Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy

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OFFICER CORPS STRATEGY SERIES

ACCESSING TALENT:THE FOUNDATION OF A U.S. ARMY OFFICER

CORPS STRATEGY

Casey WardynskiDavid S. Lyle

Michael J. Colarusso

February 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or positionof the United States Military Academy, Department of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publicationsenjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not discloseclassied information, jeopardize operations security, or

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This monograph is the fourth in a series of six monographs

that analyze the development of an Ofcer Corps strategy.Previous volumes are:

1 - Towards A U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: A ProposedHuman Capital Model Focused Upon Talent, by Colonel CaseyWardynski, Major David S. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel(Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, April 2009.

2 - Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy,

by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, November2009.


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3 - Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: RetainingTalent, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, January 2010.

ISBN 1-58487-428-7


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FOREWORD

Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. ArmyOfcer Corps Strategy, is the fourth of six monographsfocused upon ofcer talent management in the U.S.Army. In it, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major DavidS. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J.Colarusso continue their examination of how the U.S.Army accesses, develops, retains, and employs ofcertalent. In particular, they focus upon the ways in whichdynamic labor market conditions and generationalpreferences have shaped service propensity amongpotential ofcer prospects.

As in the previous volumes of this series, theauthors rst articulate a theoretical framework forimprovement and then demonstrate how the appli-cation of those theories can yield desired results.

In sum, they explain why a proper talent accessionsstrategy can create a positive sum game for the Armyas perhaps nothing else can.

Since the ofcer accessions process presents theArmy with a dramatic opportunity to leverage talentinvestments made by others, the theories and pro-grams discussed in this monograph merit thoughtfulconsideration.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

CASEY WARDYNSKI is Director of the Ofce ofEconomic and Manpower Analysis and an AssociateProfessor of Economics at the United States MilitaryAcademy, West Point, NY. In addition to creatingthe concepts for the Americas Army game andthe Armys pre-commissioning retention incentives,Colonel Wardynski has published in the area ofmilitary compensation policy and manpower. ColonelWardynski earned a B.S. at West Point, a Masters inPublic Policy at Harvard, and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysisfrom the Rand Graduate School.

DAVID S. LYLE is an Associate Professor of Economicsand Deputy Director of the Ofce of Economic andManpower Analysis at the United States Military

Academy, West Point, NY. He has publications inthe Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of LaborEconomics, the Review of Economics and Statistics,the American Economic Journal: Applied, and theEconomics of Education Review. Major Lyle earned aB.S. at West Point and a Ph.D. in Economics from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

MICHAEL J. COLARUSSO is a research analyst inthe Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysis atthe United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and hasserved in a variety of military positions, to include asan Assistant Professor of History at West Point. Mr.Colarusso earned a B.A. in History from Saint Johns

University and a M.A. in History from the PennsylvaniaState University.


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SUMMARY

Once the Army accesses a cohort of ofcers, it mustlive with them throughout a 30-year career span. Thisis because, unlike most enterprises, the Army cannotbuy talent from elsewhere to ll shortfalls at its midand upper-level ranks. The Ofcer Corps embodies aunique profession whose culture and core warghtingabilities take years to develop. This means that eachnew ofcer cohort represents far more than the Armyslatest crop of junior leaders; they are the feedstock forits future eld grade and general ofcers. As a group,they must therefore possess the depth and breadth oftalent needed not just to lead platoon-sized formations,but to meet future operational and strategic leadershipdemands as well.

Accessing the right ofcer talent directly improves

the efciency and productivity of the Ofcer Corpsby shortening developmental time and reducingrework and retraining costs. Hand-in-hand withthese efciencies, improvements in talent acquisitionprovide greater exibility to employ ofcers againstuncertain future requirements. Accessing the righttalent today also burnishes the Armys reputation,creating a virtuous cycle that makes it easier to attracttalented young people tomorrow. It also increases thelikelihood of retaining talent, particularly when soundaccessions programs are linked to targeted retentioninitiatives.

Accessing the right talent means more thanaccessing the correct numberof ofcers to ll existingbillets. It means acquiring the proper breadth and

depth of talent, the diverse skills, knowledge andbehaviors actually in demand across the Armysorganizations, both now and in the future. It also


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means recalibrating notions of fairness. While theArmy must afford equal opportunities to all, thefairest

accessions behavior it can engage in is commissioningnew ofcers with the talent needed to ght and winwars at the lowest cost in American lives and taxpayerdollars. Focusing a share of accessions efforts towarddesired ethnographic or demographic groupings canbe tremendously benecial, provided these efforts arenot at the expense of talent considerations.

The good news is that across virtually allethnographic and demographic segments in the UnitedStates, the current generation of accessions-age youngpeople is far larger, far more diverse, better educated,smokes less, drinks less, and generally enjoys greaterwell-being than the one preceding it. Now more thanever before, the Army can pursue diversity in itsOfcer Corps without putting talent at risk, provided

its accessions effort rests upon sound theoreticalprinciples.

First, the Army must understand the marketplace in which it competes. In an all-volunteer force,the prospect pool ultimately determines the scopeand tempo of Army talent accessions. The physicaldemands and risks associated with Army servicemeans that at some point the pool of willing prospectswill begin to dwindle. Therefore, understanding theshocks that shift the labor supply curve, and how eachmilitary age generation will respond to these shocks,is central to understanding the talent market in whichthe Army competes for ofcers.

Second, the Army must know how to communicatewith prospects and understand how they may respond

to information. The Millennial Generation comprisesthe bulk of todays ofcer prospect market, and theInformation Age has profoundly shaped their view of


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the military. These young people have much less directexposure to the military than previous generations of

young people, most of whom had vicarious contactwith millions of World War II or Cold War-era serviceveterans. In the absence of such direct connections,they must rely on popular culture, movies, television,or the internet for information regarding Army ofcerservice.

If the Army fails to provide accurate and easilyassimilated information about ofcership, prospectimpressions may be unduly shaped by the wealth ofincomplete, dated, or skewed information availablefrom thousands of media sources. Getting talentedyoung people interested in the Army and overcomingits negative perceptions relative to the other servicestherefore requires innovative marketing. Todaysmilitary-age young people are consumers of data, live

on the internet, play virtual games, develop virtualnetworks, and have lived most of their life in relativeeconomic prosperity. Successfully framing the Armyfor them requires an approach that makes the Armymore engaging, informative, socially based, andinteractive.

Successful talent accessions set the table for a potentOfcer Corps strategy. In all other areas (employing,developing, and retaining ofcer talent), the Armyfaces a zero-sum gameif it employs talent in onearea, it is unavailable elsewhere. By committing theright talent and resources to its ofcer accessions effort,however, the Army can increase overall talent levelswithout detracting from its productivity elsewhere. Inthe long run, this is a positive sum game, one where

the capabilities of the Ofcer Corps are driven upwardby human capital acquired from outside the Army.


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The reason for this is that unlike most enterprises,the Army cannot buy talent from elsewhere to ll

shortfalls at its mid and upper-level ranks. The OfcerCorps embodies a unique profession whose cultureand core warghting abilities take years to develop.This means that each new ofcer cohort representsfar more than the Armys latest crop of junior leaders.They are the feedstock for its future eld grade andgeneral ofcers. As a group, they must thereforepossess the depth and breadth of talent needed not justto lead platoon-sized formations, but to meet futureoperational and strategic leadership demands as well(see Figure 1).

Accessing the right ofcer talent has a positive effect that

cascades through the rest of the ofcer career model.It directly improves the efciency and productivityof the Ofcer Corps by shortening developmental timeand reducing rework and retraining costs. Hand-in-

Figure 1. Army Ofcer Human Capital Model.


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hand with these efciencies, improvements in talentacquisition provide greater exibility to employ ofcers

against uncertain future requirements. Accessing theright talent today also burnishes the Armys reputation,creating a virtuous cycle that makes it easier to attracttalented young people tomorrow. Accessing the rightpeople also increases the likelihood of retaining them,particularly when reinforced by targeted retentionprograms.

As discussed in the third monograph of this series,much of the talent in demand in the Army is generallyin demand elsewhere. These talents are thereforeassociated with higher opportunity costs, which reduceretention propensity. Improving talent matchingthrough accessions, however, can counter this effectby indirectly increasing career satisfaction, as ofcersbenet from working within their talent set alongside

similarly talented ofcers. These effects, coupled withtargeted retention incentives such as the Ofcer CareerSatisfaction Program (OCSP), may actually result inhigher retention rates.3

Anyone would agree that accessing the right talentcan yield tremendous benets to the Ofcer Corps, butwhat does right mean? In our view, it is more thanaccessing the correct number of ofcers to ll existingbillets. It means acquiring the proper breadth and depthof talent, the diverse skills, knowledge, and behaviorsactually in demand across the Armys organizations,both now and in the future.

It also means recalibrating notions of fairness.While the Army must afford equal opportunities toall, the fairest accessions behavior it can engage in is

commissioning new ofcers with the talent needed toght and win wars at the lowest cost in American livesand taxpayer dollars. Focusing a share of accessions


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efforts toward desired ethnographic or demographicgroupings can be tremendously benecial, provided

these efforts are not at the expense of talent consider-ations.If talent requirements are ignored, however, theArmy stands to reduce rather than increase diversitylevels, simultaneously lowering the mean performanceof the Ofcer Corps.

For example, bringing in and retaining a xedpercentage of tall ofcers (or brown-eyed, left-handed,etc.) simply because they are tall and without regardfor talent would require the Army to continuallywrite promotion board guidance to keep theseofcers competitive with their peers. It could actuallyreduce retention rates among tall ofcers, as thosecommissioned on the basis of height rather than talentwould be less capable role models to their youngcounterparts. This could create a negative experience

for those young ofcers, engendering talent ight.Additionally, it would undermine Army efforts tocontinuously screen, vet, and cull ofcer talent.

The good news is that across virtually allethnographic and demographic segments in the UnitedStates, the current generation of accessions-age youngpeople is far larger, far more diverse, better educated,smokes less, drinks less, and generally enjoys greaterwell-being than the one preceding it.4 Now, morethan ever before, the Army can pursue diversity in itsOfcer Corps without putting talent at risk, providedits accessions effort rests upon sound theoreticalprinciples.


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DISPARATE YET COMPLEMENTARY

COMMISSIONING SOURCES

The Army has a range of commissioning sourceswith which to acquire the talent it needs by settingmission requirements for each and resourcing themaccordingly. Although these sources are routinelycompared with one another, such comparisons aremisleading and counterproductive. The commissioningsources were designed to be complementary, witheach specically resourced to attract different talentpopulations based upon the screening, vetting, andculling measures it employs (see Figure 2). The rigorof these measures is determined by both the length oftime and the number of dimensions an individual isevaluated against.

Figure 2. Screening, Vetting, and CullingContinuum.

At one end of this continuum, the Army resourcesthe U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York,to employ rigorous screening, vetting, and cullingmeasures. It competes with the best colleges anduniversities throughout the nation for college boundtalent. West Point screens more than 11,000 applicants

each year to accept some 1,300 ofcer candidates. Itprovides an immersive, 47-month developmental


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and higher education experience to vet these ofcercandidates against both time-proven standards and

one another. Under the continuous mentorship ofseasoned cadre, some 28 percent of each class is culledprior to commissioning.5

At the other end of the continuum is OfcerCandidate School (OCS) with the Enlistment Option(EO). OCS-EO is resourced to attract college educatedindividuals who choose to pursue a commission aftercompleting their undergraduate education. Minimalscreening, vetting, and culling measures requirecandidates to only complete enlisted basic trainingfollowed by the 90-day OCS course prior to theircommissioning. This quick-turn commissioning sourceis charged with rounding out any shortfalls in ofceraccessions.

In between these two sources is OCS In-Service

(IS). OCS-IS is resourced to target successful enlistedpersonnel with the potential and proclivity forcommissioned service. Years of performance whileserving as a Soldier and the 90-day OCS courseserve as the primary screening, vetting, and cullingmechanisms. Roughly 10 percent of each OCS-IS cohortis culled prior to commissioning.

Lying between West Point and OCS-IS on thescreen-vet-cull continuum is the Reserve OfcerTraining Corps (ROTC) scholarship program. SinceWorld War II, ROTC has been the largest sourceof ofcer accessions, producing up to 70 percent ofall commissioned ofcers in some years. With 273host battalions supporting cadets at more than 1,200colleges and universities throughout the country,

ROTC offers leadership development and militaryinstruction to both scholarship and nonscholarshipstudents. The most rigorous screening occurs via


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scholarship and college applications, while vettingand culling takes place during military instruction and

training exercises. Academic performance and degreecompletion are additional vetting and culling meas-ures. ROTC spans the full spectrum of school qualityand disciplines, from Ivy League to senior militarycolleges to open enrollment. It is resourced to accessofcers with diverse degrees and demographic charac-teristics. Note that we place ROTC nonscholarshipcadets between OCS-IS and OCS-EO on the screen-vet-cull continuum. While ROTC nonscholarshipcadets have no scholarship screen, they are otherwisesubject to the same vetting and culling mechanisms astheir scholarship counterparts.

Ofcer evaluation reports (OERs) and selection ratesto battalion and brigade command support our viewthat the Army resources each source of commission to

attract different types of talent. Figure 3 shows howperformance in key company grade positions, throughthe rank of captain, sorts nearly identically with ourscreening, vetting, and culling continuum. However,in the eld grade ranks, there is a slight shift in thatROTC nonscholarship ofcers perform better thanOCS-IS in battalion and brigade level S3/XO positionsand are more likely to be selected for battalion andbrigade command. In general, commissioning sourceswith higher screening, vetting, and culling thresholdsincrease the odds of producing talent matches forduties that the Army deems critical, particularly as jobcomplexity increases.


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NOTE: OCS-EO ofcers are not represented due to the unavailability of seniorrater prole data on these ofcers.

Figure 3. Performance and Selection to Command.

To avoid any misinterpretation of Figure 3, wemake two clarifying points. First, these rates represent

populations. There are equally talented individualofcers from each source of commission, but onaverage they sort along the screen-vet-cull continuumin Figure 2.6 Second, this is not an argument aboutthe merits of each commissioning sourcethey eachhave merit. We are simply pointing out the correlationbetween performance and Army resourcingthehigher the investment (West Point and ROTC 3 and4-year scholarship ofcers), the greater the mean

performance. Figure 4 bears this out. Note that WestPoint has the highest average cost per commission,ROTC nonscholarship the lowest, and the costs of theother commissioning sources sort identically to both


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the screen-vet-cull continuum in Figure 2 and theperformance data in Figure 3.

Figure 4. Average Cost of Commission.

The exception is OCS-EO. This is because OCS-EO wasdesigned as a stop-gap commissioning source to roundout shortfalls, and the resources required to fund iton short notice (covering student loans up to $80,000,in particular) make it relatively expensive despite itslower degree of screening, vetting, and culling.

CONCERNING TRENDS IN OFFICERACCESSIONS

In light of the role that Army ofcers play in U.S.national security strategy, the role that accessionsplay in the ofcer career model, and the amount thattaxpayers invest in each ofcer, recent trends in ofcer

accessions are cause for concern. Figure 5 shows thesubstantial shift in the mix of ofcer accessions bysource of commission over the past 2 decades.


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The shift in ROTC and OCS accessions is so striking

that a casual observer might conclude that it is theresult of some deliberate plan on the part of the Army.Unfortunately, it is not. Rather, it is a result of the Armynot having an Ofcer Corps strategy that integratesthe four components of the ofcer career model. As wehave described in our previous monographs, this shiftin accessions is due primarily to low retention amongofcers commissioned in the mid-1980s throughtoday. Commensurate with the rise of the informationage, there has been an increased demand in the labormarket for problem-solving, knowledge creation, andconceptualization talents. A result has been an exodusof Army ofcer talent, principally seasoned captains.

In response, the Army increased its annual accessionmissions. With West Point capped by the United States

Code at 4,400 cadets and with ROTC experiencingsignicant resource cuts during the post-Cold Wardrawdown, the Army turned to OCS to ll the gaps.As Figure 5 indicates, this shift began in 1998, long

Figure 5. Ofcer Accessions Mix by Sourceof Commission.


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before the current conict. Modularity and increases inthe Armys end-strength resulting from the global war

on terrorism (GWOT) did exacerbate the shift, but theseeds of the problem were sown some 2 decades ago.

At the same time that the Army was experiencing anepochal change in labor market conditions and ofcerretention behavior, reductions during the drawdownin the 1990s literally gutted ROTC, forcing the Armyto further increase OCS production to ll shortages.As shown in Figure 6, the number of ofcers assignedas ROTC cadre declined by more than 50 percentover the last 2 decades. To offset this dramatic loss inmilitary leadership, the Army hired contracted cadre,a less than ideal substitute. This gutting of ROTCclosely corresponded with a period of declining cadetenrollments which began in 1990 and lasted through2006.7

Figure 6. Signicant Cuts in ROTC Ofcer Cadre.

School Entry Year


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Changes in ROTC scholarship management com-pounded the problem. Prior to 1998, scholarship can-

didates applied to a centralized board. If awarded ascholarship, applicants could apply it to any schoolthat offered an ROTC program. In 1998, however,ROTC introduced the Campus Based Scholarship Pro-gram (CBSP), with scholarship candidates applyingdirectly to individual ROTC detachments. This changewas meant to save costs by xing the number ofscholarship positions at each school, thereby reducingyear-to-year uctuations in cadet enrollment atdifferent colleges. It was also meant to give Professorsof Military Science greater discretion over the processat their college, as they could now screen applicantslocally and award scholarships accordingly. Whetheror not this would attract better talent matches to ROTCwas not a key consideration.8

One of the unintended but nonetheless realconsequences of this change was that it severelyrestricted a scholarship candidates decision space.Instead of receiving a scholarship that could be appliedat the school of his or her choice, the scholarship wasnow tied to a specic school. A candidate receivingan ROTC scholarship to Penn State, for example, butwho also applied to and was accepted at Notre Damewithout an ROTC scholarship now faced a difcultdecision. Forcing candidates to choose between anunfunded education at their school of choice versusan ROTC scholarship at their second or third choicesignicantly lowered the utility and appeal of ROTCscholarships. As compared with the Air Force andNavy, both of which continued to offer centralized

scholarships, the value of an Army ROTC scholarshipwas comparatively lower.


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As cuts to ROTC diminished its ability tocommission ofcers, and since it takes as much as 4

years to x shortfalls in ROTC production, the Armyturned to OCS, which could produce an ofcer ina matter of months. The rise in OCS from 9 percentof accessions prior to 1998 to nearly 40 percent ofaccessions in 2008 occurred rst in the OCS In-Service (IS) program, which harvests ofcers from theenlisted ranks. When OCS-IS reached its maximumcommissioning capacity, the Army expanded the OCSEnlisted Option (EO) program, which rapidly bringscollege educated civilians into the Ofcer Corps. By2006, total OCS production was split evenly betweenOCS-EO and OCS-IS, and since 2006, OCS-EO hascomprised more than 60 percent of OCS accessions.

Although OCS accessions provide the Army withthe exibility to expand quickly, these signicant

increases in OCS accessions actually ended upexacerbating the retention problem. OCS-EO ofcersretain through 6 years of service at the lowest rates (andthe Army consequently receives the fewest man-yearsof service from them). This is because their commis-sioning active duty service obligation (ADSO) expiresafter just 3 years, and they have not been subjectedto the more rigorous screening, vetting, and cullingof the other commissioning programs. Meanwhile,although OCS-IS ofcers serve through 6 years at thehighest rates, their retention falls precipitously after10 years of commissioned service since they becomeretirement eligible due to their years of prior enlistedservice. Since the Armys biggest ofcer shortages fallin the senior captain and major ranks, OCS-EO and

OCS-IS accessions do little to address those shortagesand instead intensify retention problems at exactly theworst points in the ofcer career model.


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Additionally, the Armys practice of over-accessingofcers to compensate for low retention puts additional

downward pressure on retention. As shown by thedots in Figure 7 (reading right to left), accessionswere relatively constant in the 1990s, but haveclimbed steadily since 2000.9 As a result, the Army hassignicantly more company grade ofcers than it hasstructure to employ them. This creates a lengthy queuefor platoon leader positions and forces the Army toreduce the amount of time that an ofcer spends in keyand developmental positions. Not surprisingly, thisleads to decreased satisfaction and impairs the Armysability to retain talent.

There is little doubt that recent changes in accessions

policy have placed the long-term viability of theOfcer Corps at risk. Ironically, and as we pointed outin the initial monograph in this series, accessioning is

Figure 7. Authorized Strength and Inventory (withTrainees, Transients, Holdees and Students) for

Army Competitive Category Ofcers.


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For the purposes of this discussion, the term

compensation includes all wages and benets (salary,medical care, insurance, tax benets, job satis-faction, retirement plan, educational opportunities,etc.). The relatively challenging nature of commis-sioned service provides the theoretical basis forthe curve. To understand why, consider that for amodest compensation rate (denoted by C1), the Armycan expect to have a quantity of ofcer prospects(Q1) willing to serve. These are individuals whosepositive expectations of military service outweigh thealternatives available to them in the civilian sectorat this compensation level. If the Army needs moreofcers, (say Q2), it must raise compensation from C1to C2. This increase entices more individuals to joinbecause the added compensation again outweighs their

opportunity cost in the civilian sector. In this example,there is a relatively large increase in the quantity ofofcers for a modest increase in compensation.

Figure 8. S-Shaped Ofcer Supply Curve.


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Generation, also referred to as Echo Boomers orGeneration Y. Like every generation, it has its own

persona. Roughly speaking, the Millennial Generationconsists of 78 million Americans born between 1982and 2001, three times the size of Generation X andthe largest American generation since the BabyBoomers. With its youngest members currently just 9years of age, the Millennial Generation will dominatenew ofcer accessions for the next decade. While entirepapers have been devoted to them, there are threecharacteristics of Millennials worth noting here:(1) they are the most ethnically diverse generation todate; (2) they are extremely independent because ofday care, single parents, latchkey parenting, and thetechnological revolution that bounds their coming ofage; and (3) they feel empoweredthanks to suppor-tive helicopter parents, they have both a sense of

security and signicant optimism about the future.10

Additionally, of the generational archetypes that

seem to cycle through each epoch in a somewhatpredictable pattern, the Millennials are a Herogeneration, coming of age in a period of globalunraveling and crisis (persistent conict and economicshocks) not unlike that of the Greatest Generationwhich reached adulthood during the Great Depressionand World War II. In common with that generation,they are more conventional in outlook than those (GenX) who preceded them, and they are institutionallydriven team players with a profound trust in author-ity.11 In sum, their size, character, beliefs, behavior,and location in history make Millennials an excellentofcer prospect population for the Army, provided the

Army tailors its approach to attract them accordingly.


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most of whom had vicarious contact with millions ofWorld War II or Cold War-era service veterans. In the

absence of such a direct connection, they must relyon popular culture, movies, television, or the internetfor information regarding Army ofcer service. If theArmy fails to provide accurate and easily assimilatedinformation about ofcership, prospect impressionsmay be unduly shaped by the wealth of incomplete,dated, or skewed information available from thousandsof media sources.

For those prospects with a distinct proclivitytowards military service, perceptions of each servicecomponent frame their decisionmaking as well (seeFigure 9).

Figure 9. Public Perceptions by Branch of Service.

Survey data from polling regarding the four servicecomponents shows that public perceptions segment

along two continuums: brain to brawn and elite toordinary.12 Regardless of whether these perceptionsare accurate or not, young Americans view the Army


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Figure 10 contrasts the ways in which different

generations may approach the Army as a profession.Marketing strategies that appeal to Millennials arelikely to follow the gradual pathway depicted to theright. Framing the Army so that it is seen as engaging,informative, socially based, and interactive aligns wellwith the sensibilities of the current generation. Beyondinformation failures, the limits of human rationality arelikely to further narrow markets for new ofcer talent.While we fancy ourselves to be modern thinkers whoform beliefs and reach decisions rationally, behavioraleconomists argue that we remain cognitively connectedto the earliest humans, whose primary concern wassurvival.13 This necessitated rapid decisionmakingbased upon heuristics (cognitive shortcuts that reducecomplexity and speed decisionmaking) connected with

nding the next meal or avoiding becoming a meal.Like our ancestors, modern humans genetically

encode information connected to existential and highlyvivid events so it is readily available for recall anddecisionmaking. A primitive tribe observing a tiger forthe rst time may not have known what to make ofit. If a member was then eaten by the tiger, it likelyengendered a very vivid memory. As a result, the nexttime a tribe member happened across a large, four-legged striped animal, an immediate ight responseprobably ensued, even if the animal was a harmlesszebrathe more vivid the initial existential experience,the more dramatic the response. The gist of seeingsuch an animal was that tigers are life threatening, andthat response was immediately projected to other large

striped creatures, even if that is somewhat irrational.This is one reason that advertisers employ vividinformation, to facilitate the encoding and recall ofproduct attributes.14


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While these heuristics may benet some products,they create challenges for Army marketing efforts.

Popular culture provides young adults with a largevolume of increasingly vivid information. Thisinformation often takes the form of movies such asTiger Land or Platoon that dramatize certain unatteringperspectives on service during the Vietnam draft era.Vivid information about the Army also abounds viaYouTube, blogs, websites, and commercial videogames. If that were not enough, technological progressin the form of 3D electronic commercial gamesand High Denition TV visually enhance the vividdepictions of combat. Most of this content is void ofdetails regarding how the Army of today providesmarkedly improved quality of life, pay, benets,and professional interactions as compared to what isdepicted in most war movies. Instead, the gist of Army

service vividly portrayed by these media is that itentails immediate and constant personal danger,exposure to the elements, and a dehumanizinghierarchy. This information can systemically shapeyouth impressions, overshadowing Army marketingin reach and volume.

Further complicating the situation is another typeof decisionmaking irrationality called conrmation bias.Conrmation bias causes people to systemically seekor accept evidence conrming their existing beliefs.Information that does not conform to existing beliefsis subject to greater examination than evidence that tswith existing beliefs.15 Incomplete vivid informationon the military that is rampant in popular culture canshape human estimates regarding the likelihood of

events. People often treat ctional information thatthey have seen in a movie as if it could have happened.16Because Army efforts to recruit potential ofcers do


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not go into full swing until young adults reach age 17,there is signicant time for popular culture to shape

beliefs and perceptions of military service.Summarizing the main theoretical considerations

with regard to competing for ofcer talent, theArmy must understand the marketplace, which isshaped by generational effects, market failures, andinnumerable other shocks that affect an individualsproclivity to service. This understanding also requiresan appreciation for individual decisionmaking be-haviorthe role of information framing, the impactof vivid images of military service, and the difcultyof overcoming the conrmation bias engendered bymisrepresentations of the Army by pop culture. A rststep in addressing these theoretical considerations is totarget marketing efforts at populations with increasedlikelihoods of accessing the right talent.

FISHING FOR TALENT IN THE RIGHT PONDS

While there are a few big sh in every pond, it isa fact of life that some ponds have greater numbersof big sh. Whether we are talking about actual shor talented people, it is no accident that some pondsroutinely produce bigger sh. Take eastern Ohio orTexas, for example. Both are famous for producingtop-notch collegiate football talent. Well-established junior programs feed well-resourced high schoolprograms, which attract college scouts by the droves.

Similar to eastern Ohio and Texas football, most top-tier universities have justiably powerful reputationsfor producing top-notch graduates. Harvard Business

School (HBS) epitomizes this. Routinely rated as oneof the top business schools, its tuition runs as highas $46,000 a year. Additional living expenses put the


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nal cost for the 2-year program at over $150,000.17This price tag does little to deter aspiring candidates

from even modest backgrounds because corporateAmerica compensates HBS graduates commensuratewith this high cost. Why? It is simply because Harvardhas the record and reputation for producing topnotch graduates. American companies are in essencepaying Harvard to screen, vet, and cull talent for them.Harvard provides a pond from which rms can, with agreat degree of certainty, get the talent they need.

Similarly, the Army must thoughtfully choose theponds it shes in and align resources accordingly. Take,for example the ponds of talent illustrated in Figure 11.There are 20 potential ofcers in each of the ponds, butthe talent distribution in Pond A has a lower averageand wider distribution of talent matches than PondB. At all levels of talent match, there are more high-

potential talent matches in Pond B than Pond A. Notetoo that there are three times as many potential ofcerswith an above average match in Pond B than there arefor the same talent levels in Pond A. The chances ofaccessing the right talent match for the Army is clearlyhigher in Pond B than Pond A.

Once the Army decides the size and type of sh itwants to catch, and which ponds it wants to frequent, itmust select the right lure. That is the role of market-ing. The ve primary sources of commissionWestPoint, ROTC Scholarship, ROTC Nonscholarship,OCS-IS, and OCS-EOalong with the leadershipexperiences of being an Army ofcer, provide theArmy with a wide range of marketing lures, allowingit to sh in many different ponds.


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Figure 11. Fishing in the Right Pond.

For example, West Point and ROTC scholarshipsgive the Army the ability to compete for the best talentin the country. Each year, these programs attract morethan 25,000 college-bound applicants with at leastsome service proclivity. They provide a method forreceiving a top-notch education, a guaranteed post-college job, and a tremendous amount of leadershipexperience at a relatively young age. For the Army,West Point provides accessions exibility, as theinstitution completely controls the curriculum andprogram of instruction for its graduates. With theROTC Scholarship program, the Army has someability (although diminished relative to West Point) toaffect the instruction of its graduates, contingent uponthe schools it positions itself in, and the disciplines

found at each.In contrast, ROTC Nonscholarship and OCS-IS

are designed to attract those whose overriding desire


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is to serve as an ofcer. These programs are likely toappeal to those who weight their military career goals

more heavily than their educational aspirations. Forthe Army, they provide a reduced level of exibilityto shape these commissions, as the Army cannotdirect programs or levels of study. With OCS-EO, theArmy can select candidates based on the completeddiscipline of study, but can do little to inuence thepool of applicants. Furthermore, the OCS-EO missionsoccur monthly. Therefore, the Army can only selectfrom among applicants who are available in any givenmonth. If the mission is for 100 OCS-EO ofcers in amonth, the Army must nd 100 ofcers even in themiddle of March, when few college graduates willhave become available from a recent graduation. Inother words, more talent is apt to be available in thesummer months or shortly after the rst of each year

as a result of the timing of most college graduations.The varying degree to which each applicant desires

education and each applicant desires to serve as anArmy ofcer requires a targeted marketing effort. Abroad-based marketing strategy that touts the Armysmany great educational opportunities may discourageprospects who are not as interested in education asthey are in serving as ofcers. Likewise, emphasizingthe military aspects of commissioned service maydissuade applicants with a focus on education fromapplying. Therefore, the Army must give considerablecare to understanding each pond that it shes in andusing the correct marketing lure. In the next section,we highlight several marketing innovations that takeaccount of the theoretical construct we provide above.

Some are well-developed programs and others are intheir infancy.


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MARKETING INNOVATIONS

Spanning Segmented Markets.

In 2008, ROTC returned to a centralized scholarshipselection. This policy change appreciates the framingpreferences of the current generation, since they arethe ones making the nal decision about servingas an ofcer. It also gives ROTC greater exibilityin ensuring that high-potential talent does not fallcompletely out of ROTC simply because one schooldeclined acceptance to the individual. Furthermore, itprovides information to the Army on where applicantsdesire to attend school. Armed with such information,the Army can begin to realign resources against thedemands of its applicants instead of forcing applicantsto adjust to the inertia of the Army bureaucracy.

Building on the idea of a centralized scholarshipapplication, many colleges have entered into central-ized applications for admission. Common applicationsmake it easier for the applicant to apply to multipleschools with very little additional effort. The cost tothe applicant for applying to an additional school islittle more than the checking of a box. West Point hasbegun to explore the possibility of participating in acentralized application program such as the CommonApplication. Benets include a great deal of informationregarding the other educational programs West Pointapplicants are considering. Through participation in acommon application program, West Point could notonly leaven its own pool of applicants, but throughsome innovative cross marketing efforts that reframe

the Army as a viable career, it could leaven the poolof applicants for all sources of commission, even thosethat are not necessarily tied to a specic school.


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A recent pilot program to cross market applicantsfrom West Point to ROTC shows signicant promise.

Each year, West Point receives more than 10,000applicants for some 1,300 open seats. Yet of the morethan 8,000 surplus applicants, historically fewer than100 would end up participating in ROTC. Beginning in2008, West Point and ROTC began a cross marketingprogram that resulted in more than 400 of these surplusWest Point applicants accepting ROTC scholarships.

The program was based on several of the theoreticalprinciples outlined above. Before notifying a West Pointapplicant that he or she did not receive admission, anROTC selection board reviewed the les and selectedroughly 1,000 of the applicants to receive an offer ofan ROTC scholarship. Rather than receiving a letterof notication that an individual was not accepted toWest Point, he received a phone call from an ofcer

letting him know that while he did not get acceptedat West Point and although he had not applied foran ROTC scholarship, the Army really valued hisapplication and was prepared to offer him a full ROTCscholarship at any ROTC program in the country. Inessence, the Army reframed the opportunity to servein the Army, but through a different source. The resultsare promising, as during the past 2 years, more than400 of the 1,000 scholarship offers were acceptedandnone of these applicants had previously applied toROTC.

Consistent with our theoretical construct, thisprogram was customer focused, targeted towardsMillennial considerations, and information driven.The applicant was not required to ll out duplicate

information, since West Point already had theinformation that ROTC needed to make a scholarshipdecision. Each applicant also received a phone call


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from an Army ofcer. This personal contact powerfullycommunicated the value of each young person to the

Army.A nal component of the program was targeted

marketing. By leveraging West Points brand equity,which attracts the nations top collegiate prospects,the Army gained increased access to talent at virtuallyno cost. This Academys brand equity is substantialbecause it has produced many of the nations famouscivil and military leaders. It also derives strength fromthe fact that it can be seen, touched, and experienced.In essence, West Point and its beautiful collegiatesetting serves as a storefront for the Ofcer Corps,an impressive destination that completely reframespublic perceptions of the Army as merely ordinary,average, physical, or a career of last resort.

In particular, West Points standing as a premier

institution of higher learning allows it to reach a muchyounger audience than those who are applying tocolleges. Through robust NCAA-afliated summersports camps, scouting jamborees, and tourism, WestPoint allows the Army to present young people with anengaging message about ofcership before conrma-tion bias sets in. This highlights an important considera-tion. Rather than marketing ofcership in general,which blurs the message of each commissioning source,the Army may derive greater benet by leveragingthe brand equity of its better known commissioningsources and then cross marketing excess applicants toits other programs.18

Targeted Marketing.

The Americas Army game is a prime example ofa program that accounts for imperfect information andirrationality by adapting new media and technology


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VAE develops high propensity recruiting leads for theArmy at a quarter the cost of traditional efforts. These

leads are 10 times more likely to serve than thosegained via legacy marketing events. Again, the VAEwas designed with the stair-step concept at Figure10 in mind.

Taking this concept even further, the ArmyExperience Center (AEC) draws upon many VAEfeatures, but rather than traveling, the experienceis permanently located in an upscale Philadelphiashopping mall. Covering more than 10,000 square feet,the AEC provides a venue for teens to socialize, playvideo games, drive Army simulators, learn about thebenets of an Army career, and talk with peers whomay also be thinking about a military career. Replacinglegacy recruiting stations in care worn strip malls, thisengaging experience is instead located where prime

prospects actually spend a signicant amount oftheir time. Communicating with young people aboutthe value and importance of serving the nation as anArmy ofcer must begin early to confront the biasesand heuristics associated with accurate and vividinformation, inappropriate framing, and conrmationbias.

BUILDING FLEXIBILITY INTO THEACCESSIONS PROCESS

With college serving as one of its key screening,vetting, and culling mechanisms, the Army mustensure its accessions strategy accounts for the signif-icant time lags between accessions decisions and

outcomes. For example, ROTCs decision to return toa centralized scholarship offering will not producetangible results for at least 4 more years. Over this


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chart shown at Figure 4, some may argue that OCSexpansion is the most cost effective ofcer accessions

option available to the Army. However, the questionof growing accessions from existing programs is notan average cost question, but a marginal cost one.It is the cost of producing one additional ofcergiven that the existing commissioning programs arealready in operation. When comparing marginal costsacross these programs, a completely different pictureemerges. West Point is actually the least expensivemethod of commissioning one more ofcer. The costsinvert because xed costs are already covered. Oncethe Army built West Point and resourced it with staffand faculty, the only additional costs to producinganother lieutenant at the margin are cadet pay andfood. As noted in Figure 12, the marginal cost of anROTC scholarship ofcer depends on the attributes of

the school attended.19

Meanwhile, the marginal cost ofincreased OCS-IS is high because of the replacementcosts necessitated by poaching a talented enlistedSoldier or NCO from the ranks.

Figure 12. Marginal Cost of a Commission by

Source.

Colleges

Colleges

Colleges


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Building from this marginal cost analysis, there areseveral ways the Army could exploit excess capacity

in its more rigorous screening, vetting, and cullingcommissioning sources. For example, expandingthe U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School(USMAPS) could help mitigate the worst effects ofsudden, unanticipated increases in Army ofcerdemand. Currently, USMAPS exists only to provideincoming cadets to West Point. Expanding its outputto send qualied USMAPS graduates into other ofceraccessions programs could quickly help ll shortfallsin new ofcer requirements. Another initiative couldbe a West Point without Walls program, whichwould have each of its 4,400 cadets spend a semesteroutside of the Academy, perhaps studying abroad toreceive cultural immersion benets. Alternatively,they could spend a semester at Army ROTC host

universities, broadening the experience of cadetsfrom both commissioning sources and creatingpowerful peer relationships that would be useful aftercommissioning. By leveraging the xed capital andinfrastructure of other institutions in this way, theArmy could grow West Points enrollment by perhaps500 cadets, all without a corresponding increase inits own xed capital costs. These additional cadetswould be subjected to West Points rigorous screening,vetting, and culling mechanisms, expanding its outputby up to 125 ofcers each year without compromisingcommissioning standards. The costs of such aninitiative would be relatively smalljust the tuitionand travel expenses of those cadets studying at otherinstitutions.


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CONCLUSION

The U.S. Army requires talented ofcers at alllevelsit is integral to American national securitystrategy. Unlike other large enterprises, however, theArmy cannot buy talent from other rms to ll itsofcer gaps. The Ofcer Corps embodies a uniqueprofession whose core warghting abilities and culturetakes years to develop and cannot be found elsewhere.This limits lateral entry and means that the Armymust live tomorrow with the ofcer talent it brings intoday. Each annual cohort of new lieutenants thereforerepresents far more than the Armys latest crop of junior leaders. They are the feedstock for its futureeld grade and general ofcers. As a group, they mustpossess the depth and breadth of talent needed not just

to lead platoon-sized formations, but to meet futureoperational and strategic leadership demands as well.

Because the Army must compete in the Americanlabor market for talent, ofcer accessions are a dynamicand ever-changing endeavor. To succeed, the Armymust understand market conditions, continuouslyrene its communications with prospective talent,and shape proclivities to a career of ofcer service,all the while adjusting to market shocks and shiftinggenerational preferences.

In all other areas of ofcer talent management(employing, developing, and retaining), the Armyfaces a zero-sum gameif it employs talent in onearea, it is unavailable elsewhere. By committing theright talent and resources to its ofcer accessions effort,

however, the Army can increase overall talent levelswithout harming itself elsewhere. In the long run, thisis a positive sum game, one where the capabilities ofthe Ofcer Corps rise due to human capital acquired


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from outside. Achieving strategic-level outcomes ofthis kind requires an accessions strategy grounded in

sound theory.

ENDNOTES

1. Janet C. Lowe, Warren Buffet Speaks: Wit and Wisdom fromthe Worlds Greatest Investor, New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons,Inc., 1997, p. 87.

2. See David McCullough, The Great Bridge: The Epic Story ofthe Brooklyn Bridge, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

3. For a detailed discussion of the Ofcer Career SatisfactionProgram, see Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso, Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy forSuccess: Retaining Talent, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,U.S. Army War College, January 2010, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=965.

4. Source: Index of Child Well-Being Project, Durham, NC:Duke University, Foundation for Child Development, 2004.

5. West Point develops cadets across six domains: academic,military, physical, social, ethical, and spiritual.

6. The methodology and data used to calculate the averagecost to commission can be found in Majors Jette and Yankovich,

Assessing the Quantitative and Qualitative Costs of IncreasingU.S. Army Ofcer Accessions, analysis undertaken for theHeadquarters Department of the Army, June 2007. Jette andYankovich examined reports from 2004-05 (which reect 2003data) from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) and U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)(for OCS), the Cost of Graduate Report (for USMA) and a reportprovided by Cadet Command as required by the Departmentof Defense (DoD) Financial Management Regulation, Volume

2A, Chapter 3. The USMA average cost is based on all costsattributable to education and training of Cadets (Operations andMaintenance, Army [OMA] and Manpower and Personnel, Army[MPA]) as well as the Cadets pay and stipend. The total cost does


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not account for maintenance of the post itself. ROTC average costis based on OMA and military pay accounts (active and reserve)as well as OMA designated funds for scholarships. Costs incurredthrough state funded simultaneous membership program (SMP)and the Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD) programare not included in the total ROTC cost methodology. Initialcalculations net out scholarship dollars to determine the averagecost to a nonscholarship Cadet. Then, using published NationalCenter for Education Statistics (NCES) tuition and room andboard rates, scholarship costs are added by weighting the cohortaccording to ROTC scholarship enrollment levels (across most,very, moderate, minimally competitive and open-enrollmentschools) for the year. Weighted scholarship costs are then addedto the cost to commission a nonscholarship Cadet to determineaverage costs across the scholarship/nonscholarship population.OCS-IS costs are determined by both the costs to create an ofcerthrough the OCS system and the costs to screen that futureofcer (i.e., create a private E1 and develop a noncommissionedofcer [NCO] up through OCS acceptance). These costs coincidewith the replacement of that lost NCO to the NoncomissionedOfcer Corps. In addition to the cost of OCS schooling and loanrepayment/degree completion, these costs include recruiting,accession and Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS)operations, initial issue, Basic/Advanced Individual/One StationUnit Training costs, Permanent Change of Station (PCS) to rstunit and the average enlistment bonus weighted across militaryoccupational specialties. Based on historical continuation rates,the authors apply a factor of 1.5 to the cost to recruit, train, issueand access the Soldier based on historical attrition rates. OCS-EO costs are the sum of OCS course costs, degree completionand loan repayment, as well as recruiting and accession costs, areduced initial issue, basic training and the rst PCS move. Basedon historical attrition rates the authors apply a factor of 1.1 to thecost of recruiting, accessing, training and changing the Soldiersstation of assignment.

7. Arthur T. Coumbe and Paul Kotakis, History of U.S. ArmyCadet Command: The Second Ten Years, 1996-2006, Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 2008, p. 42.

8. Ibid., p. 85.


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9. Determining whether the Army over-accessed ofcersrequires the passage of time. Accession targets are determinedby models that account for historical retention and projectedendstrength. Figure 7 provides evidence that the Army has beenover accessing since Year Group 2000, as there are more ofcersthan requirements, even after accounting for trainees, transients,holdees, and students (TTHS).

10. Generation Y: The Millennials: Ready or Not, Here TheyCome, Information Paper, Cleveland, OH: NAS RecruitmentCommunications, 2006.

11. For a more complete discussion of generational differences,see Neil Howe and William Strauss, The Lifecourse Method, availablefrom www.lifecourse.com/mi/method.html. For an examination ofgenerational differences specic to the Armys Ofcer Corps, seeLeonard Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the OfcerCorps, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 2000, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=281 .

12. Army Segmentation and Target, Unpublished briengprepared for the U.S. Army, Nashville, TN: TargetScopeSegmentation, February 16, 2001.

13. Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon is credited with rstexplaining how people irrationally tend to be satised instead ofmaximizing utility. In 2002, Daniel Kahneman was awarded theNobel Prize for integrating insights from psychological researchinto economic science with regards to human judgment anddecisionmaking under uncertainty.

14. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment underUncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, Vol. 185, No. 4157,September 27, 1974, pp. 1127-1128.

15. Eliezer Yudkowsky, Cognitive Biases PotentiallyAffecting Judgment of Global Risks, in Nick Bostrom and MilanCirkovic, eds., Global Catastrophic Risks, forthcoming, pp. 8-9.

16. Ibid., p. 12.


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17. HBS was ranked the best business school in 2009 by U.S.News and World Report.

18. Tracking surplus applicants to both West Point and ROTCmay also be a viable source of talent for OCS-EO. A small pilotprogram attempted to contact individuals who had once appliedto ROTC and West Point but never attended either. By timing theireventual graduation from college with a communication effort,the Army may be able to attract some of these individuals into theranks of OCS-EO since they once demonstrated some interest inthe military.

19. The methodology and data used to calculate the marginalcost to commission can be found in Jette and Yankovich. Theyexamined reports from 2004-2005 (which reect 2003 data)from TRADOC and USAREC (for OCS), the Cost of GraduateReport (for USMA) and a report provided by Cadet Commandas required by the DoD Financial Management Regulation,Volume 2A, Chapter 3. Marginal cost is the cost of producing eachadditional Cadet. Depending on the scale of the Cadet missionincrease, marginal cost calculations might, on the one hand, notrequire additional barracks space or instructors, and on the othermay be large enough to require new infrastructure (buildings/barracks) and instructors. We use the authors estimates for asmall increase in additional accessions of less than 100 Cadets.To produce 100 additional Cadets through OCS IS/EO, factorsof 1.5 and 1.1 respectively are used to account for attrition (seeaverage calculations above). Based on historical rates, it wouldtake 125 West Point Cadets to yield 100 ofcer graduates, andit would take 143 ROTC Cadets to yield 100 ofcer graduates.The latter two have an initial lag of 4 years to reach steadystate when increasing mission numbers. The marginal cost tocommission additional USMA graduates includes the increase inthe Cadet pay and stipend determined by the Military Pay andAllowances (MPA)-Cadet account as well as the cost of attritionthroughout the 4-year experience. Marginal cost to access a WestPoint ofcer also includes some O&M monies for a portion ofbarracks utilities, maintenance and training. The marginal costto commission a nonscholarship ROTC Cadet is the cost of theCadet stipend, attrition, and minimal training costs (O&M) suchas transportation to Leadership Development and AssessmentCosts (LDAC) (advanced camp Ft. Lewis) and local training. The


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ROTC scholarship Cadets marginal costs are weighted across theschool types by adding the cost of tuition and room and boardusing NCES data. ROTC scholarship Cadets have the largestratio of variable to xed costs and the Army assumes the greatestination risk with these Cadets due to its exposure to tuition andfee increases.

The marginal cost to commission an OCS-EO ofcer assumesthat the marginal cost to recruit is $0. Therefore, the costs incurredfor the additional mission includes accession costs, attrition, initialissue, enlistment bonus, tuition reimbursement/loan repayment,and O&M training dollars for the additional basic trainee andOCS candidate. In addition to these costs (less basic training),commissioning additional ofcers through OCS-IS requires thatthe Army bear the cost to replace the vacated NCO slot. Marginalcost calculations for OCS-IS include that replacement cost.

Documents

Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy