Academy of Management Executive Are you sure you have a ...kimboal.ba.ttu.edu/Hambrick and Fredrickson (2005)-Are...Are you sure you have a strategy? Donald C. Hambrick and James W

Are you sure you have astrategy?

Donald C. Hambrick and James W. Fredrickson

Executive OverviewAfter more than 30 years of hard thinking about strategy, consultants and scholars have

provided an abundance of frameworks for analyzing strategic situations. Missing,however, has been any guidance as to what the product of these tools should be—orwhat actually constitutes a strategy. Strategy has become a catchall term used to meanwhatever one wants it to mean. Executives now talk about their “service strategy,” their“branding strategy,” their “acquisition strategy,” or whatever kind of strategy that is ontheir mind at a particular moment. But strategists—whether they are CEOs of establishedfirms, division presidents, or entrepreneurs—must have a strategy, an integrated,overarching concept of how the business will achieve its objectives. If a business musthave a single, unified strategy, then it must necessarily have parts. What are those parts?We present a framework for strategy design, arguing that a strategy has five elements,providing answers to five questions—arenas: where will we be active? vehicles: how willwe get there? differentiators: how will we win in the marketplace? staging: what will beour speed and sequence of moves? economic logic: how will we obtain our returns? Ourarticle develops and illustrates these domains of choice, particularly emphasizing howessential it is that they form a unified whole.

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Consider these statements of strategy drawn fromactual documents and announcements of severalcompanies:

“Our strategy is to be the low-cost provider.”“We’re pursuing a global strategy.”“The company’s strategy is to integrate a set ofregional acquisitions.”“Our strategy is to provide unrivaled customerservice.”“Our strategic intent is to always be the first-mover.”“Our strategy is to move from defense to in-dustrial applications.”

What do these grand declarations have in com-mon? Only that none of them is a strategy. Theyare strategic threads, mere elements of strategies.But they are no more strategies than Dell Comput-er’s strategy can be summed up as selling direct tocustomers, or than Hannibal’s strategy was to useelephants to cross the Alps. And their use reflectsan increasingly common syndrome—the catchallfragmentation of strategy.

After more than 30 years of hard thinking about

strategy, consultants and scholars have providedexecutives with an abundance of frameworks foranalyzing strategic situations. We now have five-forces analysis, core competencies, hypercompeti-tion, the resource-based view of the firm, valuechains, and a host of other helpful, often powerful,analytic tools.1 Missing, however, has been anyguidance as to what the product of these toolsshould be—or what actually constitutes a strategy.Indeed, the use of specific strategic tools tends todraw the strategist toward narrow, piecemeal con-ceptions of strategy that match the narrow scope ofthe tools themselves. For example, strategists whoare drawn to Porter’s five-forces analysis tend tothink of strategy as a matter of selecting industriesand segments within them. Executives who dwellon “co-opetition” or other game-theoretic frame-works see their world as a set of choices aboutdealing with adversaries and allies.

This problem of strategic fragmentation hasworsened in recent years, as narrowly specializedacademics and consultants have started plyingtheir tools in the name of strategy. But strategy isnot pricing. It is not capacity decisions. It is not

� Academy of Management Executive, 2005, Vol. 19, No. 4 Reprinted from 2001, Vol. 15, No. 4

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51

setting R&D budgets. These are pieces of strate-gies, and they cannot be decided—or even consid-ered—in isolation.

Imagine an aspiring painter who has beentaught that colors and hues determine the beautyof a picture. But what can really be done with suchadvice? After all, magnificent pictures require farmore than choosing colors: attention to shapes andfigures, brush technique, and finishing processes.Most importantly, great paintings depend on artfulcombinations of all these elements. Some combi-nations are classic, tried-and-true; some are inven-tive and fresh; and many combinations—even foravant-garde art—spell trouble.

Strategy has become a catchall term used tomean whatever one wants it to mean. Businessmagazines now have regular sections devoted tostrategy, typically discussing how featured firmsare dealing with distinct issues, such as customerservice, joint ventures, branding, or e-commerce. Inturn, executives talk about their “service strategy,”their “joint venture strategy,” their “branding strat-egy,” or whatever kind of strategy is on their mindsat a particular moment.

Executives then communicate these strategicthreads to their organizations in the mistaken be-lief that doing so will help managers make toughchoices. But how does knowing that their firm ispursuing an “acquisition strategy” or a “first-mover strategy” help the vast majority of manag-ers do their jobs or set priorities? How helpful is itto have new initiatives announced periodicallywith the word strategy tacked on? When execu-tives call everything strategy, and end up with acollection of strategies, they create confusion andundermine their own credibility. They especiallyreveal that they don’t really have an integratedconception of the business.

When executives call everythingstrategy, and end up with a collection ofstrategies, they create confusion andundermine their own credibility.

Many readers of works on the topic know thatstrategy is derived from the Greek strategos, or“the art of the general.” But few have thought muchabout this important origin. For example, what isspecial about the general’s job, compared withthat of a field commander? The general is respon-sible for multiple units on multiple fronts and mul-tiple battles over time. The general’s challenge—and the value-added of generalship—is inorchestration and comprehensiveness. Great gen-

erals think about the whole. They have a strategy;it has pieces, or elements, but they form a coherentwhole. Business generals, whether they are CEOsof established firms, division presidents, or entre-preneurs, must also have a strategy—a central,integrated, externally oriented concept of how thebusiness will achieve its objectives. Without astrategy, time and resources are easily wasted onpiecemeal, disparate activities; mid-level manag-ers will fill the void with their own, often parochial,interpretations of what the business should be do-ing; and the result will be a potpourri of disjointed,feeble initiatives.

Examples abound of firms that have sufferedbecause they lacked a coherent strategy. Once atowering force in retailing, Sears spent 10 sadyears vacillating between an emphasis on hardgoods and soft goods, venturing in and out of ill-chosen businesses, failing to differentiate itself inany of them, and never building a compelling eco-nomic logic. Similarly, the once-unassailable Xe-rox is engaged in an attempt to revive itself, amidcriticism from its own executives that the companylacks a strategy. Says one: “I hear about assetsales, about refinancing, but I don’t hear anyonesaying convincingly, ‘Here is your future.’”2

A strategy consists of an integrated set ofchoices, but it isn’t a catchall for every importantchoice an executive faces. As Figure 1 portrays, thecompany’s mission and objectives, for example,stand apart from, and guide, strategy. Thus wewould not speak of the commitment of the NewYork Times to be America’s newspaper of record aspart of its strategy. GE’s objective of being numberone or number two in all its markets drives itsstrategy, but is not strategy itself. Nor would anobjective of reaching a particular revenue or earn-ings target be part of a strategy.

Similarly, because strategy addresses how thebusiness intends to engage its environment,choices about internal organizational arrange-ments are not part of strategy. So we should notspeak of compensation policies, information sys-tems, or training programs as being strategy.These are critically important choices, whichshould reinforce and support strategy; but they donot make up the strategy itself.3 If everything im-portant is thrown into the strategy bucket, then thisessential concept quickly comes to mean nothing.

We do not mean to portray strategy developmentas a simple, linear process. Figure 1 leaves outfeedback arrows and other indications that greatstrategists are iterative, loop thinkers.4 The key isnot in following a sequential process, but rather inachieving a robust, reinforced consistency amongthe elements of the strategy itself.

52 NovemberAcademy of Management Executive

The Elements of Strategy

If a business must have a strategy, then the strat-egy must necessarily have parts. What are thoseparts? As Figure 2 portrays, a strategy has fiveelements, providing answers to five questions:

• Arenas: where will we be active?• Vehicles: how will we get there?• Differentiators: how will we win in the market-

place?• Staging: what will be our speed and sequence of

moves?• Economic logic: how will we obtain our returns?

This article develops and illustrates these do-mains of choice, emphasizing how essential it isthat they form a unified whole. Where others focuson the inputs to strategic thinking (the top box inFigure 1), we focus on the output—the compositionand design of the strategy itself.

Arenas

The most fundamental choices strategists makeare those of where, or in what arenas, the businesswill be active. This is akin to the question PeterDrucker posed decades ago: “What business willwe be in?”5 The answer, however, should not be

one of broad generalities. For instance, “We will bethe leader in information technology consulting” ismore a vision or objective than part of a strategy. Inarticulating arenas, it is important to be as specificas possible about the product categories, marketsegments, geographic areas, and core technolo-gies, as well as the value-adding stages (e.g., prod-uct design, manufacturing, selling, servicing, dis-tribution) the business intends to take on.

For example, as a result of an in-depth analysis,a biotechnology company specified its arenas: thecompany intended to use T-cell receptor technol-ogy to develop both diagnostic and therapeuticproducts for battling a certain class of cancers; itchose to keep control of all research and productdevelopment activity, but to outsource manufactur-ing and a major part of the clinical testing processrequired for regulatory approvals. The companytargeted the U.S. and major European markets asits geographic scope. The company’s chosen are-nas were highly specific, with products and mar-kets even targeted by name. In other instances,especially in businesses with a wider array ofproducts, market segments, or geographic scope,the strategy may instead reasonably specify theclasses of, or criteria for, selected arenas—e.g.,women’s high-end fashion accessories, or coun-

FIGURE 1Putting Strategy in Its Place

2005 53Hambrick and Fredrickson

tries with per-capita GDP over $5,000. But in allcases, the challenge is to be as specific as possible.

In choosing arenas, the strategist needs to indicatenot only where the business will be active, but alsohow much emphasis will be placed on each. Somemarket segments, for instance, might be identified ascentrally important, while others are deemed sec-ondary. A strategy might reasonably be centered onone product category, with others—while necessaryfor defensive purposes or for offering customers afull line—being of distinctly less importance.

Vehicles

Beyond deciding on the arenas in which the busi-ness will be active, the strategist also needs todecide how to get there. Specifically, the means forattaining the needed presence in a particular prod-uct category, market segment, geographic area, orvalue-creation stage should be the result of delib-erate strategic choice. If we have decided to ex-pand our product range, are we going to accom-plish that by relying on organic, internal productdevelopment, or are there other vehicles—such asjoint ventures or acquisitions—that offer a bettermeans for achieving our broadened scope? If weare committed to international expansion, whatshould be our primary modes, or vehicles—green-

field startups, local acquisitions, licensing, or jointventures? The executives of the biotechnologycompany noted earlier decided to rely on joint ven-tures to achieve their new presence in Europe,while committing to a series of tactical acquisitionsfor adding certain therapeutic products to comple-ment their existing line of diagnostic products.

The means by which arenas are entered mattersgreatly. Therefore, selection of vehicles should notbe an afterthought or viewed as a mere implemen-tation detail. A decision to enter new product cat-egories is rife with uncertainty. But that uncer-tainty may vary immensely depending on whetherthe entry is attempted by licensing other compa-nies’ technologies, where perhaps the firm hasprior experience, or by acquisitions, where thecompany is a novice. Failure to explicitly considerand articulate the intended expansion vehiclescan result in the hoped-for entry’s being seriouslydelayed, unnecessarily costly, or totally stalled.

Failure to explicitly consider andarticulate the intended expansionvehicles can result in the hoped-forentry’s being seriously delayed,unnecessarily costly, or totally stalled.

FIGURE 2The Five Major Elements of Strategy


There are steep learning curves associated withthe use of alternative expansion modes. Researchhas found, for instance, that companies can de-velop highly advantageous, well-honed capabili-ties in making acquisitions or in managing jointventures.6 The company that uses various vehicleson an ad hoc or patchwork basis, without an over-arching logic and programmatic approach, will beat a severe disadvantage compared with compa-nies that have such coherence.

Differentiators

A strategy should specify not only where a firmwill be active (arenas) and how it will get there(vehicles), but also how the firm will win in themarketplace—how it will get customers to come itsway. In a competitive world, winning is the resultof differentiators, and such edges don’t just hap-pen. Rather, they require executives to make up-front, conscious choices about which weapons willbe assembled, honed, and deployed to beat com-petitors in the fight for customers, revenues, andprofits. For example, Gillette uses its proprietaryproduct and process technology to develop supe-rior razor products, which the company further dif-ferentiates through a distinctive, aggressively ad-vertised brand image. Goldman Sachs, theinvestment bank, provides customers unparalleledservice by maintaining close relationships withclient executives and coordinating the array of ser-vices it offers to each client. Southwest Airlinesattracts and retains customers by offering thelowest possible fares and extraordinary on-timereliability.

Achieving a compelling marketplace advantagedoes not necessarily mean that the company has tobe at the extreme on one differentiating dimen-sion; rather, sometimes having the best combina-tion of differentiators confers a tremendous mar-ketplace advantage. This is the philosophy ofHonda in automobiles. There are better cars thanHondas, and there are less expensive cars thanHondas; but many car buyers believe that there isno better value—quality for the price—than aHonda, a strategic position the company hasworked hard to establish and reinforce.

Regardless of the intended differentiators—im-age, customization, price, product styling, after-sale services, or others—the critical issue for strat-egists is to make up-front, deliberate choices.Without that, two unfortunate outcomes loom. Oneis that, if top management doesn’t attempt to cre-ate unique differentiation, none will occur. Again,differentiators don’t just materialize; they are veryhard to achieve. And firms without them lose.

The other negative outcome is that, without up-front, careful choices about differentiators, topmanagement may seek to offer customers across-the-board superiority, trying simultaneously tooutdistance competitors on too broad an array ofdifferentiators—lower price, better service, supe-rior styling, and so on. Such attempts are doomed,however, because of their inherent inconsistenciesand extraordinary resource demands. In selectingdifferentiators, strategists should give explicitpreference to those few forms of superiority thatare mutually reinforcing (e.g., image and productstyling), consistent with the firm’s resources andcapabilities, and, of course, highly valued in thearenas the company has targeted.

Staging

Choices of arenas, vehicles, and differentiatorsconstitute what might be called the substance of astrategy—what executives plan to do. But this sub-stance cries out for decisions on a fourth element—staging, or the speed and sequence of major movesto take in order to heighten the likelihood of suc-cess.7 Most strategies do not call for equal, bal-anced initiatives on all fronts at all times. Instead,usually some initiatives must come first, followedonly then by others, and then still others. In erect-ing a great building, foundations must be laid,followed by walls, and only then the roof.

Of course, in business strategy there is no uni-versally superior sequence. Rather the strategist’sjudgment is required. Consider a printing equip-ment company that committed itself to broadeningits product line and expanding internationally.The executives decided that the new productsshould be added first, in stage one, because theelite sales agents they planned to use for interna-tional expansion would not be able or willing torepresent a narrow product line effectively. Eventhough the executives were anxious to expandgeographically, if they had tried to do so withoutthe more complete line in place, they would havewasted a great deal of time and money. The lefthalf of Figure 3 shows their two-stage logic.

The executives of a regional title insurance com-pany, as part of their new strategy, were commit-ted to becoming national in scope through a seriesof acquisitions. For their differentiators, theyplanned to establish a prestigious brand backedby aggressive advertising and superb customerservice. But the executives faced a chicken-and-egg problem: they couldn’t make the acquisitionson favorable terms without the brand image inplace; but with only their current limited geo-graphic scope, they couldn’t afford the quantity or


quality of advertising needed to establish thebrand. They decided on a three-stage plan (shownin the right half of Figure 3): 1) make selectedacquisitions in adjacent regions, hence becominga super-regional in size and scale; 2) invest mod-erately heavily in advertising and brand-building;3) make acquisitions in additional regions on morefavorable terms (because of the enhanced brand, arecord of growth, and, they hoped, an appreciatedstock price) while simultaneously continuing topush further in building the brand.

Decisions about staging can be driven by a num-ber of factors. One, of course, is resources. Fundingand staffing every envisioned initiative, at theneeded levels, is generally not possible at the out-set of a new strategic campaign. Urgency is a sec-ond factor affecting staging; some elements of astrategy may face brief windows of opportunity,requiring that they be pursued first and aggres-sively. A third factor is the achievement of credi-bility. Attaining certain thresholds—in specificarenas, differentiators, or vehicles—can be criti-cally valuable for attracting resources and stake-holders that are needed for other parts of the strat-egy. A fourth factor is the pursuit of early wins. Itmay be far wiser to successfully tackle a part of thestrategy that is relatively doable before attemptingmore challenging or unfamiliar initiatives. Theseare only some of the factors that might go intodecisions about the speed and sequence of strate-gic initiatives. However, since the concept of stag-ing has gone largely unexplored in the strategyliterature, it is often given far too little attention bystrategists themselves.

Economic Logic

At the heart of a business strategy must be a clearidea of how profits will be generated—not just

some profits, but profits above the firm’s cost ofcapital.8 It is not enough to vaguely count on hav-ing revenues that are above costs. Unless there’s acompelling basis for it, customers and competitorswon’t let that happen. And it’s not enough to gen-erate a long list of reasons why customers will beeager to pay high prices for your products, alongwith a long list of reasons why your costs will belower than your competitors’. That’s a sure-fireroute to strategic schizophrenia and mediocrity.

It is not enough to vaguely count onhaving revenues that are above costs.Unless there’s a compelling basis for it,customers and competitors won’t let thathappen.

The most successful strategies have a centraleconomic logic that serves as the fulcrum for profitcreation. In some cases, the economic key may beto obtain premium prices by offering customers adifficult-to-match product. For instance, the NewYork Times is able to charge readers a very highprice (and strike highly favorable licensing ar-rangements with on-line information distributors)because of its exceptional journalistic quality; inaddition, the Times is able to charge advertisershigh prices because it delivers a large number ofdedicated, affluent readers. ARAMARK, the highlyprofitable international food-service company, isable to obtain premium prices from corporate andinstitutional clients by offering a level of custom-ized service and responsiveness that competitorscannot match. The company seeks out only thoseclients that want superior food service and arewilling to pay for it. For example, once domesticairlines became less interested in distinguishing

FIGURE 3Examples of Strategic Staging


themselves through their in-flight meals, ARAMARKdropped that segment.

In some instances, the economic logic might resideon the cost side of the profit equation. ARAMARK—adding to its pricing leverage—uses its huge scaleof operations and presence in multiple market seg-ments (business, educational, healthcare, and cor-rectional-system food service) to achieve a sizeablecost advantage in food purchases—an advantagethat competitors cannot duplicate. GKN Sinter Met-als, which has grown by acquisition to become theworld’s major powdered-metals company, benefitsgreatly from its scale in obtaining raw materials andin exploiting, in country after country, its leading-edge capabilities in metal-forming processes.

In these examples the economic logics are notfleeting or transitory. They are rooted in the firms’fundamental and relatively enduring capabilities.ARAMARK and the New York Times can chargepremium prices because their offerings are supe-rior in the eyes of their targeted customers, custom-ers highly value that superiority, and competitorscan’t readily imitate the offerings. ARAMARK andGKN Sinter Metals have lower costs than theircompetitors because of systemic advantages ofscale, experience, and know-how sharing. Granted,these leads may not last forever or be completelyunassailable, but the economic logics that are atwork at these companies account for their abilities todeliver strong year-in, year-out profits.

The Imperative of Strategic Comprehensiveness

By this point, it should be clear why a strategyneeds to encompass all five elements—arenas, ve-hicles, differentiators, staging, and economic logic.First, all five are important enough to require in-tentionality. Surprisingly, most strategic plans em-phasize one or two of the elements without givingany consideration to the others. Yet to develop astrategy without attention to all five leaves criticalomissions.

Surprisingly, most strategic plansemphasize one or two of the elementswithout giving any consideration to theothers.

Second, the five elements call not only for choice,but also for preparation and investment. All fiverequire certain capabilities that cannot be gener-ated spontaneously.

Third, all five elements must align with and sup-port each other. When executives and academics

think about alignment, they typically have in mindthat internal organizational arrangements need toalign with strategy (in tribute to the maxim that“structure follows strategy”9), but few pay muchattention to the consistencies required among theelements of the strategy itself.

Finally, it is only after the specification of all fivestrategic elements that the strategist is in the bestposition to turn to designing all the other support-ing activities—functional policies, organizationalarrangements, operating programs, and process-es—that are needed to reinforce the strategy. Thefive elements of the strategy diamond can be con-sidered the hub or central nodes for designing acomprehensive, integrated activity system.10

Comprehensive Strategies at IKEA and BrakeProducts International

IKEA: Revolutionizing an Industry

So far we have identified and discussed the fiveelements that make up a strategy and form ourstrategy diamond. But a strategy is more than sim-ply choices on these five fronts: it is an integrated,mutually reinforcing set of choices—choices thatform a coherent whole. To illustrate the importanceof this coherence we will now discuss two exam-ples of fully elaborated strategy diamonds. As afirst illustration, consider the strategic intent ofIKEA, the remarkably successful global furnitureretailer. IKEA’s strategy over the past 25 years hasbeen highly coherent, with all five elements rein-forcing each other.

The arenas in which IKEA operates are well de-fined: the company sells relatively inexpensive,contemporary, Scandinavian-style furniture andhome furnishings. IKEA’s target market is young,primarily white-collar customers. The geographicscope is worldwide, or at least all countries wheresocioeconomic and infrastructure conditions sup-port the concept. IKEA is not only a retailer, butalso maintains control of product design to ensurethe integrity of its unique image and to accumulateunrivaled expertise in designing for efficient man-ufacturing. The company, however, does not man-ufacture, relying instead on a host of long-termsuppliers who ensure efficient, geographically dis-persed production.

IKEA is not only a retailer, but alsomaintains control of product design toensure the integrity of its unique imageand to accumulate unrivaled expertise indesigning for efficient manufacturing.


As its primary vehicle for getting to its chosenarenas, IKEA engages in organic expansion, build-ing its own wholly owned stores. IKEA has chosennot to make acquisitions of existing retailers, andit engages in very few joint ventures. This reflectstop management’s belief that the company needsto fully control local execution of its highly inno-vative retailing concept.

IKEA attracts customers and beats competitorsby offering several important differentiators. First,its products are of very reliable quality but are lowin price (generally 20 to 30 percent below the com-petition for comparable quality goods). Second, incontrast to the stressful, intimidating feeling thatshoppers often encounter in conventional furniturestores, IKEA customers are treated to a fun, non-threatening experience, where they are allowed towander through a visually exciting store with onlythe help they request. And third, the companystrives to make customer fulfillment immediate.Specifically, IKEA carries an extensive inventoryat each store, which allows a customer to take theitem home or have it delivered the same day. Incontrast, conventional furniture retailers showfloor models, but then require a 6- to 10-week waitfor the delivery of each special-order item.

As for staging, or IKEA’s speed and sequence ofmoves, once management realized that its ap-proach would work in a variety of countries andcultures, the company committed itself to rapidinternational expansion, but only one region at a

time. In general, the company’s approach has beento use its limited resources to establish an earlyfoothold by opening a single store in each targetedcountry. Each such entry is supported with aggres-sive public relations and advertising, in order tolay claim to the radically new retailing concept inthat market. Later, IKEA comes back into eachcountry and fills in with more stores.

The economic logic of IKEA rests primarily onscale economies and efficiencies of replication. Al-though the company doesn’t sell absolutely iden-tical products in all its geographic markets, IKEAhas enough standardization that it can take greatadvantage of being the world’s largest furnitureretailer. Its costs from long-term suppliers are ex-ceedingly low, and made even lower by IKEA’sproprietary, easy-to-manufacture product designs.In each region, IKEA has enough scale to achievesubstantial distribution and promotional efficien-cies. And each individual store is set up as a high-volume operation, allowing further economies ininventories, advertising, and staffing. IKEA’sphased international expansion has allowed exec-utives to benefit, in country after country, fromwhat they have learned about site selection, storedesign, store openings, and ongoing operations.They are vigilant, astute learners, and they putthat learning to great economic use.

Note how all of IKEA’s actions (shown in Figure4) fit together. For example, consider the strongalignment between its targeted arenas and its

FIGURE 4IKEA’s Strategy


competitive differentiators. An emphasis on lowprice, fun, contemporary styling, and instant fulfill-ment is well suited to the company’s focus onyoung, first-time furniture buyers. Or consider thelogical fit between the company’s differentiatorsand vehicles—providing a fun shopping experi-ence and instant fulfillment requires very intricatelocal execution, which can be achieved far betterthrough wholly owned stores than by using acqui-sitions, joint ventures, or franchises. These align-ments, along with others, help account for IKEA’slong string of years with double-digit sales growth,and current revenues of $8 billion.

The IKEA example allows us to illustrate thestrategy diamond with a widely familiar businessstory. That example, however, is admittedly retro-spective, looking backward to interpret the compa-ny’s strategy according to the framework. But thereal power and role of strategy, of course, is inlooking forward. Based on a careful and completeanalysis of a company’s environment, market-place, competitors, and internal capabilities, se-nior managers need to craft a strategic intent fortheir firm. The diamond is a useful framework fordoing just that, as we will now illustrate with abusiness whose top executives set out to develop anew strategy that would allow them to break freefrom a spiral of mediocre profits and stagnantsales.

Brake Products International: Charting a NewDirection

The strategy diamond proved very useful when itwas applied by the new executive team of BrakeProducts International (BPI), a disguised manufac-turer of components used in braking and suspen-sion systems for passenger cars and light trucks. Inrecent years, BPI had struggled as the worldwideauto industry consolidated. Its reaction had been acombination of disparate, half-hearted diversifica-tion initiatives, alternating with across-the-boardexpense cuts. The net result, predictably, was notgood, and a new management team was broughtin to try to revive performance. As part of thisturnaround effort, BPI’s new executives developeda new strategic intent by making critical decisionsfor each of the five elements—arenas, vehicles,differentiators, staging, and economic logic. Wewill not attempt to convey the analysis that gaverise to their choices, but rather (as with the IKEAexample) will use BPI to illustrate the articulationof a comprehensive strategy.

For their targeted arenas, BPI executives com-mitted to expanding beyond their current marketscope of North American and European car plants

by adding Asia, where global carmakers were rap-idly expanding. They considered widening theirproduct range to include additional auto compo-nents, but concluded that their unique design andmanufacturing expertise was limited to brake andsuspension components. They did decide, how-ever, that they should apply their advanced capa-bility in antilock-braking and electronic traction-control systems to develop braking products foroff-road vehicles, including construction and farmequipment. As an additional commitment, execu-tives decided to add a new service, systems inte-gration, that would involve bundling BPI productswith other related components, from other manu-facturers, that form a complete suspension system,and then providing the carmakers with easy-to-handle, preassembled systems modules. This ini-tiative would allow the carmakers to reduce as-sembly costs significantly, as well as to deal witha single suspension-system supplier, with sub-stantial logistics and inventory savings.

The management team identified three majorvehicles for achieving BPI’s presence in their se-lected arenas. First, they were committed to or-ganic internal development of new generations ofleading-edge braking systems, including those foroff-road vehicles. To become the preferred suspen-sion-system integrator for the major auto manufac-turers, executives decided to enter into strategicalliances with the leading producers of other keysuspension components. Finally, to serve carmak-ers that were expanding their operations in Asia,BPI planned to initiate equity joint ventures withbrake companies in China, Korea, and Singapore.BPI would provide the technology and oversee themanufacturing of leading-edge, high-quality anti-lock brakes; the Asian partners would take thelead in marketing and government relations.

BPI’s executives also committed to achievingand exploiting a small set of differentiators. Thecompany was already a technology leader, partic-ularly in antilock-braking systems and electronictraction-control systems. These proprietary tech-nologies were seen as centrally important andwould be further nurtured. Executives also be-lieved they could establish a preeminent positionas a systems integrator of entire suspension as-semblies. However, achieving this advantagewould require new types of manufacturing andlogistics capabilities, as well as new skills in man-aging relationships with other component compa-nies. This would include an extensive e-businesscapability that linked BPI with its suppliers andcustomers. And finally, as one of the few brakes/suspension companies with a manufacturing pres-ence in North America and Europe—and now in


Asia—BPI executives concluded that they had apotential advantage—what they referred to as“global reach”—that was well suited to the globalconsolidation of the automobile industry. If BPI dida better job of coordinating activities among itsgeographically dispersed operations, it could pro-vide the one-stop, low-cost global purchasing thatthe industry giants increasingly sought.

If BPI did a better job of coordinatingactivities among its geographicallydispersed operations, it could provide theone-stop, low-cost global purchasing thatthe industry giants increasingly sought.

BPI’s executives approached decisions aboutstaging very deliberately. They felt urgency onvarious fronts, but also realized that, after severalyears of lackluster performance, the firm lackedthe resources and credibility to do everything all atonce. As is often the case, decisions about stagingwere most important for those initiatives where thegaps between the status quo and the strategic

intent were the greatest. For example, executivesdecided that, in order to provide a clear, early signof continued commitment to the major global automanufacturers, a critical first step was to establishthe joint ventures with brake manufacturers inAsia. They felt just as much urgency to gain afirst-mover advantage as a suspension-system in-tegrator. Therefore, management committed topromptly establish alliances with a select group ofmanufacturers of other suspension components,and to experiment with one pilot customer. Thesetwo sets of initiatives constituted stage one of BPI’sstrategic intent. For stage two, the executivesplanned to launch the full versions of the systems-integration and global-reach concepts, completewith aggressive marketing. Also in this secondstage, expansion into the off-road vehicle marketwould commence.

BPI’s economic logic hinged on securing pre-mium prices from its customers, by offering themat least three valuable, difficult-to-imitate bene-fits. First, BPI was the worldwide technologyleader in braking systems; car companies wouldpay to get access to these products for their new

FIGURE 5BPI’s Strategy


high-end models. Second, BPI would allow globalcustomers an economical single source for brakingproducts; this would save customers considerablecontract administration and quality-assurancecosts—savings that they would be willing to share.And third, through its alliances with major suspen-sion-component manufacturers, BPI would be ableto deliver integrated-suspension-system kits tocustomers—again saving customers in purchasingcosts, inventory costs, and even assembly costs, forwhich they would pay a premium.

BPI’s turnaround was highly successful. The sub-stance of the company’s strategy (shown in Figure5) was critically important in the turnaround, aswas the concise strategy statement that was com-municated throughout the firm. As the CEO stated:

We’ve finally identified what we want to be,and what’s important to us. Just as impor-tantly, we’ve decided what we don’t want tobe, and have stopped wasting time and effort.Since we started talking about BPI in terms ofarenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, andeconomic logic, we have been able to get ourtop team on the same page. A whole host ofdecisions have logically fallen into place insupport of our comprehensive strategicagenda.

Of Strategy, Better Strategy, and No Strategy

Our purpose in this article has been elemental—toidentify what constitutes a strategy. This basicagenda is worthwhile because executives andscholars have lost track of what it means to engagein the art of the general. We particularly hope tocounter the recent catchall fragmentation of thestrategy concept, and to remind strategists thatorchestrated holism is their charge.

But we do not want to be mistaken. We don’tbelieve that it is sufficient to simply make thesefive sets of choices. No—a business needs not justa strategy, but a sound strategy. Some strategiesare clearly far better than others. Fortunately, thisis where the wealth of strategic-analysis tools thathave been developed in the last 30 years becomesvaluable. Such tools as industry analysis, technol-ogy cycles, value chains, and core competencies,among others, are very helpful for improving thesoundness of strategies. When we compare thesetools and extract their most powerful central mes-sages, several key criteria emerge to help execu-tives test the quality of a proposed strategy. Thesecriteria are presented in Table 1.11 We stronglyencourage executives to apply these tests through-out the strategy-design process and especiallywhen a proposed strategy emerges.

There might be those who wonder whether strat-egy isn’t a concept of yesteryear, whose time hascome and gone. In an era of rapid, discontinuousenvironmental shifts, isn’t the company that at-tempts to specify its future just flirting with disas-ter? Isn’t it better to be flexible, fast-on-the-feet,ready to grab opportunities when the right onescome along?

Some of the skepticism about strategy stemsfrom basic misconceptions. First, a strategy neednot be static: it can evolve and be adjusted on anongoing basis. Unexpected opportunities need notbe ignored because they are outside the strategy.Second, a strategy doesn’t require a business tobecome rigid. Some of the best strategies for to-day’s turbulent environment keep multiple optionsopen and build in desirable flexibility—throughalliances, outsourcing, leased assets, toehold in-vestments in promising technologies, and numer-ous other means. A strategy can help to intention-ally build in many forms of flexibility—if that’swhat is called for. Third, a strategy doesn’t dealonly with an unknowable, distant future. The ap-propriate lifespans of business strategies have be-come shorter in recent years. Strategy used to beequated with 5- or 10-year horizons, but today ahorizon of two to three years is often more fitting. Inany event, strategy does not deal as much with

Table 1Testing the Quality of Your Strategy

Key Evaluation Criteria1. Does your strategy fit with what’s going on in the

environment?Is there healthy profit potential where you’re headed? Doesyour strategy align with the key success factors of yourchosen environment?

2. Does your strategy exploit your key resources?With your particular mix of resources, does this strategygive you a good head start on competitors? Can you pursuethis strategy more economically than competitors?

3. Will your envisioned differentiators be sustainable?Will competitors have difficulty matching you? If not, doesyour strategy explicitly include a ceaseless regimen ofinnovation and opportunity creation?

4. Are the elements of your strategy internally consistent?Have you made choices of arenas, vehicles, differentiators,and staging, and economic logic? Do they all fit andmutually reinforce each other?

5. Do you have enough resources to pursue this strategy?Do you have the money, managerial time and talent, andother capabilities to do all you envision? Are you sureyou’re not spreading your resources too thinly, only to beleft with a collection of feeble positions?

6. Is your strategy implementable?Will your key constituencies allow you to pursue thisstrategy? Can your organization make it through thetransition? Are you and your management team able andwilling to lead the required changes?


preordaining the future as it does with assessingcurrent conditions and future likelihoods, thenmaking the best decisions possible today.

Strategy is not primarily about planning. It isabout intentional, informed, and integratedchoices. The noted strategic thinkers Gary Hameland C. K. Prahalad said: “[A company’s] leadershipcannot be planned for, but neither can it happenwithout a grand and well-considered aspiration.”12

We offer the strategy diamond as a way to craftand articulate a business aspiration.

Acknowledgments

We thank the following people for helpful suggestions: RalphBiggadike, Warren Boeker, Kathy Harrigan, Paul Ingram, XavierMartin, Atul Nerkar, and Jaeyong Song.

Endnotes1 Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy. New York: The Free

Press, provides an in-depth discussion of the five-forces model.Hypercompetition is addressed in D’Aveni, R. A. 1994. Hyper-competition. New York: The Free Press. The resource-basedview of the firm is discussed in Barney, J. 1991. Firm resourcesand sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management,17: 99–120. See Brandenburger, M., & Nalebuff, R. J. 1995. Theright game: Use game theory to shape strategy. Harvard Busi-ness Review, July–August: 57–71, for a discussion of co-opetition.

2 Bianco, A., & Moore, P. L. 2001. Downfall: The inside story ofthe management fiasco at Xerox. BusinessWeek, 5 March 2001.

3 A widely applicable framework for strategy implementa-tion is discussed in Galbraith, J. R., & Kazanjian, R. K. 1986.Strategy implementation: Structure, systems and process, 2nded. St. Paul: West Publishing. A similar tool is offered in Ham-brick, D. C., & Cannella, A. 1989. Strategy implementation assubstance and selling. The Academy of Management Executive,3(4): 278–285.

4 This observation has been made for years by many contrib-utors, including Quinn, J. B. 1980. Strategies for change: Logical

incrementalism. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin Publishing;and Mintzberg, H. 1973. Strategy making in three modes. Cali-fornia Management Review, 15: 44–53.

5 Drucker, P. 1954. The practice of management. New York:Harper & Row.

6 Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. 1999. The influence of orga-nizational acquisition experience on acquisition performance:A behavioral learning perspective. Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 44: 29–56.

7 Eisenhardt, K. M., & Brown, S. L. 1998. Time pacing: Com-peting in markets that won’t stand still. Harvard Business Re-view, March–April: 59–69, discusses “time pacing” as a compo-nent of a process of contending with rapidly changingenvironments.

8 The collapse of stock market valuations for Internet compa-nies lacking in profits—or any prospect of profits—marked areturn to economic reality. Profits above the firm’s cost of cap-ital are required in order to yield sustained or longer-termshareholder returns.

9 Galbraith & Kazanjian, op. cit., and Hambrick & Cannella,op. cit.

10 Porter, M. E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Re-view, November–December: 61–78.

11 See Tilles, S. 1963. How to evaluate strategy. Harvard Busi-ness Review, July–August: 112–121, for a classic, but more lim-ited, set of evaluative tests.

12 See Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1993. Strategy as stretchand leverage. Harvard Business Review, March–April: 84–91.

Donald C. Hambrick is the Samuel Bronfman Professor of Dem-ocratic Business Enterprise at the Graduate School of Business,Columbia University. He holds degrees from the University ofColorado (B.S.), Harvard University (MBA), and the Pennsylva-nia State University (Ph.D.). An active consultant and executiveeducation instructor, he also served as president of the Acad-emy of Management. Contact: [email protected].

James W. Fredrickson is a professor of strategic managementand Chevron Oil Centennial Foundation Fellow in the Mc-Combs School of Business of the University of Texas at Austin.He was previously on the Faculties of Columbia University andthe University of Pittsburgh, and holds a Ph.D. from the Univer-sity of Washington. Contact: [email protected].


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