Access of Muslims and Other Religious Minorities to Rights and Freedoms – Bihar

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This report has been produced with the assistance of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Minority Rights Group International provided technical help. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of Misaal-CES, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency or of Minority Rights Group International.

December 2016

Access of Muslims and Other Religious Minorities to

Rights and Freedoms

Bihar

December 2016

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Executive Summary

1. This study aims to examine the access of religious minorities in the state ofBihar to minority rights - including to freedom of religion, life and security, and social, economic and cultural rights. The focus of the study is Muslims - by far the largest religious minority in Bihar, and India as a whole. We try to measure access to rights by mapping poor Muslims’ conditions as well as by examining the quality of state provisioning for them. This examination is based on (i) primary data on micro evidence on the condition of poor Muslims, collected from 5 sample sites of Muslim habitations in UP (Patna, Vaishali, Sitamarhi, Darbhanga and Madhubani districts) using household surveys (sample of 100 poor Muslim households at each site) and interviews and focus group discussions, as methods. We also use (ii) secondary data and insights, on both micro evidence of the condition of poor Muslims and working of programmes for them, as well as insights on Muslim outcomes and policy dynamics, sourced from published works, media reports, as well as some RTI questions.

2. Bihar with 17.56 million Muslims (2011 Census) accounts for 10.19 per centof the country’s Muslim population, the second highest number of Muslims in any state in India. They are a significant percentage of the state’s total population too – at 16.87 per cent. Muslim population is concentrated in northeastern and northern Bihar. Kishanganj, ArariaKatihar and Purnia, all in Northeast have very high concentration of Muslims, as do Darbhanga, Saharsa, West Champaran, and Sitamarhi, all in the north. Majority of Muslims – in the northeast, north as well as in south - live in rural areas. Those in the south eastern and particularly south western districts (Bhagalpur, Monghyr et al) are more urban-based. 63.4 per cent of Muslims in the state were OBCs, rest self-identifying themselves as General. In urban areas alone, this figure is 71 per cent. Currently, there are 9 Muslim groups included in the state BC list and 27 in MBC list. This leaves out many from the lists, including those where the state and central (OBC) lists do not match, thus depriving groups from the benefits that inclusion in BC and MBC lists enable.

3. The findings of our micro studies at the five sites, using sample householdsurveys, are revealing in how excluded poor Muslims in Bihar are from rights and freedoms: i. majority of respondents worked as manual labourers, mostly in constructionbut also as farm labour, as porters, rickshaw pullers, and head loaders. Others worked as vegetable and fruit sellers, and pheriwallahs (itinerant cloth sellers), or as motor mechanics and puncture shop owners. Income levels at all five sites was poor, allowing households little savings for basic needs. ii. a very large section of respondents was asset-less, with none or only little landownership in rural areas, and any comparable assets in urban. Permanent houses, and amenities such as piped water supply, electricity connection and flush toilets at home, too are scare among the cohort, reflecting how poor Muslims struggle with basic services. iii. despite poor incomes and vulnerable livelihoods, only a small section ofrespondents appeared to be deriving benefits of the many social security programmes for the poor – mostly universal, but some also meant specifically for minorities. These included schemes for employment and livelihoods (NREGS, NRLM), housing (IAY), education and health care (scholarship and RSBY/health insurance), food security (PDS, Antayodaya) and pensions (old age, widow, disability).

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iv. poor access of Muslims to schemes seemed - based on interviews and FGDswith respondents - to be founded on multiple factors: poor awareness among the cohort of the schemes and their rights; poor awareness of the processes for accessing the schemes; poor confidence in themselves to access the benefits, and poor trust in service providers to deliver the benefits. Further explorations reveals that poor awareness and intent is an outcome of the poor participation of Muslims in local institutions – panchayats and ward councils – as well as in civil society, resulting in Muslims largely being disengaged, and unable to influence local level decision making, all of which affects their lives. v. Our profiles of the excluded also tell a story of how, the malaise of communalpolarization and violence, spreading all over the country, is beginning to impact the lives of marginalized Muslims in Bihar too. Respondents spoke of attempts by vested interests to foment trouble; the heightened tensions during elections, even the increased activities of SanghParivar affiliated Hindu extremist groups masquerading as religious bodies, resulting in an atmosphere of fear. Yet the refrain from respondents has been that firm and fair handling of situation by state administration meant that citizens are reassured of their life and liberty.

4. Exclusion and Inclusion: Results of our survey, using a very small sample ofpoorest Muslim minorities, echo the understanding of Muslims exclusion that is available in the wider literature, going to show how persistent exclusions have been over time. These lead us to the following conclusions: i. the socio-economic condition of Muslims in Bihar is poor. Reliance of amajority of Muslims on agricultural and construction labour, at home or as migrants in urban centres, or in petty production – employment, thus wholly in the informal sector, allowing for little security against shocks – ensures poverty is rife. Low asset, and high indebtedness ensures that poverty sustains.Education indicators for Muslims – literacy, enrolment, retention, and drop out, among others – are poor. They getworse especially at higher levels, than the rest of the community. This is another sustainer of the poverty trap of the state’s Muslims. ii. Access to services for Muslims – amenities (water, electricity, roads),education, healthcare, social housing and social security schemes – has been poor historically. This does not seem to have changed much. We did not find evidence too, in our explorations, of much targeted effort by the state government to reach these services to marginalised minorities. iii. Bihar has had its share of violence and attacks against minorities, specificallyMuslims. These have resulted in significant loss of life and property, and livelihoods, such as in the Bhagalpur violence (of 1989), where displaced communities are, to this day, seeking to rebuild their lives against great odds. Majoritarian anti-minority mobilisation and hate speech too are realities in the state. But Bihar also demonstrates how strong administrative action, driven by political will to provide security and justice to all, can act to deliver the rule of law, preventing violence, protecting the right to life and protecting religious freedoms. Whilst its neighbour to the west, Uttar Pradesh, has suffered much violence, Bihar has largely remained violence free. This is a definite benefit that the state’s Muslims minorities have enjoyed. Lower violence means society is also less polarized – if not more diverse - all of which works in favour of minorities, enabling a sense of freedom of religion and practice, and an atmosphere that is not fraught with fear. iv. Positive outcomes for Muslims in Bihar, is founded on the nature of politics inthe state. Greater state action to uphold the right to life of minorities is a reflection of

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the political ideology that has held forth in the state over the past decades - the alliance of parties speaking for the ‘backward classes’, that has sought, successfully, to nurture a constituency among the Muslims of the state too. This, among other factors, has also delivered other benefits to Muslim minorities in the state, such as recognition of Urdu early on as the second official language, and inclusion of Muslim groups in the MBC category, being principal. v. Yet, despite a supportive political formation in power, Bihar’s Muslims have along distance to travel to obtain rights as equal citizens. Efforts at improved socio-economic outcomes have been less fruitful, although lower polarization in society, helps limit, to some extent, discrimination against Muslims in provision of services and entitlements. Muslim politics in the state has been reduced to search for security, in place of representation. Bihar’s is a mixed bag then.

5. Recommendations:

Policy oriented - ensure groups left out of state BC/MBC and central OBC lists are included in them - explore inclusion of poorest Muslims within SC list. - focus on education, especially at elementary and secondary level, and for girls - integrated programme against child labour in MCD districts – including long-

term education support for children and income support for parents. - Special drives on NREGS, NRLM and Kaushal VikasYojana, in

MCDs/MCBs/MCTs, including community pilots for livelihoods promotion, to scale up the programmes amongst marginalised Muslims.

- enhance Muslim representation in police, civil service, and among service providers

- empowered state Minorities Commission with authority, staff and resources - anti-discrimination law to prevent discrimination in services, and opportunities

Implementation oriented - better collection and dissemination of disaggregated data on condition and

access of minorities. Immediately, review of socio-economic condition of minorities and impact of post–Sachar report policy regime on their condition

- better use of 15 Point Programme, to channelize resources for minority development - Improved minority rights institutional capacity at state, district and local levels - enforce rule of law, including action against hate speech and minority targeting. - resolute action for access to justice for violence survivors – Bhagalpur, among them.

Voice and demand (among local communities) - systematic monitoring and dissemination of working of programs among minorities - public education and awareness creation around minority rights and laws - programme to support promotion of shared living, pluralism, and mutual respect - development of grassroots capacity among vulnerable Muslims, for public action,

through leadership and fellowships, for analysis, social mobilisation, and advocacy - state-wide platform for advocacy for better outcomes for poorer Muslims, working

with other pro-poor platforms

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Table of Contents

Page

i iv v v v vi vi

Executive Summary Table of Contents List of Tables List of Boxes Abbreviations Glossary of Terms Glossary of programmes/schemes Preface vii

1. Introduction: Objectives, concepts, research design 1 2. Muslims in Bihar: demographic profile and social composition 4 3. Profiles of Exclusion: Micro Studies 7 4. Making sense of exclusion: Contextualizing micro stories 11

- Equality and non-discrimination in provision of socio-economic rights. 11

- Life and security and Freedom of religion 17 - Effective participation 23 - Conclusion: Explaining Bihar’s Mixed bag 26

5. Recommendations 27

Annexures i. References 30 ii. Annexure I: Profiles of Exclusion 31

- Patna 31 - Madhubani 33 - Darbhanga 34 - Sitamarhi 35 - Vaishali 37

iii. Annexure II: HH survey schedule 39 iv. Annexure III: Interview and FGD schedules 41 v. Annexure IV: RTI questions schedule 43

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List of Tables Page

Table 1: Percentage distribution of population of Bihar, by religious groups 4 Table 2: Social break down, within Muslim general and OBC lists 5 Table 3: Profiles of the excluded: Micro case studies 7 Table 4: Summary findings of household survey on access amongst poor Muslims 8 Table 5: Poverty among Muslims in Bihar 12 Table 6: Access to basic services in Bihar MCDs 15 Table 7: Muslim representation in Bihar state assembly (1952-2000) 24 Table 8: Muslim Representation in Government Jobs in Bihar 25 Table 9: Muslim representation in state combined civil service examinations 26

List of Boxes

Box 1: Muslim representation in state bureaucracy and Police 25

Abbreviations

BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party BPL: Below Poverty Line ICSSR: Indian Council for Social Science Research FGD: Focus Group Discussion HDI: Human Development Index KVY: Kaushal VikasYojana MCB: Minority Concentrated Block MCD: Minority Concentrated District MCT: Minority Concentrated Town MSDP: Multi-sectoral Development Plan NFHS: National Family Health Survey NFSA: National Food Security Act NSS: National Sample Survey NMFDC: National Minority Finance Development Corporation OBC: Other backward Class RSBY: RashtriyaSwasthyaBimaYojana RTI: Right to Information SC: Scheduled Caste ST: Scheduled Tribe UC: Upper Caste

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Glossary of Terms

Arzal low caste Ashraf upper caste (literally, noble) Biradari clan/sub-caste Mohalla urban ward Pasmanda marginalised Pheriwallah itinerant cloth seller Pucca permanent or metalled (as in pucca house, or pucca road) Qasba large rural settlement

Glossary of Programmes/Schemes

15 Point Programme: national programme for development of minority groups, through targeted allocation of resources and audit of performance.

Antayodaya: Programme for super subsidized food for the ultra poor. IAY: IndraAwasYojana, housing support for poor families ICDS: Integrated Child Development Services - flagship ante and

post-natal care, nutritional, and early childhood care scheme IRDP: Integrated Rural Development Programme, erstwhile principal

anti-poverty programme, now disbanded KVY: Kaushal VikasYojana - national programme for skill

development MSDP: Multi-sectoral Development Plan, the flagship programme for

‘minority development’, enabling allocation of resources to states to develop minority concentrated districts.

NREGS: National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme - principal wage employment programme in rural areas

NRHM: National Rural Health Mission – principal public health programme, as framework for improved provisioning

NRLM: National Rural Livelihood Mission, the key national programme for security of livelihoods in rural areas. Also called Aajivika.

NSAP: National Social Assistance programme, for pension support to eligible persons – old age, widow and disability.

PDS: Public Distribution System, through which much of India’s food security policy gets operationalised

SSA: SarvaSikshaAbhiyan (literally, educate all movement), principal programme for public educationat primary and elementary stages

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Preface

This study, on access of Minorities in Bihar, specifically Muslims, to rights and freedoms, emerged from the need we felt in Misaal for a systematic understanding of the condition of the state’s minorities and their ability to access rights and freedoms entitled to them as citizens. Such a body of evidence is missing, making the working of developmental organisations, Misaal’s anyway, challenging. Absence of a baseline makes the task of planning the most appropriate interventions and assessing organizational impact on the broader problem, that much difficult.

A word about Misaal is in order here. Set up in 2015, Misaal aspires to act as a community capacity building platform for marginalized minorities in the poorest parts of India. Through supporting grassroots activists and community initiatives, it seeks to build community capacity to educate, organize, and mobilise poorest Muslims and Dalits, especially women among them, to demand and obtains rights as citizens, through awareness creation, case work and advocacy. Recently, and based on community feedback, we have launched interventions for education and livelihoods support for groups we work with.

Almost two years since inception, this is a good time to step back and revisit the main concerns that motivated us to set up Misaal – the continuing exclusion of minorities in states such as Bihar. A body of evidence based on a systematic study was the need of the hour. Minority Rights Group International’s offer then, to support such a study, was very timely. We are thankful to MRG, and to Shikha Dilawri, its South Asia Programme Officer, for the support and encouragement.

Conducting the study has been a team effort for Misaal associates, and a great learning experience for all of us. Since we located much of the research for the study in the communities we work with, the process of research and sharing the findings of the study with the community, has helped create in Misaal, both, capacity for community based documentation and participatory analysis, as well as a shared understanding, along with community members, of the problems Misaal associates deal with on a day to day basis. This has also helped build further trust between Misaal – the community based organisation we aspire to be - and the community.

Field data for the study was collected by Misaal fellows at Misal fellowship sites in Patna (Shakila Bano and Anjum Khatoon) and Madhubani (Najmul Hafiz), and by volunteers in Vaishali (Md. Shahim), Sitamarhi (Md. Nematullah), and Darbhanga (Irshad Ahmad and Javed Khan), all led by Misaal Bihar state supervisor (Ibrar Raza). Nazia Khan helped with state-level data collection and analysis. Tabish Ahsan, Misaal Programme Manager helped design and coordinate the research, tabulate field data and lead report formatting and design. Sajjad Hassan led research and writing. Shikha Dilawri, MRG, provided helpful comments on the draft of the report, and gave a hand with copyediting. We are grateful for this.

Dr. Sajjad Hassan Director, Misaal

December 30th, 2016

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1. Introduction:

1.1 Objectives, questions This is a study to examine the access of minoritiesin the state of Bihar to Freedom of religion & other rightsguaranteed by the constitution and international minority instruments. The specific questions the study engages with are: i. What is the access of minority communities in Bihar to rights andentitlements

as citizens, specifically their access to minority rights?ii. What is their access specifically, to the right to (i) freedom of religion, and

identity and culture, (ii) life and security, (iii) non-discrimination in the socio-economic sphere, and (v) effective participation.

Based on the findings, the study will also try to propose a set of recommend-ations for improving minorities’ access.

The focus of the study is particularly Muslims - by far the largest religious minority group in India as a whole, as well as Bihar. It is the group with the worst development indicators at national and provincial levels, often also the target of majoritarian violence. Finally, it is also the group that Misaal Fellowship for grassroots activists, specifically works with. The reports will, however, seek to draw generalized conclusions, for other religious minorities too.

1.2 Conceptual frameworkand research design Minorities, like other excluded groups in any society, suffer serious barriers to accessing their rights and citizenship as equal citizens. At the core, these are about institutionalized discrimination- itself the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people based especially on grounds of race, religion or sex. It is useful then, to see expansion of access as an outcome of a combination of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side efforts, working together to enhance opportunities that minorities have enjoy their rights. Supply of rights in this case, include, laws and institutions (for non-discrimination, and protection and promotion of minority rights); programmes and schemes for minority development; and structures and organisations in place to affect those policies and implement the programmes. They also include resources committed – human and financial - towards minority protection and promotion; and cruciallyefforts at tracking, documenting and analyzing outcomes, both to feed into policy implementing and dissemination. Clearly, all of this is possible only if there is a clear political focus on minority rights.

And yet, no amount of provisioning of ‘supply’ can deliver the goods, if minorities are not organized, to raise awareness (within minority groups as well as in the wider community), engage stakeholders (at policy as well as community levels), and demand their rights. Empirical research has shown that these ‘demand’ factors are the missing link, in failed attempts at improving minorities’ access to rights. It is these supply and demand factors, our ‘independent variables’, that are the focus of our

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current enquiry. We report access, by mapping extent and quality of the independent variables that contribute to ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ dynamics on access of minority communities to minority rights.

The mapping of minority rights variables, is based on: - micro evidence and insights, collected from 5 sample sites. Choice of the sites

was based on Muslim concentration (Minority Concentrated Districts – MCDs- provided a useful proxy), mix of urban and rural, and logistic convenience – mix of sites where Misaal had a presence, and others where it did not (to prevent findings being skewed by our prior work with communities).

- macro data and evidence, obtained at policy/state level

We use a mixed-method design to collect evidence. This includes, at its core, (i) household surveys of 100 households, in each of five districts, selected

purposively, from among Muslim households in the poorest sections, to document household-level outcomes, awareness, participation, and perceptions. At Misaal sites, these were 100 households selected randomly – Misaal only works with poorest households. At non Misaal sites, thepoorest part of the a shortlist of locations was chosen, typically a mohalla.

(ii) interviews with key informants at those sites, to understand access (extent, measure, nature), perceptions, and barrier (attitudes and discrimination) dynamics; and

(iii) Focus Group Discussions with a cross section of community members (residents, mix of male and female; opinion makers in the locality, and persons with authority - ward members, and panchayat members, among them), to explore issues of access, barriers, and change.

The micro case studies that emerge at each of the five sites, help weave a state level story on access of Muslim minorities in Bihar. For this broader picture, we use a combination of primary and secondary research, including survey of literature and published works;media reports, and survey of government data sourced from available sources as well as through RTI, where it was possible, to try to triangulate findings.

1.3 Data collection: Micro data was collected over September-October2016, by Misaal mobilisers (our fellows) at each of the Misaal fellowship sites, and by community researchers engaged for the specific work, at others. State level data was sourced from publically available sources, mostly state government and district administration websites, and published work. We also filed Right to Information (RTI) applications to try to obtain more state data. We filed 38questions in all, with state and district authorities, over July-August 2016. We have been able to secure 21 answers, 3 from state authorities, the rest from district officials. This rather successful outcome with obtaining RTI answers, is marred only by the fact that a majority of

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answers are ‘NIL’ reports, meaning they are reporting nothing to show. We are now in the process of filing appeals against answers not received, or where the answers are unsatisfactory.

1.3 Limitations of the study Firstly, this report was about access of religious minorities in Bihar. Given Muslims make up an overwhelming majority of religious minorities in the state, and because much of the data that is available, is for Muslims, the report has developed as one for Muslims. We hope to build on this research in future editions, looking specifically at other religious minorities, specifically Christians and Sikhs. Secondly, availability of standardized data, disaggregated by religious groups for the range of minority rights, is not available in India. What we have in their place is survey reports mostly on outcome indicators (NSS 55th and 61st round, NFHS-I, II, III reports), some public policy data, mostly at all–India level, (Kundu committee report, although Sachar report provided many state level break downs too), case studies and research reports. Most of these reports and the data they use, limited as they are, are also old. In the case of Bihar the only detailed reports we could find useful for our purposes were the ADRI survey report on socio-economic status of Muslims of the state, commissioned by the Bihar Minorities Commission (2002) and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) socio-economic survey of Minority Concentrated Districts (MCDs) districtscommissioned by the central government (2008). We have had to supplement these with non-official data and qualitative reports. This is the other limitation of the report. And lastly, we have not looked systematically at state efforts at providing for minorities, especially policies and programmes of the national government, although we have touched upon the subject. Data on these, especially in terms of financials – budget allocation, releases and spending – should have been available at state level, but are not up to date. These will form the basis for our future exploration, hopefully on the nature of provisioning by states, rather than access by minorities. This study then, although not exhaustive, is an important intervention for policy making and implementation for minorities in Bihar.

1.5 The rest of the report is organized as follows: We begin in part 2, with an overview of the demographic patterns in the state. This is followed by presenting (in part 3) summarized the findings of the micro case studies and their key lessons. (Detailed case studies are presented in Annex I).Part 4 contextualises the micro findings, by providing state level picture on access, structured by the four minority rights, to draw patterns and lessons. In part 5 we conclude by drawing some lessons, and proposing ways forward, for state and civil society actors in Bihar, to try to improve Muslim access.

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2. Muslims in Bihar: Demographic profileand social composition Muslims in Bihar, at 17.56 million, make up 16.87 percent of the State’s total population, and 10.19 percent of the country’s Muslim population (2011 Census).

Table 1: Percentage distribution of population of Bihar, by religious groups Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jain Other Not stated 2011 82.69 16.87 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.24

Source: Census 2011. (http://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php) The distribution of Muslim population across the state is far from uniform. It is concentrated in north and northeast of the state. Taking into account both the absolute size of the Muslim population in different districts and the share of that population in the district’ total population (the two indicators of Muslim concentration in a district), districts with a relatively higher Muslim concentration are all in north Bihar. Kishanganj (65.9 per cent Muslim concentration, all 1991 census data1), Araria (40.4 per cent), Katihar(39.9 per cent) and Purnia (34.5 per cent), all in the Northeast, have large concentrations of Muslims. So do Darbhanga (22.1 per cent), Saharsa (21.9 per cent), West Champaran (20.6 per cent), and Sitamarhi (20.5 per cent) in the north. These are also the Minority Concentrated Districts (MCD)2in Bihar, 7 in all, barring Saharsa. At least three of the districts also fall among the bottom 20 districts in the country (total 687) by district development index. (Shariff, 2015). There is only relatively small Muslim population in central and south Bihar, concentrated mostly in Bhagalpur (16.1 per cent of total), Sheohar (15.3 per cent) and Begusarai (12.3 per cent). In terms of the absolute size, Muslim population is largest in Katihar (7.28 lakhs), with adjoining Purnia, Araria and Kishanganj too having significant populations. Districts with the lowest size of Muslim population are Sheohar, Lakhisarai and Sheikhpura. According to the 1991 census, majority of Muslims live in rural areas (87 per cent of Muslim population) with Muslims in Northeast more rural than rest of population, and in North central and western also largely rural. Muslim population on the south eastern and particularly south western districts (Bhagalpur, Monghyr et al) are more urbanised (34 per cent in latter). How about gender indicators?Muslim households in the state had a higher sex ratiothan the overall figure – 1006 and 869, respectively. The gender differential in literacy (in rural areas) was 18.6 per cent for Muslims, compared 27.7 per cent overall. And there were 11.3 per cent Muslim households in urban areas were women

1 religion based estimates by districts available only till 1991 Census. 2 Districts with more than 20 per centconcentration of religious minorities. Also towns (MCT) and development blocks, (MCB).

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headed, compared to only 6.6 per cent for the population as a whole (Government of Bihar, 2002:xiii, based on 2001 census).MCDs in Bihar too, show that in terms of sex-ratio, the Muslim community is better placed with 894 compared to 862 of the Hindu community. Reddy (2008:27). This is of course not to say that Muslim women do not face challenges:the case of work participation rate among Muslims women is particularly problematic (14.1 for Muslims women, compared to 25.6 overall, by 2001 census), as is higher drop out and out of school ratios among Muslim girls. 2.4 Social breakdown Muslims in Bihar, like all South Asian societies, are divided by caste categories into social groups. In official listings, Muslims are broken down into General and Other Backward Castes (OBC) groupings. Based on tabulations of NSSO 61st round, 63.4 per cent of Muslims in Biharbelonged to OBC category, the rest were General. In urban areas, OBC concentration of Muslim population is even higher – at 71.4 per cent. These figures have not remained constant: in 1999, OBCs made up 40.6 percent of Muslim population of UP, with that figure being 44.1 in urban areas. (Table 2)

Table 2: Social break down, within Muslim general and OBC lists Muslims

Muslims pop. In % (2001)

OBC General

1999-00 2005-06 1999-00 2005-06 All Bihar 15.9 40.6 63.4 59.4 36.6 Rural Bihar 16.2 39.9 62.5 60.1 37.5 Urban Bihar 19.6 44.1 71.7 55.9 28.3. All India 13.4 31.7 40.7 68.3 59.3

Source: Government of India (2006: 265-267) This significant change within a gap of 5 yearscould be explained by the inclusion of further sub-castes and biradaris among Muslimsin the Central OBC list of the state. Contributing to the dynamism is also the fact thatmuch of the identification is based on self-reporting. Elsewhere, it isrecognized that ‘Pasmanda Muslims’ (OBC and ‘Arzal Muslims’ together) make upanywhere between 80-85 of Muslim population. A state government survey of the condition of Muslims in Bihar (2002)3 had identified 43 caste groups among the Muslims in Bihar. These, as with the rest of society, are largely along occupational lines, although again as with the rest of society

3Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI), Patna, survey in 2001-2002, conducted for Bihar State Minorities Commission, of 8000 Muslim households, divided by rural and urban, asking a range of questions on demographics economic and social issues. Report also uses data from National Family Health Survey-II (1998-99).

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generally, caste-occupation lines are losing strength. Of the 43 groups, 4 belonged to the ‘upper castes’(UC), 11 to the ‘backward castes’ (BC) and 28 to the ‘most backward castes’ (MBC). In rural areas, the shares of these three categories in the total population was 40.4, 25.0 and 34.6 percent respectively; and somewhat similar in urban areas. This pattern is very different from that among the Hindus, where upper castes account for a much smaller part of the population (Government of Bihar, 2002). MBC groups were found to be concentrated in Katihar and Kishanganj districts (87 and 93 per cent, respectively), and in eastern districts generally (Ibid, 20). South and South East Bihar had higher UC proportion, particularly in Patna, Monghyr, and Madhepura, as well as in Darbhanga. How groups are counted and categorized, is of course important, since - in the context of Indian policy making - theydetermine access of groups to affirmative action policies and rights. This is problematic forpoorer sections among Muslims in Bihar, as in other states. Bihar does not havea separate quota for Muslims. State OBC quotas(for reservations in jobs and educational institutions) are subdivided into Backward Category, BC (13 per cent), Most Backward Category, MBC (18 per cent), and Other Backward Category, OBC women(3 per cent). 9 Muslim groups figure in the BC list (Annexure II of state government notification) and 27 in the MBC list (Annexure I)(Government of India, 2006:198). Many communities have not been included in this categorisation.The Anthropological Survey of India Peoples of India project identified in Bihar, 37 Muslim caste groups, apart from the 4 Ashraf, but the Central list only has 23 of those(Ibid, 201). And 3 Muslim caste groups, among the 43 identified by the Government of Bihar 2002 study(Gadheri, Mughal, Turk Pasi), do not find mention in any list.Quite apart from this issue of exclusion, is also that of discrepancy between the state list and central list, that deprives individuals from accessing benefits. There are 17 OBC groups in Bihar (state list) that have not found mention in the central list, six of them are exclusively Muslim, namely, Faqir/Diwan, Julaha/Ansari (the synonym Momin is in the Central List), Itrfarosh/Gadheri/Itpaj/Ibrahimi, Jat, Gadaria and Surajpuri. (Ibid, 201). Part ofthe problem is the overlapping and arbitrary way in which groups are included in theselists. (Sachar 2006).Included among the category of Bihar’s OBCs are a range of communities,variously called Arzal, Pasmanda ordalit Muslims in recent literature on the subject,that make up the poorest sections among Muslims. Among their ranks are communities such asDhobi, Mehtar and Turk pasi, according to the Bihar Government survey, Hindu equivalent of which are classified as SC for affirmative action benefits, that only figure as MBC or are excluded from all lists completely. (Government of Bihar, 2002:18). These and similar groups are the poorest sections of society.

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3. Profiles of Exclusion: Micro studies

Our principal concern in this study was to check out and understand access of minorities in Bihar– particularly poorer Muslims – to rights and freedoms. This section summarises the findings of the micro studies we conducted to collect evidence on access, at 5 sample sites with large Muslim concentrations, most officially designated as minority concentrated districts (MCD) or blocks (MCB), all made up of excluded Muslim minorities, in poorer parts of the state. These are a mix of urban and rural locations. These include Misaal's prior work sites, where work begun in 2015, as well as those where Misaal has started to work following the survey (Table 3).

Table 3: Profiles of the excluded: Micro case studies District Village / hamlet Urban /

rural Region Misaal active at time

of survey Patna Ishopur, Phulwarisharif town Urban South Yes, since Jan. 2016 Madhubani Bhalni GP, Kaluahi block Rural North Yes, since 2015 Darbhanga Jamalpura, Darbhanga town Urban North No Sitamarhi Rajopur GP, Dumra block Rural North - West No Vaishali Khwaja Chand Chapra GP,

Chehra Kalan block Rural Central No

The questions we were interested in exploring, in the surveys, were the following: i. Socio-economic profile of the communityii. Awareness about and access to rights, laws and entitlements, including to

basic services and universal and minority specific social protectionschemes

iii. Perceptions of the community, regarding the provisioning (of rights –including life and security, religious freedoms and identity, besides socio-economic rights) by state actors.

iv. Efforts towards organizing themselves and demand rights, throughengaging with stakeholders

For the study, we used household surveys (of a sample of 100 households at each site, chosen randomly of Muslim households in the poorest parts of the village/locality); and FGDs (at least 2 at each site, with a mix of residents and opinion makers from within the designated area of concentration), to collect evidence.

The study revealed that across all five sites, Muslims were poor, with dismal physical assets and poor human capital resources; widespread exclusion from basic services and social security programmes; and largely disengaged. (Table 4).

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Darbhanga Madhubani Patna Sitamarhi Vaishali

Income and occupation Mean family monthly income (Rs.)

4034 8920 6304 4220 4542

Occupation Manual Labour 48 71 48 91 77 2nd most common Rickshaw: 12 Other formal:

12 Domestic help: 8

Begging: 15

Assets and services Agricultural land - 30 1 1 9 Brick house 11 32 36 15 14 Piped water 10 56 67 33 39 Flush toilet 8 36 52 12 7 Electricity connection 21 68 17 49 Access to Social security BPL card 27 52 44 46 72 Priority household (Under NFS Act)

18 7 27 38 3

Antayodaya scheme 3 5 10 23 9 NREGS job card 0 32 4 Pension scheme 1 21 22 7 17 Scholarship scheme (pre-matric) 0 14 9 1 12 NRLM Ajeevika (Livelihoods) 0 0 0 0 0 RSBY - Health (Insurance) card 6 4 1 3 8

Here we summarise the findings, detailed case studies, by sites, are at Annex I (page 31)

i. Income:Across the five sites, mean income levels were low, but they also vary, Darbhanga being the lowest and Madhubani, the highest. This variance represents, among other things, the demographic profile of respondents, the Darbhanga sample, one of urban poor, and Madhubani, a rural areas with a mix of the very poor and the not so, latter with formal employment too. Patna, Sitamarhi and Vaishali figure in between, with Patna being again an urban slum with poverty but also economic opportunities. Sitamarhi and Vaishali are both rural areas, with the population representing the poorest sections of society, with little avenue for mobility.

ii. Occupation:

Occupation profile among respondents shows much more convergence across the sites. Three of the five sites (all rural) have an overwhelming majority of respondents, ranging between 71 – 91 per cent of all households, working as manual labourers, mostly as farm labour, but also in construction, and as porters and head loaders et al. But manual labour is the most common occupation also at the other two sites (Patna and Darbhanga) that are both urban, with most engaged in construction work or as

Table 4: Summary findings of household survey on access amongst poor Muslims [All figures in percentage (except where stated)]

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porters and rickshaw pullers. Other common occupations were petty vending – vegetable and fruit sellers, pheriwallahs (itinerant cloth sellers), domestic workers (among women), and puncture shop owners, garbage collectors, mechanics and tailors. Much of this exists in the informal sector, without much scope for any social security safety net. And in Vaishali, 15 per cent of the respondents returned begging as their occupation.

iii. Assets and amenities:

Land is the preferred form of asset ownership in rural areas. Only a tiny minority of respondents across the sites owned land. Madhubani, with its mix of the poor and the not so poor, was an outlier here, with a relatively high 30 per cent of respondents returning ownership. Ownership of a house, especially of a permanent structure, was low, and its incidence ranged between 11 per cent of all respondents in Darbhanga to 36 per cent in Patna. Across sites, basic amenities, such as piped water supply, pour flush toilets and electricity connection too are not universal, with large sections living without those, although there is much variance across sites on availability. Patna showed the best results on all, with a third of the respondents having electricity connection and piped water supply, and half the households with a flush toilet at home. Rest of the sites were poor on amenities, Darbhanga faring the worst, reflecting the very precarious conditions under which people live.

iv. Social security benefits and entitlements:

Access to social security programmes is poor across the board. Despite poor incomes, and informal and vulnerable livelihoods, only a minority of respondents across the sites had BPL cards. BPL status opens access to families to a range of social security benefits – most prominently the elaborate food security measures (Public Distribution System - PDS), but also housing (IndraAwasYojana - IAY) and livelihoods support (National Rural Livelihood Mission - NRLM/Aajivika), among others. Data shows that the problem seems to have worsened – at least in Madhubani, Vaishali, and Darbhanga - with even fewer numbers included among ‘priority households’ category under the new National Food Security Act, that replaces BPL categorisation for the purpose of food security provisioning.

Access to Antyodaya scheme – for the poorest of the poor – is equally poor all over, specially so in Darbhanga and Madhubani. Access among respondents to other universal social security schemes – National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), Pension schemes, Aajivika and RashtriyaSwasthyaBimaYojana (RSBY) health insurance particularly - was equally poor. As is evident from the table, in some instances of schemes, the entire cohort drew a complete blank – particularly NRLM. And schemes specifically for minority communities too seemed to work poorly for Muslims – the central pre-matric scholarship scheme being a case in point. In most cases, less than 10 per cent of the families had been to take its benefit. Virtually the

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entire set of sample households in Darbhanga and Sitamarhi were unaware of the scheme – meant to support students through primary and secondary education. The result in the rest of the districts was not too encouraging either. v. Understanding poor outcomes: Trying to understand reasons for poor results on socio-economic outcomes as well as to access to services and social security benefits, threw up a range of findings. This insight is based on focus group discussion with a cross section of respondents at each site, to draw out their opinions and perceptions: - poor awareness about opportunities and programmes among the community – only a few respondents are able to name the most relevant schemes. Poor awareness ties into poor understanding of rights and entitlements - absence of serious attempt by respondents to approach service providers and engage with duty bearers – only a handful among the respondents had been to a government office to resolve their issues. This is an aspect of poor organization, with little directed attempt to voice concerns and demand rights of duty bearers - weak engagement between the community and local institutions, as a result of poor representation of minorities in local decision making bodies – Panchayats and municipalities, and a general poor political engagement. As a result, poor Muslims are not involved in decisions made by local institutions that have the potential to affect their lives. Services and schemes, resultantly, often bypass the group, further entrenching their isolation. - civil society engagement aimed to create awareness and mobilise the community has been limited as well, with only a handful and occasional efforts by NGOs to engage poor Muslims. Community based organsiations, on the other hand, mostly keep off issues that have a governance implication – with potential implications for influencing the groups rights and access – limiting themselves to cultural and religious engagement. - a recurring theme that emerged in the FGDs, was the awareness among respondents of the rising inter-community tension in the air, and attempts by vested interests to foment trouble, and trigger violence. Everywhere, respondents also noted though, the swift action by authorities to quell these attempts, so that violence was mostly avoided. The picture that emerges, all five sites taken together in the state, is one of a Muslim community that is steeped in poverty, with below poverty line income levels, dismal assets ownership, and poor capacities, surviving precariously. This is not uncommon for many communities in India, with generalized high levels of acute poverty. What is noteworthy though, in this case, is the absence of any evidence that the respondents

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are able to access anti-poverty programmes (basic services and social protection schemes) equally, as other groups in similar circumstance. This could be the result of multiple factors – poor demand for services (awareness, organization..), but equally, poor supply. This latter is about the absence of targeted protective and promotional schemes for religious minorities – a policy tool used to much fruitful outcomes in India for caste minorities (dalits, or Scheduled Castes in official parlance) and indigenous groups (adivasis, or Scheduled Tribes). India’s vast and expanding portfolio of affirmative action policies for its ‘backward groups’, has little to offer for its religious minorities. Poor Muslims are the worst sufferers of this exclusion. And as we noticed, universal programmes for the poor too work poorly for Muslims, hinting at possible discrimination against Muslims by frontline providers – schools and PDS shops and anganwadicentres and such like. Our profiles of the excluded also tell a story of how, the malaise of communal polarization and violence, spreading all over the country, is beginning to impact the lives of marginalized Muslims in Bihar too. Respondents speak of attempts by vested interests to foment trouble during religious processions; the heightened tensions during elections, even the increased activities of SanghParivar affiliated Hindu extremist groups masquerading as religious bodies, resulting in an atmosphere of fear. Yet the refrain has been that firm and fair handling of situation by state administration meant that citizens are reassured of their life and liberties. This is a marked difference from the sense we got from Uttar Pradesh. 4. Making sense of Exclusion: Contextualizing micro stories In this section, we draw on the wider evidence and literature at state level, to provide a sense of how minorities, particularly Muslims fare in the state, using the fold four classification of minority rights to report on this. This broader story of Muslim exclusion in the state will help contextualize the micro case studies of exclusions we have just presented. Evidence here is sourced from multiple sources – published works, public documents and data, as well as programme reports and, where available, some RTI sourced material. It must be emphasized though that the studies being referred to are not recent.; that this shows a lack of commitment on the part of the state to provide for minorities, 4.1 Equality and non-discrimination in provision of socio-economic rights. This study will first explore the situation regarding socio-economic rights. This will, first, involve a survey of outcomes, followed by a review of provisions on the part of the government. Astate government survey of the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in Biharconducted in 2002,provides some revealing insights on exclusion of Muslims,

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that echo much of our own survey findings, highlighting that the situation has not improved considerably since this time. That report, noted:

“the picture of the Muslims in Bihar that emerges from the survey is of a community steeped in poverty, with very low income levels to eke out a living and, as compared to the general population, endowed with lesser amount of land, land-related and non-land resources, and mostly engaged in low paid jobs in the unorganized sector or in self-employment activities where the returns are very poor on account of the very limited access to resources”. (Government of Bihar 2002:ii)

It concluded, that there was a large and widening economic and social distance between the Muslims in Bihar and other communities. (Ibid) Poverty and Employment: The official survey found, poverty rates among Muslims higher than the normal, and in urban areas, there was a high 12point difference. (Table 5).

Table 5: Poverty among Muslims in Bihar (%) BPL among Muslims

(source: 2002 survey) All state BPL (Source: NSSO, 1999-2000)

Muslims acutely poor (Source: 2002 survey)

Rural 49.5 44.3 19.9 Urban 44.8 32.9 16.1 Source: Tabulated by author from Government of Bihar (2002:53) In 2004-05, the Poverty incidence among Muslims in the state had deteriorated further, to 57 per cent, against 42 per cent for all state. (Government of India, 2006:367) The rural population of the Muslims in Bihar, the government survey found, derived their income mainly from low-wageoccupation of agricultural labourer (39.6 percent), remittances from out-migrant membersof the households (24.5 percent) and ‘other self-employment’ category (19.1 percent). (Government of Bihar, 2002: 11)‘Other self-employment’ included bidi making, rickshaw pulling, tailoring, mechanics and retail trade. In urban areas, this last category was even higher (42 per cent) –with key areas of work constituting retail (fruit trading), automobile mechanic and tailoring. Contrary to popular belief that Muslims were largely in artisanal trade, the survey found a tiny 2.1 per cent of Muslim households in rural areas engaged in artisanal activities – mostly in Bhagalpur district (in silk), and somewhat in Rohtas, Gaya and Vaishali. In urban areas, this figure was 4.4 per cent, concentrated in Rohtas, Jahanabad and Siwan districts. (Government of Bihar, 2002:29-30).

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These findings are confirmed by the surveys of Minority Concentrated Districts (MCD4) conducted by Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) as baseline for planning the launch of Multi-sectoral Development Programme (MsDP5) in 2008-09. (Reddy, 2008). All the seven MCDs from the state belong to ‘A’ category, implying the districts suffer from deficits cutting across both socio –economic and basic amenities indicators. The ICSSR survey found, the proportion of Muslim workforce in secondary sector activities like petty production and construction was 32.01 per cent, while only 19.98 per cent of working Hindus were in this sector (Ibid, 32). Migration too, among Muslims was higher (14.25 per cent) compared to (11.78 per cent for the) Hindus. (Ibid, 33). This is mostly due to individuals being forced to leave their homes due to absence of remunerative work locally. According to the Government of Bihar study, 2/3rd of rural Muslims households, sent at least one of their members to migrate for better prospects: 83.8 per cent outside of state, and 7.9 per cent abroad, largely to Middle East(Government of Bihar, 2002:viii). Levels of indebtedness are also higher in Bihar’s MCD than, for example, in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, the availability of formal institutional sources for lending is much worse in Bihar than even the poor situation in U.P, implying greater reliance on money lenders, and the debt trap it encourages, (Reddy, 2008:34). The Bihar government study found 45.1 per cent of Muslim households indebted. Most had borrowed for consumption purposes, only a few for productive. The average outstanding loans, the survey found, amounted to 57 per cent of the annual average income of the households. (Government of Bihar, 2002:viii) Poor asset base among the group, the Bihar Government survey found, was the main reason for the lower income levels of the Muslims in Bihar. Only 35.9 percent of the rural Muslim households possessed anycultivable land (against 58.0 for the general population.). According to the same survey, 77 percent of rural Muslims in Bihar were dependent on wage employment in agriculture, and 28.4 per cent of rural Muslim workers were landless labourers. (2002: ) Muslim share in formal employment, in public and private sector is dismal. The Bihar government report estimated Muslim share in organised sector employment to be about 4 percent in rural areas and 6 percent in urban (By 2011 census, Muslim share in population is 16.87 per cent) – with only 10 per cent of wage and salary earners (among Muslims) employed in government sector. Hinting at possible systematic discrimination against Muslims, the report noted:

4MCDs are districts with more than 20 per centconcentration of religious minorities. There are a total of 90 MCDs in the country (of the total 687). Bihar has 7 of these. In the case of Bihar, Muslims make up the bulk of religious minorities. 5 The flagship national programme for minority development, implemented in all MCDs.

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“No doubt, the proportion of workers employed in the organised sector is low even for the general population, but for the Muslim population it is so low that it cannotbe explained except in terms of the segmentation of the labour market to the disadvantageof the Muslim workers.”(Government of Bihar, 2002: vi)

Education: Literacy rate among Muslims in Bihar (by 2001 census, last for which disaggregated data is available) was lower for Muslims (42 per cent) compared to overall (47 per cent). (Government of India, 2006:287) In the ICSSR MCD districts survey, literacy among Muslims, was 55.8 per cent, compared to Hindus at 57.68 per cent. The dropout rate for those in the 5-15 age group was also marginally more for Muslims (3.06 per cent) against 2.43 per cent for Hindus. But the real difference, according to the report, was in the case of those with education levels of ‘matriculation and above’, with Muslim at 9.69 per cent compared to Hindu community at 14.10 per cent (Reddy, 2008:28). It is at this level, notes the report, the gap between communities widens and results in permanent differentiation. Above ‘Matriculation and above’ level, there is a wide gap in both Hindu-Muslim differences and intra-community differences. The Hindus-General at this level are more than three times the Muslims-General. (Ibid, 29), General implying those neither SC nor OBC. The Bihar Government report also found large proportion (24 per cent) of Muslim children in rural areas going to madrasa(in urban areas, that ratio was only 9 per cent). It was concluded that non-availability of schools and poor quality of teaching in schools, particularly in rural areas, was the main reasons for the high madrasa popularity there(Government of Bihar, 2002: xvi).Overall, and according to another source but for about the same years, mean years of schooling (in the 7-16 age group) was lower for Muslims, at 2.07, compared to 2.69 for the state as a whole (Government of India, 2006:290). A more far reaching consequence of the high drop out of Muslim children from schools, according to the government of Bihar Survey, was the high levels of child labour among the community. In rural areas 6.1 per cent of Muslim children (5-14 age group) engaged as child labour, mostly as agricultural workers, but also helping in hotels/shops and industrial work. In urban areas, this was even higher at 7.3 per cent, mostly as hotel workers and in industrial work, but also as domestic workers. Khagaria, Kishanganj and Katiahar districts, all MCD and in the northeast with high concentration of Muslims, showed significantly higher child labour ratios (Government of Bihar, 2002:44).Also see for this, Government of India(2011: 229) and Government of India (2013:13, 80) Access to services:

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Muslim access to services and social security schemes, the surveys found, was very poor. (Table 6). Such were the poor outcomes in the MCDs, that the ICSSR report rued:

‘It is very difficult to imagine that there could be such a large number of districts in any one state as in Bihar MCDs, with a blanket dismal situation prevailing with respect to almost all the amenities identified as basic to a decent living’. (Reddy, 2008:36)

Table 6: Access to basic services in Bihar MCDs (all figures in %) Muslim Hindu Pucca housing 6.48 12.63 Electricity 8.73 10.90 Toilet facilities 8.0 7.0 Potable water 66.0 53.0 Source: Tabulated by author from Reddy (2008:36). The ICSSR survey found Muslim households not only disproportionately deprived of basic services, but also of government anti-poverty programmes. And the Government of Bihar report, found very high incidence of poverty among Muslims, much higher than the rest of the population,but only a small percentage was designated as Below Poverty Line (BPL) for social benefits. (Government of Bihar, 2002: 53-54), Some families had benefitedfromthe public housing scheme for BPL families (IndraAwasYojana), but that too very low at 4.1 per cent of households. The principal employment / livelihood oriented programme at the time was Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP).The study found only 5.3 per cent Muslims benefitted from it. Given the high BPL incidence, this, the study noted was very poor(Government of Bihar, 2002:64). Only 81.7 per cent Muslim households possessed a ration card. Of this only 20.7 per cent owned a ‘red card’ (for BPL families among those, allowing subsidised food), much lower than the 48.5 per cent households designated BPL (Ibid, 65-66). In urban areas, the survey found even fewer red card holders among Muslim families (13.6 per cent, of the 75 per cent that owned any cards). And crucially, Muslims seemed only poorly to be accessing essential health services. Their access to institutional deliveries was poor – in rural areas, 91.7 per cent births at home for Muslims compared to 87.5 per cent for all; and in urban areas, 78.5 per cent births at home, compared to a low 58.9 per cent for all. Muslims were also poorly covered by immunisation programme, especially in rural areas – 9.7 per cent coverage under DPT, against 17.2 per cent for all; and 10.3 per cent for BCG, against 28.9 per cent overall. (Government pf Bihar, 2002:xii-xiii). Evidence of poor healthcare access among Muslims in the state (antenatal care, immunisation et al) is

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confirmed by recent data, such as NFHS-III, 2005-06. (Government of India, 2011: 161-162). Exclusion and Inclusion: Poor outcomes for Muslims in Bihar, in the socio-economic sphere is the result, among others, of poor access that minorities and Muslims particularly have to equal provision of services, opportunities and social security schemes. A point confirmed by our own micro studies of marginalized Muslim communities at the five sites in the state. Since the publication of the groundbreaking Sachar Commission report (2006), and its pointing to poor Muslim access to public services across the board, various studies have pointed to the severe challenges Muslims face, nationally, in accessing the most basic of services and anti-poverty programmes.6It is becoming clearer now additionally, that Muslim access might be even worse than other excluded groups, including Dalits/SCs. The studies all point to how exclusion persists due to a variety of, often mutually reinforcing, factors – from lack of awareness about schemes (among rights bearers), to institutional factors such as poor accountability mechanisms, but specifically lack of sensitivity and capacity among duty bearers, often bordering on discrimination, a point also made by the Bihar government study (2002:vi).These empirical findings are helpful lessons, for any dispensation serious about addressing Muslim exclusion. How has the state government responded to these challenges? Firstly, there are no publically available government studies, in recent years, on how Muslims are accessing services and entitlements. Clearly, this is not a subject calling much attention from state government. Absence of empirical data and evidence from the ground, means there is little hard evidence to develop policy and build policy correctives on. There is thus the lack of serious engagement on this public policy failure of serious consequence to the lives of a vast section of the state’s population. In its place, we have state government launching populist programmes with a great deal of fanfare, mostly before state assembly elections. Some examples are: - MukhyamantriAlpsankhyak Education Loan Scheme, launched in 2011-12,

and implemented by Bihar State Minorities Finance Development Corporation.

- MukhyamantriAlpsankhyakRozgarReenYojana, launched in 2012-13, for interest free loan to minority members, uptoRs. 5 lakhs, for income generating activities.

6 Some illustrative cases being – Centre for Equity Studies (2011); Trivedi (2012); Hasan and Hasan (2012); Fazal (2013); Centre for Peace Studies (2014).

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There is little data available on how the announcements have been implemented, and what their impact has been. A good example of how big announcements are not followed through to effective implementation is the poor disbursement under Micro-Credit Scheme of National Minorities Development & Finance Corporation (NMFDC), a central government scheme for minorities, implemented in India’s federal system through state governments. Given the challenge that poor Muslims face to secure livelihoods, this programme of credit provision could potentially have far reaching positive impact. Bihar had zero disbursements to report for 2011-12 and 2012-13, the last two years for which the data is available(Government of India, 2015: 131). Kerala had, on the other hand, disbursed Rs. 44 crores, and Tamil Nadu, Rs. 33 crores, in the same period. Disbursement of term loan too, in Bihar, was zero in the same period. (Ibid, 133). Likewise, Misaal’sapplications under the Right to Information Act, with state Minority welfare department revealed that the institutional component of the flagship programme for minority development, Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP), was being poorly implemented, violating many norms. For example, baseline surveys of MCD districts, a requirement first step, had yet to be conducted; facilitators required to be appointed for each Minority Concentrated Blockswere still to be engaged; and the all-important district and state level MsDP and 15 Point programme committees, are convened on an infrequent, and unsystematicbasis (RTI answers on file with author). 4.2 Life and security and freedom of religion In the realm of life and security and freedom of religion, much of the crime against Muslimsin Bihar, as in the rest of India, involves hate crimes that take various forms, the most common being ‘communal riots’. For long, Muslims have been the target of right-wing Hindu mobilisation, and have frequently suffered violence. Called ‘communal riots’ in India, such violence is increasingly taking the form of organised pogroms by those aligned to right-wing Hindu organisations, including political parties affiliated to the SanghParivar, that use violence instrumentally, both to consolidate Hindu support behind them, and counter Muslim mobility(Brass, 2003, Chopra and Jha, 2014; Hassan, 2016). In these situations, state agencies have often been seen to be either complicit or overwhelmed, unable to provide Muslims the security of life and property. Bihar has had its share of ‘communal riots’. Some of the major episodes of mass violence in post-Independence era include that in Ranchi-Hatia, 1967, (180 killed);Sursand, 1967; Jamshedpur, 1979, (120 killed); Biharsharif, 1981; Bhagalpur, 1989 (over 1000 killed), and Sitamarhi, 1992 (37 killed). The overwhelming majority of the victims – suffering deaths, injuries and property destruction – were Muslims. A great deal of the violence has been seen to take place around religious festivals and processions (Dusshehraand Durga Puja, Moharram and the like) which allow for

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competitive communal mobilization, with right wing Hindu organisations such as Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) playing an important role in stoking tensions. It is true that in a comparative sense, especially in relation to its western neighbour, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar has seen less communal conflict. Yet the instances of violence that have taken place have had long-standing implications. The Bihar government survey (2002) found that of Bihar’s Muslim population living in rural areas, 5.5 percent confirmed having been affected by communal riots in the past, while the rate was higher for those living in urban areas, at 12.7 percent. Further, the survey noted that 6.9 percent of those in rural areas and 14.2 percent of those in urban areas recalled incidents of communal tension during festivals. 28.2 percent of those in rural areas and 23.9 percent in urban areas found the police to be biased during such happenings, with most finding the police to be untrustworthy. (Government of Bihar, 2002:xiv) This last finding ties into what is the principal driver of the poor outcome for right to life in India – state’s failures to provide security to minorities and provide all citizens access to justice. The state government set up Balasumbramanian Enquiry Commission, looking into the Biharsharif violence (1981), and the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee fact finding report on Sitmarhi violence (1992) found local administration particularly failing in its duties to provide security equally to all. (Narayan, 1998: 84, 86). Poor capacity, weak resources, lack of proactive planning, and poor coordination between different law enforcement agencies at local and state level, proved the main barriers. (Ibid) But these failures are compounded,resulting in enhanced violence against minorities, when the state is seen also to be biased against minorities.Violence in Bhagalpur is the most glaring example of this. Over a 1000 persons7, almost all Muslims, were killed in Bhagalpur in 1989, during violence that followed a Shilanayas procession carrying consecrated bricks to Ayodhya for construction of the Ram Mandir.8 Demonstrating the extent of breakdown of rule of law, was how rioting and mass attacks by Hindu mobs continued in the district for a full 6 weeks after the initial trigger, starting with Bhagalpur town, spreading on to rural areas, where some of the worst violence took place. An estimated 524 persons were seriously injured; 82 children were orphaned; and over 11,000 houses in 195 villages damaged, 4000 of those completely destroyed. According to an official report, the violence affected 48,000 persons in various ways. (Chopra and Jha 2014: 116)

7 Official count of those killed is 982, unofficial estimates put the number at 1100. (Chopra et al, 2014:116) 8 the procession was part of the wider Hindu right mobilization nationally, ostensibly for the construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh), but in essence, for capturing political power nationally.

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State failures on providing right to life and security was consistent in the provision of justice. Despite the mass killings (414 bodies had been recovered some months after the violence), only 142 cases were tried in sessions court, 8 for murder. There was largescale closure of cases by the prosecution branch.By 1995, only 12 cases had been decided, and of those only one resulted in conviction. Of the 95 persons charged with murder, 94 were acquitted. The infamous Chanderi massacre case- 38 persons accused in a case where 65 persons were killed - was decided only in 2001. 16 of the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment. 20 accused, including the man who hacked Mallika Begum, the sole surviving witness, were acquitted. (Ibid: 133). Failures of restorative justice were equally great. Over 50,000 persons were displaced, but few relief camps were set up by state government. (Ibid, 147). Compensation was provided, but at a dismal Rs 20,000 for deaths, later increased after central government intervention. In 2001,the state government decided to close identifying victims for compensation. (Ibid,152).And in 2008, 2440 files relating to compensation were reported to have gone missing from district offices. (Ibid, 151) A study (Chopra et al, 2012) based on detailed examination of state records in Bhagalpur communal violence case – government enquiry reports and First Information Reports (FIR)sourced through Right to Information applications – revealed how poor outcomes for victims on access to justice was founded on serious failures and bias, in the working of the criminal justice system. The recording of FIRswas found to be fraught – with refusals, delays and inaccuracies rampant, stymying any robust criminal investigation to follow. The process was found to be heavily biased against Muslim victims. The reports note how FIRs targeted Muslims as the accused, rather than as victims that they overwhelmingly were; major massacres remained undetected for months after the eruption of violence, resulting in delays in registering FIRs, adversely affecting investigation; and when the Police were asked to record FIRs by Muslim victims, they were slow to record the names of the attackers, and in some cases recorded the chain of incidents dubiously; in most cases FIRs were found, according to these report, to be doctored. (Chopra and Jha, 2014,121-125) Arrests that followed the FIRs reflected strong bias against Muslims, with large numbers arrested, despite their proportionately lower population, and their predominant status as victims; and searches conducted exclusively of Muslim homes, for arms and armaments. Of the cases registered, some 70 per cent were summarily closed. The Commissioner of Bhagalpur, the administrative head of the Bhagalpur division (collection of districts), noted in his report of the violence to state government, that this exceptionally high figure was on account of, among others, poor drafting of FIRs; delay in commencing investigations; and not allowing roving inquiry by police officers. (Ibid, 136). Some of the information is revealing in its hint at institutional bias against Muslims: 70 per cent of all cases against Muslim accused ended up in charges being framed, whereas the corresponding figure for Hindu

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accused was a small 30 per cent. Such was the strong evidence of bias, that the state government set up commission of inquiry held the Bhagalpur district police “totally anti-Muslim in their attitude, (who) had no desire or will to save the life of innocent Muslims”. (Ibid, 136).It held the then District Superintendent of Police, the district police chief, directly responsible for the large loss of lives(Ibid, 140). Bhagalpur’s is a notable case for another reason. It is a case that goes to the heart of the matter ofthe protection of right to life and security of minorities. The revelations, of the clear and strong indictments of state failures by various state-led inquiry reports (Bhagalpur Riots Inquiry Commission, that of the Divisional Commissioner and of the Special Additional District Magistrate, Law &Order), at least in some cases of violence, coupled with little action on those reports by the governments of the day, point to a larger, more fundamental problem. This is about institutionalized bias, in law enforcement circles, against minorities, and the lack of a political commitment to hold the guilty accountable, and enforce rule of law. (Hassan, 2015:508) Indeed there is widespread acknowledgment of the partisan role of the then state Chief Minister, Bhagwat Jha Azad, of the ruling Congress party, and allegations that he even desired controlled riots in Bhagalpur, to boost his prospects in upcoming elections later that year. (Chopra &Jhan, 2014: 143). Further reflecting how violence against minorities in India ties into electoral politics, the BharatiyaJanata Party(BJP) and AkhilBharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, both members of the SanghParivar and active in the anti-Muslim mobilization during and after the violence, contested elections to state assembly later that year (1989), and BJP won in a big way(Ibid. 143). But Bihar also demonstrates how strong administrative action, driven by political will to provide security and justice to all, can act to deliver the rule of law. Some examples include the strong measure by the RashtriyaJantaDal (RJD) government (led by its Chief Minister then, Laloo Yadav, who has fashioned himself as the champion of the state’s backward classes, including Muslims) in September 1990, to prevent BJP leader, LK Advani’sRathYatra(literally, chariot march, leading the way to the Ayodhya movement for the construction of the Ram Mandir)from crossing through Bihar. This act is credited to have singlehandedly prevented largescale violence from engulfing Bihar, avoiding the fate of the other states that had been in the RathYatra’s path - Gujarat, central India, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. It was also seen as a strong signal to law enforcement agencies, that communal violence would not be tolerated, and is considered to have contributed to Bihar remaining largely violence free for much of its post 1990 period. An early disruption of inter-community peace in Sitamarhi (1992), led by SanghParivar elements - RSS and BJP- that threatened to snowball into a major conflagration, was scotched again with strong

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administrative measures, under the direct supervision of the Chief Minister, Laloo Yadav, resulting in the violence being contained.9 Competitive politics in Bihar and pursuit of social justice agenda also seems to deliver positive measures for victims of violence. In 2006, the new JD(U)-led coalition government (led by the current Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, a political rival of LaooYadav) set up the second Bhagalpur Commission of Enquiry, to review 27 riot related cases that had been closed.10 As a result, state government re-opened 29 cases, including Kameshwar Yadav’s, the main accused inthe infamous Logain massacre case, who many claimed was being sheltered by the RJD.11By 2008, 325 accused in mass murder, had been convicted, of whom 125 received life imprisonment. (Chopra and Jha, 2014:133).And according to an RTI answer submitted by state governmentas part of the current study, government was taking serious action on recommendation of the Bhagalpur Riot Enquiry Commission to punish guilty officers, and against distress sale of property by Muslims survivors(Home dept. RTI answer, on file with author). Bihar also seemsto have, at least in recent times and relatively speaking, less of a biased policing and criminal justice system, at least with no abnormal representation of Muslims among the undertrial population of the state, indeed there wereno Muslim among detenus in Bihar jails – a finding at variance with those from states such as Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra (National Crimes Record Bureau, 2015: 100-106), where the system has long been held to be particularly harsh to Muslims, among other excluded groups (dalits and adivasis among others). It is our conjecture that this outcome too is the result, among others of a political society that is more resilient to attempts at polarization along communal lines. Efforts by Hindu right groups to foment trouble continue underway, regardless. These, as in the past, have usually spiked around religious festivals, as opportunities,

9‘Riots savage Sitmarhi’. India Today, 27 December 2012. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/communal-riots-expose-laloos-promises-in-bihar/1/307956.html. 10Many allege that the Lallo Yadav of RJD, though having successfully prevented any further violence, was not as quick to mete justice to Muslim victims of violence. As example, they referred to RJD government - in power since 1989, just after the Bhagalpur riots – failing to act decisively against public officials indicted by official enquiries for acts of omission and commissions, resulting in the violations. And more seriously, RJD was also accused of giving shelter to some of the principal conspirators and accused, the likes of Rameshwar Yadav, Mahadeo Singh and Kameshwar Yadav, all thought close to RJD chief, Laloo Yadav. (Chopra and Jhan, 2014). Also see OneIndia, 20 November 3008. ‘Lalu, non-serious even on serious issues’. At ’http://www.oneindia.com/2008/11/20/lalu-non-serious-even-on-serious-issuesjdu-1227190412.html 11In Logain village, where 116 Muslims were killed - the biggest single incident of the violence – by a 4000 strong mob, led, among others, by Police officer Ramachandar Singh. The perpetrators buried the bodies in fields and then planted cauliflower over the mass graves.

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for those with vested interests, to pit groups against each. (Indian Express, 14-10-2016 and Times of India, 07-08-2016)12 But it is when communal polarization itself is the desired outcome and engineered violence, the instrument of choice, that violence assumes a more serious form, as happened just after the ruling JD(U) broke its long held alliance with the Hindu right BJP in 2013, and “Bihar witnessed nearly five notable incidents of communal violence — Khagaria, Bettiah, Nawada, two cases in Jamui — with the police and administration pointing to political underpinnings.” 13 Following the national trend, right wing Hindu political parties (principally BJP, in this case), supported by grassroots sanghparivar affiliates (such as RSS local formations, akharasamiti, and gaurakshaksamiti), have used trivial incidents (eve teasing) as well as a campaign of misinformation (love jihad, cow protection and gharwapsi) to mobilise anti-minority sentiments (mostly anti-Muslim), not shying away from violence against minorities, to polarize society, so as to consolidate the Hindu vote. An Indian Express investigation on communal violence in Bihar in 2015, reported “almost three-fold spike in ‘communal incidents’…… during an election year especially when the BJP has shown significant gains across the state.” 14Compared to 19 incidents of eve teasing during January 2010 - June 2013 turning into communal incidents, eve teasing had become the basis for 145 communal clashes during the following two years to June 2015. (Figure below, courtesy, Indian Express. 21-08-2015)

12 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/communal-tension-bihar-prohibitory-orders-durga-puja-3081635/ http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/Communal-clashes-in-Bihar-district-over-video-on-deities/articleshow/53580478.cms 13‘2 Killed in Bihar communal clashes’. The Hindu. 13-08-2013 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/2-killed-in-bihar-communal-clashes/article5018821.ece 14 ‘Mapping the surge in Bihar. Indian express, 21 August 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/mapping-the-surge-tension-in-areas-

where-bjp-made-big-electoral-gains/

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And during state assembly elections itself, in 2015, political campaigning took a highly polarizedtone, with BJPand its allies seeking to divide the electorate along communal lines, to try to consolidate Hindu vote, at the expense of Muslims.15 It is remarkable that despite these provocations, the state continued to remain peaceful, avoiding any major communal conflagration. Peace has also largely endured, despite a worsening environment nationally, with Hindu right wing mobilization, around ‘cow protection’ mostly, including in Bihar. As respondents of our micro case studies reported at multiple sites, it is primarily because the state administration continues to take communal violence seriously, is vigilant and quick to respond to any potentially divisive incidents,that the state has largely avoided any largescale violence.16Fact that the state administration also has the trust of Muslims and other minorities, helps in this effort. 4.3 Effective participation Muslim access to effective participation is limited. This is about poor representation in elected bodies and public services, as well as poor engagement in local decision making processes, affecting the lives of minority members. Political representation

15 FOR A SAMPLE SEE: ‘BIHAR ELECTION RESULTS CHALLENGE MODI'S BJP’. BBC, 8 NOVEMBER 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-34760794 and ‘Modi’s attempt to communalise Bihar’. NDTV blog. 28 October, 2015. http://www.ndtv.com/blog/modis-attempts-to-communalise-bihar-1237379 16 Recent case of violence in Ajitpur-Bhilwaravillage, Muzaffarpur district, in January 2015, was another case where state administration responded firmly to arrest a potentially violent episode. ‘How Muzaffarpur was different from Muzaffarnagar?’ Rediff News. http://www.rediff.com/news/column/how-muzaffarpur-was-different-from-muzaffarnagar/20150122.htm

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Muslim representation in state assemblies has been conservative. It has been highest at 10.2 per cent in 1985 Congress government, but mostly in a single digit. In the past, most Muslim MLAs belonged to the Congress party. 1990, in the context of communal polarisation elsewhere in the country, signalled a shift, with the majority of Muslims moving to Laloo Yadav-led JantaDal(JD) that took power after Bhagalpur riots. Janta Dal had 11 of the total 18 Muslims MLAs in the state. From 1995, the support base later moved on to RashtriyaJantaDal (RJD), breakaway group of JDled by Laloo Prasad. (Table 7). Table 7: Muslim representation in Bihar state assembly (1952-2000) (Numbers are members of state legislative assembly)

Source: Government of Bihar (2002:102) In 2005, after the division of Bihar into Bihar and Jharkhand, and when Nitish Kumar led JD-U (JD-United) assumed power, Muslim representation slumped to 6.58. This increased slightly to 7.28 per cent in 2010 elections. The Mahagathbandhan (literally ‘super alliance’) that emerged victorious in the 2015 state assembly elections, with JD-U and RJD among other parties coming together on a secular platform, to oppose the BJP-led alliance, has 24 Muslims in the assembly, taking the Muslims representation to 10 per cent (12 RJD, 6 Congress, 5 JD-U and one CPI-ML). Given the 16.87 per cent Muslim representation of state population (2011 Census), this under representation of Muslims in the highest decision making body in the state, is problematic. Whilst aware that mere numerical representation in decision making bodies does not necessarily translate directly into better participation, it must be said that poor representation has implications for how Muslims issues are voiced and aggregated. As political commentators have noted, much of Muslim politics in the state has been reduced to search for security, in place of representation, overall, with Muslims repeatedly reposing faith in Laloo Yadav, who has succeed in guaranteeing a

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communal violence-free state for much of the time he has been in power. 17The same has continued, more or less, during JD-U rule, since 2005. This then, is the sole achievement of the 25 years of JantaParivar(Janta family of parties) rule in the state for Muslims, for there is little hard evidence that a less antagonistic political formation in power (to the interests of minorities) has made much change to the lives of Muslims in the socio-economic sphere (ibid). Poor socio-economic outcomes, also better explains the poor local participation of Muslims. The Bihar government survey of Muslims (2002) had found only 1.5 percent of the rural households and 1.8 percent urban participating in Panchayat or Municipality administration. The same was the representation in professional organisations or minority-led entities. The survey found better Muslim representation in educational institutions, mostly on account of the network of madrasas across the state. (Government of Bihar, 2002: xiii) Public service representation Data on Muslim representation in public services is more difficult to come by, but some can be found in the Sachar report (2006). The share of Muslims in public services in Bihar was merely 7.6 percent, just above the national figure of 6.4 per cent. (Ibid, 370). In Home department, where Police is located, the representation was lower at 6.9 per cent. These figures are unlikely to have improved much. Such poor representation in public services, has the implication, at the least, of making these services unrepresentative of the diversity in society, resulting in their only limited reach into and confidence among minority communities.

Table 8: Muslim Representation in Government Jobsin Bihar (%) Muslims in total

population of state Muslim Representation in state employment

Muslim representation in Public Sector Undertakings – higher

Muslim representation in state Home dept.

Bihar 16.5 7.6 8.6 6.9 Source: Government of India (2006. 370, 373),

Box 1: Muslim representation in state bureaucracy and Police Source: Government of Bihar(2002: 37)

In May, 2003, the cadre division of the officials of the State Administrative Service and State Police Service was finalised by the Ministry of Personnel and Public Grievances, Government of India, for Bihar. The state was allotted 1756 official of State Administrative Service, of which 178 were Muslims

17 ‘25 YEARS OF JANATA PARIVAR RULE IN BIHAR: SOME MUSLIM QUESTIONS’. MAZUMDER, TA. INDIA

TOMORROW. 27 AUG 2015.

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(10.1 percent). Likewise, of the 317 officials of State Police Service allotted to Bihar, 41 were Muslims (12.9 percent). According to the Department of Minority Welfare of the Government of Bihar, the extent of representation of Muslims in different layers of the state Police Administration was poor. At the top, among the Deputy Superintendents of Police, which constitute 316 members, 35 are Muslim – implying a share of 11.1 percent for the community. The corresponding figures (percentage share of Muslims) for other levels of service are as follows — Inspector of Police (4.7 percent), Sub-Inspector of Police (8.0), Reserve Sub-Inspector (5.1), Assistant Sub-Inspector (9.7), Havildar (16.0), Constable (7.8) and Bihar Military Police (7.8). Clearly, across the board, Muslim representation in the state police force, at all levels, was much below Muslim proportion of the state population (16.7% latest figures). Among Inspectors of Police – the frontline cadre of the police - representation was particularly poor. Data from the state public service commission (Table 8) reveals that part of the problem of poor public sector representation of Muslims in Biharmay bethe limited numbers of Muslims applying, either due to poor awareness, limited numbers meeting eligibility criteria, or Muslim youth’s poor trust in government.

Table 9: Muslim representation in state combined civil service examinations – Bihar (all figures in %)

Persons Applied Appeared Called for interview

Selected

5.4 (of total 17,645)

4.54 (of total 11,111)

6.36 (of total 619)

7.3 (of total 233)

Source: Tabulated by author, from Hasan (2001:290-291)

4.4 Conclusion: Explaining Bihar’s mixed bag! Bihar’s is a mixed bag – it has a history of violence against minorities, but alsostrong evidence of state action in recent years, to prevent further violence, and provide a sense of security to all. Lower violence means society is also less polarized (both a factor contributing to the low violence as well as a consequence of the low violence itself). Society then, is also less polarized – if not more diverse - all of which works in favour of minorities, enabling a sense of freedom of religion and practice, and an atmosphere that is not fraught with fear. Positive outcomes for Muslims in Bihar, is founded on the nature of politics in the state. The change to greater state action to uphold the right to life of minorities (through preventing violence against them by non-state actors), is a reflection of the political ideology that has held forth in the state over the past decades, a result itself of the political formation that came to power in 1898. This is the alliance of parties speaking for the ‘backward classes’ best reflected by Laloo Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal, but also of Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal-United, that, as we saw in the previous sections has sought, successfully, to nurture a constituency among the Muslims of the state too.

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The antecedents to these positive outcomes go deeper, and beyond mere security of life. Urdu, the language spoken by the majorty of the state’s Muslims, was recognised as the second official language, way back in 1989 (to provide perspective, in UP – which has traditionally been the home of Urdu language and literature - that happened only in 2014, and only after the Supreme Court intervened). And up until 2006 when the Justice Sachar report was published, Bihar was the onlystate, apart from the southern ones, that provided for poorest Muslims, along with other groups, to access affirmative action policies. Muslim caste groups, are included in state Most Backward Class (besides Backward Class) category, in lists prepared as part of the ‘Karpoori formula’ of 1978,for special dispensation for more marginalised groups from amongst OBC castes. By also including many Muslim groups in the MBC list, the Karpoori formula created space for mobility also among poorer Muslims, as it did for the less advanced sections among Hindu OBCs. This takes us to another feature of politics in Bihar - the backward classes politics – of which the Karpooriformula was a product – and which has also spawned a backward class politics amongMuslims. Called the Pasmanda movement, PM argues for directed interventions for Pasmanda groups among Muslims, rather than for Muslims as a whole, which it feels are cornered by the upper castes sections of Muslim society. In 2005 elections, JD-U partnered with Pasmanda Movement, and decided to bring most Muslim OBC groups into the MBC list. Yet, despite a supportive political formation in power, Bihar’s Muslims have a long distance to travel to obtain rights as equal citizens. As we saw in our surveys, efforts at improved socio-economic outcomes have been less fruitful successful, more restrained, although absence of a polarization in society, helps limit discrimination against Muslims in provision of services and entitlements to some extent. 5.Recommendations Following are some suggestions for improving the access of Muslims in Bihar. ‘Supply side’ are steps that the state needs to undertake and put in place, and which create laws, systems and capacities to be able to deliver a programme of work for poorest Muslims. ‘Demand side’ ones are those that would potentially create ‘voice’ for more and better design and delivery of the services, thus pushing the state to respond. Provided in tandem, and with the active participation of Muslim communities, these measures could potentially engender change for Muslims in Bihar. Supply-side Policy oriented i. Representation of Muslims in education and jobs:

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- Revise the state Backward and Most Backward lists to include all left-out Muslims groups in the lists and correct anomalies. Specifically, include Gadheri, Mughal, Turk Pasi groups in the lists – they do not find mention in any, currently. - Also address the discrepancy between state and central lists, that leaves out many groups, already identified by various state agencies, thus depriving them of benefits under the policy – specifically 6 OBC groups here, listed in state list but not in central: Faqir/Diwan, Julaha/Ansari (the synonym Momin is in the Central List), Itrfarosh/Gadheri/Itpaj/Ibrahimi, Jat, Gadaria and Surajpuri. (Both specific recommendations from Sachar report (Government of India, 2006: 201).

ii. Education, and specially women’s education: reverse poor literacy among Muslims, through targeted education projects in districts with lowest female literacy rate; and promote excellence in education through investment in coaching, and pre-entrance tutoring of Muslim candidates, for competitive high, and secondary school levels; professional courses; and for public sector jobs.

iii. Integrated programme against child labour in MCD districts – including long-term education support for children and income support for parents.

iv. Better wage employment for Muslims, through special drives on NREGS, NRLM and skill development, in MCDs/MCBs/MCTs and for areas with high concentration of Muslims in it. Develop community pilots for livelihoods promotion (using NRLM, NREGS, and Kaushal VikasYojana) – to scale up the programmes amongst marginalised Muslims.

v. Empower state Minorities Commission to make it an effective monitoring and oversight body for improved conditions minority rights protection and promotion.

vi. Representative bureaucracy: special awareness and mass contact programmes for getting more Muslim youth to apply for public sector jobs, in (and central)

vii. Bring in anti-discrimination legislation, making it illegal to discriminate in provision of public services, and opportunities including in the private sphere.

Implementation oriented vi. Better data collection, including disaggregated by religious groups, on a range

of outcomes and access to services; and their dissemination, using suitable media, in the policy community, and wider stakeholder group. As a specific immediate output: a detailed state government study, to assess socio-economic condition of Muslims, and the impact of Sachar committee – inspired set of policy instruments (now, ten years old) on their lives. Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra have already done something similar.

vii. Use 15 Point Programme framework effectively, to channelize state interventions towards uplift of Muslims, demonstrating resource allocations (especially social sector budgets); usage; and achievements.

ix. Develop minority rights institutional capacity at district and local level, through educating, training, sensitizing, and holding state actors to deliver and be

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accountable (State Minority Welfare Department; District Minority Welfare office; Tehsil/Block offices; Gram Panchayats)

Demand-side What the community can do? i. Develop autonomous people’s movements for claiming rights – through

developing ‘agency’ of poor Muslims communities, freeing them up from the monopoly of narrow political agendas. Set up state-wide platform for focused advocacy for better outcomes for poorer Muslims, working in alliance with other pro-poor platforms of excluded groups – women, dalits, informal workers and the like.

What governments can do? ii. Largescale programme to support promotion of shared living; pluralism, and

respect for mutual rights and duties, What wider development community can do? iii. Support development of grassroots capacity (for analysis, dissemination,

advocacy) among poor and vulnerable Muslims, for public action, through supporting local and regional networks

iv. Support development of network of activists and CBOs at local/grassroots level, through leadership and fellowship programmes, for monitoring, tracking, researching and analysis

v. Intervention to track, monitor and report working of anti-poverty programmes (minority, as well as universal) as they work for Muslims, enabling disaggregated and dynamic analysis of poverty, as it affects Muslims.

vi. Education and awareness programmes around Minority welfare schemes (MsDP, 15 Point; Scholarship; bank and credit et al) and on minority rights (security, cultural, developmental)

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References - Government of Bihar, 2002. Socio-economic and educational status of

Muslims in Bihar. Survey report. Patna: Bihar State Minorities Commission. - Brass, Paul R. 2003. The Production of Muslim-Hindu violence in

Contemporary India. Seattle: University of Washington Press. - Centre for Equity Studies. 2011. Promises to Keep: Investigating

Government’s Response to Sachar Committee Recommendations. New Delhi: Anhad.

- Chopra, S, P Jha, A Rastogi, R Koli, S Mander, H Mander. 2012. Accountability for State Violence: Examining the State’s Records. New Delhi: Centre for Equity Studies. (Unpublished)

- Chopra, Surabhi, and P. Jha. 2014. On Their Watch: Mass Violence and State Apathy in India; Examining the Record. New Delhi: Three Essays Collective

- Dayal, John and Hashmi. 2015. 365 Days of Modi. New Delhi: Anhad. - Government of India 2006. Social Economic and Educational Status of

Muslims of India – A Report of the Prime Minister’s High Level Committee. New Delhi: Government of India

- --------- 2011. India Human Development Report, 2011. New Delhi: Planning Commission.

- --------- 2013. Report of the Standing Committee of the National Monitoring Committee of Minority Education (NMCME). New Delhi: Ministry of Human Resources.

- ---------- 2015. Report of the Post Sachar Evaluation Committee. New Delhi: Ministry if Minority Affairs.

- Hasan, Mushirul. 2001. Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims since Independence. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

- Hassan, M. Sajjad. 2014. Muslim Exclusion in India: A review of Literature. Centre for Equity Studies Working Paper series no. 4. 2014.

- …………………2015. Review, ‘On Their Watch: Mass Violence and State Apathy in India; Examining the Record’. CSD, Social Change. 45 (3) 1-7. p505-511.

- ---------------2016. Survivors of Mas Communal Violence in Muzaffarnagar: Profiles of Loss, dispossession and recovery. India Exclusion Report 2015. New Delhi: Yoda Press.

- Narayan, J. 1998. Communal riots and administration in Bihar. In Lal, AK (ed.) Secularism concept and practice. New Delhi: Concept Publishing House.

- National Crime Records Bureau 2016. Prison Statistics, India, 2015. - Reddy, D N. 2008. Baseline Survey of Minority Concentration Districts: An

Overview of the Findings, New Delhi: ICSSR. - Shariff, Abusaleh. 2015. District Development and Diversity Index: Report for

India and Major states. US India Policy Institute Occasional Paper no. 6, January 2015.

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ANNEXURE – I Profiles of Exclusion The following are detailed accounts of the findings from our micro studies of exclusion at 5 sample sites, based on household surveys (of 100 houses – all minority community - at each of the 5 sites, and FGDs with a cross section of respondents – also all minority members, and opinion makers in the community). All figures are from the household survey we conducted, and speak for the sample, not the entire population of the settlements. Case Study 1: Lal miankidargah, Ishopur, Phulwarisharif, Patna district

1. Background: Phulwarisharif, in Patna, the capital of Bihar, is a minority concentrated block – sub-district administrative unit - with more than 25 per cent population being from minority communities, in this case Muslim. The sample belongs to ward no 17 (lalMiankiDargah), a community settled on government land (on the nullah). This is a small community of a total of 221 households, belonging to a mix of Muslim castes, mostly Mansuri(dhunia), Shah (Fakir) and Ansari, although there are a few families of other castes too, overwhelmingly, excluded, both socially and economically. Misaal had been working here for almost a year at the time of writing. 2. Income and occupation: Average monthly family income of respondents was Rs 6,300, with almost all informally employed, mostly working as labourers (close to 50 per cent), as daily wage workers, casual construction workers, headload, cloth hawkers/pheriwallahs), and women mostly as domestic workers in neighbouring settlements. Of the cohort, only 4 had formal employment, in the private sector. Average monthly family expenditure turns out to be Rs. 5750. 3. Asset and amenities: Most respondents have a house (80 per cent), although majority of those (44 per cent) are non-permanent, mostly reed and tarpauline structure. It is significant that 20 per cent of the respondents answered that they possessed ‘no house’, implying their homeless status. Common services such as roads, sewage, and street lighting are poor in the ward, and there is an absence of common facilities such as parks. Indeed, life on this ‘nullah colony’ (settlement on the drain) is quite precarious, especially for the children and the infirm. Going to show the poor access to basic services and infrastructure, 33 per cent of respondents had no access to safe drinking water – most persons having to fetch water from public handpumps located at some distance away, as most public handpumps in the ward have broken down; only 51 per cent had pour flush latrines at home – even though a major national scheme for a Swatch Bharat ‘clean India’ is being implemented across the country - and some 32 per cent had no electricity connection. 4. Access to services: Our questions on access to services and social security schemes, returned poor results. Education levels among the cohort is low, although many are employed in skilled jobs, such as tailors, plumbers, and painters. The nearest primary school is about a km away, and middle school, about 2 kms away. This has impact on ability of parents to

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get their children to go to school, but the poor seriousness of teachers, appears, according to respondents, to be a big contributory factor, to preventing children from taking teaching seriously, thus dropping out. Participatory institutions such as School management committees are not functional. Only 27 per cent of respondent families are included in ‘priority households’ under Food Security Act. This is despite the poor income levels that we noted earlier on. And only 1 per cent were included in the Antayodaya category, of the poorest households, eligible for super-subsidised food.18 Clearly, this is a case of exclusion, the result, potentially of a variety of reasons, including poor administration of the headcount survey conducted as a precondition to the implementation of the Food Security act. 22 percent of respondents were included among National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP), under different pension schemes, (12 widow pension, 7 old age and 3 disability pension). 9 families had children benefiting from pre-matric scholarship schemes, 7 being ‘minority’ in nature, the balance 2 being OBC scholarships. Despite the strong showing of the Aajeevikaprogramme (NRLM) in Bihar, our cohort did not return a single beneficiary of this flagship national programme for livelihood security. 5. Barriers to access: We wanted to understand the barriers to access. Awareness about laws and social security programmes turned out be very poor – only 9 per cent could name any public scheme. For those who did cite schemes, the overwhelming majority expressed knowledge of the pre-matric minority scholarship scheme, that has been a big focus of Misaal’s work in the area. The other scheme that has any resonance among the cohort, is pensions, the other focus of Misaal’s work. In terms of visits to government offices in the past year – a measure of engaging with public schemes – a vast majority, had not visited any office, and for the ones that had, it was mostly health centres and banks. Findings regarding the number of respondents who visistednagarpalika (city council) and Minority welfare offices, were poor (2 and 3 per cent responses, respectively).

But there are other reasons too for poor access outcomes – most hutments are built on government land, most residents do not have ownership papers for their residences, thus preventing them from accessing many schemes. Most inhabitants are migrants from rural areas, and the absence of ‘immovable asset’ in their name means residence requirements – a necessity for access – is difficult to prove.

The poor showing on outcomes is despite positive results on ‘participation’, in terms of official representation: both the local ward councilor and the Nagar Parishad (city council) ward chairman are Muslims. And given Ishopur’s location, development agencies - Misaal included – have been engaging with the community, providing support. Besides Misaal’s recent work, Agha Khan Foundation too works with parents and children, for better education outcomes for children. Perhaps the scale of the problem – the large population and the severe exclusion – and the fact that most

18 Priority Households: Prioritised poor households, eligible for subsidized food rations. Antayodaya, the ultra poor, eligible for free food rations.

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respondents are busy eking out a living, and neither have the time nor the resilience for long legal battles to obtain their rights, means change is slow.

6. Right to life and freedom of religion: On access to right to life and freedom of religion, respondents felt there had been no increase in violence or hate speeches against Muslims in the past years. However, the atmosphere of mistrust means, when it comes to matters of faith and practice, our respondents were not willing to repose faith in persons from majority community, or from state actors. Respondents reported how in the previous year, in Ishopur, during dusshehra festival, tension developed directed at Muslims, instigated by Hindu youth groups, but that the local administration handled the situation well, to bring the tensions to a peaceful conclusion.

Case Study 2: Bhalni, Kaluahi and Qazitola, Harpur, both Kaluahi block, Madhubani district

1. Background: The sites are large habitations, both in Kaluahi block of Madhubani district. Respondents chosen for the survey belonged to shaikh, raeen, Ansari, mansuri groups, although a small section aslo belonged to Hindu SCs (chamar, dusadh, karori)

Mean family income of the cohort turns out to be Rs 8900, a figure significantly higher than that of other survey sites. 71 per cent of respondents were engaged in labour of various kind, which took them out of village in seek of work, as cap makers, as mechanics or at puncture repair shops, as well as some that go overseas. There are also drivers and petty shopkeepers, among the cohort. And a good 12 per cent are also engaged in different forms of formal employment, in government and private enterprises. 2. Asset and amenities: 30 per cent of respondents have agricultural land, 96 per cent have a house to use, of which 32 per cent are permanent structures, rest temporary shelters. 56 per cent of households have access to safe drinking water close by, 36 per cent have pour flush latrines at home, and 69 per cent say their homes have power connection. 3. Access to social security scheme is better than at the rest of survey sites. 52 per cent of respondents are found to be of BPL category, but only 7 per cent have been included as ‘priority household’ under Right to Food programme, and 5 per cent are included under Antyodaya scheme, meant as very subsidized food support for the very poor. 32 per cent families have National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGS) programme job cards with them. 21 per cent are beneficiaries of a pension scheme, with majority being old age pension beneficiaries. 14 per cent students have access to a public scholarship programme, some OBC scholarship, rest from minority departments. Only 4 per cent of the respondents have access to public health insurance scheme, under RashtriyaSwasthyaBimaYojana (RSBY), and coverage of Aajeevika under National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM) was nil, as was that of labour welfare insurance scheme.

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4. Awareness and access: Household survey findings from Madhubani demonstrate a much better picture on the range of indicators – socio-economic status, access to services and social security schemes. Part of the reason for this is the better awareness among the group, regards their rights and entitlements. 11 per cent of the cohort were able to name two or more schemes and how to access those. Majority, mentioned scholarship scheme, rest state government talaqshuda scheme, for the benefit of divorced women. This is founded, in part, on Misaal’s sustained work in the local community, around awareness and handholding around rights and entitlements. 5. Right to life and freedom of religion: On issues of religious freedoms and threats to life and security, the response has been much the same as in the rest of the state – respondents did not feel the threat level had increased in the recent past. They went about their lives normally, without much hindrance to observances. But respondents did talk of perceived sense of discrimination, by public bodies, on account of their being Muslim.

Case study 3: Jamalpura, Darbhanga town and Wajidpur. Bahadarpur block, Darbhanga MCD

1. Background: The two sites of surveys are a mix of urban sites (mostly) and rural. Majority of respondents identified themselves as belonging to shaikh sub-caste, but there were also mansuri, ansari, qureshi and raeen families, all settled on the banks of the Baghmati river, on government ghairmazrua land. 2. Income and occupation: Average monthly family income among the respondents is just above Rs 4000. Most adult males are informally employed, as manual labourers, in construction and other works (50 per cent), besides carrying out other forms of unskilled work – domestic work, rickshaw pulling. There are a few skilled workers too – tailors, painters, auto rickshaw drivers, mechanics and plumbers, and such like. Women mostly do domestic work at home – sewing, and some as domestic helpers in neighbouring households. Average monthly expense is Rs 4150. 3. Assets and amenities: All respondents have a house to themselves, but the overwhelming majority (90 per cent) have only non-permanent structures (reed and tarpaulin). Only 10 per cent of the respondents have access to piped water or to safe drinking water close to their homes, majority are dependent on public handpumps or ponds. Only 8 per cent have wet flush latrines at home, and only 20 per cent have electricity connections. 4. Access to social security schemes is poor. Only 27 per cent of respondents have BPL cards, only 17 per cent are included within ‘priority household’ category, under Food Security law, and a mere 3 per cent have access to Antayodaya cards, for the poorest. This is despite the poor income levels of the overwhelming majority of respondents, pointing to significant exclusions in delivery of food entitlements. Access to other social security schemes is worse - not a single household has ever benefited from NREGA programme. Only one of the 100 respondents benefit from the central NSAP pension schemes, and there is not a single beneficiary of the pre-matric scholarship scheme, or of the central insurance scheme for construction workers or of the NRLM Aajivika schemes in the entire cohort. These are all telling

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figures, and go to emphasize the extreme exclusions from access poor Muslims, at least our respondents, suffer. 5. Reasons for the outcomes are not far to see. There is almost no awareness about government programs. Asked to name two schemes specially for minorities, respondents were not able to name even one. There have been no visits to government offices too in the past year to make enquiries or to petition authorities for schemes and benefits – again a telling finding, pointing to both the lack of awareness, who to go to, as also of lack of trust that the group suffers with state/service providers. The main barrier for some respondents seems to be the absence of voter ID cards, due to which they cannot prove residence status, and hence are denied all services. Visits to local ward councilors – the main local actor accessible to respondents – has not yielded much solution. A handful of respondents also took the courage to visit Jantadarbars(grievance redress camps), at block level – with little to show for it in the end. The sense of disconnect between poor Muslims and public services, at least in this case of the urban ward in Darbhanga district, seems complete. No community based organization exists, nor an NGO that works on development issues with the community. MAAS – a local voluntary group made up of professionals – has been active, providing education support and relief, in the form of ramzaan kit. But there is little engagement on issues of right and entitlements. 6. Right to life and freedom of religion: Whilst in group discussions with the cohort, some respondent voiced their concern of their being discrimination against in provision of services, due to their being Muslim – as their applications for benefits have been unsuccessful, and they have not been able to benefit from any schemes. But there was no evidence of any perception of a threat to religious freedom or to life and security. Respondents noted they were freely able to practice their faith, and go about their lives freely. As to violence, whilst respondents are aware of the changing atmosphere in the country – hate speech and Hindu mobilization against peace and amity, and Muslims particularly – they have themselves not felt any change yet.

Case Study 4: Siratgali (ward 10), and Urdu Mohalla (ward 14), Rajopur panchayat, ward 10. Dumra block, Sitamarhi district.

1. Background: The two wards in question of ofRajopur Panchayat, are large habitations of Muslims from poorer backgrounds, a combination of Ansari sub-caste - in majority - along withdarzi (idrisi), Mansuri and Pathan and Shaikh families. 2. Income and occupation: Average monthly family income of the respondents is Rs 4220. The vast majority of households surveyed are labourers, pheriwallahs, masons, although there are those engaged in semi-skilled work too, tailoring, bidi making, and churi/bangle making too. Women are engaged in bidi making and sewing, mostly at home. A very large population of the youth and older men must migrate out of the area for work. Some also travel overseas – in particular, West Asia - in search of work.

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3. Asset and amenities: All are landless, with poor education and access to skills training, which in turns perpetuates their state of destitution, with little opportunity to improve their living conditions. 62 per cent have a house of some sort, although 47 per cent (of all) have only non-permanent structures, of reed and straw. 38 per cent of respondents indicated that they do not have a house of any kind, implying there is a large number of the homeless, or those without a structure of their own. In a rural area, this high a figure of homeless, is notable. Common services in the habitations – such as roads, sewage, street lighting – is poor. Only 33 per cent have access to potable water, through own sources (handpumps). The rest depend on public sources such as ponds or public handpumps. Only 12 per cent of households have a pour flush latrine in their house, and only 17 per cent have electricity connection. 4. Access to services: The groundwork for the national food security programme seems to have done well in the area, in terms of reach, with an uncharacteristically large section included for provisioning. 46 per cent of households have BPL cards, 38 per cent are included as ‘priority households’ under Food Security programme, and 23 per cent have Antayodaya cards, meant to provide food support to the ultra poor. But access to other social security programmes is poor - there is no beneficiary of the central labour insurance scheme, or of NRLM/Aajeevikaprogramme for livelihood security. Only 7 per cent household have accessed pension scheme ever, evenly divided between old age and widow pension. Pre-matric scholarship scheme has only one beneficiary living in the area. Although a primary school exists close by, respondents alluded to poor teaching and attention by teachers, which hinders the quality of education available, and undermines the interests and expectations of students and parents. 5. Barriers to access: Our exploration into the reasons for poor access, revealed important patterns. Poor access is, in part, an outcome of poor awareness: when asked to name two social security schemes, respondents could not name a single one. Further, none of the respondents reported having been to a government office (for either making enquiries about benefits, making applications or filing grievance claims) in the past year. As regards participation, the panchayat ward member from – a woman - is from the community, but that does not mean empowerment for women, as the person in question is a proxy for her husband, who was the past member from the ward. As informed by respondents, no non-governmental organization works in the community, and past attempts by respondents to voice their demands for rights and find solutions to their problems - usually by appealing to local leaders and officials – have not yielded much results.

Opinion about discrimination in government offices is divided among the cohort. While some felt there was some discrimination on account of their being Muslims, other felt this was not the case. Nevertheless, there is more evidence of growing mobilization by Hindu groups against Muslims. Respondents reported how, recently members of ABVP – the BJP student wing – and Vishwa Hindu Parishad took out rallies in the area, denouncing Pakistan and Muslims, presumably in the context of recent border clashes in Kashmir. The rallies resulted in tension; however, villagers also noted how local administration took quick and firm action to help diffuse the tension.

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Case study 5: ChakMoinuddin village, Khwajachandchapra Panchayat, Chehra Kalan block, Vaishali district 1. Background: ChakMoinuddin is small hamlet of Khwajachandchapra Panchayat, with 150 households, all of fakir sub-caste. 2. Income and occupation: Average family monthly income is just over Rs 4500, with an average monthly expenditure of Rs 4500 as well. 77 per cent of respondents are manual labourers, while 15 per cent reported begging as their main source of income. Education level is low and only a few reported being engaged in skilled employment of any kind. In a few cases, a given family reported having a small business – such as in mechanic or puncture repair - as their main employment. 3. Asset and amenities: 9 families (of the 100) have access to some land for agricultural purposes. 94 per cent have a house of some kind, but only 14 per cent had that of a permanent type, the remainder being reed and straw structures or those of tarpaulin. Only 7 per cent of respondents reported having pour flush latrines in their houses. 60 per cent have no access to potable water in the proximity – although all have the use of public handpumps or ponds in the village, at some distance away. There is no metalled road and no sewage system – however, almost half the households have electricity connection which is a relatively positive finding, in comparison. 4. Access to services and social security scheme is poor. 72 per cent of respondents had BPL cards, but a deplorable 3 per cent only are included in ‘priority household’ category under Food Security programme, despite the evident destitution all around. Only 9 per cent of families possess Antayodaya cards; there is a complete absence of any beneficiaries of the insurance schemes for construction labourers. And the NRLM/Aajivikaprogramme – for livelihoods support - too draws a blank in the community. Only 8 per cent of families have access to public health insurance scheme (under RSBY). Only 2 per cent have NREGS job cards. Only 17 per cent were beneficiaries of pension schemes, majority (10 per cent of all) of old age pension. 12 per cent of respondents were beneficiaries of pre-matric scholarship schemes, evenly split between that of OBC scholarship and ‘minority’ scholarship. But it is also true that most children of school going age, remain out of school. The nearest primary and middle schools are within a kilometer distance, but poor teaching and poor parent drive means majority of children remain out of school. 5. Barriers to access: Poor results on availing schemes and services, was, in part, the result of poor awareness – almost no respondents could name a scheme. Moreover, engagement with public offices remains an issue – none of the respondents had visited a public office in the past year, to enquire or to petition. However there have been some success in the past, with older members from the community having made attempts, some successfully, to access pension scheme. There is also poor ‘participation’, with no representative from among the community currently in the panchayat. A panch (member of village court, tasked with resolving family disputes) however does come from the community. No non-governmental organization has ever worked in the community. A local madrasa, run cooperatively by the community, and

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where the mosque imam is the sole teacher, is the only community based organization. 6. Our attempts to elicit responses on wider discrimination and attacks on freedom of religion and life and security, revealed not a great deal had changed over the past years, with people free to practice their religion, and go about their daily lives freely. And whilst respondents were aware of the increasing polarization along religious lines taking place nationally, they had themselves not experienced any attacks or restrictions.

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ANNEXURE II

HH survey schedule

(HH, that which has a single kitchen)

1. Socio-eco profile of family

Members Gender Age Highest class/degree

Employment

2. Family income: 2.1 Amount (average) monthly: ………. 2.2 Primary income earner:

3. Income source

3.1 Formal Job: Yes/NO If yes, type……………….. Informal job: Yes/NO, if yes type

Whether govt. schemes (NREGS/Urban..): Yes/No Number of days, average, a month: Lean months in year:………………….

3.2 Self employment: Yes/NO If yes, type:

a. Any impact of violence and displacement: Yes/ No If yes, explain briefly…………

4. Family Expenditure: 4.1 Average amount per month, in Rs.: 4.2 Break it down by items (average expenditure per month): - Food: …………. - Health: …………. - Health emergency - Housing - Services – electricity, water, phone

5. Immovable assets: 5.1 Agricultural land: Yes/No,

If yes, how much? 5.2 House: Yes/No,

If yes, Pucca/Kutcha 6. Access to health and nutrition 6.1 Health card: Yes/ NO 7. Access to basic services

7.1 Tapped water: Yes/No 7.2 Pour flush latrine: Yes/No

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7.3 Electric connection: Yes/No 8. Access to social security schemes

8.1 BPL card: Yes/No 8.2 Priority HH (under RTF) Yes/NO 8.3 Antayodaya Yes/NO 8.4 NREGS Job card Yes/No 8.5 Pension: Yes/ No

If yes, Type: (i) Old age (ii) Widow (iii) Disability 8.6 Scholarship: Yes/No

If Yes, source: (i) OBC (ii) Minority 8.7 Labour scheme insurance Yes/No 8.8 NRLM SHG Yes/No

9. Awareness about schemes 9.1 Name 2 minority schemes: ……………………………… 9.2 Name office responsible for implementing minority schemes

10. Participation: 10.1 How many times have you approached the government for social

security benefits, in the past year? 10.2 What were they for? (schemes, relief..). Please state

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ANNEXUE – III

Focus Group Discussion - Habitation based

Schedule

Each FGD: 10 persons average, mix of male and female; mix of old and young From different socio-economic strata, most poorer persons

Facilitator: to facilitate discussions, by introducing topic, asking questions, and then facilitate a discussion on the subject, getting opinions and view points, encouraging debate and discussions

Documentation: Record proceedings in as detail as possible, on a separate sheet, by each question, reflecting the main issues raised and arguments made.

1. Profile of the habitation: - Number of HH in habitation - Social profile: religion, caste break-up of total households - Occupational profile: 2. Participation i. Local government:

- Head: - ward member from habitation: - Participation of members in panchayat/urban body meetings

ii. Any NGO (developmental, religious..) working in habitation? If yes, list names, and work they do.

3. Perceptions about minority rights - what are rights of minority communities, as per law? - perceptions about their implementation - what of it in past two years?

4. Freedom of religion and identity - thoughts about any change in ‘freedom of religion’, in recent years - able to practice faith, freely? - any minority institution in the village/ habitation?

If yes, its working, and benefits. - able to use Urdu, and have children educated in mother tongue to primary

level 5. Life and security

- any increased threat to life and security? - any incidents of violations and hate speech – by non state actors?

- any incidents of violations by state? - any attempt to access justice – make complaints, file FIR? - Outcomes of such attempts 6. Socio-economic rights 6.1 Services available:

- Pucca all-weather road - Sanitation drains

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- Water supply - Electricity supply

6.2 Access to civic services: water, sanitation, - barriers? - coping mechanisms ? - attempts to obtain rights

7. Government health facility (with a regular doctor) - distance - facilities - In village: Asha worker - Regular Immunization

8. Education Distance

form habitation

Teachers’ shortage

Regular MDM

Scholarship Anyone member of SMC

Govt. primary school

Govt middle school Govt high School

- barriers to accessing education, for boys and girls - attempts to overcome those –

9. Livelihood opportunities - What jobs and livelihood opportunities do people make us of - opportunities available to poor members of minority community for jobs - opportunities to poor members of the community for self employment

10. social security schemes - access of community to schemes - barriers to those - examples of attempts to lay claim/ raise voice; and outcomes - lessons from those

11 Perception of state’s ability to provide for subjects/minorities - attitudes of providers (panchayat, Block office, district offices) - perceptions of discrimination 12. Process of accessing rights - Perceptions of barriers to accessing rights - How can barriers be overcome? - What attempts have been made by community? - What works and what doesn’t when it comes to accessing rights?

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ANNEXURE – IV RTI Questions schedule 1. Freedom of religion: 1.1. Anti conversion laws/regulations violate Art 25 of the Indian Constitution (freedom to profess, practice and propagate their religion).

Section 153, Indian Penal Code (IPC): "promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony."

Sec. 295A, IPC: prohibits "deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs."

Q: Number of cases registered under Sec 153 and Sec 295A of IPC, since 2010

1.2. UP (besides Rajasthan, MP and West Bengal) have laws regulating the

construction of public religious buildings and the use of public places for religious purposes. [UP Regulation of Public Religious Buildings and Places Act. 2000]

Q: Number of applications (since 2010) seeking permission for construction of public religious buildings et al, rejected, year-wise, and religious group wise?

Q: Number of police cases since 2010, lodged, attacks against places of worship of religious minorities, by groups? Action taken against those?

2. Language, identity and culture 2.1 Art. 29 (1): right of a group to preserve its language, distinct culture 29 (1) Q: What steps has state government taken to preserve Urdu, the mother tongue of

Muslims in UP and Bihar. 2.2 Art. 30 (1): Right of any linguistic group to establish and administer

educational institutions Q: what is the number of minority educational institutions in state/district? Q: what is the number of applications received for establishing minority

educational institutions, since 2010. Q: has the state government set up state commission for minority educational

institutions, as envisaged under Art 30 (1)? If so, what has been its chief contribution?

2.3 Art. 30 (2): freedom of Minority-managed educational institutions from discrimination in receiving aid from the State

Q: How many minority educational institutions received aid from state government, since 2010, and total amount of aid provided?

2.4 Article 347: Special provision relating to language Q. what action has been taken by the state government under Art. 347 of the

constitution, for special provision relating to language spoken by any section in the state.

2.5 Art.: 350A – provision of instruction in mother tongue at primary stage Q: Number of Urdu language government schools in the state, and by

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district? Q: Number of Urdu language teachers in government schools in state and

district 2.6 Art 350B: Provision for a special officer for linguistic minorities Q: Whether the state government has appointed commissioner for linguistic

minorities 2.7 Anti cow-slaughter/transport laws (violate freedom of culture)

The Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955 The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act 1955. Q: number of cases registered under respective laws, since 2010 Q: Number of accused lodged in judicial custody under the relevant Act, by

religious group, and duration of incarceration

3. Life and security 3.1 Art. 14: rights to equality before law, and equal protection by law 3.2 Art. 21: right to security of life and liberty Q: Number of murder, rape, injury and damage to property, in communal

incidents, in district/state, since 2010 Q: Number of cases of hate-induced violence against Muslims, registered since

2010, by crime category Q; Number of cases of hate speech (IPC Sec. 153A, 153 B; and Sec. 295A. Sec.

125 and 123(3) of RPA. Restriction on Art 19, right to freedom of speech) against Muslims registered since 2010,

Q: Number of deaths in police custody (custodial or encounter deaths), since 2010, by religious groups.

Q: Number of deaths in police firing, since 2010, by religious groups Q; Number of arrests under UAPA, and the anti-state sections of IPC, since 2010, Q: Number of acquittals of those arrested since 2010, under UAPA, and the anti-

state sections of IPC, by religious groups 3.3 Prison data: Q: Number of inmates in judicial custody by category of cases (detenues, under

trial, convicts), by religious group State government action: Q: Action take by State government on directions of the Supreme Court for relief

of victims of communal violence in Muzaffarnagar, 2013? Q: Action by State government on recommendations of the enquiry commissions

set by itself in violence cases? Bhagalpur, in Bihar; Muzaffarnagar, in Uttar Pradesh.

Q: Action taken by state government on recommendations of the Nimesh commission set up by it, to enquire into custodial death of terror accused in Faizabad/Rae Bareilly?

Q: Whether state government has set up independent Police Complaints Authority, as directed by Supreme Court, at state and district levels?

Q: how many cases of grievances received by PCA at district and state, from minority groups, by religious category.

Q: percentage of member of minority groups in police forces – state and district levels, by religious groups.

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4. Socio-economic rights:4.1 Art. 14: Right to equality before law

Art. 15: Right to prohibition of discrimination (on religious, ethnic, gender.) Art 15 (1) (2): Right to opportunity in employment and appointment to public office; and prohibit discrimination,

4.2 Art 38 (2): Duty to eliminate inequalities Art. 46: Duty to promote educational and economic interests of weaker sections

Q: Steps taken by the state government to eliminate inequalities faced by minorities (particularly Muslims) under Art. 38 (2) in outcomes and provision of services, as shown by Sachar and other official records?

Q; Steps taken by state government, under Art. (46) to promote educational and economic interests of minorities, especially Muslims

Q: What steps has state government taken to document, track and report conditions of minorities, as well as working of programmes for them.

Q: What steps has state government taken to conduct outreach among minority Muslim communities, to popularize and create awareness of programmes and laws for protection and promotion of rights of minorities?

Q: whether 15 point programme committees have been set up at state district and block levels, as required by the programme? Provide list of members, and minutes of meetings in 2015-16.

Q: Whether MSDP committees have been set up at state, district and block levels? If so, please provide list if members, and minutes of meetings, in 2015.

Q; Whether baseline surveys have been conducted in MCBs and MCTs in the districts? If so, copy of the baseline survey.

Q: Whether facilitators have been appointed, as required under MSDP? If so, names and date of appointment?

5. Participation:Q: Number of minority members, by religion, by panchayat in the district, Q: Number of minority members, by religion, by municipality in the district Q: Number of minority members, by religion, in district departments directly

charged with providing frontline services – education, health and nutrition, social welfare, women and child development, rural and urban development

Q: Number of minority member –led NGOs registered in district (under Societies Registration Act and as Trusts), by religious groups

Q: Number of minority member-led organisations in district, registered under Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 2010, by religious groups.

What does Misaal do?

Misaal Fellowship Programme

This is Misaal’s core work, creating awareness on rights and entitlements, organizing local communities, training and capacity building active members from them, and engaging with state and non-state actors at local level, all to improve citizen’s access to rights and opportunities. The focus of Misaal Fellowship is services and social security schemes, as well as laws and rights, to enable communities to better access them. Currently Misaal Fellowship is being implemented in 9 districts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. (For more details please visit http://www.misaal.ngo/misaal-fellowship/)

Misaal Taleem

This is Misaal’s attempt to improve access to quality education for poorest children. Misaal supports bright children without the means, to prepare for and successfully sit entrance tests for entry to Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya and other public schools that could potentially provide quality education at no cost to the child. More than 100 students were selected for this program. (For more details please visit http://www.misaal.ngo/all-project-list/misaal-taleem/). Parallely, the attempt is to organsie long term support to young children from poorest backgrounds – that would normally have dropped out of school – to sustain school learning, through providing after-school tutoring, and outreach with parents. Misaal Taleem is being run at multiple Misaal sites - Madhubani, Patna, Banda, Faizabad, Jaunpur and Shamli.

Misaal Rozgaar

Misaal Rozgaar seeks to find solution to the longstanding problem of vulnerable livelihoods for marginalized Muslims. The objective is to provide a package of support – including skills enhancement, credit, networking and market support – to personskeen to start a self-employment enterprise. Another version of Rozgaar seeks to only help potential candidates from poorest backgrounds build their skills, so they are able to seek employment in the private sector. In either case, the idea is to leverage public and private resources. The former include programmes such as NREGS, NRLM and Kaushal Vikas Yojana, besides Ministry of Minority Affairs credit support schemes. The latter include training and similar centres that can potentially be launched. Rozgaar is planned for launch at two sites – Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh) and Vaishali (Bihar), from January 2017.

South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016

We have recently produced - working with other members of a trans South Asia platform called South Asia Collective, that we helped set up – a report on the state of minorities in South Asia, covering 6 major countries in the region (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), looking at how minorities in each country are being provided for their states. The next edition of the report (2017) is planned for release in November 2017. (For more details please visit http://sacollective.misaal.ngo/)

Support us by visiting http://www.misaal.ngo/be-a-member/and filling up the Friends of Misaal Registration Form, and making a donation.

Misaal - Centre for Equity Studies 24, Khazan Singh Building

Adhchini, Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi - 110 017, India Email: info@misaal.ngo | Website: www.misaal.ngo

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