Abkhazia, from conflict to statehood, by George Hewitt

7/31/2019 Abkhazia, from conflict to statehood, by George Hewitt

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Abkhazia, from conflict to statehood

By George Hewitt

openDemocracy

A bitter post-Soviet war in 1992-93 saw the Black Sea territory of Abkhazia resist invasion

from Georgia and establish an independent statehood. But amid non-recognition from all

but a handful of countries, and persistent hostility from Georgia, the young republic has

faced many challenges in the subsequent two decades. The leading scholar of Abkhazia

and advocate of its case, George Hewitt, presents an overview of these twenty years and

outlines a scenario for the future.

The small republic of Abkhazia that abuts the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea was

forged out of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-91 and war with its neighbour

Georgia in 1992-93. That war had started on 14 August 1992 when rag-tag if brutal militias,nominally under the control of Georgia's president Eduard Shevardnadze, crossed the

River Ingur, which since the end of the 17th century had formed the border between

Abkhazia and Georgia; it effectively came to an end on 30 September 1993 when the last

of Tbilisi's incompetent forces were driven from Abkhazian territory by the same route.

The upper Kodor valley remained in Georgian hands, but this was recovered by Abkhazian

forces in a bloodless operation in August 2008 against the backdrop of Georgia's crushing

defeat in the shortwarwith Russia over South Ossetia.

Abkhazians had lived for sevendecadesinside the Soviet Union, in successive forms of

constitutional association with Georgia which had in their eyes permitted an increasing

erosion of their autonomy and rights. In March 1990, amid the nationalist mobilisations of

1989-90 that foretold the Soviet Union's demise, the government in Tbilisi, Georgia's capital,

annulled all Soviet legislation pertaining to Georgia. It simultaneously decided to restore the

independent status the country had enjoyed in 1918-21, when it wasruledby local

Mensheviks (so-called social democrats); this status had been codified in a 1921

constitution, which however was never promulgated.

Abkhazians responded by arguing that this annulment - which included the Soviet

constitution introduced in 1978, during the era of Leonid Brezhnev - left Abkhazia without

any properly defined constitutional status of its own - and, most pertinently, any link toGeorgia, for the 1978 document was the most recent to define its formal ties to Georgia.

Tbilisi had made a unilateraldecisionto alter its constitutional relationship with the Soviet

Union, namely to withdraw from that state tout court; but it had done so without any regardfor Abkhazianinterestsand wishes, and thus its act was seen in Sukhum, Abkhazia's capital,

as effectively one of peremptory, quasi-colonial annexation.

This crucial decision was compounded when in March 1992 the international community

recognised Georgia within its Soviet boundaries (i.e. including Abkhazia), but without any

guarantee of Abkhazia's own status or autonomy. Eduard Shevardnadze, who had served as

Soviet foreign minister under Mikhail Gorbachev during the glasnostandperestroikayears,had returned from his Moscow retirement in March 1992 totryto restore order out of the
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After the war, a contingent of peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) - in effect a Russian force - patrolled the demilitarised zone along the Ingur, and

there was a small monitoring mission from the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

(Unomig). A set of Georgian-Abkhazian peace accords were signed in Moscow in 1994. But

there were frequent acts of terrorism and sabotage throughout the 1990s, mostly inAbkhazia's south-easternmost province of Gal. The perpetrators were largely members

ofgroupingssuch as the Forest Brothers (under the Mingrelian Davit [Dato] Shengelia), or

the White Legion (headed by another Mingrelian, Zurab Samushia).

It became public knowledge that these organisations enjoyed backing from Georgian

officialdom; the Georgian journalist Akaki Mikadze (writing in the Russian-

language Vremja on 3 June 1998) even stated the amount of funds being paid to Shengeliaand his partisans by Georgias internal-affairs and state-security ministries. There was an

eruption of full-scale fighting in villages close to the Ingur border in May 1998, when a

speedy Abkhazian muster blocked the attempted incursion; and forty deaths occurred onOctober 2001 when a group of Chechens under Ruslan Gelaev, who had been ferried across

from eastern Georgias Pankisi gorge (undoubtedly with official support) attempted to

break out of the upper Kodor valley. Nine of those killed were the passengers and crew of a

UN helicopter shot down over the Georgian-controlled part of the valley on 8 October.

This was the last major incident to threaten Abkhazia while Shevardnadze remained at the

helm in Tbilisi. He was replaced in late 2003, as a result of yet another unconstitutional

ousting - known as the "rose revolution" - by his former protg, Mikheil (Misha)

Saakashvili, whofollowinghis electoral victory was inaugurated as Georgia's

newpresidentin January 2004.

Saakashvili promised to restore Georgias territorial integrity during his term of office. In

July 2006, he sent a contingent of Georgian militia into the upper Kodor valley on the

pretext of a "policing operation". By this time, Sergej Bagapsh had become Abkhazias

president, and his administration responded by breaking off negotiations with the Georgian

authorities. They would not, Bagapsh declared, be continued until Saakashvili withdrew this

military force; signed a non-aggression pact with Sukhum; and either released or made

known the fate of Davit Sigua, a Mingrelian who had been abducted from the town of Gal,

where he was serving on the regional electoral commission.

Saakashvili, far from removing the force, set about investing heavily in the area his troopshad occupied: asphalting the main road, laying a small airstrip in the village of Chkhalta, and

opening a branch of Zugdidi Bank (including an ATM) in the village of Azhara. All this was

aimed at making what he restyled "Upper Abkhazia" into something of a showpiece to

contrast with the straitened socio-economic situation existing in the rest of Abkhazia. The

appearance of troops so close (albeit via a road that was/is difficult to traverse) to the

Abkhazian capital just as the tourist-season was getting underway resulted in relatively few

visitors daring to holiday in Sukhum itself, though the northern resorts (Pitsunda, Gagra,

New Athos) did not really suffer a decline in numbers.

The five-day war
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Saakashvilis aspiration to repair (Soviet) Georgias fractured polity had an early success

when in May 2004 he re-established central control over the ethnically Georgianprovinceof

Achara (Adzharia) abutting Turkey in the south-west. But his first real target was South

Ossetia, where his reintegration venture, also in 2004, ended in (entirely foreseeable)

failure. The Kremlins attitude towards both of Tbilisis troublesome states, Abkhazia and

South Ossetia, had altered since Vladimir Putins elevation to the presidency in 1999. An

aspect of this was the decision to allow residents of both to acquire Russian citizenship and

passports.

As old Soviet documents finally became unextendable (and thus invalid), most Abkhazians

and South Ossetians adamantly refused to bend to the international communitys insistence

that they should obtain Georgian passports in order to exercise their human right to

freedom of international travel; yet without Russian passports, such individuals were (and,

indeed, are) effectively denied the possibility of crossing any frontier other than the one

their states share with Russia, for Russia at least accepted the internal documents issued in

both. Russias warming of relations with Sukhum (Abkhazia) and Tskhinval (South Ossetia)thus ran in parallel with ever deteriorating relations with Saakashvilis Georgia.

The Georgia vs Abkhazia / South Ossetiastand-offremained more or less stable, with

occasional heightening of tension, until 2008. A number of events began to unsettle the

situation. The eventual recognition of Kosovo by many western states, which had been

anticipated in 2007 - and whoseimplicationsfor Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) were the

subject of much speculation in mid-2007 in Sukhum - caused huge resentment in Serbias

ally, Russia.

Then, the United States president George W Bush arrived for the Nato summit in Bucharest(2-4 April 2008) with the confident expectation that Georgia (and Ukraine) would be granted

membership. This was rebutted by the more sensible members of the alliance (over

predictable support for the proposal from Britain), though a compromise saw the two

former Soviet republics offered a "membership action plan" (MAP) to be confirmed at

Natos next summit in December 2008. The unanswered question was whether membership

for Georgia could ever be realistic, given the de facto independent status of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia, both of which already had significant and growing support from Putins

Russia. The fear was that the mercurial Georgian president would attempt another push

against the territories in order to claim that his countrys (Soviet) borders were restored to

central control before Natos December gathering.

The Abkhazians knew, and conveyed the fact, that Abkhazia might come under attack in

spring 2008. In fact, the late Ronald Asmus, an ardent supporter of Saakashvili and

Georgias entry into Nato, confirmed in his 2010 excursuson the events of August 2008 that

such a plan had existed; indeed, it is clear from this work that Condoleezza Rices under-

secretary for Transcaucasia, Matthew Bryza, the European Unions representative for the

region, Peter Semneby, and the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, were all fully aware of

it. No assault occurred; but in May, a special Russian military contingent arrived in Abkhazia

to upgrade the railtrack from Sukhum through Ochamchira and onwards to Gal, near the

Georgian border; this had lain mostly idle since 1993.

The surge in shelling across the Georgian-South Ossetian divide, which regularly occurred in
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the summer of each year, seemed in mid-2008 moreintensethan normal. Then, as the

world anticipated the opening of the Olympic games in China, Georgian troops moved

against Tskhinval towards midnight (local time) on Thursday 7 August, even though

Saakashvili had stated in a broadcast to the people of South Ossetia earlier that evening

that they were in no danger.

Abkhazians wondered what the fighting in and aroundSouth Ossetia, in which Russia

became heavily involved within a matter of hours, portended for them. There was no doubt

in anybodys mind that a Georgian victory would be swiftly followed by a parallel operation

against their republic. And so, at the weekend, Bagapsh ordered a general mobilisation for

Monday morning, 11 August. It was decided that now was the time to eject the Georgian

military presence from the Kodor valley, which was softened up by bombing in advance of

the Abkhazian infantrys ascent early on Tuesday 12 August.

Russia had brought tanks and other armoured equipment in by sea and air, and, as an

exclusively Abkhazian land-force moved up the valley, other Abkhazians joined Russians in apush over the Ingur that brought them to the Mingrelian town of Senaki, the control-centre

for Georgian military actions in western Transcaucasia (some even advanced towards

Georgias second city of Kutaisi to test the extent and nature of Georgian defences, but -

unlike what happened in and around South Ossetia - there was no targeting or pillaging of

the local citizenry). Georgian patrol-vessels were sunk in the Mingrelian port of Poti by the

Russian navy.

Meanwhile, all military personnel, along with most of the local (Svan) residents, had hastily

abandoned the upper Kodor valley, fleeing into neighbouring Svanetia. It came as a

tremendous surprise (but welcome relief) to the Abkhazians to find the valley deserted.

Mines had, however, been left at strategic points, and these had to be defused. The large

amount of ordnance that the Georgians had stored there (for what purpose has never been

revealed) was transported down to Sukhum and briefly put on display; its speedy removal

from public view was rumoured to have been as a result of a request from the United

States, embarrassed by some of the exhibits on display.

At 3 pm (Moscow time) on 26 August, President Dmitry Medvedev - who had taken office in

May 2008 - announced in a live transmission from the Kremlin that Russia was prepared to

recognise both Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence. The announcement was met

within minutes by an eruption of wild celebrations, including much flag-waving and gunfire,

which went on into the early hours (though the former president, Vladislav Ardzinba,

introduced a note of caution with his remark: "The dreadful times are past; difficult times

are now beginning.") The Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, which had brought a formal end to the

so-called "five-day August war", had called for a return of Russian forces to their pre-war

locations, but the argument now advanced was that the recognised states had the right to

reach their own agreements with Russia as to the number and location of military units on

their territories. This stance has been maintained to the present, and Russian bases are

established in both republics.

The Russian question

Both during and after thefightingof August 2008 the world mostly accepted Saakashvilis
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view of events, which was energetically propounded by a public-relations machine fronted

by Randy Scheunemann, who alsoworkedfor Saakashvili-devotee Senator John McCain:

namely, that Georgia had been the victim of outright Russian aggression, aimed at

preserving Moscow's "control" of the two territories and thus frustrating Georgias goal of

Nato membership. But eventually, especially after the publication at the end of September

2009 of the European Union report into the war by acommissionheaded by Swiss diplomatHeidi Tagliavini, there could no longer be any doubt that the Georgians had initiated

hostilities.

But supporters of Saakashvili merely switched focus by postulating a different scenario:

whilst Saakashvili might have launched the assault, he had haplessly fallen into a trap

contrived by the Russians, who thus remained ultimately responsible. A far more plausible

hypothesis, however, should be considered: that Saakashvili, desperate to gain entry into

Nato in December 2008, felt he had to attempt to reintegrate Georgias lost regions,

possibly expecting that, if Russia responded in their defence, America and/or other western

backers of Georgias pro-western, anti-Russianorientationwould come to his rescue. Nosuch rescue was forthcoming. In any event, a new era began with Russias recognition on 26

August 2008.

It was a time of euphoria, similar to the end of the 1992-93 war; there was expectation that

the path was now open for Abkhazia to proceed to full membership of the international

community. Nicaragua granted recognition on 5 September, and established diplomatic

relations on 10 September, a day after Russia took this additional step, but the majority

opinion throughout the world was as unyielding as it had been hitherto: the principle that

(Soviet) Georgias frontiers are inviolable has to be upheld, and recognition of the

secessionist states is deemed illegitimate. Thus, the mood of ecstasy dissipated, as realitybegan to dawn.

Some unease also eventually began to be voiced about the nature of some of the

agreements that were signed with Russia in the months following the war. Several were

finalised in Moscow on 17 September 2008. These - on friendship, coperation and mutual

assistance - envisaged bilateral action in the economic, legal and security fields; dual

citizenship was to be recognised, common transportation was to be established,

accompanied by development of infrastructure for energy and communications. These

agreements were to stand for ten years and be open to quinquennial renewal, though the

lease on the military bases (e.g. at Bombora, near Gudauta, in Abkhazia) was to last forforty-nine years.

A further set of accords was signed in March 2009, whereby Abkhazia was promised $68

million from the federal Russian budget. The management and upgrading of Abkhazias

railways and airport were signed over to Russia for ten years in exchange for loans and

investments; moreover, Russia was also granted oil-exploration rights in the Black Sea for

five years. Then, on 31 March 2009, Russia was granted powers to protect Abkhazias border

and guard its coastal waters. Russias federal security service (FSB) was to set up a border-

control administration along the frontier with Georgia; assistance would be offered to the

republics for training specialists in border-control, though in compensation Abkhazia was to

provide the administration with premises, airspace and landing-fields. The agreements wereto remain effective only until Abkhazia was in a position to form its own border-control
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bodies.

It was perhaps the leasing of the railway and airport (the largest in the entire Caucasus)

along with the transfer of border-security to the FSB that caused the most concern. But

Sergej Bagapshs response, perhaps never clearly articulated publicly, was that Abkhazia did

not have the wherewithal (in terms of materials, expertise, finance and manpower) toconduct all these essential tasks itself; furthermore, whilst similar benefits to Armenia,

based on parallel understandings with Russia, were paid for out of Armenias budget,

Abkhazia was not being required to pay anything.

Stanislav Lakoba is a professional historian who had headed Abkhazias security council

since the rerun of the contentious presidential election in January 2005. Soon after

recognition, he intimated that, given Abkhazias new status, it was no longer appropriate for

the UN Observer Mission there to retain the words "in Georgia" in its title insofar as its

operation within Abkhazia was concerned. He had evidently discussed this with the head of

the mission, who foresaw no change. Lakobas response was to the point: "In that case, themission will be told to leave Abkhazia!"

There followed months of diplomacy that failed to reach a semantic compromise

satisfactory to all sides. After a Russian veto exercised on Abkhazias behalf, the UN had no

option but to end its presence - not only in Abkhazia but also in Georgia - from 30 June 2009

(though in practice duties in Abkhazia ceased on 16 June); the mandate of the OSCE was

also terminated. This meant that the only foreign observers left in Georgia were those

belonging to the EUs monitoring mission, established in line with the Medvedev-Sarkozy

peace-plan, though the authorities in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia refuse to allow them

to enter their sovereign territories. The UN presence in Abkhazia had brought some well-paid employment opportunities for local citizens, as well as contributing more widely to the

economy, and the closure of the operation thus had unfortunate consequences.

The Georgianreactionto recognition was to formulate a draft law, the final version of which

was signed off by Saakashvili on 31 October 2009, to impose notional restrictions on

various activities within the so-called "occupied territories". The Council of Europes Venice

commission criticised aspects of the content, and a modest amendment was introduced in

February 2010 lifting Georgian objections to the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Georgia had already, in January 2010, published a "state strategy on [the] occupied

territories: engagement through coperation". This caused alarm, especially among

international organisations trying to mediate between the various parties, as it aimed to

control both activity within the said areas but also the flow of funds thereto. In the main,

Georgian machinations are regarded in Abkhazia with disdain as having little or no

practicaleffectson the ground. Some NGOs that work with international partner-

organisations, however, wondered how they might affect such partnerships (perhaps to

theextentof being summarily wound up).

Any use of the phrase "occupied territories" by any western representative of standing is

seized upon and vaunted in Tbilisi. When the US Senate (on 29 July 2011) and the European

parliament (on 17 November 2011) passed resolutions defining Abkhazia and South Ossetiain these very terms, they were proclaimed by Saakashvili to be "historic documents" laying
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the foundation for the (re)-establishment of Georgian control, although what their practical

relevance (if any) will prove to be remains an open question. A proposer of the EU

resolution, Krzysztof Lisek, travelled to Tbilisi in the aftermath, where he was awarded the

Order of St. George.

For a short time in the mid-1990s a little passenger-ferry ran between the ports of Sukhumand Trabzon in Turkey. It had been hoped to reopen this route in the wake of recognition,

but so far these hopes have not been realised. Though freight has continued to be shipped,

Georgia has regularly impounded vessels plying the route and confiscated their cargoes;

between 1991-2003, forty Turkish vessels were seized, followed by a further twenty-two in

2004-06.

The most notorious incident occurred in summer 2009, when a Turkish tanker sailing from

Trabzon was impounded as soon as it entered international waters in what was clearly an

act of international piracy (yet the international community's response was a contrast with

that over similar events off the Horn of Africa). After the cargo was confiscated, the captainwas jailed for twenty-four years and only freed after high-level intervention by the Turkish

government.

It was equally hoped that regular passenger-flights might be reinstated to/from Sukhum

airport, for destinations in Turkey and perhaps elsewhere in the middle east as well as

Russia, but again none has been instigated to date.

The democratic test

The main event in Abkhazia in 2009 was the presidentialelectionat the end of the year. The

previous election of 2004-05 had been surrounded by dispute, with Moscow expressing

preference for Raul Khadzhimba, who resigned from the government in May 2009 to run

against the incumbent Sergej Bagapsh. After a rerun vote the main rivals came together in a

government of national unity with Bagapsh as president and Raul Khadzhimba as his deputy.

Khadzhimba had been Ardzinbas anointed successor, though Moscow's support of him is

thought to have driven more voters to Bagapsh's side. In May 2009, he had resigned from

the government to run his campaign. The third candidate was a wealthy businessman,

Beslan Butba. The campaign turned rather bitter. There were nationalist accusations that

Bagapsh, whose wife (now widow) is Mingrelian, had won thanks to the votes cast by those

Mingrelians who had secured voting rights in 2004-05; though he was charged more with

bending to Moscow's wishes than to Tbilisi's. The opposition complaints about Bagapshs

weak stance towards Russia were later tempered by reassurances that Russia should not

feel targeted by such criticism; after all, thegeopoliticalposition of Abkhazia and the largely

hostile attitude of the world towards it meant that no Abkhazian politician could afford to

alienate the Kremlin.

A particularly vocal section of the opposition subsequently focused on two questions: how

many of Abkhazias remaining Kartvelian (predominantly Mingrelian) population should

have voting rights in 2009, and could Abkhazia even afford to tolerate any large-scale

Kartvelian presence on its territory? It argued against the common view that the bulk of theMingrelians in the Gal district had not participated in the 1992-93 war, and claimed that
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more had actually taken up weapons against the Abkhazians than was/is generally

supposed; such being the case, the question was mooted as to why a community that had

harboured fighters should be granted residency rights, let alone be allowed to vote for the

president (and/or parliament at the time of parliamentary elections).

In the event, no special dispensation (on the model of 2004-05) was made, and the right tovote was restricted to those holding an Abkhazian passport. Such overtly nationalist

sentiment raised fears that, if prudence did not prevail, Abkhazia might end up committing

the same error as late-Soviet Georgia: namely alienate its own minorities rather than do

everything possible to make them feel respected and valued members of a society

deserving of their support.

Sergej Bagapshhad had a number of meetings in Russia with Vladimir Putin since becoming

president in early 2005, though Putin had never allowed photos to be taken. The Russian

premier eventually consented to a flying visit to Sukhum on 12 August 2009, and official

cameras recorded his laying of a wreath at the war memorial with Bagapsh at his side. Therewas also film of his extraordinary meeting with a group of oppositionists, headed by

Khadzhimba. At his press conference he acknowledged the obvious fact that the change of

Russias stance towards Abkhazia, activated while he had still held the Russian presidency,

served the strategic interests of Russia. On the morning of the visit, a bomb exploded in the

centre of the northern resort of Gagra, killing two people; and as the last meeting of the day

was being held, another exploded in Sukhum, this time without casualties.

Despite the apprehensions felt about the post-recognition agreements with Russia and the

heat generated during the campaign, the 2009 election passed off peacefully. Bagapsh, who

still basked in the glory of having been in office at the time when the process of achieving

international recognition began, proved the clear winner without any need for a run-off. His

intention, he stated, was to devote his second (and, by the constitution, final) term to

widening Abkhazias recognition and working towards improving life for the republics

citizens, free from thoughts about having to contest another election.

In 2009, the London-based NGOConciliation Resourcesand Germanys Heinrich Bll

Foundation provided financial backing for the Georgian filmmaker Mamuka Kuparadze to

produce adocumentary-Absence of Will(in Georgian, Nebis Arkona) - for Georgias StudiaRe. A young man and woman, not old enough to remember the 1992-93 war, were filmed

questioning fellow Kartvelians, including such leading figures as Shevardnadze and General

Gia Qarqarashvili, who had issued a genocidal threat against the Abkhazian nation in the

autumn of 1992, about their actions at the time and/or memories of relevant events. This

film is possibly the first time when Kartvelians are seen publicly questioning the legitimacy

of the actions of the Georgian government vis--vis Abkhazia and thus represents a veryimportant step forward in learning lessons through the process of self-criticism. The film

was presented to selected audiences abroad (including a screening in the British

parliaments Portcullis House).

In the early summer of 2010, with the agreement of Abkhazia's prime minister Sergej

Shamba (previously the long-serving foreign minister), Kuparadze was invited to Abkhazia to

attend the broadcast of his documentary on Abkhazia's state TV-channel. A live discussionimmediately followed the film, and both on this occasion and in later comments the
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predominant reaction was worryingly negative (not to say hostile). Rather than welcome the

admission of wrongs seen in the film, commentators mostly evinced suspicion. The film was

condemned as some kind of ruse to deceive the Abkhazians into adopting a less adamant

stance against reunification, and even the motives of those who had organised the event in

Sukhum (Shamba and representatives of some NGOs) were called into question: did they, it

was asked, have the best interests of Abkhazia at heart or were they (especially those whoreceived funding for projects from the west) being called to play the (presumed pro-

Georgian) tune of those western organisations who finance joint-projects?

In turn, some saw the hand of political manipulation behind much of the hysterical

response. They concluded it was essential to continue work towards reconciliation with

neighbouring Georgia at the level of inter-state politics, and to intensify efforts inside

Abkhazia to convince local citizens of this need - for this is a precondition for achieving

normality in relations with Georgia, which must happen at some point.

The last journey

The majority of the worlds ethnic Abkhazians live as a diaspora-community in Turkey, and

there has been a long-standing hope that many of the descendants of the original 19th-

century exiles will build their future in the historical homeland, Bagapsh naturally desired to

visit this community; Turkey finally agreed in April 2011. The trip was not as successful as it

should have been, because of rumour-mongering by members of the opposition in Abkhazia

who alleged that Bagapshs policy towards Russia equated to betrayal of Abkhazias true

interests. Bagapsh, thus, had constantly to defend his position in front of members of the

community in Turkey.

An even more epoch-making overseas journey was in prospect in 2011. The Oxford Union

issued an invitation for Bagapsh to deliver an address, setting out Abkhazian aspirations.

This would have been the first visit by an Abkhazian president to a western country. Leading

Abkhazians had managed to travel to various western destinations during the 1990s to

present their case at conferences or at meetings with civil servants, but since George W.

Bush became US president, visas had been refused even to allow Abkhazian representatives

(such as foreign-minister Shamba) to express Abkhazias viewpoint at the UN; it also often

proved (and, indeed, still proves) difficult for Abkhazians travelling on Russian passports

toobtainvisas to enter certain EU countries (notably Germany).

The fact that Chatham House, the leading foreign-policy think-tank in London, would also

have invited Bagapsh to speak makes it reasonably sure that the UK trip would have granted

him a visa. But the issue, and the impact of a trip on the British (or European) attitude to

Abkhazia, were never to be tested. For as his speech was being finalised, Bagapsh flew to

Moscow for a minor operation to correct a smokers complaint, and though the operation

(in an FSB clinic) evidently went smoothly, complications set in, and hediedunexpectedly

on 29 May 2011. Vladimir Putin was amongst the mourners on the day of the funeral.

The presidential contest

The unanticipated presidential election was scheduled to coincide with "recognition day"(26 August), with three candidates proposing themselves: vice-president Aleksandr Ankvab,
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prime minister Sergej Shamba, and Raul Khadzhimba. In advance of the election both

Ankvab and Shamba resigned their posts to concentrate on theircampaigns, and the

parliamentary speaker Nugzar Ashuba became interim president.

The campaign was energetic. The candidates and their running-mates travelled widely

across the republic (including to theMingrelian-dominated Gal district) to hold rallies andmeetings; they took part in debates (with one another and/or electors) and gave interviews

(in both Abkhaz and Russian) across the media-outlets; each had both a central and regional

head-quarters; and a variety of electioneeringmaterialswas produced, including on the

internet.

Shambas headquarters had the air of being the best financed and was a hive of activity

throughout the campaign. Khadzhimba, whose running-mate was Svetlana Dzhergenia,

widow of ex-president Ardzinba, retained much of the core support he had previously

attracted, but since he had failed on two earlier occasions there was a feeling that his

campaign was doomed; moreover, despite his personal reputation for integrity, the natureof (some of) his followers alienated a number of voters. Ankvab, who had survived several

assassinationattemptssince his return to Abkhazian politics from pursuing business

interests in Moscow, was renowned for personal austerity and made the eradication of

corruption the central plank of his manifesto (which was the last of the three to be prepared

for circulation and took the form of a booklet containing a personal address in Abkhaz and

Russian to the reader).

The candidates had undertaken to conduct a clean campaign, but it took a negative turn on

15 August, when Shamba (or, as he maintained, members of his team) screened outside the

Philharmonic Hall in Sukhum part of a video in which the person who had led Georgianforces into Abkhazia on 14 August 1992,Tengiz Kitovani, who now lives in exile in Russia,

accused Ankvab (Abkhazias interior minister at the time) of having known in advance of

Tbilisis plans to invade Abkhazia but had done nothing to prevent it.

Ankvab, perhaps surprisingly, declined to respond to the charge. His reason was possibly

that he had already vigorously defended himself against a similar charge made in 2003 by

Vladislav Ardzinba, arguing that Ardzinba had known as much about Georgian intentions as

he did; so that, if any blame was to be applied, it should attach to the then head of the

administration, namely Ardzinba himself, who is regarded in Abkhazia as a figure utterly

beyond public reproach.

Whoever was responsible for the video incident, the tactic backfired disastrously, for it

contravened the average Abkhazian voters sense of fair play and, in any case, the

intervention of Kitovani (of all people) was never likely to prove persuasive in Abkhazia.

Many voters are thought promptly to have transferred their allegiance from Shamba, once

seen as an urbane foreign minister with good contacts abroad, to Ankvab.

Well over one hundred observers (from such countries as Russia, France, Germany,

Switzerland, Italy, Japan, Nauru, and Fiji) cast supervisory eyes over the proceedings on

election-day and expressed themselves fully satisfied. It was possible, not for the first time,

to hear the opinion expressed thatdemocracyis more advanced in Abkhazia than in Russia(let alone Georgia). Ballot-boxes were transparent. Internal Abkhazian passports served as
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12/18

registration-cards, and voting-slips were issued only after the passport was checked against

the voter-list for that ward, and the passport stamped as proof of voting. Counts were

conducted on the spot in full view of officials, observers and individuals peering through

windows from the street outside.

Ankvab emerged the clearwinner, with 54.86% of the 101,192 votes cast, a turnout thatrepresented 71.92% of those eligible to vote. He quickly set about making changes to

personnel, both inside and outside government. Abkhazia soon gained a foreign minister

who could claim to have been partly educated in the west, namelyVjacheslav Chirikba. He

had previously been an advisor in Bagapshs administration and leader of the Abkhazian

delegation to the Geneva talks, and had earned his doctorate (in Abkhaz studies) during his

years of residence in Leiden.

The big neighbour

In light of the apprehensions raised by the nature of some of the agreements signed withRussia in the wake of recognition, one of the hopes invested in the new administration was

that it would release information about several other accords signed by the late president,

whose legacy remains to be appropriately evaluated. But, even apart from this, there were

already indications of problems affecting aspects of Abkhaziasrelationswith Russia.

There has been substantial growth in the number of hotels operating in Sukhum, but a long-

standing base for significant numbers of Russiantouristsremained the sanatorium-complex

known as the Turbaza, which lies alongside a pleasant stretch of the beach in the south-

eastern centre of Sukhum Bay. The land belongs to the Abkhazian state, but the complex,

which offered employment to many local citizens, was provisioned by the Russian defenceministry. It suddenly closed in advance of the 2011 holiday season on the grounds that a

radical refurbishment was needed, thereby reducing the number of tourists and eliminating

their contribution to the local economy. This was followed by rumours suggesting murkier

reasons to do with wrangles over ownership of this potentially very lucrative site.

Already, during Ardzinbas presidency, there were arguments over the extent to which the

sale of such fundamental state-properties as the five "Stalin dachas" should even be

contemplated (never mind actually permitted). A huge stretch of the beach and the

adjoining pine-forest in the finest of Abkhazias resorts (Pitsunda) have remained in the

exclusive control of Russian ministries since Nikita Krushchv first developed the bay into a

tourist-paradise in the 1960s. A state-dacha overlooking Gagra (the so-called "Pearl of the

Black Sea") that had fallen derelict has been renovated behind a high fence with sentry-

posts, reportedly as a retreat for the head of the Krasnodar region.

Apart from concern over the future of individual locations and what arrangements regarding

ownership reveal about the overall nature of Abkhaz-Russian relations, acontroversyalso

blew up prior to Bagapshs death over the ownership of the village of Aibga and its

surroundingterritoryalong the Abkhaz-Russian border in the area of Krasnaja Poljana, the

site of the skiing events for Sochis winter Olympics in 2014. The historical dividing-line

between Abkhaz-speaking and Ubykh/Circassian-speaking territories ran roughly along the

Mzymta River, whereas today Abkhazias northern frontier lies to the south of this along the

Psou River. Thus, if any irredentist claim were to be made, it might legitimately be expected
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23885http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23885http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23885http://abkhazworld.com/headlines/838-interview-with-v-chirikba-vestnik-kavkaza-april-2012.htmlhttp://abkhazworld.com/headlines/838-interview-with-v-chirikba-vestnik-kavkaza-april-2012.htmlhttp://abkhazworld.com/headlines/838-interview-with-v-chirikba-vestnik-kavkaza-april-2012.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20120511/173394023.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20120511/173394023.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20120511/173394023.htmlhttp://abkhazia.travel/en/http://abkhazia.travel/en/http://abkhazia.travel/en/http://abkhazia.travel/en/pitsundahttp://abkhazia.travel/en/pitsundahttp://abkhazia.travel/en/pitsundahttp://themoscownews.com/politics/20110330/188535247.htmlhttp://themoscownews.com/politics/20110330/188535247.htmlhttp://themoscownews.com/politics/20110330/188535247.htmlhttp://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5555http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5555http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5555http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5555http://themoscownews.com/politics/20110330/188535247.htmlhttp://abkhazia.travel/en/pitsundahttp://abkhazia.travel/en/http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120511/173394023.htmlhttp://abkhazworld.com/headlines/838-interview-with-v-chirikba-vestnik-kavkaza-april-2012.htmlhttp://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23885


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to come from Abkhazia against Russia. However, this northern region was largely cleared of

its native population following Russias conquest in 1864.

The village of Aibga today is occupied by a handful of ethnic Russians, and Russia asserted

that they would be better catered for under direct Russian rule. The Abkhazian government

strongly opposed any transfer of land and attendant control of whatever mineral wealthmight lie on or beneath it. A joint commission was established to investigate the matter. The

leader of the Abkhazian delegation is toponymist Valerij Kvarchia, who has marshalled

weighty documentary evidence to buttress Abkhazias right to the area. The matter awaits

resolution.

In 2011, the Russian authorities decided to close the pedestrian border-crossing in order to

widen it and thus improve the future flow of such traffic; most probably the consequence of

lack of forethought rather than any hostile intent to threaten the viability of Abkhazias

tourist trade. The problem was that, as the work wasundertakenduring the tourist season,

all movement across the border was squeezed into the channel which, for a number ofyears, had been reserved for vehicular traffic and which has only a narrow pavement

running along each side of the bridge. Frustration at the border has been the norm for

years, but the queues in 2011 presented a particularly daunting and unappealing prospect.

That said, perhaps the greatest challenge to the traditional source of tourists for Abkhazia

(viz. Russia) is the relatively high prices coupled with lowish standards of service and an

infrastructure in severe need of upgrading, whose consequence is that Abkhazia has lost out

over recent years to such destinations as Turkey and Egypt (to which Russians can easily

obtain entry-visas). In many ways, visting Abkhazia is a reminder of life in Soviet times; a

phenomenon that an Abkhazian journalist and insightful commentator on the modern

scene,Inal Kashig, ascribes not to any emotional attachment among Abkhazians to the

Soviet lifestyle but simply to the fact that they have little or no experience of anything

different. This is, of course, a direct result of the years of isolation imposed upon the

republic during the regime of sanctions and the deliberate shunning by the international

community.

For several years, Russias attempts to gain membership of the World Trade Organisation

(WTO) had been blocked by Georgia, as the latter sought to win concessions withregardto

Russias "occupation" of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia failed to gain agreement

for the posting of its own border-guards on either side of the crossings from Russia into the

two republics; but eventually, towards the close of 2011, Russia consented to a Swissproposal that trade across the frontiers be monitored by an independent and neutral

agency. Georgia found this measure acceptable and withdrew its objections to

Russianmembershipof the WTO. Some irritation was expressed in Abkhazia that this could

to a degree raise doubts about the absolute nature of Abkhazias independence, but at least

trade can continue without direct interference, and simultaneously Russia has achieved its

long-term goal.

A most important recent event was the visit of Archimandrite Dorofej Dbar of theOrthodox

Churchof Abkhazia to Istanbul in January 2012, where he was officially received by the

Patriarch of Constantinople. Dbar explained in his interview to the Russian-languagepaper kho Moskvythat, when the Georgian bishop left Abkhazia, the priest Vissarion
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14/18

Apliaa, who is now in his 60s, took complete charge of the the Sukhum Eparchy. He failed in

his attempt to persuade the Russian Patriarch Aleksej II before the latters death at the end

of 2008 to sanction the Abkhazian churchs removal from the Georgian church to join that of

Russia; when Aleksejs successor, Kirill I, maintained his predecessorsstanceand dispatched

a representative to the monastery in New Athos in 2010, the result was a schism within

Abkhazia as a group of younger reformers came together under Dbar, heading what theydeclared to be a Holy Metropolis.

The ultimateaimis for the Abkhazian church to achieve autocephaly, though, for the time

being, the Constantinople Patriarch is merely asked to define the canonical status of the

church in Abkhazia, where reconciliation will be a first step towards the further

development that might eventually lead to the desired autocephaly.

Khadzhimba, who came bottom of the poll in the 2011 presidential election, remained as

head of the "Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia", and was a founder-member of a

new oppositiongroupingcalledApsadgjyl(Homeland), designed to be a focus for self-declared "patriots". In this capacity he addressed its opening congress on 19 January 2012.

The groupingplansto contest the parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 2013. One

of its demands is for equal time to be allotted to parties on state TV and radio in the run-up

to election-day. Khadzimba himself succeeded in gaining election to the new parliament in

the first round of voting. In general, the turnout was low, and only a handful of former

deputies won re-election.

The demographic legacy

A census was taken in Abkhazia in February 2011. There had been one in 2003, but the

results, though never officially revealed, were deemed to be unreliable. The

preliminaryfiguresreleased on 28 March found the total population to be 242,826, a total

revised on 28 December to 240,705. Respondents were able to define their own ethnicity,

and the overwhelming majority of the 46,367 Kartvelian residents chose to continue the

post-1930 Soviet practice of classifying themselves as "Georgians", even though, as stated

above, almost all of them will be Mingrelians.

The main population figures in February 2011 were: Abkhazians - 122,069, "Georgians" -

43,166, Armenians - 41,864, Russians - 22,077, Mingrelians - 3,201,Greeks - 1,380. If these

figures are accurate, Abkhazians now represent an absolute majority (at 50.71%). The initial

reaction is perhaps that the Abkhazian total looks on the high side, if it is considered that

the number of Abkhazians in the whole of Soviet Georgia in 1989 had been 95,853 and that

4% of their number in Abkhazia perished during the 1992-93 war. True, there has been

some immigration from the diaspora community (mainly in Turkey), but only the awaited

breakdown of the initial figures will demonstrate the balance between natural growth and

influx from outside.

It might also be expected that both the Kartvelian and Armenianfigureswould be higher.

There is a certain amount of criss-crossing of the Ingur border by local Mingrelians, with

more of them likely to be found in Abkhazia during the summer months when they tend

their farms, and this census was taken in winter. It should also be noted that the Greek andIsraeli governments mounted rescue-missions to repatriate most members of their
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respective communities in autumn 1992. Abkhazias population today is under half what it

was in 1989, and the most glaring difference between then and now clearly concerns the

Kartvelian totals.

There has long been controversy about the ethnic composition of Abkhazia, and (without

rehashing historical arguments over the Abkhazian vs Kartvelian proportions) it is necessaryto say something about the marked reduction in Abkhazias Kartvelian population since the

1992-93 war. Many, perhaps most, members of this community chose to support the

actions of the Georgian government in resorting to military means to resolve the crisis in

Abkhazia that had arisen in the final years of the Soviet Union; a period when Georgia, in the

course of pressing for its own independence, became consumed with chauvinist rhetoric

that naturally alienated many of the republics minorities (Abkhazians, South Ossetians,

Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Daghestanis included).

The fourteen months of bitter warfare cost thousands of lives, and much of Abkhazia's

cultural patrimony wastargetedfor destruction. Sukhum's final recapture from theoccupying Georgian forces on 27 September 1993 sparked a mass exodus of the Kartvelian

population, concentrated in and around Sukhum and the south-eastern provinces of

Gulripsh, Ochamchira and Gal, through fear of reprisals for (real or perceived) collaboration

with the invaders. This population movement has been successfully portrayed by the

Georgian side as an example of the kind of "ethnic cleansing" that the world was already

experiencing in the Balkan maelstrom.

Both the UN Security Council and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation

(Unpo) sent missions to the region in autumn 1993, and neither found any evidence to

substantiate this accusation. Indeed, it is clear from a booklet published in English by theMingrelian writerGuram Odishariain 2001, in which he describes the horrors of his flight

from his home on the outskirts of Sukhum through the Kodor valley into Svanetia, where

many of the Mingrelian refugees were robbed by their fellow-Kartvelian Svans, that the

exodus began before any Abkhazian (or allied ) troops arrived and the Abkhazians finally

pronounced victory on 30 September.

Thus, whilst the bulk of Abkhazias Kartvelians may have ended up outside Abkhazia

(primarilyin Georgia), they removed themselves and were not forced out by gun-toting

Abkhazians in furtherance of some governmental policy ethnically to cleanse the republic,

which is surely what the term ethnic cleansing at heart implies. Their presence in miserable

living conditions on Georgian soil has been used by the Tbilisi authorities for general

propaganda purposes and as a means of attracting large amounts of humanitarian aid.

Moreover, their numbers have been greatly exaggerated, for the larger the number claimed,

the greater the amount of aid obtained (as late as 2010, President Saakashvili

wasreferringto 500,000 expellees from Abkhazia).

Whatever the reason why pre-war Kartvelian residents of Abkhazia have for almost two

decades found themselves as refugees in Georgia, their very existence is a stick used by

Georgia to charge that Abkhaziacannotclaim any kind of democratic legitimacy or valid

elections with so many condemned to silence beyond its frontiers. Internally, Abkhazias

human-rights record is also called into question over such issues as language-use in the Gal
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districts schools, for it is often (albeit erroneously) asserted that Georgian is banned as the

language of tuition in thisMingreliancommunity.

The next steps

Most western so-called experts on Georgian-Abkhazian relations have no knowledge ofGeorgian and are thus unable to utilise Georgian materials, which are crucial for

anunderstandingof the conflicts that have blighted the Georgian scene since the late 1980s

(at least); it is also pertinent to ask how many of them had any appreciation of Georgian (let

alone Abkhazian) affairs prior to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. A comprehensive

understanding of the history of inter-ethnic relations in theregionis also surely necessary to

grasp the essentials of the Georgian-Abkhazian (and Georgian-South Ossetian) conflicts and

comment meaningfully thereon. Abkhazians too ask why the west seems to become

exercised by alleged infringements of exclusively Kartvelian human rights, while ignoring the

transgressions committed against the Abkhazians by the Georgian authorities and/or

Mingrelia-based terrorist-groups (backed by Tbilisi) over the last two decades; they findhere yet another example of the wests notorious double standards.

The Abkhazians further resent the fact that the international community, led by the UKs

prime minister John Major and foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, precipitately recognised

Georgia as soon as Eduard Shevardnadze returned there in spring 1992. This decision

effectively gave Tbilisi carte blanche to behave as it wished within Georgias then recognised

borders. This it did, while virtually all subsequent censure and opprobrium were reserved

for the Abkhazian side, which was vilified as compliant puppets of the Kremlin.

Moscows actions in August 2008 have been almost universally condemned, but Moscow

has its interests in the Caucasus, and it has acted in the way it deems they will best be

served; to this extent, it has acted like most states and can hardly be blamed for that.

Furthermore, its policy of recognition of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) fully accorded with

the aspirations of the local majority-populations. This can be seen as a welcome rectification

of the mistake made in recognising Georgia within its Soviet borders in the first place, and

should serve as a model for the wider international community. The wests reluctance to

admit the error of 1992, combined with eighteen years of blindly sanctioning the futile

policies emanating from Tbilisi, has resulted only in Abkhazia growing ever closer to Russia

and in Russia consolidating its influence in the area. When Russia granted recognition, its

leadership stated that it wanted its initiative to be followed. It is high time for that to

happen.

The Abkhazians' effort to persuade relevant policy-makers of the correctness of this step

would in my estimation be advanced if they were to outline their case in a clear, informed,

and principled manner. Among the most relevant propositions are these:

* Much of Abkhazias housing-stock and infrastructure was destroyed in the war. According

to the silence-is-consent principle, an international community which remained largely

silent while Georgian forces wrought this devastation shares the blame and thus should now

share the burden of making good the damage. Georgia has paid no reparations, and any

money available to Abkhazias budget will be spent for the benefit of the Abkhazians andother members of the population who supported the Abkhazian cause
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* The targets of Tbilisis military operations in the war were not only the Abkhazians but all

non-Kartvelian members of the population. The relevant non-Kartvelians (especially the

Armenians) know this, which is why Abkhazians desire for independence is supported by

these members of the community, who participate fully in all socio-political activity and

enjoy their own language-rights. The main goal of Abkhazia's language-policy is to ensurethe survival of Abkhaz, an endangered language, and there is now a legal requirement for all

state business to be conducted in Abkhaz (rather than Russian) from 2015. This will present

difficulties not only for non-Abkhazians but also for those ethnic Abkhazians who have little

or no competence in the mother-tongue, and so all efforts must be directed towards

realising this ambitious aim as far as is practically and financially possible

* The Abkhazian government has no objection to Mingrelians returning to/residing in the

province of Gal, where, if they wish, they can exercise their rights to have their children

educated through the medium of Georgian. In many cases, however, Georgian textbooks in

such subjects as history and geography demonstrably pervert the relevant facts relating toAbkhazia, and it is vital that the relevant materials are subject to independent scrutiny to

guarantee their accuracy. It is wrong to impose, or try to impose, ethnic categories (in the

way that Georgian ethnicity was actually imposed on Mingrelians, Svans and Laz by the

central authorities circa 1930), and important to respect the fact that people's sense of their

identity can both shift over time and contain plural elements; by the same token,

acceptance of the distinction (which Abkhazians tend to make) between Mingrelians and

Georgians, and the growth of Mingrelian pride in their particular, historically

marginalised,languageand culture, could help greatly to reconstruct relations among

people scarred by conflict and to reduce the threat of its recurrence

* Once the economy is on a secure footing, the infrastructure restored, and Abkhazia wins

recognition fromGeorgia(including the signing of a non-aggression pact and the

establishment of normal, good-neighbourly relations), Abkhazia will undertake to consider

the possibility of gradually returning morerefugeesto areas outside the Gal district. Their

integration will need to be carefully managed so that it contributes to Abkhazia's nation-

buillding process rather than becomes a source of new division. It is essential, for example,

that the refugees become citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia (which of course entails a

requirement to respect its laws and constitution). This will both recognise their civic equality

and help address any fear among Abkhazia's other ethnic groups that the effort to build a

fair and democratic society will be undermined by the mass-return of a refugee-community

which could prove susceptible to Georgian manipulation. After all, Abkhazia had a non-

Kartvelian majority prior to the start of the war, and in Mikhail Gorbachevs pre-war

referendum of 17 March 1991 an absolute majority of Abkhazias electorate had voted not

to join Georgias drive for independence, fearing the consequences thereof. In the

meantime, everything feasible will be done to guarantee the safety of the Gal districts

Mingrelians and to make them feel proud to be citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia

Abkhazia is open to partnerships with, and investment from, all interested states, but,

despite diktats from those seeking to impose some flawedpax Americana et Britannica,there will be no abandoning of the independence so dearly won in the war and maintained

during succeeding years of isolation and sanctions.
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For years, the view was expressed that the South Ossetian problem would be the easier to

resolve. And yet it was the five-day war in/around South Ossetia in August 2008 that led to

the "unfreezing" of the so-called frozen Abkhazian and South Ossetianconflicts, when

Russias Dmitry Medvedev offered them both recognition. Since then, the two young states

have usually been harnessed together and treated as a pair. But more observers are

expressing the self-evident fact that Abkhazia has by far the greater capacity for sustaining aviable independence. Abkhazia should be given the chance to demonstrate its capacity so to

do by exploiting its potential with the full support of the international community, which

thus far has manifested only an alarming tendency to sympathise with the aggressor.

--------------

Author's note: I am grateful to Liana Kvarchelia, Asida Lomia and Michael Costello whokindly offered suggestions or commented on the first draft of this article. Any errors remainmy own responsibility.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/george-hewitt/abkhazia-from-conflict-to-statehood
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Documents

Abkhazia, from conflict to statehood, by George Hewitt