Abrc Remedial

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SURVEY OF 2009 – 2010 SC Decisions in REMEDIAL LAW

by: DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO

JURISDICTION Place of printing, venue in libel cases. Once again, the SC in Vicente Foz, Jr., et al. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009, the SC had the occasion to rule that venue is a matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases. In this case, the allegation in the information was that Panay News, a daily publication of considerable circulation in Iloilo City and throughout the region, only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation, but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determinate by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction. Effect if court has no jurisdiction. In Tiu v. First Plywood Corp., G.R. No. 176123; Tiu v. Timber Exports, Inc., et. al., G.R. NO. 182655, March 10, 2010, Morales, J, the SC had again ruled that—a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no right and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it an all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. (Calanza v. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 146622, April 24, 2009). Doctrine of Judicial stability. The various branches of the RTC, having as they do have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not cannot and are not permitted to intervene with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice (Javier v. CA, 467 Phil 404 (2004)). In accion publiciana, assessed value of property determines jurisdiction.

Under BP 129, as amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is determined by the assessed value of the property. The Court recently explained in Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, G.R. No. 165133, April 19, 2010 that assessed value is worth or value of the property as fixed by the taxing authorities for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate. The assessed value does not necessarily represent the true or market value of the property. In the present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment of RA 7691, contained a statement that, based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot subject of the accion publiciana has an assessed value of P48,000. The subject lot, with an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila, comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC erred in holding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction in this case (BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010, Carpio, J.). Estoppel to question jurisdiction; reason behind the rule. In Cudiamat, et.al. v. Batangas Savings and Loans Bank, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 182403, March 9, 2010, Carpio-Morales, J, the SC once again had the occasion to rule on the issue of estoppel to question jurisdiction. The question arose when there was a complaint for quieting of tile with damages against the bank due to a mortgage executed over a property without the consent of the owners. The bank contended that since it filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the bank, the jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed claims against it is lodged with the liquidation court, the RTC, Nasugbu, Batangas. The complaint for quieting of title was filed before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas. It was contended that the RTC Balayan should have referred the case to the RTC-Nasugbu, which the CA granted. Hence, a petition was filed with the SC questioning the ruling of the CA, that the RTC-Balayan has jurisdiction. They contended that the complaint was filed earlier than the petition for assistance in the liquidation and that the bank is now stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC as it actively participated in the proceedings. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: Yes, the bank is stopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC.


In Lozon v, NLRC, 310 Phil 1 (1995), the Court came up with a clear rule on when estoppel to question jurisdiction applies

and when it does not: The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower

court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. (See also: Metromedia Times Corp. v. Pastorin, G.R. No. 154295, July 25, 2005, 465 SCRA 320).

In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general jurisdiction had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May 25,2000, when the PDIC’s petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course.

While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to present their respective evidences in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, decided petitioners’ complaint (about two years before the appellate court rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners. The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, held that as a general rule, if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela, however, after considering the circumstances attendant to the case, held that the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to refile or relitigate its case before the litigation court would be “an exercise in futility.” Among the circumstances the Court considered in that case is the fact that the claimants were poor and the disputed parcel of land was their only property, and the parties’ claims and defenses were properly ventilated in and considered by the judicial court. In the present case, the court found that analogous considerations exist to warrant an application of Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in this Court, and his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died during the pendency of the case. To compel him to appear and relitigate the case in the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC when the issued to be raise before it are the same as those already exhaustively passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC would be superfluous. Note: This must be distinguished from Frianela v. Banayad, where the RTC had no jurisdiction at all. The issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the SC after almost 20 years of litigation and the parties participated in the proceedings. The SC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Matters that determine the jurisdiction over an issue in a case. In Lim v. BP Agricultural Dev. Bank, G.R. NO. 179230, March 9, 2010, Morales, J, the SC had the occasion to rule that jurisdiction over an issue in a case is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court (De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006). Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC, etc. Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved, there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level court by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa blg. 120, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition to being conferred by law, however, a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein. In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration (Tamado v. Ortiz, 353 Phil 775 (1998)). Required allegations in Forcible Entry cases. The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession by either force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) the action must be filed


within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof (Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil 1045 (2001)); Nunez v. SL Teas Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, Perez, J.). Forfeiture proceedings are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. Once again, the SC ruled in SBMA v. Rodriguez, et. al., G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010, that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught (Mison v. Natividad, 213 SCRA 734 (1992)). The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings (Jao v. CA, 319 Phil 105 (1995)). Regional Trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Verily, the rule is that from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant for seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the BOC acquires jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing he customs laws, subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals whose decisions are appealable to this Court. As we have clarified in Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, 257 Phil 864 (1989)), the rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform. Recovery of damages due to malicious prosecution; total amount of damages determines the jurisdiction of the court. In Sante v. Hon. Claravall, et. al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, Villarama, J., there was a complaint for damages due to malicious prosecution. It sought an award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P420,000.00 suffered by reason of the utterances while they were at a police station. In holding that the RTC has jurisdiction, the SC held: It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. In Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639 it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the respondent’s claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount. Also, in Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 394, the Court held:

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of

damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action. x x x

RULE 3

PARTIES Capacity of co-owner to sue for ejectment. In Soriente v. Estate of Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, after the death of Concepcion, the wife sued defendant for ejectment. The latter questioned her capacity since no letters of administration has been issued to her. The SC held:


She has the capacity to sue as co-owner. She is entitled to prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Article 487 of the Civil Code states, “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” Hence, assuming that she failed to submit the proper documents showing her capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the estate of her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, may deem her capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a real party-in-interest being a co-owner of the subject property considering that the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and has also acquired jurisdiction over the parties, including the plaintiff as representative of the estate. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the

preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, “[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference.” Her claim that the preceding provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she and the other defendant filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference is not correct. Sole proprietorship, no personality to sue. In Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009, the SC had once again the occasion to rule that a suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines “parties in interest” in this manner:

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

A sole proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form of business enterprise. It is an unorganized business owned by one person. The sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business. In the case of Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 870 (2002) it was held:

x x x In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality

of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.

In Navarro v. Hon. Jose Escobido, et al., G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009, it was once again said that a sole proprietorship, like Kargo Enterprises is not a juridical person hence, pursuant to Rule 3 Sec. 1, it cannot be a party to a civil action. In Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369 (1982), it was said that there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permit, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words “doing business as Juasing Hardware” may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done. This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:

SEC. 2. Parties in Interest.- A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended by the real party in interest.

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by the judgment in the case, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest.

Real party interest to prosecute original action and appeal In Alonso, et al. v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2010, Bersamin, J., the SC once again had the occasion to say that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules. A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or


the party entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. Thus, an appeal is an action to be prosecuted by a party in interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility. So it is with the petitioners! Effect of misjoinder/non-joinder of party.

Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.

In Domingo v. Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468, it was held that the proper remedy when a party

is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. (Rule 17, Sec. 3). Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. (Cortez v. Avila, 101 Phil. 205 (1957); Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009; Nocom v. Camerino, et al., G.R. No. 182987, February 10, 2009). When there is or there is no class suit In Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 29, 2010, the SC ruled that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representative would certainly claim denial of due process. (Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187 (1996). From the definition of class suit under Rule 3, Sec. 12, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interest of all concerned. In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 157 Phil. 551 (1974), the Court held that:

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing in the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., 444 Phil. 230 (2003), it was observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. In Ibañez v. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil 227, it said where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.

RULE 6 Pleadings


When counterclaim is compulsory or permissive; tests. In Bungcayao, etc. v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holding and Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010, Carpio, J., there was an action to declare as void the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, signed by petitioner’s son alleging that he was not authorized to sign the same. Petitioner is one of the members of the D’Sierto Beach Resort Owners Association (D’Sierto), the defendant filed an answer with counterclaim for the refund of the amount paid to petitioner, thru his son and to vacate the portion occupied by him as the defendant is the owner of the property. The RTC of Laoag City confirmed the Deed of Assignment and the return of the amount paid, but the petitioner manifested that he was maintaining his claim for damages. Then, the case for summary judgment, but later on petitioner manifested in open court that he was withdrawing the earlier manifestation submitting the case for summary judgment. May summary judgment be rendered? Why? Answer: Yes, considering that the issue has been limited to damages but without prejudice to the right of the defendant to file an action to recover the property from the plaintiff. This is so because the counterclaim for recovery of the property occupied by the plaintiff is a permissive counterclaim, contrary to the ruling of the lower courts that it is compulsory. While the counterclaim is an offshoot of the same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondent’s second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the main case. The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaim is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner. Nature of compulsory counterclaim A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive. The Court has ruled that the compelling text of compulsiveness characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. Criteria to determine nature of compulsory counterclaim or permissive counterclaim The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:

(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Namarco v. Federation of United Mamarco Distributors, 151 Phil. 338 (1973)

RULE 7 Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certificate

Purposes of requirement of verification of pleadings In NHA v. Basa, et al., G.R. No. 149126, April 20, 2010, Leonardo-De Castro, J., the SC once more had the occasion to rule on the importance of verification of a pleading. The reason for requiring in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct, are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good faith. (Valmonte v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 536).


No need to state that a case was filed and dismissed in the certificate of non-forum shopping if the dismissal is without prejudice. In Roberto Benedicto, et al. v. Manuel Lacson, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010, Peralta, J., a case was originally filed before the RTC of Pasig City. It was however dismissed without prejudice to the filing of another case. When the other case was filed, there was no statement to that effect that a previous case was filed in the certificate of non-forum shopping. Can it be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping for failure to state the filing of a previous action? Held: No. As early as Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 430 (2001), it has been ruled that when a complaint has been dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in a subsequent re-filed complaint the fact of the prior filing and dismissal of the formal complaint. The rule was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules or procedure- which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. The fact that Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceeding considering that the evil sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not [present. Test to determine identity of causes of action The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different form each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgement on the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has been considered the most accurate test as to whether the former judgment is a bar in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible. (Vda de Cruzo v. Carriage, Jr., G.R. No. 75109 – 10, June 28, 1998, 175 SCRA 330; Benedicto v. Lacson, supra.)

RULE 9 Default

Remedy in case of default; effect of default. Once again, in Nabua, et al. v. Lu Ym, G.R. No. 176141, December 16, 2008, the SC had the occasion to rule that when defendant is declared in default, the proper remedy is to file a motion to set aside the order of default upon a proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(b).

In Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 134, it was stressed that a party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. He may not seek the reversal of the decision on the basis of evidence submitted in the appellate court. Otherwise, his right to adduce evidence would have been returned to him. Rule on summary procedure; effect of failure to appear at preliminary conference. In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, Peralta, J, there were three (3) cases for unlawful detainer which were consolidated. One of the parties failed to appear at the preliminary conference, hence, judgment was rendered against the defendant. She contended that since the cases were consolidated, it is as if there was a common cause of action against them and there was a common answer, hence, it was an error for the MTC to render judgment. In brushing aside the contention, the SC Held: The contention is not correct. Since the cases were independent of each other, they are not co-defendants even if the cases were consolidated.

RULE 14

Summons Summons, how served upon one who is temporarily out of the country.


In Padua v. Galvez, et. al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010, Peralta, J., the basic issue is the manner of service of summons upon a Filipino who is a resident of the Philippines but temporarily out of the country. The SC held: In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section which is Section 15, that speaks of extraterritorial service. In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513, it was said that because Section 15 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also”, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to : (1) substituted service set forth in Section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. In Montalban v. Maximo, l-22997, March 15, 1968, 22 SCRA 1070, it held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. The rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines is this:

x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him. A dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the

service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.

Section 7 also designates the person with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a

relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof. Filing of motion to lift order of default; voluntary appearance. In Rapid City Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Villa, G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010, Morales, J, the SC once again had the occasion to say that it is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

“The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.” And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.


Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. (G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009).

In this Motion to Lift the order of default, they prayed for an affirmative relief, especially so that they did not allege that the filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. They acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.

RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss

MTD; failure to state a cause of action; effect.

Settled is the rule that in a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To put it simply, the test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint.

In a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or

difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,” simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of the other. (St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc., et al. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, et al., G.R. Nos. 174290, 176116, January 20, 2009).

In Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Heirs of Maria Valdez, et al., G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009, the SC likewise said that the factual allegations in respondents’ complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts. In a number of cases, the Court held that in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties should be considered in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state cause of action. Likewise, other facts not alleged in the complaint may be considered where the motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, or if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim. For while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded.

Q – An action reinvindicatoria and/or reconveyance was filed. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action contending that the plaintiffs did not present or append (annex) proof of their allegations on the complaint to establish a cause of action for reinvindication. Is the contention? Why? Answer: No, because it must be born in mind that the compliant does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial of the merits of the case. (Parañaque Kings Ent., Inc. v. CA, 375 Phil. 1184 (1997). When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action under Section 1 (G), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, such fact must be determined from the allegations of the complaint. In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint for the purpose of resolving the motion. The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. To sustain a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist. (Heirs of Antonio Santos, et al. v. Heirs of Crispulo Beramo, et al., G.R. No. 151454, August 9, 2010, Peralta, J). The defenses of res judicata, statute of limitations and laches may not be raised for the first time in the special civil action for certiorari, citing Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 216 (1999) which held: It is settled that an issue which was not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This principle applies to special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65. (Heirs of Antonio Santos, et al. v. Heirs of Crispulo Beramo, et al., G.R. No. 151454, August 9, 2010, Peralta, J)


Motion to Dismiss in declaration of nullity of marriage cases; rationale. The basic question in Susie Chan-Tan v. Jesse Tan, G.R. NO. 167139, February 25, 2010, Carpio J., is whether a respondent in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage may file a motion to dismiss. The SC said that it cannot be. Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that “no motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.” The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so the judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be considered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only the respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. Objections and defenses not raised in the Motion to Dismiss are deemed waived. In Mabanag v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et. al., G.R. NO. 153142, March 29, 2010, Bersamin, J., there was an action for specific performance for the execution of a deed of absolute sale after the payment of the price of the property sold. Judgment was rendered and it became final and executory but the losing party wanted to thwart the execution on the ground that she was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines, raising the issue of citizenship on execution. The SC said: No. The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final decision. The petitioner did not raise any issue of the qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial or, at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Above rule is tested by necessity. In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise “new” or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment. The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to the unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the very rationale of every litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation. Issue of res judicata The petitioner cannot insist that the RTC did not settle the question of respondents’ qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity (Sec. 47 (b), Rule 39). Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug 250 SCRA 218 (1995), it was held that a judgment involving the same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In fact, the present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner and her counsel to assail the qualification to acquire and own the subject property. There were other cases filed resulting in forum shopping. MTD; litis pendentia.

In G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009, the SC once again said that litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.


To constitute litis pendentia, not only must the parties in the two actions be the same; there must as well be substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought. Further, the identity should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Guidelines for the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In this case, the SC revisited the cases it decided on the issue of litis pendentia and the factors considered in determining

which case should prevail and which must yield to the other. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the case later in time should yield to the earlier case; what is required

merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens can apply; it is the filing of the action, not the receipt of summons, which determines priority in date.

In a case, the SC applied the principle of Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure (literally, he who is before in time is better in

right) in dismissing a case on the ground of litis pendentia. This was exemplified in the relatively early case of Del Rosario v. Jacinto, 15 SCRA 15 (1965) where two complaints for reconveyance and/or recovery of the same parcel of land were filed by substantially the same parties, with the second case only impleading more party-plaintiffs. The Court held that “parties who base their contention upon the same rights as the litigants in a previous suit are bound by the judgment in the latter case.” Without expressly saying so in litis pendentia terms, the Court gave priority to the suit filed earlier.

In Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. v. Ocfemia, 18 SCRA 407 complaints for damages arising from a collision of a cargo truck

and a bus were separately filed by the owners of the colliding vehicles. The complaint of the owners of the cargo truck prevailed and the complaint of the owners of the bus had to yield, as the cargo truck owners first filed their complaint. Notably, the first and prevailing case was far advanced in development, with an answer with counterclaim and an answer to the counterclaim having been already filed, thus fully joining the issues. (See also: Salacup v. Maddela, Jr., 91 SCRA 275 (1979); Andersons Group, Inc. v. CA, 266 SCRA 423 (1997). In Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon, 108 SCRA 740 (1981) the first case was a complaint for specific performance of obligations under a Memorandum of Agreement, while the second case was a complaint for sums of money arising from obligations under a promissory note and a chattel mortgage, and damages. The second case was dismissed because the claims for sums of money therein arose from the Memorandum of Agreement sued upon in the first case. Reason for rule on dismissal due to lis pendens.

Ago Timber Corporation v. Ruiz, 21 SCRA 1381 (1967) offered an insightful reason after both parties had each pleaded the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause. The Court ruled that the second action should be dismissed, “not only as a matter of comity with a coordinate and co-equal court, but also to prevent confusion that might seriously hinder the administration of justice. (Cabigao, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., 44 Phil. 182).” Three (3) tests on lis pendens.

In all these cases, preference was given to the first action filed to be retained. The “priority-in-time rule,” however, is not absolute.

In the 1956 case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956), the SC deviated from the “priority-in-time rule” and applied

the “more appropriate action test” and the “anticipatory test.” The “more appropriate action test” considers the real issue raised by the pleadings and the ultimate objective of the

parties; the more appropriate action is the one where the real issues raised can be fully and completely settled. In Teodoro, the lessee filed an action for declaratory relief to fix the period of the lease, but the lessor moved for its dismissal because he had subsequently filed an action for ejectment against the lessee. The Court noted that the unlawful detainer suit was the more appropriate action to resolve the real issue between the parties – whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land under the terms of the lease contract; this was the subject matter of the second suit for unlawful detainer, and was also the main or principal purpose of the first suit for declaratory relief.

In the “anticipatory test,” the bona fides or good faith of the parties is the critical element. If the first suit is filed merely

to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal, then the first suit should be dismissed. In Teodoro, it was noted that the first action, declaratory relief, was filed by the lessee to anticipate the filing of the second action, unlawful detainer, considering the lessor’s letter informing the lessee that the lease contract had expired.

The Court also applied the “more appropriate action test” in Ramos v. Peralta, 203 SCRA 412. In this case, the lessee filed

an action for consignation of lease rentals against the new owner of the property, but the new owner moved to dismiss the consignation case because of the quieting of title case he had also filed against the lessee. Finding that the real issue between the parties involved the right to occupy/possess the subject property, the Court ordered the dismissal of the consignation case, noting that the quieting of title case is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between them; the consignation case raised the issue of the right to possession of the lessee under the lease contract, an issue that was effectively covered by the quieting of title case which raised the issue of the validity and effectivity of the same lease contract.


In University Physician Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 412 (1991) the Court applied both the “more appropriate action test” and “anticipatory test.” In this case, the new owner of an apartment sent a demand letter to the lessee to vacate the leased apartment unit. When the lessee filed an action for damages and injunction against the new owner, the new owner moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on account of the action for ejectment it had also filed. The Court noted that ejectment suit is the more appropriate action to resolve the issue of whether the lessee had the right to occupy the apartment unit, where the question of possession is likewise the primary issue for resolution. It also noted that the lessee, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was aware that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming; the lessee’s filing of the complaint for damages and injunction was but a canny and preemptive maneuver intended to block the new owner’s action for ejectment.

It also applied the “more appropriate action test” in the 2003 case Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 395

SCRA 624 (2003) where the lessee filed a petition for declaratory relief on the issue of renewal of the lease of a gasoline service station, while the lessor filed an unlawful detainer case against the lessee. On the question of which action should be dismissed, the Court noted that the interpretation of a provision in the lease contract as to when the lease would expire is the key issue that would determine the lessee's right to possess the gasoline service station. The primary issue – the physical possession of the gasoline station – is best settled in the ejectment suit that directly confronted the physical possession issue, and not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief. (Mid-Pasig Land Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153751, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 204).

A more recent case – Abines v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 67900, February 13, 2006, 487 SCRA 421, in 2006 –

saw the application of both the “priority-in-time rule” and the “more appropriate action test.” In this case, the respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against the petitioners to enforce its rights under the promissory notes and real estate mortgages, while the petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for reformation of the promissory notes and real estate mortgages. It was held that the first case, the collection case, should subsist because it is the first action filed and the more appropriate vehicle for litigating all the issues in the controversy. The Court noted that in the second case, the reformation case, the petitioners acknowledged their indebtedness to the respondent; they merely contested the amounts of the principal, interest and the remaining balance. It observed, too, that the petitioners’ claims in the reformation case were in the nature of defenses to the collection case and should be asserted in this latter case.

Under this established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate in the ascending order

of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.

In this case, there was a contract for the supply of day-old chicks. There was a demand for payment, but there was

contention that there was overpayment. The complaint for the overpayment was filed ahead of the collection case. Which case should prevail. The SC said that the collection case is the more appropriate action to decide the rights of the parties.

RULE 17 Dismissal of Actions

Dismissal due to fault of the plaintiff. Once again, the SC in Espiritu, et. al. v. Lazaro et. al., G.R. NO. 181020, November 25, 2009, had the occasion to say that if the plaintiff fails to prosecute an action for an unreasonable length of time, the court can motu proprio dismiss the same. In this case, the plaintiff failed to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial despite the lapse of one (1) year from the time the issues were joined. In affirming the order of dismissal, the SC held: In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants’ right to have a speedy disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses from being impaired. Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules. Petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the motion to file supplemental answer or for the defendants to file a supplemental answer. The rule clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Since respondents already filed a cautionary answer and (petitioners did not file any reply to it) the case was already ripe for pre-trial. It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff’s lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with


the rules. The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for.

RULE 18 Pre-trial

Counterclaim can proceed even if main action is dismissed. Q – In an action for damages due to the dishonor of her credit cards after the defendant filed its answer, the case was set for Pre-trial but the plaintiff failed to appear, hence, the court, upon motion dismissed the complaint and allowed the defendant to present evidence on the counterclaim. It was contended by the plaintiff that the defendant cannot present evidence on the counterclaim anymore since with the dismissal of the complaint, there was no longer a pending action where defendant can prosecute its claim citing BA Finance v. Co, G.R. No. 105751, 224 SCRA 163 (1993) where the Court ruled that the dismissal of the complaint for non-appearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of the defendant, carried with it the dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. The New Rule now allows the prosecution of the counterclaim in the same case or in a separate action after the dismissal of the complaint due to the failure of the plaintiff to appear or prosecute. The BA Finance v. Co case has been changed by the Rules. In Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 393, where the SC explained that:

Section 3, [of Rule 17] on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner’s failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such an absence of evidence to prove defendant’s counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication. x x x x.

Besides, Section 5 of Rule 18 which is, for convenience, again requoted, provides:

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. ─ The failure of the plaintiff to appear [at the pre-trial] when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof, must be read in conjunction with the above-quoted Section 3 of Rule 17.

Thus, in Perkin Elmer Singapore v. Dakila Trading, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, the Court, discussing

the application of the dictum in Pinga to situations outside of Section 3 of Rule 17, held:

It is true that the aforesaid declaration of the Court refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on dismissal of the complaint due to fault of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, it does not also preclude the application of the same to the instant case just because the dismissal of respondent’s [plaintiff’s] Complaint was upon the instance of the petitioner [defendant] who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person. As the failure of the spouses to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules or any order of the

court, the dismissal of their Complaint was essentially due to their fault and the therein defendant Citibank could still prosecute its Counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.

RULE 19 Intervention

Office of the Ombudsman has no right to intervene in an appeal from its decision. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. NO. 185954, February 16, 2010, Velasco, J, the Office of the Ombudsman wanted to intervene in an appeal from its resolution while the appeal is pending before the Court of Appeals. The SC ruled No. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention.


Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In support of its argument that it has legal interest, the Office of the Ombudsman cited Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia), 388 SCRA 485 (2002). In the said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee, Garcia, the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against him. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA 425 (1999), the Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which complained of Garcia’s acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its fold. PNB should, therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the country. Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in the appellate court. Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 703 (1999) and National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag), 466 SCRA 624 (2005), in which the Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, the Court ruled:

The government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously

heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the court declared:

To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought to the Court of Appeals,

the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.”

In instituting G.R. NO. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as

adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies,” not to litigate.

Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene because it must remain detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not as an advocate. It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges’ active participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 (1992); see also Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), 538 SCRA 534 (2007). Intervention after judgment. As a rule, intervention must be done prior to judgment. The rule is not an iron-clad rule as there are exceptions, if the interest of justice should be served. One such case is Quinto, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, where after the SC decided that an appointive public official does not need to resign upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, Motions for Reconsideration in Intervention were filed by Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Manuel A. Roxas invoking their rights as private individual and public officer respectively. The propriety of the interventions after judgment was the issue raised in the Supreme Court which Held: That intervention is proper.

Pursuant to Rule 19, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following

requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.


Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention

may be filed, which must be before judgment by the trial court. (Sec. 2). This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule,

when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, (Tahan Dev. Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 155771, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 273) when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, (Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. L-45168, September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238) and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. (Mago v. CA, G.R. No. 115624, February 25, 1999, 300 SCRA 600). In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by the Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. (G.R. No. 115044, July 27, 1995, 240 SCRA 649).

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after

consideration of the appropriate circumstances. (Mago v. CA). Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523; Dir. of Lands v. CA; Mago v. CA). Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General).

RULE 33 Demurrer to evidence

Effect of demurrer to evidence.

Once again, the SC in Dayap v. Sendiong, et al., G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009, had the occasion to rule that the demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668). Civil liability despite acquittal.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. (Hun Hyung Park v, Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502). However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist (Rule 111, Sec. 2(2)) or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. (Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504 (2003). Right of accused to present evidence if demurrer to evidence is granted; reason.

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504 (2003). This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. (Salazar v. People; Dayap vs. Sendiong).

RULE 34 Judgment on the Pleadings

If defendant moves for the judgment on the pleadings, there is an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.


A suit for unlawful detainer was filed by the lessor against the lessee for failure of the latter to pay the rents. During the pre-trial, the defendant moved that the case be submitted for judgment on the pleadings considering that the only disagreement between the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The MTC rendered a judgment for the plaintiff. State the effect of the act of the defendant in moving for judgment on the pleadings. Explain. Answer: In moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of her own allegations and without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence, the defendant is deemed to have admitted the material and relevant averments in the complaint and to rest her motion for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties. (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 823 (1926). As held in Tropical Homes, Inc., v. CA, 338 Phil. 930, when there is judgment on the pleadings, the defendant is deemed to have admitted the allegations of fact in the complaint, so that there is no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim. (Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010, Carpio, J.)

RULE 35 Summary Judgment

When partial summary judgment is appealable or not. Once again, the SC in Philippine Telephone Co. v. Radiomarine Network, Inc., G. R. No. 152092, August 4, 2010, Leonardo-De Castro, J, had the occasion to rule that special civil action for certiorari is not the remedy if there is a partial summary judgment. In Monterey Foods Corporation v. Eserjose, 457 Phil. 771 (2003) the court distinguished when a partial summary judgment is appealable and when it is not, to wit:

Petitioners maintain that the order granting partial summary judgment was merely interlocutory in nature and did not dispose of the action in its entirety. They cited the doctrines laid down in Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals and Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, where the Court categorically stated that a partial judgment is not a final or appealable judgment. Petitioners’ position is untenable. The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra are not applicable in the case at bar. The said case specifically delved on the appeal of a summary judgment, which did not dispose of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. In the case at bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to respondents under the contract growing agrrement, all other reliefs sought under the complaint had already been expressely waived by respondent before the trial court. Accordingly, Order of the trial court which granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondent was in the nature of a final order which leaves nothing more for the court to adjudicate in respect of the complaint.

When summary judgment proper. In Ferrer v. Sps. Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010, the SC once again said that summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleading on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. (D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Duvas Corp., G.R. No. 155174, August 24, 2009) The variance in the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident. In this case, the parents of the mortgagor denied having executed a SPA authorizing their daughter to mortgage their property. Thus, there was a genuine issue which requires the presentation of evidence. It is necessary for the court to ascertain the validity and due execution of the SPA, the REM and the PN. Summary judgment is proper only if there is clearly no genuine issue as a material fact.

In Nocom v. Camerino, et al., G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009, while the parties admitted the existence of an

Irrevocable Power of Attorney, the defendants however alleged that they were never informed that the document they signed was an Irrevocable Power of Attorney and that they never received the full consideration of the transaction. Hence, the SC ruled that summary judgment cannot be rendered.

Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A


“genuine issue” is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.

The present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary judgment is not warranted when there are

genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

RULE 36 Judgment

When there may be a several judgment. In Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. v. Rolando Sy, et al., G.R. Nos. 114217 and 150797, October 13, 2009, there was an action for partition. There were properties under the names of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The court rendered judgment on the properties in the name of defendants but deferred judgment on the properties under the names of the plaintiffs considering that the properties are separable. The CA affirmed the partial judgment. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why? Answer: Yes. The judgment is in the nature of a several judgment.

The partial decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated by the rule. The trial court ruled on the status of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending the presentation of evidence.

A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. (Fernando v. Santamaria, 487 Phil. 351 (2004).

Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.

The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the properties in the names of the other heirs.

RULE 38 Petition For Relief From Judgment

Mistake contemplated by Rule 38 pertains to mistake of fact, not of law. In Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009, Peralta, J, the petition for relief from judgment alleged as grounds that the RTC made serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented. Is the petition proper? Why? Answer: No. The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistakes of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. (Agan v. Heirs of Spouses Nueva, G.R. No. 155018, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 421). The word mistake which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. (Guevarra v. Tuazon & Co., 1 Phil. 27 (1901). Such error may be corrected by means of appeal. Nature of petition for relief from judgment. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of


inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel. Affidavit of merit required.

Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition must be accompanied with affidavits of merits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon by petitioner and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense as the case maybe. While a petition for relief without a separate affidavit of merit is sufficient where facts constituting petitioner’s substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be, are alleged in a verified petition since the oath elevates the petition to the same category as a separate affidavit. (Mago v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225 (1999). But in this case, the petition for relief filed by petitioner was not even verified, hence, the CA did not err in no longer considering the merits of the case.

RULE 39 Judgments and Execution

Doctrine of immutability of judgment.

In Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, the SC once again said that a judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. While there are recognized exceptions – e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable – none of these exceptions apply to the present case.

Litigation must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable controversies with finality. Res judicata; requisites.

In RCBC v. Royal Cargo Corp., G.R. No. 179756, October 2, 2009 (Morales, J), the SC once again ruled that the elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

Res judicata has two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil

Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case

that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, there is conclusiveness of judgment. The first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, not as to matters merely involved therein.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot give rise to res judicata, hence, it is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.

When the ownership over a parcel of land is adjudicated, possession follows even if not expressly adjudicated in the judgment. Once again in De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. No. 181970; PEA, et al. v. Hon. Alaras, et al., Gr. No. 182678, August 3, 2010, Peralta, J., the SC had the occasion to say that as a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor it may go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. (Baluyot v. Guiao, 373 Phil. 1013 (1999). Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. In the present case, the court had


already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership. In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements. (Tumibay v. Sps. Soro, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010). It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Rule 39, Sec. 10 sets the procedure for execution of judgment for specific acts. Spouses Soro filed an action for annulment and recovery of ownership of a real property. The RTC of Cabanatuan City rendered a judgment annulling the title and the sale. On appeal, the CA and the SC affirmed the decision. After it became final and executory, the RTC issued a writ of execution. The Register of Deeds cancelled the title and transferred it to the prevailing parties who later on filed a motion that they be restored to possession of the property and the demolition of the improvements thereon. The RTC denied it because the writ of execution must conform to the judgment which the CA affirmed. Is the ruling correct? Why? Answer: No. As a general rule, the writ of execution to must conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Nonetheless, a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (DHL Philippines Corp. United Rank and File Asso.-Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa DHL Philippines Corp., 478 Phil. 842, 853; Jaban v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 896, 904; 370 SCRA 221, 228 (2001). Thus, in Perez v. Evite, 111 Phil. 564 (1961), where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included in the decision where the defeated party’s claim to possession was based solely on his claim of ownership. (See also Baluyut v. Guiao, 373 Phil. 1013 (1999); Tumibay, et al. v. Sps. Soro, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010). That a party sold her pro indiviso share in the subject property to another person and the latter caused the annotation of her adverse claim in the TCT Nos. T-98649 and T-98650, is a supervening event that has no bearing to the present case where the only issue involved is the propriety of the Order that denied the respondents’ motion to be restored in possession. Besides, whatever right Corazon T. Logramente, a third party to the present dispute, may have on the subject property is adequately protected by the inscription of her adverse claim in the land titles. Any right she may have can only be raised or brought by her as the affected party, or the real party-in-interest, in a proper forum. In their petition, they cited Nazareno v. CA, 383 Phil. 229 (2000), where it was ruled that being declared the owner of the subject property does not also mean that the winning party is automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. This is a misreading of the case. What Nazareno actually holds is that adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his rejected claim of ownership. This ruling, as understood in its correct sense, fully applies to the present case, as there is no allegation much less any proof, that the petitioners have any right to possess the improvements on the land independently of their claim of ownership of the subject property. Thus, the respondents have full right to possession of the subject property. There can be no piecemeal interpretation of a Decision as a means to advance one’s case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context; the decision must be considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, the respondent’s right to possession of the subject property fully follows. 5-year period to execute; 10-year to revive a judgment A complaint for forcible entry was filed where the judgment became final and executory. The plaintiff moved to defer the execution of the judgment and the defendant had no hand on it. Neither was there an agreement. After 5 years the plaintiff moved for execution. It was denied due to prescription. On the 11th year, he finally sought its revival. Will the action prosper? Why? Answer: No, because of prescription. An action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. (Aart. 1144, NCC). Furthermore, the law provides that once a judgment becomes final and executor, the prevailing party


fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment becomes final. When the complaint for revival of judgment was filed, it had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in. (Villeza v. German Management & Services, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010, Mendoza, J). Effect of Order holding in abeyance execution. He contended that the abeyance granted to him by the lower court tolled the running of the prescriptive period. He even cited cases allowing exceptions to the general rule. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Republic v. Court of Appeals, deals with the stay of the period due to the acts of the losing party. It was impossible for the winning party to have sought the execution of the judgment because of the dilatory schemes and maneuvers resorted to by the other party. In Torralba v. delos Angeles, 185 Phil. 40 (1985) the running of the period was interrupted when the winning party filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution. The order of ejectment was not carried out however due to the judgment debtor’s begging to withhold the execution of judgment because of financial difficulties. The agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment interrupted the period of prescription. In Casela v. Court of Appeals, 146 Phil. 292 (1970) it was the judgment obligor who moved to suspend the writ of execution. The judgment oblige was not in delay because he exhausted all legal means within his power to eject the obligor from his land. The writs of execution issued by the lower court were not complied with and/or were suspended by reason of acts or causes not of obligee’s own making and against his objections. Right of redemption by a creditor of property of debtor sold on execution In Torres, et al. v. Sps. Alamag, G.R. No. 169569, August 3, 2010, Peralta, J., the SC once again said that a creditor has the right to redeem a property sold by virtue of a Notice of Levy on the property of the debtor. He is a creditor who has a lien on the property. (Sec. 27, Rule 39). For a valid redemption, the amount tendered must include the following: (1) the full amount paid by the purchaser; (2) with an additional one percent per month interest on the purchase price up to the time of redemption; (3) together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase; (4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at the rate of one percent per month up to the time of redemption; and (5) if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. However, in Baluyut v. Poblete, the court held that the purchaser is required to furnish copies of the amounts of assessments of taxes which he may have paid to inform the mortgagor or redemptioner of the actual amount which he should pay in case he chooses to exercise his right of redemption and if no such notice is given, the property may be relieved without paying such assessments or taxes. Then, in Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corporation, the court reiterated the ruling in Estanislao, Jr. v, Court of Appeals that the payment of the full purchase price and interest thereon by a redemptioner who had not been apprised of the amount of taxes paid by the purchaser, should already be considered sufficient for purposes of redemption if the redemptioner immediately pays the additional amount for taxes once notified of the deficiency. The Court deemed this to be in consonance with the policy of the law to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption. Res Judicata; Requisites; donation declared void action to quiet title will not prosper anymore. In Sps. Noceda v. Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010, Nachura, J., after the final and executory judgment declaring the donation void, the donee filed an action for quieting of title against the donor. In both cases, issues of ownership were raised especially so that in the first it has been passed upon. The SC ruled that the action for quieting of title will not prosper anymore because of the principle of res judicata. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been juridically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, judgment of the court as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with him. Thus, petitioners can no longer question donor’s ownership over the land in the suit for quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. (Tan v. CA, 415 Phil. 675 (2001). Res judicata; there should be no re-litigation of an issue that has been settled; rationale. In Pacifico Cruz v. the Sandiganbayan, et.al., G.R. NO. 174599-609, February 12, 2010, Abad J, Special Presidential Task Force 156 investigated the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (the One-Stop Center) of the


Department of Finance (DOF). The Task Force found that certain officials of the One-Stop Center had been issuing tax credit certificates (TCCs) to entities that did not earn them through tax overpayments. It found that Diamond Knitting Corporation (DKC), a Board of Investments-registered textile manufacturer, completely shut down its operations in 1993 yet the DOF’s One-Stop Center issued to it TCCs totalling P131, 205, 391.00 from 1994 to 1997. DKC in turn sold a number of these TCCs to Pilipinas Shell with the approval of the One-Stop Center. Pilipinas Shell then used these TCCs to pay off its excise tax obligations to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Believing that petitioner Pacifico R. Cruz, the General Manager of Pilipinas Shell’s Treasury and Taxation Department, was a party to the fraud, the Task Force included him in its complaint for plunder against certain officials of DKC and of the One-Stop Center before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). OMB dismissed the plunder charge but caused the filing on August 7, 2002 of separate informations for multiple violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Cruz and the others with him. Before arraignment, Cruz sought the reinvestigation of the cases, claiming that he had been unable to seek reconsideration because of the hasty filing of the informations. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion. After reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) submitted a memorandum to the OMB, recommending the dropping of the charges against Cruz for lack of evidence that he supplied the false documents used for processing the transfers to Pilipinas Shell of the subject fraudulently issued TCCs. The OSP found that Cruz could not have known that DKC had long stopped its business operations. Indeed, the OSP had in two similar cases recommended the dropping of charges against Cruz for the same reason. Upon review, the OMB approved respondent OSP’s recommendation. Respondent Task Force sought the reconsideration which was not acted upon. In the meantime, there was a motion to withdraw the motion to drop Cruz. Meanwhile, on December 21, 2007, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. NO. 172598, December 21, 2007, 541 SCRA 316). The BIR assessed deficiency income taxes against Pilipinas Shell, given that it used for payment the fraudulently issued TCCs subject of this case. The Court nullified the assessment, finding that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value and may thus not be unjustly prejudiced by the transferor’s fraud committed in procuring the transfer of those TCCs. Cruz filed a manifestation invoking the Court’s ruling in the above tax case as res judicata with respect to his alleged criminal liabilities relating to the subject TCCs. The basic issue is whether the finding of the Court in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value of the TCCs in question bar the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of this petition or is there res judicata? Why? Answer: Yes. The res judicata rule bars the relitigation of facts or issues that have once been settled by a court of law upon a final judgment on the merits. Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of court establishes two rules:

(a) A judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars the parties and their privies from bringing a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before either the same or any other tribunal;

(b) Any right, fact or matter directly adjudged or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a

competent court that renders judgment on the merits is conclusively settled and cannot be litigated again between the parties and their privies, regardless of whether the claims, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are the same.

The first commonly referred to as “bar by former judgment”; the second as “conclusiveness of judgment.” It is the second

that is relevant to this case. Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit

cannot be raised anew in any future case involving the same parties although for a different cause of action. Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but not necessarily identity in cases of action (PCGG v. SB, G.R. No. 157592, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 360).

In the present case, the OMB charged petitioner Cruz, acting in conspiracy with others, of violating Section 3(e) of

Republic Act 3019 in connection with the transfer of fraudulently issued TCCs to Pilipinas Shell. The main issue in this case is whether or not Cruz, Pilipinas Shell’s Treasury head, connived with the officials of One-Stop Center and others in unlawfully giving, through manifest partiality and bad faith , unwarranted benefits to DKC by processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas Shell, knowing that DKC, the transferee, has been a dormant company. The Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. There, the Court categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in its acquisition of the TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for value of those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a


party to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. Indeed, there existed, no evidence that Pilipinas Shell was involved in the processing of the One-Stop Center’s approval of the transfer of those TCCs to Pilipinas Shell.

The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the same. Although it was respondent Task Force that investigated the irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the ultimate complainant in the criminal case—the party that suffered the injury—was the government , represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The latter also represented the government in the tax case against Pilipinas Shell. Cruz, on the other hand, represented Pilipinas Shell in all the transactions in question. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases represent substantially identical interests. The principle of res judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the criminal actions against Cruz.

APPEAL

Modes of appeal from RTC to CA, etc. BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010, Carpio, J., reiterates the basic principle that in case decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action. Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42. However, in numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice. Dismissal of the appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. It is better to excuse a technical lapse rather than dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. In the present case, a dismissal on technicality would only mean a new round of litigation between the same parties for the same cause of action, over the same subject matter. Thus, notwithstanding petitioner’s wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition. Reiteration of Neypes v. CA. In Torres, et al. v. Sps. Alamag, G.R. No. 169569, August 3, 2010, Peralta, J., the respondents were furnished with a copy of the order denying their MR on August 29, 2001. They filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 2010. Was the appeal perfected on time? Why? Answer: Yes, because the last day for filing the notice of appeal was on September 13, 2010. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633, the Court declared that a party-litigant should be allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or motion for new reconsideration, so as to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Furthermore, in Sumiran v. Damaso, the Court again emphasized that the ruling in Neypes, being a matter of procedure, must be given retroactive effect and applied even to actions pending in the Court. Note: In Judith Yu v. Judge Tatad, et al., February 9, 2011, the SC ruled that the Neypes principle applies even in criminal cases. Order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation; exceptions. In Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. Aumentado, Jr., G.R. No. 173634, July 22, 2010, Carpio, J., the SC had the occasion to say that the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end. (Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999); Corpus v. Alikpala, 130 Phil. 88 (1968). There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:

1. The writ of execution varies the judgment; 2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4. It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; 5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against

the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority. (Phil. Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, G.R. No. 142669, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 664).

Dismissal of appeal erroneously taken; exception


In Carriaga v. People, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010, Morales, J., the SC ruled that under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal erroneously taken to the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. This is not, however, absolute especially with the liberal interpretation of the Rules and presumption of innocence. Since the appeal involves criminal case, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to procedural lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice, the Court granted petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the Rules. For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. (De Guzaman v. SB, 256 SCRA 171 (1996).

RULE 58 Preliminary Injunction

In Barbieto v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 184645, October 30, 2009, the SC once again said that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.

A writ of preliminary injunction may be granted only upon showing by the applicant of a clear and unmistakable right that is a right in esse. Requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction In Lim v. BPI Agricultural Dev. Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010, Morales, J., the SC denied a petition for injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of mortgages despite his default in his obligation under the promissory note which he never challenged because of the inexistence of a right in esse. . The SC denied the prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction. One of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is that the applicant must have a right in esse. A right in esse is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The existence of a right to be protected, and the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right must be established. TRO is inextendible; rule is absolute. The basic issue is National Electrification Administration v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010, Peralta, J, is whether a TRO issued by the RTC is extendible.

The SC ruled, No. It can be extended by agreement of the parties.

RULE 63 Declaratory Relief

RTC has jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Once again in G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, the SC had the occasion to rule that a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court may be brought before the RTC.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the

Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet

title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word “may” – that an action for quieting of title “may be brought under [the] Rule” on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief “may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court.” The use of the word “may” in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.


In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word “shall” and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.

Since, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, the Complaint involving title to and

possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. When petition is proper; no actual breach.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. When it does not apply; breach has been committed.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

The Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.

Since they alleged in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper

remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

The Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would

depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

RULE 65 Certiorari

Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy if a case is dismissed while the main case is pending against other defendants. In Palma v. Hon. Danilo Galvez, et. al., G.R. NO. 165273, March 10, 2010, Peralta, Jr, J., a complaint for damages was filed against several defendants alleging that defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was her’s as the label therein pertained to that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely Karly Reyes, Myra Mangaser and respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them. Private respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over her as there was no proper service of summons. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case even if there are several defendants and during the pendency of the case against them. A special civil action for certiorari was filed. Is this the proper remedy? Why? Answer: Yes, as an exception to the rule. Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent , confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.


In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a final order because it terminated the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves several defendants and the complaint for damages against these defendants is still pending (Jan.- Dec. Const. Dev. Corp. v. CA, 481 SCRA 556 (2006)). Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.

Prohibition Prohibition is the remedy if a tax ordinance was passed without public hearing. In Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Mariano Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009, the SC had the occasion to say that if a tax ordinance was passed by a Local Government Unit without public hearing Prohibition is the appropriate remedy. Mandamus is not the proper remedy.

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person -- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus Mandamus, when it issues. In Angeles v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 142549, March 9, 2010, there was a finding by the LRA that there was a double titling of a parcel of land, hence, the refusal to issue the TCT. Yet, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel the issuance of the title.

The SC denied the petition.

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

In Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, 350 Phil 779 (1998) it was held that:

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.

x x x x x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the

performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.

It is settled that under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same. (Mendoza v. Judge Ubiadas, 462 Phil. 633 (2003). The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. (Bacolod City Water District v. Hon. Labayen, 487 Phil. 335 (2004). When mandamus will lie.


For mandamus to issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim sought. It will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Thus, unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, it will be denied. (Araos, et al. v. Hon. Regala, et al., G.R. No. 174237, February 18, 2010, Morales, J).

RULE 68 Foreclosure

Effect if foreclosure did not proceed as scheduled; requirement of republication. In Metrobank v. Nikko Resources Int’l. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 178479, October 23, 2009, Morales, J, it was once again held that if the foreclosure does not push through as scheduled, there is a need for republication of the notice and reposting of notice.

The sale at public auction of the properties covered by the foreclosed mortgage in Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno

Productions, Inc. cited by petitioner took place in 1976, also prior to the effectivity on April 22, 2002 of this Court’s Circular No. 7-2002. The Court therein held that under Act No. 3135, as amended, republication as well as reposting of the notice of sale is required if the foreclosure does not proceed on the date originally intended.

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the

mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

RULE 70

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer When there is forcible entry.

In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171842, July 22, 2009, it was held that there is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that he was deprived thereof. (Sps. Lopez v. Sps. Espinosa, G.R. No. 184225, September 4, 2009).

Nature of ejectment proceedings; title cannot be attacked in the UD case. In Sps. Fernandez v. Sps. Co, G.R. No. 167390, July 26, 2010, Peralta, J., the SC once again had the occasion to say that ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. The issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. (Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 29, 2009, 605 SCRA 315). Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, specifically states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack, and that it cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In forcible entry, even if the property is idle or unguarded, it can prosper. In an action for forcible entry, the complaint stated that the property was idle and unguarded; hence, the defendant contended that the plaintiff’s claim of prior possession is negated or false. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: No. While prior possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the lack of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Because possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession. (Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 601; Nuñez v. SLTeas Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, Perez, J). MTC’s adjudication on ownership in UD is merely provisional


Once again, in Sps. Fernandez v. Sps. Co, G.R. No 167390, July 26, 2010, Peralta, J., the SC had the occasion to say that the court’s adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and affirmance of the trial court’s decision would not prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. Owner of land allowed the State to use it for educational purposes; no payment of compensation; no title by the RP; ejectment suit is not the remedy; demand compensation Paninsingin Primary School is a public school operated by the government using a parcel of land owned by the Mendozas since 1957. The government however failed to acquire a title under its name. A complaint for ejectment was filed by the Mendozas due to the government’s failure to acquire ownership. Is the action proper? Why? Answer: No. Where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. In Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceeding covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The owners’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 494 SCRA 494 (2005), the Court affirmed the RTC’s power to award just compensation even in the absence of proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the owners’ right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation. (Republic, et al. v. Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 185091, August 9, 2010, Abad, J). Possession in forcible entry means actual physical possession, not legal possession In Antango v. Doblada, et. al., G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010, Nachura, J., after the purchase of a real property, a letter was sent asking the occupants to vacate the premises. In their complaint for forcible entry, they alleged that they have been in open and peaceful possession of the parcel of land. In their answer, the defendants alleged that they have been in possession of the property since time immemorial. The plaintiffs on the other hand alleged that after they purchased the property, possession was transferred to them. The Supreme Court held: No, the action for forcible entry cannot prosper. The possession claimed by plaintiffs is one flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law (Arbizo v. Santillan, G.R. No. 171315, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 600). Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case (Lagazo v. Soriano et. al., G.R. No. 170864, February 16, 2010). A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with better right lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror (Pajuyo v. CA, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492). If it is true that they were in actual prior physical possession, it would have been unnecessary to write a letter if petitioners were already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear—petitioners are demanding that respondents restore possession of the property to them. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Judgment in Unlawful Detainer is immediately executory; there are exceptions. In La Campana Dev. Corp. v. Ledesma, et. al., G.R. No. 154152, August 25, 2010, Peralta, J., there was a complaint for ejectment filed by the lessor against the lessee. Judgment was rendered against the defendant which was affirmed by the


Regional Trial Court. It was contended by the defendant that the lessor had no more right to eject the defendant since the property was already in the possession of the Development Bank of the Philippines after it foreclosed the mortgage. The Court of Appeals issued an order enjoining the execution of the judgment considering the change in the nature of the title of the lessor during the subsistence of the lease. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?

Answer: Yes. It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that “the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.” However, it was ruled in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363, that “on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances require. x x x even if the RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.” Citing Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil 486 (2000) and Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendano, 169 SCRA 138 (1977) the Court explained that:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and

the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. x x x

Moreover, the Court also stressed in City of Naga v. Asuncion, 557 SCRA 528 (2008), that when exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action. An example of such exceptional circumstance can be seen in Laurel v. Abalos, 140 Phil 532 (1969). Therein, a defendant was ordered by the trial court to vacate the premises of the disputed property and return possession thereof to the plaintiffs, but while the ejectment case was on appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where the sale of the property to said plaintiffs was declared null and void, making the plaintiffs’ right to possess the disputed property inconclusive. The Court ruled in said case that:

Where the supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.

Based on the foregoing earlier ruling in Laurel, the Court also considered it just and equitable to stay the execution of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case against the City of Naga, stating that:

Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediate

execution of the June 20, 2005 RTC Decision. x x x the people of Naga would be deprived of access to basic social services. It should not be forgotten that the land subject of the ejectment case houses government offices which perform important functions vital to the orderly operation of the local government. x x x

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Coverage of speedy disposition of cases. In Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP-Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, Perez, J, the SC had the occasion to say that while it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but

extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.


Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be

considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Appeal in special proceedings. In In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al. v. Rene B. Pascual, et al., G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009, after receipt of the Amended Decision, a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal was filed. The RTC denied the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal. The CA reversed and entertained the appeal. Is the CA correct? Why? Answer: No. The CA committed an error for entertaining the case knowing that appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality.

In special proceedings, such as a proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. (Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure).

The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal

period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. The Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not

only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirement of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.

RULE 102 Habeas corpus

Appeal in habeas corpus is more appropriate than Rule 65. In Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 67569; Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167570; Hon. Fernandez, et al. v. Go, et al., G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009, a petition for habeas corpus was denied. The petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari. The respondents contended that appeal was the proper and appropriate remedy. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: Yes, the 48-hour period of appeal is the more appropriate remedy. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no necessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. (OSG v. De Castro, 529 SCRA 157 (2007). Remedy if already charged.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the


Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. Q – Go, the person subject of deportation contended that he was deprived of the right to due process in the deportation proceedings alleging that he was not furnished with a copy of the Resolution and the Charge Sheet. The record however, showed that he was given the opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence. Is his contention correct? Why? Answer: No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110 Date of offense. People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 186379, August 19, 2009 reiterates the basic rule that the exact date of the commission of rape is not material. In rape cases, the time of commission of the crime is not a material ingredient of the offense. In rape cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and manner in which they were violated. Minority and relation must be alleged in qualified rape. In People v. Impas, G.R. No. 176157, June 18, 2009, the SC said that to obtain a conviction for qualified rape, however, the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must be both alleged in the information and proved with certainty. (People v. Corpus, G.R. No. 175836, January 30, 2009). In the case at bar, only the circumstance of minority was alleged in the information and the prosecution failed to show independent proof to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Thus, the lower courts may only convict the accused of simple rape and not qualified rape.

RULE 111 Prejudicial Question In Zuzuarregui v. Hon. Joselito Villarosa, et. al., G.R. No. 183788, April 5, 2010, Villarama J., after the death of Bella Torres, her daughter Rosemary filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. There was an opposition by petitioner but there was a compromise agreement between them which was approved by the intestate court. Later on, Peter and Catherine who claimed to be biological children of Bella filed an action for declaration of nullity of the compromise alleging that they were entitled to inherit from the estate of Bella. Rosemary filed an answer alleging that the plaintiffs in the annulment case were not biological children of Bella but were merely purchased from third persons. This was never revealed to them and that they were not legally adopted. While the action for the annulment of judgment was pending before the CA, they filed a complaint for falsification and perjury against Rosemary, alleging that Rosemary and petitioner falsely and maliciously stated in pertinent pleadings before the RTC of Pasig that the late Bella had only two heirs, the petitioner and Rosemary. There was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that the issue of whether Peter, etc. are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before the CA. The same was denied. Was the denial proper? Why?

Answer: No. Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action to wit:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based

upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves

facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal

proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1)the present civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.


If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on

whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court

of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for

falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine and Fannie and that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.

RULE 112 Preliminary Investigation

In Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, the SC had the occasion to rule once more that a

preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not only to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; it is just as well for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial. More importantly, in the appraisal of the case presented to him for resolution, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute.

If the prosecutor is convinced during preliminary investigation of the validity of the respondent’s claim of a justifying

circumstance, then he must dismiss the complaint; if not, then he must file the requisite information. This is his discretion, the exercise of which the court grants sufficient latitude.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the difference

between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other. Thus, the courts have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. Due process, requires that an inquiry into the motive behind accused’s attempt at inspection should have been made even during the preliminary investigation stage, just as soon as petitioners set up the defense of improper use and motive.

RULE 114 Bail

Discretionary power of the court to grant bail where the penalty of life, etc. is imposable by law.

In People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009, Morales, J, the SC once again said that under the Constitution “all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” (Sec. 13, Art. III).

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, likewise provides that all persons in custody shall, before

conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus

depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Stressing this point, the Court held:


When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.” On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination.” (People v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 (1997).

The People’s recourse to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to support its contention that

respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.

RULE 115 Rights of the Accused

Speedy trial. In Olbes v. Hon. Buemio, et al., G.R. No. 173319, December 4, 2009, Morales, J, it was contended that there was violation of the Speedy Trial Act when the case was set 253 days after arraignment.

The SC said, No. As early as Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 393 Phil. 172 (2000) the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. This was reiterated in People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154217 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688; Caballes v. CA, 492 Phil. 410 (2005), where it was held:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the

1987 Constitution. In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the

preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate

certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution." Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, it was held:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was

designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. x x x

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere

speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the

court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.


In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.

The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so

warranted by the situation. (Domondon v. SB, 476 SCRA 496).

RULE 117 Motion to Quash

Distinctions between MTQ and Provisional Dismissal.

In Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, the SC made certain distinctions between a Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal of an information. A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information. The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by

law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him

was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Provisional Dismissal

On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that: SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express

consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal

(sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

In People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 (2003) it was ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the

time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. The time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.

Their Comparison

A dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their

features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier

“provisional” directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without


the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.

A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.

A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This

feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows – it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6.

Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused

expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 – i.e., one with the express consent of the accused – is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.

This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal is

not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply. Other distinctions.

Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:

First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed

against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.

Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not

apply to a provisional dismissal. Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses

apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information.

Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of

the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present. Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a

permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.

To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different

situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.


Demurrer to evidence must touch on evidence of prosecution, can be done only after prosecution has rested its case. In Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, October 2, 2009, the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits and on the same day, the accused filed his motion to dismiss. The trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of the exhibits. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respect such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime. He did not touch on the testimonies of witnesses. He cited no documentary evidence. Is the demurrer proper? Why? Answer: No, because the prosecution has not even rested its case.

A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that after the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, the same day he filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since he filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.

To say that he filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant,

and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.

EVIDENCE Interpretation of contracts; effect if terms are clear.

In Heirs of Zamora v. Multi-Wood International, Inc., G.R. No. 146428, January 19, 2009, there was a Marketing Agreement between the parties. The plaintiff asked for commission for the renovation contracts of the defendant with Shangrila Hotels and Diamond Hotels. The defendant contended that the construction contracts are not covered by the marketing agreement as the Agreement spoke only of sale of products. The RTC ruled that it was included, but the CA reversed as the agreement was limited to the solicitation of the products of the defendant, excluding other services like construction contracts. The plaintiff contended on appeal that the identification, “solicitation, finding or introduction for negotiation of buyers, dealers and customers” for Multi-wood’s product as stated in the agreement is an encompassing term as to include the solicitation of interior construction projects. Besides the construction projects it afforded Multi-wood the opportunity to sell and supply its products to the project owner to implement the overall interior design. Petitioners advert to their interpretation of the text of the Marketing Agreement, as well as Multi-wood’s subsequent alleged acquiescence in Zamora’s solicitation of the disputed construction contracts and supposed partial payment of her commission therefore as indicia of the parties’ intention to include the said solicitation of construction contracts within the coverage of the Marketing Agreement. These operative acts purportedly lead to the perfection of a new contract between the parties, albeit not reduced in writing. Hence, Multi-wood is estopped from denying its obligation as the same would unjustly enrich the latter at Zamora’s expense. Is the contention correct? Why?

Answer: No. When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, such that they do not justify an attempt to read into them any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they appear on the face of the contract. It is only in instances when the language of a contract is ambiguous or obscure that courts ought to apply certain established rules of construction in order to ascertain the supposed intent of the parties. However, these rules will not be used to make a new contract for the parties or to rewrite the old one, even if the contract is inequitable or harsh. They are applied by the court merely to resolve doubts and ambiguities within the framework of the agreement. The plain import of the Marketing Agreement leaves no doubt as to the intention of the parties. The Agreement does not mention construction contracts. Need to offer evidence, otherwise it cannot be considered by the court; reason. Q – At the trial pieces of evidence were identified to prove entitlement to commission, but were never offered. May the court consider the same? Why? Answer: No. Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. (Landingin v. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 415).


Plainly, the trial court should not have read terms into the Marketing Agreement that were not expressly in the agreement itself. The agreement is clear, plain and simple that it leaves no room for interpretation. (Heirs of Zamora v. Multi-Word International, Inc., supra.).

As mandated by Article 1370 of the Civil Code, if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

Moreover, Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court is also in point:

SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written

agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties

thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the

execution of the written agreement. The “parol evidence rule” forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or

other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. None of the above-cited exceptions finds application to the instant case, more particularly, the alleged failure of the contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties nor did Zamora raise any of the issues at the proceedings before the trial court.

With more reason, documentary evidence which was not formally offered cannot be used to modify, explain or add to the

terms of an agreement. Burden of Proof. In Ono, et al. v. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 154270, March 10, 2010, Bersamin, J, it was held that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. When corroborative evidence necessary.

In People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, the SC ruled that the argument of the appellant that the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation is unworthy of belief since no corroborative testimony was presented, fails to impress. There is no law requiring that in drug cases the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated to be believed. Corroborative evidence is vital only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness twisted the truth, or that his or her observation was inaccurate. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted. Thus, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. Moreover, it is on record that the appellant no longer required the presentation of corroborative testimony. During the trial, the prosecution was ready to present another witness in the person of PO1 Santos. However, the parties agreed to dispense with his testimony since it would only be corroborative in nature.

In People v. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, February 1, 2010, the SC had the occasion to say that it is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. Thus, the trial court’s evaluation shall be binding on the appellate court unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.

Jurisprudence holds that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim’s lack of

resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. In People v. Corpuz, it was acknowledged that even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has


moral ascendancy over the victim. We emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation.

Thus, in this case, it was understandable for the victim to have silently endured the sexual attacks of her mother’s live-in

partner. As correctly observed by the appellate court, accused-appellant evidently used his moral ascendancy over the victim to carry out his bestial desire. The CA wrote:

x x x Although unmarried, the accused and the girl’s mother were living together as husband and wife,

and it was to a household where the accused wielded the patriarchal authority that she was brought. It was not unlikely that the girl had come to his words in a manner that would not exist if they were not living under the same roof. The power of the father-figure is not uncommon in rural households where families are large and cramped into living conditions without the elemental decency and privacy that growing children need. While the offended party might have initially resisted the sexual advances of the accused, the fact that the mother refused to interfere with the actuations of her live-in partner must have contributed to the sense of helplessness and resignation of the girl. She had nowhere else to go and could certainly not have survived by herself. It is not surprising that she ultimately endured her ordeal in silence. Moreover, it is of no moment that the rape occurred in a small room where other people were sleeping together with the

victim. It is already established that rape is not a respecter of people, time, or place. It may be committed not only in seclusion but also in public places, inside an occupied house, or even where there are other people around. The Court has already taken judicial notice of the fact that among poor couples with big families cramped in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons. Effect of inability to remember exact dates of rape.

Also, the victim’s inability to remember the exact dates of the rape should not be taken against her. The exact time of the commission of the crime of rape is not a material ingredient of this crime. In this case, the victim was raped almost every night for a year by her mother’s live-in partner, with her mother turning a deaf ear to her cries for help. Under these circumstances, we could not expect the victim to recall her harrowing experiences in an exact, detailed, and flawless testimony. Verily, as in this case, it is sufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken place as near to the actual date at which the offenses are committed as the information or complaint will permit.

Doctrine of equipoise. The case of Amanquiton v. People, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009, reiterates the application of pro reo principle and the equipoise rule.

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction. (People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 633 (1999).

Mentally deficient persons can testify.

In People v. Calango, G.R. No. 179280, August 27, 2009, the SC rule that human experience teaches that even mentally deficient persons or individuals having low intelligence can still narrate their ordeals in detailed manner and recall painful experiences like any average individual could. Here, the victim notably could not even recall feeling anything after appellant supposedly penetrated her private part. Circumstantial evidence may prove guilt of an accused.

In People v. Pabol, G.R. No. 187084, October 12, 2009, accused harped at every turn on the absence of direct evidence to show he had forced himself sexually on victim. Direct evidence, however, is not the only way to establish guilt. Circumstantial evidence is a recognized method to establish the commission and the authorship of a crime. The Rules of Court in fact contains provisions on the matter.

Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to proof of collateral facts and

circumstances whence the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It can support a conviction as long as the following requisites prescribed under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are satisfied, such as:

(a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In People v. Delim, it was ruled that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time


inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. (396 SCRA 386 (2003); People v. Hipona, G.R. No. 185709, February 18, 2010, Morales, J). Inconsistencies in testimonies. In People v. Sibunga, G.R. No. 179475, September 25, 2009, Morales, J, it was once again said that inconsistencies in the police officers’ testimonies, the same are neither substantial nor of such a nature as to cast serious doubts on their credibility. The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. (People v. Nicolas, 311 Phil. 79 (1995). Frame-up as defense; its nature. Finally, the defense of “frame-up” in drug cases is generally frowned upon, for like alibi, it is inherently weak as it is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. (Co v. Rep., 539 SCRA 147 (2007). For it to prosper, it must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. This appellant failed to do. The presumption that the police officers performed their duties regularly thus remains. (People v. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67 (1995). Proof of handwriting.

In Progressive Trade Services Ent. V. Antonio, G.R. No. 179502, September 18, 2009, Morales, J, the SC said that the trial court’s ruling that Secundina failed to prove her allegation that the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa was a forgery because she failed to present expert witnesses does not lie. It is settled that handwriting experts, while useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or signatures. For Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of the

person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Complementing the said provision is Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which allows the reception of the opinion

of a witness, like Judge Laviña, for which proper basis is given, as evidence regarding a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity. Admission before the media.

Accused’s confessions to the media are admissible in evidence. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. It has been held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. (People v. Hipona, G.R. No. 185709, February 18, 2010, citing People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 95; People v. Vizcara, 115 SCRA 743 (1982). Plain view doctrine; when it applies; its requisites. In Firaza v. People, G.R. No. 179319, September 18, 2009, Morales, J, it was contended by the accused that he was searched without warrant. But the SC ruled otherwise on the basis of the plain view doctrine as the firearm was tucked inside his shirt. The SC said that even assuming arguendo that, as claimed by petitioner, his firearm was tucked inside his shirt, the plain view doctrine, of which the following requirements which must concur, viz: (1) the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent, and, (3) the illegality of the evidence observed in plain view is apparent to the apprehending officer, (People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003), justified the intervention by the police officers in petitioner’s and the officers’ heated arguments in the course of which they noticed the suspicious bulging object on petitioner’s waist to draw them to check what it was. Judicial notice; notoriety is a fundamental requisite. In Sps. Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009, there was a lease contract over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Building at Baclaran, Parañaue signed by the lessor and the lessee. A year later, the lessor demand for payment of back rentals, otherwise, a complaint for ejectment would be filed. Having failed to comply, a complaint was filed but the lessee contended that there was already full payment when the lessees paid P2,570,000.00. The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the RTC reversed due to defects of the contract. The CA reversed the RTC and took judicial notice of the fact that there is a common practice in Baclaran of payment of goodwill money. There was however, no evidence that the amount was paid as goodwill money. In the


petition for review, a joint declaration by other stockholders that they had paid goodwill money to the lessor. Is the CA correct in taking judicial notice of payment of goodwill money? Why? Answer: No, because of the lack of notoriety of the practice as belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, like the joint declaration. In short, the practice had yet to be proven contravening the title of the Rule, what need not be proved. (Rule 129).

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (1994) is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. Requisites of judicial notice. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.

There must be compliance with the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel

& Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 147) which cited State Prosecutors:

As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known. Res gestae. In People v. Tirso Sace, G.R. NO. 178063, April 5, 2010, Villarama, J, after the rape and killing of a young girl, the accused admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one who committed the crime. Another barangay tanod obtained


the same confession from the accused when he interviewed him infront of other people. The barangay officials testified that accused admitted having raped and killed the victim. The testimonies were not rebutted. Issue: Are the statements of the accused admissible in evidence? Why?

Answer: Yes. Accused’s statements infront of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence (Rule 130, Sec. 4), a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, victim’s death. His admission was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00pm to 7:00pm that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of the victim. Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.

RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE MR is a prohibited motion under the Rule on Summary Procedure. In Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 10, 2010, the SC once again had the occasion to rule that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited motion under the Rule on Summary Procedure. In this case, after the judgment in an unlawful detainer in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. The same is not proper. The rule is applied to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, to achieve this end, the filing of certain motions like a motion for reconsideration is prohibited (Estate of Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 565). Thus, when the motion was filed, it did not stop the running of the period for appeal, hence, the judgment lapsed to finality.

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