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Transition of South East Europe’s energy sectors:
local development opportunity
or take-over of public infrastructure and resources?
ON THE ROADTO CHANGE
Government of the Republic of CroatiaO�ce for Cooperation with NGOs
This position paper has been produced on behalf of SEENET: The South East Europe
Environmental CSO network on natural resources, energy and transport. It is part of
the “Advocacy NGOs Networks for Sustainable Use of Energy and Natural Resources
in the Western Balkans and Turkey, ETNAR” project. The main objective of the project
is to increase the capacity of NGOs in the Western Balkans and Turkey to influence the
EU environmental approximation process through public advocacy supported by the
public.
The aim of the paper is to provide CSOs in the region with basic information about the
potential for positive developments in our energy sector, civil society public advocacy
campaigns and to introduce the updated positions of the network to relevant institutions.
The report is primarily focused on the energy sectors of the “Western Balkans and Turkey”,
thus the energy sectors of the other countries of the SEE region which are already in the EU
are not covered, except for Croatia.
It is based on the previous position papers “Need for a change” and “Time for a change”
produced in 2014 and 2012 respectively.
INTRODUCTION
The energy sectors of the countries in South East Europe are transforming at the moment of great geopolitical uncertainties. Several powerful driving forces are, often chaotically, influencing that transition:
1. Systemic change from an old centralised fossil fuel-based energy system to a much more decentralised energy system based on renewables, efficiency, and flexibility;
2. Market driven reform within the EU enlargement process
3. Efforts to maintain the status quo by existing monopolies and energy importers.
As we stressed in the previous position papers, countries in the region, clearly rich in renewable energy potential, have been suffering from development gridlock for a number of years, pushing societies in the region to the brink of a social meltdown. Governments in the region, unable and unwilling to undertake the necessary reforms of energy monopolies, and lacking a vision of productive development, are trying to stick to the old energy business models.
To the casual observer, energy policy in the region often seems to consist merely of a dilemma between Chinese coal power plants, Russian nuclear power plants, or German wind farms. The idea that local and national governments are able to develop energy policies in favour of the public interest, based on locally owned production capacities, and the self-confidence of societies to push this vision forward, seems lost.
In the absence of a strong progressive local business and expert community, the civil sector in the region, especially environmental CSOs or NGOs, are major advocates of new sustainable energy policies based on increased use of renewable energy and energy efficiency. In the years to come it will be more and more important to influence the way in which renewable energy technologies are implemented. If we would like to have a positive development effect of new technologies, it will be crucial to ensure that as large an ownership share of new capacities as possible remains within local communities. To achieve that influence, environmental NGOs will need to develop new alliances and promote new forms of business models, for example energy cooperatives.
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CONTENT
1. SEENET’s vision and recommendations to policy makers
2. Context analysis – regional legislative and policy initiatives 2.1. EU enlargement and the so-called “Berlin process”
2.2. Energy community
3. Overview of country situations 3.1. Albania
3.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.3. Croatia
3.4. Kosovo
3.5. Macedonia
3.6. Montenegro
3.7. Serbia
3.8. Turkey
4. About ETNAR project 5. About SEENET network Contacts Impressum
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SEENET shares a vision of a prosperous South East Europe in which fossil and nuclear fuels – mostly imported – have been phased out before mid-century, and replaced by locally owned and managed renewable energy sources, creating environmentally and socially sustainable energy and transport sectors. Due to the rich local resources – both natural and human – for such a transformation, the region has become a showcase for the transition of these sectors to sustainable ones.
In order to achieve this, we urge the responsible institutions in the region to implement the following recommendations in the future strategies, laws and decisions, from the local to the EU level. We demand that the public, civil society and experts must be actively and substantially involved right from the beginning of the related processes.
We call for 100% renewable, decentralised, locally produced and locally owned energy in our region by 2050 at the latest. We oppose investments in any new coal related projects (mining, power plants), the development and utilisation of nuclear energy, and hydropower projects in protected areas, future Natura 2000 areas, or other areas of high biodiversity value, and projects that conflict with the Water Framework Directive.
In order to achieve this, the following are urgently needed:
• Removal of administrative, institutional and technical barriers for sustainable energy solutions, and improvement of support policies and financial incentives, especially for small scale energy efficiency, solar thermal and biomass (subject to strict sustainability criteria)
SEENET’s VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY MAKERS
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• Ensuring strong promotional campaigns in the national media and implementation of large scale training programmes for planning, installing and maintaining sustainable energy solutions
• Supporting local municipalities in the development of sustainable energy plans and assessment of local RES potential
• Assisting local communities for the implementation of RES projects under their ownership
• Development of national sustainability criteria for renewable energy. This is especially important in the case of hydropower and biomass, but also wind.
• Revision of current energy plans in order to ensure that all investments in the energy sector are in line with the long term EU energy and climate goals and obligations
We recommend to the Energy Community to explore the full potentials of the region for energy savings and energy production, in line with the resource efficiency and climate goals of EU, and incorporate them in the regional strategy.
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There are several policy initiatives which have impacts on the reform and development of the legislative and institutional framework in which the energy sectors of SEE are operating, and on the role of CSOs in those developments. In recent times, we believe two of them are the most influential: EU enlargement process with the so-called „Berlin process“, and Energy Community.
2.1. EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE SO-CALLED „BERLIN PROCESS“
EU enlargementExperience from previous rounds of EU enlargement clearly suggest that this process strongly influences candidate countries’ policies and institutional developments, including energy sector regulations and the role of CSOs in policy development. Despite lowering priority to the current round of enlargement, all SEE countries share strong nominal political commitment to joining the EU, and it is safe to presume that the political goal is among the main driving forces in the
CONTEXT ANALYSIS – REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY INITIATIVES
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reforms of the energy sectors in the region. CSOs are often critical of the fact that many reforms are artificial and that many documents and institutions are developed just to fulfil formal requirements, but on the other hand, it is easy to imagine much worse political developments in the absence of the appeal of EU membership.
According to the EU Enlargement Strategy1, which “sets out an overarching medium-term strategy for EU enlargement policy“, several points relevant to the energy reform and the role of CSOs in it are important, namely:
• “Enlargement policy remains focused on the ‘fundamentals first’ principle. Core issues of the rule of law, fundamental rights, strengthening democratic institutions, including public administration reform, as well as economic development and competitiveness remain key priorities in the enlargement process. These issues reflect the importance the EU attaches to its core values and general policy priorities.“
• “A stronger role for civil society organisations and a much more supportive and enabling environment to foster their development is needed in the enlargement countries.
1 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf
This is necessary in order to enhance political accountability and promote deeper understanding of accession related reforms“
• “A selection of priority projects among the already agreed 35 Projects of Energy Community Interest (PECI) was also identified, notably power interconnectors. In addition, the countries have agreed to take steps to establish a regional electricity market. Measures that will allow results to be achieved also in the short term include ensuring full compliance with existing legal requirements under the Energy Community Treaty, including in the fields of unbundling, third party access, and strengthening regulatory independence.“
• “As regards climate change, aspiring Member States will need to carry out significant reforms consistent with the EU2030 framework for climate and energy policies and implement their international climate commitments.“
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The Berlin Process This is a political initiative which aims to „reaffirm the region’s EU perspective by improving cooperation and economic stability within it“2. It started in 2014 with the Conference of Western Balkan States held in Berlin, and yearly high-level meetings between the six Western Balkan governments and several EU Member States which serve as a political forum for adoption of relevant declarations affecting energy and environment policies in WB6 countries. From a sustainability point of view, the two most relevant documents adopted are the Regional Electricity Roadmap and the Sustainability Charter.
The Regional Electricity Roadmap, among other, calls for: “The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding of the WB6 on regional electricity market development (MoU) constitutes the basis for further regional market integration; it is a positive signal in the right direction. A central element is now how to continue national reform and regional market integration efforts, and to allow integration of the South East Europe (SEE) markets into the
2 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586602
pan-European electricity market.”
“Regional power trading is also a precondition to organise electricity markets in a more environmentally-friendly manner. Aggregating generation and demand over larger trading regions will become a key condition for integrating energy from water, wind and sun. Expanding renewables in small isolated markets would require considerable investment into backup generation, which would further increase costs for customers. All of this market integration will also enhance security of supply.”
The Sustainability Charter3 highlights:“In order to improve prosperity, health and jobs (especially in small and medium enterprises), cleaner environment and transition towards the low-carbon and climate-resilient development, the Western Balkan 6 countries agree to tap into their high potential for energy savings and renewable energy generation. This will also help the countries meet their commitments made at the December COP-21 summit.”
“We, the WB6 countries pledge also our highest
3 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586602
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political commitment to implement the reform measures required, and give the assurance that we will allocate the necessary resources needed to match the EU contribution.”
“By the signing up to these commitments, the WB6 countries commit to efforts to increase the sustainability of national and regional energy markets as well as their generation and consumption patterns, while the ongoing efforts to reform and integrate electricity markets will be stepped up at the same time. In line with the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, this Declaration defines the steps for implementing an enhanced agenda leading to energy efficiency improvements and larger use of renewable energy in the region.”
The following three conditions will help to develop a more sustainable energy sector:1. Each WB6 country will enhance its framework
for promoting energy efficiency by means of:
• Removing legal and regulatory barriers through amending or developing new legislation that will enable and promote ESCO (“energy service companies”) contracts, and with this, developing energy services markets (by June 2017);
• - Fully implementing the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive, especially in the area of setting minimum energy performance standards as a prerequisite for large-scale buildings rehabilitation programmes (by June 2017);
• - Establishing well-targeted programmes for public and residential buildings rehabilitation to the minimum energy performance and beyond, with particular focus on increasing the use of locally available renewable energy sources (decentralized solar-thermal heating, efficient biomass heating, high-efficient heat pumps etc.) (March 2018);
• - Assessing in details the possibilities for developing new or converting existing district or central heating and cooling systems using renewable energy, such as biomass or geothermal (November 2018);
• - Analysing the establishment of appropriate financing mechanisms, including, if feasible, a state level fund for co-financing of energy efficiency measures resulting from the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU especially in the public sector (by June 2018).
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2. Each WB6 country will develop and implement smart support measures aimed at improving the sustainability of their energy systems by means of:
• Designing and implementing market based support schemes for the promotion of renewable energy, where needed, therefore ensuring a more cost-effective renewable energy deployment compliant with the Energy Community Rules (June 2017);
• Developing effective strategies enabling the voluntary participation and engagement of citizens in renewable energy projects (June 2018);
• Developing suitable information, awareness-raising, guidance in order to inform citizens of the benefits and practicalities of developing and using energy from renewable sources (June 2018);
• Including energy efficiency and use of renewable resources in the curriculum in education and offering professional training (June 2019);
• Developing a strategy for the collection and use of municipal waste for electricity and heat generation, in both public and private sectors (November 2018);
• Developing national skills and qualifications for small and medium enterprises / individuals to do business in the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy (building assessors, energy auditors, installers etc.), by setting up qualification/accreditation/ or certification schemes (June 2018).
3. Each WB6 country will continue working towards the implementation of robust domestic greenhouse gas emissions monitoring and reporting systems in line with EU legislation and improve transparency in sustainable energy markets by:
• Reviewing the national greenhouse gas emissions monitoring and reporting systems with a view to align with the Regulation (EU) No 525/2013;
• Identifying gaps between current practices in monitoring, reporting and planning on climate and energy policies domestically and meeting the international reporting obligations;
• Establishing national indicative roadmaps for implementing measures required to increase investor confidence in sustainable energy markets;
• Strengthening the capacity of national CO
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administrative authorities to oversee and govern the national and regional sustainable energy markets in an independent, proactive and transparent manner. “
2.2. ENERGY COMMUNITY
The Energy Community is an international organisation established by the Energy Community Treaty in 2005, which “brings together the European Union and its neighbours to create an integrated pan-European energy market”4. In addition to the EU, currently the neighbouring states involved, or officially “Contracting Parties to the Treaty”, are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia (accepted in October 2016). What is especially relevant for the energy transition in the region is the fact that member states of the Energy Community commit themselves to, among other things, implement selected pieces of the relevant existing EU energy and environment legislation and develop an adequate regulatory framework for its implementation.
CSOs from SEE and the EU monitor the development of the Energy Community, in order to ensure appropriate implementation of environmental standards of the EU, see for example “Recommendations regarding the Reform of the Energy Community Treaty“(1), and more and more
4 www. energy-community.org
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frequently use the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which is a complaints body administered by the Energy Community Secretariat ensuring the implementation of the required legislation by the Contracting Parties, see press release “Lawsuits and official complaints pile up against planned Bosnia and Herzegovina coal power plants”5.
An important expansion of the environmental and climate dimension of the Energy Community happened at the 14th Ministerial Council, its main decision body, in October 2016. The Council adopted four decisions expanding the current environmental acquis with an update of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and the Sulphur in Fuels Directive to ensure the application of their latest versions in the Energy Community and the introduction of two new directives – the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive and the Environmental Liability Directive to the extent they relate to energy. As a first step towards its full application in the Energy Community, the Ministerial Council also adopted a non-binding recommendation on the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions.
5 http://bankwatch.org/news-media/for-journalists/press-releases/lawsuits-and-complaints-pile-against-planned-bosnia-and-he
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3.1. ALBANIA
Albania generates almost 100% of its electricity from hydroelectric power. The only thermal power plant existing in Albania, in Vlora, with a capacity of 98 MW, is not working due to a serious mistake (to put it mildly) made by the decision makers of Albania and the World Bank from an economic and environmental point of view. Solar energy is seeing a boom, in terms of hot water heating systems. In 2014 a 1 MW solar photovoltaic plant was constructed to serve in the cleaning of waste water in Korca, and there are also several small plants across the country for provision of electricity in small buildings, mainly for tourism, as well as some photovoltaic cells used for the lighting of roads. The possibility of using the gas that is expected to transit through Albania by the TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline) is also discussed, but this is still uncertain. There is a slight tendency to reduce imports and increase the export of energy from Albania. Due to the pressure from environmental groups, particularly the group “Protect the rivers” (in which OAA is active), it is
not likely to continue with the project of building 400 small hydropower plants, as those which have been built are causing many negative social and environmental impacts. The government has refused to give permits for most of them, due to the lack of adequate documentation. It is possible that solar and other renewable energies will take their rightful place and enable national energy production which is completely based on renewable energy.
Wind energy constitutes a potential opportunity for power production in Albania. The major problem for establishing wind power plants is the lack of consecutive measurements of velocity and duration of the wind. Consequently, various companies interested to invest in this sector should first make an assessment of the records on wind velocity and duration. There are, however, attractive areas identified in Albania in this respect, such as Shkodra (Velipoja, Has), Lezha (Ishull Shengjin, Tale, Balldre), Durres (Ishem, P. Romano), Fier (Karavasta, Hoxhara 1, Hoxhara 2), Vlore (Akerni), Tepelena, Korça, Kukesi and Saranda. The main directions
OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES
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of wind in Albania are northwest-southeast and southwest-northeast with the dominant direction towards the land. The country’s coastline is 345 km long from north to south, and a part of it is coastal lowlands. In the south, mountains come very close to the coast. On land, the directions and intensity of wind vary in time and from spot to spot.
The use of solar energy for hot water production has been extended in Albania. Of particular interest is the use of solar energy in Shkodra, Durres, Fier, Vlora, Saranda, etc., as these are the regions with a high annual radiation and higher economic opportunities. Albania displays a substantial solar energy potential, with solar radiation exceeding 1,500 kWh/m2 per year, whereas the minimum and maximum radiation values range from 1,185 to 1,700 kWh/m2 per year.
Civil society stopped 3 new waste incinerators!Recently many civil society groups and particularly the AKIP (The Alliance Against the Import of Waste), where OAA is in the leadership of the movement, have strongly opposed the aim of the government to approve a law on importing waste, seemingly to incinerate the waste for energy production. Due to several massive protests the Law on Waste Import, which was approved by the Parliament,
was sent back to Parliament by the President of the Republic. AKIP is systemically active on social media on the issue and is ready for a massive protest if the decree of the President is voted on in the Parliamentary Plenary. Also, the plans for 3 other incinerators which were planned or approved to be constructed in Albania have been stopped. It is highly unlikely that the government will go further with the plan to develop incineration of waste based on imports in Albania. This is definitely a success story of environmentalism in Albania.
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3.2. BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
For the last 20 years little has been done in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s energy systems when it comes to facing and answering the challenges of today’s reality – a disrupted climate, extreme pressure on its dwindling natural resources and a global move against harmful fossil fuels – towards renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. When it comes to electricity production, BiH is still heavily reliant (more than 60%) on its ageing coal fleet, with plans for numerous new ones, even though the country does not have an energy strategy. Making matters worse is the fact that these power plants use lignite, the dirtiest and most CO2-intensive type of coal. The remainder of electricity is produced mainly from hydropower plants, again with new ones being planned at an unsustainable rate, often with insufficient legal procedures, especially when it comes to public participation and environmental permitting. With the energy sector being one of the key pillars for any country and its society, it is clear that such developments are unacceptable and unsustainable (e.g. such a huge development in coal generated plants is not compatible with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU aspirations, since the EU’s energy sector will be virtually carbon neutral by 2050). Therefore, the civil society is heavily involved
in the matter and is using all sorts of venues to address the issues and bring them to the attention of the public and relevant stakeholders, case by case and nationally, addressing issues such as new legislation and strategies.
Center for Environment – national campaign against dirty energyThe Stop prljavoj energiji, jer budućnost je obnovljiva (Stop dirty energy - because the future is renewable) campaign has been running since 2013. The campaign’s goal is to stop all new coal plants from being built, and instead to fight for an increase in energy efficiency as well as development of renewable energy sources. The campaign has been taking place on all levels, including public awareness-raising through media, activist stunts, development of analyses and animated videos. The analyses are used to develop, with expert aid, argumentation regarding environmental, health, economic and energy security, which clearly shows just how harmful coal powered energy really is, once all the externalities are shown. As well as campaigning, Center for Environment has used a variety of legal tools to stop or slow down coal projects, or make sure the environmental standards of the projects are up to date to the latest EU and Energy Community standards. One of the legal O
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procedures that CfE started was the first ever civil society complaint towards the Energy Community Secretariat, based in Vienna. The EnCom is a very strong stakeholder in the energy sector in the SEE region because it is an instrument through which a number of EU directives are being introduced in the region, as preparation for EU accession. The complaint was lodged after CfE publicly announced that the environmental permit for the Stanari power plant is not in line with EU Directives. The complaint ended with a partial but a very important victory for CfE and the environment – the Republic of Srpska Ministry of Spatial Planning, Civil Engineering and Environment was instructed to update its legislation related to emissions levels from coal power plants, making them stricter. CfE continues its campaign for a renewable energy future in BiH, including its demands for a state-wide energy strategy based on energy efficiency and renewables.
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3.3. CROATIA
S.O.S. Adriatic – the Croatian public defended the Adriatic Sea from oil companies!In 2013 the Croatian Government announced its plans to open the Croatian part of the Adriatic for oil and gas exploration and exploitation. The Adriatic was divided into 29 exploration blocks and 10 of them were given in concessions to oil companies OMV, Marathon Oil, ENI and INA on 1st January 2015. The contracts were supposed to be signed before 1st April according to the Hydrocarbons Exploration and Exploitation Act.
National coalition named “S.O.S. Adriatic” was formed in January 2015. The coalition was led by national CSOs from Green Forum – Zelena akcija, Sunce, Zelena Istra, Žmergo, BIOM – and Greenpeace and WWF.
The coalition had short-term and long-term goals. The short-term goal was to stop the signing of the contracts with the oil companies, and at the same time to raise public awareness about this project as there was strong and active propaganda from the government claiming that Croatia would become a “small Norway”, and that this project would bring wealth and prosperity to local communities and O
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the whole country. The long-term goal is stopping oil drilling in the whole Adriatic Sea while ensuring proper protection of this sensitive ecosystem.
One of the strongest arguments in our campaign was that local communities and citizens were not consulted on their opinion about this project and what kind of future they want. For this reason, we demanded a national referendum about oil exploration in the Adriatic.
Communities along the coast are fully dependent on this ecosystem for fisheries, agriculture and tourism which in 2015 contributed around 20% to the national GDP. Furthermore, such a dirty energy project is not compatible with trying to tackle the current climate crisis and transitioning to a post-fossil fuel future.
After almost two years of active campaigning against the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in the Adriatic Sea, the S.O.S. Adriatic campaign declared victory. The (now ex) Croatian Government admitted what we have been saying for a long time – there is no place here for this environmentally and economically harmful project.
The victory came after many activities and developments within the campaign. Firstly, public opinion shifted greatly in one year from being in favour of the project to opposing it – for example 60% of citizens of Dalmatia were against this
project. We managed to postpone the signing of the contracts, which was then followed by the decision of Marathon Oil and OMV – the two oil companies with the biggest number of concessions – to withdraw from the project in July 2015.
Friends of the Earth International and Greenpeace International – including their affiliated groups in Austria, Italy and Slovenia – provided important international support. Many public figures, celebrities and local municipalities also actively opposed the project. The Government finally cancelled the plans for oil and gas drilling in the Adriatic, predominantly due to big public opposition.
After the national victory in Croatia, we formed a platform of organizations and local initiatives from countries around the Adriatic Sea with a clear goal of knowledge exchange, learning and supporting each other in our campaigning towards a fossil free Adriatic. Numerous activities have been carried out within the One Adriatic platform; a study visit in Italy during a national referendum against oil drilling; press conferences and Goletta Verde boat tour in Dubrovnik, Montenegro and Albania connecting our activities and supporting the anti-oil fights in these countries, while urging for no new oil platforms in the Adriatic.
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3.4. KOSOVO
Kosovo is facing huge challenges in its electricity sector. It is obliged to close the ageing Kosova A lignite plant in 2018 and the remaining capacity will not be able to meet the projected demands in the country. This gap between demand and supply is only exasperated by the inefficient use of electricity throughout the country, including large technical losses, usage of electricity for heating and the lack of meaningful energy efficiency improvements.
Currently, the vast majority of Kosovo’s energy comes from two old lignite plants. For more than a decade, the government of Kosovo has been attempting to resolve the energy crisis by building another coal-burning power plant while largely ignoring other elements that constitute this crisis and Kosovo’s potential for energy efficiency and renewable energy. The plans started as a 2100 MW plant that would turn the country into the leading energy exporter for the Balkans. However, due to lack of investors and resistance from civil society the project has gradually shrunk and is now planned to be 500 MW. The project has been plagued by a lack of transparency and numerous irregularities in the tender procedure, which were heavily criticized by civil society6. Currently, the Kosovo Government
6 http://kosid.org/en/news/88
has chosen US company ContourGlobal (the only bidder in the process) as the preferred bidder but there has been silence about the details of the project since December 2015 and it is not clear what is happening.
The coal project Kosova e Re, which is the main feature in Kosovo’s Energy Strategy, is expensive, unsustainable, inadequate and, most importantly, unnecessary. A study by IEEFA has shown that a new power plant in Kosovo would increase the overall price of electricity by at least 33.8% and by as much as 50%7.
Moreover, Kosovo as a signatory member of the Energy Community Treaty is obliged to meet the target of 25% energy from renewable sources by 2020.8 However, it is far behind in this goal and constructing another coal plant will take it even further from this target.
The RES targets are planned to be achieved mostly with new small hydropower plants and the planned Zhur large hydropower plant. Smaller amounts of wind, biomass and, lastly, solar energy are planned - 150 MW of wind power; 10 MW of photovoltaic energy and 14 MW of biomass energy. The installed
7 http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/The-Proposed-New-Kosovo-Power-Plant_-Jan-2016.pdf8 DecisionoftheCouncilofMinistersof Energy Community D/2012/04/MC-EnC for implementationofDirective 2009/28/EC
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capacities of thermal energy by 2020 are expected to be: 10 MW of geothermal energy; 70 MW of solar energy and 264.5 ktoe of the energy from firewood biomass.
In order to fulfil these targets, Kosovo’s Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) has drafted a support scheme which sets application criteria. In 2015, 27 renewable energy producers were admitted to the support scheme which shows that the recent amendments to the system have made it more attractive to promote renewable energy development.
3.5. MACEDONIA
Electricity sector overviewElectricity production in the Republic of Macedonia is mainly based on coal (lignite) with a relatively low quality. Around 80% of the locally generated electrical energy comes from coal-fired thermal power plants: The Bitola Mining and Energy Complex (REK Bitola) and the Oslomej Mining and Energy Complex (REK Oslomej), whereas the remaining 20% are mainly generated through hydropower. Recent attempts to build additional hydropower plants in the Mavrovo National Park have been subject to successful civil society
campaigns. An insignificant share of electric energy is generated by the so-called new renewable energy resources such as solar, wind, geothermal and biomass waste energy. With regards to the fact that the European Union plans 80-95% greenhouse gas reductions by 2050 and for the energy sector to be virtually fossil-fuel-free, the 20% usage of generated electricity from renewable energy resources will be insufficient for the Macedonian energy sector to comply with the European energy practices if it is not increased significantly.
Energy Development Strategy in the Republic of MacedoniaThe National Energy Development Strategy, currently being revised, does not envisage measures for essential change in the energy sector by which Macedonia would align with the EU directions for so-called decarbonisation. In fact, the Strategy envisages the energy sector to remain coal–based at least until 2035 (the Strategy covers the period between 2015-2035), despite the fact that it means that coal would be imported once the domestic resources (relatively small) are exploited. Coal imports in no way contribute to energy independence. The Strategy disproves the thesis that the Macedonian long-term energy security is based on domestic lignite. Moreover, a new coal- O
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fired thermal power plant is envisaged to be built, even though there won’t be sufficient domestic coal for the period of its working life (25-60 years) which would significantly contribute to the extended coal dependence, while such a tendency is being avoided in the developed countries.
In the strategy, energy efficiency is planned to reach an unambitious 9% increase until 2018, in compliance with Energy Community Treaty requirements. However, it has not been taken into account that the Energy Community already adopted the Energy Efficiency Directive and its 20% by 2020 target in 2015. If Macedonia does not move very fast indeed it will be in non-compliance with its Energy Community obligations, and the low energy efficiency situation may be one of the problems the Republic of Macedonia will face during the negotiations for EU membership.
With regards to the energy efficiency, one of the problems is not having an Energy Efficiency Fund, which has still not been implemented despite the fact that it was envisaged in the prior version of the Strategy. Such a fund is necessary to offer the opportunity for energy-efficiency home improvements, because the so-called “green” credits currently offered by the banks are rather inconvenient and do not stimulate households to improve the energy performance of their homes.
According to the “Calculator 2050”(1) model data,
with an average renovation rate of 2.5% annually in the period between 2020 and 2050, an adequate decrease of 80% in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) until 2050 can be achieved.
Unfortunately, the Strategy takes climate change and the GHG emissions into consideration only to a very small degree and only declaratively. It does not envisage measures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, despite the fact that the energy sector is the largest contributor to GHG emissions in the Republic of Macedonia (2).
Apart from GHG emissions, in recent years high air pollution with tiny particles smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10) has become a major problem, and the greatest contributor is the energy sector. However, the MARKAL energy model used for presumption modelling in the Strategy does not take into consideration emissions and their impacts on people’s health nor on the economy, for instance in agriculture.
It is also noticeable that in the Strategy there is an absence of innovative solutions, such as passive house stimulation; solutions for waste biomass collection for energy production; decentralized, local electrical energy production and the like. In addition, there is an absence of technological development and innovation stimulation for fulfilling energy needs.
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Recommendations from MK civil society The recommendations of the civil sector to the Macedonian government regarding these issues have been consulted among wider civil organizations on various occasions and are as follows:
• Provide a legal framework for compulsory participation of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia in adoption of the Energy Development Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia;
• Ensure participation of the civil sector and the public in all of the drawing up, adoption and monitoring of the Strategy phases;
• Make sure that the Strategy has a clear vision with fuel defining alternatives and electric energy distribution;
• Apply the “Calculator 2050” as an additional model in drawing up of the Strategy;
• Decrease the share of coal in the energy mix;
• Envisage measures for the increase of solar and wind energy exploitation, with or without using feed in tariffs;
• Envisage measures for the increase of solar collector exploitation for hot water;
• Envisage means of stimulation for finding innovative solutions and new technologies for energy production and saving;
• Envisage concrete measures for adaptation to climate change, outside the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, which so far have proven to be ineffective;
• Adopt and comply with “no-go zones” for construction of energy infrastructural facilities, especially in protected areas (national parks, natural parks and the like);
• Adopt special mechanisms and means for financing measures for management of air pollution by the energy sector.
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3.6. MONTENEGRO
Green Home informing and mobilizing the public against offshore oil and gas projectsThe Government of Montenegro announced an oil and gas exploration tender in Montenegro in July 2013. Between then and the beginning of 2016 the Government of Montenegro did not do anything to inform or consult the public about the project, especially those living in the coastal municipalities who make money from tourism. In early February 2016 the NGO Green Home in cooperation with CEDEM began surveying public opinion about the Government’s plan for exploration and production of oil and gas on the Montenegrin coast. Surveys were conducted in three coastal municipalities: Bar, Budva and Ulcinj. The surveys showed that citizens do not know basic information about the program of oil and gas exploration. More than two-thirds of respondents had not heard or understood what the project entails. When it comes to the risk of oil spills, 46% think that there is a high risk that something like this would happen, 29% of them think that the risk is low and 4% thinks that there is no risk, while 20% of them do not have an answer. Non-governmental organizations therefore decided to inform the public about this project themselves. Green Home
organized a press conference as an initial activity in cooperation with anti-corruption NGO MANS and Zelena akcija (Croatia). Besides the initial activities in Montenegro, Green Home also joined the coalition One Adriatic and gained support to push for a referendum in which the public would decide whether they are for or against this project.
After a series of media reactions and appearances of NGO representatives, as well as actions and performances about oil and gas exploration organized in the coastal municipalities in Montenegro, citizens of Ulcinj, Bar and Budva became more vocal and asked why no public hearing was carried out in Ulcinj, where the first wells were supposed to be set up. According to the Government’s plan, four blocks in the municipality of Ulcinj were given under concession to the Italian-Russian consortium ENI-Novatek without even informing the people of Ulcinj about it. According to the plan of public debates, no consultation was even planned in the city. After Green Home reacted and interacted with the public, the residents of Ulcinj protested publicly against oil and gas exploration and started emphasizing the importance of informing the citizens of the municipality about such a major project. The residents of Ulcinj interested in this project attended the public debate carried out in Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, since no public debate was carried out in Ulcinj.
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As well as successfully informing and mobilizing the public to participate in public discussions on this project, another success of our campaign was that the Government of Montenegro withdrew from the original intention to set oil platforms 3 km away from the coast. After our comments and media response, the Government changed the plan and stipulated that oil platforms are to be set 10 km away from the coast.
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3.7. SERBIA
Serbia is facing one of the biggest economic, social and environmental downturns since World War II. Every year Serbia loses about 35,000 citizens due to negative natural increase of the population and about 30-40,000 of people migrating (mostly long-term) to the West. Poverty levels and average income per citizen are on the level of the 1960s and industrial production is on the level of Serbia’s early industrialisation of the early 1960s. Whole parts of Serbia are becoming depopulated mostly due to weak energy, transport and other infrastructure.
Such a grim perspective can be improved exclusively by significantly changing from centrally-controlled natural and economical resources, concentrated in few hands, to regionally and locally controlled resources and infrastructure that would support a stable population, opening of local perspectives and better incorporate such locally owned infrastructure into the natural environment.
The energy sector of Serbia is suffering from number of long-term structural imbalances with detrimental social, environmentally and economically consequences. This disbalance was established in the period of high industrial development in the period 1970-1990.
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high as possible availability of domestic electricity, produced in as large as possible generation capacities with full control by the state and designed as a fully centralised system. Despite such an explosive development of electricity generation from 1970 to 1990, Serbia did not appropriate the most important technologies in coal production or electricity generation, leading to high import exposure for these technologies.
Serbia’s energy sector mostly relies on fossil fuels. Most of these resources are imported, causing both significant macro economical disbalance and pollution. The most significant domestically available fossil fuel is lignite (up to 7500 kJ/kg with high percentages of sulphur).
According to independent estimations conducted together with CEKOR, about 60%-70%9 of the price earned from coal should be considered as imports since Serbia and its state-owned electricity generation company (EPS) are actually importing all the necessary supplies for both mining and electricity generation.
As pointed out in a study about the real costs of electricity, the Serbian system calculates its costs at about 2.4 Eurocents without taking into
9 http://www.cekor.org/documents/pages/530_3.pdf, additionalestimationsabouttherealcostsofcoalproductionin SerbiaandothercountriesinSouth East Europe.
consideration any external costs10 thus leading to perpetuation of damaging energy system structure.
Without proper internalisation of the costs of health and environmental impacts as well as, technology import dependence etc. it will be impossible to solve the problem.
Such an approach has led to the construction of about 4 GW of lignite fired power plants and about 2.93 GW of mostly large hydropower plants and about 6.7 GW of installed capacity in district heating systems in 57 cities and municipalities in Serbia11. Since these facilities were built there has been a significant shift in the consumption structure from prevalently industrial in the early 1970s to about two thirds for households and services in 2016. In conjunction with political centralisation, a growing phenomenon of state capture and the corrupt privatisations of the 1990s, and a downturn of industrial activities to below 35% of that in 1990, this has led to:
a) Serious lack of capital for investment in new, modern and sustainable energy capacity (growing negative impacts on environment and health of overall population of Serbia) especially due to the artificially low price of
10 http://www.sogde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/brnabic_20_02_15.pdf, page 9411 http://www.pks.rs/PrivredaSrbije.aspx?id=6
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electricity that does not reflect exposure to imported technologies, pollution, social impacts (both pollution and resettlement issues), or relatively high losses in the transmission and distribution networks
b) Political manipulation and capture of public interest by political/technocratic and economical elites
c) More than 60% of citizens are considered energy poor despite one of the lowest tariffs for electricity in the whole Europe.
Decision-making on both the strategic and project level is taking place undemocratically and pressure is put on the affected communities who try to exercise their rights. With its connected external financial and industrial monopolies (and cartels) in providing guaranteed and long-term illicit profits, social pressure of elites against communities affected by coal production and consumption to give up on their rights for the sake of illegal profits of both domestic and foreign business and political (both private and public companies) interests.
Hydropower represents about 25-35% of Serbian annual production (depending on the hydrological situation) and historically it was the first serious Serbian success in providing domestic electricity in sufficient amounts. Major penetration of
hydropower took place during the World War II period of renewal and industrialisation of Serbia (and the whole former socialist Yugoslavia), and it enjoyed strong institutional and financial support through the whole period until the 1960s when the second generation of hydropower projects was commenced.
The major reason why hydropower did not keep its primacy was because of seasonal changes in the availability of water. Therefore already in the 1960s multilateral development banks such as the World Bank supported the idea that Serbia and other countries in the region should develop large quantities of constantly available energy, coal, gas and nuclear energy resources. During that period significant pumped storage plants were constructed, but there are still remaining potentials for the construction of such capacities that could serve as a significant alternative to the new coal power plants that are planned in Serbia.
Other forms of sustainable and decarbonised energy generation capacities are right at the beginning in Serbia, heavily opposed by national authorities and EPS as too expensive, not stable, and jeopardising the national energy system. The establishment of quotas for solar and wind energy in Serbia has led to serious problems for any small interested producers since quotas are being filled by companies and rich individuals who have close ties O
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to the authorities, thus solar and wind have become new generators of corruption. This shows that new technology as such has no potential to seriously tackle a problematic economical and social system or to seriously decrease energy poverty if that energy is not coupled with serious restructuring of decision-making and democratisation at both the strategic and project level.
CEKOR supporting local communities to mitigate impacts of lignite mining in 2016CEKOR’s support to local communities, which include helping to organise the protest in front of the Lazarevac city hall regarding a public debate, public presentation of a socio-economic study on resettlement in Drmno, among other activities, resulted in local communities’ mobilization and attention of decision makers and the media to the problems in villages impacted by the energy sector.
Drmno village is surrounded from three sides by coal mines, and is located 100-200 meters from Kostolac coal open mine pits.
In 2015, CEKOR conducted a survey and socio-economic study in Drmno village impacted by coal mining, collecting evidence from people on their health and property conditions and violations of
those rights, in order to support impacted people in their efforts to be resettled before the Drmno mine expands its operations.
More than 500 citizens (out of a total of 630 adults) of Drmno gave their signatures demanding resettlement and more than 50 people signed authorization for CEKOR to represent them and ask for resettlement from national and international institutions.
The data received from the survey on residents’ health status is alarming – four out of five households (80%) had one or more members with chronic and/or frequent illnesses. All the respondents (except for one) agreed that the proximity of mine and the other activities of the Kostolac power plant and mine have caused adverse health effects in its inhabitants.
We gathered a hundred of people in Drmno and presented them a study by sociologist Prof. Dr. Ksenija Petovar. The significance of this study is that it shows that the Public Enterprise Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) cannot continue with its current practices and ignore the demands of the local people for fair and transparent resettlement and expropriation practice.
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Lessons from the Kolubara region used in Kostolac campaignAs part of joint advocacy efforts by CEKOR and Bankwatch towards the EBRD in the last four years, we have filed complaints to the EBRD’s independent Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM), and showed that EBRD breached its own environmental and social policy when approving a EUR 80 million loan to EPS to buy new mining equipment for the Kolubara lignite mine. The Bank’s failure to include the village of Vreoci in the project assessment and thus avoiding responsibility for the collective resettlement of 1180 households from Vreoci was a negative example.
CEKOR communicated further with the EBRD about its 2015 EUR 200 million loan for EPS restructuring. The loan aimed at refinancing expensive short-term debt that EPS had to take on to cover the costs of importing electricity following the flooding in 2014.
Due to our letters, an EBRD delegation came to visit impacted communities, especially those in Veliki Crljeni, Baroševac, Vreoci and Radljevo, and as a result of that, an important condition within the new loan was set: EPS is obliged to develop “an overall Resettlement Framework which will apply to all of its activities, including across the Kolubara mining basin”, while the EBRD will monitor the implementation of the plan. The EBRD also
requested that EPS carry out an environmental audit of each of its subsidiaries and develop action plans to address the issues that CEKOR raised.
We will continue to work to ensure that Drmno and other communities are consulted formally on the resettlement framework that EPS is preparing.
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3.8. Turkey
Energy policy in Turkey is dominated by concerns on security of supply, affordability and competitiveness of energy prices and employing low-carbon technologies for combating climate change, all of which pose numerous challenges and responsibilities to the country as a whole and in terms of climate change politics. Turkey, with its population over 75 million and GDP over 822 billion USD (current US$ in 2013) has increasing demand in terms of overall energy requirements alongside its macro plans for continued economic growth, where consuming more energy is seen as a means for supporting economic and social development in line with its overarching ideology of modernization and progress. Under the larger political economic narrative, the expression: “The most expensive source of energy is non-existent energy” still holds valid for many lead actors and institutions, both from the public and private sector; therefore, it is likely that the securitization of energy sources (both demand and supply sides) will continue to preoccupy the national agenda in the near future as well. This also has serious implications for climate policy.
Regarding the shares of the different sectors in overall greenhouse emissions, the energy sector has the largest share with 72.5%, followed by industrial processes and product use with 13.4%, agricultural
activities with 10.6% and the waste sector with 3.5%. The energy sector is the primary source of Turkey’s greenhouse gas emissions, since energy policy has been dominated by fossil fuel intensive policies. After the global economic crisis in 2007/2008, Turkey embraced a new coal exploration wave, in an attempt to reduce the country’s import dependence, which in turn has caused a significant budget deficit. This situation is best reflected in the negative trade deficit due to hydrocarbon imports, with the World Bank estimating Turkey’s 6% of GDP energy shortfall accounting for 58% of the trade deficit. The Turkish government has emphasized the use of domestic resources in order to push its “coal rush”, most notably due to the recently easing geopolitical tension with Russia, on which Turkey heavily depends for the import of hydrocarbons. As a part of its development plans Vision 2023 (the centennial of the modern Turkish Republic), the country wants to “increase its energy generation capacity to 120,000 MW”, by relying mostly on domestic potential, where fossil fuels (especially coal) will be an important contributor, along with nuclear, hydropower and renewables. According to the Ministry of Energy, Turkey will utilize all its fossil fuel potential (coal, oil and natural gas) until 2023, through a strategy of transferring coal mining sites to the private companies on condition that they construct and operate new thermal power plants and produce electricity.O
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Two main trends shape the energy strategy of Turkey:
1. Rapid increase in demand for primary energy and electricity;
2. Dependence on fossil fuel imports to meet this demand which leads to foreign trade imbalance in the national accounts.
Between 2005 and 2014, Turkey’s primary energy demand increased by an annual average of 3.7%. Fossil fuels make up for 90% of the total demand, while the shares of coal, oil and natural gas are roughly 29%, 29% and 32%, respectively. Hard coal and lignite account for 56% and 42% of the total coal demand, respectively. Turkey’s import dependency in primary energy stands at 75%. 98.6% of country’s natural gas, 93% of oil and 92% of hard coal consumption derives from imports. The annual average increase in electricity demand turned out to be 5.3% between 2005 and 2014. As of 2015, coal accounts for roughly 28% of the electricity mix (15% hard coal 13% lignite). Natural gas has the lion’s share, with 38% in 2014 – down from 48% the previous year. Shifting the balance of power towards domestic sources appears to be one of the ultimate targets of Turkey’s electricity supply strategy and policies. The plans suggest that the current installed capacity of 8.5 GW of lignite-fired power plants will increase to 18.5 GW. Accordingly, the share of coal in electricity generation will
almost double (from 32 billion kWh to 57 billion kWh) in 10 years. This is likely to cause a doubling in the greenhouse gas emissions due to electricity generation (already accounting for a quarter of the all greenhouse gas emissions in Turkey). That is, the emissions will rise from 110 million tonnes CO2eq to over 200 million tonnes of CO2eq per year. These new coal-fired power plants will lock the energy infrastructure of Turkey into a high-carbon density pathway for the next 40 years. The share of renewables (also including large dams) hovers around 30%, with sporadic falls to 20% in dry years, when hydropower plants underperform. According to IRENA (the International Renewable Energy Agency), as of mid-2015, 164 countries have at least one type of renewable energy target.
The renewables target of Turkey for 2023 is 30% of the electricity mix. Since 30% is roughly the current share of the renewables in the electricity mix, we could argue that the renewables target of Turkey for 2023 is to keep the share of renewables intact. This is arguably driven by the belief that the transmissions and distribution systems could suffer problems if the intermittent renewables exceed the existing share.
Other noteworthy targets for 2023, shaped predominantly by the twin objectives of reducing import dependency and meeting energy demand by continued reliance on base load technologies O
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are as follows:
• Increasing Turkey’s total installed capacity to 100,000 MW (from 60,000 MW),
• Increasing electricity production to 500 billion kWh from the current 268 billion kWh,
• Increasing the share of renewables to 30% from 7%,
• Mobilizing the thermal and hydropower potential,
• Raising the share of installed wind power capacity to 20 000 MW,
• Commissioning 600 MW geothermal potential and
• Commissioning 2 nuclear power plants: one planned in Akkuyu of 4 800 MW in southern
Turkey (contracted to Rosatom) and the other in Sinop of 4 480 MW in northern Turkey (contracted to consortium of Japanese Mitsubishi and French AREVA) and to start theconstruction of the third nuclear power plant (potentially near İğneada, in north-western Turkey, close to Bulgarian border).
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This publication is produced and published as an output of the ENTAR project, that has served to build capacity of CSOs in development of environmental policy and advocacy, in particular of strengthening the SEENET network.
“Advocacy NGOs Networks for Sustainable Use of Energy and Natural Resources in the Western Balkans and Turkey – ETNAR” is an EU funded project from the IPA civil society partnership framework programme, active from December 2012 to January 2017.
The main objective of the project is to increase the capacity of CSOs in the Western Balkans and Turkey to influence the EU environmental approximation process through public advocacy supported by citizens. We focus on strengthening the capacity of CSOs to provide analysis, advocacy and monitoring of key environmental reforms at regional and national levels with a special focus on energy, transport and natural resources. The main project activities are: policy analyses, position papers, thematic seminars and network meetings, regional and national conferences and trainings,
environmental law analysis and toolkits, educational seminars for young environmental leaders, national public advocacy campaigns and exchanges and cooperation with Friends of the Earth International and visits to relevant EU institutions and organisations.
Expected results are:
Strengthened regional policy networking of ECSOs on energy, transport and natural resources; Improved capacity of ECSOs in policy analysis, policy monitoring and public advocacy;
Increased legitimacy of ECSOs on energy, transport and natural resources policy development and enhanced dialogue with stakeholders (national governments, experts, business and media);
Improved networking among ECSOs from the WB and Turkey with EU-wide environmental networks and CSOs.
The project is coordinated by Zelena akcija – FoE Croatia. Project partners are CSOs from the region: Green Home from Montenegro, Center for Environment and Center for Ecology and Energy
ETNAR PROJECTE
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from BiH, CEKOR from Serbia, HenrichBöll Foundation from Germany, Friends of the Earth International from the Netherlands and Friends of the Earth Europe from Belgium. In the second
phase of the project (2015-2017) the new partners are: Organic Agriculture Association – OAA from Albania, DEM and Eco-Sense from Macedonia.
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South East Europe CSOs network on natural resources, energy, and transport – SEENET, was established in 2011 with the aim to coordinate work of advocacy CSOs in the Western Balkan region on energy and transport issues. In 2014 the scope of the network was expanded to include work on natural resources. The mission of the network is to provide a platform for co-operation of environmental CSOs on the regional level, and to mobilise other sectors of civil society in achieving our vision. Primarily through advocacy activities, our members will work on accelerating the transformation towards an environmentally and socially sustainable region.
In its vision the network wants to see: a prosperous South East Europe in which natural resources are managed in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner, and fossil fuels and nuclear energy have been phased out before mid-century.
SEENET MEMBERS
1. Zelena akcija/Friends of the Earth Croatia – Croatia
2. Front 21/42 – Macedonia
3. Center for Environment – Bosnia and Herzegovina
4. Eco-sense – Macedonia
5. Young Researchers of Serbia – Serbia
6. Center for Ecology and Sustainable
7. Development (CEKOR) – Serbia
8. Green Home – Montenegro
9. Ecologists’ Movement of Macedonia (DEM) – Macedonia
10. Proaktiva – Macedonia
11. EDEN Environmental Center – Albania
12. Eko Ibar – Serbia
SEENET NETWORK
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13. Eko element – Bosnia and Herzegovina
14. Ekotim – Bosnia and Herzegovina
15. Center for Education and Raising Awareness of Energy
16. Efficiency – Energis – Bosnia and Herzegovina
17. Eko Zadar – Croatia
18. School for survival – Serbia
19. Center for Ecology and Energy – Bosnia and Herzegovina
20. Brod Ecological Society – BED – Croatia
21. GeoecologicalCenter – GEC – Serbia
22. NGO Independent Cultural Association “Green Eye“ – Serbia
23. Institute for Environmental Policy – IEP – Albania
24. Organic Agriculture Association – OAA – Albania
25. Social Education & Environment Protection – SEEP – Albania
26. Omladinski kulturni centar Bosna art – Bosnia and Herzegovina
27. Center for karst and speleology – Bosnia and Herzegovina
28. Bird Protection and Study Society of Serbia – Serbia
29. LIR Evolution – Bosnia and Herzegovina
30. Sanus – Bosnia and Herzegovina
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CONTACTS
Zelena akcija / Friends of the Earth Croatia, Frankopanska 1, 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia; phone/fax: +385 1 4813 096; [email protected], www.zelena-akcija.hr
Friends of the Earth International, Nieuwe Looiersstraat 31, 1017VA Amsterdam, Netherlands; phone: +31 (0)20 6221369, fax: +31 20 639 2181; www.foei.org
Friends of the Earth Europe, Rue d-Edimbourg 26, 1050 Brussels, Belgium; phone: +32 (0) 2 893 1000, fax: +32 (0) 2 893 1035; [email protected], http://www.foeeurope.org
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Bosnia and Herzegovina, tel: +387 33 260 450, fax: +387 33 260 460; [email protected], www.ba.boell.org
Green Home, Dalmatinska 78, 81 000 Podgorica, Montenegro; phone: +382 20 609 375, fax: +382 20 609 376; [email protected], www.greenhome.co.me
Centre for Environment, Cara Lazara 24, 78 000 Banja Luka, Bosnia and Hercegovina; phone: + 387 51 433 140, fax:+ 387 51 433 142; [email protected], www.czzs.org
Centre for ecology and Energy Tuzla Bosnia and Hercegovina; phone: +387 35 249 310, fax: +387 35 249 311; [email protected], www.ekologija.ba
CEKOR – Centre for Ecology and Sustainable Development, Korzo 15/13, 24000 Subotica, Serbia; phone/fax: +381 24 523 191; [email protected], www.cekor.org
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This publication has been produced as a part of “Advocacy NGOs Networks for Sustainable Use of Energy and Natural Resources in the Western Balkans and Turkey – ETNAR”, EU funded project from the IPA CSP FP for Western Balkans and Turkey. The project is funded by the European Union, Government of the Republic of Croatia Office for Cooperation with NGOs and Heinrich BoellFundation. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Zelena akcija / Friends of the Earth Croatia and its project partners, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union or any other funder.
IMPRESSUM
Editor: Luka Tomac
Contributors: Toni Vidan, Igor Kalaba, Zvezdan Kalmar, Pippa Gallop, Jelena Marojević, Lavdosh Ferruni
Published by: Zelena akcija / Friends of the Earth Croatia
Design and print: ACT Printlab
Circulation: 1000
ISBN-10: 953-6214-47-4
ISBN-13: 978-953-6214-47-1
EAN: 9789536214471
This publication has been produced as a part of “Advocacy NGOs Networks for Sustainable Use of Energy and Natural Resources in the Western Balkans and Turkey – ETNAR”, EU funded project from the IPA CSP FP for Western Balkans and Turkey. The project is funded by the European Union, Government of the Republic of Croatia O�ce for Cooperation with NGOs and Heinrich BoellFundation. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Zelena akcija / Friends of the Earth Croatia and its project partners, and can in no way be taken to re�ect the views of the European Union or any other funder.
Government of the Republic of CroatiaO�ce for Cooperation with NGOs
