Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians(NWCaucasus) · ABKHAZIA,GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS by now perhaps more than 400,000 Meskh(et)ians to the south-western region of Meskheti on

Central Asian Survey (1999) 18(4) 463ndash499

Abkhazia Georgia and theCircassians (NW Caucasus)GEORGE HEWITT

Demography

Although the data from the last (Soviet) census (1989) in these parts of theCaucasus are already a decade old they at least provide a basis for discussingethnic divisions

Table 1 (a) Figures for the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic(capital 5 Tbilisi) Main population of Georgia (1979 and 1989)

1979 1989 1979 1989

Whole population 4993182 5400841 100 100lsquoGeorgiansrsquo 3433011 3787393 688 701Armenians 448000 437211 90 81Russians 371608 341172 74 63Azerbaydzhanis 255678 307556 51 57OssetiansOssetes 160497 164055 32 30Greeks 95105 100324 19 18Abkhazians 85285 95853 17 18

(b) The Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (capital5 Sukhum) Main population of Abkhazia (1979 and 1989)

Whole population 486082 525061 100 100Abkhazians 83097 93267 171 178lsquoGeorgiansrsquo 213322 239872 439 457Armenians 73350 76541 151 146Russians 79730 74913 164 142Greeks 13642 14664 28 28Ukrainians 10257 11470 21 22

(c) The Adzharian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (capi-tal 5 Batumi) Main population of Adzharia (1979 and 1989)

Whole population 354224 392432 100 100lsquoGeorgiansrsquo 283872 324806 802 828Russians 34544 30042 975 77Armenians 16101 15849 45 4Greeks 7072 7379 2 19Ukrainians 5402 5943 15 15Belorussians 481 712 013 02

George Hewitt is Professor of Caucasian Languages School of Oriental and African Studies LondonUniversityLondon UK

ISSN 0263-4937 Print 1465-3354 Online99040463-37 Oacute 1999 Central Asian Survey

GEORGE HEWITT

Table 2 The Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic(capital 5 Nalrsquochik) Main population of Kabardino-Balkaria (1979 and 1989)

Percentage1979 1989 growth in 1989

Whole population 666546 753531 131 100Kabardians 303604 363351 197 482Russians 234137 240721 28 319Balkars 59710 70571 182 94Ukrainians 12139 12826 57 17OssetiansOssetes 9710 9996 29 13Germans 9905 8569 2 135 11

Table 3 The Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (capital 5 Cherkessk)Main population of Karachay-Cherkessia (1979 and 1989)


Whole population 367364 414970 13 100Russians 165604 175923 62 424Karachays 109196 128746 179 31Cherkess 34430 40230 168 97Abazas 24245 27475 133 66Nogays 11872 12933 94 31Kabardians 756 1030 362] 025

Table 4 The Adyghe Autonomous Oblast (capital 5 Maykop) Main populationof Adyghea (1979 and 1989)


Whole population 404390 432046 68 100Russians 285626 293640 28 68Adyghes 86388 95439 105 221Ukrainians 12078 13755 139 32Armenians 6359 10460 645 24

Elucidation of ethno-linguistic terms

The term lsquoGeorgianrsquo has been used since ca1930 within Georgiaformer USSRas a general designation (superordinate) for speakers of all four of the SouthCaucasian (Kartvelian) languages namely Georgians proper Mingrelians Svans

464

ABKHAZIA GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

and Laz (although this last ethno-linguistic group lives almost in its entirety inthe Laz traditional homeland which today is incorporated within Turkeyrunning from the TurkondashGeorgian border along the Black Sea coast towardsRize)mdashthere are also large numbers of ethnic Georgians who have ended up onthe Turkish side of the border I myself do not use the term lsquoGeorgianrsquo in whatI deem to be this deliberately misleading enlarged sense (NB this obfuscationof ethnic categories does not apply in Turkey) preferring the term lsquoKartvelianrsquothe same term as is used widely by linguists to refer to the relevant language-family which as far as one can determine is an isolate seemingly beingunrelated to any languagelanguage-family spoken either today or in the pastMutual intelligibility among these four sister- tongues is only possible betweenLaz and Mingrelian It will be important to bear in mind the ethno-linguisticdistinctions within the Kartvelian family during the discussion below

The other indigenous language-family with whose speakers we shall beconcerned in this section is North West Caucasian This small family consists ofAbkhaz (the most divergent dialect of which is Abaza) Circassian and Ubykh(extinct since 1992) A common synonym for Circassian is Cherkessmdashin Turkeythe term lsquoCherkessrsquo has the wider sense of lsquoNorth Caucasianrsquo Linguisticallyspeaking the Circassian language which is universally known to its nativespeakers as lsquoAdyghebzersquo can be divided into a western and an eastern group ofdialects somewhat confusingly the western dialects alone are commonly re-ferred to as lsquoAdyghersquo and this is the source of the name of Adyghea (AdygheAutonomous Oblast) where the majority of western Circassian speakers remain-ing in the Caucasian homeland are concentratedmdasha further 10000 or so speakersof the western dialect Shapsugh are found around the Black Sea town of Tuapse(lsquoTwo Riversrsquo in its Circassian eytmology) in Russiarsquos Krasnodar RegionEastern Circassian comprises the two dialects of Kabardian and Bes(le)neyWhen the Soviet administrative divisions were set up in the NW Caucasuseastern Circassians living outside Kabardino-Balkaria were styled lsquoCherkessrsquomdashhence lsquoKarachay-Cherkessiarsquo As a general rule all dialects of Circassian aremutually intelligible although it is easier for western dialect speakers tounderstand eastern Circassian than vice versa Similarly although speakers ofthe two Abkhazian dialects still to be found on their Abkhazian ancestral lands(namely Abzhywa base for literary Abkhaz and Bzyp) can with somedif culty communicate with speakers of Abaza it is easier for speakers of theAbaza dialects (namely Ashkharywa and Trsquoaprsquoanta base of literary Abaza) tounderstand the speech of (Bzyp or Abzhywa) Abkhaz There is no mutualintelligibility between Circassian and Abkhaz-Abaza It has not been nallydemonstrated to universal satisfaction that NW Caucasian is related to any otherlanguage or language-family although some think that the long-extinct Anato-lian Hattic (plus whatever the contemporary Kasks might have spoken) mayhave been related There is however growing acceptance of the theory that NWCaucasian derives from the same proto-language as the other North Caucasianlanguage-family of Nakh-Daghestanian

All the other ethno-linguistic groups mentioned in the above tables are

465

GEORGE HEWITT

deemed to be non-autochthonous to the Caucasus speaking either Indo-Eu-ropean (Slavonic Russian Ukrainian Belorussian Armenian Greek GermanIranian Ossetic) or Turkic languages (namely Azeri Nogay Karachay andBalkar which two linguistically are regarded as essentially dialects of onelanguage)mdashthere is a small community of speakers of Semitic Assyrian inGeorgia where speakers of Iranian Kurdish are also found Georgia also hassmall communities of Chechens all the 5000 or so speakers of Chechen-Ingushrsquossister- language Bats as well as small numbers of speakers of Daghestanianlanguages

De ning historical moments

One cannot understand the current aspirations of the communities to be dis-cussed below unless one takes account of the individual historical phenomenathat have largely determined them

For the Kartvelians that moment came perhaps with the annexation by Russiaof the central and eastern Georgian kingdoms in 1800 following the Tsarrsquoscynical failure to implement the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk by refusing to cometo confront the Persians when they sacked Ti is (Tbilisi) in 1795mdashremainingKartvelian speaking territories soon came under Russian sway (although FreeSvanetia succumbed only in the late 19th century) Over the years particularlyin latter decades Russia has been demonized as ever ready to thwart Georgianindependence by any and all devious means imaginable so that during the laterSoviet era Georgia rivalled only the Baltic states for depth of anti-Russiansentiment

The NW Caucasian peoples in their entirety view the end of the 19th centuryCaucasian War (21 May 1864) as the start of their greatest tragedy (namely theExile 5 Russian maxadzhirstvo) which saw all the Ubykhs plus most of theCircassians and Abkhazians forced into exile in Ottoman lands (stretching frommodern-day Kosova mainly through Turkey into Palestine Jordan Syria andIraq) Only rump Circassian and Abkhazian populations remained in the NWCaucasian homeland giving rise to their demographic weakness there today asattested by the above tables The presence predominantly in Turkey of a hugeN(W) Caucasian diaspora is an important but largely neglected factor in theappreciation of regional affairs However in the case of the Abkhaziansdetermined efforts this century by (Menshevik Bolshevik or post-Sovietnationalist) Tbilisi andor the Kremlin to implement a vicious assimilatoryprocess of lsquokartvelianizationrsquo culminating in the GeorgianndashAbkhazian war of1992ndash93 have opened up a major fault-line between the NW and the SCaucasian peoples

The Karachay-Balkars share with the Meskh(et)ians (usually referred tosomewhat tendentiously albeit by the preference of many of them themselvesas the lsquoMeskhetian Turksrsquo) the appalling fate of having been deported to CentralAsia during the war (1943ndash44) While the Karachay-Balkars were allowed toreturn home from the late 1950s Georgia has never sanctioned the return of the

466


by now perhaps more than 400000 Meskh(et)ians to the south-western region ofMeskheti on the GeorgianndashTurkish border The righting of this historicalinjustice seems to be uppermost in the minds of these peoples today

Circassians

The NW Caucasus has been the quietest and thus the least reported of theCaucasian regions since the disintegration of the USSR This does not mean thatit is free from problems

However understandable from a narrow linguistic point of view the creationof two literary Circassian languages may have been (although the inconsistenciesbetween the two in representing identical sounds introduced into the Cyrillic-based orthographies devised in the late 1930s provide ammunition to charges oflsquodivide and rulersquo) the splitting of the Circassian population into three adminis-trative units combined with an attempt to force a union in two of them betweenCircassians on one hand and a similarly divided Karachay-Balkar populationon the other hand looks suspiciously like a strategy to hinder rather than helpconsolidation of ethnic self-awareness among both communities The collapse ofthe Soviet Union has allowed calls from both the native and the Turkic groupsfor corrective action to become more vocal

Prior to 1991 it was not easy for westerners to gain access to the NWCaucasus Those who managed it legally tended to be members of the Circassiandiaspora visiting their relatives from homes in the NearMiddle East Alreadyunder perestroika some repatriation to Maykop and Nalrsquochik from the diasporawas not only taking place but actually supported by the Soviet governmentinterested no doubt in both the knowledge of the non-Soviet world andespecially the business acumen such immigrants might bring with them Hopesinvested in this process have been set back rst by the drastic decline in livingstandards across the whole former Soviet space (especially severe in thenon-Russian periphery) that followed the fragmentation of the USSR andsecondly by worries about personal safety given both the Kremlinrsquos readiness toresort to such brutal force during the Chechen war (1994ndash96) and the prevailinglawlessness that seems particularly acute in districts close to Chechenia So farreturnees have numbered around 500 to Kabardino-Balkaria 300 to Adygheaand a mere few dozen to Karachay-Cherkessia However the Circassian intelli-gentsia both at home and abroad has remained active in pushing for Circassianunity founding in 1991 the International Circassian Association Their rstpresident was the late Kabardian Yuri Kalmykov who was for a time Ministerof Justice in Yeltsinrsquos cabinet Although required to sign the decree sanctioningmilitary activity in Chechenia (only afterwards was discussion of the movepermitted) he objected resigned and died of a heart attack not long thereafterThe current president is Boris Akbashev and the Association held its IVthCongress in Krasnodar 25ndash27 June 1998 The Associationrsquos commitment to theAbkhazians is indicated by the stated intention to hold the Vth Congress inSukhum in 2000 Present in Krasnodar were not only the Presidents of Adyghea

467

GEORGE HEWITT

and Kabardino-Balkaria (Adyghe Aslan Dzharimov and Kabardian ValerijKokov respectively) but also the head of the Krasnodar administration NikolaiKondratenko the Prime Minister of Karachay-Cherkessia Anatolij Ozov andthe Vice-President of Abkhazia Valerij Arshba Also in attendance was theMufti of Adyghea and Krasnodar Region Askarbi Hachimizor although itshould be stressed that Islam is of little relevance among NW Caucasians(including the Abkhazians)mdashat least among those resident in the Caucasusitself The title lsquoAllahrsquos Mountainsrsquo (IB Tauris 1998) chosen for his recentbook on the Chechen war and the N Caucasus in general by freelance journalistSebastian Smith is misleading in this regard

The Circassians like the Abkhazians are members of the UnrepresentedNations and Peoplesrsquo Organization (UNPO The Hague) Thanks to UNPOrsquoshelp Circassians have twice participated in conferences of the UN WorkingCommittee for Human Rights and its sub-committee for National MinoritiesrsquoRights in Geneva where on 28 May 1998 T Kazanokov was able to raise thequestion about the restoration of both the common name for the Circassianethnos and Circassian surnames for all compatriots resident in Syria and Turkeyhe also requested the right to return to their motherland for all Circassianexpatriates Prince Ali ben Al-Hussein of Jordan where Circassians form thepalace guard has taken a keen interest of late in promotion of Circassian rightshaving visited the Circassian regions of the N Caucasus in October journeyingfrom Amman entirely on horseback and by boat to retrace the route to Jordantaken by the early migrantsmdashhis mother was Circassian A Caucasian CulturalSociety was founded in Turkey where estimates place the number of Circassiansanywhere between 2 and 4 million in 1967 Turkey has witnessed in recentyears a proliferation of publications dealing with cultural and linguistic problemsof (especially NW) Caucasian peoples A Circassian internet site has beenorganized by a member of the small community in Israel It can be expected thatpressure for measures to guarantee the survival of the Circassian language (underthreat of demise both among the diaspora and even in the Caucasian homeland)will continue to come from committed individuals and there is surely a worthyrole to be played here by Western organizations such as UNESCO or the EUrsquoscultural fundmdashrecall the much trickier project overseen by the Council ofEurope (representative Alison Cardwell) to prepare a common (objective)textbook to be used in the schools of Georgia Armenia and Azerbaijan Indeedan approach to such funders is likely to be made in the near future from TheCherkess Fund the brainchild of a Kabardian businessman and writer fromJordan The Fund is minded to investigate the possibilities of creating a commonform of written Circassian not only to bridge the divide caused in the Caucasusby the existence of the two literary languages but to produce a unifying bondbetween all the Circassian peoples and in order to make such a form ofCircassian attractive to Circassians unfamiliar with the Cyrillic script the Romanscript is envisaged as serving as base for the orthography

The leaders of Adyghea and Kabardino-Balkaria are former communistswho have managed to retain powermdashVladimir Khubiev head of Karachay-

468


Cherkessia and an ethnic karachay was actually appointed by Yeltsin and hasbeen the head man in the district for almost 20 years It is unlikely given theirclose ties to Moscow that any will alter past practice by initiating undertakingsopenly unfavourable to the interests of Moscow particularly at a time whenordinary people across their territories are faced with serious daily dif cultiesjust to feed themselves and their families and while whatever nancial resourcesexist emanate from Moscow However it is signi cant that Dzharimov (b1939and an economist by training) supported by leaders of other N Caucasianregions secured (3 July 1998) rati cation by the Russian government for aresolution on the urgent repatriation of Circassians from Kosova Also on 1August the rst contingent (numbering 72) arrived in Adyghea heralding the endof 135 years of exile for this small community Barriers to cooperation betweenthe three Circassian N Caucasian areas have been removed and the teaching ofand in Circassian for the rst four school-grades has been reintroduced (at leastin Kabardino-Balkaria)

The negligible increases revealed by a comparison of the gures for theRussian populations in our three NW Caucasian territories between 1979 and1989 suggests that some out-migration must have been taking place even beforenationalism became such a signi cant force both in Russia and parts of theCaucasus One can imagine that as a result of reaction to rst the roughexpulsion from post-Soviet Moscow of lsquothose of Caucasian nationalityrsquo whowere thought to be exploiting lsquoRussianrsquo () citizens in the capitalrsquos markets andsecondly the slaughter of largely civilians in the Chechen war Russian out-migration will have accelerated over recent yearsmdashindeed the Kabardians arealmost certainly now an absolute majority in Kabardino-Balkaria

Karachays and Balkars who can afford it often send their children to Turkeyfor education Both peoples enthusiastically participate in pan-Turkic culturalevents

Kabardino-Balkaria

Home to Europersquos highest mountain (Elbrus) the economy is predominantlyfarming-based although mountain health resorts also contribute Despite per-iodic calls for secession the Balkars like their close relatives to the west theKarachays are predominantly interested in gaining compensation from Moscowfor the Central Asian exile (to which they were subjected during the war alongwith a variety of other peoples from the Caucasus and nearby regions such asthe Crimean Tatars the Volga Germans and before the war the Koreans) andput all real efforts into securing this Increased educational places for Balkars areone sign of their achievements in this regard The republicrsquos premier is a Balkar

In spite of the greater opportunities to develop the local languages even in theKabardian-language papers Circassian Word and Circassian Council only cul-tural matters are addressed Political discourse is dead This is partly in reactionto the Chechen war and partly because of the prevailing wholesale corruptionThe long-serving head of state V Kokov was re-elected in 1997 largely on the

469

GEORGE HEWITT

principle lsquohang on to nurse for fear of something worsersquo he is adviser to thechairman of Russiarsquos Federation Council Nalrsquochikrsquos petrol-stations are underKokovrsquos control and his 22-year-old son heads the main factory there On 19April 1998 Pravda published an article on the extent of corruption naming theheads of various ministries and the fabulous amounts spent on their privatehomes There is widespread and growing indignation at the way those able to doso have been unrestrainedly feathering their own nests since the restraints thatkept such activity to generally acceptable levels during the Soviet period havewithered Kokov is said to run the republic like a police state RussondashKabardianrelations continue to be good and the government does not wish to upset its cosyrelations with Moscow on which the economy is wholly dependent Howeveras was anticipated less money for the provinces was forthcoming following theappointment of Sukhum-born S Kirienko as Russiarsquos short-term Prime MinisterAt that time Russian Minister of Economics Y Urinson arranged for theupgrading of a mountain plant in the republic to extract molybdenum andtungsten for processing in Nalrsquochik but since then as the world plainly saw inAugust the entire economy has sharply deteriorated so that the situation istoday no better under Premier Yevgenij Primakov Market-trading (eg inNalrsquochik Baksan Majskij) is one of the few ways ordinary people can makemoney

The local parliament naturally approved the law for repatriation (sc of thepredominantly Turkey-based diaspora) proposed by the Circassian nationalmovement Most high-quality goods available in Nalrsquochik are in fact producedby diaspora members including a jeweller belonging to Kabardians from theUnited States One prominent Turkish Kabardian built no fewer than 86 mills inthe region and our has even been used for bribery but 2 million dollars owedto the mill-builder remain unpaid Kokov has introduced a law to encourageforeign investment such that joint enterprises with a minimum investment of50000 dollars will be free of tax for 4 years However the danger of lossesthrough corruption hangs over any business venture As an indication thatMoscow does not oppose horizontal agreements within the Russian FederationKabardino-Balkaria signed a bilateral agreement with Astrakhan on 2 April1998

Local Imam Pshikhachev was re-elected but with little enthusiasm for himpersonally Even monies collected for the building of a mosque disappeared froma Circassian-owned bank Islam is no great force and the possibility of movesto spread Wahabism is viewed with real apprehension as is the intention ofthose such as Chechen warrior Shamil Basaev to turn the whole N Caucasusinto a bastion of Islam

Karachay-Cherkessia

In addition to the Turkic-speaking Karachays and the East Circassian Cherkessthe region is home to the AbaziniansAbazas whose ancestors rst migratedfrom Abkhazia across the Klukhor Pass around AD 1400 the nal wave

470


following around AD 1700 Abazinians tend to be tri-lingual in Abaza Kabardianand Russian

The Dombai Teberda and Arkhyz valleys boast famous skiing and healthresorts Radio- and optical telescopes are located in the Zelenchuk region andin Soviet times a large cement-works along with machine-building electricalfuel chemical and metal-working plants operated in lowland-parts Very fewreports emanate from the region Vladimir Khubiev serves as parliamentarychairman There are moves to create a presidency and elections are due in April1999 The 66-year-old unelected effective holder of the post Vladimir Khubievis unpopular as a result of the deterioration in the regionrsquos economy duringrecent years One favoured candidate is a leading Circassian 51-year-oldStanislav Derev a businessman mayor of the capital Cherkessk and founder ofMercury the most active production company in the area However anothername currently touted as a serious contender is 57-year-old General VladimirSemenov whose father is Russian and whose mother is KarachaymdashRussians arereckoned to represent 40 of the regionsrsquos population while the Karachay form39

Cherkessk was the venue in November 1997 for the rst session of theinter-republican legislative body that followed the earlier signing in Nalrsquochik ofan agreement between the three Circassian areas to create an InterparliamentaryCouncil

Adyghea

The majority of the West Circassian population that lives on here as arump-reminder of the original native inhabitants speak either the Bzhedugh orthe Temirgoi dialect (base of literary Adyghe)mdashthere are also a few AbadzekhsAbzakhs In terms of demographic balance the Adyghesrsquo position vis-a-vis theRussians closely parallels that obtaining in Abkhazia prior to August 1992 forthe Abkhazians vis-a-vis the Kartvelians Again very little news reaches theoutside world

The republicrsquos major industry is food and food-processing the output ofwhich increased by 125 between 1994 and 1995 On the 250000 hectares ofarable land (incorporating 90 collective farms and 1400 private farms) growgrain sun owers sugar-beet vegetables and the worldrsquos northernmost tea meatand milk are also produced Horse-breeding a national pride for generations isbeing revived Various joint ventures (involving inter alia UK and Frenchcompanies) were functioning in 1996 at which time hope was expressed forinvestment in the Maykop Centre for Production of High Quality Insulin

An exchange in the 1997 press suggests the presence of potentially explosivetensions between Circassians and Russians Megapolis-Kontinent (No 14 1997)published an article entitled lsquoRussian House triumph of national idiocyrsquo(reprinted in the Adyghe Khabze Tradition (No 6 1997)) in which Russiannationalist Sergej Pletnev used arguments reminiscent of those marshalled byGeorgian nationalists in the late 1980s against the Abkhaziansrsquo (178 of

471

GEORGE HEWITT

Abkhaziarsquos population) enjoyment of national rights in their ancestral home-landmdashAdyghes as only a 22 minority but with permanent rights to elect anethnic Circassian to Adyghearsquos presidency were creating he argued a racist(namely anti-Russian) enclave with separatist tendencies that threatened theintegrity of the Krasnodar Region A response lsquoThe idiocy of chauvinistaccountingrsquo by the director of the Adyghe State Museum Almir (Alec) Abregov(Abredzh) was appended to the reprint Among the arguments adduced was theobservation that Russia as heir to the Tsarist state that was responsible for thedecimation of the Circassian population should not only facilitate the repatri-ation of ethnic Circassians wishing to return to the homeland but also hand backlands appropriated from their ancestors and do everything necessary to compen-sate for this near-genocide

A road through the mountains from Maykop to the Black Sea was started inSoviet times but halted at nearly its highest point when it was realized that thiswould link Circassians in Adyghea directly with the ca 10000 ShapsughCircassians remaining around Tuapsemdashconsequently communication requires atrip that takes one north around the mountains and then south again

The Confederation of Caucasian (Mountain) Peoples

An Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus uniting peoplesrsquo representa-tives rather than regional governments was instituted in Abkhaziarsquos capital inAugust 1989 under the leadership of Kabardian academic Yuri Shanibov chie yat the time to provide support for the Abkhazians who were coming under evergreater threat from rampant Georgian nationalism It associated some 16 ethnicgroups from Abkhazia through the N Caucasus to Daghestan (including both Nand S Ossetians but not any of the Turkic peoples) Transformed into theConfederation in November 1991 it was to provide crucial psychological andmaterial support (thanks largely to Chechen and Circassian volunteers andweaponry provided from the N Caucasus) to the Abkhazians thereby helpingthem to win the war with Georgia (1992ndash93)mdashto avoid being stopped at theRusso-Abkhazian border ghters crossed the mountains into Abkhazia aroundWathara from where they were bussed down to the coast along the track builtby German prisoners of war in World War II The Confederation was also veryactive (prior to the war in Abkhazia) in arbitrating between N Ossetians andIngush and between Akin Chechens and Daghestanis Shanibov eventuallydeclared openly that the ultimate goal was to reestablish N Caucasian indepen-dence However the Russian onslaught in Chechenia buttressed by the sort ofdangerous (and factually ridiculous) self-deception exempli ed by Russianacademic D Danilovrsquos assertion that lsquothe Northern Caucasus is actually aninalienable part of Russian territoryrsquo (p 137 of Coppieters 1996) not supris-ingly saw its activities diminish By no means as prominent as before 1994 itstill exists (minus the designation lsquoMountainrsquo) until recently under the chair-manship of the Chechen Yusup Soslambekov At the beginning of April 1998Acting Interior Minister of Russia S Stepashin accused it of seeking to found

472


a N Caucasian Islamic state although Acting Deputy Premier R Abdulatipov(a Daghestani) preferred to downplay the Islamic threat According to itsfounding constitution Islam has no relevance to it Georgians view it withsuspicion undoubtedly because of its role in the Abkhazian war During theintense ghting in Abkhaziarsquos Gal District at the end of May 1998 Confeder-ation representatives in Sukhum were reported to have offered military assist-ance although this was turned down by the Abkhazian government who wishedto demonstrate to their opponents as well as to the Russians that they were quitecapable of defending themselves

However appealing the idea of an independently constituted confederation ofall the (North) Caucasian peoples might be to some in the longer term in theshortermedium term some form of growing consolidation between the NWCaucasians (Abkhaz-Abazinians and Circassians) is much more realistic Thiswould be motivated by their close genetic and historical ties as well as by ashared determination that their languages and cultures must not suffer the samefate that overtook their confreres the Ubykhs While there is respect for thedetermination and ghting skills of the Chechens there is great apprehensionabout the socio-religious tendencies manifesting themselves in both post-warChechenia and neighbouring Daghestan In Chechenia for its part a certainresentment is reported over the lack of support they were given during their warwith Russia by fellow N Caucasians especially over the lack of any signi cantpresence of ghters from Abkhazia in return for the support Abkhazia receivedfrom Chechens in their earlier war with Georgiamdashthe fact that Abkhaziacontinuedcontinues to face a serious threat from Georgia is ignored indeed itsborder with Russia was actually closed when the Chechen war began Whathappens in the 2001 discussions between Chechenia and Russia over Cheche-niarsquos future political status will be watched with keen interest throughout theregion

However the N Caucasus was not as exposed to foreign in uence during theSoviet period as Georgia (including Abkhazia) and N Caucasians often tend toproject the reservation frequently associated with mountain people so that manyin Abkhazia often assert that thinking in the N Caucasus seems some 20 yearsbehind that to the south of the mountains This gap plus that existing betweenhome-populations and the diaspora communities (particularly those in Turkey)arising out of different educational systems and inculcated ideologies will taketime and effort to overcome

Abkhazia

At the same time during the late Gorbachev period as various autonomies withinthe Russian Federation were declaring lsquosovereigntyrsquo over their territories andbeing awarded republican (but not independent) status Abkhazia (and SOssetia) decided to follow suitmdashAdyghea for instance gained republican statusin 1991 This move by Abkhazia as well as its post-Gorbachev restitution of its1925 Constitution which de ned Abkhaziarsquos status as a union-republic with

473

GEORGE HEWITT

special treaty-ties to Georgia from 16 December 1921 to February 1931 (whenit was further downgraded to a mere autonomous republic within Georgiamdashfrom 4 March 1921 to 16 December 1921 Abkhazia had existed brie y as afully independent union-republic recognized by Georgia on 21 May1) haveboth regularly been misinterpreted in the West as declarations of indepen-dencemdashjust one example of the gross misunderstandings of the Abkhazianquestion that have distorted western perceptions The fact that on theAbkhazian side no formal declaration of independence has ever been madeand that on the Georgian side there has been no formal annulment (ashappened in the case of S Ossetia) of Abkhaziarsquos autonomous status has beensuggested as a basis on which to build a future modus vivendi along the linesof the proposal for a federative relationship drawn up by lawyer TrsquoarasShamba (older brother of Abkhaziarsquos current Foreign Minister Sergei) Thiswas published in the paper Abkhazija (29 Junendash4 July 1992 for the translationsee Hewitt 1993)mdashTrsquoaras Shamba is also president of the International Associ-ation of the Abkhazian-Abaza Nation founded in October 1993 The fact thatthe Abkhazian authorities were apparently still willing to consider negotiatingsuch a relationship even after the wholly unnecessary suffering in icted uponthem during the Georgian occupation and subsequent events should have beenseen as a meaningful concession on their part but they have been given notthe slightest credit for this stance by the international community It has beenmooted that they might have been mistaken not to have declared full indepen-dence immediately after expelling the invader at the end of September 1993for this it is argued would have strengthened their position once negotiationshad started Equally if one recalls that a contingent of Abkhazian ghtersfollowed the rout of their opponents as far as the Mingrelian capital ofZugdidi some feel that they should have held on to this territory withinGeorgia proper and used it as a bargaining chip to guarantee the security oftheir border with Georgia along the R Ingur However there are indicationsthat the government of Abkhazia currently sees Abkhazia as nothing other thana fully independent country Sergei Shamba was quite adamant on this point inthe summer of 1998 asseverating that although Article 1 of the Constitution(rati ed on 26 November 1994) refrains from using the term lsquoindependentrsquo (cflsquoThe Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny) shall be a sovereign democratic statebased on lawrsquo) Article 3 (namely lsquoThe Republic of Abkhazia as a subject ofinternational law shall enter treaty-relations with other statesrsquo ) effectivelymakes Abkhazia independent of Georgiamdashinterestingly when Tatarstan signedits special agreement with the Russian Federation on 15 February 1994 itagreed to drop the words lsquosovereign statersquo and lsquosubject of international lawrsquofrom its constitution (Segodnja 16 February 1994 quoted by Siren 1998 p151) This interpretation of Abkhaziarsquos present status has been con rmed byboth President Vladislav Ardzinba (b1945) and Speaker of ParliamentSokrsquoratrsquo Adzhindzhal (Dzhindzholia) a former teacher Exasperation isuniversal throughout Abkhazia at Georgiarsquos unwillingness to abandon thedisingenuousness and double-dealing with which the Abkhazians assert they

474


(unlike their neighboursrsquo new western friends) have sadly become only toofamiliar

The two main problems to be resolved before any nal solution can beachieved in the GeorgianndashAbkhazian con ict remain (i) the political status ofAbkhazia vis-a-vis Georgia (which has been the very root of the problem sincethe latest are-up in the late 1980s of this post-1931 festering wound) and (ii)the question of the refugees

Some fundamental clari cations must rst be made with reference to therefugees During the war many Abkhazians were forced to go into exile eitherin safe(r) areas of Abkhazia or in Russia Since non-Kartvelians in general (andnot just Abkhazians) were targets for the nationalist rabble that constituted theGeorgian lsquotroopsrsquo the same could be said of Abkhaziarsquos large Armenian andRussian communities The Greek government sent a ship to evacuate ethnicGreeks (see Clogg 1994) and some Jews were taken out to Israel Whenreferences are made to the refugees from Abkhazia by Georgians or in inter-national documents all the above categories are conveniently forgotten Al-though references to the (remaining) refugees almost without exception namethem lsquoethnic Georgiansrsquo there are actually (sc according to our de nition)relatively few actual Georgians among themmdashthe vast majority are Mingrelianswhile both Svans (who rst appeared in signi cant numbers in Abkhazia whenthey took over mountain areas abandoned by the native population post-1864)and Georgians proper gure to a relatively small degree Since by no meansevery last Kartvelian left Abkhazia in the hasty ight that occurred before thearrival of the Abkhazian ghters and their allies (see Overeem 1995) it followsthat (a) no act of ethnic cleansing (a charge commonly levelled at the Abkhazi-ans) can have taken place for this implies a deliberate act implemented by forceor the threat thereof and (b) nowhere near the gure regularly quoted byGeorgian sources and their sympathizers for these refugees (namely 250000300000 or even 350000) can possibly re ect realitymdashmore recently Reuters hasbegun to use the much saner gure of 160000 and the current population ofAbkhazia is estimated at around 300000 Despite signi cant Kartvelian pres-ences (sc following the importations by Mingrelian Lavrentrsquoi Beria born nearSukhum in the 1930ndash40s) in Ochamchira District Gulripsh District Sukhumand around Gagra the bulk of the compact Kartvelian population of Abkhaziaresided in the southernmost Gal District There is an argument over the originalethnicity of those settled in this region (see D Mullerrsquos paper in Hewitt 1998)but there is no doubt that it was occupied almost exclusively by Mingrelianspeakers at the start of the war However since most of these sympathized notwith Shevardnadze but with his ousted predecessor the late Mingrelian ZviadGamsakhurdia Gal Mingrelians remained largely aloof from the war and theincidents of human rights abuses committed by the occupying forces (aschronicled in the 221-page Belaja Kniga Abxazii 1992ndash1993) for both thesereasons the Abkhazian authorities wereare happy for Gal Mingrelians to returnThis means that the further imputation of ethnic cleansing supposedly carried outagainst this population in the ghting of May 1998 is questionable (although it

475

GEORGE HEWITT

cannot be denied that some reprobate elements seem to have accompanied thosehastening to defend their homeland in the hope of booty That so many homeswere torched in the villages where the battle was at its most intense wasexplained by an international military observer who did not wish to beidenti ed when he noted that the best way to root out a dug-in enemy (as indeedthe in ltrators were) is to deprive him of the cover provided by buildingsmdashhadthere been no in ltration there would have been no second wave of refugees

The agreement signed between Abkhazia and Georgia in Moscow on 4 April1994 in the presence of the UN Secretary General and leading western ambas-sadors was followed by the signing of a quadripartite understanding on the returnof the refugees The latter gave the Abkhazians the right to vet applications fromprospective returnees and to reject those known to have acted militarily orcriminally against Abkhazia Accused of deliberate slowness in the vettingprocess the Abkhazians pointed out that even those whose applications wereapproved regularly failed to turn up at the Ingur bridge at the appointed timewhich demonstrated a lack of real eagerness to return At the same time nothingwas done then or has been done since to prevent unof cial returnees to the GalDistrict Georgia has from the start been clamouring for an instant mass returnof the exiles which is and will remain both unacceptable to the Abkhazians andbasically unrealisticmdasha UNHCR spokesman at a conference in June 1998 hasbeen quoted as saying that any large-scale return of refugees is out of thequestion until something is done about the catastrophic state of the Abkhazianeconomy an elementary lesson apparently quite lost on those forever clamouringabout the need to arrange an immediate mass return Given the hatreds sown bythe war (buttressing the mutual animosities that antedated hostilities) if such amass return were to occur the scale of bloodshed would simply be unimagin-ablemdashthere is a huge amount of weaponry in the hands of the ordinarypopulation of Abkhazia although (rather uniquely in such situations) one sees noovert evidence of this on the streets of towns or villages and everyone knowsperfectly well how to use the hardwaremdashlawlessness became quite widespreadin the early post-war period but has since been contained Given the enforcedisolation of Abkhazia most talk even 5ndash6 years on centres around the events ofthe war reinforcing the feelings of enmity towards former neighbours whosepresence will simply not be tolerated on Abkhazian soil for the foreseeablefuture This is an undeniable fact of life that has to be recognized by inter-national players and impressed by them upon the Georgian authorities for thekindest thing to do for the Kartvelian exiles is to implement a resettlementprogramme for them in Georgia predominantly in Mingrelia (assuming there isspace available there)mdashindeed this measure should have been undertaken yearsago The acknowledged out ow of population from Georgia especially strongamong non-Kartvelians (such as the Russians) since 1991 surely means thatthere is plenty of room to accommodate those displaced from either Abkhazia orS Ossetia if only the Georgian government were to apply itself to the problemOf course traditionally Georgians have not been noted for magnanimity towardstheir Mingrelian cousins and as long as they can use the (in ated numbers of)

476


refugees to attract more aid from the international community they will not beinclined to effect appropriate humane measures

As a mark of the Abkhaziansrsquo genuine wish to do something positive forthe Gal Mingrelians one can mention the institution in the summer of 1995of an intermittently published newspaper Gal2 which in addition to articlesin Russian and Abkhaz also included material in Mingrelian the rst timethat Mingrelian has been used for the bene t of ordinary speakers since 1938when the language was effectively banned as a literary language in Georgiamdashapart from the occasional scholarly publication for linguists or folklorists itis only post-Soviet private publishing houses that have started to print theoccasional work in Mingrelian for the Mingrelian man in the street Theexistence of an albeit part-Mingrelian publication on the Abkhazian side ofthe border reportedly aroused great interest among certain sectors of theMingrelian population in Mingrelia itself Sadly Gal has not appeared since1997 although Ardzinba agreed in September 1998 that such a publication isof crucial importance for keeping Gal residents informed of what Sukhum istrying to do to secure their well-being Personal disagreements between theGal Districtrsquos head of administration Ruslan Kishmaria and the editor ofGal Nugzar Salaqrsquoaia a Gal Abkhazian thoroughly and impressively com-mitted to improving the self-awareness and thus self- respect of AbkhaziarsquosMingrelians made it dif cult for Ardzinba to resolve mattersmdashperhaps thesolution will be to appoint a new editor Salaqrsquoaia and Ardzinba have bothrecognized that more should have been done through the media in general tomake the Gal residents better aware of the facts behind the GeorgianndashAbkhazian con ict

The 4 April 1994 Agreement itself which allows Abkhazia to have its ownconstitution ag and state emblem is seen by the Abkhazians as the onlydocument of real importance that has been signed by both sides since the end ofthe warmdashCIS (essentially Russian) peacekeepers were subsequently introducedto patrol a Security Zone along the R Ingur UNOMIGrsquos contingent was alsoincreased Since the Abkhazians regard it as granting to them fully equal statusto the Georgians they absolutely refuse to accept what they see as attempts byGeorgia supported as usual by the international community (especially the muchreviled grouping known as the Friends of [the UN Secretary Generalrsquos Initiativefor] Georgia) to backtrack on the commitments it there undertook Conse-quently the Abkhazians have stated ever since then that the best the Georgianscan hope to achieve is a union-state consisting of Abkhazia and Georgia asabsolutely equal partnersmdashwhat any settlement along these lines would mean forfuture constitutional arrangements between S Ossetia and Tbilisi on the onehand and Adzharia and Tbilisi on the other is unclear A S Ossetian delegationin London in November 1997 stated that leaders in Abkhazia S Ossetia andNagorno Karabagh were in touch with one another and that none would sign any nal agreement independently of the others for fear that should any one of themsign greater concessions might be made to the others shortly thereaftermdashthosewho constantly not only allude to the better relations existing between S Ossetia

477

GEORGE HEWITT

and Tbilisi but also suggest that the S Ossetian problem might thus be closer toa nal settlement seem unaware of this factor

The Abkhazians resent and utterly reject the accusation frequently madeagainst them that they are the ones responsible for lack of progress in negotia-tions with Georgia With regard to this Sergei Shamba began an interview in thesummer of 1998 by speaking of what had taken place one year earlierSubsequently I translated the details from an information sheet issued by theAbkhazian Foreign Ministry and I now quote the relevant passage

On 13 June 1997 the Sides began discussion of a new draft-Protocol proposed by themediator the Russian Federation Article 2 of this Protocol pertaining to the mutualrelations of Georgia and Abkhazia was based on agreements achieved earlier in particularon provisions in the 4 April 1994 Declaration and re ects the limit of the compromise towhich the Abkhazian side is ready to proceed This document was agreed by the Sides inthe presence of the Foreign Ministers of Abkhazia and Georgia through the mediation ofthe First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation At the concluding stage of thediscussion-process the Russian Federationrsquos Foreign Minister and the President of theRepublic of Abkhazia were both involved

After reaching agreement on all clauses of the Protocol late at night those present notedthe successful completion of their work and xed the 18 June 1997 as the date for signingthe Protocol However the Georgian side once again declined to sign it seeking to alter thewhole document Then on 19 June 1997 the Republic of Abkhaziarsquos Minister of ForeignAffairs wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia setting out the alterations to theProtocolrsquos clauses which the Abkhazian side was again ready to accept In fact theAbkhazian side accepted the introduction of amendments to 7 out of the 9 clauses

Consequent upon this on 14 August 1997 at the initiative of the Russian FederationrsquosMinister of Foreign Affairs there took place in Tbilisi a meeting between the presidents ofGeorgia and Abkhazia A joint Declaration was announced in accordance with which theSides committed themselves anew to refrain from the use of force or the threat to use itagainst each other and declared their readiness to settle all disputed questions exclusivelyby peaceful means This declaration lowered the acuteness in the tension in mutual relationsbetween the Sides Following the presidential meeting there took place visits of Georgianand Abkhazian governmental delegations alternating between Sukhum and Tbilisi theoutcome of which was the creation of a joint commission for deciding practical questions

Activation of the bilateral dialogue gave grounds to hope for achieving progress in thetalksrsquo process However the September round which took place in Sukhum again failedto reconcile the positions of the Sides It should be noted that this round was conducted inthe presence of the UN Secretary Generalrsquos special representative and the First DeputyForeign Minister of the Russian Federation the changes introduced into the Protocol aswell as the Attachment to it pertaining to the question of the return of the refugees andcomposed with regard to the amendments of the Georgian side were discussed Signing ofthe discussed document would have enabled the sides to proceed to the nal stage of awide-ranging settlement However the uncompromising nature of the Georgian sidersquosposition yet again caused the signing to be postponed

Those convinced by the Georgian line about Russian involvement in Abkhaziaspeak of the unreliability of Russian support They suggest that after Shevard-nadze was forced to seek protection from the threat of Gamsakhurdiarsquos advance

478


on Georgiarsquos second city (Kutaisi) in the wake of the Abkhazian victory in 1993by taking Georgia into the CIS Russia dropped Abkhazia and invested greatereffort into building its relation with Tbilisi Such people further argue that Russiaremains in control of events in Abkhazia ever ready to lsquoplay the Abkhaziancardrsquo in order to keep Georgia under control The question for those advocatingthis argument to answer is lsquoHow differently should the Abkhazians haveactedbe acting given the very real dangers posed to them by the chauvinismwhipped up by the unof cial leaders like Gamsakhurdia and his fellow Mingre-lians the late Merab Krsquoostrsquoava and the late Gia Chrsquoantrsquouria or by a host ofacademics primarily historians and linguists whose venomous outpouringsagainst the Abkhazians and other non-Kartvelian minorities have largely deter-mined Georgiarsquos ethnic policy ever sincersquo There is evidence to suggest thatYeltsin knew in advance of Shevardnadzersquos plan to invade Abkhazia on 14August 1992 and gave approval by silence following the start of the military(mis)adventure Russiarsquos Foreign Minister at the time of the war was AndrejKozyrev a protege of Shevardnadze and no friend of Abkhazia Towards the endof the war Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev proposed to introducetroops into Sukhum to keep the rival forces apart This would have effectivelypartitioned Abkhazia which was not in the interests of the Abkhazians How-ever it was not they but Shevardnadze who rejected the offer clearing the wayfor the imminent Georgian defeat The attitude of the Kremlin authoritiesthroughout has hardly been characterizable as pro-Abkhazian Whatever supportfrom Russia(ns) that Abkhazia has enjoyed has come from sources outside theexecutive voluntary helpers or weaponry (widely available from a dispirited andpoorly paid Russian military) purchased (unlike that accruing to the Georgiansthanks to the division of spoils on the breakup of the USSR) for cashmdashonRussian military involvement during the war see Billingsleyrsquos level-headedarticles in either The Harriman Review Vol 10 No 4 19983 or Hewitt (1998)Many in the Duma are sympathetic to Abkhaziarsquos plight crystallizing generalsentiment throughout Russia which is well aware of what it means to be the buttof Georgian antipathy

The Abkhazian border with Russia over the R Psou was closed for males of ghting age from the commencement of the Chechen war in 1994 At the timeAbkhazians were able to use Abkhazian passports to travel by boat to Trebizondfrom where freighters also delivered goods into Abkhaziamdashestimates put thenumber of ethnic Abkhazians living in Turkey at around half a millionHowever the passenger boat was stopped thanks to Georgian pressure in late1995 Also a total blockade of Abkhazia was imposed in January 1996 after theCIS summit assented to Shevardnadzersquos demands When pressed to lift theblockade as a goodwill gesture towards Abkhazia the of cial Georgian responseis that there are so many leaks that Abkhazia is effectively free from restrictionsalready It is true that goods (including petrolmdashoften watered-down withdamaging consequences for carburettors) still enter the port of Sukhum fromTurkey and that some trade is carried on (thanks to bribery) over the PsouHowever this is just about managing to keep Abkhazia a oat The blockade is

479

GEORGE HEWITT

biting and many people are faced with tremendous hardship What goods dopenetrate from abroad are priced beyond the means of most potential purchasersAbkhazia is (unof cially) part of the rouble-zone refusing to have anything todo with the Georgian lari so that the dire straits in which the Russian economynow nds itself are necessarily ampli ed here Little work is available andwages are naturally insuf cient to cater for the needs of the wage-earner RedCross parcels distributed quarterly are keenly awaited by recipients such aspensioners

The situation is particularly bleak in the Ochamchira District which is wherethe bulk of the actual ghting occurred and thus the physical damage here is byfar the worst in the republic There is no point listing here the nature and extentof investment required to put Abkhazia back on its feet for the 107-page UnitedNations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia produced as part of the UNDevelopment Programme in March 1998 has already carried this out mostef ciently and impressively regrettably (and scandalously) it has had restricteddistribution and so many are unaware of the desperate state in which the country nds itselfmdashone particularly alarming observation concerned the very realdanger of contamination to Sukhumrsquos water supply with all the implications thatwould have for the health of the capitalrsquos citizenry What I can do is highlightsome examples of the plight of the country on the basis of some personalobservations from the summer of 1998

Schooling is notionally free but nobody pays the teachers and so parents ofschoolchildren have to provide cash payments themselves Some parents areunable to do this or sometimes even to buy shoes and clothing for theirchildren In such cases the children simply receive no schooling Since there isoften no prospect of paid employment for those completing their education thereis a danger that lack of incentives will result in an apathy towards studySpecialist treatment and medicines are in short supply for those includingchildren who were affected psychologically by the warmdashthere have beeninstances of mentally unbalanced children untreated for years killing theirparents Importation of even medical and humanitarian supplies is only possiblewith the express permission of those imposing the blockade Assuming thatyoung males manage to cross the border into Russia the danger is that theymight never return Since Abkhazian passports are unrecognized outside Russiano one attempting to leave Russia with such documents is permitted to do soAcquisition of Russian documents is if at all possible very costly (and often notentirely legal) and while Georgian passports would be readily provided at theconsulate in Sochi the psychology of most Abkhazians is such that they atlyrefuse even to consider this option for travel outside Russia Almost 3 years ofblockade have tended to instil something of a siege mentalitymdashafter telephonelinks were rerouted via Tbilisi they were cut for about 12 months resentmentis strong against all those who are deemed responsible for in icting continuingpunishment on a country that was the victim of aggression from a neighbour andnot the instigator of military action as it is painted and since Georgia is seento enjoy such uncritical backing from the West such feelings could easily be

480


transformed into anti-westernism There is not one scintilla of evidence that theblockade could be leading to a greater willingness to accede to Georgiandemandsmdashon the contrary positions are noticeably hardening

Abkhaziarsquos President Vladislav Ardzinba is by training a specialist in Hittitewho worked at Moscowrsquos Oriental Institute where Yevgenij Primakov was thedirectormdashthe two men apparently enjoy a good relationship whereas the presentRussian premier who was brought up in Tbilisi had a Georgian as his rst wifeand speaks Georgian (in addition to Arabic and English) is reported not to beso close to Shevardnadze Ardzinba rst came to prominence when he waschosen to head the Abkhazian Research Institute (deliberately burned to theground along with its priceless archive in the autumn of 1992) on the death ofAcademician Prof G Dzidzaria during the late-1980s It was then natural thathe should have been selected as a delegate to Gorbachevrsquos Congress of PeoplersquosDeputies His defence of the rights of minorities (not just within Georgia)delivered in eloquent Russian attracted wide praise and attentionmdashhe is oftencharged in ritualistic Georgian abuse with ignorance of Abkhaz but this is justone of the deliberate untruths spread about Abkhazia and leading Abkhaziansmdashand it was directly as a consequence of this that he became ever more involvedin politics he still nominally heads the Research Institute should he wish to giveup his political role or be voted out of of ce His popularity among ordinarycitizens is undeniable There are however those prepared to voice somediscontent about the direction in which the country seems to be being takenmdashthere is regrettably and for whatever reason not much open discussion of thesematters in the press or on TV with which many people express open dissatis-faction for its lack of interesting content and in such a climate rumours ratherthan facts shape (distort) peoplersquos judgements Questions are asked about howmembers of the Ardzinba lsquoclanrsquo seem to succeed in making money and why suchleaders as Krsquoonstrsquoantrsquoin Ozgan from Gudauta or Sergei Bagapsh from Ocham-chira (both former district Party bosses) are still in prominent governmentalpositions Sergei Shamba like Ardzinba himself is an academic speci cally anarchaeligologist and a former leader of the Abkhazian National Forum (AydgylaralsquoUnityrsquo)mdashhe successfully defended his doctoral thesis in Yerevan capital ofArmenia in November 1998 much to the annoyance of Tbilisi from where thepresident of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Albertrsquo Tavkhelidze wrote invain to his Armenian colleagues to urge cancellation of the procedure Howevereven such critics as there are do not advocate closer rapprochement withTbilisimdashon the contrary they are more radical than Ardzinba has shown himselfvis-a-vis relations not only with Georgia but even with Russia

In response Ardzinba argues that Abkhaziarsquos position is still so dangerous andthe community so small that even a hint at division of opinion might lead todisaster if cunningly exploited by Georgia He himself is con dent that he cansteer a middle course between Russia and Tbilisi playing one off against theother while cultivating ever better relationships with western visitors The earlystance of western states (notably America) that demanded no contact of any sortwith the Abkhazian authorities or those seen as their representatives has

481

GEORGE HEWITT

mercifully passed and good relations seem to have been established with suchambassadors as those from the United Kingdom Germany and FrancemdashformerFrench ambassador Bernard Fassierrsquos appointment to Minsk was judged to be asuitable reward for his entirely unhelpful and unsympathetic attitude toAbkhaziarsquos problems Unfortunately Ardzinba well-read and self-con dent isnot well versed in western ways (might a possible explanation be sought here forgovernmental reluctance to break with Soviet norms and promote greaterfreedom in the media) and on a purely personal level some visitors nd hisstyle somewhat didactic and peremptory However Abkhazia cannot be equatedwith its leadermdashthat said no one should doubt that for the time being Ardzinbacertainly articulates the aspirations of most of his countrymen It remains to beseen if he will contest the 1999 presidential elections or who will be the othercandidate(s) Even if Ardzinba can given time achieve the aims stated abovethe question is whether he and Abkhazia have that time There are so manyimponderables will the blockade continue or will pressure within Russia(whether we are talking of the N Caucasus or sympathizers within Russiaproper) cause a shift of opinion inclining the government to be more favourableto Abkhazia Will Georgia continue along the same pointless path or willfoolhardy radicals such as Tamaz Nadareishvili or Boris Krsquoakrsquoubava persuadeanother futile but bloody resort to arms Might the West achieve a much-to-be-desired greater neutrality in this matter and nally exercise some in uence forthe bene t of everyone in the region The Abkhazians like the Chechens havedemonstrated that they do not respond to pressure especially when it is quitewithout justi cation

In the meantime the speed and effectiveness of the Abkhazian response to thedanger posed in late May 1998 when as widely anticipated the Georgian sidetried to seize control of the Gal District in celebration of their Independence Day(26 May) in icted (in Ardzinbarsquos words) an even more crushing defeat on theaggressor than that of the 1992ndash93 war As for the question of Georgiangovernmental complicity in the long campaign of incursions into the Gal Districtand terrorist activity conducted there by such partisan groups as the WhiteLegion and Forest Brothers one reads the following in the latest AmnestyInternational report on Georgia (August 1998)

The Abkhazian side has claimed frequently and bitterly that guerrilla forces operating inAbkhazia have the support of the Georgian government which does not act with suf cientrigour to clamp down on the activity of those who launch their attacks from Georgiancontrolled territory Russian of cials from the CIS peacekeeping forces also target ofguerrilla activity have made similar claims For example after ve soldiers from the CISpeacekeeping force were killed by a mine on 12 July this year the Russian ForeignMinistry issued a statement two days later condemning the killings as an act of terrorismby Georgian guerrillas and said that lsquoany attempts to present the White Legion or the ForestBrothers as organisations that have nothing to do with the Georgian special services are anattempt to ignore realityrsquo

The Georgian Interior and Security Ministries issued a statement on 16 July rejecting theaccusations and the Georgian government has persistently denied having any links with or

482


support nancial or otherwise to the armed groups To Amnesty Internationalrsquos knowl-edge however no criminal proceedings have been initiated against any suspects althoughsome have a high pro le locally or in the press In the western town of Zugdidi forexample close to the Inguri river border men said to be local commanders of the WhiteLegion reportedly move openly around the town and surrounding areas with the tacitapproval of the local authorities Members of armed groups are said to have given pressinterviews during the May ghting in Gal and the leader of the White Legion ZurabSamushia is regularly quoted by domestic and international media He was for exampleinterviewed and photographed by the British daily the Guardian in June while he wasrecuperating in Tbilisi from a leg wound sustained in the ghting In that interview ZurabSamushia claimed that the White Legion had lsquoexecutedrsquo 47 members of the the CISpeacekeeping forces

There have also been claims that the Georgian security ministry has been involved intraining members of armed groups including in sophisticated sabotage techniques InNovember 1996 for example UNOMIG observers discovered a paramilitary group ofsome 50 men lsquomany of whom were internally displaced persons with connections toknown insurgent groupsrsquo in a camp in the restricted weapons zone on the Georgian sideof the Inguri river UNOMIG was initially refused access to investigate but was eventuallyallowed to visit the unit after making protests The Georgian security service informedUNOMIG that the unit lsquohad been formed to control amnestied criminal elements who hadcommitted crimes in Abkhaziarsquo and who were at that time living in the Zugdidi area Theyhad been given the choice of either joining the unit or being expelled

Some individual Georgians in authority have also been linked with the guerrilla forcesThe White Legion for example is said to have links with Tamaz Nadareishvili thechairman of the Abkhazian parliament in exile

Of cial Georgian association with these terrorist groups is so well known inthe region that Georgian journalist Akrsquoakrsquoi Mikadze writing in Vremja (7 of 3June 1998) boldly stated

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security actively support thepartisan groupings operating in the Gal Region For example ghters from the divisioncalled lsquoForest Brothersrsquo of cially receive wages of 200 lari (about 150 dollars) whilst theircommander criminal authority David Shengelia receives 300 lari (about 220 dollars) Thedivision supposedly numbers about 700 for whom wages and allowances are set aside fromthe budget whereas as con rmed by our interviewer you canrsquot in actual fact locate even100 individual members

Shevardnadze employed his well-known wiles not only to outmanœuvre thewarlords (Dzhaba Ioseliani and sometime Defence Minister Trsquoengiz Krsquoitrsquoovani)who ousted his predecessor and invited him himself back to Georgia but actuallyto imprison themmdashIoselianirsquos trial for alleged involvement in the August 1995supposed assassination-attempt on Shevardnadze (in which as luck() wouldhave it no one was seriously injured) nished in November 1998 with an11-year sentence This forces one to conclude that if he really wanted terrorismin Abkhazia launched from Georgian terrritory to cease he could bring thisabout At the end of October 1998 Germany was expected to supply Georgiawith a coastal patrol-boat receiving a further one from Turkeymdashsimilar aid has

483

GEORGE HEWITT

also been proffered by America Additionally America is reported to begranting $52 million for the purchase of helicopters the rst three of whichare to be delivered in 1999 The US State Department is also said to havesigned a joint agreement for the serial production at the Kutaisi aircraft worksof a Mercury airplane to be purchased by the Frontier Defence Forces In thelight of relations with Abkhazia these developments must be seen asworrying especially when coupled with the military training promised byvarious western governments The paper Droni reported in its issue ofNovember 14ndash17 1998 that since 1995 Georgia has incurred a debt to Russiatoo of $22 million for the training of Georgian of cers

Instead of being gaoled for incitement to racial hatred TamazNadareishvili served for some years after his exile from Abkhazia as adeputy-premier of Georgia and continues to enjoy VIP treatment as he travelsthe world to press his argument for a military solution to the con ict Therecan be no doubt however that Abkhazians are still more than able to counteropen challenges The attitude found throughout the Abkhazian population isone of implacable de ancemdashAbkhazia is their land and regardless of thepressures to which they are subjected they seem quite prepared to die in itsdefence

Lifting of the blockade viable settlement with Georgia and suitableinvestment could relatively quickly restore Abkhazia with its favourableclimate and natural resources to its former position as a Black Sea rivieraTourism is always likely to be the main source of income for Abkhaziaboasts most of the main resorts on the Caucasian Black Sea coastmdashundoubt-edly one compelling reason for Georgia to try to keep control over potentiallylucrative pro ts Sukhumrsquos airport at Dranda is acknowledged to be the bestin the Caucasus having been upgraded to international standards before theSoviet collapse although it has lain idle since 1993 A 1995 feasibility studyinto the possible development of Skurcha to the north of Ochamchirareportedly suggested it had the potential to outrank the more southern portsof Poti (Mingrelia) and Batumi (Adzharia) All this would facilitate thecreation in Abkhazia of a free economic zone as envisaged by the govern-ment Maize tea citrus fruits grapes nuts bay-leaves timber (chestnut oakpine box beech walnut yew bamboo) and tobacco are the chief agriculturalcrops although many mines still make access to the elds in some areas (egaround Krsquoyndygh) impossible Water resources (mineral and plain) arevirtually limitless There are deposits of coal marble granite barite lime-stone and oil with potential for extracting copper arsenic zinc gold andsilver Discussions have taken place on the construction of a subsidiarypipeline (NovorossijskndashAbkhaziandashPotindashCeyhan) that would associateAbkhazia (jointly with Russia and Georgia) with the bene ts (assuming thatany actually accrue) owing from the export of Caspian oil However thiseconomic lsquocarrotrsquo as it is seen in Tbilisi is alone unlikely to entice Abkhaziaback into Georgiarsquos fold

484


Georgia

Logic would seem to demand that by any standards Georgia should be at thevery heart of Caucasian affairs and represent the fulcrum for the Caucasianpolicy of foreign statesmdashit has road- and rail-links to Russia Armenia andAzerbaijan two (non-rail) frontier-crossings with Turkey outlets to the BlackSea and its capital lies at the very centre of Transcaucasia The country in itsinternationally recognized borders consists of 70000 km2 (Abkhazia encom-passes 8700 km2 5 125 of the territory of lsquoGeorgiarsquo) with natural resourcescomprising tourist attractions agricultural land (800000 hectares of arable land322000 with permanent crops growing grapes tea citrus fruits bay leavesvegetables) forests mines (manganese copper iron zinc oil mercury andbarium) wines and mineral waters plus such industries as metal processingelectrical equipment chemicals food textiles iron-casting steel(-piping) pro-duction of vehicles and synthetic yarn additionally the Georgians are the largestof the indigenous Caucasian peoples and unlike any of the others can boast 15centuries of literary tradition Of 9308 small enterprises 917 had beenprivatized by October 1996 although there is no private ownership of land Thelatest gures for GDP growth-rate of 11 (1996ndash97) make Georgia the fastest-growing economy in the region The amount of investment largely connectedwith the TRACECA (Transport Corridor EuropendashCaucasusndashAsia) project as forinstance detailed in Georgia 1998 Country Pro le suggests that the West hasalready started to treat Georgia in this favourable way complementing thepoliticalndashdiplomatic gains achieved by Georgia in the wake of Shevardnadzersquosreturn (March 1992)

Russia remains Georgiarsquos main trading partner in terms of both imports andexportsmdashGeorgiarsquos total exports in 1996 were US$1992 million vs totalimports of US$6472 million Speci cally in 1996 Georgia exported US$569million-worth of primarily food coloured metal products and printed materialsrepresenting a 285 share of exports to Russia this was followed by US$259million-worth of primarily electrical energy ammonium nitrate and colouredmetals to Turkey ( 5 13 share of exports) This compared with US$1273million-worth of imports of primarily natural gas food and electrical energyfrom Russia ( 5 194 share of imports) this was followed by US$804million-worth of imports of primarily food and electrical appliances from Turkey( 5 142 share of imports) Britain represented the highest-ranking westerncountry to receive Georgian exports (mainly benzine and related products andnitrates) whilst the United States was the highest-ranking western country fromwhich imports were received (donations and food each representing aboutone-third of the US$483 million-worth of imports) The trade-turnover withRussia for the rst 10 months of 1998 was $145 million representing 147 ofGeorgiarsquos total foreign trade which is 23 higher than the volume of trade withGeorgiarsquos second partner Turkey

Of course the underlying situation is distinctly less healthy After thedisintegration of the USSR and because of internal con icts the Georgian

485

GEORGE HEWITT

economy simply collapsedmdashused to lsquoplaying the systemrsquo in Soviet times whichpartly explained the relative wealth that was always so conspicuous in Georgiain comparison with the other republics Georgians no longer had a system otherthan their own to exploit and Georgia actually became almost the poorest of theformer union-republics Only in 1995 did matters start to improve this was theyear when the new currency the lari was introduced under the control of theWorld Bank and IMF at a rate of 112 to the US dollar (September 1995) inOctober 1998 it fell to 143 sliding still further to 2105 to the dollar at the startof December This means that recent annual improvements have been set againsta remarkably low base-point As of 1 October 1996 705 production-plants(one-third of the total) stood idle Annual income in 1996 was just $665 Only116000 tourists visited Georgia in 1996 and although 1997 saw a threefoldincrease the totals are well below gures for the 1970s when Georgia (princi-pally the Black Sea coastal resorts) attracted Russians and denizens of othersocialist countries in droves There is a huge trade de cit which means thatGeorgia cannot meet its debts particularly those owed to TurkmenistanRussiafor fuel supplies In consequence there are critical problems still with electricitysupply and heating in winter Russiarsquos own economic crisis cannot but have aserious (and deleterious) effect on Georgiarsquos economic condition which again isstarting to be described as catastrophic On 14 November 1998 the FinanceMinister Mikhail Chrsquokrsquouaseli resigned over government disunity and failure toimplement his lsquopre-crisisrsquo plan This resignation highlights the voluminous andgrowing budget de cit Before he resigned the Minister claimed that budgetrevenues do not exceed 100000 lari ($75000) daily whereas expenditure standsat 2 million lari Minister of State (former ambassador to Moscow) VazhaLortkipanidze added at the same meeting that the budget shortfall for the rst 10months of 1998 was 160 million lari ($120 million) Thus the governmentcurrently owes $9 million in wages to public sector employees and no less than$35 million in pensionsmdashthe current living-wage in Georgia amounts to 855 lari(ca $57) per month whereas 70 of Tbilisi residents are estimated to fall shortof this income As the Radio Free EuropeRadio Liberty Caucasus Report Vol138 (18 November 1998) goes on to say

This shortfall is rst and foremost the result of chronic tax-evasion which has provenresistant both to changes in the tax-code proposed by Chrsquokrsquouaseli several months ago andwarnings from the IMF In its annual review of Georgiarsquos economy in July the IMF hadadvised the countryrsquos leadership to mobilise additional tax-revenues and expressed satisfac-tion with the governmentrsquos professed commitment to eliminate all outstanding paymentsrsquoarrears by the end of this yearmdashan objective which now looks utopian An IMF mission iscurrently in Tbilisi and will make recommendations to the Fundrsquos directors on disburse-ment of the nal tranche (worth $38ndash40 million) of an ESAF loan

Col Avtandil Davitadze head of the nancial department at the Ministry ofDefence has stated that the Finance Ministry will shortly owe the DefenceMinistry more than 22 million lari (ca $145 million) The 1997 defence budgettotalled 79 million lari (ca $527 million) reducing in 1998 to 74 million lari

486


(ca $50 million) while the draft budget suggests that it may shrink in 1999 to65 million lari (ca $43 million) At the same time the size of the army isexpected to fall from 30000 to 25000

This state of affairs would be bad enough in a stable country with agovernment commanding the con dence of its citizenry This is far from the casein Georgia

Ethno-territorial wars have left both Abkhazia and S Ossetia de factoindependent and effectively beyond the control of Tbilisi although S Ossetiahas recently been reported as being interested in joining the lari-zone Althoughno ghting has occurred in the southwestern province of Adzharia (Achrsquoara) thistoo is tightly administered by local strongman Aslan Abashidze who came topower there during the Gamsakhurdia period He enjoys excellent relations withTurkey (and indeed with the Russian troops stationed there still ) the Adzharianborder with Turkey at the village of Sarpi is said to be quite open small- tradersbene ting greatly from ows of goods in both directions whereas Adzhariarsquosborder with Georgia proper is reported to be rather more strictly controlledRelations between Abashidze and Shevardnadze are decidedly frosty the formernot having set foot in Tbilisi since Shevardnadzersquos return even though he is amember of the central parliament The daily English-language digest of Geor-gian newspapers provided by the Caucasian Institute for Peace Democracy andDevelopment (CIPDD) included the following for 27 October 1998 from anarticle that day by Mikhail Esartia in Resonance (294)

Aslan Abashidze the leader of Adzharia told journalists yesterday that before themutiny [by Akrsquoakrsquoi Eliava and his army group from Senakrsquoi Mingrelia] in WesternGeorgia Temur Shashiashvili the governor of the Imereti region had offered the Presidentto order the army to decimate the population of the Mingrelia province [NB this incidentalhint at the nature of the tension between Mingrelia and Georgia proper for which videinframdashauthor] Abashidze promised to make public the record of this conversation tappedin his words by a high-ranking of cial in Tbilisi For his part Mr Shashiashvili claimedAbashidzersquos accusations to be a delirium The lsquoAdzharian lionrsquo he said seemed upset bythe defeat of the mutineers in Western Georgia and by the af liation of Imereti to theAssembly of European RegionsmdashAdzharia has been the only Georgian member of thisorganisation so far and Abashidze used this fact to increase his popularity If Abashidzeindeed provides the record the newspaper argues he is going to fall into a trap as theAdzharian leader and his team may be sued for unsanctioned tapping of the presidentrsquostalks

In the 15 November 1998 elections a huge 94 of the electorate in Adzhariareportedly cast their vote awarding all 30 seats on the Batumi council toAbashidzersquos party (The Union of Georgian Traditionalists) The 33-year-old sonof literary critic Guram Sharadze a prominent member of Abashidzersquos party inTbilisi was found shot dead in his Tbilisi at some months ago the authoritiesclaim it was suicide though the victimrsquos father is convinced it was a politicalmurder The nature of future relations between Adzharia and Tbilisi whenAbashidze (or for that matter Shevardnadze) is no longer in power is an

487

GEORGE HEWITT

imponderable question Though Abashidze cannot really be styled a separatistnevertheless the autonomous status Adzharia has enjoyed has fostered a range ofvested interests and the population is predominantly Muslim something whichGamsakhurdia once threatened to lsquorectifyrsquo thereby creating here a strongreaction of resentment towards the central authorities

The remote Dzhavakheti region (capital 5 Akhalkalaki) somewhat to the eastof Adzharia is populated almost exclusively by ethnic Armeniansmdashin betweenAdzharia and Dzhavakheti lies Meskheti (capital 5 Akhaltsikhe) this wholeborder-zone was contested between Georgians and Armenians during the periodof their independence after the Russian Revolution (speci cally in 1920) andGeorgia seems to have gained control thanks to a secret agreement with thewithdrawing Turks who given the then catastrophic relations between Turksand the surviving Armenians naturally did not want to see Armenians strength-ening their hold over any neighbouring territory Relations with Tbilisi havebeen strained (to say the least) since Gamsakhurdia attempted to imposeGeorgian prefects in this district Reports also indicate that Shevardnadzersquoscollusion with the Georgian Orthodox Church over its moves to seize control oflocal Armenian churches and graveyards has hardly endeared the DzhavakhetianArmenians to the present Georgian regimemdashthe Georgian Church took over theCatholic cathedral in the Adzharian capital some time ago It is Armenian TVbroadcasts that are watched in Dzhavakheti while the ying of Armenian agshas also been reported and many local Armenians are part of the soldiery at theRussian base in Akhalkalaki In early autumn 1998 Georgian troops were forcedby (armed) local Armenians to withdraw from the area because no priornoti cation had been given of the planned manoeuvres as is required by anunderstanding with Tbilisi In recent months there have been reports thatAbashidze has been trying to effect a union of some sort between Adzharia andMeskhet-Dzhavakheti to widen his base of appeal possibly with a view to hiscontesting the 1999 presidential elections Given a free choice (that is to say inconditions where such a decision would not lead to war between Armenia andGeorgia as it surely would at the moment) would the population of Dzhavakhetichoose to remain part of Georgia In issue 1 of volume 3 of Caucasian RegionalStudies (1998) Voitsekh Guretski devoted an article to lsquoThe question ofJavakhetirsquo He points out that the current administrative region known asSamtskhe-Dzhavakheti incorporates historical Dzhavakheti where Armeniansrepresent over 90 (some estimates go as high as 97) of the population andbetween Dzhavakheti and Adzharia Meskheti where Armenians form aboutone-third of the total population Georgian is not widely known while localGeorgians tend also to speak Armenian In 1988 a national-popular movementDzhavakhk was formed its goal from the beginning lsquowas at least to obtainautonomy if not to unite the region with Armeniarsquo The movement feels that thecreation of the current administrative unit was aimed at weakening Armenianpredominance within Dzhavakheti alone The most radical members ofDzhavakhk are in uenced by the Dashnak(tsutyun) Party (of cially non-existentin Georgia) which demands union with Armenia However David Rstakyan

488


one of Dzhavakhkrsquos leaders denies that such is the present aim of themovement which he declares to be solely concerned with securing Armeniancultural rights in this part of Georgia (what of their rights elsewhere such as inthe capital Tbilisi)mdashthere has been an out ow of population from this ratherinclement locality in search of economic betterment On the other hand Guretskistresses that lsquoignoring the demands of the Armenians by the Georgian authoritiescan lead to civil disobediencersquo If Georgia is reconstructed on federal lines itremains to be seen what special arrangements would be offered to Armenians inthese south-western areas Interestingly Armenia itself opposes any form ofseparatism for Dzhavakheti including the splitting-off of Dzhavakheti from theSamtskhe-Dzhavakheti administrative unit because the current arrangementgives Armenia direct access to Adzharia with which it enjoys good relationsand thus to the Black Sea via Batumi Erevan cannot afford to have open con ictwith another neighbour given its relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey

In the DmanisindashBolnisindashMarneuli area further to the east live the majority ofGeorgiarsquos Azerbaijani population which is not noted for its knowledge ofGeorgian or its affection for Georgian culture in general Pipelines to Armeniapass through this area and have often been blown up Much of the anti-minorityrhetoric in early 1989 was directed against the local Azerbaijanis and their highbirthrate (perceived to be at levels dangerous for Kartvelian majority-status) andthere were in fact deaths in ethnic clashes here in early July 1989 although thesewere not widely reported abroad as events in Abkhazia quickly overshadowedthem

There is far from universal harmony in some other Kartvelian provinces tooSvaneti(a) the northwestern mountain fastness has like Chechenia been re-ported to be a conduit for the drug trade Mingrelia the atland in thewesternmost part of Georgia proper is however perhaps Shevardnadzersquos maintrouble-spot Although most ethnic Svans and Mingrelians (plus any Laz thatlive in Georgia) might be reasonably content to be classi ed as lsquoGeorgiansrsquo (egfor census purposes) the ethnic component in the GamsakhurdiandashShevardnadzesplit should not be overlooked although Georgians themselves argue that this isnothing more than a political problem Just as even those Georgians who knowof and accept the crimes committed by Stalin cannot entirely escape a sneakingregard for the local lad christened Iosep Dzhughashvili who achieved suchworld-prominence so it cannot be accidental that the main stronghold ofZviadism remains his native region of Mingrelia (although Zviad Gamsakhurdialike his famous novelist father Krsquoonstrsquoantrsquoine and other Mingrelian intellectualsof the inter-war years was never a Mingrelian nationalist)mdashGamsakhurdiarsquoswidow Manana Archvadze underlined this emphatic local support for her latehusband during the rst week of January 1999 when she repeated the (widelybelieved) accusation that Shevardnadze was directly responsible for Zviadrsquosdeath After Gamsakhurdia was overthrown the Mkhedrioni (Cavalry) ghtersunder Dzhaba Ioseliani went on a murderous rampage in various parts ofMingrelia to root out his supportersmdashIoselianirsquos boasting on Georgian TV ofwhat he and his followers had done in Tsrsquoalendzhikha was nauseating in the

489

GEORGE HEWITT

extreme This aspect of Georgiarsquos civil war of early 1992 was largely ignored orpoorly reported in the West perhaps because the ethnic dimension was notproperly appreciated but there remains throughout Mingrelia an understandablystrong legacy of bitterness towards Shevardnadze and his Tbilisi clique Despitethe predictable knee-jerk reaction of blaming lsquosome hostile foreign powerrsquo (scRussia) for the assassination attempt on Shevardnadze in Tbilisi in February1998 it eventually transpired that the plotters were Zviadists led by MingrelianGocha Esebua (to be shot while attending a funeral in April 1998) In likefashion the October mutiny in western Georgia ( rst reported to be threateningthe capture of Georgiarsquos second city Kutaisi but then apparently and somewhatsuspiciously zzling out in a couple of days) was master-minded not by thatsame lsquohostile foreign powerrsquo but by a Mingrelian army commander based inSenakrsquoi Akrsquoakrsquoi Eliava (a one-time supporter of Gamsakhurdia and still atlarge) One of the reasons that the Mingrelian language has since the mid-1930sbeen suppressed (in the sense of not being awarded literary status and thus nevertaught in schools or used for publishing of materials for the bene t of ordinaryMingrelians) is the fear that encouraging language rights would inevitably leadto political separatismmdashthis was openly admitted in the introduction to aprivately published collection of Mingrelian colloquial expressions by AnaChikvanaia in 1998 Any Mingrelian who dared in the closing days of commu-nism to speak out in defence of their Mingrelian (as opposed to the imposedGeorgian) identity came in for violent contumely (not to say in some casesactual physical assault) Consequently one does not really know the extent ofany such desires among the Mingrelian community whose numbers anecdotallyare put at anywhere between 500000 and 1500000mdasheven the likely gure of750000 represents a sizeable proportion of Georgiarsquos 1989 701 Kartvelianpopulation It would not however be an unreasonable supposition that theongoing dissatisfaction with Tbilisirsquos attitude to this region might easily lead toincreasing manifestations of ethnic self-assertion In fact I was told in Abkhaziain the summer of 1998 by an Abkhazian Mingrelian that there are indeedMingrelians over the border in Mingrelia proper who are interested not only inreviving the fortunes of the Mingrelian language (after the lead taken inAbkhazia with the Gal newspaper) but possibly even in acting on the politicalfront to raise Mingreliarsquos pro le (although not necessarily in the sense of aimingat total independence)4 Personally I feel that however paradoxical it mightappear at rst glance such a move would actually be in the interests of Georgiaas a whole (and certainly in the interests of GeorgianndashAbkhazian relations inparticular) for the country seems to me to be a paradigm case for the creationof a federal structuremdashMingrelia Svaneti(a) Adzharia Dzhavakheti the Azer-baijani area Imereti Kartli and Krsquoakheti(a) as an absolute minimum should beconstituent but separate parts of such a reconstituted state The establishment ofa Mingrelian buffer-zone between Abkhazia (whether totally independent afellow-member of the CIS or part of such a newly con gured Georgian(con)federation) and Georgia proper would be the best means of relievingGeorgianndashAbkhazian tensions for the Abkhazians have never regarded Mingre-

490


lians as Georgians and state openly that they can more easily build relations withthem than the more distant (and nationalistically inclined) Georgians If assome suggest (real) federalism is now acceptable to many politicians in Tbilisiperhaps herein lies the seed of hope for Georgiarsquos future and any attendantprosperity

Corruption widespread throughout the USSR was endemic in Georgia andone receives the impression that little has changed just as the introduction of aveneer of democracy to appeal to western observers has been said by somenative commentators to have done little to alter underlying realities The yearlyUS State Department reports on Georgia consistently refer to transgressions ofjudicial processmdashI quote from the latest (January 1998) issue

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the courts were often in uenced by pressurefrom the executive branch This pattern continues with judicial authorities frequentlydeferring to the executive branch particularly at lower levels of the court systemInvestigators routinely plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct violationof the Constitution Judges are generally reluctant to exclude evidence obtained illegallyover the objection of the Procuracy Local human rights observers also report widespreadjudicial incompetence and corruption including the payment of bribes to prosecutors andjudges which also leads to denial of justice

In addition the mistreatment of prisoners is regularly chronicled in AmnestyInternationalrsquos reports on Georgia and in response to Georgiarsquos request to begranted full membership of the Council of Europe short-sightedly approved bythe delegation despatched to assess the country in the middle of 1998 the BritishHelsinki Human Rights Group stressed the following in their letter to theCouncil on 24 April 1998

Other reports issued in recent months by both non-governmental organizations andof cial bodies have we note been strikingly severe in their criticism of the Georgianauthorities concerning that area that has long been of concern to us namely civil libertiesand human rights See for example US State Department report on Human RightsPractices in 1997 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1997 annual reportConclusions and Recommendations of the UN Committee Against Torture (November1996) Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee (March 1997)

Mentioning the speci c cases of Krsquoarlo Dzhichrsquoonaia Tamaz Gorelishvili andZaza Tsrsquoikrsquolauri the Group conclude

We can only share Georgiarsquos aspirations based on its history and culture to join thefamily of European nations But due to its extremely grave recent human rights record wehold serious reservations about its present eligibility for membership of the Council ofEurope

As the trial of Mkhedrioni leader Dzhaba Ioseliani was coming to a close atthe start of November 1998 the paper Sakartvelos Gazeti (149 11 November)quoted by CIPDD reported this incident

On November 10mdashPolice DaymdashTemur Mgebrishvili the commander of the special police

491

GEORGE HEWITT

force and his policemen beat Alekrsquoo Tskitrsquoishvili a reporter of the lsquoResonancersquo newspaperwho tried to enter the Supreme Court building where the Mkhedrioni trial was coming toan end The reporter was conveyed to the Mtatsrsquominda district police station and detainedfor three hours while Mr Mgebrishvili beat him in the presence of duty of cers Thatevening the NGO lsquoLiberty Institutersquo and journalists launched a protest action demandingthe dismissal of Mgebrishvili

On the same day Resonance itself (309) reported (cited from CIPDDrsquos dailydigest) lsquoWhile the police suppression of the mass-media is strengthening dailyShevardnadze congratulates the police calling them a pillar of the state helliprsquo

There is widespread disillusion with the Tbilisi leadership and political classin general as the poor turnout in the 15 November 1998 local electionsindicated with the (suspicious) exception of Adzharia barely more than theone-third of the electorate required by law to legitimize the ballot bothered tovote with just 20 (the largest share) of Tbilisi voters casting their ballot infavour of Shevardnadzersquos Citizensrsquo Union of Georgia party The newspaper Alia(19ndash20 November 1998) as quoted by CIPDD gave the preliminary results ofthe local elections for the provinces (ie outside Tbilisi) according to the CentralElection Commission as Citizensrsquo Union of Georgia 585 mandates Union forDemocratic Revival 238 National Democratic Party 183 Labour Party 167Socialist Party 141 Popular Party 95 Union of Georgian Traditionalists 61Lemi 39 Bloc lsquoNational Accordrsquo 38 Sportive Georgia 30 Bloc lsquoGeorgiamdashMerab Krsquoostrsquoava Societyrsquo 17 Greens 6 Freedom Party 1 The nal results areexpected on 5 December The newspaper 7 Days (27ndash29 November 1998) statedthat the Central Election Commission by a vote of 15 to 9 (with two membersabsent) had approved the following division of the 55 places on the Tbilisi CityCouncil Citizensrsquo Union of Georgia 20 Labour Party 12 Socialist Party 9Union for Democratic Revival 4 Popular Party 4 National Democratic Party 3Union of Georgian Traditionalists 3

As the paper Droni (132 17ndash18 November) as cited by CIPDD put it lsquoThelocal elections in Georgia marked the end of the national movementrsquo arguingthat the people demonstrated their indifference towards the pro-western policy ofthe ruling party which made them abandon the national (nationalist) ideals forwhich they had fought Of course the citizeny was misguided in the rst placeto have allowed itself to be taken down the road of nationalism by its mixtureof incompetent andor devious leaders over recent years While similar chargesmay be levelled against the Kremlin at least Russia can take some pride in thepresence of intellectuals such as Sergei Kovalev and the late GalinaStarovoitova prepared to speak out against the policies of the government (egover the Chechen war)mdashGeorgiarsquos shame is that far from anyone of in uenceraising a voice in protest at the dangers of treading the nationalist path theintelligentsia either said nothing or eagerly jumped aboard the nationalistbandwagon themselves The country is palpably in desperate need of a bettereducational system less insular and more objective (namely non-nationalist) inits outlook Perhaps there will be little fundamental improvement in Georgian

492


society until this is introduced and a ruling elite reared on Soviet ideology fadesinto history

Many (most) western leaders andor their advisers evidently think highly ofthe current Georgian leader and deem him at least to be worthy of support Thosewho think this way should not examine merely Shevardnadzersquos term as SovietForeign Minister in isolation but consider the entirety of his career includingboth the preceding 13 years he spent in charge of Georgia and the 6 years sincehis return they would also do well to resist being bowled over by Georgianbonhomie and hospitality (no greater incidentally than that found amongCaucasian people in general) and recall that even those who had the acumen tosee through that other (notorious) Georgian politician Josef Stalin found himon a personal level to be a man of supreme charm An Abkhazian politicianvisiting London in 1993 remarked that Shevardnadze was an ideal executor ofothersrsquo decisions but no man himself to lead an independent state This latterjudgement is surely borne out by the facts The only world leader to backYeltsinrsquos murderous tactics in Chechenia was quite predictably (given hispro-Kremlin orientation displayed throughout his career) Eduard ShevardnadzeAs soon as it became clear however that Russia had effectively been defeatedin that campaign the rst to welcome Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadovoutside Chechenia was hellip Eduard Shevardnadzemdashlittle wonder the sobriquetawarded to this man by his fellow-countrymen for his lack of principle duringhis tenure of of ce as Georgian Party Boss was tetri melia (White Fox)Realpolitik for Chechenia required that it achieve a means of egress that avoidedRussia and since Georgia is the only non-Russian region it borders the Chechenleadership chose to ignore the previous pro-Russian (anti-separatist) stance ofthe Georgian leadership and engineered agreement on the construction of a newroad linking Chechenia with Georgia The Chechen section of this was com-pleted quite promptly but the Georgians have havered alleging fear of a newroute for the passage of narcotics However there can be no doubt that Georgiahas totally lost any respect it might once have commanded across the whole NCaucasus because of its treatment of the Abkhazians speci cally the in ictingon them of the wholly unnecessary war of 1992ndash93 For this Shevardnadze mustshoulder the blame

How did it happen Shevardnadze had no excuses for not understanding thenature and depth of Abkhazian suspicions towards Georgians as a result of theirconstant attempts over the years to dominate Abkhazia and introduce there theGeorgian language At the time of the promulgation of the Brezhnevite consiti-tutions in the late 1970s the language issue came to the fore in a number ofSoviet regions including Georgia proper (Georgian vs Russian) and Abkhazia(Abkhaz vs Georgian) The situation within Abkhazia became extremely tenserequiring Shevardnadze as Party General Secretary to visit Sukhum and pacifylocal emotions by referring to the mistakes committed by Tbilisi during theStalinndashBeria period However not having learnt his lesson Shevardnadze facedwith ongoing rebellion among Mingreliarsquos Zviadists seems to have gambled thatperhaps the only way to win universal Kartvelian approval would be to divert

493

GEORGE HEWITT

attention from intra-Kartvelian disputes towards a common foe and the mostconvenient foe available happened to be the Abkhazians The gamble conspicu-ously failed at appalling cost to the victims of the aggression to the aggressorsthemselves as well as to the republic whose frontiers these aggressors weresupposedly protecting After the Georgian forces were expelled from AbkhaziaShevardnadzersquos bacon was pulled from the further ames ignited by Gamskhur-diarsquos sudden return to Mingrelia from Chechenia only thanks to the receipt oflsquohumanitarianrsquo Russian aid proffered after another volte-face that took Georgiainto the CISmdashGamsakhurdiarsquos revolt crumbled and he perished under mysteri-ous circumstances over the 1993ndash94 New Year

The one thing Georgia desperately needs as an absolute precondition forsecuring the desiderata common to all the states emerging from the Sovietshadow (namely peace and prosperity) is stability and the key to this isAbkhazia Georgiarsquos rail-link to Russia has been cut ever since the Abkhazianwar as the sole line runs the length of Abkhazian territorymdashthe motorway(M27) stretching alongside it is also the only highway connecting Georgia toRussia that is open all year roundmdashthe cutting of these direct permanent linksto Russia was perhaps even more damaging to Armenia (in its conditions ofblockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan) than to Georgia itself Closure of thenorthern railway has necessitated the wasteful building in the renovated port ofPoti of a special rail-dock so that wagons can be rolled onto ships for onwardtransmission across the Black Sea to such ports as Odessa In fact apart fromthe oil terminal at Supsa in Shevardnadzersquos home region of Guria Poti (currentcapacity 5ndash6 million tons per year) is the only port under the direct control ofTbilisi and Poti is in Mingrelia This is because the remaining port is Adzhariarsquoscapital Batumi (current capacity 4ndash5 million tons per year) Given the demon-stration by the Abkhazians of their superior military prowess in both the war of1992ndash93 and the large-scale skirmishes of May 1998 in Gal Poti might provean attractive and attainable target should another rash military adventure beessayed by Tbilisi or indeed should the Abkhazians nally lose forbearance inthe face of the continual terrorist attacks on their territory mounted fromneighbouring Georgia The security of Supsa a little further to the south or ofany extended pipeline from Baku via Georgia down to the southern Turkish portof Ceyhan in which Georgia is investing such great hopes must always be opento doubt if the Abkhazian question cannot be resolvedmdashrecall that there are anestimated half a million ethnic Abkhazians in Turkey

References to Abkhazia in the current Constitution of Georgia (eg lsquoArticle55 1 The Parliament of Georgia in accordance with the Parliamentary Regula-tions for the term of its authority and by secret ballot shall elect a chairman ofParliament and deputy chairmen including one deputy chairman from theAbkhazian deputation and another from the Adzharian deputation Candidatesfor the post of deputy chairmen shall be nominated by the deputations of theirrespective autonomous regionsrsquo) are utterly meaningless given the total absenceof any authority over Abkhazia wielded by Georgia Since it is the relationshipwith the Abkhazians that represents the nadir in all the relationships contracted

494


between Georgians and the non-Kartvelian minorities that constituted 299 ofSoviet Georgiarsquos 1989 population if that one could be repaired a crucialprecedent would be established for improvement all around an indispensable rst step in turning Georgia into a mature modern democracy Sadly there arestrong indications that without some external guidance (pressure) in the rightdirection this is unlikely to happen Many Georgians are pursuing today thesame anti-Abkhazian rhetoric that has become the norm since the late 1980smdashwith all the attendant dangers Even those Georgians who are prepared in privateto acknowledge frankly mistakes in recentpresent policy towards Abkhaziaoften cloak any public pronouncements in verbiage which still manages to beoffensive to the Abkhazians When challenged to explain why they do this theyregularly respond that this is essential to make their criticisms acceptable to aGeorgian audience To my mind this is a most revealing statement about thenature of Georgian society and it is something which external (and super cial)observers with no knowledge of Georgian (and thus no capability to read all thisfor themselves) cannot possibly appreciate It is regrettable that policy-makers(in the United Kingdom and United States especially for example) fail toovercome this shortcoming by tending to listen to those whose advice con rmstheir a priori pro-Georgian prejudices Successful regional policies have to takecognizance (in this of all regions) of more than the aspirations of just the titularpeoples of the internationally recognized republics

The Westrsquos role

It is time that policy towards the Caucasus and its peoples was predicated onfairness and a genuine wish to help establish there a foundation for a peacefuland prosperous future rather than on the cronyism and rigid adherence to the triteprinciple of territorial integrity that seem to have determined policy in recentyears A state remains a viable entity for only as long as it retains the globalrespect and con dence of its citizens The N Caucasus fell to Russiarsquos imperialexpansion as recently as 1864 and the central authorities whether Tsarist orSoviet have hardly gone out of their way since to earn the devotion and delityof the multiplicity of ethnic groups resident there The late Andrej Sakharovdescribed Georgia in the summer of 1989 (in lsquoOgonekrsquo) as one of the USSRrsquoslsquolittle empiresrsquo and it was a huge tragedy for the Soviet Unionrsquos minorities ingeneral that Sakharov did not live longer for he was perhaps the one gure towhom the West might have listened when the collapse of the Union brought inits train so many dangers for those not lucky enough to have been grantedadministrative frontiers that fortuitously happened to demarcate union-republics(as opposed to autonomous republics or regions) for only union-borders wereallowed by the international community to delimit the new states that were tojoin the worldrsquos family of nations Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze wererapidly appraised by lsquoexpertsrsquo in foreign ministries the world over as the type ofleader we should cultivate and support In the case of Shevardnadze this meantthat his return to his former communist efdom in March 1992 brought

495

GEORGE HEWITT

immediate diplomatic recognition and access to the lsquoclubsrsquo of the IMF WorldBank and UNmdashand all this took place despite the fact that the legitimatelyelected although increasingly unbalanced president Zviad Gamsakhurdia hadbeen ousted in a coup a few weeks earlier Instead of waiting for the newleadership to establish what credentials it could muster in the October electionsall the carrots were given away and along with them went any possibility theWest might have had of controlling the excesses of Georgiarsquos continuingnationalism Shevardnadze celebrated his countryrsquos admittance to the UnitedNations by invading Abkhazia within a matter of days Also of course to aWest already preoccupied with Yugoslavia what Tbilisi did in Abkhazia waspurely its internal affair In the case of Yeltsin blasting his opposition out of theparliament building by tanks on the streets of Moscow proved a minor incidentin comparison with the repower he employed to massacre thousands in Groznyand various Chechen villages Interviewed on British radio Douglas Hurd thenBritish Foreign Secretary could only think to say in defence of his lsquofriendrsquo thatYeltsin had defended freedom in Russia when he took to the top of a tank inAugust 1991 President Clinton was moved to offer the outrageous comparisonof the Chechen campaign with Americarsquos own civil war (evidently ignorant ofthe true comparison with Americarsquos genocidal Indian wars) This is no way forsupposedly civilized states to conduct their foreign policies for as things standwestern policy-makers share a good deal of the guilt for the shedding of bloodin the Caucasus since 1991 Indeed by continuing to offer blanket support to theTbilisi authorities when they are proven to be engaged in promoting terrorism inAbkhazia western governments cannot easily divest themselves of some re-sponsibility for the deaths and injuries resulting from these terrorist acts Oneexample of double standards that exhibits a distinct pro-Georgian bent in westernpolicy is seen in the insistence that the Abkhazians take back the bulk of theKartvelian refugees before any nancial assistance is given to repair Abkhaziarsquosshattered infrastructure (including the housing-stock) while Tbilisirsquos assertionthat the Georgian economy is in such dire straits that it cannot contemplateaccommodating the Meskh(et)ians seeking to resettle their dispossessed homesis readily approvedmdashwhen the junior British Foreign Of ce minister JoyceQuin was recently asked in a private letter why the countries constituting theFriends of the Secretary-Generalrsquos initiative for Georgia make no representationon behalf of the Meskh(et)ians her reply was that the Friends operate exclu-sively with reference to the Abkhazian problem The international communitysays nothing of reparations due to Abkhazia to cover the damage in icted on therepublic by Georgiarsquos invasion and Abkhazian insistence that any talk ofrefugees should also take account of the Abkhazian diaspora descendants ofthose coerced into exile in the 1860ndash70s is airily dismissed

Of course it would be preferable not to have to start from here but theCaucasus lies on the edge of the European continent and it behoves the EU tooffer assistance to fellow Europeans This should not take the form of profferingany further state-sanctioned bene ts (such as membership of the Council ofEurope to Georgia5) but a more balanced approach to regional problems The

496


necessity of (i) withdrawal from colonized regions (ii) correct treatment ofminorities and (iii) observance of human rights must be instilled in both Moscowand Tbilisi Training programmes and exchanges should be instituted to teachinter alia the meaning of democracy civil society and the rule of lawtechniques in nance business management and commerce con ict resolutionrace relations understanding the role of NGOs and the need for them to beindependent of without being hostile to local government(s) the absolutenecessity for education to be objective and free from national bias (cf Hewitt1998a) A whole range of practical skills not familiar to post-Soviet societiesmust be introduced and help must be made available for the creation of newschool textbooks (possibly in newly devised scripts for some of the minorlanguages) and the training of teachers All this should be available to represen-tatives from all the regions and ethnic groups discussed in this report

Proper policies towards a region can only be devised if that region isunderstood The West in my opinion has made many serious mistakes forwhich it needs to atone in the Caucasus If this project helps to lay thefoundation for the introduction of corrective measures the exercise will havebeen worthwhile

Note on Georgian government-personnel

The current Minister for State Security is Gen-Lieut Vakhtrsquoang Kutatelidze(b1955) (having replaced Gen-Lieut Dzhemal Gakhokrsquoidze who in turnreplaced Shota Krsquoviraia in 1997) on 12 May 1998 Gen-Lieut Davit Tevzadzetook over from Gen-Lieut Vardikrsquoo Nadibaidze as Minister of Defence theMinister of the Interior is Krsquoakha Targamadze Valeri Chkheidze is head ofGeorgiarsquos State Department of Frontier Defence Dzhamletrsquo Babilashvili is ChiefProsecutor Sulkhan Papashvili (b1966) has been appointed to head the StateSafeguard Service Zaza Mazmishvili has moved from being chief of thepresidentrsquos bodyguard to head the anti-terrorism centre at the State SecurityMinistry while Gia Tsatsanashvili is acting head of the presidential bodyguard

Notes and references1 For the justi cation of the treaty-relationship with Georgia offered by the contemporary leader of Abkhazia

Nestrsquoor Lakrsquooba see p 24 of the 1987 collected edition of his articles and speeches (NA Lakoba Statrsquoii Rechi Alashara Sukhum)

2 Since this move was in conformity with what I had been privately advocating for some time before thisI am reluctant to see it as a purely cynical political gesture In 1991 Abkhazia undertook to publish GedevanShanavarsquos Mingrelian verse-translation of the Georgian national epic Shota Rust(a)velirsquos lsquoThe Man in thePantherskinrsquomdashwhen Krsquoakrsquoa Zhvania had tried to have his own translation published in 1966 to coincidewith the 800th anniversary of the poet his request was denied in Tbilisi

3 Consider for example the following lsquoIt is dif cult to prove Georgian accusations of universal Russiansupport for Abkhazia On many occasions Russian actions bene ted Georgia more than Abkhaziarsquo (p 8)or later on the same page lsquoSupport for the Abkhaz seems almost random If this is the case then one canposit that other factors were critical to the failure of Georgian forces in Abkhazia Georgian accusations ofRussian intervention must be weighed against the need for assistance and a scapegoat in the face of anill-planned military adventure with a terribly unprepared militaryrsquo Suggestions that the Abkhazians musthave had Russian assistance simply because of their small numbers in comparison to the size of the force

497

GEORGE HEWITT

capable of being mustered by their Kartvelian opponents are simplistic in themselves and fail to take intoaccount such factors as (a) the support received by the Abkhazians from other non-Kartvelian minoritieswithin Abkhazia from North Caucasian volunteers from members of the diaspora communities across theNear East and (yes) from sympathetic individuals in the Russian military wishing to offer assistance tofellow-targets of Georgian sentiments of ethnic superiority (b) the military skills acquired by Abkhaziansdoing their military service while avoidance of conscription was always something of a sport among certainsectors of Georgian society during the Soviet era (c) the FACT that the Abkhazians were ghting indefence of their homeland against a clear invader (despite whatever the ass of international law may haveto say about the applicability of this designation to the Kartvelian forces operating in Abkhazia in 1992ndash93)

4 Given the reaction to those Mingrelians who spoke out in the late 1980s against being globally classi edas lsquoGeorgiansrsquo it is not surprising that this highly sensitive issue is not widely discussedmdashcertainly casualwestern visitors to the region who have no knowledge of Georgian andor Mingrelian would probably haveno inkling of any such tensions Equally given the way that Mingrelian language and culture have beendownplayed over the decades it is understandable that many Mingrelians openly cleave to Georgianlanguage culture and identity as this is the way to personal advancement Closer to home one could forexample point to those Welshmen who see no advantage in preserving Welsh language and culturepreferring to have their offspring taught only English The difference (sc with respect to the issue hereunder discussion) between the situation in Wales and Mingrelia is that whereas those who hold a contraryopinion in Wales can speak out in favour of preserving their language and culture without fear of violencefrom the English or fellow Welshmen achieving such successes as a Welsh-language TV channelMingrelian preservationists by no means enjoy parallel freedom While there is no suggestion that separatisttendencies might be about to burst forth in Mingrelia it would equally be misguided to assume that thereis no potential for such unrest in this part of the republic

5 Bearing in mind that Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe actually during its pursuit of themurderous war in Chechenia we can say that a further nail has now been hammered into the Councilrsquoscof n by the recommendation that Georgia be allowed full status from January 1999mdashone of the feebleconditions of entry to this lsquoclubrsquo is that the problem of the Meskh(et)ians be resolved within a time-frameof 3 years

BibliographyR Clogg lsquoTurmoil in the land of the Golden Fleece the Greeks and the war in Abkhaziarsquo The Greek

American 1994 26 March pp 1 8B Coppieters (ed) Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels VUB Press 1996) 205 ppP Henze lsquoThe demography of the Caucasus according to 1989 Soviet Census datarsquo Central Asian Survey

1991 Vol 10 No12 pp 47ndash170BG Hewitt lsquoAbkhazia a problem of identity and ownershiprsquo Central Asian Survey 1993 Vol 12 No 3 pp

267ndash323BG Hewitt lsquoDemographic manipulation in the Caucasus (with special reference to Georgia)rsquo Journal of

Refugee Studies 1995 Vol 8 No1 pp 48ndash74BG Hewitt lsquoYet a third consideration of ldquoVolker Sprachen und Kulturen des sudlichen Kaukasusrdquorsquo Central

Asian Survey 1995a Vol 14 No 2 pp 285ndash310BG Hewitt (ed) The Abkhazians A handbook (London Curzon Press 1998) 288 ppBG Hewitt lsquoThe role of scholars in the Abkhaziansrsquo loss of trust in the Georgians and how to remedy the

situationrsquo in Mehmet Tutuncu (ed) Caucasus war and peace The new world disorder and Caucasia(Haarlem SOTA 1998a) pp 115ndash125

BG Hewitt amp Z Khiba Abkhaz Newspaper Reader (with supplements) (Maryland Dunwoody Press 1998)xxvi 1 309 pp

P Overeem lsquoReport of a UNPO coordinated human rights mission to Abkhazia and Georgiarsquo Central AsianSurvey 1995 Vol 14 No1 pp 127ndash154

P Siren lsquoThe battle for Groznyrsquo in B Fowkes (ed) Russia and Chechnia The permanent crisis Essays onRussondashChechen relations (London Macmillan 1998) pp 87ndash169

498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT

Table 2 The Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic(capital 5 Nalrsquochik) Main population of Kabardino-Balkaria (1979 and 1989)


Whole population 666546 753531 131 100Kabardians 303604 363351 197 482Russians 234137 240721 28 319Balkars 59710 70571 182 94Ukrainians 12139 12826 57 17OssetiansOssetes 9710 9996 29 13Germans 9905 8569 2 135 11

Table 3 The Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (capital 5 Cherkessk)Main population of Karachay-Cherkessia (1979 and 1989)


Whole population 367364 414970 13 100Russians 165604 175923 62 424Karachays 109196 128746 179 31Cherkess 34430 40230 168 97Abazas 24245 27475 133 66Nogays 11872 12933 94 31Kabardians 756 1030 362] 025

Table 4 The Adyghe Autonomous Oblast (capital 5 Maykop) Main populationof Adyghea (1979 and 1989)


Whole population 404390 432046 68 100Russians 285626 293640 28 68Adyghes 86388 95439 105 221Ukrainians 12078 13755 139 32Armenians 6359 10460 645 24

Elucidation of ethno-linguistic terms

The term lsquoGeorgianrsquo has been used since ca1930 within Georgiaformer USSRas a general designation (superordinate) for speakers of all four of the SouthCaucasian (Kartvelian) languages namely Georgians proper Mingrelians Svans

464





465

GEORGE HEWITT







466



Circassians




467

GEORGE HEWITT




468





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





465

GEORGE HEWITT







466



Circassians




467

GEORGE HEWITT




468





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT







466



Circassians




467

GEORGE HEWITT




468





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)



Circassians




467

GEORGE HEWITT




468





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




468





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

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482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





Kabardino-Balkaria



469

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




Karachay-Cherkessia


470





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

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sus

( up

to19

88)





Adyghea




471

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT





472





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





Abkhazia


473

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT


474





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

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auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





475

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





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493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














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Map

2D

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ibut

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ngua

ges

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eC

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sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT



476





477

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478




479

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480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





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483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

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sus

( up

to19

88)





477

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





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GEORGE HEWITT





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483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





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493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT








478




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)




479

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




480





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





481

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT





482








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)








483

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




484


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)


Georgia




485

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




486







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)







487

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT



488





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





489

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT


490











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)











491

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT





492





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)





493

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT




494



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)



The Westrsquos role


495

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT



496










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)










497

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

GEORGE HEWITT














498


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)


499

Map

2D

istr

ibut

ion

ofla

ngua

ges

inth

eC

auca

sus

( up

to19

88)

Documents

Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians(NWCaucasus) · ABKHAZIA,GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS by now perhaps more than 400,000 Meskh(et)ians to the south-western region of Meskheti on