Fall 2005

$1.00

A quarterly newsletter devoted to A WORLD AT WAR, GMT Games’ strategic simulation of World War II.To order AWAW, go to www.gmtgames.com or phone 1-800-523-6111.

Aspects of the Early War

The Early War........................................... Front Cover By Bruce Harper

Poland ........................................................................ 3 By Kris Dzikowski and Bruce Harper

Norway ...................................................................... 7 By Ken Cruz, Dave Hanson, Markus Kässbohrer and

Donald Stanley

The German Attack in the West ...............................10 By Ken Cruz and Bruce Harper

Next Issue: France 1940

THE EARLY WAR Getting Off to a Good Start

by Bruce Harper

Introduction A WORLD AT WAR players tend to be a contentious,

although amiable, lot. One interesting subject of debate is how soon the crucial moments of a game first arise. Some players like to try to force the issue as early as possible, reasoning that time is already starting to run out for the Axis, while for the Allies the sooner they start chipping away at the Axis, the sooner they’ll win the war. Other players are more relaxed, and try to build a solid and powerful position from which to defeat their opponents or exploit their opponent’s errors, should opportunity knock.

This issue doesn’t attempt to resolve this question, which is as much a matter of style as anything else. It deals with two campaigns which happen in almost every game – Poland and Norway – and winds up with a discussion of the pros and cons of an early German attack in the west.

Poland Every A WORLD AT WAR game starts with the

Polish campaign, although it may be that this will change with the advent of GATHERING STORM. In the meantime, every Axis player should get off on the right foot by knocking out Poland quickly and cheaply. The dice will have their say, but there are a few fundamental principles which apply to the Polish campaign. These are discussed in detail in this issue.

What makes the Polish campaign worth analysis isn’t so much its intrinsic interest (the Poles don’t have many options and they all lead to the same basic result), but rather that the Polish campaign includes all the essential components of the larger, more important struggles in France, Russia and elsewhere. The Germans counterair the Polish air force, conduct overruns, ground attacks and exploitation. A close examination and understanding of these aspects of the Polish campaign will pay dividends later on, just as they did in the real war.

Norway Norway is a different matter. The Norwegian forces

are tiny even in comparison to the Poles, but Norway’s unique geographical position makes the fighting there tricky, even though it is on a small scale. The Germans must get their ground units into Norway by sea and air, at the same time they are conquering France. Looming in the background is the possibility of British intervention to prolong the fighting in Norway and perhaps upset the Axis timetable for further conquests.

Understanding the possibilities in Norway helps players become comfortable with the more subtle tactics involved in naval and airborne operations. Of course there is another reason to master the Norwegian campaign – if the Axis are to fail, they don’t want it to be in Norway. Many of the technical problems associated with Norway have been worked out, so

2 Fall 2005

ULTRA readers might as well benefit from the hard-earned lessons learned by other players. But, as can be seen by the article on Norway in this issue, there are still interesting areas to be explored and options for both players.

The German Attack in the West The third topic explored in this issue is the German

attack in the west. An in-depth analysis of the battle of France will occupy much of the next issue of ULTRA – in this issue we are more concerned with the merits of the ahistorical Winter 1939 attack into the Low Countries, as opposed to the conventional and historical Spring 1940 attack.

The analysis presented is not exhaustive (ULTRA issues aren’t long enough for that), but it may help readers appreciate at least some of the factors that players take into account when making fundamental strategic decisions. Fortunately there are so many such factors to consider, both short and long term, that the game has no chance of being “played out” for the foreseeable future. It is one thing to analyze the Polish

or even Norwegian campaigns sufficiently to achieve a firm grasp of the best options for both sides, but it’s another matter to try to make a definite assessment of the French campaign, much less the battles which follow it.

The Role of the Early Game As discussed above, players differ as to the extent to

which they can put their own stamp on the first few moves of the game. This issue doesn’t touch on research and diplomacy, which in 1939 and 1940 can be essential in setting the stage for various strategies, and in all cases have some effect on the grand strategic environment in which the various alliances must operate. Research and diplomacy alone, quite apart from the various combat die rolls, ensure that no two games will be exactly alike. Rolling over Poland and executing a technically competent Norwegian attack in no way diminish the variation which gives A WORLD AT WAR its high replay value. It is only failure in these operations which channel the game into uninteresting and sterile channels.

A WORLD AT WAR lasts for some 25 turns (and perhaps even longer), which gives the players more than enough time to display their individuality and stylistic preferences. Experienced players may skim the Polish article, although I suspect most will find they were taking something for granted (I know I was), but newer players should find their confidence increased and their enjoyment of the game enhanced by their mastery of these early campaigns. For this reason, Poland and Norway were thought to be suitable topics for ULTRA, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise for readers to learn that it was originally anticipated that these articles would be one or two pages in length, but they grew into the feature articles seen in this issue as the analysis was organized and continued.

EDITOR: Markus Kässbohrer GUEST EDITOR FOR THIS ISSUE: Bruce Harper ASSOCIATE EDITOR, ARTICLE DEVELOPMENT: Ed Schoenfeld PROOFREADERS: Tim Schroeder (lead), Bryan Brinkman, Michael Confoy, Todd Dunnavant, Bill Humphrey, Donald Stanley BUSINESS MANAGER: Maurice Buttazoni ULTRA BOARD: Bruce Harper, Don Moody, Eric Thobaben, Markus Kässbohrer, Mike Crowe, Vic Hogen.

ULTRA would like to express its gratitude to GMT Games and ULTRA Publications without whose cooperation and support this newsletter would not be possible. GMT is not responsible for the fulfilment of ULTRA subscriptions or for any other monies tendered to ULTRA Publications for ULTRA or related materials.

ULTRA is available only by e-mail. This ensures rapid and inexpensive delivery of a color product and allows subscribers to print and retain their issues in the form they wish. Printed (hard copy) subscriptions are no longer available. ULTRA subscription rates (US $) are $1.00 per issue: one year (4 issues) for $4.00; two years (8 issues) for $8.00; three years (12 issues) for $12.00. The preferred payment method is to use Paypal (www.paypal.com). Paypal will accept Visa, Mastercard, or a transfer from a checking account. The Paypal account is ULTRAnewsletter@aworldatwar.com. Alternatively, you can send a check or money order in USD to ULTRA Publications, 2227 N 73rd street, Milwaukee, WI 53213, U.S.A. E-mail is as above.

The entire contents of this issue are copyright 2006 by ULTRA Publications. All rights are reserved. No part of ULTRA may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical or otherwise without the prior written permission of ULTRA Publications. Published opinions are solely those of the authors.

POSTMASTER: send address changes to ULTRA Publications, 2227 N 73rd street, Milwaukee, WI 53213, U.S.A.

A WORLD AT WAR is available from GMT Games, www.gmtgames.com Tel. 1-800-523-6111.

Missing Topics It’s hard for a single issue of ULTRA to fully

cover a specific topic. Here are a few related topics, although some of them have been dealt with in past issues and others will be discussed in future issues:

• Whether to use German raiders in Fall 1939. • Early research allocations and the possibilities

they allow and foreclose. • Diplomacy in 1939 and 1940. • Russian options. • The Balkans during the Nazi-Soviet

honeymoon.

Fall 2005 3

Introduction Thinking about World War II brings to mind the

Battle of Britain, Rommel and the Africa Korps, the titanic struggle on the eastern front, Pearl Harbor, Midway and Iwo Jima. But it all began in Poland, with a campaign that was as lopsided in history as it is in A WORLD AT WAR. But it is not without subtleties, either.

Poland, like a phoenix, was reborn in 1918 after 123 long years of occupation under the rule of three neighboring powers: Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Between the two world wars the Second Polish Republic built everything from scratch: industry destroyed during the First World War and the Russo-Polish War which followed, a national economy, a unified system of laws, a political system and a national identity, although the flame of Polish nationalism had never been extinguished following the partitions of the late 18th century.

The Polish Situation Poland’s rebirth after the First World War was to a

large extent a fortuitous accident of history. Poland’s misfortune of being located between two hostile great powers was temporarily offset by the collapse of Germany and Russia in 1918-1920. This gave Poland the opportunity to assert its independence, but also created in some Polish circles the dangerous delusion that it was a power on par with its potentially powerful neighbors. Historically Poland suffered from being the invasion route between Germany and Russia, but a disaster occurred when the rapprochement between Hitler and Stalin led to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which really amounted to a fourth partition of Poland.

The Depression of the 1930s was hard on Poland and the economic recovery that was underway in 1939 came too late to significantly benefit the Polish armed forces. When the Germans attacked in September 1939, Poland had an obsolete army with relatively few tanks and aircraft. The army consisted mainly of infantry and the cavalry beloved by the Poles.

The German five-fold superiority in tanks and planes was augmented by the impossible strategic situation in

which Poland found itself. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 allowed the Germans to attack from three different directions (in the north from East Prussia, in the west from Germany and in the south from Slovakia). Defense in depth, behind the Vistula, was impossible, as that meant giving up Poland’s richest provinces. The Poles were concerned that if they didn’t defend these areas, the Germans could conquer them without a fight and the Western Allies might accept the result in another Munich. Historically, in contrast to A WORLD AT WAR, Polish troops deployed along the Polish borders.

The Poles had some one million soldiers, in 39 divisions and 16 brigades, with 4,300 guns, 880 tanks and 400 planes. Against this the Germans deployed nearly two million men, in 56 divisions and 4 brigades, with 10,000 guns, 2,700 tanks and 3,000 planes.

The Historical Conquest When Germany attacked Poland on September 1,

1939, the Polish armies were forced to withdraw towards the east. The basic Polish plan was to hang on and await an expected Western Allied attack in the west, but of course this attack never came. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army invaded the eastern regions of Poland to reclaim the territories lost to Poland in the Russo-Polish war of 1920. Poland had no chance against this combined attack, although its military situation was already hopeless when the Russians attacked (the Russian action in fact being accelerated by the speed of the German success).

The Polish government, which never surrendered, together with the remaining Polish forces, evacuated to neighboring Rumania. Many of the exiled Poles fought for the Western Allies with great distinction in many campaigns during the Second World War.

The Polish Defense In A WORLD AT WAR, the conquest of Poland is

determined by control of Warsaw, so the Poles will always set up with two 2-3 infantry units in the Polish capital. Their remaining forces will be used to try to block German access to Warsaw. We will consider the

POLAND The First Blitzkrieg

by Kris Dzikowski and Bruce Harper

4 Fall 2005

basic Polish defensive set up to consist of five 1-3 infantry units adjacent to Warsaw, the third 2-3 infantry unit in the hex southeast of Warsaw (N35), to cover the only non-river access to Warsaw, and the remaining two 1-3 infantry units in two of the three hexes adjacent to N35. This will be referred to as Polish Defense 1.

Note that in all the diagrams in this article, the Polish air units have been omitted.

Polish Defense 1

The German Attack The German attack varies depending on the precise

Polish set up. First let’s consider the basic Polish defense, Polish Defense 1.

The Counterair One aspect of the German attack common to all

variations is that the Germans will counterair the Polish air force. No matter where the two Polish AAF deploy, only two Germans AAF are required to negate them, as a quick look at the first two rows of the Air Combat Table confirm:

Air Combat Table - 19.2

Dice Roll AF AS 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12+ 1 0 0 0/1 0/1 1/0 1/0 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/2 1/3 2 0/1 0/1 1/0 1/0 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 2/2

Since the German Air Nationality DRM is two higher than that of the Poles, the German air combat dice roll receives a +2 modifier, while the Polish air combat dice roll incurs a -2 modifier. If the air combat is resolved as two one-on-one battles, the worst the Germans can do is roll a “2”, which is increased to a “4”, which inverts the Polish AAF. If the air combat is resolved as a single two-on-two battle, then the worst the Germans can do in their first air combat dice roll is to eliminate one Polish AAF, while the best the Poles can do is eliminate one German AAF. The battle would then continue with each side having one AAF, which we know the Germans can’t lose.

This makes this part of the Polish campaign pretty simple – the Germans allocate two AAF to knocking out the Polish air force, leaving them 18 AAF for ground support. The only variable is how well the Poles roll, which will determine the extent of the German air combat losses.

The Overrun The next step for the Germans is to overrun one of

the Polish 1-3 infantry units southeast or east of the Polish 2-3 infantry defending the southern route to Warsaw. For this the Germans will use two 4-6 armor units and four AAF (leaving them with 14 unused AAF). If the Germans are unfortunate to roll a “1” on the overrun they lose one AAF (see rule 15.54A, below), leaving their armor units intact.

The Breakthrough After the overrun, one of the German 4-6 armor units

remains in place, while the other withdraws to make room for a German 3-3 infantry unit. Two more German 3-3 infantry units move into position and all four units attack the Polish 2-3 infantry unit (13:4 = 3:1). This attack is guaranteed to succeed. The rest of the German armor moves adjacent to the attacking German units.

The Exploitation At this point the Germans have three 4-6 armor units

available for exploitation, plus 14 AAF, for a total of 26 factors for the exploitation attack on Warsaw. This is another 3:1 attack (24:8 = 3:1), with the only question being whether the Germans will lose a 4-6 armor unit. They can no longer lose two 4-6 armor units, because of the following rule: 15.54 EARLY GERMAN OVERRUNS AND EXPLOITATION ATTACKS: "Ex" results from German overruns and exploitation attacks are treated as "Ex-1" results:

Fall 2005 5

A. In Poland in Fall 1939.

B. On the western front during the first two Axis player turns in which the Axis conduct any western front offensive ground or air operations, but no later than Summer 1940. Normally this will be Spring 1940 and Summer 1940.

Variations in the Polish Defense The first variation in the Polish defense is to leave

two of the hexes adjacent to N35 vacant, and put a 2-3 infantry unit and a 1-3 infantry unit in N35 itself. This is Polish Defense 2:

Polish Defense 2

The German attack is then slightly varied. Germany overruns a Polish 1-3 infantry unit adjacent to N35, just as it did before, then attacks the three Polish infantry factors in N35 with a 4-6 armor unit and five 3-3 infantry units (19:6 = 3:1).

The second variation in the Polish defense is similar to Polish Defense 1, but in Polish Defense 3 one of the hexes adjacent to Warsaw is left vacant, and that 1-3 infantry unit is used to reinforce N35. The idea of this defense is that if the Germans overrun one of the Polish 1-3 infantry units adjacent to N35, they will be able to attack the 2-3 Polish infantry unit in N35 with only a 4-6 armor unit, three 3-3 infantry units and two AAF (15:6 = 2.5:1). The attack will succeed and Warsaw will be captured by exploiting German armor at 3:1 odds, but the likely German losses are slightly increased because the Germans are unable to create their breakthrough with a 3:1 attack.

Polish Defense 3

The Germans don’t have to go along with the Polish plan, however. When one hex adjacent to Warsaw is left vacant, the Germans may overrun the four Polish 1-3 infantry units adjacent to Warsaw using two 4-6 armor units and four AAF for each overrun. Once five hexes adjacent to Warsaw have been cleared, the Germans can attack Warsaw with four 4-6 armor units, six 3-3 infantry units and their two remaining AAF, for a total of 36 attacking factors, which is exactly what is required for a 36:12 = 3:1 attack against Warsaw.

A third variation of the Polish defense is similar. The Poles leave two hexes adjacent to Warsaw vacant, put a 2-3 infantry unit and a 1-3 infantry unit in N35 and defend all three hexes adjacent to N35 with 1-3 infantry units. This is Polish Defense 4.

An inflexible German player will overrun two of the Polish 1-3 infantry units adjacent to N35, using eight AAF, then attack N35 with a 4-6 armor unit, three 3-3 infantry units and two AAF (15:6 = 2.5:1). This will use a total of 12 AAF (including the two needed to counterair the Polish air force), leaving him only eight AAF for the exploitation attack on Warsaw. The 20:8 = 2.5:1 exploitation attack on Warsaw will succeed, but the German losses from two 2.5:1 attacks are likely to be higher than those for two 3:1 attacks.

To meet Polish Defense 4, the Germans should adopt the same approach as to Polish Defense 3, overrunning the Polish 1-3 infantry units adjacent to Warsaw, then attacking Warsaw in a 3:1 non-exploitation attack. Because the Germans have to make

6 Fall 2005

one less overrun, Polish Defense 4 is actually slightly weaker than Polish Defense 3.

Polish Defense 4

Expected Losses It should be clear by now that Poland cannot survive

if the German player knows how to attack it (and if you’ve read this far, you do). The best the Poles can do is to try to maximize the losses incurred by the Germans. The merits of the various Polish defenses may be judged by the expected German losses, although this type of analysis doesn’t tell the whole story, because some defenses may inflict higher German losses on average, but may also have a lower maximum German loss.

With respect to the Polish air, the expected losses to Germany are virtually the same whether the Polish air is stacked separately or together (with a tiny edge to stacking them separately). It comes out to around 2.5 BRPs (slightly less than one AAF).

For each overrun, the Germans have a 1/6 chance of losing one AAF (rule 15.54A gives relief for overruns, therefore a die roll of “1” results in an “Ex-1”, not a full “Ex”), so the expected loss for each overrun is half a BRP (although for any given overrun, the actual loss will be either 3 BRPs or nothing at all).

For regular combat and exploitation attacks, the expected losses are calculated by determining the BRP

cost of each possible result on the Combat Results Table:

Combat Results Table - 15.6 1:4 1:3 1:2 1:1 2:1 3:1 4:1 5:1 1 A A A A a Ex Ex-1 Ex-2 2 A A A a Ex Ex-1 Ex-2 d 3 A A a Ex Ex-1 Ex-2 d D 4 A A Ex Ex-1 Ex-2 d D D 5 A Ex Ex Ex-2 d D D D 6 Ex Ex Ex d D D D D

Modifier

+1 For each previous round of combat

For example, for the most important attack (the 3:1 exploitation attack on Warsaw), the Germans will lose 8 BRPs on a die roll of “1” (rule 15.54A), 8 BRPs on a die roll of “2”, and nothing on a die roll of “3” or more. The expected loss is therefore 16 BRPs divided by 6 die rolls = 2.66 BRPs, although the actual loss in any given game will be either 8 BRPs or nothing.

For the 3:1 attack to create the breakthrough in N35, the Germans get no relief on a die roll of “1”, but they can take their losses from infantry, so against both a single Polish 2-3 infantry unit or a Polish 2-3 infantry unit and a 1-3 infantry unit, the Germans will lose two 3-3 infantry units on a die roll of “1” (6 BRPs) , one 3-3 infantry unit on a die roll of “2” (3 BRPs) and nothing on a die roll of “3” or more, for an expected loss of 1.5 BRPs.

If the Germans overrun the Polish 1-3 infantry units adjacent to Warsaw, the expected losses for the 3:1 attack on Warsaw will be four 3-3 infantry units on a die roll of “1” (12 BRPs), three 3-3 infantry units on a die roll of “2” (9 BRPs), two 3-3 infantry units on a die roll of “3” (6 BRPs), and nothing on a die roll of “4” or more. This comes out to 4.5 BRPs, plus 1 or 2 BRPs for the overruns, but in assessing this attack it must be kept in mind that these are the only attacks Germany will have to make, and that Germany will miss the infantry when it attacks in the west less than it would miss an armor unit.

In summary, the expected losses for Germany in Poland are a little less than 10 BRPs, and this figure changes little regardless of the exact Polish defense and the precise German attack. For most players, these details are not worth worrying about. Germany can only get in trouble in Poland if they somehow mishandle the attack.

Fall 2005 7

Editor’s Note: This article is a compilation of submissions from a number of people who often attack Norway. Bruce Harper has attempted to combine these into a coherent analysis.

Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister notorious for appeasing Hitler in 1938, stood up to the German dictator by guaranteeing the integrity of Poland and, perhaps unexpectedly, declared war on Germany on the basis of that guarantee. On April 4, 1940, Chamberlain famously declared that Hitler had “missed the bus” by failing to follow up on the German conquest of Poland with further offensives.

Less than a week later, Germany attacked Norway and soon after, following one of the first and still one of the boldest air-naval operations ever, German troops were in control of all the major ports in Norway. Within a month, Chamberlain lost office over Britain’s utterly shambolic intervention in Norway and was replaced by Winston Churchill, although Churchill also played a considerable role in bringing about the British disaster in Norway.

While there is no British Prime Minister to remove in A WORLD AT WAR, the Germans still want to get the victory. Conquering Norway is a fairly straight forward exercise, but precise execution is necessary to discourage the British from mucking it all up.

The Defenders The Norwegians have two one-factor infantry

units. One must be placed in Oslo: 82.54 MANDATORY DEPLOYMENT IN CAPITAL: At least one minor country ground unit must be deployed in an attacked minor country’s capital. This deployment requirement applies only to the initial setup of the minor country.

The other Norwegian 1-3 infantry unit usually goes on the beach hex southeast of Oslo (D35), in Oslo or occasionally in Bergen.

The common set up of one Norwegian 1-3 infantry unit in Oslo and the second Norwegian 1-3 infantry unit in the beach hex southeast of Oslo (D35, referred to as “the Norwegian beach hex” in this article) is depicted below. Hex G32, the normal location of a German airbase, is also shown:

Preparation To be ready to deal with all possible Norwegian

setups and stop any mischief the British may try to cause, Germany should have the following units in position at the end of its Winter 1939 player turn:

• A 2-6 armor unit, 1-3 infantry unit and a 1-3 airborne unit (in addition to the German navy) in Kiel.

• Two 3-3 infantry units in Rostock. • A 2-6 armor unit in Stettin. • Three AAF and an air transport within eight

hexes of G32 (in northern Denmark).

This may seem like a lot of force, but the Axis won’t need it all. Which units are actually used in the

NORWAY Getting the Germans in and Keeping the British Out

by Ken Cruz, Dave Hanson, Markus Kässbohrer and Donald Stanley

8 Fall 2005

attack on Norway will depend on the Norwegian set up. If the armor units are not used, they are within range of the Low Countries and France and can help out with Germany’s spring offensive in the west. The two German 3-3 infantry units will not be missed in France.

Declaring War Germany should declare war on both Denmark and

Norway together. This counts as only one declaration of war for BRP and USAT purposes: 50.22 DECLARATIONS OF WAR ON MINOR COUNTRIES: A declaration of war against a minor country costs 10 BRPs, subject to the following exceptions: ... B. DENMARK AND NORWAY: Any major power may declare war on Denmark and Norway as a unit by making a single declaration of war at a cost of 10 BRPs. If a declaration of war is made against only one of Denmark or Norway, the other remains neutral and a second declaration of war, requiring another 10 BRPs, must be made before it can be attacked.

50.53 USAT EFFECTS: ... C. If Belgium and Luxembourg, or Denmark and Norway, are subject to a single declaration of war, the USAT effect is either +1 (for an Axis declaration of war) or -2 (for a Western Allied declaration of war). If Belgium and Luxembourg, or Denmark and Norway, are subject to separate declarations of war, USAT are affected by both declarations of war.

A German declaration of war gives Germany control of Denmark at the start of the Axis player turn, which is very important. 86.122 EFFECT OF GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR: If Germany declares war on Denmark, Denmark does not resist German occupation and all Danish hexes are deemed to have been controlled and fully supplied by Germany from the start of the Axis player turn in which it declared war. Germany may thus operate air units out of Copenhagen and construct and use an airbase in a Danish hex in the turn in which it declares war on Denmark.

Timing Germany may not declare war on Denmark and

Norway in Fall 1939: 50.33 DECLARATIONS OF WAR ON MINOR COUNTRIES: A. GERMANY: Germany may not declare war on any minor countries in Fall 1939.

Winter invasions of Norway are prohibited: 21.5121 WEATHER: A. Seaborne invasions which involve naval movement through western and eastern front sea hexes are prohibited during winter turns, regardless of the location of the invasion hex. Thus winter invasions of hex T10 (in Portugal), Casablanca and French North Africa from Britain through the Straits of Gibraltar are prohibited, while a winter invasion of U19 (in southern France) is allowed if the naval movement of the invasion forces is confined to the Mediterranean.

This means the earliest turn Germany may attack Denmark and Norway is Spring 1940, and that’s when they normally should do so. See, however, the boxed comment at the end of this article for an interesting alternative which defers the invasion of Norway until Fall 1940.

Execution The execution of the Spring 1940 German attack

depends on how the Norwegians set up. Since one Norwegian 1-3 infantry unit must be in Oslo, the variable is the location of the other 1-3 Norwegian infantry unit.

On the Beach This is the usual setup, as depicted in the

illustration on the previous page. The Germans should invade the Norwegian beach hex with a 2-6 armor unit and a 1-3 infantry unit, supported by at least two AAF flying from a German airbase in G32 and fleet factors for shore bombardment. This will give the Germans at least a 3:1 attack. Any losses are first taken from the 1-3 infantry unit, then from the AAF (the worst the Germans can do in this attack is roll a “1” and get an “Ex”, for a maximum German loss of three factors).

The purpose of the armor unit on the beach adjacent to Oslo is that its ZoC prevents Norway from rebuilding its 1-3 infantry unit in Oslo: 84.47 UNIT CONSTRUCTION: An associated minor country may rebuild a single one- or two-factor infantry unit at no BRP cost each turn (EXCEPTION: Dutch units in the Dutch East Indies may not be rebuilt). No more than two factors of infantry may be rebuilt each turn. Associated minor country units must be rebuilt in a controlled, supplied hex in the minor country which is not in an enemy ZoC (27.44). Associated minor country air and armor units may not be rebuilt unless the minor country activates as a minor ally. Associated minor country naval units may be repaired, but not rebuilt, in a shipyard controlled by their alliance faction.

Fall 2005 9

This means that at the end of the Allied Spring 1940 player turn Oslo will contain only one Norwegian 1-3 infantry unit. Even if the German 1-3 infantry unit was taken as a loss in the German invasion, Germany will be guaranteed at least at 2.5:1 attack on Oslo in Summer 1940 unless British units can get to Oslo in Spring 1940.

In Oslo If both Norwegian 1-3 infantry units set up in Oslo,

the Germans are able to invade the Norwegian beach hex (D35) with twice as many ground factors as they can if the Norwegians defend it: 21.5131 CARRYING CAPACITY: A. UNDEFENDED HEXES: One destroyer factor is required to carry each invading ground factor if the invasion hex is not occupied by an enemy ground unit. B. DEFENDED HEXES: Two destroyer factors are required to carry each invading ground factor, including ground units which do not participate in the initial invasion combat, if the invasion hex is occupied by an enemy ground unit.

Rather than use a 2-6 armor unit, the Germans invade the Norwegian beach with the two 3-3 infantry units in Rostock. In Summer 1940 Oslo will be defended by two Norwegian 1-3 infantry units, but the two German 3-3 infantry units in the Norwegian beach will be able to attack Oslo, so again Germany is guaranteed at least a 2.5:1 attack on Oslo in Summer 1940 unless British units can get to Oslo in Spring 1940. It is even possible for Germany to invade the Norwegian beach with another two 3-3 infantry units in Summer 1940 in order to attack Oslo with 12 infantry factors in Fall 1940. This works best when Germany intends to conduct a full offensive on the western front in Fall 1940 by bombing or invading Britain.

An alternative worth mentioning, but which cannot be recommended, is for Germany to invade the vacant Norwegian beach with two 2-6 armor units, and attack Oslo during Spring 1940 exploitation with a 2-6 armor unit and five AAF based in G32 (or a 1-3 airborne unit and four AAF). The problem facing Germany is that it can only build one airbase in Denmark in time for a Spring 1940 attack, and Italian AAF can’t reach northern Denmark from Italy. The exploitation attack would therefore be a risky 1:1 (7:4), and it is too early in the game for the Germans to resort to such desperate tactics. In any case, the attack would divert two 2-6 armor units and five AAF from the attack on France, as opposed to two 3-3 infantry units, which won’t be missed.

In Bergen A third, and very rare, possibility for the

Norwegians is to set up their second 1-3 infantry unit in Bergen, in the hope of securing British intervention. This fails because the Germans can invade the Norwegian beach with one 2-6 armor unit and attack Oslo with the other 2-6 armor unit during exploitation, with three AAF as ground support. This 2.5:1 attack guarantees the conquest of Norway in a single turn, giving German control of Bergen before Britain can react.

If the Germans want to use their 2-6 armor units in France, they can also invade the Norwegian beach with two 3-3 infantry units and prevent British intervention by an airdrop.

The Essential Airdrop In conjunction with the invasions described above,

the German airborne unit should move to G32, along with the German air transport. The Germans then can airdrop on either Bergen or the mountain hex between Bergen and Oslo (C34).

An airdrop of Bergen forces the British to invade Bergen during their turn in order to get units into Norway. This is a difficult operation, because the British will have no land-based air units within range of Bergen to intercept German defensive air support from G32, which will be tripled in its effect against a

10 Fall 2005

seaborne invasion: 18.611 During the combat phase of an enemy player turn, after the attacker has announced his ground support air missions, uninverted defending army air units and land-based naval air units may provide defensive air support to any units within range which the defender thinks may be subject to ground attack, including by seaborne invasion and as yet unannounced airdrops (EXCEPTION: Deferred defensive air support against low-odds attacks - 18.619). ... B. The strength of defensive air support flown against seaborne invasions is tripled. Each NAS adds one factor and each AAF adds three factors to the defense of the attacked ground units. The tripled strength of defensive air support against seaborne invasions is not affected by factors which modify the DM of the defending ground units, such as the use of marines by the attacker, and applies when determining combat losses inflicted on the attacker (15.61).

Alternatively, the Germans can airdrop in the mountain hex east of Bergen. This allows the British to sea transport into Bergen, but unless the British have a 2-5 armor unit in port at the start of their turn, they can’t move a unit into Oslo (it takes five movement factors to sea transport into Bergen and move to Oslo if the direct path is blocked) and redeployment to Oslo is prevented because there are German units adjacent to Oslo.

Even if the British have a 2-5 armor unit in reserve in a port, the Germans may want to allow it into Oslo, reasoning it might benefit the Allies more in France or Egypt, but this is up to the German player and will depend on the situation elsewhere on the board.

British Intervention While a German airdrop will prevent Britain from

saving Norway, it is impossible to prevent the British from occupying Bergen, if they wish to do so.

The airdrop into Bergen more or less prevents a Spring 1940 British invasion of Bergen, but in Summer 1940 the German airborne unit will be eliminated due to isolation.

There are several ways the Germans can save the airborne unit in Bergen, but none are likely. One is to sea supply Bergen, but the British will intercept and the Germans are unlikely to win the ensuing naval battle. Another is to use the German air transport to air supply the German airborne unit, but this means the Germans must be willing to forego an airdrop in France in Summer 1940 (when they normally airdrop into Paris to negate the French river defense) unless the Germans have produced a second air transport in 1940 (which will almost certainly cost two RPs). Finally, if Germany somehow invaded in Spring 1940 with two armor units, they might be able to exploit out

of Oslo in Summer 1940, but it’s difficult to see how this could ever be possible.

If the German airborne unit in Bergen is eliminated, Germany will be unable to redeploy into Bergen because, while it will control Oslo and Bergen, it won’t control the hex in between the two; and any German attempt to NR into Bergen will be intercepted by the Royal Navy.

This means the British will have the option of invading an undefended Bergen in Summer 1940, provided they are prepared to fight the German navy and the German AAF based in G32.

Alternatively, if the Germans airdrop into the hex east of Bergen, they won’t control Bergen and the British can sea transport units into Bergen in Summer 1940 if they are so inclined.

Either way, the British can intervene in Norway with ground units in Summer 1940, but this is hardly the end of the world for the Axis. The British must maintain this force by tracing a sea supply line to Bergen, because Oslo will be firmly in German hands. If sea supply fails, the British ground units will be eliminated.

Unless the British are prepared to either write off their Norwegian intervention, which makes it pointless to begin with, or accept naval losses due to German air and fleet attacks, they must raise the stakes in Norway in one of two ways.

Raising the Stakes The first option the British have to sustain their

Norwegian adventure is to commit air units to Norway. If the British can maintain even air parity over Bergen, they will have little difficulty in getting supply to their troops in Norway. The problem with this idea, of course, is that Germany has more AAF and more BRPs than Britain, and Britain will lose this air battle if the Germans want to commit the resources to win it.

The second option for the British is to construct a fort in Bergen. This is only possible if the British have committed an RP to fort production in 1940 (two RPs if the British have no military general research breakthrough) and if Bergen is not in the ZoC of a German armor unit. This option is expensive, both in terms of BRPs and in terms of the opportunity cost, since the fort won’t be in London, Suez or any one of a number of other important hexes, depending on the course of the war. On the other hand, the British units

Fall 2005 11

in Bergen would be immune from attrition and would survive a turn or two without sea supply if necessary. The Allied goal in Norway is not to reconquer Oslo, which is impossible until after the U.S. is in the war. Nor will the interruption of iron ore shipments from Sweden have much of an effect on the German war effort. Instead the Allies hope to maintain the potential of opening a Scandinavian front. But even a limited British intervention in Norway has a cost. The British have so few ground units in 1940 and 1941 that any British forces committed to Norway may well be missed in Malta, the Middle East, Gibraltar or even in Britain itself.

Epilogue The key to Norway is to prevent British meddling.

While an airdrop into or east of Bergen usually does the job, if the British are intent on saving Norway then they might invade Bergen with a 2-5 armor unit and a 3-4 infantry unit, overpower the German airborne unit and its defensive air support, and exploit into Oslo with a second 2-5 armor unit.

The Germans shouldn’t even try to stop this operation and shouldn’t panic if the British decide to invest BRPs and units in a Norwegian adventure. The British may well find they miss these BRPs and units by the end of 1940. The Germans should just take care of France in Summer 1940 and then either evict the British from Norway in Fall 1940 using their air superiority or, more ambitiously, firestorm London or invade southern England, to teach the English not to meddle in the Reich’s affairs!

The end of the Blucher. Game designer Bruce Harper

has a dog named Blucher.

The Brophy Option An interesting alternative to the standard Spring

1940 German attack on Denmark and Norway suggested by Joe Brophy is for Germany to defer the attack and launch an additional DD in Spring and Summer 1940. This may slow the full construction of the German submarine force slightly, but it also threatens a stronger invasion of Britain.

If Germany invades Britain in Fall 1940, the Axis focus on Sea Lion and ignore Denmark and Norway indefinitely. If Germany does not invade Britain, Germany declares war on Denmark and Norway in Fall 1940.

If the Norwegian beach is defended by a 1-3 Norwegian infantry unit, the Germans invade with two 2-6 armor units. The initial attack against the Norwegian beach consists of one 2-6 German armor unit plus three Italian AAF plus four factors of shore bombardment, for an attack of 9:3 (3:1). In exploitation, the other 2-6 German armor unit plus two Italian AAF and two German AAF attack Oslo, for an attack of 6:2 (3:1).

If the Norwegian beach is undefended, the Germans invade with two 2-6 armor units and a 4-6 armor unit. The initial attack is a 2-6 German armor unit against an undefended beach. In exploitation, the 4-6 German armor unit and the other 2-6 German armor unit plus four Italian AAF and two German AAF attack Oslo, for an attack of 12:4 (3:1). In either case, Oslo falls in Fall 1940 and the German airborne unit airdrops into Bergen to prevent the British from invading. The airborne unit is then supplied in Winter 1940.

This attack works because both the Germans and Italians can build airbases in Denmark in the turn of the attack and because the Germans can land more armor because they have built an additional two DDs. If the Axis wish, they can save one or two AAF by risking 2.5:1, rather than 3:1, attacks. While deferring the attack on Denmark and Norway costs the Germans BRPs, because the value of their conquests will be pro-rated, and may save the Western Allies a transport or two in Summer and Fall 1940, this approach preserves the option of not attacking Denmark and Norway at all and rules out any real chance of British intervention in Norway.

There is always something new to try in A WORLD AT WAR!

12 Fall 2005

Editor’s Note: One of the perennial questions in A WORLD AT WAR has been whether it is better for Germany to attack in the west in Winter 1939 or wait until Spring 1940. Here we present the pros and cons of the early attack

Ken Cruz plays the role of the mad German dictator Adolf Hitler by advocating an immediate attack once Poland has collapsed. Ken doesn’t just talk the talk, he walked the walk by executing just such an attack in the recent Boardgame Players Association convention (see the Summer 2005 issue of ULTRA).

Bruce Harper weighs in for the con, setting out the advantages he sees to waiting until Spring 1940. Ironically, Bruce played Japan as Ken’s partner at the convention and for at least a few hours was a cheerleader for the Winter 1939 attack....

WINTER 1939

by Ken Cruz

The Opportunity One alternative for Germany is to spend its Winter

1939 turn just building more forces in preparation to crush the Low Countries and France in 1940. This period of time was historically referred to as the “The Phony War” and “Sitzkrieg”. How boring – such sloth should not be rewarded! There is much the German player can do in Winter 1939 to improve his chances of winning the game. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are easy targets that provide many rewards if conquered sooner rather than later.

What you get During the 1940 YSS Germany reaps the rewards of

its early conquest of the Low Countries. Let’s see what the Fatherland will gain:

• An extra 30 BRPs (10 BRPs for the Netherlands, 15 BRPs for Belgium and 5 BRP’s for Luxem-bourg).

• One extra DP for control of the Low Countries and a second extra DP for starting the year with over 200 BRPs (150 BRPs for Germany’s base, 20 BRPs for Poland, 10 BRPs for economic interest in Russia and 30 BRPs for the Low Countries).

• An extra RP for starting the year with over 200 BRPs.

• The front line is one hex closer to Paris. The extra DPs have the potential to be cashed in later

during 1940 with a possible hex control result in Spain, a more favorable French surrender level or intelligence project results; their usefulness is endless. The extra RP can always help somewhere as well and being a hex closer to Paris always makes the Allies nervous.

How to do it The conquest of the Low Countries is a simple task

to carry out. The key to success is high odds attacks that minimize potential losses.

Fall 1939 builds An essential component in the Winter 1939 conquest

of the Low Countries is a fully built Luftwaffe. Germany therefore should give priority in Fall 1939 to building their remaining 10 AAFs and any AAFs lost in Poland.

The Defenders The Low Countries have rather modest forces. The

Netherlands are only defended by a single 2-3 infantry unit and one AAF, both of which must set up in The Hague. Belgium has one 2-3 and three 1-3 infantry units. There are lots of ways to set up these forces, but the optimum Allied setup is to place the 2-3 and one 1-3 infantry unit in Brussels, one 1-3 infantry unit in Antwerp and the remaining 1-3 infantry unit in N25. It doesn’t really matter how the Belgians set up, as they can’t defend against the German attack.

Poor Luxembourg has no forces so the Germans take it for free.

THE GERMAN ATTACK IN THE WEST Winter 1939 or Spring 1940?

by Ken Cruz and Bruce Harper

Fall 2005 13

Keep in mind that France and Britain cannot provide any help to the Low Countries in the turn in which they are attacked, so the Germans don’t have to worry about French or British AAF providing defensive air support.

The Attack The conquest will consist of four high odds attacks,

but first the Dutch and Belgian AAFs have to be counteraired by one German AAF each. This guarantees that they can’t interfere with the German attacks, and leaves Germany with 28 AAF.

The German ground units then move into the positions set out below:

The Germans execute four attacks: • The Hague: Two 3-3 infantry units and 10 AAFs

(16:4 = 4:1). • Antwerp: One 4-6 armor unit, one 3-3 infantry

unit and one AAF (8:2 = 4:1). • Brussels: One 4-6 armor unit, one 3-3 infantry

unit and 17 AAF (24:6 = 4:1). • N35: Four 3-3 infantry units (12:2 = 6:1). All the attacks will be successful and German units

will occupy all the attacked hexes. The 6:1 is an automatic victory; for the three 4:1 attacks the Germans lose one 3-3 infantry unit on a die roll of “1”. The expected losses for the entire operation are about 2.5

BRPs from the two counterair attacks plus 1.5 BRPs from the ground attacks, for a total of about four BRPs.

1940 The Allies should now be a bit nervous: German

troops are on the French border ready to assault northern France and Paris. The Allies must defend stoutly in France or Paris might fall in Spring 1940. The Allies must also have to worry about those extra Axis DPs and where they are placed.

SPRING 1940

by Bruce Harper

At one point in the development of A WORLD AT WAR the Axis Winter 1939 attack was not simply a viable option, but was arguably the best strategy for the Axis. In my view, the cumulative effect of various rule changes has been to change the Winter 1939 attack into a dubious gambit, justified only in certain circumstances.

The German Superiority The main reason I prefer to wait until Spring 1940 to attack in the west is that I see Germany’s top priority as building its forces. Historically the Germans had a big advantage over the Western Allies in 1940 in terms of doctrine, the employment of their armor and air and the professionalism and competence of their leadership (Hitler’s meddling notwithstanding). The Germans had a better plan and they executed it brilliantly. What the Germans did not have, Allied propaganda notwithstanding, was a quantitative or even a qualitative advantage over the Western Allies. The French and British had more tanks and planes and many of them were better than their German counterparts. They were just used poorly.

In A WORLD AT WAR, the German superiority is represented partly by the German CTL and Air Nationality DRM advantage over the French, but mainly by the higher combat and movement factor of the German 4-6 armor units and the German numerical advantage in armor and air factors.

The Germans may have as many as 40 armor factors, as against the nine French armor factors and the four British armor factors, two of which are often in Egypt. In the air, the Germans may have 30 AAF

14 Fall 2005

vs. France’s five AAF and Britain’s 15 AAF. I emphasize the words “may have”...

Building Germany’s Force Pool Some numbers are in order.

Germany begins the game with 110 BRPs, and gains five BRPs in Winter 1939 from the conquest of Poland. Germany therefore has 115 BRPs to spend in 1939. Since the free eastern front offensive in Fall 1939 is long gone (the starting German BRP level was increased to reflect this change), 15 BRPs of Germany’s 115 BRPs are spoken for. This leaves Germany with exactly 100 BRPs. Germany’s unit construction limit is 50 BRPs per turn, which means that if Germany does nothing else in 1939 other than attack Poland, it can spend the remainder of its starting BRPs to build units. In practice, Germany may spend two or three BRPs in Fall 1939 to raid, so the actual number is slightly less, even if Germany defers its attack in the west until Spring 1940. On the other side of the ledger, what does Germany have to build? Ignoring for the moment losses from the Polish campaign (which are usually around 8-10 BRPs of units), Germany’s At Start allowable builds and its Winter 1939 force pool additions are: 10 AAF (30 BRPs); two 2-6 armor units (8 BRPs); eight 4-6 armor units (64 BRPs); one 1-3 infantry unit (one BRP); 16 3-3 infantry units (48 BRPs); two 1-3 airborne units (six BRPs); for a total of 157 BRPs. In addition, Germany will almost always want to spend six BRPs each turn on shipbuilding, for another 12 BRPs. This adds up to 169 BRPs, plus another 8-10 BRPs for units lost in Poland, for a grand total of nearly 180 BRPs of builds.

Something has to give. Clearly Germany cannot build all its forces in 1939, as even with no shipbuilding and no losses in Poland, Germany will be almost 60 BRPs short of the amount needed to build all its forces. Fortunately for Germany’s dreams of conquest, it doesn’t need to build all these units. The attack in the west can be conducted without building any additional 3-3 infantry units, and can be carried out with fewer than 12 4-6 armor units.

Essential Builds Starting the analysis from another viewpoint, what

German builds are essential? I would never forego German shipbuilding, so there’s 12 BRPs. Germany has to build both 1-3 airborne units (6 BRPs) and would certainly like to build its 10 AAF (30 BRPs), plus its expected one AAF lost in Poland (three BRPs), for a total of 12 + 6 + 30 + 3 = 51 BRPs. Assuming raiding with two pocket battleships in Fall 1939, that leaves 100 – 2 – 51 = 47 BRPs to build armor units. The two 2-6 armor units are the most cost effective (8 BRPs), which means Germany can build another four 4-6 armor units (32 BRPs), plus a few infantry units with the remaining 7 BRPs, or fudge its air builds a little bit and build one more 4-6 armor unit, for a total of five 4-6 armor units. If Germany’s four starting 4-6 armor units survive the attack on Poland, this will give Germany two 2-6 armor units and nine 4-6 armor units, plus almost all its AAF, for its Spring 1940 attack on France. Since Germany can’t lose more than one 4-6 armor unit in Poland, it will have a minimum of eight 4-6 armor units for its attack on France in Spring 1940. If desired, Germany will have all its air and armor built for the Summer 1940 turn. The remaining German forces, which consist of a few 4-6 armor units and about half of the German 3-3 infantry units, can be built in 1940 or even 1941. If Germany attacks Russia in Summer 1941, it needs all its armor units, but can do without some of its infantry, which can be built in Summer 1941.

The Cost of the Winter Attack If Germany attacks in the west in Winter 1939, it will spend 20 BRPs on declarations of war (only one declaration of war is required for Belgium and Luxembourg) and 15 BRPs on a western front offensive. This reduces the German 1939 builds by 35 BRPs. The BRP value of the German losses in Winter 1939 will be small. It’s up to the German player to decide what units to leave unbuilt, but it’s helpful to think in terms of specific units. If Germany attacks in Winter 1939, it will go into 1940 with almost five fewer 4-6 armor units (it will have something like four 4-6 armor units rather than nine 4-6 armor units). Or it might have 12 fewer AAF, or some combination of the two.

Comparing Forces I think it can be a fatal mistake for the Germans to assume they will have a decisive advantage in France

Fall 2005 15

and that France will automatically fall. This is certainly true if the Germans have transformed their potential advantage into something concrete by building their air and armor units, but until they are built the additional units don’t do anything. This is one reason why Germany collapses near the end of the game (it doesn’t have all its units on the board) and the same logic applies at the beginning of the game. Unbuilt units do absolutely nothing until they are built (for Britain, Russia and Japan, whose resistance levels are reduced by unbuilt units, they do less than nothing). The use of 1939 BRPs to declare war on the Low Countries and attack, rather than build units, will mean that Germany has only rough parity with the Western Allies in armor and air strength going into 1940. The Western Allies will probably have an infantry superiority, and certainly will if one takes into account the inherent superiority of defense and the defensive modifiers for the Maginot line. If a Winter 1939 attack reduces the number of German armor, the scope of German breakthroughs in Spring 1940 will be significantly reduced. If the Germans have less air, they may not be able to attack at all in Spring 1940. It goes without saying that the idea of the Winter 1939 attack isn’t to conquer France in Spring 1940, so let’s have a look at how the French campaign is likely to unfold, as compared to the simple and almost foolproof Spring-Summer 1940 conquest associated with the Spring 1940 attack.

The French Campaign To me a Winter 1939 attack implies a Spring 1940 German attrition in the west, deferring a western front offensive until Summer 1940, when the Germans have built another 44 BRPs of armor and air units. I realize that in our convention game Ken’s Germans attacked in Spring 1940, although I’m not quite sure how or why, nor can I see how the Germans would be able to sustain this level of fighting, since attacking implies losses. In any case, it’s clear that even if Germany conducts an offensive in Spring 1940, they can’t take Paris in that turn, because German exploitation on the western front is prohibited in Winter 1939. Both an attrition and a modest offensive (constrained by the “missing” German armor or air units), may put the Germans in position to take Paris in Summer 1940. If the Germans attrition in France in Spring 1940, the Western Allies have a decision to make. One

option is to take replacements as losses and give ground to the Germans, then attrition and hope to regain the lost hexes or force the Germans to take front-line units as losses. The second option is to take front-line French 2-3 infantry units as losses themselves and hold their ground, in order to try to hold Paris until Fall 1940. Both options can be combined with counterair attacks to reduce the German air superiority for Summer 1940, since French and British air losses can be rebuilt, while German air losses won’t be available for a German attack in Summer 1940. If the Germans attack in Spring 1940, how big an attack will it be? If the two sides are roughly equal in air, the Germans won’t be capable of too much, although they may get within reach of Paris. If the Germans have built air units in Winter 1939 so they have an air superiority, they will only have five or six armor available for exploitation (and maybe less, depending on what happens in Norway). In any event, if the Germans conduct an offensive, the Western Allies fight, including by making counterair attacks in Spring 1940 if the opportunity presents itself.

Anglo-French Cooperation Anglo-French cooperation restrictions will be lifted at the start of the Western Allied Spring 1940 player turn, which means that British units may defend Paris and British and French air units may cooperate in attack and on defense in Summer 1940. The essential Allied strategy is to trade French BRPs for German BRPs, since the French BRPs will be lost once France surrenders. The longer and more intense the fighting in France, the happier the Allies should be. Britain should be willing to sacrifice BRPs and run risks in order to stem the German tide and delay the fall of France until Fall 1940, because the chances of a German invasion of Britain will be low and the first German “Happy Time” in the Atlantic will be delayed by a turn. This is why Anglo-French counterair attacks in Spring 1940 come into consideration or, if the German air withdraws, even a joint ground offensive. Remember too that the British add five AAF to their force pool in Spring 1940, so the combined Anglo-French air strength will be 25 AAF, or even more if the British produce AAF. Even with the help of the Italian air force, the Axis will have no more than about 35 AAF, so the Axis margin of air superiority for the key airdrop on Paris is not that

16 Fall 2005

great. The bottom line in France is that a Winter 1939 attack may lead to a long, costly campaign where the British don’t worry about shipbuilding and BRPs and instead roll up their sleeves and commit to wearing down the Germans in France. While the Germans will have a few more 1940 BRPs than normal (with a Spring 1940 attack they will receive the pro-rated BRPs for the Low Countries in Summer 1940) and won’t have to attack the Low Countries, the German construction limit will be the same, and that’s where the Germans may run into problems. Even if the Germans win the battle for France, they are less likely to have the forces to do anything significant in the rest of 1940, and I think Fall 1940-Spring 1941 are the turns where the Axis win or lose the game.

The French Surrender Level One hidden consequence of this type of fighting in

France is that the French surrender level may favor the Allies. Because the forces are more evenly balanced, the Germans may not have the luxury of being able to capture Lyon or Marseilles. For the same reason, more French ground units are likely to survive the German conquest, which also shifts the French surrender level in favor in the Allies. Since the German strategy will be known to the Allied player by the time the 1940 YSS arrives, the Western Allies can either put DPs in France to try to get a large Free French force or can rely on these modifiers and use their DPs elsewhere, as they see fit.

Ken’s solution to this problem was not to establish Vichy France at all. That will be the subject of a future article in ULTRA, so for now I’ll just say that at the convention the Japanese response to this development was to send a secret peace mission to the Chinese to see whether we couldn’t all play WRASSLIN’ instead...

Other Considerations In addition to the military advantages of having

control of the Low Countries as the jumping off point for the Spring 1940 attack on France, which I think are more than offset by the disadvantages discussed above, the Winter 1939 attack gives the Germans one additional RP and two additional DPs in the 1940 YSS. The RP can be useful, because it allows the Axis to put eight, rather than seven, RPs in a single

category (probably naval research). The DPs can obviously come in handy in a variety of ways.

For the Allies, there is an early increase in USAT which may turn out to be a significant drawback to the early German attack. Assuming equal allocations of DPs and covert operations, USAT will be 8 in Winter 1939, so a die roll of “6” is needed to trigger an American mobilization and another Western Allied RP and DP. A Winter 1939 American mobilization is something of a disaster for the Axis, because the American BRP base will be 12 BRPs higher in 1940 as compared to the normal Spring 1940 American mobilization, 18 BRPs higher in 1941, 27 BRPs higher in 1941, 40 BRPs higher in 1942, and so on (due to the magic of compound interest).

Even without good luck in this area, the worldwide tension level will be 11, so the Western Allies will probably get an additional RP, as the U.S. gets one RP for every 10 tensions worldwide.

It is therefore not guaranteed that the Germans will get an RP and DP advantage relative to the Western Allies from the Winter 1939 attack.

From Italy’s point of view, entering the war in Winter 1939 is not necessarily a bad thing. Ethiopia and Libya will be more vulnerable than they are after France falls and the Italians will forego slight BRP growth in the 1940 YSS, but in exchange the Italians will have all their BRPs available for 1940. They will probably need them, because the Italian AAF and 2-5 armor unit are likely to be pressed into service in France. If the Western Allies fight in France, as they probably should, combat between the British and Italians in 1940 may well occur near Paris or London, rather than in the desert near the Libya-Egypt border.

Conclusion I consider the Winter 1939 attack to be terribly

risky for the Axis, with little payoff. The Western Allies will know the German force levels going into the 1940 YSS, and can allocate their RPs and DPs accordingly. By attacking early, the Axis fail to make the most of two of their big advantages: the German air and armor superiority and the Axis flexibility in choosing its strategic goals after the fall of France.

How to subscribe to ULTRA Subscription information for ULTRA is available at www.aworldatwar.com. We are not responsible for any A WORLD AT WAR game lost by non-subscribers (nor by anyone else – our lawyers thought we should add this last bit!)