of 1988 (not

accounting for the debt to USSR(23)) of which about US $ 2.3 billion duc by the Central governrnent.

The share to GDP of the concessional extemal debt was nearly three times as big as the non

concessional one (37.8 pcr cent in 1987 compared to 13.3 per cent). These figures contrast strongly

Ethiopia from the rest of Africa where the share of non conccssional external debt amounts 52.9 per

cent compared to a concessional share of 23.3. Th~ figures for sub-Saharan Mrica are respectively

these of 66.8 and 28.5 pcr cent. As a result of these constrasting figures debt service to export ratio,increased nearly 10 points more for Ethiopia than for Mrica (34 per cent compared to 25.9 in 1987).

4) Qutcome 00 the eoviroomeot

29. The negative impacts of the Ethiopian agriculture managing scheme were also meaning

fuI in terms of environment degradation. This is mainly duc to the way govemment treated peasants

whatever the organization structures were. The focus was on ideology rather than efficiency. People

were order what to do and opposition was considered to be a counter-revolutionary attitude. The

official approach was prescriptive and commandist rather than consultative and supportive of local

initiatives. In fact as several analysts of Ethiopia have said the main feature of the structural changes

in the Ethiopia countryside since the revolution was to substitute the state for feudal lords as the

supremc appropriator of pcasant produce, labour and think ! Consequcntly peasants participated in

environmental rchabilitation only when food-for-work was arranged. In this framework govemment's

measures lost a certain amount of efficicncy and participation because several ones had not only

something to do with environmental degradation or drought but also civil war. So it was not always

very clear for peasants wethcr villagization or resettlement were decided to reduce the pressure on

land or to empty the rebellion regions. This was particularly obvious in case of Eritrea and Tigre

proned to recurrent drought and so featured by pronounced environmental degradation (para 13).

30. Various scenarios for natural resource use in highlands have been developed to predict the

future situation of the country in the absence of major changes in agricultural practices, in the rate of

estimated population growth or in the rate of resource degradation. One scenario suggests that

between 1985 and 2010 soil erosion will cause an incrcase in the land incapable of supporting

agriculture from 2 mj11jon hectares to 10 million hectares an area which covcrs sorne 17 per cent of

the highlands. Another study suggests that by the same date agricultural production in almost three

quarters of the administrative districts will not be enough to provide subsistance for thcir inhabitants.

combat regiona/ po/itica/ activism and Soma/ia. Progress on chis issue at the beginning of the 1980s /ed the Wor/d Bank toreS/une /ending by february 1981.23 By 1989 Ethiopia's mi/itary debt to the USSR, since invo/ment started in 1977, was estimated to have reached $ s,OOOm ­$6,OOOm.

19

24 The notes of the next paragraphs are [rom The Policy Framework Paper (1990/91 - 1992/93) prepared hy the Ethiopianauthorities in collaboration with the Staffs ofthe Fund and the World Bank (aug. 30, 1990).

31. Under pressure from western governments unwilling to contemplate another famine (para

6) on their domestic television screens and hoping to benefit from increased western financial support

the Ethiopian govemment opencd up to economic, social and political reforms at the beginning of

1990. At the llth Regular Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia on

March 5th President Mengitsu Haile-Mariam announced a completely new Ethiopian economic

system bascd on a mixed economy. In addition the President's speech inc1uded political innovations

through which to embody an Ethiopian perestroïkha or so caHed il.

rnembers;

III - THE ETHIOPIAN REFORMS

20

32. The mixcd economy was defincd by several points amongst which the most relevant were:

3/ The abolition of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation and the quota system;

4/ The abolition of the produccrs cooperatives if this would be the dcmocratic will of the

1/ The co-existence of state and private entcrprises. faons to construct a socialist Ethiopia. In

both cases the latter ones should be encouraged and strenghencd ;

5/ The admittance of peasants'rights to use specifie area of land and to transfer these rights to

their legal heirs when they derive their livelihood from faoning ;

2/ Astate managing system putting the emphasis on competitIOn. profitability and

productivity otherwise state entreprises or farms should be sold or c10sed down ;

The six points should lead to a change in the national plans. Instead of issuing state's directives they

should be transformed into indicative plans reflecting both planning and marketing laws. One of the

govemment's objectives was to stimule the agricultural sector. As such the refonn was more or less a

response to a recognised agriculture crisis.

6/ The peasants' rights to hire workers to work on their farms ; the private investors' rights to

establish modern large farms ; the private traders' rights to compete without any restrictions with the

state-run trade enterprises in aH sectors of the economy.

33. The Ethiopian perestroïkha was preparcd since the beginning of 1988 i.e. in the context of{

the IDA supported Peasant Agricultural Development Project, the Ninth Plenum of the Central

Committee of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia and the july 1989 three decrees. They were promulgated

to liberalize the economy improve the c1imate for private investment and encourage levels of extemal

assistance(24).

11111111111111111111~

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21

34. The Ethiopian perestroïkha was just one comerpiece of a wider Government's Economic

Reform Programme (ERP) covering the period through the year 2000. Its major aims were :

a) to raise the real GDP growth rate on a sustained basis in order to progressively increase per capita

income and consumption ;

b) to increase food production and food security ; .

c) to diversify the production base ;

d) to increase exports through broadly based extemal sector policies ;

e) to promote balanccd regional development in order to expand employment opportunities in both

urban and rural areas ;

f) to provide adequate levels of health education, and other social welfare facilities ;

g) to introduce and diffuse appropriate technologies in order to raise labor productivity ;

h) to work toward removing long-term structural impediments to economic stability with a sustained

high rate of growth ;

i) to remove or minimize constraints to the quality of life, including the adverse effects of recurrent

drought, high population growth, and environmental degradation. Vulnerable groups are to be

protected during this transformation.

35. To ensure the success of the reforms aIready announeed as weIl as that of the institutional

reforms envisaged in the ERP, the Ethiopian govemment announced the implementation of

comprehensive macroeconomic policies and structural adjustment measures during the next three

years (1991-92). Amongst the latter ones :

(a) to adopt an appropriate exchange rate level in conjunction with decreased trade and

exchange restrictions(25);

(b) to phase out the remaining pricc distortions by eliminating most official priee controls

while allowing a flexible administration of the remaining controlled priees ;

(c) to reduee the budget deficit through revenue measures that seek to broaden the tax base by

removing priee distortions and improving the elasticity of the tax system, and through expenditure

restraint by containing the wage bill, curtailing subsidies, gradually reducing security-related outlays,

and setting priorities for capital expenditure ;

25 Exchange rate parity had been {lXed to 207 bi"per US $ since febntary 1973.

111111111111111111111

(d) to pursue a monetary policy consistent with the reduction in the rate of inflation by

curtailing the Government's rccoursc to the banking system, while providing adequate credit to the

expanding private sector, and adoption of a nondiscriminatory interest rate structure that is positive in

real terms.

These measures and policies were expected to result in an average real GDP growth of about 4.5 per

cent per annum during 1990/91 -1992/93. This rate was mainly determined by the agricultural sector

which would continue to be the leading sector in the economy.

36. The successful implementation of the reforms was crucially dependent on containing the

civil war and receiving increascd financial support from the international community through

increascd levels of extemal rcsourcc on concessional terms and substantial debt relief. This was not

the case as far as the civil war was concemed. So even the period was too short to appreciate the

outcome of the announced reforms on people it may be said that Ethiopia has begun a transition from

a command economy to a market-based one. Now tbat it may be reasonaly expected war coming to

ifs end rçforms balancing efficienc.y and justice bave to be irnplernented or pursued.

IV - CONCLUDING REMARKS

37. At the light of the preceding the question adressed by the E.E.C., i.e. how to pass from a

war to a peace cconomy in the Ethiopian case is now relevant. Fundamentally, it would mean to help

the Ethiopian autboritics(26) coping with different challenges often inter-related.

38. The first challenge would concem the agriculture sector and its labour force. Il would be :

1] how to develop the agriculture sector within a determined period of time so as to

improve food supply and distribution and curb people impoverishing and

2] how to deal with environment degradation so as to reduce the effects of recurrent

drougbt and increase potential agriculture output.

Both parts are linked for:

1] peasants taking care or better of their environment implies them benefitting from a certain

level of sustainable growth or better related purchasing power. This obviously in the context of

greater freedom and structures where the peasants' knowledge amongst otber ones may be accounted

for;

26 Hoping they would he democratically elected.

22

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2] potential output increase means upswing in farmers' productivity the latter one being related

to peasants' welfare improvements and increascs of yields and as such to environment rehabilitation.

39. The second challenge wouId be to deal with the needs to rebuilt or built the basis

infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, harbours, etc...). It would take a rather long time. Obviously

the agriculture challenge is linked to the infrastructure related one for roads etc... are needed to

distribute agriculture output aIl over the country so as to reduce food shortage due to transport

problems. Likely, it would be hampercd by the timing of infrastructure rebuilt. That means that,

international food aid would remain a requirement during a certain period of time. This would he even

more true if nonnal rainfall does not occur.

40. The third challepge would he how to allocate government expenditure so as to improve

growth, inflation, to curb budget deficit and to reduee debt ratios. Here it is worth indicating that

peaee would mean sorne gains for government given the expected decreasc of military expenditure

and the closing down of unefficient state enterprises. In this respect one has nevcrtheless to keep in

mind the possible cession of Eritrea which would mean losses of growth potentials for the Ethiopian

economy and thereforc the Ethiopian government. It would definitely loss 40 per cent of the country

manufacturing potentials plus seaports such as Massawa Tio and Assab. In this case Ethiopia would

be cut from the world market. It would just remain with the railway linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti.

41. The fourth challenge wouId be an employment one. Indeed, soldiers would have to be

demobilized in a period during which state enterprises would be closcd down at a rate of about 50

(para 25) per cent given increased losses. So employment in the industry sector would reduce (supply

shock). Given the industry employment figure (about 90,000 persons in 1984(27) factories closing

down and Eritrean cession may increase unemployment drastically. The preceding indicates that

increased part of the labour force (amongst which the demobilized soldiers) would normally tum to

the black market to get a job. That shows also there would be an income gap to be fulfillcd when

passing from a war to a peace economy. As such there would be risks for the social stability of the

country in a period during which growth would be unstable at least.

42. AlI the already mentioned challenges should be coped within a climate where private

initiatives may reveal and strenghen in such a way to case the substitution of market regulation for

state planning. Then improved growth, trust, desinflation would mean private savings increase. And

as such private invcstrnent and employment growth. The fonner is a prerequisite for a market

economy. A market economy instead of a command one is the fundamentaJ rcfonn to be implemented

in Ethiopia. But this can only be the case gradually not only because urgent needs have to be

27 Last year for which data are avaUable.

23

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encountered but to avoid the disintegration of the economy or more precisely increased number of

activities bccoming black market ones (as it is the case for several countries of the late Eastern bloc or

developing ones trying to apply perestroïkha : the Vietnam one for instance). And also bccause what

Ethiopia needs is a regulation conciling efficiency and justice. Such a functioning pIcas for fine tuning

which can only be obtained at long run and further with the help of democratic experiments.

43. The preceding given the EC working programme should be set up by establishing

prioritics among the challenges the Ethiopian government has to cope with. In this respect, it wouId

seem relevant to focus first of aIl on the agriculture potentials Le. the quantity and quality of available

cultivated arcas, related production factors and the way to increase output price at least cost given the

govemment budget deficit and the level of external debt. The focus on agriculture would permit to

cope with food shortage, the income-employment problem and the social stability one. It would help

to define a tax basis for a sustainable growth. This would improve Public Finance at long run. It is

worth indieating that underlyingthe agriculture crisis is an"environment one reducing land yields by 2

per cent per annum. Therefore the focus on agriculture should also be an environrnent rehabilitation

one. Further this pleas for the development of specifie macro tools during the time study to account

for economic depreciation of natural resource capitaU28J. These tools which arc new..GDP

accounting procedures would likely yield mcasures which would be much more relevant to appreciate

Ethiopian future than old national accounts based ones. Just to show the pertinency of these "new"

measurcs let's indicate that in the case of Indoncsia (a country whcre cnvironmental degradation turns

to be a land devastating process) deprcciation has becn calculated for oil, timber and top soils. The

outcome was a growth rate of the adjusted GDP for the periode 1971-84 of only 4 per cent compared

to unadjusted figure of 7.1 per cent.

28 See for instance works done by J.M. Hartwick at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario.

24

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ANNEX,

25

11 .... --_....-

Social Indicators of Development, 1990

1 -

1 Most~ rtgÎon 1Ùlcome group

NuI25-30 15-20 rtCtN Sub- t"glltr

UttÏlof ytiU'.r YUJ~ utimau SaMrQII Low- lIUXHfIemza.nlrt Ggo aga (mrt) A/riCtl ~ group

1 HUMAN RESOURCESSIu, growth, rtructure or popula1JonToul~tiOQ(mre = 1989) milliall 2S 33 49 481 2r5 6ô1

14 an under %otpop· 44.5 44.4 47.4 47.2 5.3 37.915-64 53.1 53.0 49.3 50.3 60.1 57.6

1 Age depend;cncy ratio unit 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.65 0.73Pcrcc:nLlge ln uiban areaJ %of pop. 7.6 9.5 12.7 33.1 37.4 59.2

Fcmales per 100 malelUrban Dl.III;!ber 107 11SRural 96 98

1 P~OQ growth raie annual % 2.S 2.6 3.1 3.1 2.0 2.1w 5.7 4.5 4.7 5.2 5.6 3.0Urban/rural groWlh differenti.al difference 3.4 2.1 1.8 2.8 5.8 1.9Projecu:d~tion: 2000 mill,!OOI 70 674 3,62D 831

1Stationaty pcipuhtioo 471Detennlnan15 ~ populatlon growthFertilily

~r thou. pop. 43.5 43.1 50.5 46.7 29.8 30.0Crude birth raieToul fertilily raie liithl per woman 5.80 5.92 7.50 659 3.80 3.87

1Contnceptïve fRvalence % oC women 15-49 2.0 56.2

Oilld (0-4) 1wanan 05-49) ratiolper ](Xlwwomen 62 57Urban

Rural 75 85Morulity

~r thou. ??p. 20.2 19.2 19.2 15.5 9.9 8.1

1Crude death raieInfant morttlilv raie per thou. !ive birth1 165.2 151.4 133.2 106.9 69.3 52.7Under 5 mortalilY raie 189.5 1S7.1 161.0 81.5We expectancy al birth: overall ~n 42.8 44.1 47.6 51.0 61.9 65.2

fcmale 43.3 44.6 49.4 5'L7 62.7 67.6

1Labor force (15·64)Toullabor force nùlliOOI 13 16 21 194 1,371 244

Agriculmre %ci laborforce 86.2 82.4 ~ ..IndulUY w 5.3 6.9

Fcmal.e 40.2 39.7 37.6 37.8 35.9 30.2

1Fcmalel per 100 males

DUIt,!ber 102 123UrbanRural 96 102

Panicipation raie: overall % ci labor force 47.4 46.4 42.7 41.3 49.5 38.8fcmale w 37.8 36.6 31.9 30.4 35.0 22.6

EducationalauaJnment ot'Iabor force

1 School ye&n canpleted: overall ~nmale

NATURALRESOURCESArea thou.lq. km 1,222 1,222 1,222 23,056 36,997 21,088

1 DenA ~·lbr'CJ.km 21 27 38 20 76 30Agri~Wralland o land &lU 48.0 48.6 48.3 33.8 36.1 36.9Agricu1wraI denlity ~.perl~ 43 55 78 58 212 82Foresu and woodlind ou.l~. 296 286 275 6,819 9,154 6,084De!oreJl&tion raie (net) annu % -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7

1Access 10 ufe "ater %ofwpop· 8.0 14.0 36.3

73.463.5

Urban 58.0 69.0 75.7 77.2Rural 1.0 9.0 24.2 46.8

1 Population growth Infant mortality Primary school enroUmentIl ~o 120+

,200 100

~1 0& 101~

:J 81

1 100·2 40

~:20

1 0 0 0-tr6Clo -tr1OO ... -tr6..0 _17 100

• llIbiopia - lAw·;'-

11

111 ~ ..... f "

1 S- TI'ÏCIt 1iN:_ rroupMMI Nat

125·30 15·20 r~c~fIJ Sub- [UIMr

Unit of ]*Us yean UlimalC SaNuQ/t Low- lItcomtmuJ.SIITC alo ago (mTl) AfriaJ ÙIcOtM group

INCOME AND POVERlY

1 Incame ,GNP per capila (mrc = 1989) USS 50 90 120 330 330 1,320Tol.Il houschold income

Sharc lO top 10% of households %of~caneSharc lO top 20% of houscholds

1 Sharc to bOllan 40% of householdsSharc to bouan 20% of households

PonnyAbsoll11e poveny income: urban USS pe!penoo 190

1runl

Pop. in absolute poveny: urban %o~pop.rural

Prcvalcnœ of malnutrition (lII1dcr S) % of age group 38.1

1 EXPE:-lDITURE

Food %ofGDP 24.9Suples 9.5!vieal, fish. mille, chocse, eggs 5.5

40,386

1Ccreal imporu lhou. metric tollJlCS 28 67 6fI} 8,274 27,738Food aid ID cercah

109.687 825 3

9796 7,122 7~67

Food production percaëiu 1979·81=100 97.6 88.7 2.6 117.8 .9Sharc oC agricu1wrc in DP %ofGDP 57.5 47.8 41.6 33.7 328 15.2D&ily calorie supplv alories pa penal 1,802 1,533 1,658 2,010 2,342 2,741D&ily protein suppfy grams pa penoo 59 48 50 48 56 71

1 Houslng %ofGDP 13.1Aven.ge household siu: penOlU JlC'!: houschold 5

Urbin 4 4Fixed investment: housing %ofGDP 3.9 3.0

1 Fuel and power %ofGDP 3.7Ene~cœs~Œ1 pc:r.capita ki of cil cquivaknt 9.7 14.2 21.2 103.8 323.8 843.7Hous oIdJ W1 electneuy

Urban. %of houseboldlRural

1 Transport and communlcatloa %ofGDP 9.3P9PWation per passcngercar ~rsŒlS 1,063 641 1,055 30Fixed invesuncnt: tnnsport cquiprncnt ofGDP 1.2 1.6Tol.Il road Icnglh km

49243,200

1Population per telephonc persall 328 17

INVESTMENT lN HUMAN CAPrrAL

Medkalcare %ofGDP 1.3

1Population per: physicim pe~Œ1S 70,191 86,100 77,356 1,463 1,551

nurse 5,9703,500

5,404 1,747hospital bed 755

Accento hea1lh carc % of pop. 44.0Inununized (under 12 moolhs): measles % of a&oe group 13.0 526 43.5 629

1DPT 16.0 45.7 41.3 65.2

0n..I Rchydn.tion Therapy use (\IIIderS) % of cases 22.5 18.4 21.6 27.5

Education %ofGDP 0.4Grou cnrolhncnt ratios

Primary: total % of schooJ.age group 11.0 24.0 35.0 66.8 104.3 102.0

1 fcmale 6.0 15.0 28.0 69.7 94.7 101.1Scconduy: total 20 6.0 15.0 28.5 37.2 51.1

fcmale 1.0 4.0 120 122 28.0 524Tertiuy: scicnctlcngineering %of teniary sbldenU 19.0 17.3 19.0

1Pupil-teacherratio:~ pupiIs pc;,r teacher 41 44 48 41 29 26

21 34 48 33 18 17~ils reaching grade 4 %ofcohort 58.8 48.0 76.4 67.8

8.6R~ter rate: PrullarJl % oC tot.&1 cnrollmClt 0.0illiteracy rate: ove % oCp<)P.o (~e 15~ 37.6 53.4 43.4 25.4

fcmale %oUcm.iles age 1 +) 64.0 56.5 31.6

1 Newspaper circu1atiŒl per thou. pop. 1.3 21 1.0 5.2 20.4 78.9

Savoo: Wald 8d:~ Ilcœaaico Dopwr.md.~ tm.

11

111 ETHIOPIA

Statistical SurveySource (unless ()th~n\'i!'e statecl): Central StatislicaJ Office. POB 1143. Addis Ababa: tel. 113010.

ADlIU:--;ISTRATI\'E REGIOXS (census of 9 !\Iay 1984)N

l'RIXCII'AL TOW:\S (population Olt 1!1~ œn:,u;<,

.. 483.123 sq miles.+ 1nduding an estimate for areas not cO\'el'ed by the eel1:'us.

14.1J.l'I.3.-:~.J~I

1j.5~.

5,877422623

6.922

Males Female~ TUI<:

8,164960

1.54710,671

AgriculturePRI:\C1PAL CROPS ('000 metric tons)

19lili 1987* 19~"

\\'heat , 826 800 S:!"Barle\' . 1.041 950 1.05"r.laizè 1.788 1.530 1.6-)"Oats . . . 36 20 ~,

Millet rDagusal. 188 180 :!O"Sorghum , . 1.092 950 1.I(~,

Other rereals . 1.112 1.000 1.I(H·

POlaLoe~" 210 220 23\'ral11~" . . . . 250 2:~(1 :!~I'

Othel' l'llots and tuber:," ~O l'7(1 9(M'

Dn' hE:'ans'" . 3.'3 :~(1 ?;.:Dn' bea~·. . 130 120 1~"

Dr~' road beans· 520 480 ~"Chick·peas . 88 120 1;1"Lentil~. . 26 50 5'Othel' pul:,e;:* lI3 85 ~..SUj!aJ' r.lI1e" 1.f)(l{J 1.600 1 ·'M.'SlI,\'hean;:. . . . 3 4; ,.Grllundnuti' (in "hl'lll" . 53 ,,,, 5'.Ca:'IOI' beans" . 12 1:! l'

Rapl.'st'ed . 2(1 9°.'.,.

-' .'.'-SesamE:' :'I?E:'d N 3i .,. .'...j,Lin:'l.'ec!N 31 :~(1

"..1.

Safllower sel.'d~ :>.3 a:~ i"

CnllOll:'E:'E:'d+ 44 44 .;~

Collon C1intl+ 20 :!11 ~

\'eI!Nable:' lmll melons" 557 :>lll 5tl~.

Banana:'" 75 75 "Other fruit ·(ex~\. m'elo~s!" : 214 215 :!1~

1"Tree nUl;:N. 61 61 '.Coffee \!.'Teen)+ 178 1i!1 1~

TohacC'o Oea\'es)'" 3 :'1 ..Fibre crop;; (exe\. c~tlo~l* :

."16 17 ,.-

ECO~OMIC.-\.LLY ACTIVE POPULATIONOLO estÎmate~. '000 persans al mid·1980)

Agriculture. etc.1ndustr\'Sen'ice;Total .

.. FAO estÎmates. + Unofficial estirnates.Source: F.-\O. ProductiOIl Yearbook.

Som'ce: ILO. Ecollomically Active Populatioll Estimates alld ;;:jectiolls. J 950-:?Oi!5.

1984 census: Total labour force 18,492.300 (male~ 1l.243,fKl:female~ i .249.235).

44.927.00046.184.UOO47.882.000

38.3

1.251.28'2*

21.080.20921.104.74342.184.952

1.(>62.232 70.21.006,490 7.92.614.699 27.91.248.033 30.93.224.881 52.ï2.921.124 36.74.181.167 15.3963.5~ 20.S

2.450.468 4:3.39.50:3.140 111.43.7~.577 31.72.409.599 37.12.477.27(\ 35.13.f>42.013 44.3

~9.:'~ 3.342.1N.!152 :~t7

Densit\·Population (pel' HI km)

23.674.7127.052.893.679.140.374.861.224.379.579..1

272.636.946.367.156.6.33,1;55.315.li11~.76(JA

f"'.921.370..181.0&':!.J43.627Af}.J.5

1.2;J1.281.9

Area (~q km)

Area (~q km) .Population icen~u:, of 9 May 1984)+

Males . . . . . .Females .Total.

Population (offiri:.1 estimates Olt mic1·year)1986. . . . . . . . ,1~87 .1~8S .

Density (pel' sq km) at mid·1988

Addi~ Ahaba (Jt·;<:,it: 68.848lcapitah 1..112.577 Haral' 62.160

Asman.l . 275.355 ~lekele 61.583Dire Dawa 98.104 Jimma 60.992Gondar (incl. Bahir Dar 54.800

Azesa) 80.886 Akaki 54.146:\azret i6.284 Debre Zeit 51.143

BIRTHS A.'\D DEATHS (official estimateslA\'eràj!e annual birth rat€' 4G.0 pel' 1.000 in 1!17(1-81: death rate18.1 pel' 1.000 in 1970-81.

•. Fllllo\\'il1~ thl' acioption oi a ne\\' con:'tiulliclIl in 19:;7. the 15exi;:tinj! r"l.'il.n:, \\'ere replatec1 h~' 24 Aclmini:'trati\'t" Region!'and fj\'E:' AulCtn(lmous ReglOns.

+ Data indudE:' thE:' capital. Addii' AbabOl. which i:, 0111'(1 a separateAdmini:'~nl\i\'€· Region larea 222.u :'CI km: ]Jo]Juialion 1..112.577).

Area and Popu lation.-\RE.-\.. l'OPULATIO!\ AND DE:-iSITY

ArussiBaIe.Eritrea ,Gemu GoffaGojamGondar ,HarargE:' ,lllubabor ,Kef01 lKafiOl/Shoa+ .SidamoTigrE:' .WollegaWollo. . . .A:':'<II. Admini!'trOltionTulal .

11

1

1

11

1

11

11

1111111

111

Sourc~: FAO. l'CClrbook of Fishery Statistics.

Fishing(FAO estimate:,. '000 melric tons. live weighl)

'- 1985 1986 1987

1nland waters 3.5 3.5 3.5Indian Ocean 0.5 0.6 0.5

. Total calch 4.0 4.1 4.0

1988

31.00023.40017.5003.9301.6101.5001.060

19

1987

30.000*23.20017.3003.9251.6001..J901.050

19

1986

30.000·23,000*lï.ooo*3.9201.5901.4801.000*

19

L1\'ESTOCK CFAO estimates. un1ess other",ise indicated; '000tI "ear endin/! September)

~::.'.:.--------------------­l'_lllt' .:;tIf.'CJl •tjo;lt~ .A.<SCs .Hor::es.Mulc~ .ClIlllels.~ .

11

1

I.I\'ESTOCK PRODUcrs •lF:\O estimates. unless otherwise indicated; '000 meu;c tons)

:L'lIofficial e~timate.f'uUlt!')' crAO estimates. million): 56 in 1986; 57 in 1987: 57 in 1988.SoUrce: FAO. ProductiOIl l"earbook.

1986 1987 1988

Ik't'f and \'eal 246 2.J6 255~Iutton and 1amb 81 S2 83GoaLS' meat 65 66 66PlI! meat 1 1 1f'oult!')· meat ..') -') 73I- I-

Other meat 120 12.J 126Etlible offals 97 98 100C(JW;:' milk. 780* 800 814Goats' milk 94 !15 95Sheep's milk 64 G5 66Butter. 9.0 9.1 9 .)Hfn eggs n.3 7~.O 78.7Hone\' . 21.9 ').) ') 'l') •

Wool:_.il

gre~~' 12.5 12.5 12.6clean. 6.5 6.5 6.6 .

Cattle hide~ 47.3 .J7.3 .J8.8!'heep skins 1.J.6 15.0 14.9Gu3t skins . 13.7 l.J.O 14.1

• L'nofficial e..timatt:.::.ource: FAO. j'mdl/ctioll l'rarhook and QI/artcrly BI///rtill ofSlalÜitics.

Forestry.~!lrXD\~·OOlI ~El\IOY.-\L.."-.:.'"0 estlmate... (I/KI cuhic metre". excludin/! bark J

n.a.n.a.n.a.

n.a.n.a.

n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.

n.a.

n.a.n.a.n.a.n.:I.,1222153a.'!n.a.n.a.n.a.764

923.02.4

1985/86

1986187

!l18.1~ 0.1

19519

181104797796

5.7~.xr"'"

15.51:{li

11171!1l1:UI

1:~

t'270759

l:H1.215

2.J5:!.li:!9

10.6

1984/85

1!185/86

661.60.2

18118

ISO100818755

28

5.!!7.682

12.9105*

101195

. =310216

228750

781.274

2:{'i:?2:...~

9.4

19B31~

1984/85

Gold (kilogram,,) .Platinum (kilogram,,'

Mining(year ending 10 September)

IndustrySELECTED PRont'crs ('000 metric tons. unlcl's olher\\"h:e indi·catl't!: year endill)! HI Septemher)

Wheat nourMacaroniRa\\" SUl!ar. . . .Wine ('O(KI hectolitres) .Beer ('000 hectolitres). .Soft drinks ('00(1 h('ctolitres)Mineral waters ('00(1

hectulitrt':'). .(Ïg-al·ette" lmillion). . .Cotton ~'arn . . . .\\"(l\'en cutton falll'ic" (million

l'el metre:,) . .Blankets lnumber) . .\\"oollt:n carpets ('000 sq

metresJ. . . .:\.r\on fabrics (million ~q

mt'tre:'). . . .Foot\war ("(11)0 pair:,) .Suap . . . . . . .Eth\'l akohol /'U(I(I hC('wlitre,:) .Lillùelietlpetro)l'um I!as . .~lotnr /!a,:olint: . .Dj:'tillat(· iU1.'1 oil:,Re"idual fuel oib. . .C1a,\' huildinl! bricks (million)~uicklime. . . . .Cement . . . . .Electric energ-y 1million kWh)

* Pro\·isiollal.Suurce: C:\. II/dI/striai Slatistici' rearboo/~.

1!18ï

1201.693

38.15539.!!68

1986

1201.693

37.10538.918

1:!1I1.6!1;{

36.0.')337.8!l6

:'\;Iwiogs. etc... . .~.her indusu;al wood·.tuel wood.Total .

• Assumed to llf: unchangt:d :;inc{' 1983.Source: FAO. l'cC/r!Jook of Forc.~t Products.

1

11

1

11

1

1

1

1

1

4545

__ 1981 1982 1!183~-:--------------------=~~includinl! boxboards)

• FAÜ estimate.

~i: Annual production as in 1983 (FAO estimates).e: FAO. l'earbook 0.( Forest Products.

~1\'WOOD PRODUCTION ('000 cubic metres)

11

1

1

11

Source: IMF, international Fillancial SUltistics.

-MONEY SUPPLY (million birr al 31 December)

COST OF LIVING (General Index of Retail Prices fur Aù.Ababa. exc1uding renl: base: 1980 = loo)

Hl&--

I!lN'

1.962

198ïl88

19i<4iS5

1.744

1983!:<-I

1986/8ï

191)5 1986 Il'

Food . . . . 155.3 131.6 l'"Fuel. lighl and ~oap· 128.2 137.6 15:Clolhing . . . 97.2 99.0 1'"..,.,Ali ilems (incl. olhers). 144.1 1:-10.0 12'

~ATIO:\AL ACCOU:\"TS(million birr al current prices. year ending 7 Jul)')Expenditure on the Gross Domestic Product

GO\'crnnJ~nt final consumpliun~xp(;'Ildlture. . . . 2.Hi-l .) --- 3.t':_.1 lé)

PrÎ\'alE:' final consumplion~xJlendilure· . . . 8.f>50 ~.2(1-l 6.~:

Gro~s fixeo capilal f(lnnalion 1.633 ).~J:'. l.~.

Tolal domestÎl: expenditure 12.4-17 12.ïS-l 13.~:

Exports of goocl,: and ;;en'ice~ . 1.289 1 .)~ .• lA:....<>ù

Less 1~Jlorts of I:!uud~ and2.541sen'Ice~ . ~.598 ~.E:

GDP in purchasers' \'alues 11.196 11.53!l 1') n,-.,).

• Including certain kilchen ulensils.1988: Food 133A: Ali ilems 135.8.Sourc~: 1LO. mainly }"ear Book of Labollr Statistics.

Gross Domeslk Product by Economic AclÏ\·it~·

• 1ncludinl! illl·rE:'a,:... in "l,>t.'k~. The fi!-rur~': are obtainc:d a:ire~idual.

Sourct.': !:IIF. intcrnatil/llal Fill(llirial Statistir.~.

A!!1'Îcultur.... hUllling. forestl'\'and fi,:hing. . . .' 4.0ïO.2 3.915,~ U.j.;

Mining and quarr.\·inj.' . l~.:~ 15.1 1'-Manufacturing. . . . 1.009.2 1.02:U1 1.(t';'~

EleclriC'Îly. ,e-a:' and \\'at~r . 67.G ï:i,r. M{'Iln;:lrurtion . . . . 3:'7.3 :{7.l,i'> :3~:

Whul{-sale and l'Naïl ! radE:' . 997.5 !IIi:!.! 1.1~~I:

Tram:port. :;luraj!l' andcummunÎC'aliun:, 5r,.UI ti)·!.\! ':'1:-

FinanC'~. insuralll'(' 'and' rt:ai~"lal{'· ;;1O..l :.-I:!.!I 5';7

PubliC' adminisl~ali~1I1 a~ddef~nct: ï50.!l 77lJ.ll ';"5i

Olh{-r com~uniiy. ~llci~1 an'dbersonal l'en'icl'st 503.1 5:39.\1 5~~

Ol er :;en'ices . . ïO.l ïO.~-,..

GDI' at factor cost 8.943.5 ~.\101.ï 9.70:

Indirecl taxes. Irss ~ub;;idie~ 1.057.5 !li9.1 ],0%GDP in purchasers' \'alues 10.000.1 9.8RO.f' 10.&0-'1

19Hï 1988---------------------..2:Currenc\' ou~icl~ banksDemand' deposils al

cummercial banks 1.597 1.759 LI,Total money . 3.341 3.721 ,------------------.:~,:~

BUDGET ESTIMATES (million birr, ~'ear ending 7 July)

FinanceCURRE~CY ANI) EXCHANGE RATESMonetar)' Units

100 c~nl~ = 1 birr.

DenominationsCoins: 1. 5. 10. 25 and 50 cenls.NOles: 1. 5. Hl. 50 and 100 birr.

Sterling and Dollar EquÎ\'alents (31 March 1!J!IO)!1 slerling = 3..l1O birr;US SI = 2.070 birr;100 birr = L'>9.32 = S48.31.

Exchanl{e RateFixed al US SI = 2.070 birr since February 1973.

Renmue 1984/R5 1985;86 1986181

Taxalion 1.685.0 1.8S::l.0 2.098.2Taxes on 'inc~me:proÏils:elC: 646.6 722.0 860.5Taxe~ on prupert\· . . . -12.0 -I.t.j 46.2Value·added lax : 173.4 190.2 219.5t:" • 353.5 373.7 409.3~xcl~e~

Import dutie~. elc. 275.9 268.i' 387.1Export dUlie:, 172.8 :!63.(1 153.7Slamp dUlies. 13.9 )-1.5 16.4

Property incomE:' . . 395.9 53&..1 491.9AdministralÏ\'e fees and

charres. elc.. 79.2 -l6.6 50.8Capila re\'enuE:' 92.5 -1'\ i) 74.3t~._

Total re\'enue . 2.266.0 2.730..l 2.847.8

Expendit ure 198-l/S5 1985!86 1986/87

General lJublic ':l'rvices anddefence. . . . 1.056.6 993.0 1.166.7

Public order and safel\' 165.7 166.!! 173.4Educalion , . 364.4 3S1.(1 413.7Health. 114.7 122.1 139.3Social ,:ecu;il \' ~Jl(l'\\'elfare: 200.2 ~(f.J.6 201.8Hou,:in,e- .'. . . . 118.0 13-1.l\ 160.8Olher ~(mlmunilY and social

l'en'I('e:: . 38.8 11:;..1 49.4Econumie ':t.'n·i~'es : 6'23.0 1.125.2 1.17S,7

Fuel and ener,e-y . : : 112.1 221.(1 213.5:\,l!licuitur~. f('r~':ln' and

fishinl! . . .'. . 310.5 -l.'6.2 4~.4

Mïnin,e-. ma~\Ifaclurinl! andconstruction 155.0 ) (j';'.:~ 230.0

Tr,m':Jl(lrt~ti(J'~ and203.9commUlllcau,.n. 211.7 252.6

Olher expenclitun: . 827.8 (i!l<I.3 428.:-1Total expenditurc. 3.7œ.2 3.!l-lU.5 3.912.1

:\ATIO:\AL ll.-\..'\I\ RESER\'ES (US S milliun al 31 Decem'ber)

I!!S7 Hl~ 19~

Golo· 21.::1 21.3 17.3IMF s~ciai dr;I\\'i~l! righl; l.ï 0.1For~il:!n exchange. . . 121.0 CH.2 46.1Total 144.0 85.5 63-,iJ

.. Valued al VS SI02 pel' troy ounce.Source: IMF. illtemati07lal Financial Stcztistics.

11

1

1

11

1

11

11

11

111

1• Includ!n,e- impuled renl;: of owner·occupi...d dwellinl!s.t Includmg. r~slaur.lIlls. hOlel,: and busines,: sen·ices.Source: Dl\. Natiol/al .~CCOllllt.~ Stati.~tics.

11

111 B,4LAI"CE OF \':\Y!ltENTS eus $ million)-- 1986 198i 1988

1;;;;ndisl' l'Xports f.o.b.. 477.1 355.2 429.3)I:rchandise imp(lrt;: f.o.b.. -932.6 -932.7 -956.0

rr-de balance. -455.4 -577.4 -526.7

f:xports of sen'!ces 277.9 318.7 ?-- -_1".1

1111lports of sen'Ice:; -332.9 -366.4 -415.8

Ilalan~e on goods and-510.4 -625.1 -666.8~I"\·u..es. . . .

l'ri''atl' unrequiled lransfers69.4 129.6 180.5lOel). . . '. . .

1 (jo"l'mmenl unrl'qulted113.7 278.0 261.6• transfers (net) . .

eurrent balance -327.3 -217.5 -224.6

Lonl!.tl'rm capital Illet). 240.6 292.8 292.9

1 :\hOTt.term capital !n~l) -1.0 6.8Sel l'rrors and IInll~:;lOns 201.6 -182.7 -97.3Tolal (net mont'tilry

l1lovl'mentl'). . 113.9 - 107.4 -22.3

1 \':.Jualion chanJ!l':' III<:t) -9.4" -11.4 3.9E,~cl'ptional finandng . 0.4Changes in rl'scrVCS 104.5 -118.4 -18.4

1:i<lurcc: BIF. Iliternationai Fillancial Statistics.

1 External TradePRI~CIPAL C0:\t:\IODITIESIdi~lribution by ~ITC. VS S '(00)

1 111lports c.iJ. ]!1&1 198-1 1985

Food and Ih'c animais 103.814 82.909 241.8'20Dair... product:' and birds' egsr:; n.a. 11.028 33.066

Milk and l'l'cam. . . . n.a. 9.926 28.i69

1 Presen'ed milk and cream . n.a. 9.926 28.765Dried milk Wilh up to

1.5<.:ë fal l'(,"leml n.a. 8.911 24.421Cfrl'als and cen'al~rl'parationl'. . . . . n.a. 59.104 1&i.7ï~

1 \"hl'at and nw:,iin tunmill<:l)) . n.a. ;{:>.;ï75 77.4~7

\\ltl'at, etc.. nwal "r Onur n.a. (j.561 65.iH1Flour of Whl':11 ur ml':,lin n.a. 5.461 aa.31i.1Whl'at m<:a) anci l!T"atl'. n.a. 1.099 32.1 ï8

1Crude materiall' tinedihle)

e>:cept fuels. . . n.a. 20.001 32.fl51TeXlile fibres alHI \\"a:'le n.a. 9.iH7 24.120~Iineral fuels. luhric:mts. etc. n.a. 174.150 146.~12

Petroll'um. pC'll'"i"UIll

1~rodul"ts. l'tl·. . . . n.a. li·UOi 1411.2.''::

rude ~trol"1I1ll "il:,. t'tl'. 160.521 14Ii.4i,;{ 133.4~"Refine petroll'Iml prllc1uct.~ 16.192 2(i.413 l1.f...<;l

Animal and \'ej!clablc oils.fats and waxCl'. . . n.a. 11.773 47.Rfl7

1 Flxed \'egetabll' oii:, and fats n.a. 6.3Ga 44.208Soft fixed \'c/,!l!tahll' uill'. . n.a. 4.111 22.133

So\"a bean oil. . . . n.a. 3.4~ 20.615Other fixed \'l'j!l'table oils' . n.a. 2.25:! 22.0ï5

1Chemicals and rclaled11P~ucts. . . . . 75.:{~ 99.50a 72.673

ediClnal and pharmaccuticalr,roducts. . 22.413 24.266 22.847ledicaments. . . n.a. 22.108 21.988

1 ~asic manufacture~ . 123.321 140.198 133.232iper, paperbuarel and

T !Ila:"ufacturel' . . . 10.600 12.443 20.9681extile Vam. fabric~. l!tc. . 22,23i li.971 25.878Idron ana steel. . . . n.a. 41.284 29.964

1 eLal structurel' and parts. n.a. 2U.089 13.445

11

Imports c.i.f. 1983 1984 1985

Machiner)' and transportequipment 300,159 373.947 284,147

Machinen' specializcd forparticular industries. . n.a. 91.927 64.311

General industrial machinelJ',equipment and parts n.a. 21.290 21.715

Electncal machinelJ',ap!aratus, etc. . . n.a. 41,937 34.i64

Roa \'ehicles anel parts· 92,117 92.540 116,618Mutor vehicles fur sroods

transpon. etc.. . . n.a. 35.988 53,i53Guuds \'ehicle;: ((unies and

trucks) . . . n.a. 31.060 49.474Patts and accessories for

cars. buses, lorries. etc.· n.a 32,686 29,913Other transpon equiprnent· n.a. 110.025 23,279

Aircraft. etc.. and parts·. n.a. 107.201 21,69ïl'ttisccllanl'ous manufactured

articles . n.a. 29.735 25.851Total (incl. others) . 8i6.003 942.563 988.620

• Excluding tyres. enginl's and electricaJ parts.Source: 1,;:\. IlIlentatioual Trade Statistics l'earbook.

Expons f.o.h. 19113 1984 1985

Food and li\'(' animais n.a. 299.377 235.022Lh'e animaIs for rnod 8.448 5.831 9.1iOVegetable;: and fruit . . n.a. 11,48.1 8.692

Fresh or simply presen'ed\'<:j!etable;: . . . . 13.185 10.552 7.054Dried ICJ!Uminou;:

\·C'J!l'tabl('.< . . . . 11.676 8.008 4.769Coffee. lea. cQ('lIa and spices . n.a. 2f>5.651 209.783

Coffee and roffel' :,ubstitutes. 251.1i6 :W3.627 209.045Crudc matcriall' linl'dible)

cxccpt fuels. n.a, 7!1.187 f>4.675Hielel' and skin:, n.a. 46.752 53.720

Ra\\" hidel' and ;;kins CcxcI.furs) . . . . 40.637 46.751 53.il8Raw Llwin(· and equinc:

hidl's, n.a. 8.819 9.376Guall'kin;: n.a. 8.981 12.172Sh('c:p:,kin;: \\"ilh \\"001 n.a. 28.951 3~.094

Oil :'l·(·eI:, and o!eaj..rinous fruit n.a, B.067 4.4&1&ed:, for :'oft fixl'd oils 11.4110 7.11~(i 4.401

\'e~etahJ(' rnaterial:, u:'ed inp annacy . . . . 13.638 15.466 2.003

Mineral fuels. lubricants. etc. n.a. 30$~6 33.146Petrull'um. petruleum

l{roelucl:'. l'tc. . . . . n.a. 30.846 3.1.146efilwel lK'truleum products . n.a. 30$W 33.146Rl':,ielual fUl!f uil:, . . . n.a. 30.~li 33.146

Totallincl. othl'r;:)· 402.GS:! 417.188 3.17.ï~~

• Exc1udinJ! platinum.Source: C:\. IlIlrnlcrticmal Trade Slati.~tic:; rearbook.19li6 (million hirr): III/[JCJl1s: Total 2.280.4: ErJlClri.~: Coffl'e 725.6:Hides and l'kin:' l~UI: Total iincl. others) 941.6.1987 (million birr): III/III/ris: Total 2.205.9: Erpori.~: Cuffee 414.0:Hide~ and :,kinl' 123.i: Tot'oIl (incl. others) 735.2.1988 (millilln birr): 17IIpol1s: Total 2.3:{6.2: EXl'orts: Coffee 513.4:Hide~ and :,kin:' 1:!9.3: T\ltallinc1. othl'rl') 888.6.(SourcC': 1~IF. IlItenlotiullul Fillallcial Sialistics).

1

Transport

• Excluding EritrE'a but ineludin{! traffie lin the portion of theD,iibouti-Adùis Ababa Hne which run~ threlUgh tht.o Rt.opublic ofDjibouti.

PRINCIPAL TRADI~G PARTNERS ('000 birr)

Imports 1983 19~ 1985

China. People'li ReJ!. 8.n5 8.213 8.118France. 51.4!J4 64.231 66.524German Dem. Rep. 39.0RG 31.724 29.080Gcrmany. Fed. Rep. 179.419 201.346 203.7!1llndia 8.098 9.58i 9.~4

Itah' . 243.045 190.418 164.1lYlJapàn . 168.147 126.042 123.G3SKenya. . 9.75i 9.394 8.0!l8Korea, Rep. 46.25i 20.172 51.378Netherlands 51.879 37.571 58.201Saudi Arabia 18.002 9.994 18.142S.....eden 36.108 25.9i6 63,16.'3Switzerland 38.798 42.401 40.698USSR. 379.063 452.996 356.339United Kingdom 137.638 124.589 178.300USA.. 83.192 298.219 330.469Total Cincl. others). 1.813.325 1.951.104 2.046.443

Source: Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce.

Exports 1983 19S1 1985

Djibouti 65.363 59.856 25.274Egypt . 6 1 2.908France. 63.320 43.720 26.335German~·. Fed. Rep. 137.809 155.686 129.099Italy 62.1~ 63.696 53.80!lJapan. . 62.805 64.510 ïl.7201\etherlands 16.476 17.4i1 92.266Saudi Arabia 47.931 36.440 25.600Sudan . 1.525 10.330;- 12.690USSR. 3.~ 39.0i4 36.872United Kingdom 13.435 20.055 22.185USA . . . . . . 169.665 167.802 i3.31iYemen. People';: Dem. Rep. 54.893 49.679 56.S19Yugos!a\·ia. 2.204 2.012 3.452Total Cincl. others). 832.973 ~63.5i9 698.712

-

l

16.74il

1,0166GA

61

1985

14.639985843.8

60

1984

14.934676724 -.0>

Tourism

1982 1983 191-:

Telephones ('000 in ù~e) 101 110 III"Radio receÎ\'er;; ('(l()(I in use) 3.000 3.000 3.Ûl)'Tele\'ision receÎ\'ers ('000 in

use) . . . . . 45 45 5"Book production: titles" n.a. 45i ~~

Daih' newspaper;;:!\ùmber. . . . 3 3 .",

A\'era!!€' circulatillll ('000copie;;) . . . 40 n.:l. ~"

Xon.àaily new"palJer~::\umber. , . . 4 Il.a.Avera!!€' circuia~ion rooocopies} , . 3!J n.a, ~"

Other periodicak:\umoer. . . . n.a. n.a. ...A\·e.ra!!€' circuiati\ln rooo

1:-copIes' n.a. n.a.

Tourist arri\'als ('000) .

Source: l:lIi. Statistical rearbook.

SHIPPING (Ports of Assab and Massawa. year ending 7 Jul~'1

1981182" 1982183 "'ï;;::---.:

• Source: l:X. Statistical l"earbook.

CIVIL AVIATlOlIi (traffic on scheduled services)

Communications Media

Ves~els entereù ('000 net reg.tons). . . . . .. 2.681 2,961

Goods loaded ('000 metric tons) 625 650Goods unloaùed ('000 metric

tons). l.i53 1.856 1~"--------------------.::..::.• Pro\'isional figures.

-----------------------1983 1984· 1!1S,'l'----------------------.:.-

Kilometres flown (million) .Passengers carried ('000)Passenger·km (million) .Freight ton·km (million)

26.13.000117.000

1983/841982'83

360.00(1122.(I{l(l

1981/~

3Oi.000108.000

Addis Ababa-Djibouti:Passen{!er·km' (,OOOl. .Frei{!ht ('000 net ton·kmi.

RAILWAYS (tramel"

11

1

11

111

1111111 ROAD TRAFFIC' Imotor \'ehicles in use at 31 Dt'cl'mb..rl

1!J~1l 19S7 1988

w lnciuding pamphlet,: (::!14 in 1!f83: 157 in I!1Nl.19S,: B(l{\k prl'Iiuction 335 titles.Souret': maini.\' l·:\E~Cù. Stati.<tim[ rearbuCJk.

1111

Cars . . . .Bu~es and coache,: .Goods \'ehicle,: . . .Motorcycies and scootersTotal .

Source: 1RF. \\'orld Raad Statistics.

35.5562.i!l2i.9HI1.261

4i.528

30.2124.5426.36&1.516

42.63&

41.5124.465

12.6191.69i

60.2!13

Education -Teachers PupilfStuden:.-

1986 19B' 1986 1!l.~:-Pre.primary 1.~ 1.900 74.107 8i.(l(Y"Primary . . . 56.684 58,400 2.736.51i ., 884 ('((,

_. ';7(l11Seconàary: {!eneraJ . 16.98i 18.580 742.351 84.·VocationaJ . n.a. n.a. 5.859 Il.~'

Uni\'ersities 1.022 1.098 23.633 22.7Ol

Other higher 337 297 6.5ii 6,~-Source: l:KESCO. Statistîcal rearbook.

1

111

Paid employmcnt in manufacturing by industry (major groups)(ISle code - Thousand)

10.557 15.850 15.224 15.502 16.547 16.664 16.5514.605 5.141 5.564 6.194 7.143 6.936 6.8960.706 0.761 0.794 0.849 1.289 1.719 1.854

28.645 28.510 29.305 30.012' 31.604 32.206 36.3891.313 2.107 2.148 2.293 2.459 2.587 3.1391.806 1.963 2.000 2.066 2.122 2.184 2.5941.843 2.148 2.344 2.471 2.531 2.504 2.4793.823 4.387 4.198 01.286 2.127 1.948 1.6820.616 0.878 1.042 0.951 0.939 0.990 0.9400.852 0.894 1,417 1.396 0.900 0.982 1.1561.861 2.047 2.302 2.380 2,496 2.587 2.7390.101 0.124 0.136 0.255 0.256 0.245 0.2941.333 1,436 1.618 1.796 US8 1.896 2,4880.819 0:982 0.914 1.039 1.038 0.976 1.0701.087 1.217 1.328 1.347 1.4901 1.543 1.6290.932 0.991 1.056 1.153 1.226 1.299 1,4130.504 0.399 0,421 0.407 0.749 0.812 0.7622.705 2.864 2.755 2.587 2.761 2.821 3.1700.524 0.552 0.642 0.681 0.709 0.758 0.7521.185 1.371 1.328 1.353 1.590 1.632 1.6310.041 0.072 0.075 0.073 0.080 0.088 0.094

65.858 74.694 • 76.611 79.091 81.818 83.377 89.722

, Establishments wÎth ten or more persans emploved.:t EmDloyees. J Year ending in June of the ye.r .ndi·

r.aled.

11111111

Counuv - ISIC Cod. 1.1PayS - Cod. CITI,·IPais - Clave CIIU 1.1

Ethiopia • {1I11 '

Totsl J

311-312313314321322323324331332341342351352353355356362369371381383

Total

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

1111111111

Unemployment : Generalle,,'el(Nbers : 000' and rates: %)

Unemployment : By sex and age group (Nbers : thousands)

Males FemaIes

1985 1986 1987 1ge5 1986 1987Ethiopia (111.11

18-19 12.915 10.783 10.132 12.387 11.123 10.69920-24 14.311 13.102 22.163 8.308 8.008 8.17025-44 5.896 5.949 5.187 2.356 2.550 1,40545-55 0.142 0.815 0.428 0.058 0.264 0.052Total 33.264 30.649 37.910 23.109 21.945 20.326

~ LL.O Geneva

Population 99z 120.70 21.05" 21.32" 21.59" 21.88" 22,17" 22,49"122.87

1960 1961 1963 1964 1965

-0.8 -10.9

22.0106.3

-8.8-7.889,7

O.i

22.5128.8-12,4-10.7105.6

0,2

-114.5 -93.1Millions ~ b,,,-49,2 -43.1561.0 619.7

91.7 975678.6 733.c

23,3 28.1

22.540.3-3.4-5.731,2

0,4.-

120.3144.11-0.2225,9335,4

-0,7 8.139.8 46.~

10,1 -11.1225,1 237.1367.9 410.C

Millions de birr491 654 821508 538 586·603 569 549

3 720 3 797 4 2~1

-578 -552 -6554 744 5 006 5 551 i

-29 -47 -3f4 715 4 958 5 515

Millions: estimation!25.89 26.19 26.7~

-31.9

1-64.21494,1

192.91647.9

13.3

Nombres·indices (1985= 1aO) :28,2 26,5 28,9 31.3

Millions ;/e bitr384.1 502,4 556.2182,5 189.8 151.9

47.6 68,6 47,1435.6 448.2 586.0

60,4 72.2 177.s24,7 30,3 76.2

366,1 376,2 487.S1985=100

150.9 165,3 137.:121 112 82125 118 95Millions de OOlla's EU:8,1 75,3 55.4

165,6 239,0 266,7-157,8 -178.8 -249,7

7,8 60,2 17.181.6 108,7 123.6

-98,9 -119,1 -137.12,8 11,3 18.2

14,8 14.2 33.79.7 30,9 28.S

30.6-8,9

5,1-2.1-5.9

0.4

-51.0466.0

93,4603,8

6.6

13.039.8-1.7

205.7305,7

314,4175.2

25.7469,6

70,326.7

394,6

127.5119

95

2.1

25.25

469461554

3782-556

4710-19

4691

1971 1972 1973 1~

Pourcentage /nnue!

3,4 0.3 8.6 3.4-2,1 31.9 114.5 93.1

-45.2126,4

-158,9-32.568.0

-89.9-1.810.9

5.7

-46.8426.8

88,0550,4

11,2

26.727.3-7,2

489443512

3519-504

4461-20

4441

2,5

-2.5

-32,2122,3

-144.3-22.0

63,0-81.2

-2.610.6

3.9

12,6-15.7

14,8-2.2-3.10,6

25,5 28.1

1969 1970

-4.1

-30.0390,4

85.2506.6

-1.0

11,7-0,418,8

400411544

3188-487

4056-20

4036

298.1 305.9174.0 181,3

29.2 24,5388,3 429.1

44,2 52.416.5 19,0

326.3 360.6

129,5 111.6130 104109 89

24,02 24.63

-10.3119.0

-130.5-11.560,8

-70.8-3.014.2

2,7

14.87.2

-5,00.72.91.3

-0,14.1

-52.0357.7

87.5503.8

-6.6

29.36.1

16,5

-9.3

399403538

2969-473

3837-22

3815

120.8119

89

25,1

266.0153.3

24,9432.5

42,315.6

367,3

1968

23.44

-34,7106,4

-146,9-40.5

58.2-64,2

-2,414,2

4,8

26.1-3,8

5.34.15,63,6

0,19.3

18.0

376384511

2787-455

3604-17

3587

-18,0

-24.2355,1

91.9477.7

-6,5

6.09,78.7

115,3109

71

-33.0101,1

-125.9-24.8

52.3-66.9-4,010.4

5.8

11,2-16,0

-2,2-1,6

-19.81,8

398376448

2658-497

3383-13

3370

24.9 25,1

-1,4

-38,4322.8104,7468,6

-2,7

0.534.0

3,9

1966 1967

277.5 252,7156,0 139.5

35,7 29.8404.3 357.7

26.3 31.1

342.6 303,1

114.6110110

-32.6112.3

-142,3-30.0

52.5-67.0

0.111.810,6

21.0-1.0

0.4-0.2-0.80,6

1,61,4

-6,5294.5

87.9388.8

0,1

11,1

-4.7

-16,2

25.2"

125.5129

85

390336399

2588-456

3258-9

3249

289,8188,4

23,5375.7

23,3

318,4

-17.0116,7

-132,4-15.744,1

-58,S0.6

12,510,8

17.611,4

2,41.2

15.00,6

0.616.2

-24.9268.1

53,7345.8

0,9

7.417.9-0.4

346283353

2321-375

2927-16

2911

-11,2105,2

-108,7-3.535,7

-50,2-1,07.8

12.1

3.14,04.62.0

10.60.2

0.110.9

0,40.8

-21,389,3

-96.7-7.428.8

-47.7-2.0

7,014.2

12.65,5

-2.9-2,2

0.4

223,4 262,5110,9 158.9

23.5 22.0276,1 307.6

18,4 23.5

234.0 260,7

114.7 115.098 10387 83

281256337

2 118-334

2657-14

2643

199.19275

1962

9,0

-9,0

199.6107,2

24,8257.3

22,8

218,1

-14,782,S

-88.1-5,629,1

-48.6-3.113.5

5,3

24.014.6-1.8-3.89.0

272199317

2074-328

2534-10

2524

-11,778,7

-82,2-3.519,2

-37.6-2.813.0

5.9

5,4-0.4

2,4-0,9

1,1

188.793.925.1

235.6

-1.0

199.7

88.78286

-0.11,0

237187294

1 983-269

2434-18

2416

-5.7

77.07578

-7.676.6

-75,61.0

15.7-29,5

-3.38.59,5

8.510,4-5,8

1.05.6

-0,2

0.35.7

185,8

192,694,419,3

219.3

2306

Volume des exportations 72Café 72eCuirs et peaux 72pBalance des paiements

Transactions courantes, n.i.a 77a.dMarchandises; exportations lob 77aadMarchandises; importations lob 77abd

Bal. com..71aad+17abd 77acdAutr.biens.serv..revenus; crédit 77addAutr.biens,serv..revenus; débit 77aedTransferts priv.sans contrep 77aldTransf.ollie.sans contrep.n.i.a 77agdInvestissements directs 77badInvestissem. portefeuille.n.i.a 77bbdAutr.capitaux long terme.n.i.a 77bcd

Total,77a.d 71bad il17bcd 77c.dAutres capitaux crt.terme.n.i.a 77d,dErreurs et omissions nelles 77e.d

Total./ignes 77c.d il 77e.d 77f.dOr·contrep.monètlsidèmonétis 78a,dContreparl.allocation de DTS 78b.dContreparl. des rèèvaluations 78c.d

Tolal,/Ignes 71f.d a78c.d 78d.dFinancement exceptionneL 79a,dEngagem=réserves de l'étrang 79b.dRéserves· variation totale 79c.d

Finances publiquesDéficit ( . ) ou excèdent 80

Recettes 81Dons reçus 81lDépenses 82Prêts moins recouvrements 83

FinancementEmprunts nets: intérieurs 84a

extérieurs 85aUtilisation soldes de trésorerie 87

Oelle : intérieure 88aextérieure 89a

Comptabilité nationaleExportations de biens et services 90cConsommation publique 91 fFormation brute de capitaL 93Consommation privée 96fImportations de biens et services 98cProduit intèrieur brut 99bRev nel/pmts nets( - ) fact de l'étr 98.nDépense nationale brute = PNB 99a

Ethiopie644

Taux d'intét'~t

Taux d'escompte 60Taux des bons du Trésor 60cTaux sur dépOts 601Taux prêteur 60pRendement des obligations d'Etat 61PrixPrix 11 la consommation 64Transactions internationalesExportations 70

Café 70eCuirs et peaux 70p

Importations. caf 71Pètrole 71 a

Pétrole brut 71aaImportations. fob 71.v

111

1

1

11

1

11

1

11

1

1111

Uquidité international.: 1 A partir de 1963. les données de la ligneId.d S" rapportent il la Banque Nalionale d·Elhiopie. De \%0 il 1972.dies onltrail il la Banque d'Elal et comprennent des soldes qui. en 1963.onl élé translërès il la Banque commerciale d'Ethiopie (ligne 7a.dl. Lesdonnées anlérieures à 1%0 se rapporlenl il l'ensemble du systémemonêlairc.

Autorités monétaires: 1 En 1%3. les services de l'émis.sion CI desof'Orations bancaires de la Banque d'Elai ont élé Iranslërèsrespeclivemenl à la Banque nalionale d'Ethiopie el il la Banquecommercialed·Ethiopi<. Avant celle date. la seclion 10comprenaÎtlousles avoirs el <ngagemenls de la Banque d·Etal. En 1%3. la c1assilicalionsecloridle des données du sYSléme bancaire a été au.'iSi sensiblemenlaméliorée.

Banques créatrices de monnaie: 1 Voir la note relative à la section la.1 A partir de décembre 1979. les préts el avances des banquescommerciales sonl divisés en Créances sur les organismes publics (ligne22bAI. Créances sur le secteur privé (ligne 22d) et Créances sur les autresinslitulions linanciéres (JjgM 220. Auparavant. ces préts et avancosliguraient 10us à la ligne 2M. 1 En juillet 1980, l'Addis Bank a rusionnéavec la Banque commerciale d'Elhiopie el. depuis lors. <n raison de la

reclassirlcalion dos données. \cs ~rios chronologiquos de 5Fl : DéJlÔl'à vue (ligne 24). Autres posles (net) (ligne 27rJ, Monnaie (ligne J41r.Autres postes (net) (ligne J7r) ont élé révi~. 1 A parlir d'aoùl 19.&1\cs données révi~ n'englobenl pas l'agence de la BanquecommercUkd'Elhiopie élablie à Djibouli.

Situation monétalr.: 1 Les données antérieures il 1%0 ne ~rapportent qu'à 1·.nS"mble du syslème monélaire. 1 Voir les notes dt­sections 10 el 20.

finances publiquos: 1 A partir de 1972, oulre los opéraI;""budgétaires, les donnëcs couvr<nt certaines opérations extrabudgélailt'1 A parlir de 1982. les données se rapportent uniquennenl:l'administraI ion cenlrale.

Population: 1 Les estimations des Nalions Unies portant sur Irannées aulres que cdl< du recensement onl élé révi~. pour loouto> Irannëcs. en ronclion de fa dilTérenc< observée enlre les rèsulilals d.rec<nsemenl et l'eslimalion iniliale qui en avait élé raite pour l'ar1l1i<d.recensement.

1F366 Statistiques financières internationales 1199C

1

Ethiopie644

Taux d'intéfetTaux d'escompte 60Taux des bons du Trésor 60cTaux sur dépôts 601Taux prêteur 60pRendement des obligations d·Etat.. 61PrixPrix li la consommation 64Transactions internationalesExportations 70

Café 70eCuirs et peaux 7 Op

Importations. caf 71Pétrole 71 a

Pétrole brut 71 aaImportations. lob 71.v

1989

12597

18.4

1988

3,9-18,4

292,968.2

6.8-97.2-22.3

-224.6429.3

-956.0-526.7275.7

-415,8180.5261.6

108109

1987

292.875,3

139,7

-217.5355.2

-932,7-577,4318.7

-366.4129.6278.0

-182,8-107.4

ï0988

1986

-9.4 -32.7104,5 -140,1

0,4

240.6-86,7

-1.0201,6113.9

-327.3477.1

-932.6-455.4277.9

-332.969.4

113,7

6.00 3,00 3.00 3.003.00 3.00 3.00 3.006,35 6.70 6,70 6.707.25 6.00 6,00 6.006.00 5.00 5,00 5.00

90.2 88,0 94,2 101,5

941.6 735,2 888,6725,6 414.0 513.4109.9 123.7 129.3

2280.4 2 205,9 2 336.2223.9 219.0 215.8163.7 183,3 182.2

1 922.8 1 859.9 1 969.8

6.003,006,008.50

1985

100,0

-11,6150,6

100.0100100

105,9'332.9

-840.5-507.7313.6

-310,6212,9397.7

175.2281.1

49.8-168.8162.2

3.00

50.0 -150.6 -104.5

84.0

1984

194.664.229.6

-150,6-56.8

-130,4416,8

-798,4-381.5210.3

-290.1144.9186.1

3,00

77.5

44.2

1983

8.7 5.7-44.3 -51,2

0.1 1.2

207,437.1

-35,9-54.1-53.0

127.0 124'.7137 128.

52 75

-170.4402.6

-740,0-337,3169.6

-252.992.1

158.1

833.3 862.7 689,4521,4 545.7 432.7

83,9 96,3 103.61 813.3 1 921,4 2056,4

366.6 370,4 289.4332.3 313.2 262,9

1 534.2 1 631,1 1 733.9

3.00

78.0

74.4

1982

117.7123

91

-195,2402.8

-675.2-272,4176.5

-239,838,1

102.4

69.5-125.7

39.510.8

-75,4

73.7

1981

4.721.3 1,0

134,0 -74.40.2

242.3-7,7

123.3-7.5

108.1

-250.0374.1

-629.8-255.7157.1

-219.923.744.8

2,80

69,4

1980

48,4-178.3

99.0-33.4

-112,712.6

5,0-21,0

-116.110.9

-226,7419.3-649.6-230,3153.5

-221,818.253.7

-380,5 -334.2 1-491.5 -1 352.3 P -621.5 P -868.8 P -813.1 P -754,9 P -829,9 P1597.1 1791.71 1865.3 2 158,4P2 283.2 P2 266,OP2 730.4 P2 847,8 P3 377,7P

174.1 190,4 261,6 P 259,3 P 253,7 P 631,3 P 443.1 P 322,OP 274.4 P2 162.1 2 323.71 2 625.9 3 390.0 P3 107,6P3 709.2 P3 940.5 P3912.1 P4 482.0 P

-10.4 -7.4 -7.5 P 380.0 P 50,8 P 56.9 P 46.1 P 12.6P P

2.02

66.4

14.5 105.2 -134,2

1979

77.8-14.3-35.0

19.5-29.8

4.8-0.1

-25.110.6

-92.0430.3

-522.9-92.5106.8

-187.820.760.7

-254.51410.1

194.51 858.3

0.8

2.03

57.2

1978

36.76" 37.63" 38.52" 39.44" 40.40" 41,39" 42.44" 43.35" 44.93" 46.18" 47.88 49.51 Population 99z

633.6 864.3 878,8 805.1 835.5502.3 592.7 563.7 469.9 511.8

66.3 141,3 108,0 98.3 84.5942.7 1 174.6 1494.7 1 528.9 1 627.8129.3 228.1 369.5 354.0 393.5122.2 194.4 262.5 336.4 357.8787.6 982.1 1 270.6 1 304.9 1 397,3

1977

689.0519.3

47.7727.8163.0123,0580.5

61.1 29.8 11,237.8 -48.4 -101.4

-11,5 -17.9 -30.1-12.7 3.3 29.2

13.5 -63.0 -102,40.2 0.5-3,1 0.7 0.9

16.8 -61,9 -101.514,1

0.15.3

50,423.3-5.1

-13.05.2

PriUfcentage annuel

.J975 1976

-5.3 -16.8 61.9 87.5

l IMée se terminant au 7 juillet-226.2 -325.1 -232.5 -421.9710,4 777.9 1 013.7 1 184.396.1 77.2 82.6 71.8

985.4 1 144.5 1 320.0 1 664.147.3 35.7 8.8 13.9

1

Volume des exportations 72Café 72eCuirs et peaux 72pBalance des paiements

Transactions courantes. n.i.a 77a.dMarchandises: exportations fob 77aadMarchandises: importations fob 77abd

Bal. com..77aad+77abd 77acdAutr.biens.serv.• revenus : crédit 77addAutr.biens.serv.,revenus : débit 77aedTransferts priv.sans contrep 77afdTransf.offîc.sans contrep.n.i.a 77agdInvestissements directs 77badInvestissem. portefeuille.n.La 77bbdAutr.capitaux long terme.n.i.a 77bcd

Total.77a.d+ llbad.1J llbcd 77c.dAutres capitaux crt.terme.n.i.a 77d.dErreurs et omissions nettes 77e.d

Total,lignes llc.d.1J lle.d 77f.dOr·contrep.monétis/démonétis 78a.dContrepart.aliocation de DTS 78b.dContrepart. des réévaluations 78c.d

Total,lignes llf.d.1J 78c.d 78d.dFinancement exceptionnel 79a.dEngagem=réserves de l'étrang 79b.dRéserves· variation totale 79c.d

Finances publiquesDéficit ( . ) ou excédent 80

Recettes 81Dons reçus 81zDépenses 82Prêts moins recouvrements 83

Financement146.1 203.8 131.0 338.0 85.6 229.3 206.0 10.OP 948.1 P 411.8 P 531.8 P 371.5 P 414.9 P 458.0 P Emprunts nets: intérieurs 84a98.3 104.2 86.8 73.7 170.8 150.5 130.5 474.9 P 422.5 P 208.5 P 335.7 P 478.3 P 392.6 P 371.9 P extérieurs 85a

-18.2 17.1 14.7 10.2 -1,9 0,7 -2.3 6.6 P -18.3 P 1.2 P 1.3P -36.7 P -52.6 P -p.... Utilisation soldes de trésorerie 87

1383.2 587.0 732.4 1080.6 1 164.3 1394.3 1598.0 1 614.6 P2 544.4 P2 957,4P3 490.5 P3 825.4 P4187.7 P4 360.9 P4 830.7 PDette : intérieure 88a508.3 612.5 699.3 773.0 943.8 1094,3 1224.8 1 699.7 P2 122.0P2 330.7 P2 666.4 P3 091.2 P3 483.8 P4 439.5 P extérieure 89a

mb! se terminant au 7 juillet Comptabilité nationale682 760 822 866 943 1 210 1 147 1 076 1 142 1 267 1 137 1 421 1 289 1 353 1 438 Exportations de biens et services 90c730 866 967 1240 1 168 1293 1400 1487 1733 1841 1924 2045 2164 2775 3026 Consommation publique 91f579 578 606 545 699 854 922 1 082 1 119 1 284 1 131 1 213 1 633 1 805 1 783 Formation brute de capitaL 93

~ 428 4618 5461 5885 6 544 6795 7077 7 347 8027 7919 7929 8651 8650 8204 8930 Consommation privée 96f-896 -818 -1 030 -1 271 -1 368 -1 652 -1 642 -1 824 -1 991 -2 310 -2240 -2 508 -2 541 -2598 -2822 Importations de biens et services 98c

5523 6 004 6 826 7 265 7 988 8499 8 903 9 167 10031 10 001 9 881 10823 Il 196 11 539 12 355 Produit intérieur brut.. 99b-35 -3 -6 -9 -5 15 -15 -5 -28 -40 -68 -60 -79 -138 -157 Rev netlpmts nets( . ) fact de I·étr 98.n

5489 6001 6820 7256 7983 8514 8888 916210003 9961 9812 10763111191140112198 Dépense nationale brute = PNB 99a

I de milieu d'année

27,47 28.19 135.92

1

111

1 moyennes sur la période33,4 42.9 50.1

Itfi//iOIIs de birr~97.8 580.6152.7 324.634.5 55.4

647.9 729.5258.5 224.0116.8 113.1

1 534,7 591.51985= 100:123.5 120.0 88.1 96.8 148.0 108.0 11 0.1

85 100 71 98 128 112 12676 92 101 95 133 93 108

1 ft signe moins indique un débit-46.4 -27.6 -84.0 -112.7237.6 278.2 333.3 306.2-281.2 -337.2 -417.0 -436.5-43.6 -59.0 -83.7 -130.3111,7 11 3.0 103.2 97.5-154.3 -144.4 -158.6 -163.7

14.4 21.7 14.1 19.425.4 41.1 41,0 64.319.3 4.3 5.8

1

11

111111

1990 Statistiques financières internationales 1. M. (: _ F367

1

1111111111111

111111111

36

_____ .

i?.:lr;~~I~t&1*~l~~~:~~m~~[~~~~:*~l~~*Jü:~~~i;~~~~~:~~~~§*~:J'§"t~:~~:~~~~~:ir?i$~~~~~~~~$.%~~~:~::~lI:It~~:~~t~:~:~~~m:~~[f~~~~~~~~~~:~~~~:t~~G~~~$!:~~!~~~~l~~:~i$r~:;:S:*~$*"t~~~~~f1~~~l;-:~r~:{:I~f;:?it§;"f:t

EllIIOl'lA 196& 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 19'U 1975 1976 lm ln,

CURRENT Gl'p l'ER CAPITA (US 5) 60 60 60 70 70 70 80 90 90 90 100POPUlATION (lhousand5) 27,467 . 23,193 23,937 29,676 30,444 31,245 32,082 32,954 33,867 34,833 35,82.3

ORlGIN AND USE OF RESOURCES (Mi11iau ofCU11't:1I1 EIhiopiDn Birr)Gross National Product (GNP) 3,1120 4,030 4,441 4,691 4,7U 4,955 5,513 5,516 5,993 6,851 7,295

Ncl Factor locome frOID Abroad ·18 ·26 -20 -19 -32 -50 -39 ·35 ·3 -4 0Gross Dome5Uc Product (GDp) 3,837 4,056 4,461 4,710 4,744 5,005 5,551 5,551 5,996 6,855 7,295

Indirect Taxes, oel 236 237 m 301 327 376 410 421 474 690 749GDP al Cador cosl 3,602 3,819 4,173 4,409 4,417 4,629 5,141 5,130 5,522 6,164 6,546

Agriculture 2,011 2,UO 2,327 2,405 2,286 2,331 2,605 2,450 2,768 3,227 3,497lodusll)' 548 SM 602 672 707 748 796 855 1124 892 894

MaouCacluJÎng 302 337 372 420 440 464 508 569 586 636 636Scrvicx:s, etc. 1,043 l,lU 1,244 1,333 1,424 I,5SO 1,739 1,825 1,930 2,046 2,154

Rcsource Balaoee ·73 -37 ·14 -88 -93 101 189 ·164 ·58 -216 -405Exports oC Good5 &: NFScrvicx:s 399 400 489 468 487 653 1127 683 760 340 866Imports of Good5 &. NFScrvicx:s 473 487 S04 556 580 552 638 !W7 818 1,056 1,271

Dome5lic Abwrplioo 3,911 4,143 4,475 4,798 4,837 4,905 ~,362 5,715 6,054 7,071 7,700l'rivate Consumplioo, etc. 2,969 3,188 3,519 3,783 3,726 3,798 4,227 4,405 4,610 5,497 5,9LSGeoeral Goy't Consumplion 403 411 443 461 S08 538 586 730 866 96ll 1,240Gross Domcslic Invcstmc:ol 538 544 5U 554 603 569 549 580 578 606 545

FlXed lovcslmcot ~27 533 5U 554 603 569 549 580 578 606 545

Gross Domeslic Saviog 46S 457 498 467 510 670 739 416 520 390 140Gross Nalional Saving 441 424 472 443 48S 644 738 411 561 420 171

(MilJkJns of1980 Elhiopian DÛT)Gross Nalional Product 5,754.1 5,971.4 6,365.9 6,633.9 6,9526 7,150.8 7,264.4 7,282.2 7,525.1 7,729.7 7,648.7GDP at factor cost 5,447.4 5,649.8 5,971.7 6,223.1 6,502.0 6,663.5 6,757_0 6,749.9 6,909.8 6,925.1 6,832.9

Açiculture 3,291.1 3,361.0 3,439.6 3,509.0 3,633.8 3,660.0 3,639.9 3,569.6 3,667.7 3,654.9 3,607.9lodustl)' 726.1 nu 871.7 955.0 997.7 1,027.0 1,019.7 1,005.0 966.5 978.7 947.2

MaouC3cturing 397.2 442.8 567.5 619.7 645.1 6n.2 670.4 662.7 652.3 657.4 657.&ScIVÎCCS, ctc. 1,430.2 1,510.2 1,660.5 1,759.2 1,670.6 1,976.5 2,097.4 2,175.3 2,275.6 2,291.4 Un.&

Rcsouree Dalance: -133.8 ·154.7 -190.6 .182.3 -202.9 25.1 158.6 ·184.7 -25,1 -225.1 -400,5Exports oC Good5 &: NFScrviCe5 782.2 781.1 766.3 823.4 815.6 945.4 I,U6.7 1,038.6 1,133.6 1,159.1 1,016.7Imports oC Good5 &: NFSclVÏccs 916.0 935.8 956.9 1,005.7 1,018.7 920.2 968.1 1,223.3 1,158.7 1,3lW.2 1.417.2

Domcstic Abwrplion 5,944.7 6,164.3 6,585.11 6,!W3.9 7,202.5 7,1911.7 7,157.3 7,513.0 7,553.5 7,959.1 8,049,5l'rivale Consumption, elC. 4,449.3 4,6n7 5,163.5 5,350.3 5,493.7 5,534.2 5,601.7 5,709,7 5,447.5 5,828.1 6,116.8Ocneral Goy't Consumption 604.3 603.0 630.3 ~.1 746.5 n4.4 nO.8 968.6 1,092.7 1,096.4 1,304.&Gross Domcslic Iovcstmcol 891.0 883.5 792.0 845.5 962.3 890.1 784.7 834.7 1,013.3 1,034.6 627.9

FlXed Invcslmcot 834.7 1,013.3 1,034.6 627.9

Capacity to 1mport n4.l 768.3 929.6 !WU 855.3 1,088.1 1,255.6 986.3 1,076.6 1,100.7 %s,5Tcrms oC Tradc AdjusllDCol -3.1 -128 163.2 23.6 39.5 142.7 U8.9 ·52.4 -57.l -58.4 ·5UGross Domeslic locomc: 5,8028 5,996.8 6,558.5 6,685.2 7,039.2 7,366.6 7,40$4.8 7,276.0 7,471.4 7,675.6 7,597.8Gross Natiooal Iocome 5,n6.0 5,958.7 6,529.2 6,657.5 6,992.1 7,293.5 7,393.3 7,229.8 7,468.0 7,671.3 7,597.5

DOMESllC PRiCES (DEFlATORS) (lllikx 1980 • 100)OveraU (GOP) 66.0 67.5 69.7 70.7 67.11 69.3 75.9 75.7 79.6 88.6 95.4Domcslic Abwrptioo 65.3 67.2 67.9 70.1 67.2 68.1 74.9 76.1 80.1 88.8 95.7Agriculture 61.1 63.1 67.7 68.5 62.9 63.7 71.6 68.6 75.5 88.3 96.9Indusll)' 75.4 75.5 69.0 70.3 70.8 72.9 78.l 85.1 85.3 91.1 94.4

ManuCaduring 76.0 76.1 65.6 67.7 68.2 68.5 75.7 85.9 89.8 96.7 96.7

:-lA.'"UFACTURlJ'G ACIl\1lYEmploymeot (1980-100) 63.1 64.1 65.1 67.4 70.0 71.9 75.2 78.7 n8 82.2 86,5

Rcal Eamint;' pcr EmpL (1980-100) 138.1 143.1 139.5 147.2 160.8 156.4 151.7 146.8 U8.3 119.8 107.6Real Output pcr EmpL (1980-100) 39.0 45.5 61.2 65.2 69.6 74.5 74.7 63.9 69.0 66.0 63.3Eamiot;' as c;V of Value Added 27.9 26.8 23.8 24.0 23.5 23.6 23.3 21.7 23.0 25.3 25.3

MOl''ETARY iJOLDI~GS (MiJüons ofCIUTQIl Elhiopian DÙT)Money Supply, Broadly DcfUled 524.8 604.8 639.7 651.3 755.9 981.8 1.134.6 1,243.9 1,402.9 1,651.9 1,861.4

Moncy as Means of Paymcol ·399.6 454.8 453.2 436.7 490.7 618.5 753.9 942.1 953.0 1,178.7 1,378.2Cum:ocy Outsidc Banks 273.8 319.1 323.2 303.8 339.5 403.8 532.9 689.0 574.6 769.4 894.7Dcmand Dcposits 125.8 135.7 130.0 132.9 151.2 214.7 221.0 253.1 378.4 409.3 483.5

Quasl-Monctal)' Uabifilics 125.1 150.1 186.5 214.6 265.2 363.3 380.7 30U 449.9 473.2 483.2

(MiJüons ofCIUTQIl Elhiopian Birr)GOVER."'MEr.7 DEfiCIT (-) OR SURPLUS -64.2 -49.2 -43.8 ·226.2 -325.1 ·232.5 -421.9

CUITent Revenue 586.2 651.1 716.2 804.8 853.2 1,093.6 1,252.&Cum:nl Expcoditure 545.2 581.2 646.9 848.1 966.7 1,090.9 1,405.6

CUlTCnl Dudsct Balance 41.0 69.9 69.3 -43.3 -113.5 2.7 -152.8Capilal Rcœipts 0.8 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.7 3.3Capital Payments 106.0 UO.7 114.5 1&1.6 213.5 237.9 272.4

::::::::~J:~~;~:~;:~:~:~:?:}::~::~:~:fB~:~:~}r:~:}rr;::i:~:~:r~;~t:~:~~~~;~:;:~;:;~:~:::~:rI;;;;I?~:r~:~·::~:?f~œl=::~:~:~:r::::~;:'::~I~:~~----

111111111111111111111

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Befekadu DeguefeProfilc of the Ethiopian Economy, papcr publishcd in thc Long-TermPerspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa by the World Bank

D.M. Etherington and Alasebu YainshetThe Impact of Income Terms of Trade for Coffee on Capital GoodsImports and Investmcnt in Ethiopia, Eastcrn Africa Economie Review, vol. 4, n° 1, 1988, pp. 48-52

Asmeron Kidane and Gerhard KocklaeuncrA Macroeconomie Modcl for Ethiopia : Spécification, Estimation, Forccast and Control, EastcrnAfrica Economie Rcvicw, 1985, pp. 1-12

Bulletin du FMI - 25juin 1990, p.181-183

M.Stahl:Constraints to Environrnental Rehabilitation Through People'sParticipation in the Northern Ethiopian Highlands, Un Rcsearch Institutè for Social DcvelopmentDiscussion Paper 13, 1990

The EeonomistMarch 9th, 1991, p. 56May 25th, 1991, p. 59, 64June 1st, 1991, p. 45-45

Poliey Framework Paper, 1990/91 - 1992/93Prepared by the Ethiopian authorities in collaboration with the staffs of the Fund and the World Bank,Aug. 30, 1990 .

Asmeron KidaneDeterminants of Savings in Ethiopia with Referencc to the role of demographic variables, EasternAfrica Economie Review, vol. 3 n° 2, 1987, pp. 121-129

Alber Ade OkunadeA comment on the determinant of savings in Ethiopia and the rolc of demographic variables, EasternAfrica Economie Revicw, vol. 5 n° 1, june 1989, pp. 24-31

Habtermariam TesfaghiorghisThe Growlh ofUrbanization in Ethiopia 1966-1984Eastcrn Africa Economie Review, vol. 2,1986, pp. 157-167

Gôte HanssonEthiopia, Institute for Economie Research, Lund University, 19/1990

Stephane Remy1968/1988 : Note rétrospective sur l'évolution macro-économique des deux dernières décennies,D.LAL., juin 199!JEuropa Publications Limited (1990)Africa South of the Sahara - 1991

J. Leonard, K. Behnia, Cl. Jedlieki, J. MonsalveAnalyse structurelle des échanges C.E.EJAC.P., I.S.M.E.A, sept. 1988

38

11111111111111111111l'

D.I.A.L.'s PUBLICATIONS

November 19901. An Endogenous Growth Process, 13 p.

Dccember 19902. An Endogenous Growth-Employment Process, 24 p.

Colloque intern : "Nouvelles Théories de la Croissance :Développements récents et Applications" (Automne 1991, Marrakech)

January 19913. Appréciation des conditions théoriques présupposées pour espérer

réussir une dévaluation, 156 p.

February 1991 •4. Les échanges frontaliers du Nigéria : une dynamique d'intégration

régionale en cours, 64 p.

5. Economie non enregistrée par la statistique et secteur informeldans les PED, 40 p.

March 19916. Un processus de croissance endogène, 13 p.

Colloque intem. : "Restructuration économique et Développementrégional et urbain du Maroc" (3/5 octobre 1991 - Rabat)

7. Progrès technique, Tiers Monde et Processus d'AjustementStructurel: le cas des Biotechnologies, 13 p.

8. Cameroun: Evolution économique rétrospective et perspectivesmacroéconomiques à l'horizon de 1995, 98 p.

\( 9. Le modèle K2000

April 199110. Influences exercées par le Nigéria sur la Cameroun, 8 p.

May 199111. Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (P.A.S.)

Contenu, Appréciation, Instruments de mesure et d'analyse(Enseignement au FORTBILDUNGSCENTRUM A MUNCHEN,2-8 mai 1991),60 p.

June 1991<7 12. Les aspects théoriques du Commerce international et de la• Protection, 80 p.

13. The Ethiopian verses, 39 p.

14. Ethiopie - 1968/1988: Note rétrospective sur l'évolutionmacro-économique des deux dernières décennies, 28 p.

q 15. La politique monétaire et la demande de monnaie:.. une comparaison Cameroun-Nigéria, 40 p.

39

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

F. ROUBAUDS~L)S~~

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

G.de MONCHY,F.ROUBAUD

G. OLIVE

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

M-P. VERLAETEN

S. REMY

F. LENSEIGNE