Abbott Pierce Reprint

8/8/2019 Abbott Pierce Reprint

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November 2006 / $4

New CERCLA Exemption Rules page 12

Class Actions in Europe page 32

Ethics of Outsourcing Legal Work page 75

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EARN MCLE CREDIT

Conflict Standards

or Affiliated Firmsage 27

Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses

WRIT LARGELos Angeles lawyers Mitchell E. Abbott and T. Peter Pierceexamine the dilemma appellants face when a writis issued before nal judgment page 20


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by Mitchell E. Abbott and T. Peter Pierce

2 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2006

city denies a prop ertyowners applicationfor a use permit andvariance to build alarge addition to anexisting residentialstructure. The prop-

erty owner promptly files a petition for awrit of mand ate to compel the city to issue theapprovals and combines the petition with acomplaint for 1) inverse condemnation, 2)civil rights damages based on a denial of du eprocess and equal protection, and 3) injunc-tive and declaratory relief. As is often thecase, the property owner obtains a hearing onthe writ p etition even before the court sets atrial date on the other causes of action. Thecourt grant s the writ petition and issues a writcompelling the city to set aside its earlierdecisions and to issue a new decision grant-ing the development approvals.

The city prefers to app eal the trial court sdecision granting the writ, but t he city attor -ney is concerned that not only is there noappealable judgment at th is stage of the pro-ceedings but one will not b e rendered until thetrial court disposes of the other causes of action, perhaps months later. Opposing coun-sel understandably has no intention of dis-missing the other causes of action and fullyintends to enforce the writ if the city does notimmediately comply. Th e city attor ney fearsthat compliance will render any future appealmoot.

This common conundru m highlights anunresolved issue in California law: whethera writ o f mandat e may be issued and enforcedprior to entry of a nal judgment on a ll causesof action. This issue has the pot ential to con-front every practitioner who han dles writ lit-igation, no matter whether the client is thepetitioner, th e pub lic agency or pu blic official,

or the real party in interest. Addressing thecontours and implications of this issue rstrequires an understanding of the nature of thetwo types of writs frequently sought in trialcourts as well as the history of writs andappealable judgments in California.

Lawsuits led against p ublic agencies inCalifornia frequently seek to compel anagency to issue a particular discretionaryapproval or t o set aside an approval alreadyissued. 1 Code of Civil Procedure Section1094.5 provides redressin the form of a wr itof administrative mandamusfor th ose whobelieve an agency has wrongly denied, orwrongly granted, an application. In consid-

WritLargeThe issuance of a writ of mandatebefore final judgment creates a Hobsons choice for the

potential appellant

AMitchell E. Abbott and T. Peter Pierce are share-holders in the law firm Richards, Watson &Gershon. Both are certied as specialists in appel-late law by the State Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization.


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ering an application for a land use permit orfor any other discretionary approval, anagency must ensure tha t 1) it has acted withinits jurisdiction, 2) it has provided the appli-cant with a fair hearing, 3) it has proceededin the manner required by law, and 4) itsultimate decision is supported by evidence inthe record of the proceedings. 2 If a courtconcludes a public agency violated any of these statutory dictates in granting or deny-

ing an application, the court may issue aperemptory writ of administrative mandamusrequiring the public agency to set aside itsdecision and take the necessary action toreach a new decision. Courts may specifywhat th at new decision must be, but they donot always do this. A court also may vacatethe pu blic agencys decision an d requ ire theagency to rehear the ma tter.

Perhaps the most common error identiedby courts in administrative mandamus pro-ceedings occurs when a public agency makesa decision that is not supported by substan-tial evidence in the r ecord. 3 In those cases, the

court may no t take additional evidence to sup-ply the b asis for t he agencys decision becausedoing so would interfere with the agencysexclusive discretionary powers to make deci-sions supported by substantial evidence. 4

Moreover, a court remanding a mat ter to anagency may not ord er the agency to exerciseits discretion in a particular manner whenconsidering or reweighing the evidence. 5

Public agencies and officers may not a lwaysenjoy discretion in performing official duties.In some instances, the law compels a p ublicagency or official to take a particular action.One of myriad examples is found in Gov-

ernment Code Section 3 4460, which requiresthe mayor and clerk of a charter city to cer-tify any charter amendment ratied by t he vot-ers. If an agency or official refuses to per-form an act required by law, an aggrievedperson may le a petition in court for a writof traditional mandate under Code of CivilProcedure Section 1085. If the court con-cludes the agency or official had no valid rea-son for refusing to perform the act, th e courtmay issue the writ compelling the agency orofficial to perform the par ticular act.

In practice, writs of administrative man-damus issued pursuant to Section 1094 .5 ortraditional writs of mandate under Section1085 customarily impose a deadline for apublic agency or pub lic official to reach a newdecision or to perform the required action.The agency or official later files with thecourt a return attesting to compliance withthe writ.

Petitions for w rits of administrative man-damus or for traditional writs of mandateoften are joined with other causes of action.The California Supreme Court expresslyauthorized the combined writ/complaint pr o-

cedure in Hensler v. City of Glendale .6 Thecourt also recognized an alternative approach:A property owner, for example, may opt toinitiate a writ proceeding and simultaneouslyor later le a separate lawsuit asserting oneor more other causes of action, such as inversecondemnation, for money damages. Thechoice lies with the petitioner/plaintiff. Almostinvariably, however, a pet itioner/plaint iff willchoose to le one omnibus action, pleading

the petition for writ and other causes of action t ogether. Tha t decision may be dr ivenby cost considerations, future res judicataconcerns, or other factors.

One might reasonably assume that thecourts h ave resolved ma ny issues implicatedby the simultaneous prosecution of a writ of mandate and other causes of action againstpublic agencies. But the courts have notaddressed whether a court may issue andenforce a peremptory writ (under eitherSection 1085 o r Section 109 4.5) when oth ercauses of action remain pending and no nal

judgment has been entered.

The California Supreme Court has heldthat an action concludes with on ly one nal

judgment. In a 1942 decision, Bank o f America v. Superior Court ,7 the court heldthat there can be but one judgment in anaction no matter how many counts the com-plaint contains. Three years after deciding

Bank of A merica , how ever, the court held inSteen v. Board of Civil Service Commis-sioners 8 that an order issued by a superiorcourt denying a writ petition was appealableimmediately. According to the court, a nal

judgment was not necessary to perfect anappeal from the decision on the petition for

a writ of mandate.

Divergent PathsThese early decisions of the supreme courtapparently promp ted the intermediate appel-late courts to tread two divergent paths. Somecourts of appeal readily concluded that anappeal lies from an order granting or deny-ing mandamus relief, regardless of whetherthere is an entry of nal judgment. 9 In severalof these cases, other causes of action were stillpending when an appeal was taken from thetrial courts decision on the writ petition. 10 Inothers the writ petition w as the only cause of action asserted and the appellate court tr eatedthe order adjudicating the writ as a final

judgment in a special pro ceeding. 11

At least one court of appeal departedfrom t his line of cases. In Hadley v. Superior Court ,12 a 197 2 decision, th e court expresslydisagreed with Daggs v. Personnel Commis-sion, 13 a 1969 decision holding that an or dergranting or denying writ relief is appealableabsent a nal judgment. Hadley involved aminute order issued by the trial court deny-ing a mandamus petition. The losing party,

Hadley, moved for entry of judgment, pre-sumably in order to clear the way for lingan appeal. After the trial court denied themotion for entry of judgment, Hadley peti-tioned the court of appeal for a writ com-manding the trial court to enter a judgment.Hadleys petition did not challenge the trialcourts decision on the merits. Instead, itsought narrowly to compel the trial court toenter a judgment on the ground th at only a

judgment could properly terminate the pro-ceedings in the trial court. The appellatecourt granted relief and comman ded the trialcourt to enter a judgment consistent with itsminute or der.

The court in Cody v. Superior Court ,14

although no t as strident in its language as the Hadley court, observed that the grantingor denial of relief in mand amus pr oceedingsis effectuated by a judgment rather than anorder. 15 Unlike Hadley , Cody did notexpressly criticize any earlier appellate deci-sions that noted that an order granting ordenying writ relief could be appealed without

a final judgment. Nevertheless, the Codycourt treated an appeal from an ord er deny-ing writ relief as an ap peal from a nal judg-ment in a special pro ceeding.

Adding to the splintered authorities on theissue of whether an o rder adjud icating a sin-gle cause of action is appealable (be it a w ritcause of action or o therwise) was the decisionin Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo ,16 which hassince been overruled. Schonfeld created asomewhat amorph ous exception to the onefinal judgment rule announced by theCa l i fo rn i a Sup reme Cour t i n Bank o f

America . The trial court in Schonfeld rendered

a judgment dismissing two causes of actionand leaving a remaining severed cause of action for declaratory relief. The court of appeal declined t o rigidly adhere to the onefinal judgment rule and created the newrule that an appeal may be taken when causesof action remain in the trial court if th e cir-cumstancesare so unusual that postpone-ment of the appeal until the final judg-mentwould cause so serious a hardshipand inconvenience as to require us to augmentthe number of existing exceptions [to theone nal judgment r ule]. 17

Relying upon Schonfeld , the court in Highland Development Com pany v. City of Los A ngeles 18 concluded that a separate judg-ment on a writ of mandate petition wasappealable even though causes of action fordeclaratory and injunctive relief had not beentried: [I]n recent years, the number of exist-ing exceptions to the one nal judgment rulehas been augmented so that separate appeal-able judgments may be rendered on countsthat present separate claims for relief, wherethe trial court has severed such causes of action from those remaining to be tried. 19



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Los Angeles Lawyer November 2006 5

At least two appellate courts disagreedin principle with Schonfeld s erosion of theone final judgment rule. In ArmstrongPetroleum Corporation v. Superior Court ,20

the court went to great pains to harmonize itsdecision with Schonfeld but nevertheless rec-ognized the lack of any auth ority for enlarg-ing the class of appealable judgments beyondthat au thorized by statute. The court in Dayv. Papadakis 21 upheld the on e nal judgment

rule, citing Armstrong with approval anddistinguishing Schonfeld .

Morehart and the One Final Judgment RuleFinally, in 1994, the California SupremeCourt brought much-needed clarity to theissue of whether an appeal may be takenfrom anything other than a nal judgment dis-posing of all causes of action. The supremecourt unanimously reaffirmed the one nal

judgment rule in its decision in Morehart v.County of Santa Barbara 22 and expresslydisapproved the line of cases commencing

with Schonfeld that had recognized an excep-tion to th e rule.

In Morehart , the County of Santa Barbaradenied a property owner a p ermit to build asingle-family dwelling. The property ownerpetitioned for a writ of mandate directingthe county to set aside the permit denial. Inthe same action, the prop erty owner broughtdamages claims for inverse condemnationand civil rights violations and sought declara-tory and injunctive relief. The trial courtordered th e causes of action for the writ anddeclaratory and injunctive relief to be triedseparately from th e causes of action seeking

damages. Thereafter, th e trial court entered a judgment on the writ and declaratory andinjunctive relief. The property owner appealedthat judgment, and the court of appeal treatedthe j udgmen t a s appea l ab l e unde r t heSchonfeld line of cases.

The California Supreme Court held thatthe judgment disposing of fewer than allcauses of action was not a t rue nal judgmentand thu s was not appealable:

Accordingly, we hold that an appealcannot be taken from a judgment thatfails to comp lete the disposition of allthe causes of action between the par-ties even if the causes of action dis-posed of by the judgment have beenordered to be tried separately, or maybe characterized as separate and inde-penden t f rom those r ema in ing .Statements to the contrary in [ Schon-

feld ] and its p rogeny are disapproved. 23

In the wake of Morehart , several appellatecourts have held that an order granting ordenying a writ of mandate is not appealableif other causes of action remain pend ing andthus no nal judgment has been entered. The

court in Nerhan v. Superior Court ,24 relyingupon Morehart , concluded that an orderdenying a petition for a writ of mand ate wasnot appealable when a cause of action fordamages for a regulatory taking still waspending. Several years after Nerhan , theCalifornia Supreme Court r eaffirmed its hold-ing in Morehart :

When an order denying a petition forwrit of administrative mandate doesnot dispose of all causes of actionbetween the part ies, allowing an ap pealfrom the denial order would defeat

the purpose of the one nal judgmentrule by permitt ing the very piecemealdispositions and multiple appeals therule is designed to prevent. 25

Morehart plainly does not limit its hold-ing to cases in which writ petitions weredenied. Allowing an appeal from an ordergranting a writ petition would also contra-vene the one final judgment rule, and forthe same reasonthe prospect of multipleappeals.

Thus, in Connell v. Superior Court ,26 th ecourt concluded that an order granting awrit commanding the state controller to takecertain actions was not appealable becauseother claims remained und ecided. Last year,the court in In re Bay-Delta Programmatic

Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings 27 observed that any appeal fromthe grant or denial of a writ under the Cal-ifornia Environmental Q uality Act must awaitthe entry of nal judgment on all causes of action.

With courts now uniformly applying theone nal judgment rule to preclude appealsfrom orders disposing of fewer than all causes

of action, public agencies and officials oftennd themselves in a quandary when a trialcourt issues a peremptory writ of mandatecommanding them to act while other causesof action sti l l remain pending. In thoseinstances, the one nal judgment rule pre-cludes an app eal from th e order granting thewrit. Some writs require public agencies or

officials to take action within a matter of days or weeks. But b ecause an ap peal cannotbe perfected at that point, litigants againstwhom peremptory writs have been issuedare deprived of the aut omat ic stay of enforce-

ment 28 that usually results when an appeal istaken from a judgment granting a writ of mandate.

Petition for Extraordinary Relief Short of seeking reconsideration in the trialcourt, t he only possible judicial relief from thecommand of a writ issued in the middle of acase, without a nal judgment, is to le a peti-tion for extraordinary relieftypically styledas a petition for a writ of mandatein thecourt of ap peal. A few post- Morehart appel-late decisions have treated premature noticesof appeal from writs granted by tr ial courtsas petitions for extraordinary relief. 29

But a petition for extraordinary relief inthe court of appeal under Rule 56 of theCalifornia Rules of Court differs markedlyfrom an appeal filed as a matter of rightunder Code of Civil Procedure Section904.1(a). The court of appeal is required tohear an ap peal and issue an opinion. In sharpcontrast, petitions for extraordinary relief frequently are denied w ithout comment. In s-cal year 2003-2004, 92 percent of originalproceedings led in civil cases in the cou rts o f


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appeal in California were disposed of with-out opinion. 30 It is therefore no surprise thatone court of appeal has observed, Ex-perienced lawyers know how difficult it oftenis to persuade a Court of Appeal to grantextraordinary relief. 31 Another appellatecourt candidly stated, Cou rts of Appeal arenormally reluctant to grant petitions forextraordinary relief. 32 It appears to be therare exception when courts are willing to

exercise their discretion and tr eat prematu reappeals as petitions for extraordinary relief that yield opinions fully adjudicating theissues. 33

Confronted with this remote chance of success in seeking extraord inary relief, a pub-lic agency or official might decide to comp lywith a t rial courts writ of manda te and t akethe ac t i on o rde red by t he cou r t . Tha tapproach, however, could forever deprivethe agency or official of its right to appealfrom the wr it once a nal judgment is entered.Compliance with a wr it of mandate may ren-der moot any subsequent appeal. 34

Given the current legal landscape, a trialcourts issuance of a writ of mandate withouta nal judgment presents public agencies andofficials with a H obsons choiceeither com-ply with the writ an d risk losing any right of a subsequent appeal because of mootness,or ignore the writ until a nal judgment isentered, thereby risking a citation for con-tempt of court. Despite this untenable situa-tion, however, no appellate court in Californiahas expressly decided the question of whethera peremptory writ o f mandate may be issuedand enforced prior to entry of a nal judgment(although man y appellate decisions, without

discussion, presume this to be the case). 35Perhaps courts have not had an opportun ityto answer this question because of a conu-ence of circumstances that simply could n othave been for eseen: The effect of Morehart .36

The reluctance by courts of appeal to grantpetitions for extraordinary relief. The mooting effect of complying with aperemptory writ. The possible contempt citation for dis-obeying a writ.

Adopting the Right Solution

Nonetheless, there are three possible answersto the question. The rst is that a writ of mand ate may be issued and enforced absententry of a nal judgment. In that case, how -ever, the only possible remedy would beappealing the grant or denial of a writ of mandate regardless of the lack of a nal judg-ment . That solut ion would contravene

Morehart 37 directly. It also would create inter-locutory proceedings which, as th e Morehart court cautioned, would clog the courts witha multiplicity of appeals. Furthermore, this

solution almost certainly would require leg-islative action. Unless and un til any legislativeaction is forthcoming, issuing and enforcingwrits absent entry of a nal judgment deeslogic.

The second possible solution is for theparties to stipulate that 1) the public agencywill comply with the writ, subject to its rightto appeal the order granting the writ after nal

judgment is entered, and 2) the public agency

may rescind the act by which it compliedwith th e writ if it prevails on ap peal. At leastone appellate court, in an unpublished opin-ion, ha s recognized the validity of this type of stipulation. 38 The problem inherent in thissolution is that it will not work unless the pre-vailing party who secured the peremptorywrit agrees to remain suspended in a state of legal limbo for t he extended period o f time itwill take to litigate the remaind er of the casein the trial court and then defend any appeal.Many parties, if not most, will be unwillingto dilut e their trial court victory by agreeingthat the pub lic agency, after taking th e com-

manded action, may rescind that action if successful o n a ppeal.

The third possible solutionand the onethat courts should adopt in a post- Morehart worldis a rule that a peremptory writ of manda t e s imp ly canno t be i s sued andenforced except upon entry of a nal judg-ment. This rule would spare the appellatecour ts the f lood of addi t ional appeals

Morehart anticipated and presumably wouldreduce the number of petitions for extraor-dinary r elief seeking review of or ders grant -ing or denying peremptory writs.

In practice, this rule need not hamstring

plaintiffs and petitioners by requiring them toawait nal judgment on all causes of actionbefore enforcing a writ. A party seeking a writof mandate as well as other relief based onnon-wr it causes of action has the choice of l-ing two actions1) a writ proceeding, and 2)another action seeking all other relief. Thiscourse was express ly approved by theCalifornia Supreme Court in Hensler 39 and iscertainly the preferable approach if there is anurgent need for the writ to be issued andenforced as soon as po ssible. If the party ha sled a separat e writ pro ceeding, the peremp-tory writ may be issued as part of the nal

judgment, thus paving the way for enforce-ment of the writ withou t compromising theresponding partys right to meaningful appel-late review. Even when enforcement of thewrit is stayed pending appeal, th e petitionerbenets because appellate review will not b edelayed by any ongoing adjudication in thet r i a l cou r t o f o the r causes o f ac t i on .Otherwise, if the writ is brought as one of many causes of action in the same lawsuit, notonly are the responding partys appellaterights potent ially compromised if a writ issues

without a nal judgment, but th e appellateproceedings that m ay eventually conclude inthe petitioners favor on the writ cause of action are delayed by the length of time ittakes the trial court to adjudicate all othercauses of action and enter a nal judgment.

The one nal judgment rule endorsed by Morehart 40 promotes judicial economy andefficiency and ultimately reduces the legalcosts borne by the part ies. The unfortunate

and no doubt unintended consequence of Morehart , how ever, is tha t its r uleappliedto cases in which writs are issued long beforeother causes of action are decidedyieldsharsh results. The only workable solution,absent revisiting the one nal judgment rule,is to preclude issuance and enforcement of aperemptor y writ until the trial court enters anal, appealable judgment.

1 See, e.g ., Morehar t v. County of Santa Barbara , 7 Cal.4th 725 (1994); Consaul v. City of San Diego, 6 Cal.App. 4th 1781 (1992).2 C ODE C IV. P ROC . 1094.5(b).3 See C ODE C IV. P ROC . 1094 .5(c).4 Sunrise Retirement Villa v. Dear, 58 Cal. App. 4t h948, 955 (1997).5 C O DE C IV . P RO C . 1094.5(f); Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1174-75(1996).6 Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1 (1994).7 Bank of Am. v. Superior Court, 2 0 Cal. 2d 697, 70 1(1942).8 Steen v. Board of Civil Serv. Commrs, 26 Cal. 2d 716(1945).9 Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858(1963); Daggs v. Pers. Commn, 1 Cal. App. 3d 925(1969); Healdsburg Police Officers Assn v. City of Healdsburg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 444 (1976); CaliforniaTeachers Assn v. Board of Educ., 109 Cal. App. 3d 738(1980); Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 159 Ca l.

App. 3d 185 (1984); Highland Dev. Co. v. City of LosAngeles, 170 Cal. App. 3d 169 (1985); Bollengier v.Doctors Med. Ctr., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1115 (1990);Consaul v. City of San Diego, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1781(1992).10 California Teachers Assn, 109 Cal. App. 3d 738;Elmore, 159 Cal. App. 3d 185; H ighland Dev. Co., 170Cal. App. 3d 169.11 Dunn, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858; Healdsburg PoliceOfficers Assn, 57 Cal. App. 3d 444; Consaul, 6 Cal.App. 4th 1781.12 Hadley v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 389(1972).13 Daggs, 1 Cal. App. 3d 925.14 Cody v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. App. 2d 275(1965).15 Id . at 277 n.1.16 Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo, 50 Cal. App. 3d 401(1975), overruled by Morehart v. County of SantaBarbara, 7 Cal. 4th 725 (1994).17 Schonfeld, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 418.18 Highland Dev. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal.App. 3d 169 (1985).19 Id . at 179 (quoting Schonfeld, 50 Cal. App. 3d at418).20 Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court , 114Cal. App. 3d 732 (1981).21 Day v. Papadakis, 231 Cal. App. 3d 50 3 (1991).22 Morehar t v. County of Santa Barbara, 7 Cal. 4th 7 25(1994).23 Id . at 743.



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24 Nerhan v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 536(1994).25 Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commn, 25 Cal. 4t h688, 697 (2001).26 Connell v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 382(1997).27 In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact ReportCoordinated Proceedings, 133 Cal. App. 4th 154(2005).28 C ODE C IV. P ROC . 916.29 See Connell, 59 Cal. App. 4th 382; Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks, 30 Cal. App. 4th 547 (1994).

30 JUDICIAL C O UN C IL O F C ALIFORNIA , 2005 C OURTSTATISTICS R EPORT 33 (Table 13Dispositions of Orig-inal Proceedings, Fiscal Years 2002-03 and 2003-04).31 Green v. Amante, 3 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690 (1992).32 City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.App. 4th 795, 803 (2003).33 See Connell, 59 Cal. App. 4th 382; Cohan, 3 0 Cal.App. 4th 547.34 MHC Operating Ltd. Pship v. City of San Jose, 106Cal. App. 4th 204 (2003); Ryan v. California Inter-scholastic Fedn, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1033 (2001).35 See , e.g ., Connell, 59 Cal. App. 4th 382; Kavanaugh

v. West Sonoma County Union High Sch. Dist., 111Cal . Rptr. 2d 829 (2001) (unpubl ished) ; MHCOperat ing Ltd. Pship, 106 Cal. App. 4th 2 04; City of Half M oon Bay, 106 Cal. App. 4th 79 5.36 Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 7 Cal. 4th 7 25(1994).37 Id .38 Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 2005 WL1774402 (2005) (unpublished).39 Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1 (1994).40 Morehart, 7 Cal. 4th 725.

Los Angeles Lawyer November 2006 7


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Mitchell E. Abbott | Shareholder t 213.626.8484f 213.626.0078e [email protected]

Mitchell E. Abbott is a shareholder in the LitigationDepartment at Richards, Watson & Gershon and Chair of the firms Appellate Law Practice Group. Mr. Abbott iscurrently one of fewer than 300 lawyers in the state

designated as a Certified Specialist in Appellate Law by theState Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization. Formore than 30 years, he has specialized in the representationof municipalities and other public entities in a variety of cases at both the trial and appellate level, and in both thestate and federal courts. He has handled many constitutionalcases arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments tothe federal constitution, as well as land use cases anddisputes arising under the California Environmental QualityAct. Mr. Abbott has also handled litigation and appeals inpublic financing cases, including validating actionschallenging the formation of redevelopment agencies andother districts, taxpayers actions challenging the validity

and fairness of local assessment districts, and a variety of other cases involving challenges to local enactments underPropositions 13 and 218.

While at the University of Virginia Law School, he wasNotes Editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law .He is a member of the California Academy of AppellateLawyers, and of the State Bar Board of LegalSpecializations Appellate Law Advisory Committee, andhe is a past chair of the State Bar of Californias StandingCommittee on Appellate Courts. He is a contributingauthor of the CEB treatise, California Civil AppellatePractice (3d ed.) and of CEBs California Administrative

Mandamus (3d ed.). He is a consulting editor of BancroftWhitneys California Civil Practice regarding govern-mental immunities, and is co-author of the chapter onPrivileges and the Work Product Doctrine in CaliforniaCivil Discovery Practice (CEB 4th ed.). In addition to hislegal career, Mr. Abbott serves on the Board of Directorsof Los Angeles Music Week and is a past Moderator of First Congregational Church of Los Angeles.

T. Peter Pierce | Shareholder t 213.626.8484f 213.626.0078e [email protected]

T. Peter Pierce is a shareholder and Assistant Chair of theFirms Litigation Department. Mr. Pierce is one of fewerthan 300 attorneys in California certified as a specialist inappellate law by the State Bar of California Board of Legal

Specialization.Mr. Pierce has represented a diverse group of publicagencies before the United States Supreme Court, the U.S.Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California SupremeCourt, the California Court of Appeal, and various trialcourts at the federal and state levels. The wide variety of cases Mr. Pierce has managed from inception through theappellate process involve land use and zoning issues,CEQA, constitutional law, telecommunications law, inversecondemnation issues, and elections law.

Mr. Pierce is a member of the California State BarCommittee on Appellate Courts and is a contributing

author of the CEB treatise, California Administrative Mandamus (3d ed.). He also is an adjunct professor at theUniversity of Southern California Law School. He hasserved as a volunteer in Los Angeles Countys TemporaryJudge Program.

Outside of his law practice, Mr. Pierce is an AdvisoryTrustee to the ALS Association, Greater Los AngelesChapter, a non-profit organization assisting those afflictedwith Lou Gehrigs Disease. Mr. Pierce served as a Trusteeof that organization from 20022005 and represented theLos Angeles Chapter before members of Congress.

Immediately following law school, Mr. Pierce served as a

law clerk to the Honorable Marcel Livaudais, Jr. on theUnited States District Court in New Orleans. Prior toattending law school, Mr. Pierce worked as a broadcast

journalist.

RICHARDS, WATSON & GERSHON

Richards, Watson & Gershon is one of Californias leading law firms specializing in all aspects of publiclaw. RW&G serves as city attorney, special counsel, redevelopment agency counsel, bond counsel, and disclosure counsel to public entities throughout the State. With offices in Los Angeles, Orange County and San Francisco, RW&G also represents a distinguished roster of private sector clients. Core practiceareas include appellate law, writs, litigation, public law, redevelopment, public finance, real estate,eminent domain, environmental, labor and employment, and water rights and water law.

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