ACHIEVING CROSS-DOMAIN FIRES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMY JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLERS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

General Studies

by

JAMES H. MASON, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY B.S., Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville, Edwardsville, Illinois, 2007

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2018

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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT For the past 16 years the U.S. military has been engaged in constant combat in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operating environment. This thesis analyzes how the Army conventional fire support community can use tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used by the special operations fire support community specifically with the use of Army Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) to prepare for a peer threat in a Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) environment. The research is isolated to only air-to-ground operations as the conventional Army continues to struggle with success in these domains. The primary research question of this thesis is: Can the lessons learned from special operations cross-domain fire support over the last 15 years contribute to the implementation of conventional force Army JTACs? An applied professional case study is used to frame the research findings and to recommend a change for the Army. The research suggests that the conventional Army can implement organic JTACs, much like special operations, with minimal changes to the doctrine, organization, leadership, and education domains of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) model. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Terminal Attack Controller, Air Ground Integration, Air Support Operations Center, Joint Fires Observer, Joint Air-to-Ground Integration Center 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ James H. Mason Thesis Title: Achieving Cross Domain Fires: The Implementation of Army Joint

Terminal Attack Controllers

Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Kenneth E. Long, D.M. , Member LTC Michael D. Vick, M.A. , Member Ryan B. Rydalch, M.S. Accepted this 15th day of June 2018 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT

ACHIEVING CROSS DOMAIN FIRES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMY JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLERS,112 pages. For the past 16 years the U.S. military has been engaged in constant combat in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operating environment. This thesis analyzes how the Army conventional fire support community can use tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used by the special operations fire support community specifically with the use of Army Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) to prepare for a peer threat in a Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) environment. The research is isolated to only air-to-ground operations as the conventional Army continues to struggle with success in these domains. The primary research question of this thesis is: Can the lessons learned from special operations cross-domain fire support over the last 15 years contribute to the implementation of conventional force Army JTACs? An applied professional case study is used to frame the research findings and to recommend a change for the Army. The research suggests that the conventional Army can implement organic JTACs, much like special operations, with minimal changes to the doctrine, organization, leadership, and education domains of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) model. .

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to take the time to first thank my family for their unwavering support

during this journey. This endeavor consumed much of my free time and I thank you for

your constant support and love. This would not have been possible without you.

I would also like to acknowledge the support I received from my thesis

committee. Your invaluable feedback and timely responses provided me with

professional insight, direction on my topic, and writing skills that I will be able to use in

my future career. Thank you for your help and pushing me to finish this adventure.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................ xi

TABLES ........................................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Background ..................................................................................................................... 1 Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 2 Scope and Delimitations ................................................................................................. 3 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 5 Significance of the Study ................................................................................................ 6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................8

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8 The DOTMLPF-P Model ................................................................................................ 9 Capabilities-Based Assessment .................................................................................... 11 The Kotter Change Model ............................................................................................ 13 Sources .......................................................................................................................... 14 Doctrine and Organization ............................................................................................ 14 Leadership and Education ............................................................................................. 33 Previous MMAS Theses ............................................................................................... 40 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 42

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................44

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 44 Case Study .................................................................................................................... 46 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 50

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .................................................................................................51

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Introduction ................................................................................................................... 51 History .......................................................................................................................... 54 Doctrine ........................................................................................................................ 59 Organization .................................................................................................................. 65 Leadership and Education ............................................................................................. 71 Stakeholder Analysis .................................................................................................... 76 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 83

CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................85

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 85 Kotter Change Model (Proposed Glide-path) ............................................................... 85 Short-Term (1-2 years) ................................................................................................. 87 Long-Term (3-5 years) .................................................................................................. 88 Future Research Ideas ................................................................................................... 89 Personal Lessons Learned ............................................................................................. 91

GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................95

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................98

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ACRONYMS

AAGS Army Air Ground System

ACO Airspace Control Order

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

ALO Air Liaison Officer

ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center

ASOS Air Support Operation Squadron

ASP Air Support Party

ATO Air Tasking Order

BAE Brigade Aviation Element

BCT Brigade Combat Team

CAC Combined Arms Center

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAS Close Air Support

CF Conventional Force

CDID Capability Development and Integration Directorate

COIN Counter-Insurgency

DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, Policy

FA Field Artillery

FAC Forward Air Controller

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FM Field Manual

FSNCO Fire Support Non-Commissioned Officer

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FO Forward Observer

FSO Fire Support Officer

JAGIC Joint Air-Ground Integration Center

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

JFC Joint Forces Commander

JFO Joint Fires Observer

JP Joint Publication

JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller

LSCO Large-Scale Combat Operations

MARSOC Marine Special Operations Command

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MTOE Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment

MTTP Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

PGM Precision-Guided Munition

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution

ROE Rules of Engagement

ROMO Range of Military Operations

RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft

RW Rotary Wing

SEAL Sea, Air, Land

SOCOM Special Operations Command

SOF Special Operations Force

SOTACC Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course

STS Special Tactics Squadron

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

x

TAC Terminal Attack Control

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UAS Unmanned Aerial System

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ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. Organizational Design & Development in the Force Development Process ........9

Figure 2. Capabilities-Based Assessment ..........................................................................11

Figure 3. Infantry Brigade Combat Team Task Organization ...........................................28

Figure 4. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Task Organization.............................................29

Figure 5. Armored Brigade Combat Team Task Organization ..........................................30

Figure 6. The Conflict Continuum and the Range of Military Operations ........................31

Figure 7. JAGIC Controlled Airspace ................................................................................35

Figure 8. JAGIC Inputs ......................................................................................................36

Figure 9. Capability Development Key Players .................................................................45

Figure 10. Applied Professional Case Study Research Outline ........................................46

Figure 11. Cross Domain Synergy ....................................................................................51

Figure 12. Task-Org of FCoE DOTD ...............................................................................77

Figure 13. FCoE CDID Organization................................................................................79

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TABLES

Page Table 1. Kotter Change Model..........................................................................................13

Table 2. CAS Execution Template ...................................................................................60

Table 3. Routing and Safety of Flight Considerations ......................................................60

Table 4. Situation Update Example 1 ...............................................................................62

Table 5. Game Plan and 9-Line CAS Brief ......................................................................63

Table 6. Fire Support Personnel........................................................................................66

Table 7. U.S. Air Force JTAC Allocations .......................................................................69

Table 8. U.S. Air Force JTAC Allocation per U.S. Army Unit ........................................70

Table 9. U.S. Army SOF Fire Support Task-Org of Enlisted JTACs ...............................73

Table 10.Recommendation Priorities.................................................................................87

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

For the past 16 years the U.S. Military has been engaged in sustained combat, and

the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has caused a skill set

deficiency for the Conventional Force (CF) fire support community. One would believe

that the CF fire support community would be very proficient in their skills because of the

steady exposure to combat; however, that is not the case due to a highly restrictive Rules

of Engagement (ROE) protocol for operating in urban environments and the inability to

effectively employ cross-domain fires, specifically air-to- ground. Furthermore, the CF

fire support community found itself engaged in non-standard artillery missions that

included civil affairs, information operations, pay agents, and other tasks that did not

include placing lethal effects onto the enemy which in turn contributed to the degradation

of fire support skills.

Meanwhile, the Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) fire support community

improved its fire support skills and has executed air-to-ground fires effectively, due to a

modified task organized fire support element and staying with their traditional fire

support tasks. The Army SOF community has already implemented the use of Army

JTACs in their formations. The primary research question of this thesis is: Can the

lessons learned from SOF cross-domain fire support over the last 15 years contribute to

the implementation of a conventional force Army JTAC program?

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Assumptions

Throughout this thesis the researcher will use personal experiences and

experiences of other experts from his career spent with the 101st Airborne Division (Air

Assault), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and a Special Operations unit. The first

assumption may be derived from a poorly performing unit or units the researcher served

in while assigned to the CF; therefore, may have bias that all SOF units operate with a

high level of fire support skill set. This is relevant because there may be CF units that

perform air-to-ground fires effectively unknown to my knowledge and scope of the

research conducted. Additionally, the researcher believes it is reasonable that SOF units

operate with a high level of fire support skills due to high selection and training standards

but that does not necessarily mean that a CF fire support element could not execute a

similar task.

The second assumption is that the CF fire support community has not already

tried to implement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used in the SOF fire

support community. This is significant because researcher’s argument implies that it has

never been attempted before. Furthermore, this is a reasonable assumption based on

personal experiences and experiences of other fire support professionals the researcher

has interacted with throughout his career. Additionally, if the conventional force were

already using SOF fire support TTPs, you would find them in recent publications such as

Field Manual (FM) 3-0.

The third assumption is that the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma will be able to facilitate and operate a newly formed conventional force Army

JTAC school if the argument of this thesis is approved. Additionally, the funding to build

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an additional school at Fort Sill may not be readily available with budget constraints of

recent years and they may not have the physical space available on their main post.

The final assumption is that the Army will not immediately reorganize the

conventional fires force to mirror the SOF fires community in the next five years to every

division. This assumption is reasonable because the mechanized fire support community

will need specific vehicles with communications packages to support their training at

JTAC school, and researcher’s experience has shown that current JTAC curriculums do

not account for the myriad of vehicle types needed for training. The reorganization of the

conventional force, as a whole, is important to achieving cross domain fires for the Army

as opposed to only light infantry brigades containing a unique capability.

Scope and Delimitations

For this study, the researcher has chosen to only analyze the tactical level and not

the operational and strategic levels of fire support. The reasons for this include the

similarities of fire support execution at division and higher and the higher echelons do not

require the proposed change. However, the only change would be at the operational level

where a JTAC qualified officer and non-commissioned officer would have to manage the

JTACs at the tactical level. This officer and non-commissioned officer will eventually

transition from the tactical level as they progress with their careers. Additionally, this

thesis will primarily focus on air-to-surface fires because that is the primary purpose for

JTACs. Moreover, the researcher chosen to only research the Army fire support

community albeit both the CF and SOF. The researcher did not choose to implement the

proposed changes to the Marine Corps as they already operate with their own organic

JTACs. The research of the Marine Corps will only highlight and support the claims for

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change in the Army. The research will not use any after-action reviews from the special

operations community due to classifications. The researcher will only use unclassified

material found in SOF and joint doctrine but does acknowledge that most Standing

Operating Procedures (SOPs) that exist in SOF are classified as FOUO and SECRET.

The only after-action reviews used for the research will be that of the CF and will

highlight the gaps in fire support and argue how the implementation of an Army JTAC

program will close said gaps.

As far as organization of the research, the researcher will be using the R1/R2/R3

method outlined by Dr. Kenneth Long. The R1 will be chapters 1 through 3 and will

cover the introduction with my initial personal recommendation prior to conducting

research, literature review, and methodology. The R2 is chapter 4 and will be the research

findings and analysis of the DOL domains of the DOTMLPF-P model. Additionally, my

updated individual recommendation and stakeholder analysis will be covered. The R3

will be the end of chapter 4 and will transition into chapter 5. It will cover the

recommendation that has been improved by stakeholder insights and finally overview the

final recommendations, time frame, priorities, phases, ideas for future researchers, and

personal lessons learned from the research.

The study will assess the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of implementing

SOF lessons learned, specifically in the addition of Army JTACs to the conventional fires

formation. The researcher will also use examples of how joint forces use JTACs and will

use the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education,

Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) as an analytical model with a narrowed

focus covering only the Doctrine, Organization, Leadership and education (DOL)

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domains. The researcher uses the DOTMLPF-P model to explain to the chosen audience

how to implement this plan. The researcher has only identified the DOL domains of the

DOTMLPF-P because the domains of training, materiel, personnel, and facilities can be

resourced at lower levels of the Army. The audience for this study include: The Fires

Center of Excellence (FCoE), ), the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the

Army G3, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The chief decision

maker is the Chief of Staff of the Army. This thesis will only focus on the lethal aspects

of cross-domain fires that operate at the tactical level. The reason for this is due to limited

differences, if any, at the operational and strategic levels of SOF and conventional fires. I

will use the principles of the Kotter change model to identify tasks that should be

accomplished in the short term (1-2 years) and the long term (3-5 years).

Limitations

The research has several limitations. The first being the researcher’s limited

experience in conducting original research and conducting an applied professional case

study. Secondly, there may be a possible bias due to prior experience serving in both

conventional and special operations fires elements. Third, there is limited data to draw

conclusions from particularly to the benefits of adding Army JTACs to the conventional

force. This is due to only SOF using Army JTACs in their formations and no CF fire

support element has attempted to integrate Army JTACs. Lastly, the reports and lessons

learned obtained to build the case study analysis will not include SECRET or For Official

Use Only (FOUO) information. The inability to leverage classified TTPs that SOF fires

implement will not help the argument of adding an Army JTAC program to the

conventional force. The reason for only researching UNCLASSIFIED material is because

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it will be available to the widest range of readers. Lastly, the stakeholders in the

conventional fire support community have limited, if any, experiences in special

operations and may possibly have a negative bias towards implementing an Army JTAC

program.

Significance of the Study

The conventional fires community is not effectively employing cross domain fires

and is one of the Army’s current warfighting challenges. Many in the fire support

community will argue that the CF is properly employing cross domain fires but cannot

speak for the entire force as a whole or those individuals have never seen fire support

executed at its most effective state in special operations. Conventional fires must improve

its Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) by incorporating TTPs and duty positions

that are used in SOF units in order to better prepare for peer adversaries. It is imperative

that the Army conventional fires start a JTAC program now as it will take time to build

the entire force with fully trained Army JTACs. The Marine Corps and Army special

operations forces already have JTACs included in their modification table of organization

equipment (MTOE) and the Army conventional force should do the same.

Conclusion

In order to better prepare for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in a joint

environment and transition out of COIN operations, the Army conventional force fires

community must adopt some of the training methods and lessons learned from the SOF

fires community. The use of Army JTACs in SOF must be one of the reasons they are

more proficient at achieving cross domain fires, specifically with air-to-ground

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integration. A change to the DOL domains of the conventional fires community is

necessary to achieve cross domain fires in a peer adversary contested world. Chapter 2

will describe the literature to be analyzed during this research and the author believes that

there is already an abundance of doctrine in circulation within the Army conventional

force that will support the implementation of an Army JTAC program.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to increase the proficiency of the Army

conventional fire support community in order for the Army conventional force to better

achieve cross domain fires with the addition of an Army JTAC program. With the five

domains on the multi-domain battlefield to include the land, air, maritime, space and

cyberspace, the researcher will only focus on the land and air concerning air-to-surface

fires. Furthermore, the Army considers achieving cross-domain fires as one of its

Warfighting Challenges. The research includes numerous doctrine manuals, books, and

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) documents. This chapter will cover the

DOTMLPF-P model and explain the Capabilities-Based Analysis for a better

understanding on how the Army implements change. Additionally, a list of the selected

references with a brief synopsis will be listed in order to provide the reader a way of

seeing how the researcher came to the conclusions.

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Figure 1. Organizational Design & Development in the Force Development Process

Source: Department of Logistics and Resource Operations, “F102a Student Slides” (PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), slide 2.

The DOTMLPF-P Model

This research points that a DOTMLPF-P change is necessary to implement an

Army JTAC program in the conventional force. For further understanding, we must first

describe the DOTMLPF-P model. Doctrine frames the fundamental principles by which

the military forces or military elements guide their actions in support of national

objectives.1 Organization describes how the Department of Defense (DOD) organizes to

1 Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DRLO), “F102a Student

Slides” (PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), slide 22.

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fight.2 Training outlines how DOD prepares to fight tactically and can range from basic

training to advance individual training or unit training. Materiel pertains to all of the

“stuff” necessary to equip DOD forces so those forces can operate effectively.3 Materiel

includes ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, related spares, repair parts, and

support equipment but excludes real property, installations, and utilities.4 Leadership and

education outlines the professional development leaders need to lead the fight; education

ranges from educating squad leaders to educating four-star generals and admirals.5

Personnel describes the individuals required in either a military or a civilian capacity to

accomplish the assigned mission.6 Facilities are the real property, installations, and

industrial facilities that support DOD forces.7 Policy is how the organization will be

regulated through regulations.8For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher will

specifically focus this study to the doctrine, organization, leadership and education

(DOL) domains of the DOTMLPF-P model. Furthermore, the researcher will identify key

capability requirements of conventional fires and provide SOF fires solutions to the

capability gaps. To understand the documents to be analyzed, the reader must first

2 Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DRLO), “F102a Student

Slides,” slide 22.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

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understand the structure of the Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) and how it helps

the Army to identify gaps in capability and test future capabilities.

Figure 2. Capabilities-Based Assessment

Source: Department of Logistics and Resource Operations, “F102a Student Slides” (PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), slide 4.

Capabilities-Based Assessment

The CBA process consists of three main components: Functional Area Analysis

(FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solution Analysis (FSA).9 The

9 Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DRLO), “F102a Student

Slides,” slide 23.

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FAA identifies the mission area or military problem to assess, the concepts to examine,

the timeframe in which the problem is assessed, and the scope of the assessment.10

TRADOC will then identify the tasks, conditions, and standards for each required

capability.11 In this thesis, the FAA will consist of a list of tasks that fire support

members (conventional and SOF) have to execute in order to support their units with

fires. A review of current Army doctrine and Joint doctrine will provide the information

for the FAA. The FNA assesses current and future force capabilities to meet the military

objectives of the scenarios chosen in the FAA.12 In this thesis, the FNA will identify any

capability gaps that may exist. Articles provided by the Center of Army Lessons Learned

(CALL), previous scholarly documents, and journals from the Field Artillery branch will

provide the data to complete the FNA. The FSA is the operationally-based assessment of

the potential DOTMLPF-P approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the

capability gaps identified in the FNA.13 As previously mentioned, this thesis will only be

covering the DOL domains of DOTMLPF-P. Professional articles from the Field

Artillery community, SOF community, and CALL documents will provide the data for

the FSA.

10 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 71-9,

Warfighting Capabilities Determination (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 23.

11 Ibid.

12 Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DRLO), “F102a Student Slides,” slide 22.

13 Ibid.

13

The Kotter Change Model

Table 1. Kotter Change Model

1. Establishing a sense of urgency -Examining the market and competitive realities -Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities 2. Creating a guiding coalition -Putting together a group with enough power to lead the change -Getting the group to work together like a team 3. Developing a sense of urgency -Creating a vision to help direct the change effort -Developing strategies for achieving the vision 4. Communicating the change vision -Using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies. -Having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of subordinates. 5. Empowering broad-based action -Getting rid of obstacles -Changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision -Encouraging risk-taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions 6. Generating short-term wins -Planning for visible improvements in performance, or wins -Creating those wins. -Visibly recognizing and rewarding people who made the wins possible 7. Consolidating gains and producing more changes -Using increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit together and don’t fill the transformation vision. -Hiring, promoting, and developing people who can implement the change vision. -Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents. 8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture -Creating better performance through customer and productivity-oriented behavior, more and better leadership, and more efficient management. -Articulating the connections between new behaviors and organizational success -Developing means to ensure leadership development and succession

Source: Billy Miller and Ken Turner, “Leading Organizational Change: A Leader’s Role,” Department of Leadership, L104RB Reading, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017, 9.

Billy Miller and Ken Turner sum up Kotter’s change model as such, “Part of the

appeal of Kotter’s change model is its simplicity and straightforwardness. The model

provides a foundational approach, with each stage building upon the success of the

previous. The first four stages assist in overcoming the existing status quo and set the

conditions for leading changes. Stages five through seven are the action stages that move

14

the change effort from words to action by introducing new or different practices into the

organization. Without successfully completing these three stages the effort loses

momentum, the sense of urgency dissipates, and the coalition becomes marginalized.

Kotter’s final stage is reached when the changes are inculcated into the culture of the

organization; the change becomes the status quo and is accepted.”14 In Chapter 5 of this

thesis, the Kotter Change Model will be used as a framework to explain the timeframes,

priorities, and phases for the implementation of Army JTACs in the conventional force.

Sources

The sources for this thesis will be categorized into doctrine and organization,

leadership and education, and previous MMAS theses. The intent of researching these

sources is to provide the researcher and reader with background information on what

doctrine and other research has been completed to support the topic. Additionally, the

sources will be used to test biases, assumptions, and perspectives prior to the start of this

analysis. The researcher believes that there is a sufficient amount of doctrine easily

assessible to the conventional force for the implantation of an Army JTAC program.

Doctrine and Organization

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 12 December 2014 – This source will be used to

explain the fundamentals of joint fire support and provide a level plane for comparison

between CF and SOF. Referencing this manual will be beneficial in showing the gaps in

14 Department of Leadership, “F104RB Leading Organizational Change: A

Leader’s Role,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017, 4.

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doctrine and organization of conventional fires. The Joint Publication establishes the

command and control (C2) structure for fire support personnel assigned at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels.

The following fire support personnel/entities advise the command on fire support capabilities and joint fire support command and control (C2), effective use of fires assets, and assist in planning, coordination, and execution of fires.

1. At the company level, a fire support officer (FSO) serves as the company commander’s principal advisor for fire support. The FSO will head up a fire support team (FIST) to plan and coordinate all available company supporting fires, including mortars, FA, naval surface fire support (NSFS), and CAS integration. Battalion/squadron/brigade combat team FSOs lead the fires cell at their respective headquarters (HQ) and are assisted by subordinate FSOs and fire support noncommissioned officers (FSNCO).

2. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) is the brigade combat team’s organic field artillery (FA) battalion commander. If a division artillery or an FA brigade is designated as the division force field artillery HQ, the division artillery commander is the division’s FSCOORD and is assisted by the chief of fires (COF), who then serves as the deputy FSCOORD during the period the force FA HQ is in effect. The FSCOORD is the primary advisor on the planning for and employment of fires. The responsibilities and authority given to the FSCOORD should be fully delineated by the supported commander.

3. COF. A US Army chief of fires (COF) is the senior organic fires staff officer at division level or higher who advises the commander on the best use of available fire support resources, provides input to orders, and develops and implements the fire support plan. Under the COF is the deputy FSCOORD, who leads the joint air ground integration center (JAGIC). The JAGIC physically collocates the Army current operations fires cell, airspace element, aviation cell, and air and missile defense (AMD) section with the U.S. Air Force air support operations center (ASOC) and the terminal attack control party (TACP), to integrate, coordinate, and control fires and air operations within the commander’s assigned area of operations (AO). Assigned air space is normally over the division AO up to the coordinating altitude, and from the rear boundary to the fire support coordination line (FSCL), and between the lateral boundaries.

4. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The U.S. Army provides a BCD to interface between the Army forces commander and the supporting air component commander. A BCD is collocated with the joint air operations center (JAOC), or the Air Force air operations center (AOC). The BCD accomplishes tasks that facilitate the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, II-10 JP 3-09 Joint Fire Support Command and

16

Control monitor and interpret the land battle situation and coordinating airspace requirements. When a US Army HQ is designated as the joint forces land component command, the BCD may serve as the land component commander’s liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives.

5. Other Liaisons. The Army provides liaisons to integrate Army requirements with other components and multinational partners. Typically, Army ground liaison detachments are located at supporting fighter and bomber wings, airlift wings, and reconnaissance liaison detachments at supporting reconnaissance squadrons. The Army provides representatives to the JFE/JTCB, other joint working groups, and supporting elements such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System(JSTARS), and control and reporting center (CRC). Liaison elements from other Services are found at Army units. In addition to the Air Force TACP and ASOC, common liaison elements include air naval gunfire liaison company and special operations command and control element (SOCCE).15

An understanding of all of the players that allow a fire support plan to be executed

are critical to the understanding of the integration of Army JTACs in the U.S. Army

conventional force.

JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 13 November 2014 – This source will provide

the foundation of how SOF conducts airspace control. Referencing this manual will be

beneficial in providing doctrinal and organizational consistencies in SOF. This manual

will also be used to depict the gaps that may exist in a “non-joint” environment that may

be found in the conventional force. The joint publication outlined the principles of

airspace control as:

The basic principles of airspace control are:

• Unity of effort requires the airspace control system and associated procedures to be fully coordinated, integrated, and centrally planned by the airspace control authority.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, Joint Fire Support

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 December 2014), II-10, II-11.

17

• Reduce the risk of unintended engagements against friendly, civil, and neutral aircraft, and optimize the effectiveness of air defense.

• Centralized airspace planning facilitates meeting joint force commander priorities.

• Decentralized execution gives subordinate commanders the flexibility to execute their missions effectively.

• Maintain close liaison and coordination among all airspace users.

• Require common airspace control procedures, which include procedural and/or positive control measures.

• Require reliable, jam-resistant, beyond line-of-sight, and secure communications networks.

• Require integrated, interoperable, survivable, and redundant airspace control systems.

• Respond to developing threat conditions and to the unfolding operation.

• Airspace control relies upon airspace management capabilities provided by airspace control elements and US civil and host-nation air traffic control.

• Emphasize flexibility and simplicity.

• Support 24-hour operations in all weather and environmental conditions.

• Require appropriate training for effective and safe airspace control operations.16

Furthermore, the Joint Publication outlines the processes of airspace control and

through its doctrinal explanation, the researcher will argue the need for Army JTACs in

the conventional force to fulfill some of the requirements needed to effectively manage

the airspace in any environment whether it be in Special Operations or the Conventional

Force area of operations.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Joint Airspace Control

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 13 November 2014), vii, viii.

18

JP 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014 – This source will be used to explain

SOF TTPs and their overall operations. In Chapter 4, this Joint Publication describes SOF

use of JTACs in fire support operations that may require, “long-range, surface-based,

joint fire support in remote locations or for targets beyond the land, maritime, and

amphibious force area of operations.”17 Additionally, the Joint Publication describes the

use of SOF liaison elements that include the special operations command and control

element (SOCCE) and the special operations liaison element (SOLE) to “coordinate,

synchronize, and deconflict SOF fire support.”18

Furthermore, Chapter 4 describes the SOF air support mission that can include

“ISR, airlift, close air support, air refueling, electronic warfare (EW), and the use of SOF

or CF JTACs, and all elements and capabilities of an Air Force air support operations

center (ASOC).”19 The Joint Publication also describes the importance of the SOF

mission with specially trained individuals to perform their missions, with one of the

missions being close air support. Army SOF units recognized the need for their own

specially training aircraft controllers and implemented the Army SOF JTAC program to

fill the gaps that existed with limited numbers of Air Force JTACs.

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Joint Application

of Firepower (JFIRE), January 2016 – This source will be used to explain the duties,

capabilities, and responsibilities of JTACs and JFOs. Chapter 2 of the JFIRE explains all

17 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP), 3-05, Special Operations

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 July 2014), IV-11.

18 Ibid., IV-11, IV-12.

19 JCS, JP 3-05, IV-12.

19

TTPs for executing surface-to-surface fires to include artillery, mortars, rockets, and

naval gunfire. The chapter provides numerous call for fire (CFF) templates that forward

observers, JFOs, and JTACs can use for execution. Chapter 3 describes air-to-surface

fires or close air support. “Brief, stack, mark, and control are primary terminal attack

control responsibilities. When multiple JTACs and/or forward air controllers (airborne)

(FAC(A)) share the area of operations, the brief, stack, mark, and control responsibilities

must be clearly assigned.”20 This chapter provides JTACs and CAS pilots across all of

the services with a set of guidelines to abide by whenever aircraft come on station by

ways of the routing and safety of flight brief, CAS aircraft check-in, situation update, and

the game plan and 9-line CAS brief.

Although Chapter 3 is primarily focused on procedures for JTACs, the JFIRE is

available to all JFOs and forward observers to familiarize themselves with the procedures

that JTACs execute. Furthermore, Chapter 3 describes JFO integration (between the

JTAC and JFO) as such: “JTACs can use JFOs to develop and correlate targeting data,

mark targets, and provide terminal guidance operations. JFOs may pass the observer

lineup, the CAS situation update, and observer target brief (lines 4 through 8 of the CAS

9-line) directly to the JTAC or may require the CAS aircraft to relay the situation update

to the JTAC.”21 Additionally, the JFIRE provides a checklist for non-JTAC qualified

service members, which could be a JFO if the situation dictates, in emergency situations

20 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Joint Application of Firepower, JFIRE (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2016), 39.

21 Ibid., 55.

20

where a JTAC is not present and CAS is needed in order to save the lives of friendly

forces in close combat. This addition to the JFIRE notifies CAS pilots of the fact that

they will have to extract pertinent data from the non-JTAC service member and will

proceed with extreme caution.

The remainder of the JFIRE describes procedures in Electronic Attack (EA),

cyberspace effects, capabilities and communication equipment, brevity, laser operations,

and descriptions of munition capabilities and collateral damage considerations. If Army

JTACs were implemented in the conventional force, the JFIRE would already be in

circulation and distributed amongst all Army fire supporters. There would be no need for

an immediate and dramatic change to doctrine in order for Army JTACs to fight

effectively.

JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 25 November 2014 – This source will be used to

describe close air support aspects, terms, duties, and responsibilities. Chapter 1 depicts

the basic terminology for CAS and explains terminal attack control (TAC) as “a certified

and qualified joint terminal attack controller will be recognized across the Department of

Defense as capable and authorized to perform TAC.”22 Additionally, Chapter 1 describes

terminal guidance operations (TGO) as “personnel conducting TGO do not have the

authority to control the maneuver of, or grant weapons release clearance to, attacking

aircraft.”23 Similar to the JFIRE, JP 3-09.3 describes a clear delineation between JFOs

and JTACs with their duties and responsibilities. Additionally, the JP provides templates

22 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ,Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 November 2014), I-2.

23 Ibid.

21

and guidelines for JTACs and CAS pilots for execution. The difference between the

JFIRE and JP 3-09.3 is that the JP goes into more details for JTACs and CAS pilots but

does not come in a pocket-sized publication. During JTAC school, the JP 3-09.3 is

primarily used as the foundational document for instruction.

The joint publication provides data that is suitable and feasible for a conventional

force Army JTAC to execute his duties if the argument for them is approved.

Additionally, this JP can be excepted by stakeholders as doctrine that does not necessarily

need to be changed immediately or if at all. This is significant to this study because

changes to doctrine take time and if there are no changes needed, the integration of

conventional force Army JTACs can happen virtually immediately.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8

November 2010 (as amended through 15 February 2016) – This source will be used to

provide doctrinal definitions of topics covered in the thesis.

ATP 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, March 2016 – This

source will provide foundational examples of the organization of the brigade combat

team, specifically to how fire supporters are implemented in their respective formations.

Referencing this manual will be beneficial in identifying personnel gaps in conventional

fires. Additionally, this manual will be used as reference on possible recommendations

for Army JTACs.

In Chapter 1, ATP 3-09.42 describes the organizations of BCTs and the fire

support elements within them from the BCT level down to the battalion level. “Effective

field artillery fires require qualified observers to call for and adjust fires on located

targets. Forward observers, forward air controllers, naval gunfire spotter teams, JFOs, and

22

JTACs train together and work effectively as a team to request, plan, coordinate, and

place accurate fires on targets that create the effects desired by the BCT commander.”24

Furthermore, “forward air controllers (airborne), JTACs, and naval gunfire spotter teams

may not always be available when and where their support is required. Therefore, field

artillery observer teams must be proficient in planning and executing close air support

when a JTAC is not available.”25

The ATP continues on and defines JFOs and provides their duties and

responsibilities. Analysis of this ATP would lead to a conclusion that the Army was fully

aware of the shortage of JTACs in the Air Force and wrote into the doctrine the very

responsibilities of Army forward observers/JFOs to execute the roles and responsibilities

of the JTAC, if not available. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 there is discussion of how

lessons learned in Special Operations on the conduct of aerial fire support due to their

distance to the enemy target in relation to other friendly forces. Chapter 4 describes how

a fire support element is augmented from the brigade level to the battalion level by way

of other warfighting functions and enablers, like JTACs. Additionally, the ATP states,

“JTACs provide recommendations to the BCT and subordinate commanders on the use of

close air support and its integration with ground maneuver. The JTAC also validates

targets of opportunity, submits immediate requests for close air support, controls close air

24 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication

(ATP) 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2016), 1-3.

25 Ibid.

23

support with the supported commander’s approval, and performs battle damage

assessment.”26

In summary, the ATP 3-09.42 provides substantial guidance for fire support

operations within the BCT. Additionally, the publication places importance on the use of

JTACs operating within the BCT but also acknowledges that U.S. Air Force JTACs may

not always be readily available and therefore places importance on the use of JFOs to fill

the capability gap, albeit not to its entirety. The feasibility and suitability of U.S. Army

JTACs to fill the U.S. Air Force JTAC gaps can be argued with the use of the ATP;

however, the acceptability needs to be further researched.

ATP 3-91.1, Division Operations, 2014 – This source will provide doctrinal and

organizational information about the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) and

will also be referenced in identifying clearance of fires capability gaps. The researcher

will mostly use this source to explain how a division fire support element operates.

Additionally, the researcher will use this source to explain how a JTAC program manager

can be implemented in the current doctrine.

According to ATP 3-91.1, “the U.S. Air Force is aligned as an air support

operations squadron (ASOS) to support each division and provides air support planning

and execution capabilities. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force provides tactical air control

parties (TACPs), air liaison officers (ALOs), and JTACs. These personnel form the

26 HQDA, ATP 3-09.42, 4-11.

24

JAGIC when teamed with personnel from the fires cell.”27 The personnel that make up a

division fires cell are similar, in duty position, of what is found at the BCT and BN

levels. Through personal experience, the JAGIC only contains two JTACs that are senior-

level in their respective ASOS.

The integration of conventional force Army JTACs would not affect the JAGIC in

any negative way. The Air Force will still maintain their TACPs, ALO, and JTACs;

therefore, the suitability and feasibility of the addition of Army JTACs is not a

foreseeable issue. Additionally, the acceptability of Army JTACs working in the JAGIC

is acceptable because many professionals in the fire support community will agree that

more subject matter experts in airspace coordination is a good thing for the JAGIC;

however, this would not be a change that happens immediately or within the next seven

years. The JTACs will need to first gain valuable experience at the battalion and brigade

levels before moving up to the division level.

ATP 3-09.90, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division,

October 2017 – This source will be used to describe how the division artillery

(DIVARTY) operates and maintains fire supporters. It is important to understand the role

of DIVARTY because this organization consolidates and trains the fire supporters that

support the brigade combat teams (BCTs).

The DIVARTY is the force field artillery headquarters for the division. Force field artillery headquarters can be designated at battalion and above by the supported commander. The supported commander specifies the duration, duties, and responsibilities of the headquarters. If given the authority by the division commander, the DIVARTY may provide mission command of fires forces.

27 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication

(ATP) 3-91.1, Division Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-18.

25

Depending on the established command or support relationship, this will include the authority to position and task allocate FA and air defense artillery (ADA) units. For more information on the force field artillery headquarters see FM 3-09. The following are tasks of the DIVARTY:

Support the integration of Army, Joint, and Multinational fires. Deliver fires.

Mass fires in support of the decisive operation.

Conduct targeting.

Manage the establishment of common survey and meteorological data across the division area of operations (AO).

Provide the counterfire headquarters for the division and synchronize radar employment in the division AO.

Advise the division commander on standardization of all FA training and certification.

Support brigade combat team (BCT) standardization, training, certification and mentoring of FA battalions.

Provide the force field artillery headquarters for the division.

Provide indirect fires in support of the division when indirect fire assets are allocated to the DIVARTY.

Provide suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), when task organized with firing units.

Provide input to the division's shared common operational picture.28

In the above listed tasks for DIVARTY, the most relevant task for this study is the

DIVARTYs task to “support BCT standardization, training, certification, and mentoring

of FA battalions.”29 This publication states that the DIVARTY maintains the certification

28 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication

(ATP) 3-09-90, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017), 1-1.

29 Ibid.

26

of the fire supporters that operate for the BCTs. If this is the case, the integration of

conventional force Army JTACs will be managed by the DIVARTY within each division

in the Army. Furthermore, the ATP 3-09-90 depicts how air component assets will

support the ground component.

Immediate requests for air component delivered fires usually originate at the lowest echelon’s tactical air control party (TACP) and are sent directly to the air support operations center (ASOC) through the joint air request net. The division fires cell as part of the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) monitors the immediate request for CAS and assists the air liaison officer (ALO) with any issues processing the request. Immediate requests for air interdiction (AI), within the division assigned airspace, will be handled within the JAGIC via use of on-call assets or by changing the role of other aircraft missions. The division fires cell assists with airspace control for the employment of fires from both ground and air delivery mechanisms. The fires cell integrates and synchronizes airspace control requirements with Army and joint control measures, including FSCMs, airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) and provides input to the ATO, airspace control plan and airspace control order (ACO).30

The JAGIC was developed to manage all air to ground operations and provide a

linkage to the air component with regards to planning and coordination. The JAGIC

operates within in the division Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC) and would

ultimately manage conventional force Army JTACs if the argument of this thesis is

approved. If the integration of Army JTACs is approved, the conventional force JTACs

that had been operating at the company and battalion levels would eventually be

promoted and move to the division level. With the battalion and brigade level experience,

the JTAC would provide the level of expertise necessary to improving JAGIC operations

because the JTAC would better “speak the language of the Air Force.” Additionally, the

ATP describes how the Army conventional force would receive JTACs from the Air

30 HQDA, ATP 3-09-90, 1-4.

27

Force to provide integration of the airspace between the air component and the ground

force. This requirement would be unnecessary with the integration of conventional force

Army JTACs.

In summary of ATP 3-09-90, it is feasible and suitable that the DIVARTY be

tasked with maintaining the conventional force JTACs within its division; however, the

acceptability remains a question for further research. Would a DIVARTY be able to

coordinate with the home-station ASOS to maintain JTAC currencies? Ultimately, there

is an argument that conventional force Army JTACs would be able to increase the

effectiveness of the JAGIC by simply being able to speak the common language between

the air component and the ground component, but how would those individuals maintain

their JTAC currency? These questions remain as further research topics and the ATP 3-

09-90 does not provide explicit guidance on this subject.

FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, October 2015 – This source will provide an

organizational foundation for the Army conventional force. “Chapter 1 addresses the

deployability, role, and organizational characteristics of the BCT as optimized and

trained to conduct offensive and defensive tasks, and operations in support of stability to

function across the range of military operations (ROMO).”31 Additionally, FM 3-96

“describes the organization and mission of the infantry, Stryker, and armored BCT.”32

31 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-96,

Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2015), ix.

32 Ibid.

28

Figure 3. Infantry Brigade Combat Team Task Organization

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2015), 1-7.

Figure 3, above, depicts the task-organization of an infantry brigade combat team

(IBCT). If my recommendations are approved, an IBCT will have three Army JTACs at

the company/troop-level (12 x FSNCOs) and two at the battalion/squadron-level (1 x BN

FSO, 1 x BN FSNCO). Additionally, with three infantry battalions and one cavalry

squadron there will be a total of 20 x Army JTACs within the IBCT. Below, figure 4

depicts the task-organization for a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

29

Figure 4. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Task Organization

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2015), 1-10.

Similar to an IBCT, the SBCT will also contain 20 x Army JTACs if

recommendations are approved. Figure 5, below, depicts an armored brigade combat

team (ABCT) task organization. The ABCT will differ from the IBCT and SBCT with an

additional company for total of 23 x Army JTACs.

30

Figure 5. Armored Brigade Combat Team Task Organization

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2015), 1-15.

In summary, the FM 3-96 depicts the task organizations for an IBCT, SBCT, and

ABCT. It is feasible and suitable that the three organizations are able to support the

recommended quantity of Army JTACs in their formations due to the fact that the JTACs

will be derived from their current MTOE positions of company/troop fire support non-

commissioned officers (FSNCOs) and battalion/squadron FSOs and FSNCOs; however,

this is not explicitly stated in the FM. The acceptability to maintain the JTAC currencies

in each of these organizations remains as an issue to be further researched but may not

31

necessarily be mentioned in a field manual similar to the FM 3-96. For the purposes of

this research, the FM 3-96 only provided the task organizations that could support the

argument for conventional force Army JTACs.

FM 3-0, Operations, October 2017 with change 1 (06DEC17) – This source is the

most current document for this thesis and provides an overview of Army operations.

Chapter 1 describes “large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and associated challenges

Army forces face today. It addresses anticipated operational environments (OEs), the

threat, joint operations, and the Army’s strategic role in support of joint operations.”33

Essentially, the FM was published to refocus the Army away from COIN and prepare for

peer threats.

Figure 6. The Conflict Continuum and the Range of Military Operations

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, with Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 6 December 2018, 1-1.

33 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, with change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2017), 1-1.

32

“The range of military operations (ROMO) is a fundamental construct that helps

relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the

conflict continuum.”34 Figure 6, above, provides a depiction of the conflict continuum

and ROMO. “Large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict

continuum.”35 This establishes that large-scale combat operations are something that

every military leader needs to be cognizant of as we go into the future and it is important

as we transition out of the COIN OE. The remainder of the chapter describes challenges

that the military will face in the future and acknowledges that the Army has become

accustomed to small-scale warfare against small enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The

enemy lacked capabilities in the form of sustained long-range precision fires, integrated

air defense systems, robust conventional ground maneuver, and electronic warfare.”36

This statement, alone, can justify the need for more JTACs on the battlefield because

against a peer threat and contested airspace, Air Force JTACs will no longer be able to

conduct ‘Type 2’ terminal attack control from forward operating bases (FOBs) or combat

outposts (COPs) as they did during the COIN fight. JTACs will still be able to operate

out of those locations but not exclusively.

Additionally, the FM describes the importance of a multi-domain battlefield

requiring a “cross domain understanding of the OE.”37 Furthermore, the FM describes

34 HQDA, FM 3-0, 1-1.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., 1-2.

37 Ibid.

33

that “the fires warfighting function includes the following tasks: deliver fires, integrate all

forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires, and conduct targeting.”38. Implementing

conventional force Army JTAC program would help the conventional Army to achieve

these fires warfighting function tasks, specifically with the integration of all forms of

Army, joint, and multinational fires. If the importance of achieving cross domain fires is

listed in the Army’s newest publication, why not implement conventional force Army

JTACs to allow the Army to achieve its goal to be prepared for a peer threat in the future?

Leadership and Education

“Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq” Texas A&M

University Press, 2007 – This source will provide historical examples of the use of

JTACs in combat. The article primarily talks about Air Force JTACs operating within

Army formations but will be used to identify personnel shortage gaps in the Army’s

conventional fires. Additionally, the article provides a foundation for the need of JTACs

at the small-unit level or tactical level of employment in special operations missions. The

lessons learned in the special operations community will provide sufficient argument for

JTACs in the conventional force. Furthermore, the article provides good unclassified

historical data to support the arguments.

The book provides a good example of Army SOF in its initial stages of the war on

terror and the need for more JTACs on the battlefield; however, the author depicts Air

Force JTACs sufficiently fulfilling the role of providing close air support to the ground

forces. The feasibility and suitability of JTACs is supported with this document;

38 HQDA, FM 3-0, 1-1.

34

however, the acceptability of maintaining the JTAC currencies remains for future

research of other sources.

CALL. Handbook 17-04, Joint Air Ground Integration Center, Lessons and best

practices, 2017 – This handbook describes the JAGIC’s responsibilities for support to a

division and provides insights on “lessons and best practices from numerous Warfighter

exercises, experiments, and named operations in order to empower division commanders

and their staffs to learn from others.”39 The researcher will primarily use this handbook to

provide insight on how the implementation of conventional force Army JTAC program

will ultimately improve the effectiveness of a JAGIC; however, the change will not

happen immediately because the conventional force Army JTACs will need to gain

experience at the battalion and below levels first. Arguably, SOF JTACs that have

already served at the battalion and below levels have gained the experience needed to

work in a JAGIC but I do not foresee the feasibility of maintaining their JTAC currencies

at the division level while difficulties remain for the conventional force JTACs at lower

levels. Below is a depiction of the airspace a division controls.

39 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CALL Handbook 17-04, Joint Air

Ground Integration Center, Lessons and Best Practices (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2017), 2.

35

Figure 7. JAGIC Controlled Airspace

Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CALL Handbook 17-04, Joint Air Ground Integration Center, Lessons and Best Practices (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2017), originally derived from FM 3-52, 3.

“The JAGIC is a modular and scalable center designed to integrate and coordinate

fires and air operations over and in the division commander’s area of operations (AO)

and there is no change in existing roles or authorities for the fire support element (FSE),

tactical air control party (TACP), air support operations center (ASOC), airspace control,

aviation operations, and air and missile defense.”40 Figure 8, below, gives a visual

depiction of where the JAGIC receives its inputs from all of the players involved.

40 CALL, CALL Handbook 17-04, 3.

36

Figure 8. JAGIC Inputs Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CALL Handbook 17-04, Joint Air Ground Integration Center, Lessons and Best Practices (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2017), originally derived from FM 3-52, 3.

One of the emerging concepts, according to the handbook, is the linkage between

the division artillery (DIVARTY) and the JAGIC. An important aspect is the linkage

between the two elements can be increased with the use of conventional force Army

JTACs because they have already established a relationship with DIVARTY and are

well-versed on counter-fire operations, clearance of fires, and airspace deconfliction.

Additionally, the Army JTACs would assist in the military decision-making process

(MDMP) and the close air support decision-making process (CAS-DMP) on the division

staff. Furthermore, “the division fires cell manages the division targeting process” and the

use of Army JTACs would increase the overall effectiveness of the joint targeting process

37

by using the existing relationship with the Air Force and fire support planning skills that

are inherent to the duty position.41

As previously mentioned, the argument of this thesis will not enhance the JAGIC

immediately and may not for another seven years if the implementation of conventional

force Army JTACs is approved due to the Army JTACs needing to gain experience at the

battalion-level and below first. The suitability and acceptability of Army JTACs

enhancing a JAGIC are there but the feasibility of maintaining additional JTAC

currencies at the division-level may cause a problem, at least initially, until an effective

plan to maintain currencies is developed.

CALL. Newsletter 03-13, Synchronization of Fires, April 2003 – This source will

be used to provide historical examples of good and bad practices of the synchronization

of fires. The newsletter highlights good TTPs to be put into practice but does not explain

any that were currently being used at the time of publishing. The newsletter, for the

purposes of my research, provided many examples of the gaps in the synchronization of

fires specifically between the Army and Air Force most notable at the operational level.

However, the article does provide insight in what is needed at the tactical level to support

my argument for the need of Army JTACs in the conventional force.

The newsletter was selected for this research because many professionals in the

conventional fire support community will attest to the difficulties of synchronizing fires.

Initially, this source highlights exact circumstances where arguably an Army JTAC

would have helped with the synchronization but the source is classified as FOUO and

41 CALL, CALL Handbook 17-04, 15.

38

will not be published the findings of this thesis. It is important; however, for the

researcher to use the examples of the lack of synchronization of fires when arguing future

points.

CALL. Newsletter 10-25, Army/Air Force Integration, Volume III, February 2010

– This source will be used to highlight historical best practices and lessons learned for the

integration of JTACs within Army formations. This article primarily depicts the shortfalls

of U.S. Air Force and Army integration at the fire support level. The newsletter continues

to describe the training gaps that exist between in the Air Force and Army during regular

scheduled train-ups for Combined Training Center (CTC) rotations and even

deployments to combat.

The examples of the difficulties of training as a joint force (Army and Air Force)

used in this source are classified as FOUO and therefore the specific findings will not be

published in this thesis. This source is important; however, for identifying the

relationship and training gaps that occur between the two branches of the military and

possibly portraying the suitability, feasibility and acceptability of additional JTACs.

Additionally, this source provides good supplementary data outside of this thesis for

those that will continue the argument and research for conventional force Army JTACs in

the future.

“Case studies in the development of Close Air Support” by Benjamin Cooling,

1990 – This source will highlight some materiel items needed for JTACs to operate

within Army formations. Benjamin Cooling highlights many foundations of the need for

a JTAC in a conventional formation. He mostly depicts the role of the JTAC in the Air

Force realm with the use of the Air Force ASOS located at each major Army installation.

39

He helps to describe and depict the need for JTACs in the close air support role as the

Army continued to improve their TTPs in 1990 with regards to air-to-ground integration.

Many of his main arguments would be seen in Operation Desert Storm shortly after the

publication of his article.

The article depicts the suitability and acceptability of implementing conventional

force Army JTACs but does not lead into arguments for the feasibility of the

implementation. Maintaining JTAC currencies remains an issue during this research and

could possibly be a topic of future researchers.

“Joint Terminal Attack Controller, a Primary MOS for the future” by M.J. Carroll,

January 2008 – This source will be used to highlight the need for JTACs. M.J. Carroll

goes into great length to explain the importance of Marine Corps JTACs being a Military

Operational Specialty (MOS). He continues to explore the downfalls of having JTACs in

the Marine Corps without them being an actual MOS with regards to initial training,

currency training, and program manager specifics. His thesis explains the importance of

having JTACs in a conventional formation but implores on the ideas of actually having

JTACs and maintaining within the Marine Corps.

Furthermore, Carroll’s argument did get implemented in the U.S. Marine Corps as

he described how becoming an MOS would achieve feasibility with the acceptability and

suitability also being described. Making the JTAC qualification an MOS in the

conventional force could be a topic of future research; however, it is outside of the scope

of the thesis research.

40

Previous MMAS Theses

Cohe, Joab H., MAJ, U.S. ARMY, The Future of the Brigade Combat Team: Air-

Ground Integration and the Operating Environment, Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas,2017. MAJ Joab Cohe’s thesis primarily speaks of the

downfalls of the Army fire support system and he looks to improve it by way of fire

support systems. He does relate his MMAS for the need of JTACs but does not

specifically mention the need for Army JTACs. His thesis depicts the shortfalls that the

Air Force undergoes to support the Army with close air support operations world-wide.

MAJ Cohe’s thesis primarily focuses on the operational level and above. However, much

of his research findings indirectly support my arguments for change in the Army,

although he may not agree. MAJ Cohe and the researcher served in the same special

operations unit and have many of the same experiences and positive attributes that a

JTAC can bring to the battlefield. His thesis provides data that this thesis will later

implore about with regards to numbers of Air Force JTACs available to support brigade

combat teams (BCTs) and divisions.

Johnson, Ryan, MAJ, U.S. ARMY, Fires Readiness: The State of US Army Fires

in Support of Combined Arms Maneuver at the Division Level, MMAS, Command and

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2016. Dr. Long, the thesis chair,

suggested this source, and he also served as the chair for Ryan Johnson. Moreover, Dr.

Long provided a structured approach towards this thesis using the R1/R2/R3 method of

researching and explaining the thesis. MAJ Johnson also used the DOTMLPF-P model to

argue his changes for implementation for the Army.

41

This thesis also provided an example of what a DOTMLPF-P case study looks

like in an MMAS. MAJ Johnson’s stakeholders are very similar to the stakeholders used

for this thesis. Overall, it is important to use a previous thesis that was structured by the

same chairman in the past to maintain continuity and to use the research of previous

students for understanding.

Why, Robert A., LTC, U.S. ARMY, The Evolution of Fire Support Doctrine was

Driven by Airmobile Doctrine and New Weapon Systems During the Vietnam War,

MMAS, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2004. LTC

Why’s thesis provided a historical background for my thesis with regards to the

development of the fire support system in the Air Force and the Army. He specifically

talks about the development of the Air Force fire support community of the Tactical Air

Control Parties and Forward Air Controllers during the Korean War and how ineffective

they were until the Vietnam War. Additionally, LTC Why describes the effectiveness of

fire support systems during the Vietnam War that help set the foundation of the historical

facts of this thesis. LTC Why’s thesis is important to this thesis because he provides a

linkage between the Air Force and Army and he describes how history shaped the JTACs

of today and future.

Armfield, Robert G., Maj, U.S. AIR FORCE, Joint Terminal Attack Controller:

Separating Fact from Fiction, Air Command and Staff College Air University, Maxwell

Air Force Base Alabama, 2003. – This source will provide details on the inception of the

JTAC from the viewpoint of the Air Force. Major Armfield describes many of the issues

that the Air Force had in the early 2000’s with regards to standardizing the JTAC

programs across all of the services. Major Armfield specifically states that “there are

42

currently four different qualification standards (USMC, SEAL, AF TACP, AF SOTAC)

within the U.S. military for terminal attack controllers.”42 Maj. Armfield was correct

during his research in 2003. However, the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller

Course (SOTACC) has implemented strict guidelines to provide one qualification

standard for SOF members from the Air Force, Marines, Navy, and the Army.

Furthermore, the Army and Air Force has actually implemented some of Maj. Armfield’s

recommendations since its publication.

Maj. Armfield’s paper is important to this thesis because it supports the suitability

and acceptability of the argument for conventional force Army JTACs. His paper also

describes the difficulties of maintaining currencies and keeping doctrine the same across

all branches of service which ties into the difficulties of feasibility.

Conclusion

This analysis focuses specifically on a solution to increase the conventional fire

support proficiency in order to ultimately achieve cross domain fires with the addition of

a conventional force Army JTAC program. As previously mentioned, the scope of

analysis is limited to only air-to-surface fires because there has been minimal research in

this topic and the Army considers achieving cross-domain fires as one of its warfighting

challenges. Through the DOTMLPF-P model, changes can be made to the Army to

implement a conventional force Army JTAC program into the task organizations of all

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

42 Maj Robert G. Armfield, USAF, “Joint Terminal Attack Controller: Separating

Fact from Fiction” (Thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 2003), 5.

43

The sources selected for this thesis all generally support the suitability and

acceptability of implementing conventional force JTACs; however, numerous sources did

not support the feasibility of maintaining the currencies and training requirements needed

for a JTAC to continue executing missions. Chapter 3 will explain how the facts of the

researched items will be organized and provide insights of the key players involved in the

DOTMLPF-P framework and will be organized using the applied professional case study

method.

44

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to increase the level of proficiency of the CF fire

support community in order for the CF to better achieve cross domain fires with the

addition of an Army JTAC program. A DOTMLPF-P change is necessary, specifically in

the DOL domains of the model for this implementation. This chapter will describe the

research methodology and will review the steps that were taken to obtain information

needed to address the primary and secondary questions. Additionally, the researcher

explains the criteria used to determine the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of the

methodology.

Through the DOTMLPF-P model, the researcher uses a quantitative research

methodology to explore the potential of implementing a conventional force Army JTAC

training program and including JTACs on the Army MTOE as an explanation of the ways

and means to accomplish the ends. For the purposes of this thesis, the ends are the

implementation of a conventional force Army JTAC program, the means will be this

chapter, the ways will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Figure 9, below, states the key

players for change in the Army. The figure is displayed top to bottom, which is the

inverse of how it travels in actuality and explains the path that a change goes through for

approval and implementation.

45

Figure 9. Capability Development Key Players

Source: Department of Logistics and Resource Operations, “F102a Student Slides” (PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), slide 11.

46

Case Study

Figure 10. Applied Professional Case Study Research Outline

Source: Kenneth Long, “Case Study Insights” (PowerPoint presentation, U.S Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), slide 5.

An applied professional case study, as described by Long (2017) was chosen for

this thesis in order to provide a contextual understanding of the problem. “It is a specific

form of case study that accounts for and leverages the professional body of knowledge

and best professional practices concerning real world decision.”43 Additionally, “any

research project that wishes to make real changes in the world must take the professional

43 Dr. Kenneth Long, conversation with author, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2018.

47

body of knowledge and the best practices into consideration when choosing a research

method.”44This study will be a case study of comparison between Army conventional fire

support and Army special operations fire support with a specific focus on doctrine,

organization, leadership and education used to complete their missions; however, SOF

fire support task organizations and TTPs are classified as FOUO, SECRET, and TOP

SECRET and will not be described, at least in absolute detail, in this thesis. Furthermore,

the case study will highlight current capabilities of conventional fires and SOF fires, but

ultimately demonstrate the potential capability gaps in conventional force Army fire

support.

The intended audience to frame the argument and conclusions of this thesis are

the decision makers within the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), the Army Capabilities

Integration Center (ARCIC), the Army G3, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command

(USASOC). This particular audience of decision makers will serve as the key players

(means) for the approval of the implementation of conventional force Army JTACs. The

FCoE will serve as the subject matter expert (SME) on fire support due to their current

studies to achieve cross domain fires and ultimately serve as the higher authority for

Army JTACs, if approved. Additionally, the FCoE will provide constructive and realistic

feedback to the potential suitability, acceptability, and feasibility of the proposed

implementation because they will be at the “point of friction” for the implementation.

Specifically, the FCoE will be the authority to choose a location for the proposed Army

JTAC school.

44 Long.

48

Furthermore, ARCIC and the Army G3 will accept the recommendations of the

FCoE and will serve as additional vetting organizations of the proposed implementation

and ultimately serve as the approval. Both organizations have sufficient staffs that will

conduct additional thorough studies of the argument and will prioritize it with other

possible solutions that are being proposed for the Army. Lastly, USASOC will serve as

the authority to provide the instructors needed for the initial Army JTAC school.

Additionally, the expertise that the SOF JTACs will bring to the future curriculum will

need to be vetted by USASOC for clearance purposes. Furthermore, USASOC will be

able to provide the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and lessons learned of the

proposed argument since they have actually implemented Army JTACs in their ranks.

Currently, the FCoE is working on staffing the solution to this challenge and it

was briefed during the FA preparatory course at the U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College (CGSC).45 This analysis will highlight capability gaps that conventional

fires and look to close the gaps with SOF fires solutions. The analytical model selected

for this analysis is the CBA. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the CBA is

composed of three phases: FAA, FNA, and FSA. During the FAA phase, an analysis of

current Army and Joint doctrine will assist in the framing of the problem area within

conventional fires with regards to achieving cross domain fires. During the FNA phase,

an analysis of the combination of Army and joint doctrine and the Center of Army

Lessons Learned (CALL) after-action reviews (AARs) will provide assessments in

proficiencies of the both the convention and SOF fires communities. In this phase, the

45 Department of Tactics, “Field Artillery Preparatory Course,” U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017.

49

capability gaps of conventional fires will be identified with regards to achieving cross-

domain fires. During the final phase of the CBA, FSA, an analysis of all of the sources

will assess initiatives in the DOL domains of the DOTMLPF-P model. Additionally,

professional articles, CALL lessons learned, scholarly work, and emerging doctrine will

be used to identify and assess existing solutions to the problem.

The analytical lenses for this study will be the suitability, feasibility, and

acceptability of the use of Army JTACs in conventional fires. For this study, the

suitability is the overall rationale of the solution and how it fits into the conventional

Army. Feasibility is whether or not the conventional Army can implement the proposed

change46. Acceptability is concerned with the expectations and expected outcomes of this

proposed solution of the FA branch, ARCIC, USASOC, and the Army G3. Furthermore,

within the analytical lenses of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability this study will

focus on doctrine, the Army G3, TRADOC, and the individual in order to highlight issues

that each stakeholder represents. In doctrine, this study will provide insights on support to

Army concepts, consistency, clarity, and integration. Through the Army G3 lens, this

study will focus efforts on the readiness, cost, tradeoffs, priorities, and field forces

available for the solution. Through TRADOC, this study will focus on program

management, institutional base, faculty, curriculum, training, education, and

infrastructure. Through the individual, this study will focus on the tenants of

empowering, enabling, rewarding, and challenging.

46 HQDA, FM 3-0, 23.

50

Conclusion

With the DOTMLPF-P model, the conventional Army will be able to adopt the

proposed addition to its formations. A case study of the conventional force fire support

system compared to that of the special operations fire support element will possibly

provide sufficient evidence for the need of an Army JTAC program. The DOTMLPF-P

model will provide explanation to readers on how changes are implemented in the Army

CF. The change may take a considerable time with the approval processes it may undergo

but can eventually make the change.

The need to close the gap of achieving cross-domain fires remains an Army War

Fighting Challenge. Adopting the idea of implementing Army JTACs may help close this

gap if the research draws this conclusion. If the conventional Army does not implement

this change, they risk not being able to effectively achieve cross-domain fires in a near

peer battle. Through the lenses of the FCoE, ARCIC, USASOC, and the Army G3 the

adoption of Army JTACs in the CF will possibly identify the challenges to make the

ends, ways, and means feasible to execute.

51

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Figure 11. Cross Domain Synergy

Source: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025-2040, Version 1.0, December 2017, accessed 17 December 2017, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDB_ Evolutionfor21st%20(1).pdf.

Introduction

A mission that involves joint and coalition forces providing fires in close

proximity of ground forces is Close Air Support (CAS). The purpose of this particular

mission is to support the ground forces that are engaged in close combat with the enemy.

The execution of CAS involves very detailed planning, requests for aircraft, airspace

coordination, and execution of Terminal Attack Control (TAC). This chapter will focus

52

on only the tactical execution of CAS because there are no differences in how CF or SOF

plan and request for CAS support at the battalion-level and above. However, there are

differences between CF and SOF SOPs but do not necessarily require the need for a

JTAC. The execution of TAC, at the battalion-level and below, is the main difference

between the two concerns with the CF only using Air Force JTACs and SOF using a

combination of Air Force and Army JTACs.

Currently in the CF, all training and combat execution with CAS is executed by

Air Force personnel through their Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP). Within this team

are Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) that are approved to execute terminal

attack control to fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. Additionally, the CF uses U.S.

Army personnel that are Joint Forward Observer (JFO) qualified to help in the execution

of CAS. The JFO qualification was a product of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq due to

the need to execute CAS quickly and efficiently with the minimal numbers of available

Air Force JTACs. The only issue with this concept is the fact that JFOs are not qualified

to provide TAC. JFOs are only authorized to execute Terminal Guidance Operations

(TGO). The JFO identifies the target and is qualified to talk to aircraft. He is qualified to

pass a CAS 9-line to the aircraft but has to rely on an Air Force JTAC to grant release of

munitions of the aircraft. In most cases, there were more Army JFOs than Air Force

JTACs. This allowed the Air Force JTACs to execute more targets for more forces from a

centralized location in the forward operating base (FOB) or in the consolidation area.

The main issue with this concept is the time it takes for execution. If one Air

Force JTAC is supporting a company-sized element, he may receive four or five CAS 9-

lines from Army JFOs at the same time. The researcher has experienced this in

53

Afghanistan where a company-sized element was highly dispersed over a wide area of

operations. The one Air Force JTAC had to execute each of the five CAS missions one at

a time and had to spend time gathering situational awareness of each request. The Army

JFOs, in this particular example, had the most situational awareness of their need for

CAS support. What if that situation and situations like it had an Army JTAC to help

facilitate the execution of CAS along with the Air Force JTAC that would still be

operating from the FOB?

The special operations community identified this problem early on during the war

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the CF, SOF initially only had Air Force JTACs supporting

their elements. In 2003, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) allowed the use

of Army JTACs and created the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course

(SOTACC) to facilitate this training. This resulted in SOF units having two qualified

JTACs at every company-level force. Army instructors from the John F. Kennedy Special

Warfare Center initially controlled the course. Today, the school is controlled by the Air

Force Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) Special Tactics Squadron (STS) and

both Army and Air Force JTAC instructors teach in order to establish an understanding

that there are no differences amongst services when it deals with controlling CAS

aircraft.

Many will argue that the responsibility and skill set of a JTAC cannot be easily

made in mass quantities to fill shortages and not everyone should be a JTAC. The SOF

community placed its own pre-requisites that differed from what the CF Air Force was

doing. In order for an enlisted Soldier to attend JTAC school, he has to be an artillery

forward observer (MOS: 13F), rank of Staff Sergeant and JFO qualified. The CF Air

54

Force sends their enlisted airman to JTAC school as E-3s. For officers, the minimum rank

for SOF is Captain that is key developmental (KD) complete as an artillery officer (MOS:

13A) while the CF Air Force allows Second Lieutenants to attend. How the CF Air Force

trains their JTACs, should by no means be discounted, but merely shows a comparison of

the two in order to justify the argument for the Army in later sections of this chapter.

In this chapter the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of implementing Army

JTACs in the conventional force will be explained through the lenses of tactical level

commanders, FCoE, ARCIC, Army G3, and USSOCOM. Following this introduction,

Chapter 4 will be organized into a brief history of the forward observer and JTAC, the

Doctrine, Organization, and Leadership and Education (DOL) analysis, the author’s

updated individual recommendation (after conducting research), the stakeholder analysis,

and finally improved stakeholder insights. Before conducting the research, there is

sufficient enough of doctrinal publications and documents to implement conventional

force Army JTACs but the leadership and education for this argument may be difficult to

execute. This initial conclusion is solely based on my experiences in the conventional

Army and special operations. Furthermore, to fully understand the need for JTACs in the

Army conventional force, the history of the JTAC and the Army forward observer must

first be analyzed.

History

Since the introduction of air power during World War I, providing close air

support to the ground forces has always been a challenging and specified mission set. The

first concepts of CAS had aircraft flying over trenches and pilots dropping grenades on

the enemy. The pilots also began targeting enemy on the ground with machine gun fire.

55

For obvious reasons, this TTP was not very accurate. Additionally during World War I,

the aircraft attacked the enemy without close coordination with friendly ground forces.

This resulted from the lack of radio communications during that era of history, but the

overall concept of air-to-surface attack in close proximity to friendly forces was born.

During the interwar period, the Army Air Corps continued to develop and refine

doctrine and produced the Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground

Forces published in 1942. According to this manual, the Army Air Corps developed an

air support mission that assigned aircraft to support ground forces. The Air Support Party

(ASP) was created to plan, coordinate, and execute the air support mission. “Air support

parties and air support controls are components of an air support communication

squadron, which is attached to a bombardment group when the latter is engaged in air

support operations.”47 The field manual also explains the importance of cooperation

between the air component and the ground component as, “the basis of effective air

support of ground forces is team work. The air and ground units in such operations in fact

form a combat team. Each member of the team must have the technical skill and training

to enable it to perform its part in the operation and a willingness to cooperate

thoroughly.”48 Additionally, this doctrine established some of the same guidelines we use

today regarding the importance of communications between the aircraft and the ground

force, target description and grid location, and location of friendly forces.

47 Headquarters, Department of the Army Air Corps, Field Manual (FM) 31-35,

Aviation in Support of Ground Forces (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Air Corps, 1942), 54.

48 Ibid., 5.

56

During the Korean War, the terrain consisted of ridge lines and mountainous

terrain that forced fire support personnel to conduct high-angle fires to destroy dug-in

enemy positions. Additionally, the Korean War was the first war that the Air Force had

its independence from the Army. With the conclusion of the World War II, the newly

founded Air Force was preparing to fight the next nuclear war and did not conduct close

air support to ground troops in close contact with the enemy. At this time, the Air Force

was also transitioning from propeller-based aircraft to jet propulsion aircraft. The

techniques, tactics, and procedures outlined in the FM 31-35 developed at the conclusion

of World War II were, arguably, forgotten after the Army Air Corps separated in the Air

Force that we know today. The new Air Force decided to establish Tactical Control

Squadrons (TCSs) to fill the gap to maintain close air support. The unit was established to

maintain air-to-surface fires. Furthermore, the first addition of Tactical Air Control

Parties (TACP) was seen in combat. The Air Force established TACP operations to

provide the final tactical guidance and direction needed to conduct close air support

operations; however, they only operated at the regimental level of command. Since the

Air Force finally implemented an element to control close air support for the ground

troops, a better method to decentralize them to the tactical level was needed. Sadly, this

method was not formally developed until years later.

After the Korean War, the Air Force started to understand its role in close air

support to the Army. The mindset of that time was to kill as many of the enemy without

exposure to U.S. service members. The Army artillery had already established a method

of providing fire support from afar and how to effectively mass fires on the enemy.

Although not properly implemented during the Korean War, the use of forward air

57

controllers (FACs) and TACPs to integrate provided an integration for air-to-surface

fires, they did not fully integrate with fire support coordination centers to command and

control fires. Another issue the Air Force faced was the implementation of Naval gunfire

onto the battlefield along with Army field artillery. The biggest issue with the Air Force

separating from the Army was how it would coordinate with other services in order to

mass fires in a time of war. Fire supporters mostly forgot the art of close air support

coordination with indirect fire and direct fire assets after the Korean War and would not

be revisited until years later.

The Vietnam War brought many new innovations to warfare, specifically to the

Army fire support community, the addition of rotary-winged fire support. The Army

started implementing the use of air-mobile forces in 1965 and shortly after realized the

need for rotary-winged aircraft to provide close air support to troops in combat. The test

of fire supporters in Vietnam was the Battle of Ian Drang Valley, made famous by the

portrayal of LTC Hal Moore in the book We Were Soldiers Once and Young and the hit

motion picture We Were Soldiers. “LTC Moore was overcome with the threat of being

overrun by North Vietnamese regulars and directed his fire support officer (FSO) to call

for all available fires to be delivered as close to the perimeter as possible.”49 As the battle

continued, coordinated artillery and close air support from the Air Force continued to lay

down effective fire support around the surrounded battalion.

49 Robert Why, “The Evolution of Fire Support Doctrine was Driven by

Airmobile Doctrine and New Weapon Systems During the Vietnam War” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, 2004), 47.

58

The use of coordinated efforts from LTC Moore’s fire support officer and the

attached forward air controller led to the efficiency of artillery and air-to-surface close air

support for the first time in U.S. history. Arguably, this incident was the first time in U.S.

history where the Army fire supporter and Air Force forward air controller (who was

essentially the JTAC during that time) met and worked together flawlessly in combat.

This begs the question of what if the Army fire supporter was a JTAC during that time?

Would LTC Moore have had to direct two individuals or just one qualified individual that

could do both jobs? Would it have been more efficient if one qualified individual

executed all of the fire support tasks during the battle of Ian Drang in 1965?

After the Vietnam War, the U.S. military found itself undergoing numerous

personnel and budget cuts; however, the air-to-ground lessons learned in Vietnam were

not forgotten. In the 1980’s the Army and the Air Force did not train for close air support

concurrently as much as they could have, but TTPs and technology continued to improve

as the years past. As the U.S. became involved in Iraq during Desert Storm, the need for

accurate and timely close air support was seen again. Desert Storm brought

improvements to close air support and bombing campaigns with GPS-guided bombs. The

best method for accurately locating a target during this time was the combination of an

aircraft overhead and a forward observer/JTAC on the ground near the target. Even with

the innovations of the GPS-guided bombs, fratricide from attacking aircraft on friendly

ground troops continued to persist.

After the Gulf War, the Army and Air Force continued to work independently

with regards to TTPs for close air support. It was not until the wars in Afghanistan and

Iraq did the U.S. military realize the need for a specialized training program for JTACs.

59

Specifically, in Afghanistan, the aftermath of Operation Anaconda left the Army wanting

their own qualified JTACs due to the shortage of Air Force JTACs in that fight. In 2002,

a Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Executive Steering Committee (ESC), under guidance

from the Joint Chief of Staff, identified the need for “standardized training of joint

terminal attack controllers through the Services, USSOCOM, and other DoD

agencies/organizations that will improve joint force interoperability and effectiveness

while reducing the potential for mishaps and fratricide.”50 With JTAC training already

standardized across the force, the implementation of conventional force Army JTACs

will not require further standardizing.

Doctrine

Currently, there is sufficient doctrine published for the implementation of

conventional force Army JTACS. Additionally, the current doctrine can easily be found

in virtually every Army conventional force fire support element (FSE) office across the

force. The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Joint

Application of Firepower (JFIRE), January 2016 and the Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3,

Close Air Support, 25 November 2014 provide current Army JTACs and aspiring JFOs

doctrine to study and use for execution. The advantage of having all of this readily

accessible doctrine allows current forward observers and JFOs to start training now and

there is no reason that they cannot. The JFIRE and JP 3-09.3 provide multiple execution

templates for JTACs and JFOs. Table 2, below, provides a CAS execution template for

50 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Close Air Support Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA), JCAS AP MOA 2004-01, Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)(Ground) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

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an aspiring or current JTAC to use in training or combat. This template provides a

prescriptive guideline that all JTACs use across the military.

Table 2. CAS Execution Template

1. Routing / Safety of flight 2. CAS aircraft check-in 3. Situation update 4. Game plan 5. CAS brief 6. Remarks / restrictions 7. Readbacks 8. Correlation 9. Attack 10. Assess effects 11. Battle damage assessment (BDA) 12. Routing / Safety flight

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Application of Firepower, JFIRE (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2016), 37.

Table 3. Routing and Safety of Flight Considerations

1. Three-dimensional directions from the current aircraft position to the intended holding point or area. 2. Holding point and altitude, once established, and which agency to contact. 3. Other aircraft on station. 4. Surface-to-air threats that may immediately affect close air support aircraft 5. Any other safety of flight issues.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Application of Firepower, JFIRE (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2016), 40.

Table 3, above, depicts routing and safety of flight considerations that a JTAC or

JFO uses to control aircraft. This step in the CAS process is usually the step that young

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JFOs fear the most because the routing and safety of flight considerations are the first

transmission that is sent to an aircraft after the aircraft conducts an initial check-in. For

example, the lead pilot of the sortie will do an initial check in of the type of aircraft, how

many aircraft, current altitude, and current location, which most times is many nautical

miles away. The pilot does this to announce the arrival of the aircraft and to request a safe

route and altitude to enter the airspace in need of CAS. Additionally, the above template

can be reviewed and studied long before an aspiring JTAC ever has to talk to live aircraft.

Arguably, since this is the first time the pilot is hearing the JTACs voice the pilot either

gains or loses confidence in the JTAC.

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Table 4. Situation Update Example 1 Situation Update Line

Close Air Support (CAS) Situation Update

Battlefield Handover (BHO)

Threat -Give general locations of surface-to-air threats not already provided. -Pass the time of the last observed surface-to-air fires.

Targets -Give the general enemy disposition. Avoid giving a list of grids. Specific targets and locations will be addressed in a CAS brief

-Give the general enemy disposition. -Include ground combat element (GCE) targeting priorities. -Include target location grids. This may require breaking up the transmission. -Provide a GCE attack guidance matrix and target priority list.

Friendly -Provide the general situation and scheme of maneuver for friendly forces. -Use geographic references, phase lines, checkpoints, etc. The technique is to use general terms: “all friendlies are east of the 94 easting.” -Do not pass friendly grids, if it can be avoided. If necessary, use no more than 6 digits. -Include all friendlies that may be factors during time on station (TOS), not just the JTAC. -Include all CAS assets, ordnance, and TOS remaining for BHO.

Artillery -Indirect fire assets that could be factors during TOS, may include the general direction of fire.

-Include the firing unit’s location, call sign, frequency, and status.

Clearance Authority

-Omit it if the speaker has control. -Clarify roles if there could be confusion due to multiple voices on the tactical air direction net -Determine who has which elements of brief, stack, mark, and control. -Pass a plan for approving fires for BHO if one has not been prebriefed.

Ordnance -Determine the expected ordnance required to achieve the ground commander’s intent. -Provide any restrictions to ordnance, such as no cluster bomb units or low collateral damage bombs only.

Remarks and Restrictions

Remarks and restrictions may include the following: -JTAC capabilities -Intent for aircraft -Hazards

Remarks and restrictions may include the following: -Hazards (weather) or other remarks. -At the conclusion, provide a positive passing of the appropriate elements of brief, stack, mark, and control.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Application of Firepower, JFIRE (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2016), 43-44.

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The JFIRE and JP 3-09.3 provide a situation update example and a sample CAS

9-Line, above, in Table 4. With the above template, a JFO can provide CAS aircraft with

a situation update that will help establish situational understanding to the CAS pilots on

activities happening on the ground as well as any threats that may endanger the CAS

aircraft/pilots. The most important example template for JTACs is the Game Plan and

CAS 9-Line template in the JFIRE.

Table 5. Game Plan and 9-Line CAS Brief

Game Plan Type (1,2,3) BOT/BOC Ordnance requested Interval 9-Line CAS 1. IP/BP 2. Heading 3. Distance 4. Target elevation 5. Target description 6. Target location 7. Type of mark 8. Location of friendlies 9. Egress Remarks/Restrictions

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Application of Firepower, JFIRE (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2016), 48.

Table 5, above, is the game plan and 9-Line CAS brief used by the U.S. military

and coalition forces. This template is prescriptive in nature and used in the execution of

CAS. Pilots expect to receive the terminal attack control guidance in the exact depicted

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order to facilitate the efficient receiving of targeting data. Once a JTAC memorizes this

template, passing the data to aircraft ready to attack a target becomes second nature. Like

the previous templates provided in this chapter, an aspiring forward observer or JFO is

able to start reviewing and studying now. Furthermore, the studying of all tables provided

will increase the chances of a candidate successfully passing JTAC school.

The JFIRE and JP 3-09.3 have been in circulation for a number of years and it

would prove difficult for a fire support element to operate without these two doctrinal

publications. The acknowledgement that both publications are “Joint” exists, but arguably

all fixed-wing CAS missions that occur with the Army are Joint. Additionally, the Army

Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.42 Fire Support in the Brigade Combat Team (March

2016) provides roles and responsibilities of members of the fire support team to include

JTACs. However, the publication only highlights the use of Air Force JTACs but does

acknowledge that they are not always readily available.

The doctrine that does not exist; however, includes the regulations on how many

qualified JTACs are needed for each BCT and how to maintain those JTAC currencies on

a yearly basis in the conventional force. Currently, the Army special operations

community manages its JTACs through the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between

the United States Army and United States Air Force for Army/Air Force Liaison Support.

The memorandum establishes specifications on how the Army and the Air Force will

carry out their functions in conjunction. “The intent of the agreement is to increase joint

capabilities, identify joint interdependencies, and standardize air-ground training,

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equipment interoperability, and combat operations for both services.”51 Ironically, the

MOA governs conventional force Air Force JTACs and Tactical Air Control Parties

(TACPs) in their support to the conventional Army force. The issue with the MOA is that

it does not dictate Air Force JTACs to support at the company-level, but maneuver units

can request one JTAC based on that company’s mission.52

In summary, doctrine already exists that can support the implementation of Army

JTACs in the conventional force through the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures (TTPs) for Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE), January 2016, the Joint

Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 25 November 2014, and the Army Training

Pamphlet (ATP) 3-09.42 Fire Support in the Brigade Combat Team (March 2016).

Additionally, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Army and the Air Force for

Army/Air Force Liaison Support outlines and directs the requirements and certifications

for Air Force JTACs to the Brigade Combat Team. For all of the publications listed,

minor changes would be necessary to explain the change. Simple change documents

added to the publications would suffice until the next addition of each publication.

Furthermore, the doctrine already in circulation will provide candidates the opportunity to

study for JTAC school now.

Organization

51 Joab Cohe, “The Future of the Brigade Combat Team: Air-Ground Integration

and The Operating Environment” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, 2017), 51.

52 Ibid., 52.

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Table 6. Fire Support Personnel Personnel Type Unit

Stryker Armor Infantry Light division

Airborne Air assault

Company FSO (LT) 1 1 1 1 1 1 Fire Support sergeant (SSG) 1 1 1 1 1 1

Forward observer (SGT) 3 0 3 3 3 3 Fire support specialist (SPC) 1 1 1 1 1 1

RTO 4 1 4 4 4 4

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fires (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), x.

The conventional force fire support community has numerous doctrinal

publications and Standing Operating Procedure (SOPs) that dictate how a fires element is

task-organized. However, the special operations community does not have unclassified

documents for reference. Table 6, above, is a representation of the task organization of

fire support personnel at the BCT. At the company-level, “the mission of the Fire Support

Team (FIST) is to provide fire support to the maneuver company. To accomplish this

mission, the FIST is responsible for the five tasks discussed below:

Fire Support Planning. Fire support planning includes developing fires plans (target lists and overlays) and determining FO control options to ensure fire support is integrated into the company commander’s scheme of maneuver and can be executed in a timely manner.

Fire Support Coordination: The FIST must stay abreast of the maneuver situation at all times and monitor requests for fire support within the company to prevent fratricide as the result of friendly fire support. The FIST must advise the maneuver commander on fire support coordinating measures in effect.

Target Location and Calls for Fire: With an accurate target location and proper match of fire support asset to a target, the FIST can increase the effectiveness of indirect fire support.

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Battlefield Information Reporting: The observers are the eyes of the field artillery and a major source of information for the fire support community. Information may be sent in the form of artillery target intelligence (ATI) reports or spot reports. Information is also gathered from the target description and the surveillance received in a each call for fire.

Emergency Control of Close Air Support and Naval Gunfire: Forward air controllers and naval gunfire spotter teams may not always be available. Therefore, the FIST must be proficient in controlling CAS and Naval Gunfire.53

Essentially, each company or troop in a brigade combat team has one fire support

officer (2nd Lieutenant/1st Lieutenant), one fire support sergeant (Staff Sergeant), three

forward observers (Sergeant), one fire support specialist (Specialist), and four radio-

transmitting operators (RTO) (Private First Class). Additionally, the forward observers

and RTOs are positioned into separate platoons within the company or troop with a

purpose of dispersing the whole fire support element for the company/troop commander.

The fire support officer will position himself with the company/troop commander during

planning and the execution of missions while the fire support sergeant and fire support

specialist will position themselves where they feel they are needed. There is currently no

mandate for a JTAC at the company level. The company/troop commander may request a

JTAC for a mission but is limited to the amount of JTACs he will receive. This will lead

to the question: How many JTACs does a BCT need?

The answer to this question depends on the mission, where the mission is being

conducted, and who the enemy is. If the conventional force is preparing to face a near-

peer adversary, the fight could be with multiple companies and troops simultaneously.

53 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 6-30,

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), x.

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Furthermore, the fight could be happening with multiple platoons within a company or

troop simultaneously. One Air Force JTAC will not be as effective and efficient

providing fire support for all of those elements within a BCT at the same time. On the

contrary, this is the reason the Army started implementing the Joint Fires Observer (JFO)

procedures and initially it was a good idea until everyone realized that a JFO still needed

a JTAC to provide terminal attack control (TAC) or actually placing air-delivered

munitions on the enemy. An additional problem set is that “the number of BCTs per

division is not the same across the Army; however, the task organization of Air Force

JTACs that each Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) remains the same.”54 Each

active-duty division headquarters contains one U.S. Air Force ASOS and through

personal experience, there are not enough Air Force JTACs to effectively maintain JFO

currencies.

U.S. Army Major Joab Cohe makes a compelling argument in his Master of

Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis, “The Future of the Brigade Combat Team: Air-

Ground Integration and the Operating Environment” that describes the small numbers of

U.S. Air Force JTACs that are allocated to each BCT. Table 7, below, depicts Major

Cohe’s research findings.

54 Cohe, 54.

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Table 7. U.S. Air Force JTAC Allocations

Brigade Combat Team IBCT SBCT ABCT BCT Headquarters 1 1 1 # of Maneuver Battalions / Squadrons 4 4 4 # of Maneuver Companies / Troops 15 12 15 JTACs required IAW MOA 2011 (min. 2 per HQ) 10 10 10 Additional 1 x JTAC for each Maneuver Company 15 12 15 Total JTACs if disseminated to MNVR CO/TRP 25 25 25

Source: Joab Cohe, “The Future of the Brigade Combat Team: Air-Ground Integration and the Operating Environment” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), 54.

Additionally, MAJ Cohe describes how many Air Force JTACs would be needed

to fulfill the needs of the U.S. Army at the company and troop levels in a peer operating

environment. The bottom line is that there are not enough Air Force JTACs to support

each company/troop in a BCT. Arguably, the need for more JTACs may be

overshadowed by the use of TTPs that were used during the counter-insurgency (COIN)

fight. Table 8, below, shows his research findings.

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Table 8. U.S. Air Force JTAC Allocation per U.S. Army Unit Division (Aligned with 1 x ASOS) IBCT SBCT ABCT JTACs per MOA JTAC x MVR CO 1st Armored Division 0 1 2 30 72 1st Cavalry Division 0 0 3 30 75 1st Infantry Division 0 0 2 20 50 2nd Infantry Division 0 2 0 20 44 3rd Infantry Division 1 0 1 20 50 4th Infantry Division 1 1 1 30 72 10th Mountain Division 3 0 0 30 75 25th Infantry Division 3 1 0 40 97 82nd Airborne Division 3 0 0 30 75 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 3 0 0 30 75

Total JTACs IAW MOA 2011 and FM 3-96 BCT Task-Org 280 685

Source: Joab Cohe, “The Future of the Brigade Combat Team: Air-Ground Integration and the Operating Environment” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2017), 54.

Could the conventional force fire support community (which includes Army

FO/JFOs and Air Force JTACs) learn from the special operations community,

specifically with task-organization? Numerous Army SOF units have very similar fire

support task-organizations as the conventional force; however, SOF units have qualified

Army JTACs as part of their task organization. In specific SOF units, the qualified

JTACs are the fire support personnel on their MTOE. Special operations require

additional JTAC allocations due the distance from other friendly units and most

operations occur deep into enemy territory. SOF units are assigned specially trained U.S.

Air Force personnel known as Combat Controller Team (CCT) members that are also

JTAC qualified. CCTs are trained to conduct air traffic control and fire support with

rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. The CCT works closely with the company

commander and the fire support team. Normally, one CCT is assigned to each SOF

company element with additional CCTs assigned to the battalion headquarters; however,

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there are not many CCTs in the Air Force assigned to Army SOF units. For this reason,

Army SOF units assign Army JTACs to close the gap of CAS execution requirements at

the tactical level.

In summary, the conventional force fire support community lacks qualified Air

Force JTACs available to support Army units at the company-level. It is not feasible for

the Air Force to fill all of the manning positions that the CF Army requires described in

this thesis but the addition of Army JTACs could help the Air Force. Furthermore, SOF

units maintain the same fire support task-organization as the conventional force with the

addition of one CCT in each company and the use of Army JTACs. The conventional

force fire support community could mirror their task-organization to that of the SOF fire

support community by simply allowing forward observers/joint fire observers to become

JTAC-qualified. The Air Force JTAC from the ASOS could fulfill roles, with the

exception of air traffic control that the CCT conducts in the SOF task-organization.

Additionally, there is no a need to adjust the conventional force task-organization to

support additional JTACs at the company-level.

Leadership and Education

The most important question to implementing conventional force Army JTACs is:

How does a conventional unit train and maintain JTACs? Many senior artillery officers

claim that allowing forward observers/joint fires observers to become JTACs is too costly

to the Army and Army JTACs cannot be maintained because of the difficulty of acquiring

live aircraft to conduct training. Additionally, there is an issue in the conventional force

Army to maintain the currencies of joint fires observers. Therefore, how could adding

JTACs to the equation help? The implementation of Army JTACs is not an impossible

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task for the conventional force as special operations units train and maintain their JTACs

every year. Many fire supporters believe SOF is able to do this because of their smaller

size. However, the conventional force could train and maintain JTACs if the military

established another JTAC school to educate the increased population of forward

observers. Conventional units would need to work closer with their ASOS counterparts

and us simulators to fulfill currency requirements for both JFOs and JTACS.

Currently, SOF sends forward observers/joint fires observers (of the rank of Staff

Sergeant and above for enlisted and KD-complete Captain and above for officers) to the

Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course (SOTACC), the Air Force Joint

Terminal Attack Controller Qualification Course (JTAC QC), and other sister service

JTAC schools to earn the qualification. Each of the schools provide the academic

requirements needed for a JTAC qualification outlined in the JTAC MOA. The schools

are four months in length and have high standards for graduation. Soldiers, Airmen,

Marines, and Naval Special Warfare personnel spend the first three weeks in the

classroom studying aircraft capabilities, munitions, fires planning, and simulated terminal

attack controls are conducted followed by the final week at the range with graded

terminal attack controls with live aircraft and munitions. However, each JTAC school

does not fully qualify a candidate as JTAC-qualified until the service member returns to

his unit to conduct his final twelve graded controls. The reason for this is to place

ownership of the final responsibility of certifying a JTAC on the unit.

Arguably, the SOF fire support community continues to have issues finding

available school slots for their JTAC candidates due to the limited amount of schools.

With the limited availability of JTAC schools, the conventional force could alleviate the

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issue for both SOF and CF by establishing an additional JTAC school to support the

greater increase of candidates. The school would be located at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and

would be managed by the Field Artillery School. Instructors would come from the SOF

community of JTACs that are at risk of losing their qualifications due to promotions.

In one particular SOF task-organization, there is only one enlisted Army JTAC in

each company. There are four companies per battalion and only one of those four

company-level JTACs has the privilege of being promoted to battalion-level JTAC. Out

of the three battalions, only one of the three battalion-level JTACs has the privilege of

being promoted to regiment-level. This leaves a total of eleven remaining U.S. Army

JTACs without a job in the SOF fire support community (Table 9 below). The example

provided, through personal experience, is only from one particular SOF unit and other

Army SOF units have similar issues. The individuals that do not get promoted normally

find themselves in the conventional force to continue their careers until retirement and

are unable to maintain their JTAC currency requirements. With the establishment of a

conventional force JTAC school, those individuals would have the opportunity to

maintain their JTAC currency and be the instructors for future conventional force

candidates.

Table 9. U.S. Army SOF Fire Support Task-Org of Enlisted JTACs # per Company

# of Company per BN

# per BN # of loss per BN

# of BN per REG

# of loss per REG

Net loss of JTACs

1 4 4 3 3 2 11

Source: Created by author, U.S. Army SOF Fire Support Task-Org of Enlisted JTACs, 2018.

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Another issue that exists with the implementation of conventional force Army

JTACs concerns the question of: How and where to conduct training for currencies? An

additional question is: How and where will the live aircraft training be conducted?

Conventional force fire support communities already work close to their ASOS

counterparts that are co-located at each Army duty station. The CF relies on the ASOS to

maintain the joint fires observer training, qualifications, and currencies because JTACs

are needed. Conventional force Army JTACs would be able to maintain their training and

qualifications at the ASOS since JFOs are currently using the same facilities. There is no

change to how many Army Soldiers that would be using the ASOS facilities; only a

change to some of the Army personnel being JTAC-qualified.

Through personal experience and experiences of other professionals in my field,

the availability of live aircraft to conduct CAS training is very limited for JTACs.

Oftentimes, JTACs in the Air Force and Army SOF JTACs have to travel to distant

ranges where they can find available live aircraft for training. This can be costly for the

conventional force to maintain and not every Army duty station has ranges that support

air-to-ground missions and live munitions. On the contrary, it is costly for the Air Force

to fly their pilots to Army duty stations to support the training. There is a need for a better

system to allow JTACs to conduct live aircraft training for the both the Army and Air

Force.

Simulators provide a possible solution in lieu of live aircraft training to maintain

JTAC/JFO training, qualification, and currency. The current JTAC MOA mandates the

use of live aircraft for qualifications and currencies, which is restricting JTACs.

Oftentimes, a JTAC finds himself rushing to meet currencies before a deployment and

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needs to request travel to a distant location. If that JTAC could use a simulator to meet

his requirements, it would save the unit money and time to prepare for combat. Each U.S.

Air Force ASOS has at least one dedicated simulator at each Army duty station. The

simulator is used for JFOs and Air Force JTACs in training. It is acknowledged that a

simulator will most-likely never provide the realistic 360-degree experience that a JTAC

would have on the ground, but it could facilitate the learning of the JTAC fundamental

skills.

From personal experiences and observations, most JTACs struggle with

situational awareness of friendly positions, munitions weaponeering, and airspace

management of multiple aircraft in a single stack. A simulator can provide all of these

scenarios for an individual in training or a JTAC in need of currency requirements. The

simulator will actually provide numerous aircraft stacked at numerous altitudes and will

show the actual effects of munitions. Most bombing ranges across the country only allow

for training munitions that do not accurately simulate the lethal munitions used in combat

and could be the reason why some JTACs initially struggle with weaponeering.

Additionally, conventional force JTACs struggle with CAS training at the bombing range

with multiple aircraft availability. On the contrary, some Army SOF JTACs only conduct

this type of live aircraft training a handful of times a year due to high costs and aircraft

availability. SOF units do, however, have the benefit of more frequent deployments to

expose their JTACs to combat scenarios.

In summary of the findings, the conventional force could train and maintain

JTACs if the military established another JTAC school to educate the increased

population of forward observers. Conventional units would need to work closer with

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their ASOS counterparts and use simulators to fulfill currency requirements for both

JFOs and JTACs. Out of all of the DOTMLPF-P domains described in previous chapters,

the domain of leadership and education is the biggest friction point for stakeholders as it

will require the most funding and changes to the current Air Force JTAC memorandum

of agreement.

Stakeholder Analysis

As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the stakeholders identified for this study

are the decision makers within the Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), the Army

Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the Army G3, and U.S. Army Special

Operations Command (USASOC). Through the analysis, the only changes necessary for

the implementation of a conventional force Army JTAC program are minimal changes to

the capabilities of the Army’s fire support task-organization and the establishment of

conventional JTAC school to facilitate the leadership and education domains of the

DOTMLPF-P model.

Specifically, within the FCoE, the primary audience for the implementation of an

Army JTAC program includes the Directorate of Training Development and Doctrine

(DOTD) and the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) are the

main audiences for the implementation of a conventional force JTAC program. “The

DOTD is a catalyst for change within the FCoE and the driver for the development of

innovative learning, training and doctrine products that enable the Operational Fires force

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readiness through institutional, operational, and self-development domains.”55 Below is

the task-organization of the FCoE DOTD.

Figure 12. Task-Org of FCoE DOTD

Source: Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Directorate of Training Development and Doctrine,” 1 August 2017, accessed 4 January 2018, http://sill-www.army.mil/dots/ index.html.

The DOTD will use the current JTAC joint doctrine that is already in circulation

within the Army conventional force to support JFO training. The task of the FCoE DOTD

55 Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Director of Training Development and

Doctrine,” Fires Center of Excellence Directorate of Training Development and Doctrine, 01 AUG 17, accessed 04 JAN 18, http://sill-www.army.mil/dots/index.html.

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is to “enhance the combat readiness and effectiveness of the current and future fires

force.”56 The implementation of an Army conventional force JTAC program would allow

the FCoE DTOD to accomplish their task. Minimal if any changes are required to the

current conventional force doctrine. Simply allowing an NCO forward observer that is

JFO-qualified to become JTAC-qualified is all that is needed for the change.

Furthermore, the DTOD is an organization within the FCoE with a task “to develop

FCoE related concepts, requirements, and experimentation to validate DOTMLPF-P

integrated combined arms capabilities that complement other joint, interagency, and

multinational capabilities and acts as the user representative to the materiel developer for

field artillery and air-missile defense systems.”57

Furthermore, the DTOD, will use the current doctrine but will provide further

testing and evaluation of the current doctrine that will ultimately test future training

requirements based on the current training requirements that have been outline by the Air

Force. Training requirements will remain the same as the joint force JTACs, for the time

being, but if there may be restrictive findings that the DTOD discovers during their

testing and evaluation. Specifically, the DTOD may find friction points with the current

conventional force Army training requirements with correlation to the future Army JTAC

requirements. For example, the current glide-path for an IBCT to prepare for deployment

56 Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Director of Training Development and

Doctrine,” 1 August 2017, accessed 4 January 2018, http://sill-www.army.mil/dots/index.html.

57 Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate,” 1 August 2017, accessed 4 January 2018, http://sill-www.army.mil/cdid/ index.html.

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will not include training requirements for Army JTACs. IBCTs, today, have a hard time

finding time to maintain currencies of their MTOE forward observer/JFOs. Along with

the DTOD, within the FCoE, there is the Capabilities Development and Integration

Directorate (CDID) and this organization may be able to help the DTOD in their

research. Figure 13, below, depicts the FCoE CDID organization.

Figure 13. FCoE CDID Organization

Source: Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate,” 1 August 2017, accessed 4 January 2018, http://sill-www.army.mil/cdid/ index.html.

The CDID will validate the requested change to the DOL domains of the

DOTMLPF-P model. The CDID takes the recommendations and possible friction points

that the DTOD has identified and conducts further testing/experimentation. They

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essentially take the recommended and initially vetted changes and put them into practice

albeit still in experimentation phase. Furthermore, the CDID will identify future

requirements for Army JTAC training and maintenance of currencies and produce the

required Capabilities Development Documents (CDD) and further the Capabilities Needs

Analysis (CNA) process as part of the overall DOTMLPF-P process mentioned in

Chapter 3.

At the FCoE, the DOTD and CDID validate the requirements needed for the

implementation of the Army conventional force JTAC program and then the requested

change would move up to the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) for final

approval. ARCIC “establishes a sound conceptual foundation for Army modernization by

conducting rigorous experiments, wargames, and assessments to learn in a focused,

sustained, and collaborative manner by using the DOTMLPF-P model to prioritize efforts

to accomplish the Army’s Warfighting challenges.”58 Like the DTOD and CDID of the

FCoE, ARCIC will continue to test and validate the requirements needed for

conventional force Army JTACs. They will ultimately test the feasibility, suitability, and

acceptability of the findings that the DTOD and CDID prescribed and approved for

further examination. ARCIC has identified the FCoE as the lead proponent to research

Warfighting Challenge #17/18: Employ Cross-Domain Fires.59 Additionally, ARCIC has

identified the following learning demands for FCoE:

58 Army Capabilities Integration Center, August 2017, accessed January 2018,

http://www.arcic.army.mil/.

59 Ibid.

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How does the Fires Cell in the Operational Fires Command rapidly clear and gain engagement authorization to employ Army and JIM fires across all domains during JCAM?

How does the Fires Cell in the Strategic Fires Command rapidly clear and gain engagement authorization to employ Army and JIM fires across all domains in ROMO?

How does the Operation Fires Command deliver effective cannon, rocket, and missile fires against land, air, and maritime targets with the capacity, range, and lethality to overmatch enemy capabilities?

How does the Strategic Fires Command deliver effective rocket and missile fires against land, air, sea, and space targets to defend friendly forces and critical assets?

How do the Operational and Strategic Fires Commands employ cross domain fires within a JIM environment, leveraging joint assets and the capabilities of allied nations?

How does the Observation Battery of the Operational Fires Command provide persistent all weather targeting in dense urban/suburban areas during JCAM?

How does the Target Acquisition Batter in the Strategic Fires Command provide persistent all weather targeting in littorals across ROMO?

How does the Fires Cell of the Operational and Strategic Fires Commands integrate Army and JIM sensors to collect and share information, facilitate targeting and engagements, and provide early warning?

How does the Observation Battery of the Operational Fires Command locate ground and maritime targets throughout the depth of the joint operational area with sufficient accuracy and timeliness to engage targets with precision cannon, rocket, and missile fires, achieving desired effects only on designated targets?

How does the Operational and Strategic Fires Command leverage space-based capabilities in satellite communications (SATCOM), position, navigation and timing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile warning, and environmental monitoring during multi-domain battle?60

As portrayed above, ARCIC has its hands full with requirements to prepare the

Army for a peer threat operating environment. If the FCoE, as the fire support subject

60 Army Capabilities Integration Center.

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matter expert (SME), approves a solution to solve the majority of the above listed

questions with the implementation of conventional force JTACs, ARCIC will quickly

look to push the approved change to the next higher echelon. With recommendations

from FCoE DOTD and CDID and improved recommendations from ARCIC, the request

for change will then move on the Army G3 for final approval. “The function of the

HQDA G35/7 is to acquire and distribute people and equipment to build, train, and

maintain readiness to provide a combat ready unit/force to the combatant commanders.”61

The Army G3 will action the conventional force Army JTAC program.

Specifically, the Army G3 will direct the establishment of a new Army JTAC school and

prescribe where it will be located and how it will be operated. Additionally, the Army

G3 will coordinate with the Air Force G3 to synchronize and integrate the curriculum for

the future Army JTAC school, based on current JTAC school curriculums. Furthermore,

the Army G3 will direct the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to

identify qualified Army JTACs within their ranks that are at risk of being removed from

SOF for promotion purposes and direct the conventional Army to prepare their senior fire

supporters for the opportunity of going to JTAC school.

The final stakeholder for the requested change of this thesis is USASOC.

USASOC needs to be a stakeholder, at least initially, because the qualified Army JTACs

that will be needed to start the implementation of conventional force JTAC program will

have to come out of this organization. As previously described in this chapter, the SOF

61 Department of Logistics and Resource Operations, F100: Reading Book (Ft.

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 2017), F101RA-23.

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fire support community tends to promote JTACs out of positions; however, USASOC can

transition those Soldiers to the FCoE to continue working as qualified JTACs. The

friction point lies with the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of USASOC allowing

the qualified Army JTACs that they had trained to simply transition to the conventional

force. Additionally, Army SOF JTACs that are transitioning out of USASOC

assignments may have little if any experience operating in the conventional Army. This

may seem like a miniscule problem, but many enlisted Army SOF JTACs have not spent

any time in the conventional Army as they went from basic training straight into SOF. A

further study of how this would affect USASOC and the conventional Army is needed

because numerous jobs exist within SOF for JTACs but they remain classified for the

purposes of this thesis and no study has been conducted on the successfulness of an Army

SOF JTAC progressing in the conventional Army.

Conclusion

In summary, after sixteen years of COIN operations the conventional force Army

fires community, along with the entire conventional Army, has become complacent from

fighting a small enemy force, slow operations tempo, the privilege of having a myriad of

resources, and conducting operations from fixed locations. Changes to the domains of

doctrine, organization, and leadership and education of the DOTMLFPF-P model are

needed for the implementation of an Army conventional force JTAC program. Through

the FCoE (specifically the DTOD and CDID), ARCIC, the Army G3, and the approval of

USASOC the implementation of a conventional force JTAC program is feasible, suitable,

and acceptable.

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The changes to doctrine and organization are minimal at best but the change to

leadership and education may be the biggest friction point. Furthermore, the

establishment of a conventional force JTAC school and the SOF JTACs, initially needed

for instructors, compound the issue. Additionally, my analysis has described that the

requirements to maintain a JTAC with training, qualifications, and currencies remains to

be difficult. The research shows that a possible solution is certainly within reach;

however, the solution make be longer in duration for full implementation.

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CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis remains to provide a possible solution to solve the

Army warfighting challenge of achieving cross domain fires. Specifically, the Army can

achieve and accomplish the air-to-surface domains with the implementation of a

conventional force Army JTAC program. Over sixteen years of fighting in a COIN

environment has led the conventional Army fire support community to lack superior fire

support skills that will be needed against a peer adversary may be faced in the future. In

this chapter, the eight-stage process of the Kotter change model is used as a construct to

implement an Army conventional force JTAC program. Furthermore, the author separates

recommendations into short term (1-2 years), long-term (3-5 years), and will prioritize by

“must do” (Priority A), “should do” (Priority B), and “nice to do” (Priority C), as

depicted in Table 10. Lastly, possible future research ideas will be described and personal

lessons learned from writing this thesis to future MMAS researchers.

Kotter Change Model (Proposed Glide-path)

The sense of urgency (Stage 1) is the Army warfighting challenge of achieving

cross domain fires against near peer threats. The United States cannot ignore the threats

of North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran of today. The guiding coalition (Stage 2) of this

thesis argument are the SOF JTACs that are officers. Officer JTACs differ from the

enlisted JTACs because of the transition back to the conventional force before having an

opportunity to return to SOF. The Army SOF JTAC officers must transition back to the

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conventional force to achieve key and developmental positions to further career

progression before having the opportunity to return to SOF. There are numerous officer

JTACs that return to the conventional force to only realize what it is missing and those

officers lose their JTAC currencies due to no positions for JTAC-qualified individuals.

This thesis serves as a potential module of developing a vision and strategy (Stage

3) for future MMAS candidates and the publication of this thesis will serve as the means

of communicating the change vision (Stage 4). Additionally, the stakeholders could use

this thesis and others to empower broad-based action (Stage 5) to change the doctrine,

organization, and leadership and education domains to support Army JTACs. The short-

term wins (Stage 6) will be the first two years of the implemented change. The first group

of conventional force JTAC school graduates will return to their units and deploy to

combat where they will showcase their skills. In this effort, their ground force

commanders will truly appreciate their worth on the team.

The consolidation of gains and production of more changes (Stage 7) will be

years three through five of the implemented change. For the same reasons as previously

listed, the more conventional force Army JTACs performing in combat will show the

ground force commanders of their value. Additionally, the more conventional force Army

JTAC graduates will eventually reduce the initial reliance on the U.S. Air Force to keep

the program going. Anchoring new approaches in the culture (Stage 8) will naturally

occur with conventional force Army JTACs being seen and heard in their BCT

formations. Young forward observer/joint fires observers can emulate senior Army fire

support JTACs and see their successes to one day assume those positions.

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Short-Term (1-2 years)

Table 10. Recommendation Priorities

Priority A “Must do” Priority B “Should do” Priority C “Nice to do”

Source: Created by author.

The first two years of implementing a conventional force JTAC program will be

the most difficult as personnel from USASOC will have to transition to the conventional

force under the FCoE and establish a JTAC curriculum (Priority A). Current Army SOF

JTAC instructors at SOTACC will develop and teach the classes in the curriculum. The

curriculum will stay initially the same with the exception of providing terminal attack

control to assets that are only exclusive to special operations (Priority B). Simultaneous

to curriculum development will be identifying a location for the JTAC candidates. The

initial location could be in Snow Hall at Fort Sill, Oklahoma until further locations are

identified and funded by DoD (Priority B). The duration needed to identify instructors,

develop a curriculum, and identify a location for the school will take approximately one

year.

Initially, the only units that will be able to send their forward observer/joint fires

observers to the school will come out of 18th Airborne Corps, specifically from the 101st

Airborne Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and 10th Mountain Division (Priority A). The

reason for this is that the SOF JTAC curriculum focuses on light infantry and not

mechanized infantry formations. Numerous vehicles and communications suites are

needed to simulate the requirements needed in a mechanized infantry formation but will

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be provided at a later time based on the initial success or failures of the first school.

Candidates from the three divisions will be required to attend a pre-JTAC course to

ensure success of the candidate and remove unprepared candidates (Priority B).

Additionally, the Air Force ASOS located at Fort Campbell, Fort Bragg, and Ford Drum

respectively will provide pre-JTAC training for Army candidates if able to support

(Priority C). If the ASOS at any of the three locations cannot support the pre-JTAC

training, the course will be provided at Fort Sill (Priority C).

Once candidates return from JTAC school, the personnel will be provided initial

controls and an initial evaluation conducted by ASOS JTACs (Priority B). Air Force

JTACs assigned to BCTs will initially manage and train the Army JTACs that are in the

same BCTs (Priority B). This is similar to how the special operations community started

using Army JTACs in their formations but the CCTs providing the initial oversight. The

use of an already assigned Air Force JTAC to facilitate the training and management of

the Army JTACs assigned to the same unit will provide an opportunity to work closer

together and establish relationships for not only the Air Force JTAC but also the Army

JTACs with other fire support members of their BCT.

Long-Term (3-5 years)

In the long-term, the JTAC school will be open to personnel in mechanized units

because the training platforms and communication suites will be provided at Fort Sill

(Priority A). The initial reliance of the Air Force ASOS JTACs to manage and conduct

evaluations for the Army JTACs will start to diminish as the first group of JTAC

candidates get promoted to the battalion-level where they can manage Army JTACs at

the company-level; however, Air Force JTACs will continue to work with their Army

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counterparts at the BCT level with training, qualifications, and evaluations with live

aircraft.

Additionally, the long-term goal will result in updated doctrine to the

conventional force (Priority B) and the reliance to Army SOF personnel needed for

instructors will start to diminish. After five years of being a conventional force JTAC, an

NCO would be allowed to compete for an instructor position at the JTAC school and

Human Resources Command (HRC) would identify this career move as a broadening

assignment in the NCO career path (Priority C).

Future Research Ideas

Numerous challenges became apparent during the research of this thesis. There is

adequate fire support information and how it has changed the battlefield; however, the

majority of the research is surface-to-surface when specifically referencing Army forward

observers. On the contrary, there is much information on air-to-surface operations,

notably for the Gulf War and the War on Terror but nothing that specifically talks about

the need for conventional for Army JTACs; however, there are a few sources that

describe the need for more Air Force JTACs to support the Army.

A possible future research topic could be: How to maintain conventional force

Army JTAC currencies? Currently, the Air Force memorandum of agreement for JTACs

does not allow simulators or online training to replace the live aircraft requirement for

semi-annual controls. A secondary question to this possible future research topic could

be: Could the Army produce its own memorandum of agreement for Army JTACs or

does the Air Force own the duty position of JTAC exclusively? It is possible that if the

90

Army had more control of its own JTACs that it could use simulators and online training

to suffice for required semi-annual controls if live aircraft are unavailable.

An additional research topic could be: Would the Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE) be the authority of conventional force Army JTACs or would the Air Force adopt

this role? The ability of the FCoE to establish, operate, and maintain a new conventional

force Army JTAC school remains one of the assumptions to the proposed solution.

Additional questions to this topic could be: Does the FCoE have the manpower to support

Army JTAC training and currencies? Also, can the Air Force support the same issue with

the addition of Army JTACs?

Furthermore, the question of whether or not Army JTACs could become an MOS

in the future could be a topic of future research. As previously stated in this thesis, the

Marine Corps implemented this change. Arguably, they made this change for the

suitability, acceptability, and feasibility of having organic Marine JTACs to support their

operations. The establishment of the Marine Corps JTAC MOS allowed for funding and

consideration to training and currency requirements. The Marine Corps lead into the next

future research idea because they have their own organic aircraft.

With this being said: Could U.S. Army rotary winged and unmanned aerial

system (UAS) aircraft assist in JTAC currencies? Current doctrine does not require that

an individual must be JTAC-qualified to employ fires from rotary wing platforms. Any

individual on the battlefield in close combat with the enemy can use the rotary wing 5-

line call for fire. On the contrary, armed Army UAS platforms are still a relatively new

concept for employment and does require the need for a JTAC-qualified individual to

employ its weapon systems. Two secondary questions to this future research topic could

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be: Could Army UAS platforms support Army JTAC currency requirements?

Additionally, how feasible is it for Army rotary wing platforms to receive 9-Line CAS

calls for fire as opposed to the traditional 5-Line calls for fire?

In summary, further research of maintaining Army JTAC currencies, the

feasibility of the FCoE being the Army JTAC higher authority, the possibility of making

the Army JTAC an MOS, and a study of Army rotary wing and UAS platforms assisting

in JTAC currencies will be a positive addition to this thesis argument for the

implementation of a conventional force Army JTAC program. These topics are not within

my scope of research for this thesis and require a more thorough study. The topics will

bring similar research challenges concerning the majority of publications, articles, and

books only portraying surface-to-surface fires and only the use of Air Force JTACs

executing CAS. These challenges are inherent when dealing with a new concept for the

Army.

Personal Lessons Learned

The journey of writing this thesis has brought me to numerous realizations mostly

concerning the writing of the longest written document I have ever completed.

Additionally, the longest research paper I completed included only one single book as a

source. I now have a deeper appreciation whenever I open a book and look at how it is

outlined and for the countless hours that the author must have spent writing it. The

countless hours of research, revisions, and refinement of the document is simply

something to be respected and appreciated. The most important lessons that I have

learned during his journey include the problem-solving skills, the process to finding

professional dialogue, and the application of the Army’s processes in a way that can

92

effectively persuade the policy makers. The Army Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) set me up for success to achieve my goals in completing this thesis with superb

instruction and a curriculum that effectively ties together through multiple course lessons,

instructors, and subjects.

When I first arrived at CGSC, I knew I wanted to complete a MMAS thesis but

did not know what topic I wanted to research. One of the first assignments of the

curriculum was to conduct an oral presentation on one of the Army’s Warfighting

Challenges and the assignment was to demonstrate a student’s ability to brief a topic and

was not necessarily meant to display research ability. I decided to take on the topic of

achieving cross domain fires, which ultimately inspired me to write about this thesis, and

along with my personal experiences in my career, I felt compelled to share my thoughts

to the broader audience. The difficult topic of achieving cross domain fires was given to

the FCoE to solve and numerous individuals have written on the subject to contribute to

the Field Artillery branch. Accomplishing a difficult task has been well instructed during

the CGSC course and topics like the Kotter change model was the driving framework for

my argument. After identifying my topic, I then learned from the MMAS class

instructions on where and how to conduct my research.

Finding sources for this thesis was the most time-consuming part of this entire

process and countless hours were spent at the library looking up any topic that resembled

what I was trying to write about. Additionally, numerous hours were spent researching

the library via Blackboard where I did find a few previous MMAS theses. One of biggest

challenges of this research was arguing a point that is only justified in special operations

classified doctrinal documents and lessons learned of actual classified special operations.

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For future researchers using special operations TTPs as an argument, I would recommend

an upgraded classification of similar thesis to FOUO, or higher, in order to fully describe

and portray the argument with information that has been written into doctrine.

Additionally, the decision to not use professional interviews for the thesis became an

issue when attempting to make a point about a certain topic that is not written into

doctrine or common knowledge other than amongst SOF fire supporters. Furthermore,

studying previous MMAS thesis provided me with insights from the Center of Army

Lessons Learned (CALL) and other professional documents from the fire support

community of all branches of the military. Now that I had all of my research documents,

I needed a way to explain for my proposed change to the Army.

During CGSC, the F100 block of instruction described how the Army implements

change dealing with personnel and equipment. This is where I learned about the

DOTMLPF-P model and all of the key stakeholders. My instruction from LTC Wayne

Vornholt of the Department of Logistics and Resources Operations (DLRO) and Staff

Group 10C provided me with superior knowledge of implementing change in the Army.

Additionally, guidance from my chairman, Dr. Kenneth Long, provided the construct of

truly showing “how” to implement change in the Army and put it into writing using the

R1/R2/R3 method. Furthermore, before the F100 block of instruction, I was completely

unaware of how the Army adopted change and I was unaware of the numerous

stakeholders that are the decision-makers for change. Additionally, learning about the

organizations within the stakeholders that conduct further research of a change for

implementation was unknown to me at the beginning of this journey.

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In conclusion, the writing of thesis has given me a deeper appreciation for authors

of all of types concerning numerous topics. The overall instruction from the CGSC cadre

ultimately assisted me in putting together this thesis and I am greatly thankful. This thesis

will shed light on a topic that is widely known amongst the fire support community and

will portray a possible implementation that requires minimal changes to the Army. To the

future MMAS researchers: Good luck on your journey!

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GLOSSARY

Air Liaison Officer (ALO). The senior tactical air control party member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground command on air power.62

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The principal air control agency of the theater air control system responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground combat element.63

Army Air-Ground System (AAGS). Consists of airspace elements, fires cells, air and missile defense sections, and coordination and liaison elements embedded in Army command posts.64

Close Air Support (CAS). Air action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity for friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.65

Conventional Forces (CF). U.S. military forces other than those designated as Special Operations Forces.66

Counterinsurgency (COIN). Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.67

Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). Measures employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.68

62 JCS, JP 3-09.3, GL-8.

63 Ibid.

64 Headquarters, Department of the Army Air Corps, FM 31-35, 2.

65 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2016).

66 JCS, JP 3-05, 1-3.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 87.

96

Fire Support Officer. The field artillery officer from the operational to tactical level responsible for advising the supported commander or assisting the senior fires officer of the organization on fires function and fire support.69

Fire Support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuant of tactical and operational objectives.70

Fires. The use of weapon systems or other actions to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.71

Forward Air Controller (FAC). An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in close air support of ground forces.72

Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC). Located within the Army division current operations integration cell, it provides commanders a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in the division-assigned airspace.73

Joint Fires Observer (JFO). A trained service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 close air support terminal attack control, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations.74

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). JTAC is defined as a qualified (certified) service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive operations.75

69 JCS, JP 3-05, 87.

70 JCS, JP 1-02, 86.

71 Ibid.

72 JCS, JP 3-09.3, GL-10.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

97

Special Operations Forces (SOF). Those active and reserve component forces of the services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.76

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The principal air liaison unit co-located with the ground maneuver units. The TACP has two primary missions: advise the ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air operations and provide the primary Terminal Attack Control (TAC) of close air support. Members of the TACP include the ALO, JTAC, ISR liaison officer, and space liaison officer.77

Terminal Attack Control (TAC). The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. JTACs located within TACPs at the division, brigade, and battalion levels provide this capability.78

Type 1 control. Type 1 control is used when the JTAC requires control of individual attacks and the situation requires the JTAC to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target for each attack.79

Type 2 control. the JTAC must visually acquire the target or utilize targeting data from another asset with accurate real-time targeting information for individual attacks, however visual acquiring of the attacking aircraft is not required.80

Type 3 control. is used when the JTAC requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement, subject to specific attack restrictions and the JTAC must visually acquire the target or utilize another asset with real-time targeting information but is not required to visually acquire the attacking aircraft.81

76 JCS, JP 3-09.3, GL-10.

77 HQDA, ATP 3-91.1, 1-1.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 JCS, JP 3-09.3.

81 Ibid.

98

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