ACC Opp to Mot to Remove Confidentiality

866332

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Charlotte Division

)

In Re: ) Chapter 11 )

GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES ) Case No. 10-31607 LLC, et al. ) ) Debtors.1

) ) Jointly Administered

OPPOSITION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMANTS TO MOTION OF DEBTORS TO REMOVE

CONFIDENTIALITY DESIGNATIONS FROM CERTAIN EVIDENCE FOR

PURPOSES OF TRIAL

The Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants (the “Committee”),

hereby responds to the Debtor’s Motion to Remove Confidentiality Designations from Certain

Evidence for Purposes of Trial (the “Motion”) filed by Garlock on July 3, 2013 [Dkt. No. 2979].

1. Garlock’s Motion is a transparent attempt to use information that was provided in

discovery under stringent protections and solely for use in this lawsuit (the “

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Confidential

Discovery Materials”) in other fora and for other purposes. This attempt is contrary to the

controlling protective order entered by this Court, by the terms of which Garlock specifically

agreed to be bound, and upon which terms the nonparty law firms relied when providing

Garlock’s requested discovery (the “Stipulated Protective Order”).2

1 The Debtors in these jointly administered cases are Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC (“Garlock”) Garrison Litigation Management Group, Ltd., and The Anchor Packing Company.

2 Stipulated Protective Order, dated Mar. 22, 2011 [Dkt. No. 1225].

Case 10-31607 Doc 3046 Filed 07/17/13 Entered 07/17/13 20:58:24 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 16

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2. Moreover, the law is clear that, having stipulated to a protective order providing

for confidentiality, Garlock is not entitled to make “public access” arguments to eliminate such

confidentiality. Yet those are the only arguments that Garlock makes.

3. The Motion must be denied.

4. On March 22, 2011, the parties submitted the Stipulated Protective Order to the

Court. The Debtors, the FCR, and the Committee were all signatories. The Court entered it as

an order that same day.

BACKGROUND

5. In November of 2012, Garlock issued subpoenas for documents and deposition

testimony — with respect to the so-called “Designated Plaintiffs” and also more broadly — to

various asbestos plaintiffs’ law firms who had been active litigants against Garlock in the tort

system prepetition. Ostensibly, that discovery was undertaken only for the purposes of the

estimation proceeding. While the Committee did not oppose the depositions, it moved for

protection against the Subpoenas Duces Tecum, noting, inter alia, that “Garlock’s search for

‘poster children’ is thus fundamentally irrelevant and can serve no proper purpose in aggregate

estimation,” and that “[b]ecause the Subpoenas Duces Tecum are so plainly out of place for

aggregate estimation, they suggest ulterior purposes.”3 The Court allowed the subpoenas in part,

while narrowing their scope.4

3 Motion of the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants for a Protective Order with Respect to Document Demands Included in Garlock’s Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Five Law Firms at 7, 8, dated Nov. 16, 2012 [Dkt. No. 2623].

4 Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Motion by Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants for Protective Order with Respect to Document Demands Included in Garlock’s Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Five Law Firms, Certain Firms’ Joinders in Committee’s (Footnote continued on next page.)


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6. On December 20, 2012, the same signatories filed an Amendment to Stipulated

Protective Order [Dkt. No. 2704] (the “Amendment”); this Amendment makes clear that the

protections of the Stipulated Protective Order for confidential information extend to discovery

materials produced by non-parties and designated as confidential by those non-parties. Id.

7. On March 1, 2013, Garlock sent various asbestos plaintiffs’ law firms a three-

page letter challenging the confidentiality designations of 11 depositions of plaintiffs’ tort

counsel, as well as challenging the confidentiality designations of plaintiffs’ documents

“produced by Belluck & Fox; The David Law Firm; Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC;

Early, Lucarelli, Sweeney & Strauss; Shein Law Center, Ltd.; Williams Kherkher; and Waters

Kraus & Paul” by Plaintiffs. Letter from Garland Cassada, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,

to Trevor W. Swett et al. at 2 (March 1, 2013) (“Garlock March 1 letter”). That letter did not

purport to identify any particular documents or testimony.

8. After the parties engaged in discussions as to the confidentiality designations,

Garlock filed the Motion, seeking the same broad-brush removal of confidentiality initially set

forth in its March 1 letter.

9. Garlock requests in the Motion the blanket removal of the confidential

designations made as to the depositions it took of opposing counsel relating to how those counsel

prepare and present asbestos personal injury claims against Garlock and others. This is

information that Garlock would never be entitled to under ordinary circumstances, and which the

asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers only provided pursuant to, and in reliance on, the provisions of the

ARGUMENT

(Footnote continued from previous page.) Motion, and Motion to Quash and for Protective Order of Troy D. Chandler and Williams Kherkher Hart Boundas L.L.P., dated Dec. 12, 2012 [Dkt. No. 2686].


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Stipulated Protective Order. Garlock likewise seeks to remove the confidentiality of a large

group of documents, including Rule 2019 Exhibits, Trust claim forms and documents relating to

the law firms’ clients’ asbestos exposure, all of which fall within the scope of “Confidential

Information” as defined in the Stipulated Protective Order as information regarding individual

asbestos claimants. Garlock’s Motion cannot be justified under the terms of the Stipulated

Protective Order, and indeed, the Motion studiously ignores the standard for Confidential

Information set forth therein. Controlling law demonstrates that the Motion must be rejected.

I.

10. The Stipulated Protective Order binds all parties to this proceeding, including

Debtors, who are signatories to it. It provides that “[t]his Stipulated Protective Order is the

jointly-drafted product of arm’s-length negotiations among the Parties with the benefit of advice

of counsel,” Stipulated Protective Order § 17, and also provides that “[t]he Debtors, FCR,

Committee and Counsel of Record shall seek to have this Stipulated Protective Order entered as

an order of the Court, but agree to be bound by this Stipulated Protective Order whether or not

the Court so orders.” Stipulated Protective Order § 26.

THE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER CONTROLS HERE

A. The Sole Purpose and Intended Effect of Garlock’s Motion is to Enable Garlock to Use the Confidential Discovery Materials in Other Contexts and to Publicize Them

11. Garlock already has the Confidential Discovery Materials, and nowhere in the

Motion does Garlock argue, nor could it, that the confidential designations of those materials

preclude Garlock from using the Confidential Discovery Materials at the estimation hearing.

Indeed, the Stipulated Protective Order expressly provides for the potential use of such

confidential materials there, subject to the terms of a pretrial order or other rulings to be made by

this Court. Stipulated Protective Order § 6(b).


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12. As Garlock already has the Confidential Discovery Materials and will be able to

use them at the estimation if this Court so permits, its argument with respect to confidentiality at

the trial of estimation boils down to the proposition that other entities not involved therein

should be given access to such documents. But Garlock provides no legal basis on which to

assert the alleged rights of such hypothetical third parties or for exempting Garlock from the

normal rule that a litigant may not assert the rights of others.

13. Garlock is also disingenuous in arguing that “Debtors do not intend to publicize

this evidence before it is introduced at trial, but wish to ensure that when they do present the

evidence, it will be publicly available.” Motion ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Indeed, Garlock seeks to

strip the confidential status preemptively of materials that it only might offer in evidence and

might succeed in getting admitted into evidence over objection.

14. In fact, the Stipulated Protective Order makes clear that the confidentiality

protections attached to Confidential Discovery Materials, like any other materials designated

confidential, may not be removed until (a) this Court decides that they should be removed, and

(b) any such decision by this Court is affirmed on any appeal. Stipulated Protective Order § 5

(disputed discovery material shall be treated as Confidential Information even after having its

confidential treatment challenged “pending the Court’s decision and any appeal therefrom”). As

Garlock chose to file its Motion on the eve of trial, even if this Court were to grant it the full

relief requested (a ruling that would be wrong, for reasons explained herein), there would be no

realistic prospect that the confidentiality protections would become inoperative in time for the

Confidential Discovery Materials to be used publicly at the estimation trial. This makes even

more clear that what is really at stake with respect to the Motion is whether Garlock will


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potentially be able to use the Confidential Discovery Materials for purposes other than the

estimation hearing.

15. Indeed, Garlock expressly argues that it seeks to have “Congress, the public, state

legislatures, state and federal courts, other defendants, and other interested parties” get “the full

story on these issues of major public concern.” Motion ¶ 15. But such out-of-court use of the

Confidential Discovery Materials flies in the face of the Stipulated Protective Order’s clear

directive that “[a]ny Receiving Party shall use Confidential Information solely in fulfillment of its

respective rights, duties, and obligations in the Chapter 11 Cases subject to the terms of this

Stipulated Protective Order.” Stipulated Protective Order § 6(a) (emphasis added). Garlock’s

attempt to remove confidentiality protections for the purpose of transmitting currently

confidential information to other entities is blatantly inconsistent with this explicit use restriction

set forth in the Stipulated Protective Order itself, to which Garlock expressly agreed. And it is

black-letter law that, had Garlock informed this Court prior to seeking the Confidential

Discovery Materials that it sought such discovery materials for use outside of the estimation

proceeding, this Court would have been obliged to deny discovery of such materials. See, e.g.,

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 (1978) (“[W]hen the purpose of a

discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit,

discovery properly is denied. Likewise, discovery should be denied when a party’s aim is to

delay bringing a case to trial, or embarrass or harass the person from whom he seeks discovery.”)

(citations omitted); Insulate Am. v. Masco Corp., 227 F.R.D. 427, 434 (W.D.N.C. 2005)

(“[W]hen the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other

than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied.”) (citation omitted).


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16. Garlock’s position is also hypocritical: with respect to the thousands of pages of

information Garlock itself, or its affiliates, have designated as confidential, Garlock and its

controlling parent apparently will continue to protect such designations irrespective of its

purported interest in having an “open trial.” Motion ¶ 15.

B. Garlock’s “Public Access” Arguments Are Contrary to the Governing Law

17. Garlock cites Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code and cases regarding “public

access” rights to certain documents as legal support for the Motion. Motion at 8-10. But, as the

Motion itself sets forth, Section 107’s express language is limited to “a paper filed in a case

under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court.” Motion ¶ 20, citing 11 U.S.C. 107(a). By

the clear terms of Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code therefore, such “public access” rights

have no application to discovery materials such as depositions and document productions, which

are the subject of Garlock’s Motion. Neither a document produced in discovery nor a deposition

transcript is a “paper filed.” Numerous cases make this same point. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp.

Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 2005 WL 3504860, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005)

(finding that any documents underlying the Examiner’s report, “if not filed, are not part of the

court record and are not subject to public access”); In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Ctrs.,

Inc., 199 B.R. 376, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding Section 107 inapplicable to discovery

materials because it “only applies to filed documents” and that “absent a court order, discovery

materials may not be filed” in the district); In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.

1989) (“This Court determines that the Underlying Documents are not subject to § 107(a)

because they have not been, and will not be, filed. The plain language of § 107 establishes

standards only for those documents which are filed with the court. To the extent the Underlying

Documents are not filed, they are not subject to the § 107(a) requirements.”). Garlock does not

cite any case to the contrary.


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18. Nor does Garlock’s alleged intent to use some of the depositions and documents

at the estimation entitle Garlock to “remove” the confidentiality designations of the Confidential

Discovery Materials. Controlling case law in this Circuit makes clear that a party may not solicit

the production of sensitive information through means of an agreed protective order, and then

later use Constitutional, statutory or common law arguments regarding “public access” to

undercut the protections to which it previously agreed. The case of Pittston Co. v. United States,

2002 WL 32158052 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2002), aff’d, 368 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004), is directly on

point. In that case, the party receiving documents designated as confidential by the disclosing

non-party utilized such documents in a summary judgment brief, and then argued that pursuant

to the presumption of access set forth in “public access” cases, such documents were not worthy

of continued protection and should have such protection removed. Id. at *1. Accordingly, the

receiving party filed a motion to remove protection from certain such documents. Id.

19. The district court first held that the fact that the requesting party had agreed to a

protective order to get the documents in the first place removed the otherwise applicable

presumption of public access. “A party to the protective order cannot later make a public access

claim which it bargained away in order to expeditiously receive the documents in the first place.”

Id. at *2. The district court also noted that a contrary ruling would require “a document-by-

document review” and “complete litigation of the confidentiality issue for every document” the

receiving party sought to strip of protection. Id. at *3. This, in turn, “would defeat the purposes

of Rule 26(c) protective orders — to facilitate discovery and expedite resolution of the issues.”

Id. The district court concluded by noting that the receiving party’s “public access argument is

inappropriate coming from a party who agreed to the Protective Order and benefitted from it.”

Id. The district court denied the Motion, and maintained the protection of the documents. Id.


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20. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Pittston Co.

v. United States, 368 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit specifically distinguished the

case from the case of Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (a

case on which Garlock specifically relies in the Motion), because, in Pittston, the party seeking

to remove confidentiality from the documents “had access to the documents covered by the

protective order.” Pittston, 368 F.3d at 406. The Court also reiterated the district court’s point

that the movant had previously agreed to the sealing of documents pursuant to the protective

order “in order to benefit from a more open discovery from [the producing entity], which was not

a party to the litigation.” Id. Both points apply fully to the present Motion, and reveal that it

must be denied.

21. A similar result was reached in the case of Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 186

F.R.D. 331 (M.D.N.C. 1999). There, a party who had previously agreed to the terms of a

protective order and received confidential documents under it, did not initially challenge the fact

that the other party had designated “many documents and categories of documents” as

confidential. Later, the receiving party sought to remove such confidentiality from those

documents wholesale to avoid having to submit the record on appeal under seal and so that it

could provide the information to the public at large. Id. at 332-34.

22. The district court rejected the receiving party’s blanket request to remove

confidentiality, noting that granting a protective order during pretrial discovery necessarily

required that the court had found that “good cause” existed for its issuance. Id. at 333. The court

held that the receiving party could not meet its burden of showing that the protective order

should be modified so as to remove such confidentiality where the receiving party “agreed to the

terms of the protective order,” did not challenge the confidentiality designations during


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discovery, and where the producing party “relied on this protection in producing documents.”

Id. The district court specifically rejected the argument that the receiving party’s desire to

provide such information to the public constituted “good cause” to, in effect, modify the

protective order by a broadbrush removal of such confidentiality designations. Id. at 333-34.

23. The district court also rejected the receiving party’s argument that at least the

materials submitted as part of the summary judgment proceeding should have protection

removed from them based on the common law presumption of access to judicial records and the

First Amendment right of access. Id. at 334. The court held that because the receiving party

“agreed to the Confidentiality order, the Court will not entertain their First Amendment and

public access arguments.” Id. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529

F. Supp. 866, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (a party who voluntarily enters into a protective order

“effectively waive[s] their right to seek wholesale declassification”).

24. By contrast, the majority of the cases relied upon by Garlock do not involve

stipulated protective orders, or any agreement between the parties. And, those cases relied upon

by Garlock that do contain an agreement between the parties also involve third-party requests for

the protected material, not just a request by one of the parties to the agreement. Garlock’s cases

are thus inapposite. See, e.g., Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 577, n.6

(4th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the party’s “argument for public access in the instant appeal

is similar to the one we rejected in Pittson, the cases are distinguishable because here (unlike

Pittson) we have the intervention by the Media Appellees”).

C. Garlock’s Motion Violates the Requirements of the Stipulated Protective Order

25. The very first sentence of the Motion makes clear that it is theoretically premised

on Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order: “Debtors bring this motion under section 5 of the


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Stipulated Protective Order (Docket No. 1225) to remove confidentiality designations from

certain evidence that law firms have designated as confidential under that order.” Motion at 1.

26. But Garlock violates the requirements of that Section. Section 5 of the Stipulated

Protective Order requires that, if a party receiving materials designated as confidential disputes

that designation, the Receiving Party shall give “prompt” written notice of the dispute to the

Producing Party. Garlock’s Motion is noticeably absent of any assertion that it did so. In fact,

the Confidential Discovery Materials were largely provided to Garlock in December 2012 and

January 2013, but Garlock’s first notice regarding a challenge to such confidential designations

was in March of 2013. A delay of several months to challenge confidentiality is not prompt.

27. Moreover, Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order also requires that an

“impasse” be reached and declared before a Receiving Party can challenge confidential

designations in this Court. Yet the Motion itself sets forth that Garlock’s conferences with the

law firms have “not yet” resolved the disputes, and that Garlock “will continue to meet and

confer with counsel for the law firms.” Motion ¶ 9.

28. In other words, the Motion was filed before an impasse had been reached and

declared (in fact, Garlock declared an impasse in an email to counsel for the ACC and the law

firms on July 16 after a telephonic meet-and-confer the same day, nearly two weeks after it filed

the Motion). This is another example of how the Motion fails to meet the requirements of the

Stipulated Protective Order.

29. These violations of Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order by Garlock are

full and independent reasons why the Motion should be denied.


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II.

30. The Motion, although it purports to argue that the Confidential Discovery

Materials should have their status as Confidential Information under the Stipulated Protective

Order stripped away, does not set out the definition of Confidential Information from that Order.

That language is as follows:

THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY MATERIALS WERE APPROPRIATELY DESIGNATED AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION UNDER THE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

“Confidential Information” means Discovery Material that (i) is produced or provided by the Producing Party or its representatives or has previously been produced or provided by a Producing Party or its representatives pursuant to an Existing Confidentiality Agreement; (ii) is believed in good faith by the Producing Party to contain information that has not been made public and which the Producing Party would not make public in the ordinary course of its activities, including, without limitation, proprietary or sensitive information concerning the Debtors’ assets, liabilities, business operations, projections, analyses, compilations, studies, terms of employment, employee compensation levels, asbestos claims data, the Database, information regarding individual asbestos claimants, including medical information, health information, and social security numbers; and (iii) is designated as Confidential Information pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 4 hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term “Confidential Information” shall not include any information or Discovery Material, or portion thereof, that (1) is or becomes generally available to the public or is or becomes available to any Party on a non-confidential basis, in each case to the extent such information or Discovery Material became so available other than by a violation of a contractual, legal, or fiduciary obligation, including without limitation this Stipulated Protective Order; or (2) was in the possession of the Receiving Party prior to its disclosure by the Producing Party and is not subject to any other duty or obligation to maintain confidentiality.

Stipulated Protective Order § 1(g).

31. Confidential Information is thus defined by the Stipulated Protective Order as

information that “is believed in good faith by the Producing Party to contain information that has

not been made public and which the Producing Party would not make public in the ordinary

course of its activities.” Stipulated Protective Order § 1(g). This expressly includes, without

limitation, “information regarding individual asbestos claimants.” Id.


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32. Garlock’s Motion makes clear that the Confidential Discovery Materials it would

remove confidentiality from fall within this definition. Specifically, Garlock seeks to remove

confidentiality from:

a. Documents produced by law firms pursuant to subpoena relating to seventeen “Designated Plaintiffs,” consisting of documents pertaining to the plaintiffs’ asbestos exposures produced during tort cases and Trust claims, ballots, and Rule 2019 statements filed for these plaintiffs;

b. Testimony from six law firms provided under subpoena about the exposures identified to Garlock during the tort case; Trust claims, ballots, and 2019 statements filed for these plaintiffs; exposures underlying those Trust claims, ballots, and 2019 statements; and law firms’ practices with respect to exposure evidence, Trust claims, ballots, and 2019 statements;

c. The report of Professor Lester Brickman, which Debtors have designated confidential solely because it references in part the above evidence that has been designated confidential.

Motion ¶ 2. The Confidential Discovery Materials are revealed by Garlock’s own description

above to be “information regarding individual asbestos claimants.” Stipulated Protective Order

§ 1(g). Nor would such information be made available by the producing law firms in the

ordinary course of their activities. The same analysis applies to the depositions, which Garlock

acknowledges address those same topics and include “law firms’ practices with respect to

exposure evidence, Trust claims, ballots and 2019 Statements.” Motion ¶ 2. For example,

questions that were asked and answered at the depositions include such matters as “the

circumstances” of certain asbestos plaintiffs’ cases, plaintiffs’ particular exposures and how the

law firms identified and analyzed products to which their clients were exposed, the process by

which the law firms were retained by their clients, their referral sources, the extent of their pre-

filing investigations, how the law firms responded to discovery, the questions they asked their

clients in so responding, and how the law firms approached settlement negotiations. This

questioning and the answers given were also frequently tied to particular asbestos cases and


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plaintiffs. The law firms’ practices with respect to how they investigate and try cases and make

claims, and the other topics addressed, are not the sort of information that a firm would plausibly

“make public in the ordinary course of its activities,” and certainly not to its tort litigation

adversaries such as Garlock. Thus, they are Confidential Information under the Stipulated

Protective Order. Stipulated Protective Order § 1(g).

33. Indeed, the rhetoric Garlock uses in the Motion reveals that Garlock itself does

not believe that the Confidential Discovery Materials are the kind of information that the

producing law firms have made public or make public in the ordinary course of their activities: it

alleges, for example, that various other non-parties need to get access to the Confidential

Disclosure Materials to get “the full story.” Motion ¶ 15. Inherent in Garlock’s Motion to

destroy the confidentiality of the Confidential Disclosure Materials is that such documents are

not available publicly; otherwise, there would have been no need for Garlock to seek in

discovery, and to now utilize at the estimation hearing, the Confidential Discovery Materials in

the first place.

34. The casualness with which Garlock approaches the confidential nature of the

Confidential Discovery Materials is best illustrated by its attempt to have this Court make a

blanket ruling that, among other items, confidentiality should be stripped from the Rule 2019

Statements (by which Garlock means the non-public Rule 2019 Exhibits that are associated with

publicly-filed Rule 2019 statements, yet typically kept off the public docket by order of the

presiding court, as indeed they were in Garlock’s own Chapter 11 case). In response to

Garlock’s attempt to get 2019 Exhibits from a variety of bankruptcy courts, Judge Stark, United

States District Court Judge for the District of Delaware, recently ruled that they would be

provided, but that “[t]his Order authorizes Garlock to use such 2019 Exhibits solely in


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connection with the estimation proceedings in Garlock’s chapter 11 bankruptcy cases pending in

the North Carolina Bankruptcy Court, and neither the 2019 Exhibits nor the information

contained therein may be used for any other purpose.” Order Implementing Opinion and Order

Reversing Bankruptcy Court Orders and Granting Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC Access to

2019 Exhibits ¶ 2, In re Motions for Access of Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC, No. 11-1130

(D. Del. Mar. 14, 2013) (emphasis added). Judge Stark also ruled that “Garlock shall not

disclose publicly the information contained in any 2019 Exhibit except in an aggregate format

that does not identify any individual represented person.” Id. ¶ 3. This Court likewise ordered

that such “2019 Exhibits shall be confidential and treated as such without need of any special

designation,” that they not “be used for any purpose other than the Estimation Proceeding,” and

that “any hearing, deposition or other proceeding is closed and limited to attendance by persons

who are subject to the terms of this Order.” Order Governing Use and Confidentiality of Certain

Exhibits to Rule 2019 Statements from Other Bankruptcy Cases ¶¶ 9, 13, 17, dated Mar. 28,

2013 [Dkt. No. 2807].

35. Such materials deserve the same solicitude and protection from this Court now as

they were given by Judge Stark and this Court previously, and Garlock’s attempt to strip away

the confidentiality protections from them, so that they can be publicly disclosed and used “in

other contexts” as Garlock proclaims, should be rejected.


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Garlock’s Motion should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Dated: July 17, 2013 Respectfully submitted, CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED By: Trevor W. Swett III

/s/ Trevor W. Swett III

([email protected]) Kevin C. Maclay ([email protected]) One Thomas Circle, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 862-5000 Elihu Inselbuch ([email protected]) CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED 600 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 319-6001

MOON WRIGHT & HOUSTON, PLLC Travis W. Moon ([email protected]) 227 West Trade Street, Suite 1800 Charlotte, NC 28202 Telephone: (704) 944-6560 Attorneys for the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants
