Accountability Under HRL and ICL for Atrocities Against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actor

7/30/2019 Accountability Under HRL and ICL for Atrocities Against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actor

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AccountabilityunderHumanRightsLawand

InternationalCriminalLawforAtrocitiesAgainst

MinorityGroupsCommittedby

Non-StateActors

boAkademiInstituteforHumanRights

PeterFinell

May2002


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

1.Introduction p.1

1.1.Internationalresponsestowarcrimes,genocide,crimesagainsthumanity

andseriousviolationsofhumanrights

p.1

1.2.Theaimandpurposeofthestudy p.4

1.3.Methodandsources p.6

2.Minoritygroupsandthreatsfromnon-stateactors p.7

3. International human rights law and abuses perpetrated by non-state

actors

p.9

3.1.Introductoryremarksonthecharacterofhumanrightstreaties p.9

3.2.Protectionofminoritygroupsunderhumanrightslaw p.11

3.3.Stateresponsibilityforhumanrightsabusesbynon-stateactors p.14

3.4.Duediligenceasappliedtotheprotectionofminoritygroups p.20

3.5.Othermeansforensuringaccountability p.21

4.Internationalcriminallawandnon-stateactors p.22

4.1.Initialremarksoninternationalcriminallawandinternationalcrimes p.22

4.2.Accountabilityandinternationalcrimes p.24

4.3.Individualinternationalcriminalresponsibilityofnon-stateactors p.26

4.4.Non-stateactorsandgenocide p.31

4.5.Crimesagainsthumanityandnon-stateactors p.34

4.5.1.Thecharacteristicsofcrimesagainsthumanity p.34

4.5.2.Persecutionasacrimeagainsthumanity p.394.5.3.Accountabilityofnon-stateactors p.41

4.6.Internationalhumanitarianlaw,warcrimesandnon-stateactors p.43

4.6.1. On international humanitarian law and the protection of minority

groups

p.43


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4.6.2.Non-stateactorsandwarcrimesintheRomeStatute p.48

5. The complementarity between human rights law and international

criminallaw

p.51

5.1.Generalremarks p.51

5.2.BenefitsforthehumanrightsprotectionsystemsbroughtaboutbytheRome

Statute

p.52

6.Conclusions p.54


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Abbreviations

AJIL AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw

Art. Article

CoE CouncilofEurope

ECHR EuropeanCourtofHumanRights

FRY FederalRepublicofYugoslavia

G.A. GeneralAssembly

ICC InternationalCriminalCourt

IMT InternationalMilitaryTribunal

Inter-AmCt.H.R. Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights

ICCPR InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights

ICHRP International Council on Human RightsPolicy

ICTR InternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for FormerYugoslavia

S.C. SecurityCouncil

UN UnitedNations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees

UNTAET United Nations Transitional AdministrationinEast-Timor


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1.Introduction

1.1.Internationalresponsestowarcrimes, genocide, crimes againsthumanity and

seriousviolationsofhumanrights

Thenatureofthearmedconflictshaschangedquitedramaticallyduringthelastdecades.

Recent conflicts in Europe and elsewhere in the world reveal that most of the

contemporary armed conflicts are not fought between two states, but rather between

partiesinsidestates.Theoccurrenceofnon-internationalandpurelyinternalconflicts,and

tyrannical regimes, which produce systematic human rights violations, has dramatically

increased victimisation. Since the Second World War around 250 conflicts of different

kinds have taken place and during these conflicts some 170 million people have been

killed. This is almost twice as much as during the two world wars, and most of the

victimisationhastakenplaceinnon-internationalconflicts.Suchvictimisationhasaswe

havewitnessed includedgenocide, crimesagainsthumanity,andwar crimes,alongwith

extra-judicial killings, torture and arbitrary arrests all of which constitute serious

violationsofinternationalhumanrightslaw.1

More than often the contemporary conflicts are caused by tensions between a central

governmentanda minoritypopulation,orbetweenthemajoritypopulationandminority

groups. According to the analytical report of the UN Secretary-General on minimum

humanitarianstandards,contemporaryconflictsarecharacterisedbysituationswhereone

or more groups have taken up arms against the central government in the pursuit of

political objectives such as secession or autonomy for a particular ethnic, religious or

linguisticgroup,ortheoverthrowingoftheexistinggovernment.Typicalarealsoconflicts

where an existing Government has collapsed, or is otherwise unable or unwilling tointervene and stop the violence between armed groups.2 Furthermore, the patterns of

humanrightsabuses in thesecircumstances showthat thecivilianpopulation in general

1Bassiouni,p.2,1996,Bassiouni,p.5,1999.


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and especially children, women, and minority populations are most vulnerable to

unregulatedterrorandviolence,whichcharacterisethecontemporaryconflicts. 3

The role of the international community in preventing and halting genocides, crimes

againsthumanityandotheratrocities is usually focusedon actions after such atrocities

have been committed. Thus, the international community strives to try and punish

individuals for international crimes such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against

humanityandotherserioushumanrightsviolations.Institutionssuchascourts,whichare

designed to protect, restore and improve our public order, seeks to fulfil a set of

fundamentalgoals.Thesegoals,whicharecommonforalllegalsystemsareaccordingto

Reisman:thepreventionofimminentdiscretepublicorderviolations;suspendingcurrent

public order violations; deterring in general, potential future public order violations;

restoringpublicorderafterithasbeenviolated;correctingthebehaviourthatgenerates

publicorderviolations;rehabilitatingvictimswhohavesufferedthebruntofpublicorder

violations;andreconstructing in a largersocial senseto remove conditions that appear

likelytogeneratepublicorderviolations.Thecommondenominatorofthesegoalsisthus

to protect, re-establish or create a public order, which can be characterised by low

expectations of violence and an increased respect for human rights. A wide range of

international institutions and practises are thus being used in order to accomplish the

above-mentionedgoals.OfsuchinstitutionalpractisesReismanregardsthefollowingas

mostimportant:1.)Internationalhumanrightslaw, thelawof state responsibility,and

the developing law of liability without fault; 2.) International criminal tribunals; 3.)

Universalisationofthejurisdictionofnationalcourtsforinternationalcrimes;4.)Non-

recognition or the general refusal to recognise and to allow violators the beneficial

consequencesofactionsdeemedunlawful;5.) Incentivesin theform of foreignaidor

other rewards; 6.) Commissions of inquiry or truth commissions; 7.) Compensation

commissions;and8.)Amnesties. 4

2UNDoc.E/CN.4/1998/875January1998.Minimumhumanitarianstandards.AnalyticalreportoftheSecretary-GeneralsubmittedpursuanttoCommissiononHumanRightsresolution1997/21,at17-19.3Ibidem.at2526.4Reisman,p.76-78,1996.


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For the purposesofthis studycategories 1-3 are most relevant as the objective of this

paper is to examine the possible legal responses to serious human rights abuses under

contemporaryhumanrightslawandinternationalcriminallaw.

Humanrightsareconceivedofas rightsheldby individualsvis--vistheState, andthey

createlegalobligations,bothpositiveandnegativeinnature,onpartoftheStatetoensure

thefull enjoymentoftheserights.TheState is thenarguablyalsotheonlyentity,which

can be responsible for human rights violations. Nevertheless, measures taken by other

actors can also violate human rights. After the Second World War, large-scale

victimizations of civilians have often been committed by non-state actors5, such as

paramilitaryunits,armedcivilianbandsandevenchildren.Inthelastdecadewehavealso

witnessed attacks on civilian populations, campaigns of ethnic cleansing and even

genocides that have been perpetrated by militias, insurgent groups or other non-state

actors.Thethreatposedbynon-stateactorshavebecomesofrequentthatKlinclaims

thatthemajorityofrefugeesaretodayfleeingviolenceemanatingfromnon-stateactors.6

During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, most of the atrocities falling within the

definition of crimes against humanity were according to Bassiouni perpetrated by such

paramilitarygroupsorarmedcivilianbands.Moreover,theHutucivilianswereincitedto

kill Tutsi civilians in the Rwanda conflict, and in Liberia armed civilian bands have

committed crimes against humanity.7 In the international on-going discussion on

fundamentalstandards of humanity, the accountability of armed groups and other non-

state actors is seen as one of the most difficult challenges posed by contemporary

conflicts,regardingtheprotectionoffundamentalrights. 8

5AstudyconductedbytheInternationalCouncilonHumanRightsPolicy,ontheaccountabilityofnon-

statearmedgroups,usethetermarmedgroupsin thatcontextfornon-stateactors,anddefinessuchgroupsasgroupsthatarearmedanduseforcetoachievetheirobjectivesandarenotunderstatecontrol.Abroad understanding of this definitionwillalsobeused below, but in relation tothe term non-stateactors. (International Council on Human Rights Policy: Ends & means: human rights approaches toarmedgroups,pp.5-6.)6Klin,p.43,2001.7Bassiouni,p.274,1999.8 See for example UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87 5 January 1998. Minimum humanitarian standardsAnalyticalreportoftheSecretary-GeneralsubmittedpursuanttoCommissiononHumanRightsresolution1997/2,andUNDoc.E/CN.4/2001/9112January2001FundamentalStandardsofHumanityReportof


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1.2.Theaimandthepurposeofthestudy

AswehavewitnessedthroughtheconflictinKosovo,andelsewhere,minoritygroupsare

veryoften thevictims ofatrocities,whichcould classifyasviolations ofminority rights

underhumanrightslaw,thecrimeofpersecutionasacrimesagainsthumanity,aswar

crimesandevenasactsofgenocide.Oftenitisaswasmentionedabove,non-stateactors,

which are behind such acts. With regard to war crimes, genocide and crimes against

humanity,allactorsareindividuallycriminallyliable,underinternationalcriminallaw.The

morecomplicatedissuesarewhetherhumanrightslawappliestonon-stateactors,and

hownon-stateactorscouldbemadeaccountableforviolationsoffundamentalrights.

Theaimofthisstudyisthustoexaminethescopeandthecontentofthelegalresponses

availableundertwobranchesofcontemporaryinternationallaw,namelyhumanrightslaw

and international criminal law, to atrocities that can be defined as war crimes, crimes

against humanity, genocide and human rights violations, when they are perpetrated by

non-stateactors.Minorityrightsareprotectedunderhumanrightsconventions,thatare

treatiesbetweenStates,inwhichStateshaveundertakento respectandensuretherights

enshrined in the treaty. Thus, this paper seeks to examine the nature and scopeof the

obligationsonpartoftheState,whenthethreattominoritygroupsstemsfromnon-state

actors.Themainissueinthisrespectisthustoexaminewhatkindobligationsinternational

humanrightslaw putson theduty-bearers foratrocities againstminority groups,when

non-state actors perpetrate them. The questions that arise in this connection are thus:

Doeshumanrightslawapplytonon-stateactors?Howcannon-stateactorsviolatingthe

rightsofminoritygroupsorengaginginpersecutionofsuchgroupsbemadeaccountable

forsuchacts?WhatkindofdutiesdohumanrightsconventionsputonStates,withregard

to violations of the very rights that the convention isdesigned to protect? What is thescopeoftheduediligencedoctrine?

the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 2000/69. Report from the ExpertMeetingonFundamentalStandardsofHumanity,Stockholm22-24,February2000.


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In international criminal law, crimes against humanity overlap with some fundamental

human rights violations in the Rome Statute, which as Meron puts it, means that

fundamental human rights violations become criminalized under the Rome Statute.

Scheininalsoelaboratesfurtheron this importantconnection, andstates that:What is

punishable for an individual under international law is also prohibited in relation to

States. And what is prohibited by international law by qualifying certain acts as

international crimes is certainly relevant for an understanding of what rights

fundamental standardsofhumanity-mustberespectedbyStatesand individuals inall

circumstances.9Moreover,thesamereasoningcanalsobetracedinGeneralComment

No.29onstatesofemergency,whichwasadoptedbytheUNHumanRightsCommittee

in July 2001.10 This connection between international criminal law and international

human rights law leads to the second major issue of this study. Thus, the study will

examinethemeanstoholdnon-stateactorsaccountableunder theGenocideConvention

and under the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Both genocide and crimes

againsthumanityareveryspecificcrimes,whichputspecificrequirementsregardingboth

theacts,theintentionsbehindtheactsandtheactorbehindthem.Withthisinmindthe

studyseekstoidentifytherequirements,whichmustbefulfilledbeforeanon-stateactor

can be held criminally liable for genocide and crimes against humanity. This study is

especially interested in offences, which have targeted minority groups, and thus the

offenceofpersecution,whichhasexpandedthroughthecodificationwillbepaidspecial

attention. The protection afforded to minority groups under international humanitarian

law,andespeciallythemeanstoholdnon-stateactorsresponsibleforwarcrimesunder

theRomeStatutewillalso beexaminedundertheheadingofinternational criminal law.

TheRomeStatuteisespeciallysignificantwithregardtonon-stateactors,asitisthefirst

9

Scheinin,p.32,2000.10UNDoc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1131August2001GeneralCommentNo.29onStatesofemergency,atparagraph12,whichreads: InassessingthescopeoflegitimatederogationfromtheCovenant,onecriterioncanbefoundinthedefinitionofcertainhumanrightsviolationsascrimesagainsthumanity.If

actionconductedundertheauthorityofa Stateconstitutesabasisfor individualcriminalresponsibility

foracrimeagainsthumanityby thepersonsinvolved inthat action,article4ofthe Covenantcannotbe

usedas justificationthata stateofemergencyexempted theState inquestion from itsresponsibility in

relation to the same conduct. Therefore, the recent codification of crimes against humanity, for

jurisdictional purposes, in theRomeStatute of the International CriminalCourt is of relevance in the

interpretationofarticle4oftheCovenant.


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major multilateral treaty codification of certain war crimes in non-international armed

conflicts,which in turn are the circumstances in which non-statearmed groupsusually

operate.

The study requires, in addition to an analysis of the ICC-Statute and its preparatory

documents, also a careful examination of the case law from the international ad hoc

tribunalswithjurisdictionoverthesecrimes.

The fifth chapter is then devoted to an elaboration of the idea of a merger between

international criminal law and international human rights law. As the Rome Statute

criminalizesgenocideandcrimesagainsthumanity,itisalsoofrelevancetoconsiderwhat

addedvaluethisbringsto humanrightstreatyregimes,andto theprotectionofminority

groupsinconflictcircumstances.Inreverse,onealsoneedstoconsiderwhetherornotthe

discourse concerning the merger of human rights law and international criminal, is

prematureandevenharmfulforinternationalcriminallaw.

1.3.Methodandsources

Thisstudyapproachesthethemefromalegalpointofview,withtheaimofansweringthe

questions posed through an examination of the relevant legal sources. In this respect,

internationalhumanrightsconventions,especiallytheInternationalCovenantonCiviland

PoliticalRights(ICCPR),instrumentsoninternationalcriminallaw,suchastheGenocide

Convention andespecially theStatuteof the International Criminal Court (ICC) areof

mostrelevance.Inadditiontotheinstrumentsandtheirpreparatorydocuments,alsothe

relevantcaselawoftheICTYandtheICTR,andtheUNHumanRightsCommitteewill

beexamined.Attentionwillalsobegiventothelatestdoctrineontheseissuesandtheongoing international discussion, especially on the fundamental standards of humanity,

whichrelatescloselytothetheme.


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2.Minoritygroupsandthreatsfromnon-stateactors

The ability of non-state actors to commit large-scale victimisation has been clearly

demonstratedduringtheconflictsinRwanda,theformerYugoslavia,andelsewhere.TheInternationalCouncilonHumanRightsPolicystudyonarmedgroupsandhumanrights

abusesconfirmshowthechangingnatureofarmedconflicts,frominternationaltointernal,

hasbroughtaboutarmedgroups,whicharenotunderthecontrolofanyState,andwhose

conductgiverisetoserioushumanrightsabuses.Thestudyalsoenliststhemostcommon

humanrightsabuses,whichareattributabletoarmednon-stateactors.Amongtheseare:

arbitrarydeprivation of the right to life, disregard for the protection owed to civilians

caughtupinconflicts,interferencewithfreedomofmovement,interferencewithfreedom

ofexpression,assemblyandassociation,torture,ill-treatment,andabusesagainstchildren

andwomen,andarbitrarydeprivationoflibertyanddueprocess. 11

Therightsofminoritygroupsarenotmentionedassuchonthelist,butminoritygroups,

orgroupswithdistinctethnic,religious,linguisticcharacteristicsareusuallythevictimsof

theabove-mentionedabuses.Thevulnerabilityofminoritiesduringcrisissituationsisalso

recognised in the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency, Mr.

LeandroDespouyoftheSub-CommissiononPreventionofDiscriminationandProtection

ofMinorities,whomentionsminorities, indigenous populationsand migrant workers as

groupsthatareparticularlyvulnerableduringstatesofemergencies,andwhoseprotection

needstobestrengthened.12

Theconflict in Kosovo is agood exampleofvictimisationofminorities, whichasbeen

perpetratedbybothStateactionandbynon-stateactors.Firstly,theAlbaniancommunity

inKosovowasthetargetofgenocidalactsonbehalfoftheregimeinBelgrade,whichlead

11 InternationalCouncilon HumanRightsPolicy:Ends& means:human rights approaches toarmedgroups,p.10.12UNDoc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19.FinalReportofMr.LeandroDespouy,SpecialRapporteuroftheSub-Commission, on the Protection of Human Rights and States of Emergency, 23 June 1997, TheadministrationofJusticeandtheHumanRightsofDetainees:QuestionofHumanRightsandStatesofEmergency,paragraph173.


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to the indictments of the political and military leaders of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia (ICTY).13 After the deployment of UNMIK and KFOR, the Serb-

minority residing in Kosovo, was according to the reports of the international human

rights monitors, the targetof revengecrimes perpetrated by armed non-state groups.14

ThehumanrightsabusesbyarmedgroupsinKosovomightalsobetriedbytheICTY.

ThechiefprosecutoroftheICTY,CarlaDelPontealsostatedataPressConferenceon

the21stofMarch2001,thatinvestigationswithrespecttopossibleviolationsofthelaws

or customs ofwarand crimes againsthumanity in Kosovo, involving allegations about

activities, againstSerbs and other minorities, by unidentified Albanian armed groups in

KosovofromJune1999untilthepresent,isunderway.15

13Milutinovicetal.CaseNo.IT-99-37"Kosovo"InitialIndictment,24May1999.14PreliminaryAssessmentOftheSituationofEthnicMinoritiesinKosovo.UNHCR/OSCE26July1999.Taken from http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/. UN Doc. S/1999/987 Report of

theSecretary-GeneralontheUnitedNationsInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo,p.1-2.Takenfrom:http://www.un.org/Docs/reports/1999/s1999987.htm,UNDocs/1999/1250ReportoftheSecretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, p. 1-2. Taken from:http://www.un.org/Docs/reports/1999/s19991250.htm. UNHCR OSCE Assessment of the Situation ofEthnic Minorities in Kosovo (Period covering November 1999 through January 2000), p. 1-2, 5.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/.15StatementgivenbytheProsecutoroftheICTY,CarlaDelPonte,atthePressConferenceon21March2001 with thePresident of theICTY, JudgeClaudeJorda,Mr. Grubac, theMinister of Justice of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia,and Mr. Batic, theMinister of Justiceof theRepublicof Serbia. TheHague,21March2001.FH/P.I.S./578e.Takenfromhttp://www.un.org/icty/latest/latestdev-e.htm.


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3.Internationalhumanrightslawandabusesperpetratedbynon-state

actors

3.1.Introductoryremarksonthecharacterofhumanrightstreaties

Thegeneralinternationalhumanrightsconventions,suchastheInternationalCovenanton

CivilandPoliticalRights,theEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRights

andFundamentalFreedoms,andtheAmericanConventiononHumanRights,aretreaties

betweenStates.TheyweredraftedbyStates,addressedtoStates,andintendedtocreate

obligationsonpartoftheStates.OnlyStatescanbepartiestointernationalhumanrights

treaties,andStatesarealsotheonlysubjectstotheoversightmechanismsthatthetreatiesestablish.16Thus,onlyStatescanbeheldaccountableforhumanrightsviolations,underan

internationalhumanrightsprotectionregime. 17

16 Nevertheless, the UN Human Rights Committee, which is monitoring the implementation of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, can also monitor the implementation of theCovenant ona territory, which is not a State party to the Covenant. In the case of Hong Kong forexample, the government of China, which is not a State party to the Covenant, submitted a reportconcerningtheimplementationoftheICCPRinHongKong,astheCovenantcontinuedtoapplyintheHong Kong Special Administrative Region. See for example UNDoc. CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1 16 June

1999Initialreport(HongKong):China.16/06/99.CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1.(StatePartyReport).17 International Councilon HumanRights Policy:Ends& means:human rights approaches toarmed

groups,atp.60.AccordingtoarticleintheOptionalProtocoltotheICCPRonlyStatescanbefoundtohaveviolatedtherightsenumeratedintheCovenant.Thus,article1readsasfollows:AStatePartytotheCovenantthatbecomesaPartytothepresentProtocolrecognizesthecompetenceoftheCommittee

to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be

victimsofaviolationbythatStatePartyofanyoftherightssetforthintheCovenant.Nocommunication

shallbereceivedbytheCommitteeifitconcernsaStatePartytotheCovenantwhichisnotaPartytothe

presentProtocol.OptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,G.A.res.2200A(XXI),21U.N.GAORSupp.(No.16)at59,U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966),999U.N.T.S.302,enteredintoforceMarch23,1976.Onthesameissuearticle44oftheAmericanConventiononHumanRightsprescribes:Anypersonorgroupofpersons,oranynongovernmentalentitylegallyrecognizedin

oneormoremember states ofthe Organization,may lodge petitionswiththe Commission containingdenunciationsorcomplaintsofviolationofthisConventionbyaStateParty.Article63providesthat:1.IftheCourtfindsthattherehasbeenaviolationofa rightorfreedomprotectedbythisConvention,

theCourt shall rule that theinjuredpartybeensured theenjoymentof his rightor freedom thatwas

violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that

constitutedthebreachofsuchrightor freedomberemediedand thatfaircompensationbepaidto the

injuredparty.AmericanConventiononHumanRights,O.A.S.TreatySeriesNo.36,1144U.N.T.S.123enteredintoforceJuly18,1978,reprintedinBasicDocumentsPertainingtoHumanRightsinthe Inter-AmericanSystem, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82doc.6rev.1at25(1992).Furthermore,articles33and34oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,alsoreadsasfollows:AnyHighContractingPartymayreferto


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Humanrightstreatiesareinthefirstplace,designedtoprotecttheindividualagainstthe

exercise ofStatepower, and they create a legal obligation for States to respect and to

ensuretherightsenumeratedintheConvention.Furthermore,italsomeansthattheState

hasanobligationtoextendthereachofhumanrightslawtorelationsbetweenindividuals,

whichisoftenreferredtoasDrittwirkung.ThismeansthatStateshaveanobligationto

adoptcorrespondingmeasuresinmunicipallaw,whichinturncreatesobligationsonpart

of the individuals.18UnderinternationallawStatesaretheduty-bearers,withregardto

humanrights treaties, and as such internationally responsible for what happens in their

territory. States must therefore take effective measures, in order to protect the rights

enshrined in the conventions, also when private actors threaten the rights.19 Similarly,

Provostalsoassert,that thismeansthathumanrightslawcouldcoverterroristactivities

bynon-stateactors.20

Even if the State is primarily responsible for upholding human rights, new non-state

entities, which have entered the global scene and perpetrated serious human rights

violations, have seriously challenged the States ability to regulate and control these

entities. In the discussion concerning terrorism and human rights with the Sub-

CommissiononPreventionofDiscriminationandProtectionofMinorities,Ms.KalliopiK.

Koufaassertedthatthereisaneedto:assessobjectivelywhetherinternationalhuman

rightslawismovingbeyondthetraditionaldichotomyofindividualversusState,beyond

thedutyofStatestorespectandensuretheobservanceofhumanrights,andtowardsthe

theCourtany allegedbreachof theprovisionsoftheConventionand theprotocolstheretoby another

High Contracting Party., and The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmentalorganisationorgroupofindividualsclaimingtobethevictimofaviolationbyoneoftheHighContractingPartiesof the rights set forth in theConvention or the protocols thereto. TheHigh

ContractingPartiesundertakenottohinderinanywaytheeffectiveexerciseofthisright.[European]Conventionforthe ProtectionofHumanRightsand FundamentalFreedoms,(ETSNo.5),213U.N.T.S.222,enteredintoforceSept.3, 1953,as amended by ProtocolsNos 3,5, 8,and 11which entered intoforceon21September1970,20December1971,1January1990,and1November1998respectively.18Provost,p.59,2002.19Scheinin,p.26,2000.20Provost,p.59,2002.


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creationofobligationsapplicablealsotoprivateindividualsandothernon-stateactors

includingliberationmovementsandterroristorganisations. 21

Generallyspeaking,therearehoweverdivergentviewsamongscholarsandGovernments

regarding the question whether, non-state actors, such as armed groups can commit

humanrightsviolations,andwhethertheycouldbeheld accountable under international

humanrightslawforthese,orwhethersuchviolations,despitedeservingcondemnation,

cannotperdefinitionberegardedashumanrightsviolations. 22

Below,thequestionwhether,andunderwhichconditions,aStatecanbeheldliablefor

humanrightsviolationsperpetratedbynon-stateactorswillbefirstaddressed.Thiswillbe

donethroughanexaminationoftheobligationsonpartoftheState,thatthehumanrights

conventionsgiverise to. Thisanalysiswill thenbefollowedby adiscussiononwhether

non-stateactorscouldbehelddirectlyaccountable.

3.2.ProtectionofMinoritygroupsunderhumanrightslaw

Underinternationalhumanrightslaw,article27oftheInternationalCovenantonCiviland

PoliticalRightsaffordsthemainandgeneralminorityprotection. 23Article27,whichisthe

most widely accepted legally binding provision regarding minority rights, protects the

existenceofmembersof minorities, and theircultural, religious and linguisticactivities,

andreadsasfollows:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons

belongingtosuchminoritiesshallnotbedeniedtheright,incommunitywiththeother

21UNDoc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/28TerrorismandhumanrightsWorkingpapersubmittedbyMs.KalliopiK.KoufainaccordancewithSub-Commissionresolution1996/20.22UNDoc.E/CN.4/1998/875January1998.MinimumhumanitarianstandardsAnalyticalreportoftheSecretary-GeneralsubmittedpursuanttoCommissiononHumanRightsresolution1997/21.23InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsadoptedonthe16December1996.HereinaftertheCovenantwillbecalledtheICCPR.


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membersof their group, toenjoy their ownculture, toprofess and practise their own

religion,ortousetheirownlanguage.24

Astheaimofminorityrightsregimesistoprotectminoritiesagainstactivitiesthatare

aimed at the destruction of the group, it is evident that the protection of the physical

existence of minorities is primordial.25 This negative element of the provision obliges

statesto refrainfrominterferenceandto practisetolerance.Allformsofintegrationand

assimilation pressure, and of course all measures directed against, and threatening the

existenceofminoritiesarealsoprohibited.26Withregardtotheprotectionofthisright,the

newGeneralComment,onderogationsfromprovisionsoftheCovenantduringstatesof

emergencies,stands out asextremely important, as it states that: the international

protectionoftherightsofpersonsbelongingtominoritiesincludeselementsthatmustbe

respected in all circumstances. This is reflected in the prohibition of genocide in

international law, in the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in article 4 itself

(paragraph1),aswellasinthenon-derogablenatureofarticle18. 27Althoughmost

threatstominorityrightsstemfrom thestateside,since thedominantgroup usuallyuse

the state power mechanisms to oppress minorities, experiences from states with many

rivallingethnicorreligiousgroupsshowthatminorityrightscanalsobethreatenedbythe

privateside.Thereforearticle27hasalsoahorizontaleffect,andstatesarethusobligedto

protect minority rights as well against threats stemming from the state side as well as

against threats stemming from other groups of the population.28 The Human Rights

Committee,initsGeneralCommentonart.27,alsoconfirmedthisimportantobligation,

astheCommitteeheldthat:a Statepartyisunderanobligationto ensure that the

existenceand theexerciseof this right are protectedagainst theirdenialorviolation.

Positivemeasuresofprotectionare,therefore,requirednotonlyagainsttheactsof the

24ICCPR,art.27.25LundbergKristiansen,1997,p.381.26Nowak,1993,p.502.27 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, (2001) Human Rights Committee General Comment 29, 31August2001.28Nowak,1993,p.502-503.


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Statepartyitself,whether through itslegislative, judicial oradministrativeauthorities,

butalsoagainsttheactsofotherpersonswithintheStateparty. 29

Furthermore, therearealso provisionsapplicable to minorities in theConventionon the

EliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,30intheConventionontheRightsof

theChild31andintheConventionagainstDiscriminationinEducation.

In1992theUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedtheUNDeclarationontherightsofPersons

belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. This instrument,

whichformallyisnot legallybinding, is, however, thefirstUNhumanrightsinstrument

devotedsolelytominorities.Ontheregionallevel,onealsohastomentiontheFramework

ConventionfortheProtectionofNationalMinorities,withintheCouncilofEurope,which

is the first binding international instrument on minority rights. Further, the European

Convention on Human Rights creates through article 14 a legally binding, but limited

minorityprotection.OfsignificancewithregardtominoritygroupsisalsoProtocolNo.12

to the ECHR, which regards the prohibition of discrimination. Moreover, the OSCE

documentsalso includefar-reachingminorityrights,but theseare formallynon-binding,

andassuchnotofprimaryimportanceforthisstudy.Withregardtonon-legallybinding

standards, one can also mention the so-called Turku Declaration of Minimum

Humanitarian Standards of 1990, which has been part of the ongoing international

discussiononfundamentalstandardsofhumanity,applicableinallcircumstancesandtoall

actors.Thisinstrumentwasapprovedbyagroupofexperts,andcanbeseenasapart in

the process aimed at strengthening the protection of fundamental rightsduring various

statesofemergency.32 It isformulatedasadeclarationto beadoptedby theUN,and it

29

Therightsofminorities(Art.27):.08/04/94.CCPRGeneralComment23(Fiftiethsession).30 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Adopted andopenedforsignatureandratificationbyGeneralAssemblyResolution2106A(XX)of21December1965.HereinafterthisConventionwillbereferredtoasCERD.31ConventionontheRightsoftheChild.Adoptedandopenedforsignature,ratificationandaccessionbyGeneralAssemblyresolution44/25of20November1989.32Scheinin,2000,p.4.On2December1990,agroupofexpertsconvenedattheboAkademiUniversityInstitute for Human Rights in Finland and approved a document called Declaration of MinimumHumanitarian Standards, which nowadays is internationally known as the Turku Declaration. Theapprovalofthedeclarationbyagroupofexpertscanbeseenaspartofamoregeneralprocessaimedat


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containsnormsthatshouldbeapplicableinallcircumstances,includinginternalviolence,

disturbances,tensions,andpublicemergency,andwhichcannotbesubjecttoderogations.

Italsocontainsaprovisionontheprotectionofminorities.33Thusarticle16provides:In

observing these standards, all efforts shall be made to protect the rights of groups,

minorities and peoples, including their dignity and identity. 34 This instrument is,

however,notlegallybinding,butshouldratherbeseenasasoft-lawtypeofinstrument.It

hashowevergainedsomekindofrecognition,asarevisedversionofitwastransmittedto

theCommissiononHumanRightsin1994bythegovernmentsofFinlandandNorway,

andithasbeenontheagendaoftheCommissionsincethen. 35Moreoverithasalsobeen

referredtobytheICTYintheTadiccase.36

3.3.StateResponsibilityforhumanrightsabusesbynon-stateactors

Stateshaveanobligationofduediligencetoprotecttheenjoymentofrightsofindividuals

under general international law. Under conventional international law States have an

obligation to respect and to secure or ensure respect of the rights enumerated in the

conventions.Thisobligation,whichmaydependingonthecircumstancesincludeadutyto

strengtheningtheprotectionoffundamentalrightsduringvariousstatesofemergencies.TheDeclarationhas since that been revised and submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights, (See UNDoc.E/CN.4/1995/116).SeealsoAsbjornEide,AllanRosas,TheodoreMeron:CombatingLawlessnessin GreyZone Conflicts through MinimumHumanitarian Standards, AJIL 89 (1995), pp.215-223 formoreinformation.ThisdocumentwillhereinafterbecalledTheTurkuDeclaration.33TheTurkuDeclarationonMinimumHumanitarianStandards,art.1.34Ibid.,art.16.35UNDoc.E/CN.4/1995/116,Scheinin,2000,p.42.,ReportfromtheExpertMeetingonFundamentalStandardsofHumanity,Stockholm,22-24February2000.WithintheCommissiontheTurkuDeclarationhas been part of the discussion on fundamental standards of humanity. In this respect the analyticalreportsonfundamentalstandardsofhumanity,presentedbytheSecretary-GeneraltotheCommission,concludedthatthemostimportantpurposeofidentifyingsuchstandardsistoenhanceprotectionofall

persons, and that a document identifying such standards would be useful for education- and trainingpurposes as well for improving respect for and compliance with norms. There are however alsodisadvantages with the adoption of an instrumentidentifying fundamental standardsof humanity. Themostseriousdisadvantage,identifiedbythesamereportisthattheadoptionofsuchadocumentmightundermine existinginternational standards, andimply thatnormsnot included areless important. UNDoc. E./CN.4/1998/87 Minimum Humanitarian Standards Analytical report of the Secretary-GeneralsubmittedpursuanttoCommissiononHumanRightsresolution1997/21,paras.89-95.SeealsoUNDoc.E.CN.4/1999/92 Fundamental Standards of Humanity, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant toCommissionResolution1998/29.


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enact domestic legislation which impose obligations upon individuals, is laid down in

similartermsinallmajorhumanrightsconventions. 37Thus,article2(1)oftheICCPR

readsasfollows:

1.EachStatePartyto thepresentCovenantundertakestorespectandtoensure toall

individualswithinitsterritoryandsubjecttoitsjurisdictiontherightsrecognizedinthe

presentCovenant,withoutdistinctionof anykind, suchas race,colour,sex, language,

religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birthor other

status.38

WithregardtotheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights, the

correspondingarticlestipulates:

1.EachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestotakesteps,individuallyand

throughinternationalassistanceandco-operation,especiallyeconomicandtechnical,to

themaximumof itsavailableresources,witha view toachievingprogressively thefull

realization of therightsrecognized inthepresentCovenant byallappropriatemeans,

includingparticularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures.39

ThecorrespondingarticleoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsreadsasfollows:

The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the

rightsandfreedomsdefinedinSectionIofthisConvention.40

36

CaseNo.IT-94-1-AR-72Prosecutorv.TadicDecisionof2October1995.37Provost,p.60,2002.38ICCPR,art.2.39 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21U.N.GAORSupp.(No.16)at49,U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966),993U.N.T.S.3,enteredintoforceJan.3,1976.40[European]ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,(ETSNo.5),213U.N.T.S.222,enteredintoforceSept.3,1953,asamendedbyProtocolsNos3,5,8,and11whichentered into force on21 September 1970, 20December 1971, 1 January 1990, and1 November 1998respectively.


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Article1oftheAmericanConventiononHumanRightsprescribesthat:

The States Parties to thisConvention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms

recognizedhereinandtoensuretoallpersonssubjectto theirjurisdictionthefreeand

fullexerciseofthoserightsandfreedoms,withoutanydiscriminationforreasonsofrace,

color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,

economicstatus,birth,oranyothersocialcondition.41

The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Art. 1) also contains a similar

obligation,whichstipulatesthat:

TheMemberStatesoftheOrganizationofAfricanUnitypartiestothepresentCharter

shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall

undertaketoadoptlegislativeorothermeasurestogiveeffecttothem.42

Thus,humanrightsconventionsestablishasystembywhichStatesare,aswassaidabove,

internationally responsible forwhat happens on its territory.This means thatStates are

obligedtotakeeffectivemeasuresinordertoprotectrights,againstallthreats,including

threats stemming from non-state actors. Thus, a State,which fails to complywith this

obligation,isinitselfguiltyofviolatinghumanrights.43Theleadingcaseontheissueisthe

VelsquezRodrgues-case ,acaseagainstHondurasinvolvinginvoluntarydisappearances

attributabletoanon-stateactor.Here,theInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsheld

thattheobligationonpartoftheStatetoensurethefullenjoymentofrightsentailsaduty

to prevent, investigate and punish any violation, through legislative measures and

reorganisation of the State apparatus. On this issue the Court stated that: Thus, in

41AmericanConventiononHumanRights,O.A.S.TreatySeriesNo.36,1144U.N.T.S.123enteredintoforce July18, 1978, reprinted in BasicDocumentsPertaining toHuman Rights in the Inter-AmericanSystem,OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82doc.6rev.1at25(1992).42 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5,21I.L.M.58(1982),enteredintoforceOct.21,1986.43Scheinin,p.26,2000.


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principle,anyviolationof rightsrecognizedbytheConventioncarriedoutbyanactof

publicauthority or bypersonswho use theirpositionof authority is imputable to the

State.However,thisdoesnotdefineallthecircumstancesinwhicha Stateisobligated

toprevent,investigateandpunishhumanrightsviolations,norallthecasesinwhichthe

Statemight be found responsible for an infringement of those rights. An illegal act

whichviolateshumanrightsandwhichisinitiallynotdirectlyimputabletoaState(for

example,becauseitistheactofaprivatepersonorbecausethepersonresponsiblehas

notbeenidentified)canleadtointernationalresponsibilityof theState,notbecauseof

the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to

respondtoitasrequiredbytheConvention.44

Thus the Court upheld, that an omission to prevent, investigate and punish a violation

mightbeinbreachwiththeStatesobligationsarisingfromahumanrightstreaty,also

whentheviolationitselfwasnotcommittedbyastateagent.TheStatehasthenviolated

its obligation, if it tolerates or condones infringements in rights by non-state actors or

privateindividuals.45Similarreasoninghasalsobeenadoptedbyotherinternationaltreaty-

monitoringbodies.TheHumanRightsCommitteeheldinthe HerreraRubiov.Colombia-

case,that:thatStatespartiesshouldtakespecificandeffectivemeasurestopreventthe

disappearance of individuals and establish effective facilities and procedures to

investigate thoroughly, by an appropriate impartial body, cases of missing and

disappeared persons in circumstances which may involve a violation of the right to

life.46

In theOsman v. United Kingdom-case the European Court of Human Rights took a

similar stand regarding the due diligence requirement, as it established a standard for

positiveobligationsforStateswithregardto therightto life.Here theCourtnotedthat:TheCourtnotes that the firstsentenceofArticle 21 enjoins the Statenot onlyto

44VelsquezRodrguezCase,JudgmentofJuly29,1988,Inter-AmCt.H.R.(Ser.C)No.4(1988),at.Para.172.45Provost,p.61,2002.


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refrainfromtheintentionalandunlawfultakingoflife,butalsototakeappropriatesteps

to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the L.C.B. v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p.

1403, 36). It is common ground that the States obligation in this respect extends

beyonditsprimarydutytosecuretherighttolifebyputtinginplaceeffectivecriminal-

lawprovisionstodeterthecommissionofoffencesagainstthepersonbackedupbylaw-

enforcementmachineryforthe prevention, suppressionandsanctioning of breachesof

suchprovisions.ItisthusacceptedbythoseappearingbeforetheCourtthatArticle2of

the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive

obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an

individualwhoselifeisatriskfromthecriminalactsofanotherindividual.Thescopeof

thisobligationisamatterofdisputebetweentheparties.47

Thedoctrineofduediligencetoprotectthefullenjoymentofrights,asstatedinthecase-

law, and advocated for by scholars, confirms that States have a duty to prevent,

investigateandpunishviolationcommittedbynon-stateactors.

Thereseem howeverto be divergentviewsamongscholars regarding the scopeof the

obligation.On theonehand, many commentators argue that theobligationto ensure

implies a duty to prosecute those who violate the rights.48 This view can certainly be

backed up by the above-cited case law, and by other findings of the Human Rights

Committee.InacaseconcerningallegedactsoftortureinZaire,theCommitteeheldthat

thegovernmentwasunderadutytoconductanenquiry,andtopunishthosefoundguilty

of torture.49 In a view concerning alleged extra-legal executions in Surinam, the

Committeeurgedthegovernmenttotakeeffectivestepstoinvestigatethekillingsand

46 Communication No. 161/1983 : Herrera Rubio v. Colombia. 02/11/87. CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983.(Jurisprudence),at10.3.47Osmanv.UnitedKingdom,Judgementof28October1998,EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,Reports1998-VIII.,atpara.115.48SeeforinstancePocar,p.71,2001.49CommunicationNo.124/1982:Mutebav.Zaire.24/07/84.CCPR/C/22/D/124/1982.(Jurisprudence).


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tobring tojusticeany persons found tobe responsible.50Withregardtothedutyto

prosecuteonecouldalsomentiontheviewadoptedbytheCommitteeinacaseinvolving

disappearancesinUruguay,inwhichtheCommitteeheldthattheGovernmentshouldtake

effectivestepstobringthoseresponsibletojustice. 51Scharf,ontheotherhandseemsto

takeamorerestrictedview,ashedoesnotsubscribetotheexistenceofastrictdutyto

prosecuteviolators.Heassertsthatthecaselawsuggest thatat aminimumStatesmust

conduct an investigation, and impose some form of punishment on those identified as

responsible.52

Nevertheless,onemustconcludethatwhenitcomestoviolationsofcertainhumanrights,

it is beyond doubt that States have an obligation to prosecute the violators. This is

especiallytrueconcerningsuchhumanrightsviolations,whichatthesametimeconstitute

internationalcrimes.Inthisrespect,articleVoftheGenocideConventionstipulatesthat

States undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the

necessary legislationtogiveeffect totheprovisionsof the presentConvention,and,in

particular,toprovideeffectivepenaltiesforpersonsguiltyofgenocide53Similarly,the

UNTortureConventionalsorequiresprosecutionorextradition.54Withrespecttocrimes

against humanity, the case is not so clear. There is no international treaty-obligation

requiringprosecutionorextradition,butseveralGeneralAssemblyresolutionscallingfor

theprosecutionofcrimesagainsthumanity.55Itishoweverdifficultnottoconcurwith

Scharf, who points out that the absence of State practise concerning prosecutions of

50 Communication No. 154/1983: Baboeram-Adhin et. al. v. Suriname. 04/04/85.CCPR/C/24/D/154/1983.(Jurisprudence).51CommunicationNo.107/1981:AlmeidadeQuinterosv.Uruguay.21/07/83.CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981.(Jurisprudence)52Scharf,pp.7-9,1997.Inadditiontoanotsostricttoneintheviews,Scharfbaseshisconclusioninthe

fact thatStatesrejected a proposal,which wouldhaverequired States toprosecute violators, when theICCPRwasnegotiated.53TheGenocideConventionart.5.54ConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment,G.A.res.39/46,annex,39U.N.GAORSupp.(No.51)at197,U.N.Doc.A/39/51(1984),enteredintoforceJune26,1987.55SeeforexampleUNDoc.A/8028(1970)G.A.Res.2712UnitedNationsResolutiononWarCriminalsUNDoc.A/9030(1973)G.A.Res3074Principlesofinternationalco-operationinthedetection,arrest,extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity Adopted byGeneralAssemblyresolution3074(XXVIII)of3December1973.


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perpetrators makes it difficult to prove the existence of a customary obligation to

prosecute.56

3.4.Duediligenceasappliedtotheprotectionofminoritygroups

Toconclude,onecanthereforeassertthatStateshaveanobligationtoprotectminority

groupsandtheirrightsagainstinfringementsstemmingfromnon-stateactors.IftheState

fails to do so, it could itself, in accordance with the due diligence doctrine, be held

responsibleforahumanrightsviolation.Exactlywhatthisobligationentailsisdifficultto

determine. The General Comment on article 27, states that article 27 recognizes the

existenceofaright,whichmustnotbedenied,andfurthermore,that: aState party is

under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise of this right are

protectedagainsttheirdenialorviolation.Positivemeasuresofprotectionare,therefore,

requirednotonlyagainsttheactsoftheStatepartyitself,whetherthroughitslegislative,

judicialoradministrativeauthorities,butalsoagainsttheactsof otherpersonswithin

the State party.57 Thus, we can conclude that legislative, judicial and administrative

measurescanberequiredinordertoprotecttheexistenceofminoritygroupsandtheir

rights.Withregardtomoreviolentacts,whicharethemainfocusofthisstudy,onecould

holdthatStatesareunderanobligationtoprotectminoritygroupsagainstthreatstotheir

existence.Inthisrespect,thereisatleastanobligationtoprosecuteacts,whichwould

qualifyasgenocide.Thereisnooutrightdutytoprosecuteactsofpersecutionamounting

to crimes against humanity under that heading, but such acts could fall under other

articles, whichdrittwirkung would requireprosecution.Moreover, withregard to other

thanviolentthreats,Stateshaveanobligationtoprotecttherightofminoritygroupsto

enjoytheirculture,professtheirownreligion,andtospeaktheirownlanguage,whenitis

threatened by private actors. Moreover, States have on the basis of article 20 in theICCPR anoutright obligation to prohibit any advocacy of national, racialor religious

56Scharf,p.8-9,1996.57U.N.Doc.HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1at38(1994).HumanRightsCommittee,GeneralComment23,Article27(Fiftiethsession,1994).


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hatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibited

bylaw,ofwhichminoritycouldfallvictim.

3.5.Othermeansforensuringaccountability

Stateresponsibility,coupledwiththeduediligencedoctrinecanaswasdescribedabovebe

used as a vehicle for making non-state actors accountable for human rights violations.

With reference to the above examination of the nature of human rights treaties, it is

accordingtothepresentauthor,notpossibletoholdnon-stateactorsdirectlyresponsible

for human rights violationsper se. Such violations must be addressed under domestic

criminallaw,orbyenforcementmechanismsofinternationalcriminallaw,suchastheICC

orthroughtheprincipleofuniversaljurisdiction,insofarastheviolationsalsoqualifyas

internationalcrimes.Thisissuewillbeexaminedfurtherinthecomingchapters.Anyway,

in the discussion on fundamental standards of humanity and in the ICHRP -study,

strategiesformakingitattractiveforarmednon-stateactorsto respectforhumanrights

are also highlighted. In that context, non-legal approaches such as shaming and

persuasion,whichincludesfact-findinganddenunciationanduseofmedia,workingwith

armedgroups,whichincludesamongotherthingsthedevelopmentofcodesofconduct

arehighlighted.58

58 InternationalCouncilon HumanRightsPolicy:Ends& means:human rights approaches toarmedgroups,p.39-58.SeealsoScheinin,p.28-30,2000.


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4.InternationalcriminallawandNon-Stateactors

4.1.Initialremarksoninternationalcriminallawandinternationalcrimes

The definition of international criminal law can be held to include both the penal and

proceduralaspectsofinternationallawandtheinternationalproceduralaspectsofnational

criminallaw.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,thepenalaspectsofinternationallaw,which

establish international crimes and identify elements of criminal responsibility and

enforcementmodalities,andincreasinglyalsoproceduralmodalities,isofmostrelevance.

The sources of law for international criminal law can thus according to Bassiouni, be

distinguishedasbetweeninternationallawforthe rationemateriae,rationepersonae,and

enforcement obligations, and national criminal law for enforcement modalities.

Accordingly, the basis for international criminal accountability and ratione personae is

established in international law, as is also the rationemateriae. The general part, the

elementsofcriminalresponsibility,arealsoestablishedbyinternationallawwheneveran

internationally created judicial body adjudicates criminal responsibility. Moreover, with

regard to the sources, also international human rights law and general principles of

criminal law recognised by the worlds major criminal law systems, and emerging

international criminological perspectives are regardedasadditional collateral sources of

internationalcriminallaw.59

With regard to the ratione materiae, the international crimes derive from both

conventionalinternationallawandcustomarylaw.Allinternationalcrimesareaccording

toBassiouni,linkedbyfourfactorsthatreflectthepolicyofinternationalcriminalisationof

suchacts.Thesefactorsare:

a)Theprohibitedconductaffectsasignificantinternationalinterest(includingthreatsto

peaceandsecurity);

59Bassiouni,p.9,1999.


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b) the prohibited conduct constitutes an egregious conduct deemed offensive to the

commonly shared values of the world community ( including conduct shocking to the

conscienceofhumanity);

c)theprohibitedconduct involvesmore thanonestate (transnational implications)inits

planning, preparation or commission either through the diversity of nationality of its

perpetratorsorvictims,orbecausethemeansemployedtranscendnationalboundaries;

d)theconductbearsuponaninternationallyprotectedinterestwhichdoesnotrisetothe

level required by (a) or (b) but which cannot be prevented or controlled without its

internationalcriminalisation.60

Accordingly,Bassiounihasidentified25categoriesofinternationalcrimes,adducedfrom

international conventions, which all have penal characteristics, that identify proscribed

conduct and/or establish legal obligationswhichare penal in nature.61 These categories

are: 1) aggression; 2) genocide; 3) crimes against humanity; 4) war crimes; 5) crimes

against United Nations and associated personnel; 6) unlawful possession or use or

emplacementofweapons;7)theftofnuclearmaterials;8)mercenarism;9)apartheid;10)

slavery and slave-related practices; 11) torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment; 12) unlawful human experimentation; 13) piracy; 14) aircraft

hijackingandunlawfulactsagainstinternationalairsafety;15)unlawfulactsagainstthe

safetyofmaritimenavigationandthesafetyofplatformsonthehighseas;16)threatand

useofforceagainstinternationallyprotectedpersons;17)takingofcivilianhostages;18)

unlawful use of the mail; 19) unlawful traffic in drugs and related drug offences; 20)

destruction and/or theft of national treasures; 21) unlawful acts against certain

60

Bassiouni,p.33,1999.61Thesetenpenalcharacteristicsare:1)anexplicitrecognitionofproscribedconductasconstitutinganinternationalcrime,oracrimeunderinternationallaw,orasacrime;2)implicitrecognitionofthepenalnature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute, punish, or the like; 3)criminalisation of theproscribedconduct; 4)duty orright to prosecute;5) dutyor right topunishtheproscribedconduct;6)dutyorright toextradite;7)dutyorright tocooperateinprosecution,punishment(includingjudicialassistanceinpenalproceedings);8)establishmentofacriminaljurisdictionalbasis(ortheoryofcriminaljurisdictionorpriorityincriminaljurisdiction);9)referencetotheestablishmentofaninternationalcriminalcourtoraninternationaltribunalwithpenalcharacteristics;and,10)eliminationofthedefenceofsuperiororders.(SeeBassiouni,p.47,1999).


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internationallyprotectedelementsoftheenvironment;22)internationaltrafficinobscene

materials; 23) falsification and counterfeiting;24) unlawful interference with submarine

cables;and,25)briberyofforeignpublicofficials.62

4.2.Accountabilityandinternationalcrimes

Theconflictsfoughtduringtherecentdecadegaverisetoanincreasingattentiontothe

issueofaccountabilityforinternationalcrimessuchasgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity

andserioushumanrightsviolations.Thesecrimesaregenerallycharacterisedbytheirmass

scale and by their impact on whole societies, and hence the purposes for seeking

accountability for these crimes are somewhat different from the purposes for bringing

ordinarycriminalstoaccount.63

Accountability forabove-mentionedatrocities is thusaccording to Ratner andAbrams,

firstofallimportantfor thevictimsoftheatrocitiesandtheir relativesandfriends,asit

gives them a sense of justice and closure. Secondly, accountability is also especially

importantintransitionalregimes,forrepairingthedamagedonetosocietytraumatisedby

massivehumanrightsviolationsandforstartinganationalreconciliationprocess.Thirdly,

accountabilityshouldalsohaveadeterringeffect,bydeterringthespecificaccusedfrom

committing similar crimes in the future and deterring others from committing similar

crimes, and more generally by promoting justice and the rule of law. Fourthly,

accountabilityalsoseekstorehabilitatetheoffender,althoughthisaspectisinvokedless

prominently when it comes to genocide, crimes against humanity and massive human

rightsabuses.Fifthly,beyondtheconsequentialistargumentspresentedabove,Ratnerand

Abrams assert that a retributive theory of justice would regard accountability as a just

punishmentforthosewhodowrong,anfurtherthataccountabilitymayalsoserveasarighteousexpressionofmoralcondemnationofheinousoffences. 64

62Ibidem.,p.32,1999.63Morris,p.1,1996.64Ratner&Abrams,p.135,1997.Withregardtothepurposesbehindaccountabilityforinternationalcrimes it is also of relevance to take a look at principal objectives for establishing The International


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Theprimary legal response to warcrimes,genocide,crimesagainsthumanityand gross

violations of human rights is thus to hold the individuals responsible for those acts

accountable. Individual criminal responsibility for the above mentioned acts is today

undisputed, but to make accountability meaningful requires the creation of specific

mechanism.Nationaljudicialsystemsand international tribunals,suchasadhoctribunals

and theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)aremostimportantin this respect.65Despite

thehighlevelofvictimisationtherehavenotbeenmanyprosecutions.Notwithstandingthe

establishmentoftheICC,therehavebeentwointernationallyestablishedadhoccriminal

tribunalsfortheformerYugoslaviaandRwandarespectively,whichhavejurisdictionover

war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.66 Moreover, a hybrid international-

domestictribunal,withjurisdictionovercrimesagainsthumanityhasbeenestablishedin

Sierra Leone,67 and mixed international-national panels with exclusive jurisdiction over

genocide andcrimes againsthumanity were created by the United Nations Transitional

AdministrationinEast-Timor.68Inaddition,legislation,whichallowsfortheestablishment

ofaninternationalisedpanel,fortryingtheleadersoftheKhmerRougeforgenocidehas

alsobeenapprovedinCambodia. 69

TribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in theTerritory of theFormer Yugoslavia since1991 (hereinafter ICTY). In thefirstannual report submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-Generalidentifiesthebringingofthepersonsresponsibleofthecrimestojustice,todeterfurthercrimesandtocontributetotherestorationofthepeaceandsecurityastheprincipalobjectivesofthetribunal.InthisrespecttheSecretary-Generalemphasisestheroleofthetribunalasatoolforpromotingreconciliationand restoring true peace, asresponsibilityforthe atrocities areattributed to individuals rather than to

wholeethnicandreligiousgroups.SeeUNDoc.A/49/342andS/1994/100729August1994ReportoftheInternationalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsof InternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryoftheFormerYugoslaviasince1991,atpp.11-13.65Ratner&Abrams,p.133,1997.66TheICTYwasestablishedbyUNDoc.S/Res.827/1993May25,andtheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR)byUNDoc.S/Res.955of8November1994.67UNDoc.S/Res.13512000August14.68UNTAETRegulationNo.2000/15ontheEstablishmentofPanelswithexclusivejurisdictionoverseriouscriminaloffences6June2000.69Linton,p.146,2001.


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4.3.IndividualinternationalcriminalresponsibilityofNon-StateActors

Itisasnotedabovebeyonddoubt,thatinternationallawrecognisesthatindividualscanbe

held criminally responsible under international law. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials

pavedthewayfortheindividualcriminalresponsibilityunderinternationallaw,asarticle6

oftheNurembergCharterestablishedindividualcriminalresponsibilityforcrimesagainst

the peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes.70 Further, the principle of direct

individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law was confirmed by the

United Nations General Assembly on December 11, 1946 in the so-called Nuremberg

principles.71 The position of international law on the individual responsibility for

internationalcrimesaftertheNurembergtrialscanbesummarisedinthefollowingcitation

fromtheNurembergJudgement:

Crimesagainstinternationallawarecommittedbymen,notabstractentitiesandonly

bypunishingindividualswhocommitsuchcrimescantheprovisionsof internationallaw

beenforced.72

Moreover,theestablishmentoftheInternationalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersons

ResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedinthe

Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) and the International Criminal

TribunalforRwanda(ICTR)reinforcedtheprincipleofindividualcriminalresponsibility

forthecommissionofinternationalcrimes.73In1996theUNGeneralAssemblyadopted

theILCDraftCodeofCrimesagainstthePeaceandSecurityofMankind,whicharticle2

prescribes:

70IMTCharter,art.6.71UNDoc.G.A.Res.95(1)A/236(1946)AffirmationofthePrinciplesofInternationalLawRecognizedbytheCharteroftheNurembergTribunal.72 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Judgement, Nuremberg,14.11.19451.10.1946,OfficialDocuments,1947,Vol.I,s.223.73StatuteoftheICTY,art.7and23,thestatuteoftheICTRart.6and22.


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Article2

Individualresponsibility

1.Acrimeagainstthepeaceandsecurityofmankindentailsindividualresponsibility.

2.Anindividualshallberesponsibleforthecrimeofaggressioninaccordancewith

article16.

3.Anindividualshallberesponsibleforacrimesetoutinarticle17,18,19or20if

thatindividual:

(a)Intentionallycommitssuchacrime;

(b)Ordersthecommissionofsuchacrime,whichinfactoccursorisattempted;

(c)Failstopreventorrepressthecommissionofsuchacrimeinthecircumstancesset

outinarticle6;

(d) Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the

commissionofsuchacrime,includingprovidingthemeansforits

commission;

(e)Directlyparticipatesinplanningorconspiringtocommitsuchacrimewhichin

factoccurs;

(f)Directlyandpubliclyincitesanother individualtocommitsucha crimewhich in

factoccurs;

(g)Attemptstocommitsuchacrimebytakingactioncommencingtheexecutionofa

crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances independent of his

intentions.74

The most important codification is however the Rome Statute, or the Statute of the

International Criminal Court, which article 25 confirms the individual criminal

responsibilityfortheinternationalcrimesoverwhichtheICCwillhavejurisdiction.Thus,article25readsasfollows:

74 International Law Commission Draft Codeof Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,1996,art.2.Takenfrom:http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm.


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Article25

Individualcriminalresponsibility

1.TheCourtshallhavejurisdictionovernaturalpersonspursuanttothisStatute.

2.ApersonwhocommitsacrimewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourtshallbeindividually

responsibleandliableforpunishmentinaccordancewiththisStatute.

3.InaccordancewiththisStatute,apersonshallbecriminallyresponsibleandliablefor

punishmentforacrimewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourtifthatperson:

(a)Commitssuchacrime,whetherasanindividual, jointlywithanotherorthrough

anotherperson,regardlessofwhetherthatotherpersoniscriminallyresponsible;

(b)Orders,solicitsorinducesthecommissionofsuchacrimewhichinfactoccursor

isattempted;

(c)For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or

otherwiseassistsinitscommissionoritsattemptedcommission,includingprovidingthe

meansforitscommission;

(d)Inanyotherwaycontributestothecommissionorattemptedcommissionofsucha

crimebyagroupofpersonsactingwitha commonpurpose.Suchcontributionshallbe

intentionalandshalleither:

(i)Bemadewiththeaimoffurtheringthecriminalactivityorcriminalpurposeof

thegroup,wheresuchactivityorpurposeinvolvesthecommissionofacrimewithinthe

jurisdictionoftheCourt;or

(ii)Bemadeintheknowledgeoftheintentionofthegrouptocommitthecrime;


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(e)Inrespectofthecrimeofgenocide,directlyandpubliclyincitesotherstocommit

genocide;

(f)Attemptstocommitsuchacrimebytakingactionthatcommencesitsexecutionby

means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances

independent of theperson's intentions.However, aperson whoabandons theeffort to

committhecrimeorotherwisepreventsthecompletionofthecrimeshallnotbeliablefor

punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person

completelyandvoluntarilygaveupthecriminalpurpose.

4.Noprovisionin thisStatuterelatingto individualcriminalresponsibilityshallaffect

theresponsibilityofStatesunderinternationallaw.75

Thesedevelopmentsandprecedentsthusestablishboththeprincipleofindividualcriminal

responsibilityunderinternationalcriminallaw,andtheabilityofinternationalcriminallaw

to penetrate the shield of state sovereignty and enforce this principle directly, without

goingthroughthemediationofstates.76

Whereasinternationalcrimes,suchashijacking,piracyorterroristattacks,arecommitted

by individuals without any complicity of states the situation is a bit more complicated

whenitcomesto genocideandcrimesagainsthumanity.Dugardholdsthatthesecrimes

areprincipallycrimesofstates,astheindividualperpetratorisusuallyactingasagentsof

the state pursuing a policy of a state.77 What distinguishes these crimes from other

internationalcrimesisthattheyaretheproductofastateactionorpolicy,andrequire

some form organisational structure of the perpetrator. Up to the Second World Warvictimisation of civilians and mass scale human rights violations of human rights was

75 UN. Doc. A/CONF.183/9. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Adopted by theUnited Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourton17July1998,art.25.76Bassiouni,pp.18and23,1999.


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perpetrated by the states public apparatus, such as the armed forces, the police,

paramilitary units and the civilianbureaucracy, as products of a state action or policy.

SinceWWIIsuchatrocitieshaveasmentionedabove,oftenbeencommittedbynon-state

actorsduringinternalconflicts.Thesenon-stateactorshavefrequentlyexercisedthesame

typeofdominionoverpeopleandterritoryasstates,andalsopossessedanorganisational

powerstructurecomparableto theonesofstates.Thus,Bassiouniassertsthatsuchnon-

stateactorsaretoberegardedasfunctionalequivalentsofstates.78TheFinalReportof

theCommissionofExperts forexamining theviolationsofhumanitarian law during the

conflict in the former Yugoslavia states that non-state actors committed most of the

crimesfallingwithinthedefinitionofcrimesagainsthumanity.79

TheNurembergCharterdidnot applycriminal responsibilitytonon-stateactors,butthe

newrealitiesofviolentconflictshavebroughtaboutanextensionofapplicationofnorms

of international criminal law to non-state actors.80 First of all, article 4 of the 1948

GenocideConvention,thefirstmodernhumanrightstreaty,extendstheapplicationofthe

Convention to non-stateactors.81Secondly,thecommonarticle3ofthe1949Geneva

Conventions,applytoallpartiesofaconflict,andsimilarlyAdditionalProtocolIIofthe

Geneva Conventions apply in conflicts between the governmental authorities and

organisedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroups.82Furthermore,theStatutesoftheICTY

77Dugard,p.239,1999.78Bassiouni,p.25-26,1999.79 UN Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) Final Report of the Commissions of Experts Established pursuant toSecurity CouncilResolution780 (1992) andUN Doc.S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994) Annex I to theFinalReport.80Bassiouni,p.26,1999.81Inthisrespect,articleIVreads:PersonscommittinggenocideoranyoftheotheractsenumeratedinarticleIIIshallbepunished,whethertheyareconstitutionallyresponsiblerulers,publicofficialsorprivate

individuals(emphasisadded).82ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII),1125U.N.T.S.609,enteredintoforceDec.7,1978.Article1readsasfollows:ArmedConflicts (ProtocolI)andwhichtakeplaceinthe territoryofaHighContractingPartybetweenitsarmedforcesanddissidentarmedforcesorotherorganizedarmed

groupswhich,underresponsiblecommand,exercisesuchcontroloverapartofitsterritoryastoenable

themtocarryoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperationsandtoimplementthisProtocol.Whereasthe grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions do give rise to individual criminalresponsibility and universal jurisdiction, but they are not so relevant for the discussion aroundaccountabilityofnon-stateactors,astheGenevaConventionsapplyonlyininternationalarmedconflicts.


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andtheICTRhaveextendedthedefinitionsofcrimesagainsthumanitytoapplyalsoto

non-stateactors.OfspecialrelevancewasalsothattheICTRStatuterecognisedcommon

article3andAdditionalProtocolIIasbasesforindividualcriminalresponsibility. 83The

mostimportantdevelopmentishowevertheadoptionoftheICCStatute,whichnotonly

reinforcedtheaccountability ofnon-stateactors forgenocide, crimes againsthumanity,

butalsoextendtheaccountabilityfornon-stateactorsbeyondAdditionalProtocolII,asit

doesnotrequirethatitisshownthatorganisedgroupsareunderresponsiblecommand,

norrequiresthatsuchgroupsexercisesanycontroloverapartoftheterritory.84

As a conclusion one could assert, that on the one hand international treaties between

statesconcerninginternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw,create

obligationsfornon-stateactorswiththehelpofdomesticlaw.Ontheotherhand,andin

this context even more importantly, international criminal law through the latest

developmentsdoescreatedirectobligationsonpartofthenon-stateactors.

4.4.Non-StateactorsandGenocide

TheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocidewasadopted

in1948.ArticleIIoftheConventiondefinesthecrimeofgenocideas:killingmembersof

thegroup;causingseriousbodilyormentalharmtomembersofthegroup;deliberately

inflictingonthegroupconditionsoflifecalculatedtobringaboutitsphysicaldestruction

in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

forciblytransferringchildrenofthegroupto anothergroup,if theyarecommittedwith

theintenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup,

83SeetheICTYStatutearticle4,theStatuteoftheICTRarticle3andarticle7oftheICCStatute.Seealso Meron: International criminalization of internal atrocities in The American Journal ofInternationalLawVol.89(1995)pp.554-577.84TheICC-Statutearticles6,7and8.


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assuch.85Sincethat,theprovisionsoftheConventionhavealsobeenincorporatedas

suchintheStatutesoftheICTY,theICTRandtheICC.86

Thecrimeofgenocideisaveryspecificcrime.Thevictimofthecrimeofgenocideisthe

groupitselfandnotanindividual.Thus,theprohibitionongenocideprotectstherightto

physicalexistenceofminoritygroups,asthegroupscoveredbythedefinitioncorrespond

to the groups mentioned in the ICCPR, with the exception, that the definition avoids

referenceto linguisticminorities.Eveniflinguisticminoritiesarenotmentionedinarticle

II,suchgroupscanneverthelessbearguedtofallunderthedefinitionofethnicgroups.87

Foranacttobeconsideredasgenocide,itisnecessarythatoneoftheactslistedabove

hasbeencommitted,thattheacthasbeencommittedagainstoneoftheprotectedgroups,

andthatthecrimehasbeencommittedwiththespecialintenttodestroyinwholeorin

part,thegroupassuch.Thisthirdelement,theso-calledgenocidalintent,togetherwith

thespecialidentityofthevictimsrequirementiswhatdistinguishesgenocidefromother

crimes.88

Ontheissueofcriminalresponsibility,theGenocideConventionandtheStatutesofthead

hoctribunalsandtheICCStatutestipulate,inthat,Personscommittinggenocideorany

of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are

constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.89 As the

content and scopeofthis article has also been reinstated in the statutes of the ad hoc

85 Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide approvedand openedforsignatureandratificationoraccessionon9December1948.HereinaftercalledtheGenocideConvention,art.II.86

ICTYStatute,art.4,ICTRStatuteart.2,andart.6oftheICCStatute.87Schabas,2000,p.124,146.SeealsoUNDoc.A./C.6/SR.75(Petren,Sweden).WhilediscussingthetermethnicalintheSixthCommittee,Swedennotedthatthelanguagemightbea constituentfactorofminoritygroup,and furthermorethatthereforelinguisticgroups,ifnotconnectedwithanexistingstate,shouldbeprotectedasanethnicalratherthanasanationalgroup,withinthemeaningoftheConvention.This interpretationhas alsobeen upheldby theICTR in theProsecutor v. KayishemaandRuzinadanacase.HeretheTribunalheldthatanethnicgroupisagroupwhosemembersshareacommonlanguage.88TheProsecutorversusJean-PaulAkayesuCaseNo.ICTR-96-4-T,2September1998.,atpara.499.89ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,78U.N.T.S.277,enteredintoforceJan.12,1951.


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tribunalsandtheStatuteoftheICC,thecriminal responsibilityof individuals, actingas

heads of states, government officials or as private individuals for genocide is thus

undisputed.TheGenocideConventionwasthusthefirstinternationalinstrumentadopted

aftertheSecondWorldWar,whichapplieditsprovisionsalsotonon-stateactors.Thereis

nodoubt,whetherornotnon-stateactorscouldbeheldaccountableforgenocide,inthe

ICCforinstance,butitmightbedifficultforanon-stateactortoperformthecrimes,ina

waywhichwouldshowgenocidal intent.Inthisrespect,MorrisandScharfassertthatit

wouldbe:virtuallyimpossibleforthecrimeofgenocidetobecommittedwithoutsome

or indirect involvement on part of the State given the magnitude of this crime.

Nevertheless,onecouldarguethatsomeaspectoftheexistingcaselawfromtheadhoc

tribunals would suggest that non-state actors such as an armed group could commit

genocide.IntheJelisic-case,theTrialChamberheldthat:Themurderscommittedbythe

accusedaresufficienttoestablishthematerialelementofthecrimeofgenocideanditis

aprioripossibletoconceivethattheaccusedharbouredtheplantoexterminateanentire

group without this intent having been supported by any organisation in which other

individualsparticipated.Inthisrespect,thepreparatoryworkoftheConventionof1948

brings out that premeditation was not selected as a legal ingredient of the crime of

genocide,afterhavingbeenmentionedbytheadhoccommitteeatthedraftstage,onthe

grounds that itseemed superfluousgiven thespecial intentionalready requiredby the

textandthatsuchprecisionwouldonlymaketheburdenofproofevengreater.Itensues

fromthisomissionthatthedraftersof theConventiondidnotdeemthe existenceofan

organisationorasystemservingagenocidalobjectiveasalegalingredientofthecrime.

Insodoing,theydidnotdiscountthepossibilityofaloneindividualseekingtodestroya

groupassuch.Andfurtherthat:itwillbeverydifficultinpracticetoprovideproofof

thegenocidalintentofanindividualifthecrimescommittedarenotwidespreadandif

thecrimechargedisnotbackedbyanorganisationorasystem.90Inthelightofthesestatementsitseemspossibletoargue,thatanarmedgroup,withoutanyconnectiontothe

State,seekingtodestroyinwholeorinpartagroupassuch,couldcommitgenocide.

Anotherimportant factor,whichspeaksforthepossibilityofsuccessfullychargingnon-

90TheProsecutorVersusGoranJelisic,JudgementCaseIT-95-1014December1999,para.100-101.


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state armedgroups with genocide is that it is not required that the crimes have to be

committedoveravastgeographicalareaortoeliminateanimportantorsubstantialpartof

the population. In theJelisic-case the Trial Chamber held that: international custom

admitsthecharacterisationofgenocideevenwhentheexterminatoryintentonlyextends

toalimitedgeographiczone.91Whatiscentralistheknowledgeortheintenttoseekthe

totaloratleastpartialdestructionofacertaindefinedgroup.92

Evenifthereisnocase-lawyetagainsta non-stateactorconcerninggenocide,one is, in

thelightofthewordingoftheConventionand Jelisicjudgement, bound to hold that it

would be possible to hold non-state actors, such as armed groups accountable for

genocide.Itwouldhoweverbedifficultholdanon-stateactor,whichdoesnotpossess

similarlegalcharacteristicsasaState,responsible.

4.5.Crimesagainsthumanityandnon-stateactors

4.5.1.Thecharacteristicsofcrimesagainsthumanity

The Nuremberg Charter was the first international instrument to define crimes against

humanity.Inarticle6coftheChartercrimesagainsthumanityweredefinedas,murder,

extermination,enslavement,deportation,andotherinhumanactscommittedagainstany

civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or

religious grounds in the execution of or in connection with any crime within the

jurisdictionoftheTribunal,whetherornotinviolationofthedomesticlawofthecountry

whereperpetrated93CrimesagainsthumanityhavealsobeenincludedintheStatutesof

theICTYandtheICTR,andthesecodificationstogetherwiththecase-lawtheyresulted

inhavedevelopedtheconcept.Themostimportantdevelopmentwasthattherequirementofanexustoaninternationalarmedconflictoranyconflictwasdroppedalreadyinthe

91Ibid.,para.83.92TheProsecutorVersusGoranJelisicJudgementCaseIT-95-1014December1999,para.80-82.93NurembergTrialProceedingsVol.1CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,art.6(c).


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Statute of the ICTR and in the Tadic-case, with respect to the ICTY.94 The most

importantandauthoritativecodificationofcrimesagainsthumanityishowever,theoneof

theICCStatute.Inthisinstrumentcrimesagainsthumanityaredefinedas:

1.ForthepurposeofthisStatute,"crimeagainsthumanity"meansanyofthefollowing

actswhencommittedaspartofawidespreador systematicattackdirectedagainst any

civilianpopulation,withknowledgeoftheattack:

(a)Murder;

(b)Extermination;

(c)Enslavement;

(d)Deportationorforcibletransferofpopulation;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of

fundamentalrulesofinternationallaw;

(f)Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced

sterilization,oranyotherformofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravity;

(h)Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,

national,ethnic,cultural,religious,genderasdefinedinparagraph3,orothergrounds

thatareuniversallyrecognizedasimpermissibleunderinternationallaw,inconnection

with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crimewithin the jurisdiction of the

Court;

(i)Enforceddisappearanceofpersons;

(j)Thecrimeofapartheid;

(k)Otherinhumaneactsofasimilarcharacterintentionallycausinggreatsuffering,

orseriousinjurytobodyortomentalorphysicalhealth.

2.Forthepurposeofparagraph1:

94ProsecutorversusDuskoTadic,CaseNo.IT-94-1,ICTYAppealsChamber,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdictionof2October1995,para.141.


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(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct

involvingthemultiplecommissionofactsreferredtoinparagraph1againstanycivilian

population,pursuanttoorinfurtheranceofaStateororganizationalpolicytocommit

suchattack;

(b)"Extermination"includestheintentionalinflictionofconditionsof life,interalia

thedeprivationofaccesstofoodandmedicine,calculatedtobringaboutthedestruction

ofpartofapopulation;

(c)"Enslavement"meanstheexerciseofanyorallofthepowersattachingtotheright

of ownership over a personand includes the exercise of such power in the course of

traffickinginpersons,inparticularwomenandchildren;

(d)"Deportationorforcibletransferofpopulation"meansforceddisplacementofthe

personsconcernedbyexpulsionorothercoerciveactsfromtheareainwhichtheyare

lawfullypresent,withoutgroundspermittedunderinternationallaw;

(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether

physical ormental,uponaperson in thecustodyorunderthecontrolof theaccused;

exceptthattortureshallnotincludepainorsufferingarisingonlyfrom,inherentinor

incidentalto,lawfulsanctions;

(f)"Forcedpregnancy"meanstheunlawfulconfinementof awoman forciblymade

pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or

carryingoutothergraveviolationsofinternationallaw.Thisdefinitionshallnotinany

waybeinterpretedasaffectingnationallawsrelatingtopregnancy;

(g)"Persecution"meanstheintentionalandseveredeprivationoffundamentalrights

contrarytointernationallawbyreasonoftheidentityofthegrouporcollectivity;

(h)"Thecrime ofapartheid"means inhumaneacts of a character similar to those

referred toinparagraph 1,committed inthe context of an institutionalised regimeof

systematicoppressionanddominationbyoneracialgroupoveranyotherracialgroup

orgroupsandcommittedwiththeintentionofmaintainingthatregime;

(i)"Enforceddisappearanceofpersons"meansthearrest,detentionorabductionof

personsby,orwiththeauthorization,supportoracquiescenceof,aStateor apolitical

organization,followedbyarefusaltoacknowledgethatdeprivationoffreedomortogive


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informationonthefateorwhereaboutsofthosepersons,withtheintentionofremoving

themfromtheprotectionofthelawforaprolongedperiodoftime.

3.ForthepurposeofthisStatute,itisunderstoodthattheterm"gender"referstothetwo

sexes,maleandfemale,withinthecontextofsociety.Theterm"gender"doesnotindicate

anymeaningdifferentfromtheabove.95

TheICCdefinitionisnotanewinventionbutratherareflectionofthedevelopmentof

international law since Nuremberg. Thus, the contemporary notion of crimes against

humanityasithasdevelopedthroughtheStatutesofthe adhoctribunals,thecaselawof

thosetribunalsandtheRomeStatuteanditsdraftel